From  the  PRINCE  DE  JOINVILLE  (Frar^ois  d'Orleans). 

I  firmly  believe  that  your  book  will  live  as  a  true  and  able  record  of  one  of  the  most 
gigantic  and  stubborn  military  efforts.  .  .  .  For  me,  whose  fortune  it  was  to  be  as 
sociated  with  the  infancy  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  who  spent  so  many  happy 
days  in  the  field  with  her,  I  have  read  with  emotion  the  long  account  of  her  deeds, 
trials,  suffering,  and  final  success,  so  feelingly  told ;  and  I  thank  you  for  the  satis 
faction  I  experienced. 


From  HON.  WM.  H.  SEWARD. 


It  is  a  great  subject  you  undertook  in  writing  the  history  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac.  But  I  knew  your  ability  and  candor  so  well  as  to  feel  assured  you  would 
treat  the  great  theme  as  it  deserved.  In  this  I  have  not  been  disappointed,  for  I  dis 
cern  the  vastly  different  character  of  your  excellent  and  judicially  considered  History 
from  the  great  mass  of  ephemeral  productions  on  the  subject. 


From  PROF.  D.  H.  MAHAN,   late  Professor  of  Engineering  at  West  Point. 

Mr.  William  Swinton,  in  his  work,  "Campaigns  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac," 
has  not  only  shown  himself  the  worthy  Polybius  of  that  army,  but  has  placed  him 
self  on  a  level  with  our  best  modern  lay  military  historians. 


From  HENRY  WARD  BEECHER. 

If  any  one  will  know  the  mechanism  and  anatomy  of  battle,  let  him  read  our 
American  Napier,  William  S  win  ton. 


From  MAJOR-GENERAL  W.  S.  HANCOCK. 

I  have  read  your  "History  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,"  and  consider  it  the  most 
valuable  addition  to  the  military  criticism  of  the  War  that  has  yet  appeared  in 
print.  By  one  who  has  been  so  long  identified  with  that  army  as  myself  it  can  readily 
be  perceived  that  you  have  endeavored  to  write  the  truth.  [  may  add  that  I  believe 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac  has  been  fortunate  in  its  historian,  and  that  your  array  of 
facts  will  not  hereafter  be  surpassed  in  accuracy. 

From  MAJOR-GENERAL  W.  B.  FRANKLIN. 

It  tells  the  story  nearly  as  it  is  believed  to-day  by  the  honest  actors  in  the  scenes 
and  incidents  which  it  narrates.  It  is  a  matter  of  astonishment  to  me  that  you  have 
been  able  to  make  so  impartial  an  account. 

From  MAJOR-GENERAL  D.  N.  COUCH. 

You  have  put  forth  a  truthful  record — a  new  era  in  American  military  writers. 
a  You  need  not  fear  what  man  can  do  to  you." 


From  JEFFERSON  DAVIS. 
The  fairest  and  most  careful  of  the  Northern  writers  on  the  war. 


From  ALEXANDER  H.  STEPHENS. 

The  exciting  scenes  and  stirring  events  of  the  battle-fields  have  been  quite  graphically 
described  by  many  writers,  but  by  none  so  far,  as  I  have  seen,  with  greater  ability  or 
more  impartiality  than  by  Mr.  William  Swinton  in  his  two  works.  .  .  .  Upon  the 
whole  I  regard  these  two  works  from  his  pen  as  the  best  and  most  accurate  chronicle 
of  the  military  operations  which  he  undertook  to  describe  that  I  have  met  with  from 
any  quarter. 


NOTE  TO  THE  REISSUE. 


THIS  history  of  the  defeats  and  the  triumphs  of  that  great 
army  which,  for  four  years,  maintained  in  Virginia  the  cause 
of  the  Union  against  the  chief  armed  force  of  Secession  was 
first  published  in  1866. 

Though  meeting  a  favorable  reception  from  most  of  those 
best  qualified  to  judge  of  its  deserts,  the  book,  through  a  mis 
hap  of  publication,  ere  long  disappeared  from  "  the  market," 
and  for  more  than  a  decade  it  has  been  practically  unprocur 
able.  Still  there  has  been  all  the  while  a  demand  for  it  suffi 
cient  to  indicate  that  it  was  not  yet  quite  ready  to  go  into 
Time's  "  wallet  for  oblivion " ;  and  recently  things  have  so 
shaped  themselves  that  it  is  now  possible,  under  favorable  cir 
cumstances,  to  make  resuscitation  of  the  "  Army  of  the 
Potomac." 

In  preparing  the  book  for  reissue  I  have  taken  occasion  to 
make  correction  of  a  considerable  number  of  minor  faults  of 
matter  and  manner,  and  in  the  Appendix  will  be  found  some 
addenda  for  which  the  foot-notes  did  not  afford  space.  , 

While  engaged  in  the  revision,  I  have  read  most  of  the 
authoritative  works  bearing  on  the  history  of  the  Army  of  the 


2  NOTE  TO  THE  REISSUE. 

Potomac  which  have  appeared  since  1866.  It  is  no  small 
satisfaction  to  find  many  of  my  conclusions  confirmed  by  his 
torians  of  greater  ability,  writing  under  more  favorable  oppor 
tunities  of  information  and  criticism.  It  was  my  chief  aim 
(as  stated  in  the  Preface)  to  present  "army-verdicts,"  and 
it  is  pleasant  to  find  after  sixteen  years  a  very  general  acqui 
escence  in  the  justness  of  these  verdicts.  And  I  may  add  that, 
had  I  the  "  Campaigns  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  "  to  make 
over  again,  though  I  hope  I  should  bring  to  the  expression  of 
its  judgments  more  balance  and  moderation,  the  judgments 
themselves  would  not  be  materially  modified.  The  picture 
might  differ  in  coloring;  the  drawing  would  remain  in  its 
chief  lines  the  same.  W.  S. 

BROOKLYN,  October,  1882. 


PEEFACE   TO  FIRST  EDITION. 


IT  is  not  without  diffidence  that  I  give  to  the  world  a  volume  in 
eluding  within  its  single  self  the  history  of  events  so  vast  and  com 
plicated,  so  little  understood  and  so  greatly  misunderstood,  as 
those  that  rilled  up  the  momentous  four  years  during  which  the 
chief  armies  of  the  North  and  the  South  fought  the  war  of  secession 
to  an  issue  upon  the  soil  of  Virginia.  Yet,  I  should  not  have  at 
tempted  the  task,  had  I  not  been  met  both  by  an  inward  prompting 
in  the  desire  to  speak  truly  of  actions  and  men  whereof  there  has 
been  hitherto  little  else  than  false  witness,  and  by  outward  solici 
tations,  in  the  possession  of  such  a  mass  of  documentary  material 
as  it  seldom  falls  to  the  writer  of  contemporaneous  history  to 
obtain. 

While  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  yet  in  the  field,  there  were 
many  who,  believing  that  I  would  in  time  make  fitter  record  of  the 
doings  and  sufferings  of  that  army  than  was  possible  in  the  brief 
chronicles  which  it  was  my  duty  to  prepare  for  the  press,  began 
even  then  to  furnish  me  with  oral  and  written  information.  And 
no  sooner  had  the  war  closed,  and  it  was  known  that  I  had  ad- 


4  PREFACE. 

dressed  myself  to  this  work  in  earnest,  than,  from  all  sides,  reports, 
dispatches,  and  memorials  poured  in  upon  me.  It  soon  came  about 
that,  respecting  every  important  action  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
there  were  brought  to  my  hand,  not  only  the  manuscript  official  re 
ports  of  its  corps,  division,  and  brigade  commanders,  but,  for  the 
illustration  of  its  inner  life  and  history,  a  prodigious  mass  of  me 
moirs,  private  note-books,  dispatches,  letter-books,  etc.  In  addition, 
I  have  had  the  benefit  of  the  memory  and  judgment  of  most  of  the 
chief  officers  ;  and,  both  from  these  and  others,  have  had  so  many 
proofs  of  their  kindly  solicitude  that  nothing  which  could  be  of 
use  to  me  should  be  wanting,  that  I  have  been  led  to  believe  they 
did  not  regard  me  as  entirely  unworthy  to  record  the  history  of 
their  army. 

For  the  elucidation  of  the  deeds  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Vir 
ginia,  the  mighty  rival  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  my  sources  of 
information  have  been  scarcely  less  ample.  These  embrace  the 
complete  "  Reports  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,"  and  many 
manuscript  reports  and  documents  kindly  forwarded  to  me.  I  have 
also  had  the  advantage  of  full  conversations  with  most  of  the  chief 
commanders  of  the  Confederate  army  ;  and  I  think  the  result  cannot 
fail  to  appear  in  the  explanation  of  many  things  hitherto  wrongly 
interpreted,  many  things  hitherto  wholly  incomprehensible. 

I  have  seldom  needed  to  refer  for  the  corroboration  of  statements 
to  what  1  personally  saw  ;  and  indeed  the  individual  knowledge  of 
any  one  man  respecting  such  actions  as  were  waged  in  Virginia,  is 
necessarily  slight.  But  that  which  has  been  of  such  use  that  with 
out  it  the  history  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  never  could  have  been 
written,  is  the  power,  gained  by  personal  experience  in  the  field,  of 


PREFACE.  5 

testing  the  truth  of  written  evidence  by  a  reference  to  the  actual 
conditions  under  which  warfare  was  made  in  Virginia.  Nor  is  it  ot 
less  value  to  have  known  the  private  judgments  upon  events  of  that 
great  body  of  instructed  officers  that  adorned  the  Army  of  the  Po 
tomac.  As  these  judgments  took  shape  from  the  deeds  themselves 
under  the  very  circumstances  of  their  performance,  I  hold  them  to 
be  sounder  than  any  that  are  hereafter  likely  to  be  rendered. 
Hence  I  have  garnered  these  with  care,  endeavoring  to  make  this  a 
record  of  the  arm?/-verdicts  on  men  and  things.  It  will  be  safe  to 
presume  that  whatever  is  of  worth  in  this  book  has  this  origin. 

It  is  probable  that  the  estimates  here  rendered  of  the  successive 
commanders  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  may  in  some  cases  be 
found  to  run  counter  to,  and  in  other  cases  to  be  a  reversal  of,  popu 
lar  estimates.  I  must  say,  in  justice  to  myself,  that  if  some  com 
manders  are  here  exalted  above  the  place  they  have  hitherto  held 
in  popular  esteem,  and  others  brought  down  to  a  lower  place, 
it  is  because  I  dared  not  judge  one  commander  by  one  standard, 
and  another  by  another.  Whatever  criticism  I  have  made  on  men 
has  resulted  from  the  reference  of  their  actions  to  the  test  of  those 
simple  principles  to  which  almost  all  great  military  questions  may 
be  reduced.  Those,  therefore,  who  would  impugn  these  judgments 
must  in  justice  first  impugn  the  reasoning  on  which  they  are 
founded. 

I  desire  to  call  attention  to  the  maps  and  plans,  which,  though 
on  a  small  scale,  are  entirely  reliable.  They  have  been  prepared 
with  great  care,  by  Colonel  W.  H.  PAINE,  of  the  engineer  staff  of 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  I  particularly  instance  those  illustra 
tive  of  Grant's  campaign  from  the  Rapidan  to  Petersburg.  The 


6  PREFACE. 

lines  of  works  marked  thereon  are  derived  from  the  government 
surveys,  and  the  angles  indicated  are  correct.  They  will  prove 
highly  interesting  and  instructive  to  military  students. 

To  a  distinguished  officer  I  owe  a  special  acknowledgment  for 
the  invaluable  gift  of  the  unpublished  consolidated  monthly  returns 
of  the  Confederate  army  from  the  commencement  to  the  close  of 
the  war. 

The  notes  in  support  of  the  text  are  made  very  ample,  especially 
touching  all  disputed  points.  As,  with  a  few  well-known  excep 
tions,  the  sources  of  information  are  entirely  manuscript,  it  has  not 
been  thought  necessary  to  state  this  fact  in  each  individual  case. 

W.  S. 
,  April,  1866. 


CONTENTS. 


Page 
THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC  IN  HISTORY..  13 


II. 

THE  THREE  MONTHS'  CAMPAIGN 26 

I.  War  in  Embryo 26 

II.  McClellan  in  Western  Virginia 34 

III. 

THE  ARMY  BEFORE  WASHINGTON 60 

I.  Organization  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 60 

II.  Plans  of  Campaign 68 


IV. 

THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN 99 

I.  Before  Yorktown 99 

II.  From  Yorktown  to  the  Chickahominy 112 

III.  Confederate  Strategy  on  the  Chickahominy  and  in  the  Valley  of 

the  Shenandoak 121 

IV.  The  Battle  of  Fair  Oaks 128 

V.  The  Seven  Days'  Retreat 140 


8  CONTENTS. 

V. 

Pag« 
POPE'S  CAMPAIGN  IN  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA 167 

I.  Removal  of  the  Army  from  the  Peninsula 167 

II.  Pope's  Retrograde  Movement 175 

III.  Jackson's  Plank  March 177 

IV.  The  Second  Battle  of  Manassas 182 

V.  Exit  Pope 192 


VI 

THE  MARYLAND  CAMPAIGN 194 

I.  Manoeuvres  Previous  to  Antietam 194 

II.  The  Battle  of  Antietam 208 

HI.  Close  of  McClellan's  Career  . .  .  225 


VII. 

THE  CAMPAIGN  ON  THE  RAPPAHANNOCK 230 

I.  Change  of  Base  to  Fredericksburg 230 

II.  The  Battle  of  Fredericksburg 238 

III.  Abortive  Movements  on  the  Rappahannock 255 

VIII. 

THE  CHANCELLORSVILLE  CAMPAIGN  267 

I.  The  Army  under  Hooker 267 

II.  The  Passage  of  the  Rappahannock 270 

III.  At  Chancellorsville— Friday 276 

IV.  Jackson's  Flank  March— Saturday 283 

V.  Sunday's  Action  at  Chancellorsville 292 

VI.  The  Storming  of  the  Heights 296 

VII.  The  Coup  de  Grace 299 

VIII.  Observations  on  the  Battle  of  ChanceUorsville  . .  .  303 


CONTENTS.  y 

IX. 

Pago 

THE  GETTYSBURG  CAMPAIGN , ,.     ..  308 

I.  Theory  of  the  Confederate  Invasion 308 

II.  Manoeuvres  to  Disengage  Hooker 312 

III.  Hooker's  Retrograde  Movement 316 

IV.  Across  the  Border 320 

V.  Concentration  on  Gettysburg 325 

VI.  Gettysburg— First  Day 328 

VII.  Gettysburg— Second  Day 843 

VHI.  Gettysburg— Third  Day 356 

IX.  The  Confederate  Retreat ....  .366 


X. 

A  CAMPAIGN  OF  MANOEUVRES 373 

I.  The  March  to  the  Rapidan 373 

II.  The  Flank  March  on  CentreviUe 376 

HI.  Mine  Run 390 

IV.  The  Army  in  Winter-quarters 398 


XL 

GRANT'S  OVERLAND  CAMPAIGN 402 

I.  Combinations  of  the  Spring  Campaign 402 

II.  The  Battle  of  the  Wilderness 413 

III.  The  Lines  of  Spottsylvania 440 

IV.  Co-operative  Movements  on  the  James  and  in  the  Shenandoah  Val 

ley 460 

V.  From  Spottsylvania  to  the  Chickahominy 470 

VI.  The  Battle  of  Cold  Harbor 481 

VH.  Observations  on  the  Overland  Campaign 489 


XII. 

THE  SIEGE  OF  PETERSBURG. 497 

I.  The  Change  of  Base 497 

II.  The  Army  before  Petersburg 507 

HI.  The  Lines  of  Petersburg 515 


10  CONTENTS. 

Pro 

IV.  The  Mine  Fiasco 518 

V.  Lee's  Diversion 525 

VI.  Summer  and  Autumn  Operations  against  Petersburg  and  Richmond.  529 

VII.  Observations  on  the  Siege  of  Petersburg 5W 

VIII.  Sheridan's  Operations  in  the  Valley 554 


XIII. 

THE  FINAL  CAMPAIGN 565 

I.  The  Circle  of  the  Hunt 565 

H.  Lee's  Initiative 573 

III.  The  Armies  Unleashed 578 

IV.  Five  Forks  and  Petersburg 596 

V.  The  Retreat  and  Pursuit 604 

VI   Closing  Scenes 614 


APPENDIX. 625 

INLEX. 645 


MAPS  AND  SKETCHES. 


Page 

Map  of  Bull  Run (opposite)  46 

Map  of  the  Peninsula "  100 

Sketch  of  the  Siege  of  Yorktown 101 

Sketch  of  the  Siege  of  Williamsburg 113 

Sketch  of  Fair  Oaks 133 

Sketch  of  Games'  Mill 149 

Sketch  of  Malvern  Hill 160 

Map  of  Pope's  Campaign (opposite)  176 

Sketch  of  Manoeuvres  on  Antietam 199 

Map  of  Antietam (opposite)  208 

Map  of  Fredericksburg "  238 

Map  of  Chancellorsville "  276 

Sketch  of  Manoeuvres  on  Gettysburg 325 

Map  of  Gettysburg,  first  and  third  days (opposite)  328 

Map  of  Gettysburg,  second  day » "  342 

Map  of  the  Wilderness "  414 

Map  of  Spottsylvania "  442 

Map  of  North  Anna "  472 

Map  of  Cold  Harbor «  484 

Map  of  Country  around  Petersburg  and  Richmond "  508 

Map  of  Final  Operations "  578 

Map  of  Lee'a  Retreat  and  Grant's  Pursuit "  608 


POETEAITS. 

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL  U.  S.  GRANT. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  G.  B.  MCCLELLAN.         MAJOR-GENERAL  A.  E.  BURNSIDE, 
MAJOR-GENERAL  J.  HOOKER.  .  MAJOR-GENERAL  G.  G.  MEADE. 


CAMPAIGNS 


OF    THE 


ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 


THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC  IN  HISTORY. 

So  soon  as  the  passionate  rushing  to  arms  that  succeeded 
the  bombardment  and  fall  of  Fort  Sumter  had  indicated  that 
a  great  war  was  upon  the  sundered  sections  of  the  American 
Union,  it  became  manifest  that  Virginia  was  marked  out  as 
the  principal  theatre  of  the  impending  conflict.  The  tidings 
of  what  had  happened  in  the  harbor  of  Charleston  found  that 
State  assembled  at  Richmond  in  high  debate  on  the  question 
of  Secession  ;  and  then  whatever  there  was  in  its  councils  of 
what  men  called  "  Unionism"  or  conservatism  was  hushed, 
and  in  wild  tumult  Virginia  was  voted  out  of  the  Union  and 
into  the  Confederacy. 

This,  Virginia  voted  on  the  16th  of  April,  1861 ;  but  from 
her  eyes  was  hid  what  else  she  voted — to  wit,  a  war  destined 
to  redden  all  her  streams,  to  desolate  her  fertile  fields,  to  cut 
off  the  flower  of  her  young  men,  and  to  leave  her  at  its 
close  prostate  and  impoverished. 

When  Virginia  linked  her  destiny  with  the  Confederacy, 
those  who  controlled  the  Secession  revolution  signified  their 
appreciation  of  the  accession  of  that  ancient  and  powerful 
Commonwealth  by  transferring  to  her  chief  city  the  capital  of 


14  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE   ARMY  OF  THE   POTOMAC. 

the  Confederate  government ;  and  whereas  that  government 
had  borne  the  name  "provisional"  at  Montgomery,  at  Rich 
mond  it  assumed  to  itself  the  style  and  title  of  "permanent." 
Thus  marked  out  as  a  seat  of  war  by  virtue  of  being  the 
administrative  centre  of  the  insurgent  power,  Virginia  was 
furthermore  marked  out  as  the  main  seat  of  war  by  her 
geographical  relations  as  a  frontier  State.  For  upon  her 
secession  the  Potomac,  her  northern  boundary,  became,  for  all 
the  region  between  the  Atlantic  and  the  Alleghanies,  the 
dividing  line  betwixt  those  "  points  of  mighty  opposites,"  the 
North  and  the  South, — names  which,  hitherto  of  no  more  than 
political  import,  now  assumed  the  new  and  dread  significance 
of  belligerent  Powers. 

Thus,  by  her  will  and  by  fate,  Virginia  became  the  Flanders  of 
the  war.  And  already,  from  the  moment  the  events  in  Charles 
ton  harbor  made  war  flagrant,  armed  men,  in  troops  and  bat 
talions,  hurried  forward,  from  the  North  and  from  the  South, 
to  her  borders.  An  equal  fire  animated  both  sections.  Pres 
ident  Lincoln  called  for  seventy-five  thousand  men ;  Mr.  Davis, 
for  a  hundred  thousand, — armies  of  a  proportion  never  before 
seen  on  the  "Western  continent.  Yet  such  was  the  spontaneous 
alacrity  with  which  on  each  side  the  summons  was  obeyed, 
that  within  the  space  of  a  few  weeks,  these  limits  were  greatly 
overpassed,  and  an  additional  call  for  a  half  million  men  on 
the  part  of  the  North,  and  a  levy  en  masse  on  the  part  of  the 
South,  met  a  like  response.  Then  by  that  new  agent  of  trans 
portation  which  has  revolutionized  military  operations  no  less 
than  the  movements  of  commerce,  the  volunteers  were  quickly 
conveyed  to  Virginia  from  points  so  distant  and  divergent 
as  to  strike  the  imagination  with  wonder.  It  is  estimated 
that  for  many  weeks  after  the  first  call  for  troops,  armed 
men  arrived  in  Richmond,  from  all  parts  of  the  South 
at  the  rate  of  from  fifteen  hundred  to  two  thousand  daily; 
and  the  multitude  poured  forth  from  the  populous  North  was 
not  less,  but  greater.  From  the  loyal  States,  the  point  of 
concentration  was  Washington,  where  for  a  time  the  gather 
ing  force  held  a  simply  defensive  attitude  :  then  bursting  the 


THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC  IN  HISTORY.  15 

barrier  of  the  Potomac,  it  launched  itself  upon  that  soil  which 
!:he  men  of  Virginia  fondly  named  "  sacred,"  and  the  history 
of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  began. 

I  design  in  this  volume  to  record,  as  far  as  may  now  be 
done,  what  that  Army  did  and  suffered  in  ten  campaigns  and 
two-score  battles,  in  Virginia,  Maryland,  and  Pennsylvania. 
This  history,  if  adequately  made,  must  be  the  history  also  of 
much  the  larger  part  of  that  gigantic  war  that,  originating  in 
the  secession  of  eleven  States  from  the  Federal  Union,  ended, 
after  four  years,  in  the  establishment  of  that  Union  on  a  last 
ing  basis.  For  though  this  conflict  assumed  continental  pro 
portions  and  raged  around  a  circumference  of  many  thousand 
miles,  it  was  observed  that  its  head  and  front  ever  remained 
in  that  stretch  of  territory  between  the  Potomac  and  the 
James,  and  between  the  Blue  Ridge  and  Chesapeake  Bay. 
Here,  from  the  start,  each  belligerent,  as  by  common  consent, 
concentrated  its  richest  resources  ;  here,  throughout  the 
struggle,  each  continued  to  sustain  its  greatest  armies,  under 
its  ablest  commanders  :  and  never  for  a  day  did  it  lose  its 
military  primacy  in  the  eyes  of  either  party  to  the  conflict. 
It  is  estimated  that  out  of  the  half  million  men  who  met  death, 
and  the  two  million  who  suffered  wound  in  the  war — the  losses 
of  both  sides,  and  the  casualties  of  all  the  battles  and  sieges 
over  the  whole  continental  field  of  action,  being  included — 
above  one-half  this  appalling  aggregate  belongs  to  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  and  its  adversary.  These  losses  are  the  sum 
ming  up  of  a  series  of  campaigns  and  battles  as  grand  in  their 
proportions  as  any  on  record,  waged  with  a  remorseless 
energy,  wrought  out  with  all  the  resources  that  modern  art 
has  devised  to  make  war  deadly,  and  fought  under  peculiar 
conditions,  upon  a  theatre  peculiar  in  its  character.  That 
theatre  is  Virginia — a  colossal  canvas  whereon  moving  masses 
and  the  forms  of  wrestling  armies  appear. 

The  history  of  the  War  for  the  Union  would  set  forth  that 
majestic  exhibition  of  power  by  which  a  free  people,  without 
military  traditions,  created  great  armies,  waged  a  national 


16      CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

war,  and  subdued  an  internal  revolt  of  a  magnitude  without 
parallel.  The  scope  of  this  volume  is  more  restricted,  and 
embraces  the  story  of  one  alone  of  these  armies,  though  the 
main  one. 

I  shall  have  to  trace  how  this  force  arose,  and  its  first  essays 
and  failures ;  how  it  grew  into  the  shape  and  substance  of  an 
army  ;  and  how  it  then  entered  upon  campaigns  bloody,  in 
decisive,  and  protracted. 

I  shall  have  to  show  how  this  army,  losing  again  and  again 
the  component  parts  of  its  structure, — thinned  by  death,  and 
wounds,  and  wasting  disease,  and  tilled  up  again  and  again  by 
the  unquenched  patriotism  of  the  people, — never  lost  its  indi 
vidual  being,  but  remained  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  still ; 
and  I  shaU  have  to  follow  those  changing  phases  that 
the  life  of  an  army,  not  less  than  the  life  of  an  individual, 
undergoes. 

I  shall  have  to  celebrate  the  unswerving  loyalty  of  this 
army,  that,  ofttimes  when  the  bond  of  military  cohesion  failed, 
held  it,  "  iinshaked  of  motion,"  to  a  duty  self-imposed. 

I  shaU  have  to  follow  it  through  a  checkered  experience,  in 
a  tale  commingled  of  great  misfortunes,  great  follies,  and 
great  glories  ;  but  from  first  to  last  it  will  appear,  that  amid 
many  buffets  of  fortune,  through  "  winter  and  rough  weather," 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac  never  gave  up,  but  made  a  good 
tight,  and  finally  reached  the  goal. 

Nor  can  there  fail  to  arise  the  image  of  that  other  Army 
that  was  the  adversary  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac — and 
which  who  can  ever  forget  that  once  looked  upon  it  ? — that 
array  of  "  tattered  uniforms  and  bright  muskets" — that  body 
of  incomparable  infantry,  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia — 
which  for  four  years  carried  the  Revolt  on  its  bayonets, 
opposing  a  constant  front  to  the  mighty  concentration  of 
power  brought  against  it ;  which,  receiving  terrible  blows,  did 
not  fail  to  give  the  like ;  and  which,  vital  in  all  its  parts,  died 
only  with  its  annihilation. 

Of  this  drama  there  will  be  no  other  hero  than  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  itself ;  for  it  would  seem  that  in  this  war  of  the 


THE  ARMY  OF  THE   POTOMAC  IN  HISTORY.  IT 

people  it  was  decreed  there  should  arise  no  imperial. pres 
ence  to  become  the  central  figure  and  cynosure  of  men's  eyes. 
Napoleon,  in  an  outburst  of  haughty  eloquence,  exclaims 
that  in  the  great  armies  of  history  the  Commander  was  every 
thing.  "  It  was  not,"  says  he,  "  the  Roman  army  that  con 
quered  Gaul,  but  Caesar  ;  it  was  not  the  Carthaginian  army 
that  made  Rome  tremble  at  her  gates,  but  Hannibal ;  it  was 
not  the  Macedonian  army  that  marched  to  the  Indus,  but 
Alexander  ;  it  was  not  the  Prussian  army  that  defended  Prus 
sia  for  seven  years  against  the  three  most  powerful  S^  ates  oi 
Europe,  but  Frederick."  This  proud  apotheosis  has  no  appli 
cation  for  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  And  one  must  think 
— seeing  it  never  had  a  great,  and  generally  had  mediocre 
commanders — it  was  that  it  might  be  said,  that  whatever  it 
won  it  owed  not  to  genius,  but  bought  with  its  blood. 

I  must  now  add,  that  it  would  be  to  fail  to  draw  some  of  the 
most  important  lessons  furnished  by  the  history  of  the  army 
whose  deeds  form  the  subject-matter  of  this  volume,  if  I 
should  fail  to  set  forth  the  relations  of  that  army  with  the 
central  authority  at  Washington.  The  conduct  of  a  war  under 
a  popular  government  introduces  new  conditions  into  the 
established  military  system  and  traditions,  and  greatly  com 
plicates  the  duties  of  the  commander.  Now  the  history  of  the 
Secession  war  affords  a  new  and  enlarged  exhibition  of  the  be 
havior  of  a  representative  executive  suddenly  charged  with 
the  direction  of  great  military  affairs.  While  a  sense  of  justice 
will  suggest  the  exercise  of  much  lenience  in  the  judgment  of 
an  Administration  called  to  a.  difficult  task,  it  is  none  the  less 
incumbent  on  the  historian  to  point  out  errors  and  follies  that 
cost  much. 

In  the  campaigns  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  there  is  pre 
sented  a  remarkable  unity,  both  as  regards  the  theatre  of 
operations  and  the  objective  of  operations.  The  theatre  was 
Virginia  ;  the  objective,  Richmond.  The  first  military  aspira 
tion  of  the  North  expressed  itself  in  the  vehement  cry,  "  On 
to  Richmond  :"  and  when,  after  many  battles  and  campaigns, 

2 


18  CAMPAIGNS   OF   THE   ARMY   OF   THE   POTOMAC. 

— more  than  the  wisest  foresaw, — Richmond  fell,  the  structure 
of  the  Confederacy  fell  with  it. 

But  though  the  sphere  of  action  is  in  the  main  bounded  by 
the  geographical  limits  of  the  State  of  Virginia,  it  resulted 
from  the  fact  of  the  war  assuming  twice  on  the  part  of  the 
insurgent  force  an  aggressive  character,  that  its  area  must  be 
extended  so  as  to  include  a  part  of  the  territory  of  the  contig 
uous  Spates  of  Maryland  and  Pennsylvania.  This  circum 
stance  does  not  destroy,  however,  the  unity  of  the  zone  within 
which  the  armies  of  the  Potomac  and  of  Northern  Virginia 
operated.  The  battles  of  Antietam  and  Gettysburg — the  two 
actions  out  of  the  limits  of  Yirginia — were  fought  in  the  nar 
row  salient  of  a  great  triangle,  having  the  southern  boundary 
line  of  Virginia  as  its  base,  the  Shenandoah  and  Cumberland 
valleys  as  its  western  side,  and  the  Susquehanna  River  and 
Chesapeake  Bay  as  its  eastern  side.  From  its  apex,  this  tri 
angle  measures  seven  hundred  and  fifty  miles  on  its  mountain 
side,  and  about  three  hundred  miles  on  its  eastern  side,  with 
five  hundred  miles  on  its  base  line. 

Now  if  it  be  considered  that  within  this  comparatively 
restricted  space,  two  great  armies  manoeuvred  and  fought 
during  the  protracted  period  of  four  years,  and  that  for  all 
that  time,  though  surging  backwards  and  forwards,  each  main 
tained  its  essential  vantage-ground,  there  will  arise  the  in 
ference,  either  that  the  operations  were  conducted  with  little 
vigor,  or  else  that  there  must  have  been  some  peculiar  condi 
tions  that  shut  out  victory  from  sooner  declaring  itself  on  the 
one  side  or  the  other. 

But  the  former  supposition  is  excluded  by  the  palpable  evi 
dence,  notorious  to  all  the  world,  of  the  long  record  of  bloody 
battles,  and  the  terrible  aggregate  of  losses  sustained,  in  this 
conflict  of  Americans  with  Americans. 

It  results  therefore  that  we  must  seek  in  the  alternative  the 
explanation  of  a  historic  fact  seemingly  so  unaccountable.  I 
shall  briefly  set  forth  some  of  the  leading  elements  that  enter 
into  this  problem  as  it  stands  related  to  the  theatre  of  opera 
tions  in  Virginia  and  the  conditions  of  warfare  upon  thai 


THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC  IN  HISTORY.  19 

theatre.  A  proper  appreciation  of  these  conditions  will  help 
to  explain  the  many  bloody  but  indecisive  battles  that  char 
acterized  the  Virginia  campaigns,  and  must  modify  the  con 
clusions  of  those  who,  from  a  distance,  vainly  seek  to  apply 
European  principles  and  precedents  to  warfare  in  a  region 
affording  hardly  one  element  of  legitimate  comparison. 

From  the  Potomac,  as  base,  to  Richmond,  on  the  left  bank 
of  the  James,  as  objective,  the  distance  is  one  hundred  and  ten 
miles  ;  and  it  is  to  be  noted,  first  of  all,  that  in  this  zone  an 
army  upon  the  defensive  has  its  operations  facilitated,  while 
an  army  assuming  the  offensive  has  its  operations  rendered 
difficult,  from  the  fact  that  the  watershed  being  towards  the 
coast,  all  the  rivers  cross  any  line  of  manoeuvre  against  Rich 
mond.  These  rivers  are  :  the  Occoquan,  formed  by  the  union 
of  Bull  Run  and  Cedar  Run ;  the  Rappahannock,  swelled  by 
the  converging  tides  of  the  Rapidan  and  Hedgman  rivers ; 
the  Mattapony,  which  results  from  the  confluence  of  four 
streams,  named  the  Mat,  the  Ta,  the  Po,  and  the  Ny ;  the 
Pamunkey,  formed  by  the  union  of  the  North  and  South 
Anna ;  and  the  Chickahominy,  which  has  its  embouchure  in 
the  James.  The  Confederates  found  eligible  lines  of  defence 
along  these  rivers,  which  they  used  to  great  advantage,  from 
the  time  when,  at  the  opening  of  the  war,  Beauregard  formed 
his  array  along  Bull  Run,  to  when,  almost  four  years  there 
after,  Lee  disputed  with  Grant  the  passage  of  the  Chick 
ahominy,  and  compelled  the  Union  commander  to  seek  a  new 
base  south  of  the  James. 

The  mountain  system  of  Virginia  is  thrown  off  on  the 
western  flank  of  the  theatre  of  operations,  where  the  Blue 
Ridge  forms,  with  that  parallel  ridge  called  successively  the 
Clinch,  Middle,  and  Shenandoah  mountains,  the  picturesque 
and  fertile  Valley  of  the  Shenandoah.  This  valley,  from  its 
direction  north  and  south,  and  its  peculiar  topographical 
relations,  is  an  eminently  aggressive  line  for  a  hostile  force 
moving  northward  to  cross  the  Potomac  into  Maryland,  either 
with  the  view  of  penetrating  Pennsylvania  or  of  manoeuvring 


20  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE   ARMY  OF  THE   POTOMAC- 

towards  "Washington.  It  was  by  this  line  that  Lee  issued  upon 
the  soil  of  the  loyal  States  on  the  occasion  of  both  the  Con 
federate  invasions — to  wit,  the  Maryland  invasion  of  1862,  and 
the  Pennsylvania  invasion  of  1863.  This  circumstance  com 
pelled,  throughout  the  war,  the  constant  presence  of  a  con 
siderable  army  to  guard  the  debouch  6  of  this  great  valley  and 
the  passes  of  the  Blue  Bidge ;  and  the  Shenandoah  region 
was  the  scene  of  a  series  of  operations  having  an  intimate 
relation  with  those  of  the  main  theatre. 

This,  in  general  terms,  may  be  defined  as  the  territory  be 
tween  the  Blue  Ridge  and  Chesapeake  Bay,  and  between  the 
Potomac  and  the  James. 

This  region  has,  as  its  characteristic  feature,  a  dense  forest 
of  oak  and  pine,  with  occasional  clearings — rarely  extensive 
enough,  however,  to  prevent  the  riflemen  concealed  in  their 
margins  from  covering  the  whole  opening  with  their  fire. 
The  roads  are  few,  bad,  and  form  so  many  defiles  ;  and  it  was, 
throughout  the  war,  commonly  necessary  for  the  axeman  to 
precede  the  artillerist,  to  hew  for  him  a  path.  It  is  rare,  in 
all  this  tract  of  country,  to  find  a  field  in  which  cavalry  can 
have  any  legitimate  play ;  and  it  frequently  happened  that, 
owing  to  the  density  of  the  forest,  not  even  artillery  could  be 
employed. 

It  is  easy  to  see  that  under  these  circumstances  military 
operations  must  assume  many  peculiarities ;  and,  it  is  to  be 
added,  these  were  much  in  favor  of  the  defensive.  The  abun 
dance  of  wood  afforded  such  facility  for  the  construction  of 
breastworks  and  abatis,  that,  during  all  the  late  years  of  the 
Virginia  campaigns,  actions  were  invariably  waged  behind 
and  about  hastily  improvised  ramparts  of  earth  and  logs,  with 
which  every  hundred  yards  gained  was  instantly  intrenched. 
Under  cover  of  these  rude  yet  strong  "  coigns  of  vantage," — 
with  the  infantry  protected  by  a  parapet,  and  equipped  with  the 
improved  arms — with  rifled  artillery  sweeping  a  front  of  two  or 
three  thousand  yards,  and  this  front  obstructed  by  "slashings," 
— the  army  on  the  defensive  might  await,  with  comparative 
security,  the  approach  of  lines  of  battle  that  were  almost  fore- 


THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC  IN  HISTORY.  21 

doomed  to  repulse.  If,  peradventure,  driven  from  one  line, 
the  enemy  could,  with  the  greatest  ease,  take  up  another,  and 
another.  A  campaign  thus  became  a  kind  of  rough  siege ; 
and  in  this  state  of  facts,  even  victory  was  generally  fruitless, 
because  pursuit  was  impossible.  The  task  of  the  commander 
increased  in  difficulty  in  the  same  proportion.  Shut  out  from 
sight,  and  often  even  from  hearing,  the  general  on  the  field  of 
battle  was  constrained  to  work  in  a  manner  blindfold,  and 
compelled  to  rely  on  the  firmness  of  his  troops  till  couriers 
should  arrive  to  bring  tidings  of  the  fight. 

But  the  obstructions  that  beset  American  warfare  are  not 
confined  to  these  distinguishing  features  of  the  terrain;  for 
the  difficulty  of  any  extended  operation  became  greatly  en 
hanced  by  the  question  of  subsistence,  on  which  the  mobility 
of  an  army  so  largely  depends.  There  are  two  maxims  that 
forcibly  set  forth  the  bearing  of  the  commissariat  on  wars  of 
invasion :  the  first  is  the  saying  of  Frederick  the  Great,  that 
"  an  army,  like  a  serpent,  moves  on  its  belly ;"  the  second  is 
the  declaration  of  Caesar,  that  "war  must  support  war."  The 
former  of  these  maxims  asserts  the  absolute  dependence  of 
military  operations  on  the  means  of  feeding  the  operating 
army ;  the  latter,  that  this  dependence  should  be  simplified 
by  drawing  supplies  from  the  country  in  which  the  troops  act. 
But  while  it  is  no  less  true  in  America  than  elsewhere  that 
"  an  army,  like  a  serpent,  moves  on  its  belly,"  the  actual  con 
dition  did  not  permit  of  carrying  out  the  admonition  to  "  make 
war  support  war."  In  the  densely  populated  countries  of 
Europe,  it  is  easy,  from  the  resources  of  the  country,  to  sub 
sist  an  army  of  a  hundred  thousand  men  ;  and  Napoleon, 
while  operating  in  the  basins  of  the  Rhine  and  Danube,  and 
in  the  rich  granaries  of  Belgium,  Italy,  and  Swabia,  constantly 
supported  by  requisitions  much  greater  numbers.  But  in 
proportion  as  the  population  becomes  thin,  the  productive 
forces  decrease,  and  local  sources  of  supply  for  an  army  de 
cline  or  disappear  altogether.  What  is  possible  in  Germany, 
therefore,  is  impracticable  in  Poland,  Russia,  or  America.  In 
Virginia,  no  dependence  whatever  could  be  placed  on  procur- 


22  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  AEMY  OF   THE  POTOMAC. 

ing  local  subsistence.  The  area  of  manoeuvre  was,  therefore, 
circumscribed  by  the  amount  of  rations  that  could  be  carried 
on  the  persons  of  the  soldiers  and  in  wagons,  which  in  Vir 
ginia  was  not  more  than  sufficient  for  from  ten  to  sixteen 
days  ;  while  its  transport  necessitated  immense  trains  of 
two,  three,  and  four  thousand  wagons — an  overgrown  mass 
of  impedimenta  that  made  rapidity  of  movement  almost  impos 
sible,  and  constantly  bound  in  the  commander  to  "  saucy  doubts 
and  fears."  Indeed,  what  alone  made  operations  over  the  im 
mense  tracts  of  country  overrun  by  the  Union  armies  prac 
ticable  was,  first,  that  new  agency  in  warfare,  the  railroad ; 
and,  secondly,  the  command  of  the  seaboard  by  the  North. 

Now  taking  into  account  this  cardinal  maxim  of  American 
warfare,  that  an  army  operating  over  a  large  tract  of  country 
must  pivot  either  on  a  railroad  or  a  river,  it  appears  that  from 
Washington  as  a  base,  a  force  advancing  against  Richmond 
by  the  overland  route,  and  having  at  the  same  time  to  cover 
Washington,  is  restricted  to  two  lines  of  manoeuvre  :  1.  The 
line  of  the  Orange  and  Alexandria  Railroad ;  2.  The  line  of 
the  Fredericksburg  and  Richmond  Railroad.  Each  of  these 
lines  was  repeatedly  essayed  during  the  Virginia  campaigns — 
the  former  by  Pope  and  Meade ;  the  latter  by  Burnside  and 
Hooker.  Touching  the  merits  of  these  lines,  experience  con 
firmed  what  theory  would  have  indicated :  that  the  line  of 
the  Orange  and  Alexandria  Railroad,  though  an  eminently  de 
fensive  line  as  regards  Washington,  is  hardly  aggressive  ;  and 
beyond  the  Rapidan  involves  so  many  complex  considerations 
that  no  commander  was  ever  able,  on  this  line,  to  push  an 
advance  south  of  that  river.  The  Fredericksburg  route  is  an 
aggressive  line  as  regards  Richmond,  though  it  is  surrounded 
with  many  difficulties.  It  is  not,  however,  a  good  defensive 
line  as  regards  Washington ;  and  experience  has  shown  that 
an  army  operating  by  that  line,  and  having  also  to  cover 
Washington,  may  readily  be  dislodged  from  it  and  forced  to 
attempt  to  regain  the  Orange  and  Alexandria  line  by  a  simple 
menace  against  the  latter.  And  this  fact  suggests  the  reflec 
tion  that  railroads  in  war,  though  affording  great  facilities  for 


THE  AEMY   OF  THE  POTOMAC   IN  HISTORY.  23 

transport,  and  permitting  the  execution  of  operations  that, 
without  this  resource,  would  be 'impracticable,  have  their  own 
peculiar  drawbacks,  and  require  the  detachment  of  a  consider 
able  part  of  the  active  force  for  their  protection  against  hos 
tile  raids. 

But  it  may  be  said  that  the  possession  by  the  North  of  the 
whole  Virginia  seaboard  gave  many  other  secondary  bases 
and  lines  of  operation,  free  from  the  objections  above  men 
tioned.  This  is  undoubtedly  true  ;  yet  the  statement  must  be 
taken  with  the  limitations  that  belong  to  it.  The  most  im-. 
portant  of  these  lines  are  the  Peninsula  between  the  York 
and  James  rivers,  and  the  route  by  the  south  side  of  the 
James.  The  former  was  adopted  by  General  McClellan  in 
the  spring  of  1862,  and  the  latter  w^as  eventually  taken  up  by 
General  Grant  in  the  summer  of  1864,  after  having,  in  a  re 
markable  campaign,  crossed  every  possible  line  of  operation 
against  Richmond.  But  it  is  manifest  that  Richmond  could  be 
operated  against  from  the  coast  only  by  an  army  that  was  in 
condition  to  leave  Washington  out  of  the  question.  The 
secession  of  Virginia  made  the  Potomac  the  dividing  line 
between  two  warring  powers;  and  the  unfortunate  location 
of  the  national  capital  on  the  banks  of  that  river,  and  on  an 
exposed  frontier,  profoundly  affected  the  character  of  military 
operations  in  Virginia,  and,  during  the  first  three  years  of 
the  war,  caused  a  subordination  of  all  strategic  combinations 
to  the  protection  of  Washington.  Saving  the  time  when 
McClellan  moved  to  the  Peninsula,  and  Grant  swung  across 
the  James  River,  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  never  allowed 
to  "  uncover"  Washington.  Now,  in  the  former  case,  the  first 
menace  by  Lee  foreshadowing  a  northward  movement  caused 
the  withdrawal  of  the  army  from  the  Peninsula ;  and,  in  the 
latter  instance,  a  small  raiding  column,  detached  by  way  of 
the  Shenandoah  Valley  into  Maryland,  compelled  General 
Grant  to  part  with  two  of  his  corps  to  protect  the  national 
capital,  and,  for  the  time,  almost  suspended  active  operations 
before  Petersburg. 

It  remains  now  to  add  that  the  gigantic  war  whose  prin- 


24  CAMPAIGNS   OF  TEIE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

cipal  field  was  Virginia  was  one  that,  from  its  very  nature, 
threw  the  burden  of  the  offensive  on  the  side  of  the  North. 
For,  as  the  National  Government  undertook  to  subdue  the 
insurrection  of  the  Southern  States,  it  rested  with  it  to  strike, 
and  with  the  South  to  parry.  But  it  soon  became  apparent 
that  the  task  was  very  different  from  that  involved  in  the 
quelling  of  an  ordinary  rebellion,  and  that  the  conflict  had, 
from  the  unanimity  of  hostile  sentiment  at  the  South,  the  vast 
extent  of  territory  in  insurrection,  and  the  mighty  force  in 
arms,  ah1  the  character  of  a  war  waged  between  two  powerful 
nations.  Now,  of  all  the  forms  that  war  may  assume,  that  is 
the  most  formidable  which  is  denominated  a  "National  "War," 
the  nature  of  which  is  thus  powerfully  depicted  by  the  great 
est  of  military  theorists :  "  The  difficulties  in  the  path  of  an 
army  in  National  wars  are  very  great,  and  render  the  mission 
of  the  general  conducting  them  very  arduous.  The  invader 
has  only  an  army ;  his  adversaries  have  an  army  and  a 
people  wholly,  or  almost  wholly,  in  arms — a  people  making 
means  of  resistance  out  of  every  thing,  each  individual  of 
whom  conspires  against  the  common  enemy  ;  so  that  even 
the  non-combatants  have  an  interest  in  his  ruin,  and  accel 
erate  it  by  every  means  in  their  power.  He  holds  scarcely 
any  ground  but  that  upon  which  he  encamps ;  and,  outside 
the  limits  of  his  camp,  every  thing  is  hostile,  and  multiplies  a 
thousandfold  the  difficulties  he  meets  at  every  step.  These 
obstacles  become  almost  insurmountable,  when  the  country  is 
difficult.  Each  armed  inhabitant  knows  the  smallest  paths 
and  their  connections ;  he  finds  everywhere  a  relative  or 
friend  who  aids  him.  •  The  commander  also  knows  the  coun 
try,  and,  learning  immediately  the  slightest  movement  on  the 
part  of  the  invader,  can  adopt  the  best  measures  to  defeat 
his  projects ;  while  the  latter,  without  information  of  their 
movements,  and  not  in  a  condition  to  send  out  detachments  to 
gain  it,  having  no  resource  but  in  his  bayonets,  and  certain  of 
safety  only  in  the  concentration  of  his  columns,  is  like  a  blind 
man — his  combinations  are  failures;  and  when,  after  the 
most  carefully  concerted  movements  and  the  most  rapid  and 


THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC   IN  HISTORY.  25 

fatiguing  marches,  he  thinks  he  is  about  to  accomplish  his 
aim  and  deal  a  terrible  blow,  he  finds  no  sign  of  the  enemy 
but  his  camp-fires ;  so  that,  while,  like  Don  Quixote*  he  is 
attacking  windmills,  his  adversary  is  on  his  line  of  communi 
cations,  destroys  the  detachments  left  to  guard  it,  surprises 
his  convoys  and  depots,  and  carries  on  a  war  so  disastrous 
for  the  invader  that  he  must  inevitably  yield  after  a  time" 

It  needs  not  to  tell  any  one  who  has  followed  the  history  of 
the  Virginia  campaigns,  that  every  "sling  and  arrow  "  thus 
graphically  shown  to  assail  an  army  penetrating  a  hostile 
country  in  which  the  population  as  well  as  the  army  enters 
into  the  belligerency,  did  harass  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 
Yet  it  is  not  possible  that  any,  save  such  as  have  had  actual 
experience  of  command,  can  measure  aright  the  obstructions 
of  every  nature  that  hedged  military  operations  in  a  country 
unknown  and  unmapped,  filled  with  a  population  ready  to 
convey  to  the  enemy  information  of  every  movement,  and 
eager  to  cut  a  telegraph-wire  or  throw  a  railroad-train  from 
its  track.  The  Confederates,  waging  war  on  that  theory  that 
is  named  the  "  defensive  with  offensive  returns,"  attempted,  in 
two  memorable  campaigns,  an  operation  of  invasion  ;  but  the 
decisive  failure  that  attended  both,  may  stand  as  an  example 
of  the  difficulties  that  constantly  beset  the  Union  army. 

If,  notwithstanding  these  difficulties,  the  Army  of  the  Po 
tomac  at  length  succeeded  in  destroying  its  opponent, — thus 
disproving  the  dictum  of  General  Jomini,  who,  in  the  passage 
I  have  just  quoted,  asserts  that  in  such  a  task  the  invader 
"  must  inevitably  yield  after  a  time," — it  would  appear  to  be 
a  reasonable  inference  that  the  means  by  which  this  end  was 
brought  about  must  be  notable,  and  that  the  army  that 
accomplished  this  result  may  be  worthy  of  a  larger  fame  than 
the  world  has  yet  accorded  it. 


26  CAMPAIGNS  OF   TILE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 


II. 

THE  THKEE  MONTHS'  CAMPAIGN, 


i. 

WAR   IN   EMBRYO. 

BY  the  express  terms  of  the  ordinance  of  secession,  passed 
by  the  Yirginia  Convention  on  the  17th  of  April,  1861,  the 
decree  that  was  to  link  the  fortunes  of  that  State  with  the  Con 
federacy  became  valid  only  on  being  ratified  by  the  popular 
vote,  appointed  to  be  given  on  the  fourth  Thursday  of  May. 
The  Administration  at  Washington  respecting  this  provision, 
awaited  the  action  of  the  people  before  advancing  its  armed 
force  to  "  repossess  the  places  and  property"  of  the  Federal 
Government. 

But  it  was  soon  manifest  that  this  stipulation  was  destined 
to  be  a  nullity  in  face  of  the  swift-advancing  realities  of  war. 
Virginia  immediately  threw  herself  into  an  attitude  of  defence. 
Governor  Letcher  issued  a  proclamation  calling  out  the 
militia  of  the  State,  and  Colonel  Eobert  E.  Lee  was  appointed 
major-general  and  commander  of  the  "  Virginia  forces." 
More  than  this  :  the  Convention  having,  on  the  24th  of 
April,  decreed  that  pending  the  popular  vote  on  the  question 
of  secession,  "  military  operations,  offensive  and  defensive,  in 
Virginia,  should  be  under  the  chief  control  and  direction  of 
the  President  of  the  Confederate  States,"  Confederate  troops, 
from  South  Carolina  and  the  States  of  the  Gulf,  were  rapidly 
thrown  forward  into  Virginia.  Meantime,  the  United  States 
arsenal  at  Harper's  Ferry  had  been  evacuated  and  partially 
destroyed  by  the  commander  of  the  post ;  and  the  United 
States  navy-yard  at  Norfolk  had  been  abandoned  by  the 


THE  THREE  MONTHS'  CAMPAIGN.  27 

Federal  officer  in  command,  and  several  men-of-war,  with  a 
vast  accumulation  of  war  material,  were  there  destroyed. 
Save  from  the  fortress  that  guards  the  entrance  of  James 
River,  the  Federal  flag  floated  nowhere  within  the  boundaries 
of  the  "  Old  Dominion." 

The  Confederates,  with  much  energy,  pushed  forward  prep 
arations  for  the  defence  of  Virginia ;  and  the  middle  of  the 
month  of  May  reveals  the  growing  outlines  of  a  definite  mili 
tary  policy.  This  policy,  however,  so  far  as  it  touched  the 
distribution  of  force,  seems  to  have  been  shaped  rather  by  the 
Austrian  principle  of  covering  every  thing,  than  by  any  well- 
considered  combination  of  positions.  The  Peninsula  between 
the  James  and  the  York  rivers  was  held  by  a  Confederate 
force  of  about  two  thousand  men,  under  Colonel  J.  B.  Ma- 
gruder,  who  took  position  near  Hampton,  where  he  confronted 
the  Federal  force  at  Fortress  Monroe,  which  had  lately  been 
placed  under  command  of  Major-General  B.  F.  Butler.  The 
defence  of  the  highland  region  of  "Western  Virginia  had 
been  assumed  by  General  Lee,  commander-in-chief  of  the 
State  forces,  who  had  dispatched  to  that  section  Colonel  Por- 
terfield,  with  instructions  to  raise  a  local  volunteer  force — not 
a  promising  undertaking  among  the  hardy,  Union-loving 
mountaineers — and  hold  the  line  of  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio 
Railroad,  the  direct  line  of  communication  with  the  States 
west  of  the  Alleghanies. 

Between  these  outlying  members  was  placed  the  main  body 
of  the  Confederate  force,  in  two  camps — the  one  located  at 
Manassas  Junction,  twenty-seven  miles  southwest  from  Alex 
andria,  (and  the  point  of  intersection  of  the  great  Southern 
railroad  route  between  Washington  and  Richmond  and  the 
Manassas  Gap  Railroad,  leading  to  the  Valley  of  the  Shenan- 
doah) ;  the  other  posted  at  the  outlet  of  this  valley,  at 
Harper's  Ferry.  The  force  assembled  and  assembling  at  the 
former  of  these  camps  was  at  first  under  the  orders  of  Gen- 
( ral  Bonham,  of  South  Carolina  ;  but  before  the  close  of  May, 
the  obvious  importance  of  the  position,  as  confronting  any 
direct  advance  from  Washington,  caused  the  Confederate 


28  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

authorities  to  assign  to  its  command  the  man  enjoying  the 
first  military  reputation  in  the  South.  This  man  was  General 
Beauregard,  and  the  region  of  country  under  his  control  was 
named  the  "  Department  of  the  Potomac." 

The  body  of  troops  collected  at  Harper's  Ferry,  and  which, 
at  the  close  of  the  month  of  May,  consisted  of  nine  regiments 
and  two  battalions  of  infantry,  four  companies  of  artillery, 
and  about  three  hundred  troopers,*  had  been  formed  under 
the  hand  of  a  man,  then  of  no  name,  but  destined  to  become 
one  of  the  foremost  figures  of  the  war — Colonel  Thomas 
Jonathan  Jackson,  better  known  in  the  world's  bead-roll  of 
fame  as  "  Stonewall  Jackson."  A  lieutenant  of  artillery  in 
the  United  States  service  during  the  Mexican  war,  he  had  at 
its  close  retired  to  a  professorship  in  the  Yirginia  Military 
Institute,  beyond  whose  walls  he  was  quite  unknown,  and 
within  which  he  was  marked  only  for  his  personal  eccentrici 
ties,  stern  puritanism,  and  inflexible  discipline.  Upon  the 
secession  of  Yirginia,  Professor  Jackson  resigned  his  chair, 
and  being  appointed  by  Governor  Letcher  to  a  colonelcy  in 
the  Yirginia  line,  he  was  immediately  sent  forward  to  com 
mand  the  Confederate  troops  at  Harper's  Ferry.  About  the 
time,  however,  that  Bonham  was  replaced  by  Beauregard, 
the  command  of  the  force  at  Harper's  Ferry,  which  bore  the 
style  of  the  "Army  of  the  Shenandoah,''  was  committed  to 
the  hands  of  General  J.  E.  Johnston ;  and  Colonel  Jackson, 
assigned  a  subordinate  command  under  that  able  soldier,  de 
voted  himself  to  moulding  into  form  and  stamping  with  the 
qualities  of  his  own  genius  that  famous  "  Stonewall  brigade," 
whose  battle-flag  led  the  van  in  that  series  of  audacious 
enterprises  that  afterwards  rendered  the  Yalley  of  the  Shen 
andoah  historic  ground.  General  Johnston's  other  sub 
ordinates  were  men  of  scarcely  inferior  ability  to  Jackson. 
Colonel  A.  P.  Hill,  subsequently  one  of  Lee's  ablest  lieu 
tenants,  was  at  the  head  of  another  of  his  brigades ;  Pendle- 
ton  was  chief  of  artillery ;  and  his  few  squadrons  of  Yirginia 

*  Report,  of  General  J.  E.  Johnston. 


THE  THREE  MONTHS'  CAMPAIGN.  29 

horsemen  were  under  command  of  Colonel  J.  E.  B.  Stuart, 
whom  even  then  Johnston  styled  "  the  indefatigable,"  and 
who  was  also  destined  to  a  greater  fame. 

Thus  far,  the  line  of  the  Potomac  had  not  been  crossed. 
The  soil  of  Virginia,  which  her  inhabitants  loved  proudly  to 
style  "  sacred,"  had  felt  the  tread  of  no  invading  force. 
Popular  notions  hardly  went  beyond  simply  defending  the 
capital ;  and  not  only  many  men  who  were  supposed  to  be 
skilled  in  the  calendar  of  state,  but  even  the  shepherds  of 
the  people,  still  nattered  themselves  with  the  hope  that  there 
would  be  no  war — that  all  that  was  needed  to  quell  the 
"rebellion"  was  an  imposing  display  of  force. *  Meanwhile, 
volunteers,  burdening  all  the  railways  that,  from  the  North 
and  East  and  West,  converge  on  Washington,  continued  to 
accumulate  on  the  Potomac.  The  insurrection  that  for  a 
time  had  threatened  to  involve  Maryland,  and  had  broken 
out  in  open  attack  upon  the  first  Federal  troops  that  passed 
through  Baltimore,  had  been  subdued  by  the  firm  policy  of 
the  Administration,  and  direct  railroad  communication  be 
tween  the  national  capital  and  the  North,  for  a  time  inter 
rupted,  had  now  been  restored.  By  the  middle  of  May, 
between  forty  and  fifty  regiments  were  encamped  about 
Washington  ;  and,  at  Chambersburg,  Pennsylvania,  a  large 
force  was  accumulating  under  General  Patterson,  which  by  its 
position  menaced  Harper's  Ferry.  The  presidential  call  had 
been  for  seventy-five  thousand  volunteers  for  a  term  of  three 
months ;  but  through  the  persuasion  of  General  Scott,  who 
well  knew  that  it  was  no  three  months'  affair  the  Govern 
ment  had  on  its  hands,  a  supplementary  call  for  forty  thou 
sand  men,  to  serve  for  three  years  or  the  war  was  made. 
An  increase  of  the  force  of  the  Regular  army  was  also  ordered. 
These  troops  were  raised  with  the  greatest  alacrity,  and  each 

*  "  It  was  a  favorite  notion  with  a  large  class  of  Northern  politicians  (and 
the  people  too)  that  nothing  but  an  imposing  display  of  force  was  necessary  to 
crush  the  rebellion."  General  Barnard:  The  C.  S  A  and  the  Battle  of  Bull 
Hun,  p.  42. 


30  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

State  soon  so  greatly  outran  its  assigned  quota,  that  energetic 
measures  had  to  be  taken  to  stop  recruiting,  until  Congress, 
having  assembled  in  extra  session  on  the  4th  of  July,  au 
thorized  a  levy  of  Five  Hundred  Thousand  Men.  Meantime, 
the  frontier  had  not  been  passed ;  and  the  pickets  lounging 
at  the  bridges  that  span  the  Potomac  from  Washington  to 
the  Virginia  shore,  and  the  gray-uniformed  videttes  on  the 
southern  bank,  observed  each  other  without  any  hostile  mean 
ing  in  their  opposing  eyes. 

But  when  the  day  came  that  the  popular  vote  on  the  ques 
tion  of  secession  was  taken,  the  war,  which  had  thus  far 
"  drifted,"  took  definite  shape.  Though  there  were  yet  no  tid 
ings  what  the  vote  had  been,  there  was,  nevertheless,  no  room 
for  illusion  as  to  its  scope  and  purport ;  and  that  night,  the 
night  of  the  23d  of  May,  the  van  of  the  "  grand  army"  passed 
the  Potomac.  After  midnight,  fifteen  thousand  troops  were 
transferred  by  the  Long  Bridge,  by  the  Aqueduct,  and  by  steam 
ers  to  Alexandria,  situate  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Potomac, 
and  four  or  five  miles  below  Washington.  The  city  of  Alex 
andria,  and  the  Heights  of  Arlington,  opposite  Washington, 
with  the  intermediate  connecting  points,  were  seized  without 
opposition.  A  few  troopers,  that  held  the  town  as  an  outpost 
of  the  force  at  Manassas,  were  captured  ;  the  remainder  gal 
loped  off  to  bear  the  weighty  tidings.  The  bloodless  initia 
tion  of  operations  was  beclouded  by  but  one  event,  the  mur 
der  of  the  young  Colonel  Ellsworth,  of  the  Fire  Zouaves,  who 
was  shot  by  a  citizen  within  a  hotel  of  the  town  of  Alexandria, 
while  bearing  away  a  Confederate  flag,  which  he  had  hauled 
down  from  the  cupola  of  the  building.  Powerful  earthworks, 
as  tetes-de-pont  to  the  Long  Bridge  and  Aqueduct,  were  imme 
diately  constructed  by  the  engineers  ;  and  forts  were  laid  out 
to  cover  the  approaches  to  Alexandria  and  Arlington.  These 
formed  the  initiation  of  the  system  of  "  Defences  of  Washing 
ton."*  The  active  force  south  of  the  Potomac  was  placed 
under  the  command  of  Brigadier-General  Irvin  McDowell, 

*  Barnard  :  Report  of  Engineer  Operations,  p.  9. 


THE  THREE  MONTHS'  CAMPAIGN.  31 

and  held  a  position  threatening  advance  against  the  Confed 
erates  at  Manassas,  by  the  line  of  the  Orange  and  Alexandria 
Railroad.  Leaving  it  for  the  present  in  that  attitude,  I  must 
now  detail  a  series  of  initial  operations  in  other  parts  of  the 
theatre  of  war  in  Virginia. 

The  first  of  these  operations  is  the  affair,  or,  as  it  was  at 
the  time  named,  the  battle,  of  Big  Bethel, — an  affair  which,  in 
significant  in  itself,  had  a  considerable  moral  effect  in  elating 
the  Southern  troops,  and  a  correspondingly  depressing  effect 
upon  the  people  of  the  North.  This  expedition,  which  is  as 
remarkable  for  the  crudity  of  its  conception  as  for  the  blun 
ders  that  marked  its  execution,  was  devised  by  General  But 
ler  for  the  purpose  of  capturing  the  Confederate  posts  at 
Little  and  Big  Bethel,  a  few  miles  up  the  Peninsula  from 
Fortress  Monroe.  The  execution  of  the  project  was  intrusted 
to  one  General  Pierce,  who,  as  it  appears,  had  never  been 
mustered  into  the  United  States  service,  and  had  no  right  to 
any  command.  The  advance  was  made  in  two  columns — the 
regiment  of  Duryea's  Zouaves,  followed  by  the  Third  New 
York  Volunteers,  under  Colonel  Townsend,  on  the  right,  by 
way  of  Hampton  ;  and  Bendix's  New  York  regiment  and  a 
Vermont  battalion  on  the  left,  by  way  of  Newport  News. 
The  movement  was  begun  during  the  night  of  the  9th  of  June, 
and  it  was  designed  to  surprise  the  enemy  before  daylight 
next  morning.  The  marches  of  the  two  columns  were  based 
on  the  showing  of  an  old  and  incorrect  map  ;  and  as  from  this 
the  troops  that  had  to  move  from  Newport  News  were  three 
miles  nearer  the  point  aimed  at  than  the  other  column,  it  was 
arranged  that  they  should  start  an  hour  after  the  others.  The 
true  state  of  the  case,  however,  was,  that  they  were  four  miles 
further;  and  just  before  daybreak  the  rear  regiment  of  the 
left  column,  under  Colonel  Bendix,  and  the  rear  regiment  of 
the  right  column,  under  Colonel  Townsend  (which  had  fol* 
lowed  Duryea's  regiment  at  an  interval  of  two  hours),  met  a 
a  junction  of  roads  near  Little  Bethel ;  and  the  former,  mis 
taking  the  latter  for  an  enemy,  opened  a  fusillade,  by  which 
Townsend's  regiment  suffered  a  loss  of  twenty-nine  in  killed 


32  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE   ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

and  wounded  before  the  contretemps  was  discovered.*  The 
snemy  at  Little  Bethel,  getting  the  alarm,  took  flight,  and  the 
^expedition  then  advanced  on  Big  Bethel.  This  position,  as 
it  appears,  was  occupied  as  an  outpost  of  Magruder's  main 
body  at  Yorktown,  and  was  held  by  a  force  of  eleven  hundred 
North  Carolina  and  Virginia  troops,  under  Colonel  D.  H.  Hill, 
then  in  command  of  the  First  North  Carolina  regiment. t  The 
position  was  rather  advantageous  for  defence,  being  covered 
by  a  swampy  creek,  and  further  strengthened  by  some  guns 
placed  under  cover.  It  was  liable,  however,  to  be  easily 
turned  by  the  right.  General  Pierce  displayed  a  great  in 
competence  in  his  dispositions  ;  but  it  happened  that  there 
was  one  man  there  who  saw  the  course  of  action  suited 
to  the  case.  Lieutenant-Colonel  "Warren  suggested  that  a 
regiment  should  be  sent  round  on  each  side  to  take  the  posi 
tion  in  flank,  and  when  these  became  engaged,  those  in  front, 
lying  in  shelter  in  a  wood,  should  attack.  This  operation,  if 
carried  out,  would  probably  have  been  successful.  But  the 
regiment  that  was  to  make  the  movement  on  the  enemy's 
right,  instead  of  being  directed  by  a  detour  through  the 
woods,  was  advanced  right  across  an  open  field,  in  front  of 
the  position,  whereby  it  became  exposed  to  an  artillery  fire. 
It  happened,  too,  that  the  left  company  became  separated 
from  the  rest  of  the  regiment  by  a  thicket ;  and  Colonel 
Townsend  not  being  aware  of  this,  and  seeing  the  glistening 
of  bayonets  in  the  woods,  concluded  the  enemy  was  outflank 
ing  him,  and  so  fell  back  to  his  first  position.  The  regiment 
that  had  gone  round  on  the  other  flank  found  itself  in  a  diffi 
cult  situation,  where  being  exposed  to  pretty  severe  fire,  it  was 
found  hard  to  bring  the  men  up  ;  and  Major  Winthrop,  aid  to 
General  Butler,  a  young  man  of  superior  culture  and  promise, 


*  Lieutenant-Colonel,  afterwards  Major-Qeneral,  Warren,  at  that  time 
attached  to  Duryea's  Zouaves,  states  in  his  evidence  before  the  War  Committee 
that  "  the  two  regiments,  when  they  arrived  on  the  ground,  finding  things  not 
at  all  as  they  had  been  instructed,  were  justified  in  firing  on  each  other." 
Report  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  vol.  iii.,  p.  384. 

t  Hill :  Eeport  of  Big  Bethel. 


THE  THREE  MONTHS'  CAMPAIGN.  33 

was  killed  while  rallying  the  troops  to  the  assault.  Lieuten 
ant  Greble,  of  the  regular  artillery,  who  had  handled  his  guns 
very  skilfully  and  caused  the  enemy  to  withdraw  a  battery 
posted  to  command  the  road  leading  to  Bethel,  was  also 
killed  ;  and  the  aggregate  loss  was  found  to  be  about  a  hun 
dred  men.  General  Pierce  then  ordered  a  retreat,  and  the 
regiments  marched  off  as  on  parade.  Colonel  Warren,  who 
alone  protested  against  the  retreat,  voluntarily  remained  on 
the  ground,  and  together  with  Dr.  "Winslow,  of  his  regiment, 
brought  off  the  wounded.  While  he  yet  remained  on  the 
ground,  the  Confederates  abandoned  the  position ;  and  the 
reason  for  this  step  assigned  by  Colonel  Hill  is,  that  he  feared 
re-enforcements  would  be  sent  up  from  Fortress  Monroe.* 
The  affair  of  Big  Bethel  really  proved  nothing,  except  that  an 
attempt,  involving  failure  in  its  very  conception,  had  failed. 
Yet  it  was  magnified  as  a  great  victory  by  the  South  ;  was 
put  forth  as  a  test  of  what  was  called  "  relative  manhood ;" 
and  produced  throughout  the  North  a  deep  feeling  of  mortifi 
cation  and  humiliation. t 

This  feeling  was  kept  alive  by  a  trivial  fiasco  which  occurred 
shortly  after  in  General  McDowell's  department.  General 
Schenck  had  been  ordered  to  make  a  reconnoissance  up  the 
London  and  Alexandria  Eailroad  to  Leesburg ;  and  setting 
out  with  a  few  hundred  troops,  upon  a  train  of  cars,  he  pro 
ceeded  upon  that  novel  kind  of  reconnoissance.  The  excur 
sion  was  made  uninterruptedly  until  the  train  neared  Vienna, 
thirteen  miles  from  Alexandria,  when,  turning  a  curve,  it  was 
suddenly  opened  upon  by  two  guns  planted  near  the  track,  the 
fire  killing  and  wounding  some  twenty  men.  The  troops 
immediately  sprang  from  the  cars  and  took  to  the  woods  ;  and 
the  engineer  having  detached  the  locomotive,  made  all  speed 
to  Alexandria,  leaving  the  excursionists  to  get  back  as  best 

*  Hill :  Report  of  Big  Bethel. 

f  Colonel  Hill,  in  a  "bombastic  report  published  at  the  time,  spoke  of  repuls 
ing  "  desperate  assaults,"  and  pursuing  "  till  the  retreat  became  a  rout,''  etc., 
etc.  ;  while  he  himself  was  retiring  without  any  reason  whatever.  This  fus 
tian  found  ready  credence  at  the  South. 

3 


34  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

might  be,  and  the  cars  to  be  burnt  by  the  enemy.  The  hos 
tile  force  consisted  of  a  small  scouting  party  under  Colonel 
Gregg,  and  did  not  pursue  in  the  least.  The  adverse  guns  were, 
like  those  of  Big  Bethel,  immediately  set  down  as  a  "  masked 
battery," — a  phantom  of  the  imagination  that  played  a  really 
considerable  part  during  the  early  stages  of  the  war.* 

But  the  discouragement  caused  by  these  lapses  was  destined 
soon  to  disappear  under  the  influence  of  a  series  of  very  dif 
ferent  operations  in  "Western  Virginia,  from  whose  mountains 
was  flashed  the  first  gleam  of  positive  victory  upon  the  Union 
arms. 


II. 
McCLELLAN  IN  WEST  VIRGINIA. 

IT  has  been  seen,  in  an  earlier  part  of  this  narrative,  that 
the  defence  of  "Western  Virginia,  on  the  side  of  the  Confed 
erates,  had  been  undertaken  by  General  Lee,  who  had  dis 
patched  Colonel  Porterfield  to  that  region,  for  the  purpose  of 
raising  there  a  local  force.  The  object  of  this,  it  is  probable, 
was  not  so  much  to  undertake  offensive  operations  across  the 
Ohio  River,  as  to  coerce  the  loyal  inhabitants  into  the  seces 
sion  movement,  t 

*  This  "  masked  battery"  theory  was  given  by  General  Schenck  in  explana 
tion  of  the  affair  at  Vienna,  touching  which  he  says,  in  his  dispatch  of  the  time 
to  General  Scott :  "  We  were  fired  upon  by  raking  masked  batteries  of,  I  think, 
three  guns,  with  shell,  round-shot,  and  grape,"  etc.  It  would  be  difficult  to  say 
how  much,  and  for  how  long  a  time,  this  absurd  fiction  of  "  masked  batteries" 
affected  operations ;  but  it  is  certain  that  it  had  no  inconsiderable  influence.  A 
curious  illustration  of  this  is  given  by  General  McDowell,  in  his  evidence  touch 
ing  the  battle  of  Bull  Run.  "  The  march,"  says  he,  "  was  slow, — one  reason 
being,  that  since  the  affairs  at  Vienna  and  Big  Bethel,  a  fear  of  '  masked  bat 
teries'  caused  hesitation  in  regard  to  advance  upon  points  concerning  which 
there  was  a  want  of  information."  Report  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  vol.  ii., 
p.  4.  So  true  to  human  nature  is  the  maxim,  "  Omneignotum  pro  magnijico  /" 

f  The  correctness  of  this  view  of  the  aim  of  the  Confederates  in  West  Vir 
ginia  is  fully  confirmed  by  captured  dispatches  from  General  Lee  to  Colonel 
Porterfield. 


THE  THREE  MONTHS'  CAMPAIGN.  35 

Now  about  the  middle  of  May,  the  States  of  Ohio,  In 
diana,  and  Illinois  had  been  formed  into  a  department  named 
the  Department  of  the  Ohio,  and  its  control  had  by  General 
Scott  been  intrusted  to  General  George  B.  McClellan,  for 
merly  of  the  Corps  of  Engineers  in  the  regular  army,  who  hav 
ing  a  short  time  previously  been  made  major-general  of  the 
Ohio  contingent  under  the  three  months'  call,  was  now  raised 
to  the  same  rank  in  the  regular  army.  His  command  being 
bounded  on  one  side  by  the  Ohio  Eiver,  McClellan's  attention 
was  naturally  attracted  to  the  events  passing  on  the  other 
side  of  the  frontier,  within  the  limits  of  West  Virginia.  Find 
ing  the  position  of  the  Confederates  both  oppressive  to  the 
loyal  inhabitants  and  menacing  in  a  military  point  of  view, 
General  McClellan,  about  the  end  of  May,  without  instructions 
from  Washington,  threw  over  a  force  to  the  Virginia  side  of 
the  Ohio  ;  and  hearing  of  a  secession  camp  at  Phillippi,  he 
ordered  it  to  be  broken  up.  The  movement  to  this  end  was 
under  way,  when  Porterfield,  becoming  aware  of  it,  abandoned 
his  position.  McClellan  having  determined  to  occupy  the 
whole  region,  had  his  Ohio  regiments,  as  they  were  in  succes 
sion  equipped,  transferred  to  the  Virginia  side.  But  the  Con 
federates  were  indisposed  to  give  up  this  mountain  fastness  ; 
and  accordingly,  to  meet  the  Union  occupation,  strong  re- 
enforcements,  to  the  amount  of  six  thousand  men,  were  directed 
upon  Western  Virginia,  and  the  command  given  to  General 
Garnett,  an  old  officer  of  the  regular  army.  Garnett  took  up 
advantageous  positions  at  Laurel  Hill,  a  westward-facing 
sentinel  of  the  Alleghany  range,  where  he  held  command  of 
the  great  road  from  Wheeling  to  Staunton, — the  main  high 
way  of  communications  for  the  region  west  of  the  AUeghanies 
with  that  to  the  east  of  that  mountain-wall, — and  began  a 
system  of  very  active  and  very  annoying  partisan  operations. 
In  the  course  of  a  month  General  McClellan  had  on  foot  a 
considerable  army,  and  he  then  determined  to  take  the  field 
against  Garnett's  force.  The  theatre  of  operations  was  that 
portion  of  Western  Virginia  contained  between  the  Ohio  and 
Cheat  rivers  in  one  direction,  and  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio 


36  CAMPAIGNS   OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

Railroad  and  Great  Kanawha  and  Gauley  rivers  in  the  other. 
The  affluents  of  the  Monongahela  and  the  two  Kanawhas 
divide  this  region  into  a  number  of  narrow  valleys,  separated 
by  rough  and  difficult  hills,  which  rise  into  true  mountains  as 
they  approach  the  heads  of  the  Little  Kanawha  and  the  west 
fork  of  the  Monongahela.  The  country  here  becomes  alpine 
in  its  character.  The  roads  practicable  for  wagons  are  few, 
narrow,  and  difficult.  As  cultivation  is  generally  confined  to 
the  valleys,  and  the  mountain-sides  are  obstructed  by  rocks 
and  a  dense  growth  of  timber  and  underbrush,  it  is  difficult 
even  for  skirmishers  to  move  across  the  country,  and  it  is  not 
possible  for  troops  and  trains  to  march  elsewhere  than  on 
the  narrow  roads.  Positions  suitable  for  handling  artillery 
are  rare,  and  cavalry  is  useful  in  that  district  only  to  con 
vey  intelligence.  The  resources  of  the  country  are  incon 
siderable.* 

These  characteristics  of  ground,  which  are  the  common 
characteristics  of  mountain  regions,  give  to  mountain  warfare 
certain  principles  particular  to  it,  and  different  from  those 
that  obtain  in  military  operations  in  the  plain.  Thus  moun 
tain  warfare  readily  admits  of  combined  inarches,  which  can 
seldom  be  employed  in  the  plain.  Such  marches  offer,  in 
highland  regions,  no  real  danger,  since  the  enemy  is  unable 
to  throw  himself  between  the  columns  :  it  is  therefore  suffi 
cient  that  each  column  be  strong  enough  to  defend  the  valley 
in  which  it  operates. t  But  the  facility  of  the  tactical  defence 
of  highlands  renders  it  necessary  for  the  assailant  to  seek  to 
dislodge  the  enemy  by  manoeuvres  rather  than  direct  attack  : 
in  other  words,  he  should  manoeuvre  offensively  while  he 
fights  defensively  ;  or,  as  Napoleon  sums  up  the  theory  in  one 
pregnant  sentence,  "  the  genius  of  mountain  warfare  consists 
in  occupying  camp  on  the  flanks  or  on  the  rear  of  the  enemy, 


*  McClellan :  Campaigns  in  Western  Virginia,  p.  25. 

f  Vial :  Cours  d'Art  et  d'Histoire  Militaires,  vol.  ii.,  p.  82.  On  this  feature  of 
mountain  warfare,  see  also  McDougall :  Modern  Warfare  and  Modern  Artillery, 
p.  356. 


THE  THREE  MONTHS'  CAMPAIGN.  37 

so  as  to  leave  him  only  the  alternative  of  evacuating  his  posi 
tion  without  fighting,  or  of  issuing  to  attack."* 

I  make  this  exposition  of  the  theory  of  mountain  warfare, 
because,  as  will  presently  appear,  the  operations  of  General 
McClellan  in  Western  Virginia  afford  a  very  happy  applica 
tion  of  all  the  cardinal  principles  here  laid  down.  The  main 
turnpike  from  Staunton  to  Wheeling,  which  is  the  great  high 
way  across  the  mountains,  was  held  by  Garnett  in  an  in 
trenched  position,  at  Laurel  Hill.  This  road,  which  here 
runs  nearly  southward,  was  his  direct  and  natural  line  of 
retreat,  and  if  cut  off  from  that,  his  only  chance  of  escape 
was  by  difficult  roads  over  the  mountains,  eastward.  Five 
miles  below  Garnett's  main  position  at  Laurel  Hill,  a  road 
from  the  west  passes  through  this  spur  at  a  defile  known  as 
Eich  Mountain,  and  strikes  the  main  road.  To  guard  this 
approach  against  any  menace  directed  upon  his  line  of  re 
treat,  Garnett  had  placed  here  his  second  in  command, 
Colonel  Pegram,  with  a  force  of  about  one  thousand  men. 
McClellan,  whose  line  of  march  was  from  the  west,  from  the 
direction  of  the  Ohio  Eiver,  determined  to  dislodge  Garnett 
and  Pegram  by  striking  their  main  line  of  retreat  below  the 
position  held  by  the  latter.  Then,  to  make  the  operation  de 
cisive,  he  resolved  to  direct  another  column  from  the  north  to 
seize  the  only  other  avenue  of  escape,  and  thus,  if  possible, 
capture  or  destroy  the  whole  adverse  force. f 

With  the  main  column  of  two  brigades,  under  Brigadier 
Generals  Scheich  and  Eosecrans,  the  afterwards  illustrious 
commander  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  and  victor  of 
Stone  Eiver,  General  McClellan  moved  from  the  west,  by  way 
of  Clarksburg  to  Buchanon  (July  2),  twenty  miles  west  of 
the  hostile  position.  From  here,  several  divergent  expedi- 


*  As  authority  on  this  same  point,  see  also  Dufour,  Strategy  and  Tactics,  p. 
261 ;  Jomini :  Art  of  War,  p.  168  ;  Vial :  Cours  d'Art,  etc.,  vol.  ii.,  p.  83. 

f  In  a  letter  to  Lieutenant-General  Scott,  communicating  his  proposed  plan 
of  operations,  McClellan  adroitly  put  it  that  he  should  seek  to  "  repeat  tlit 
manoeuvre  at  Cerro  Gordo" 


38  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

tionary  columns  were  sent  out  to  mislead  the  enemy.  Another 
column,  composed  of  the  brigade  of  General  Morris,  held 
position  at  Phillippi,  about  the  same  distance  north  of  the 
enemy's  stronghold,  as  General  McClellan,  at  Buchanon, 
with  his  other  two  brigades,  was  west  of  it.  The  7th  of 
July,  Morris  was  directed  to  advance  southward  to  a  position 
within  a  mile  and  a  half  of  Garnett's  camp  at  Laurel  Hill,  and 
by  strong  demonstrations  give  the  enemy  the  impression  that 
the  main  attack  was  to  be  made  by  him.  The  8th,  Mc 
Clellan,  with  the  brigades  of  Eosecrans  and  Scheich,  moved 
eastward  from  Buchanon,  and  on  the  following  afternoon 
came  within  two  miles  of  Pegram's  position  at  Eich  Moun 
tain.  Having  reconnoitred  it,  he  resolved,  instead  of  making 
a  direct  attack,  to  hold  one  of  his  brigades  in  front,  while  he 
sent  Eosecrans  by  a  detour  by  the  right  and  southward,  to 
lay  hold  of  the  enemy's  main  line  of  retreat,  the  turnpike,  and 
then  take  Pegram's  position  in  the  rear.  Setting  out  early  in 
the  morning,  Eosecrans  moved  partly  by  mountain  bridle 
paths,  and  partly  through  rough  and  trackless  woods  and 
thickets  of  laurel.  It  rained  incessantly.  By  noon  he  had 
gained  Pegram's  rear ;  but  the  latter,  having  captured  a  dra 
goon  carrying  dispatches  from  the  Union  commander,  became 
aware  of  the  plan,  and  effecting  a  partial  change  of  front, 
posted  a  force  of  six  hundred  men  and  three  guns  to  hold  the 
crest  of  the  mountain  in  his  rear,  while  with  the  remainder  he 
confronted  the  force  McClellan  held  in  his  front.  After  a  sharp 
fusilade,  Eosecrans  carried  the  crest,  driving  the  defenders 
in  upon  Pegram's  intrenchments ;  but  against  this  force  hf 
did  not  push  his  advance,  and  as  McClellan,  awaiting  the 
sounds  of  his  musketry  before  joining  in  with  a  front  attack 
heard  none,  the  day  passed  by.  During  the  night,  Pegram 
evacuated  his  position,  and  attempted  to  join  Garnett's  main 
body,  five  miles  north.  After  a  day's  wandering  through  the 
woods,  being  surrounded,  he  was  compelled  to  surrender  with 
six  hundred  men,  the  few  remaining  hundreds  escaping. 
Meantime,  Garnett,  alarmed  at  the  forces  gathering  around 
him  on  all  sides,  also  abandoned  his  position  at  Laurel  Hill. 


THE  THREE  MONTHS'  CAMPAIGN.  39 

But,  attempting  with  about  four  thousand  men  to  make  good 
his  escape  southward,  he  found  McClellan  already  grasping 
his  line  of  retreat,  and  he  then  fled  eastward  over  the  moun 
tains.  Being  vigorously  pursued,  he  was  twice  brought  to  & 
stand  and  severely  handled ;  but  forces  that  the  Union  com 
mander  had  directed  to  move  from  the  north  and  east  to 
intercept  the  flying  enemy,  did  not  act  with  sufficient  prompt 
ness,*  so  that  the  operation  was  not  as  decisive  as  it  other 
wise  must  have  been.  The  last  stand  made  by  Garnett  was 
at  Carrick's  Ford,  at  the  passage  of  the  Cheat  River,  where 
he  was  attacked  by  the  advance  of  General  Morris's  brigadef 
on  the  13th,  driven  in  disorder,  losing  all  his  guns  and  bag 
gage,  and  General  Garnett  himself,  while  gallantly  striving  to 
rally  his  rear-guard,  was  killed.  This  ended  the  brief  and 
brilliant  campaign  in  the  mountains,  and  General  McClellan 
was  able  to  telegraph  to  Washington  as  its  result  the  capture 
of  a  thousand  prisoners,  with  all  the  enemy's  stores,  baggage, 
and  artillery,  and  the  complete  disruption  of  the  hostile  force. 
"  Secession,"  he  added,  "  is  killed  in  this  country." 

The  result  of  this  miniature  campaign  was  most  inspiriting 
to  the  people  of  the  North,  and  had  an  effect  far  beyond  its 
intrinsic  importance,  just  as  had  in  another  way  the  fiascos  of 
Big  Bethel  and  Vienna.  It  is  the  moral  influence  of  small 
successes  and  small  defeats,  that  in  the  first  stages  of  a  war 
makes  their  importance  and  forms  the  real  measure  of  their 
value.  All  great  commanders  have  understood  this  well.  The 
campaign  in  West  Virginia  was  conducted  agreeably  to  mili 
tary  principles, — a  characteristic  that  did  not  belong  to  other 
operations  thus  far ;  and  its  execution,  as  well  as  the  fact  that 
it  was  undertaken  by  General  McClellan  of  his  own  motion, 
and  without  countenance  from  Washington,  stamped  him  as  a 
man  of  superior  ability. 

*  McClellan  :  Campaign  in  Western  Virginia,  p.  34. 

f  This  attack  was  made  by  the  Fourteenth  Ohio,  the  Seventh  and  Ninth 
Indiana,  and  a  section  of  Barnett's  battery. 


4Q  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  AKMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

III. 
THE   BATTLE   OF   BULL   RUN. 

WHEN  in  a  national  crisis  the  thoughts  of  men,  and  even 
the  policy  of  the  Government  are  in  that  condition  which  is 
expressed  bj  the  term  drifting,  wonderful  is  the  effect  of  a 
phrase  that  crystallizes  the  floating  and  half-formed  senti 
ments  of  the  people  into  a  definite  theory.  Such  a  phrase, 
about  the  time  reached  by  this  narrative,  arose  in  the  North. 
Thus  far,  no  well-defined  military  policy  guided  the  conduct 
of  the  war.  The  series  of  small  outlying  operations  already 
sketched  were,  with  the  exception  of  those  in  West  Virginia, 
crude  in  conception,  undertaken  at  haphazard,  and  aimed  at 
no  definite  result.  But  when  Congress  assembled  in  extra 
session,  on  the  4th  of  July,  the  effervescent  enthusiasm  of  the 
country  found  expression  in  a  phrase  that,  as  it  perfectly  em- 
-  bodied  the  popular  sentiment,  was  presently  echoed  through 
out  the  whole  North.  This  phrase  was,  "  On  to  Eichmond." 

Now,  in  such  popular  cries  there  is  always  a  certain  element 
of  the  ideal ;  and  hence  we  may  suppose  that  this  one  did  not 
so  much  imply  a  literal  movement  "on  to  Eichmond,"  as  it 
expressed  with  emphasis  and  in  definite  shape  the  conviction 
of  the  popular  mind  that  immediate  action  should  be  taken 
against  the  rebellious  force  that  had  ensconced  itself  in  the 
Manassas  stronghold,  only  a  few  miles  in  front  of  the  Federal 
capital.  No  doubt  there  were  many  that  actually  believed  the 
Union  force  might  not  only  drive  the  enemy  from  Manassas, 
but  really  follow  "  on  to  Eichmond."  It  need  hardly  be  said, 
however,  that  an  overland  march  to  Eichmond  by  the  force 
then  assembled  at  Washington  would  have  been  an  impossi 
bility,  even  had  there  been  no  enemy  to  oppose  the  adven 
ture.  The  people,  conscious  of  great  earnestness  and  en 
thusiasm,  were  unconscious  either  of  the  nature  of  the  task 
they  had  set  themselves  to  do,  or  the  nature  of  the  means 


THE  THREE  MONTHS'   CAMPAIGN. 

needed  to  carry  it  through.  They  knew  that  the  rebels  were 
at  Manassas.  They  saw  around  Washington  an  imposing 
martial  array,  which  they  fondly  named  the  "  Grand  Arm}'  of 
the  United  States;"  and  they  could  not  understand  what, 
after  almost  three  months  of  preparation,  could  possibly 
hinder  the  advance  of  that  army  against  the  confronting 
enemy,  and  even  on  to  the  capital  seat  of  the  rebellion.* 

The  veteran  soldier  who,  burdened  with  years  and  the 
infirmities  of  nature,  remained  at  the  head  of  the  United 
States  army,  and  to  whom,  by  consequence,  it  fell  to  direct 
the  military  councils  at  Washington,  was  ill-fitted  to  grapple 
with  the  tremendous  problem  forced  upon  him.  General 
Scott  knew  well  war  and  war's  needs.  He  knew  that  the 
imposing  array  of  patriotic  citizens  who,  dressed  and  armed 
to  represent  soldiers,  lay  around  Washington,  was  but  the 
simulacrum  of  an  army  ;  that  to  this  mass  were  wholly  want 
ing  the  organization,  discipline,  experience,  whatever,  in  fact, 
goes  to  the  fashioning  of  that  most  complex  of  living  organ 
isms.  But  it  was  little  that  he  should  know  this,  when  those 
hi  power,  who  knew  it  not  and  would  not  know  it,  were 
determined  to  act  as  if  it  were  not.  Indeed  he  had  himself  to 
assume  that  it  was  not,  and  proceed  in  the  work  of  forming  a 
plan  of  campaign  for  immediate  action.  Now,  a  plan  of  cam 
paign  General  Scott  could  well  devise ;  for  he  was  a  man  that 
knew  generalship  and  grand  war  ;  had  himself  plucked  laurels 
on  the  field  of  battle  before  the  present  generation  of  men 
was  born  ;  and  long  years  ago,  in  Europe,  had  discussed  the 
highest  principles  of  the  military  art  with  the  great  marshals 
of  Napoleon.  But  all  this  only  served  to  separate  him  and 
his  views  and  plans  the  more  hopelessly  from  those  with 
whom  he  had  to  deal.  He  was  opposed  to  what  he  called  "  a 

*  "  The  country  could  not  understand,  ignorant  as  it  was  of  war  and  war's 
requirements,  how  it  could  possibly  be  true  that,  after  three  months  of  prepa 
ration  and  of  parade,  an  army  of  thirty  thousand  men  should  be  still  utterly 
unfit  to  move  thirty  miles  against  a  series  of  earthworks  held  by  no  more  than 
an  equal  number  of  men."  Hurlbut :  McClellan  and  the  Conduct  of  the  Wa?, 
page  103. 


42  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

Little  war  by  piecemeal."  He  was  averse  to  fighting  at  all  in 
Virginia,  which  he  did  not  regard  as  a  theatre  for  decisive 
action,  and  thought  that  the  Union  army  should  strike  its 
first  blow  in  the  basin  of  the  Mississippi.  But  what  were 
such  views  to  the  ardent  congressmen  and  cabinet  councillors 
to  whom  Beauregard's  blazon  at  Manassas  was  the  picador's 
flag  to  the  infuriate  bull  ?  They  prevailed.  General  Scott  has 
confessed  it :  his  moral  firmness  gave  way  under  the  pressure 
of  an  Administration  thai  was  in  turn  goaded  almost  to  frenzy 
by  a  press  and  people  demanding  action  at  ah1  hazards. 

There  was,  therefore,  to  be  an  advance  of  the  army  in  front 
of  Washington ;  and  early  in  July  the  duty  of  planning  and 
executing  a  movement  against  Beauregard  at  Manassas  de 
volved  upon  General  McDowell,  who,  since  the  transfer  of  the 
Union  force  into  Virginia,  had  been  put  in  command  of  the 
column  of  active  operation  south  of  the  Potomac,  and  of  the 
Department  of  Northeastern  Virginia.  This  column  numbered 
about  thirty  thousand  men. 

The  officer  to  whom  it  thus  fell  to  lead  the  main  army  to 
its  first  field  was  a  man  of  no  mean  capacity  as  a  soldier. 
Of  the  staff  of  the  old  regular  army,  McDowell  was  distin 
guished  for  his  fine  professional  acquirements;  and  having 
studied  the  theory  of  war  and  seen  European  armies,  he  was, 
of  the  small  body  of  trained  soldiers,  perhaps  the  man  best 
qualified  for  the  command.  That  he  had  never  commanded 
any  considerable  body  of  men  on  the  actual  field  was  a  draw 
back  shared  by  every  other  oificer  in  the  service. 

General  McDowell  knew  perfectly  well  the  kind  of  mate 
rial  with  which  he  had  to  work,  and  its  greenness  and 
unfitness  to  take  the  field ;  and  he  did  his  best  to  improve  it. 
This  he  might  readily  have  done,  had  he  had  to  grapple 
merely  with  this  work ;  but  his  main  struggle  was  elsewhere  : 
and  he  has  left  a  picture,  half  pathetic  and  half  ludicrous,  of 
his  unavailing  plea  for  a  little  common  sense  with  those 
whose  ardor  was  only  equalled  by  their  ignorance.  "  I 
wanted,"  says  he,  "  very  much  a  little  time — all  of  us  wanted 
it.  We  did  not  have  a  bit  of  it."  To  his  plea  of  the 


THE  THREE  MONTHS'  CAMPAIGN.          43 

"greenness"  of  his  troops,  the  answer,  more  specious  than 
well  taken,  was  constantly  returned  —  "  You  are  green,  it  is 
true  ;  but  they  are  green  also  :  you  are  all  green  alike.  "* 

So  far  from  having  time  to  mould  his  army,  many  of  his 
regiments  were  brought  across  the  Potomac  at  the  last 
moment,  without  his  even  seeing  them,  and  without  being 
even  brigaded.  He  had,  therefore,  no  opportunity  to  test  his 
machinery  —  to  move  it  round  and  see  whether  it  would  work 
smoothly  or  not  ;  and  such  was  the  feeling,  that  when,  on  one 
occasion,  McDowell  had  a  body  of  eight  regiments  reviewed 
together,  he  was  censured  for  "trying  to  make  a  show."t 
Even  the  special  circumstance  that  should  have  caused  de 
lay,  —  to  wit,  the  fact  that  a  large  part  of  the  best,  that  is,  the 
best-armed,  drilled,  officered,  and  disciplined  troops  in  front 
of  Washington  consisted  of  three  months'  volunteers  whose 
term  of  service  was  about  to  expire,  —  was  an  incentive  to 
precipitate  action.  These  troops  had  fulfilled  the  duty  for 
which  they  wsere  called  out,  which  was  to  assure  the  safety  of 
the  national  capital  ;  their  presence  had  given  time  to 
organize  a  force  for  the  war  ;  Congress  had  authorized  a  call 
for  five  hundred  thousand  three  years'  volunteers,  and  these 
were  thronging  to  the  Potomac.  It  is  certainly  easy  to  see 
that  the  dictate  of  prudence  was  this  :  not  to  attempt  to 
employ  the  three  months'  men  in  active  operations,  but  to 
organize  and  mobilize,  from  the  three-year  troops,  an  ade 
quate  army  for  the  field.  Other  counsels  prevailed,  and  the 
army  with  which  McDowell  took  the  field  was  an  army 
without  organization,  or  a  staff,  or  a  commissariat,  or  an 
organized  artiUery.J  The  wonder,  indeed,  is  not  that  he 


*  Report  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  vol.  i.,  p.  38.  t 

|  "  Being  tete-a-tete  with  McDowell,  I  saw  him  do  things  of  detail  which,  in 
any  even  half-way  organized  army,  belong  to  the  specialty  of  a  chief  of  the 
staff.  ....  McDowell  received  his  corps  in  the  most  chaotic  state.  Almost 
with  his  own  hands  he  organized,  or  rather  put  together,  the  artillery. 
Brigades  are  scarcely  formed  ;  the  commanders  of  brigades  do  not  know  their 
commands,  and  the  soldiers  do  not  know  their  generals."  Gurowski  :  Diary, 
1861-2,  p.  61.  Mr.  Russell  (My  Diary  North  and  South,,  pp.  424-5)  makes 
some  striking  statements  to  the  same  purpose. 


44  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

should  not  have  done  more,  but  that  he  did  so  much ;  and 
the  spirit  of  forbearance  and  alacrity  with  which  he  entered 
upon  and  carried  through  his  trying  task,  entitles  him  to  great 
credit. 

In  entering  upon  the  special  problem  assigned  him,  it  was 
not  possible  for  General  McDowell  to  avoid  taking  into 
account  not  only  his  immediate  enemy  at  Manassas,  but 
whatever  other  hostile  forces,  distributed  over  the  theatre  of 
war  in  Virginia,  might  influence  the  fortunes  of  his  projected 
expedition.  The  occupation  of  Manassas  had  been  recom 
mended  to  the  Confederates,  from  the  very  fact  that  it  was 
the  centre  of  the  railroad  system  of  Northern  Virginia — at 
the  junction  of  the  great  southern  railroad  route  connecting 
Washington  with  Eichmond,  and  the  Manassas  Gap  Kailroad 
leading  to  the  Valley  of  the  Shenandoah.  The  former 
highway  connected  Beauregard  with  the  forces  on  the  Penin 
sula  and  at  Eichmond  (distant  by  railroad  about  seventy-five 
miles) ;  the  latter,  with  the  army  under  Johnston,  in  the 
Shenandoah  Valley  (distant  by  railroad  about  seventy  miles). 
The  Confederates,  in  fact,  held  a  line  interior  to  the 
forces  of  Butler,  McDowell,  and  Patterson — respectively  at 
Fortress  Monroe,  in  front  of  Washington,  and  on  the  Upper 
Potomac.  This  distribution  of  the  Union  armies  was  a  fault 
to  which  General  McDowell  was  quite  alive  ;  but  he  had 
assurances  from  the  lieutenant-general  that  the  enemy  on  the 
Peninsula  should  be  occupied  by  General  Butler,  and  that 
Johnston's  forces  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley  should  be  held 
there  by  General  Patterson.  On  expressing  his  fears  in 
regard  to  Johnston,  a  few  days  before  the  opening  of  the 
campaign,  General  McDowell  was  assured  by  General  Scott 
that,  "if  Johnston  joined  Beauregard,  he  should  have  Pat 
terson  on  his  heels."* 

With  this  understanding,  McDowell  projected  a  plan  of 
operations  against  Manassas,  which  was  substantially  to 


*  For  more  on  the  same  subject,  see  McDowell's  testimony :  Report  on  the 
Conduct  of  the  War. 


THE  THREE  MONTHS'  CAMPAIGN.  45 

advance  by  Fairfax  Courthouse,  there  make  a  sudden  move 
ment  to  the  left,  and,  crossing  the  Occoquan  just  below  the 
junction  of  that  stream  with  Bull  Eun  (thus  turning  Beaure- 
gard's  right),  strike  at  the  enemy's  railroad  communications. 
This  project  was  submitted  to  the  cabinet  and  agreed  to,  and 
the  9th  of  July  was  fixed  as  the  day  when  the  army  should 
move.  Owing,  however,  to  the  deficiency  of  transportation 
and  supplies,  the  advance  was  not  begun  till  a  week  later. 

With  the  view  of  giving  effect  to  that  part  of  the  military 
programme  which  provided  that  Johnston's  force  in  the  Shen- 
andoah  Yalley  should  be  neutralized,  General  Patterson  was, 
on  the  2d  of  July,  again  ordered  across  the  Potomac  from 
Maryland.  He  made  the  passage  of  the  river  at  Williams- 
port,  and  took  position  at  Martinsburg.  Johnston  then  held 
post  near  Winchester  with  a  force  of  about  eight  thousand 
men.*  The  specific  duty  assigned  to  Patterson  was,  in  view 
of  the  impending  battle  in  front  of  Washington,  to  defeat 
Johnston  or  prevent  his  making  a  junction  with  Beauregard 
at  Manassas.  For  this  purpose,  the  force  of  twelve  thousand 
men  with  which  General  Patterson  had  crossed  the  Poto 
mac  was  augmented  to  an  effective  of  about  eighteen  thou- 
sand.f  Now,  from  the  relative  position  of  the  contending 
forces,  it  is  evident  that  the  only  method  of  accomplishing 
the  latter  purpose,  to  wit,  preventing  Johnston  from  re-enfor 
cing  Beauregard,  was  to  adopt  the  former  course — namely,  to 
attack  Johnston.  If  Patterson,  therefore,  was  not  in  condi 
tion  to  do  this,  his  force  should  immediately  have  been  with 
drawn  to  the  front  of  Washington  and  united  with  McDowell's. 
General  Scott  expected  Patterson  to  attack  Johnston, {  but  he 
gave  no  imperative  order  to  do  so ;  and  Patterson,  who 
though  more  than  doubly  outnumbering  his  opponent,  fancied 
Johnston  had  "  at  least  forty  thousand  men,"  and  that  the 

*  This  estimate  I  derive  from  General  Johnston  himself. 

f  Patterson  :  Campaigns  in  the  Valley  of  the  Shenandoah,  p.  63. 

|  "  I  have,  certainly  been  expecting  you  to  beat  the  enemy ;  if  not,  to  hear 
that  you  had  felt  him  strongly,  or  at  least  had  occupied  him  by  threats  and 
demonstrations."  Dispatch  from  General  Scott,  July  18th. 


46  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

wily  enemy  "  had  a  trap  set  somewhere"  for  him,*  feared  either 
to  demonstrate  or  attack.  His  conduct  was  certainly  feeble ; 
and  his  marches  and  countermarches,  made  far  from  the 
enemy,  were  ridiculous.  At  Martinsburg  his  position  was  a 
false  one,  where,  instead  of  threatening  the  enemy,  the  enemy 
threatened  him.  At  length,  when  informed  that  the  army  in 
front  of  "Washington  was  actually  under  way,  he  (July  15th) 
advanced  his  force  from  Martinsburg  to  Bunker's  Hill,  from 
which  point  he,  on  the  17th,  fell  off  upon  Charlestown,  near 
Harper's  Ferry,  and  Johnston  was  left  free  to  move  to  form  a 
junction  with  Beauregard!  This  was  precisely  what  John 
ston  now  found  occasion  to  do.  As  will  presently  appear, 
McDowell's  reconnoitring  parties  appeared  in  front  of  Bull 
Bun  on  the  18th  of  July.  On  the  same  day  a  message  reached 
Johnston  from  Beauregard  :  "  If  you  wish  to  help  me,  now  is 
the  time."  Johnston  promptly  availed  himself  of  the  oppor 
tunity  to  escape  unmolested.  Making  a  rapid  flank  march 
by  way  of  Ashby's  Gap,  he  took  cars  on  the  Manassas  Gap 
Railroad  at  Piedmont,  and  joined  Beauregard  with  his  ad 
vance  brigades  on  Saturday,  the  20th.  What  part  they 
played  in  the  coming  battle  will  presently  appear. 

General  McDowell  moved  his  army  from  the  banks  of  the 
Potomac  on  the  afternoon  of  July  16th.  The  movable  column 
consisted  of  four  divisions — the  First  Division,  under  General 
Tyler ;  the  Second,  under  General  Hunter ;  the  Third,  under 
General  Heintzelman  ;  the  Fifth,  under  Colonel  Miles.  The 
Fourth  Division,  under  General  Eunyon,  was  left  in  the  works 
on  the  south  bank  of  the  Potomac.  These  divisions  made  an 

*  Patterson  :  Narrative  of  the  Campaign  in  the  Valley  of  the  Shenandoah, 
p.  57. 

General  Johnston,  in  conversation  with  the  writer  touching  this  point,  made 
a  ludicrous  comment  on  Patterson's  statement  of  his  numbers.  On  my  mention 
ing  to  him  that  Patterson,  in  a  Narrative  recently  published,  had  put  down 
the  Confederate  strength  at  forty  thousand,  General  Johnston  laughingly  ex 
claimed:  "Why,  if  he  had  really  thought  that  I  had  forty  thousand,  or  half 
that  number,  sooner  than  have  crossed  the  Potomac  he  would  have  thrown 
himself  headlong  into  it." 


RUN 

Fonght  J  U  LY  21  ?T  1862  . 
Scale  of \;Wtle&. 
REFERENCES 


Uiuon-  Troops . 


tlKcyes 
6.  S/iernuiu 

f 


l.WUcox, 

f.  Porter- 


'/i  Miles 


ll>r  'Campaigns  of 'Mr  Army  of  (tie  h>tt>m<t< 


Troops. 

First  &  taut  Positions 

Z.         t"  tturtori 
3.         3'  K> 
b.        &'  Bee 


6.  ft'  /ion ham 

7.  7>  Etey 

8.  8  'Early  _ 

St.  9'  Stiuti'tfi  Cnv. 

H).  /O'EvrflL 

11.  tt'Lon 
1%, . .      iz'U.fi. 


. 


THE  THREE  MONTHS'  CAMPAIGN.  47 

aggregate  of  about  thirty-five  thousand  men.  They  moved  in 
four  columns  :  one  by  the  turnpike ;  one  by  the  lateral  country 
roads  on  the  right ;  one  on  the  left  of  the  railroad ;  and 
another  between  the  turnpike  and  railroad,  following  what  is 
known  as  the  "  Braddock"  road.*  It  was  known  that  Fairfax 
Courthouse  was  held  as  an  outpost  by  a  brigade  of  South 
Carolina  troops,  and  the  three  right  columns  were  directed  to 
co-operate  on  that  point  with  the  view  of  capturing  this  force  ; 
but  on  entering  the  place,  at  three  o'clock  on  the  afternoon  of 
the  17th,  it  was  found  abandoned.  General  McDowell  had 
hoped  to  have  his  columns  concentrated  at  Centreville  that 
night,  but  the  troops  being  unused  to  march,  did  not  arrive 
till  the  following  day.  As  it  was,  however,  the  march  was 
really  made  with  a  good  deal  of  rapidity.  From  Centreville, 
General  McDowell  proceeded  to  push  out  reconnoissances, 
with  a  view  to  the  projected  manoeuvre  by  his  left ;  but  ex 
amination  soon  proved  the  impracticability  of  the  ground  for 
this  purpose.  Moreover,  the  character  of  General  McDowell's 
move  was  revealed  to  Beauregard  by  an  affair  which  the  weak 
ambition  of  a  division  commander  brought  on  that  afternoon 
at  Blackburn's  Ford,  on  Bull  Eun.  General  Tyler  had  been 
ordered  with  his  division  to  occupy  Centreville,  and  thence 
"  observe  the  roads  to  Bull  Run,"  but  was  cautioned  "  not  to 
bring  on  any  engagement. "f  In  obedience  to  this  h«  pushed 
a  brigade  forward  to  Blackburn's  Ford,  which  proved  to  be 
about  the  centre  of  Beauregard's  true  defensive  line  along 
Bull  Eun.  Reaching  the  heights  on  the  northern  side  of  the 
stream,  he  opened  an  artillery  fire  with  two  twenty-pounder 
rifle-guns,  which  had  the  effect  of  first  developing  and  after 
wards  silencing  the  enemy's  battery  near  the  ford.  Thus  far 
he  had  not  exceeded  his  instructions ;  but  he  had  the  impres 
sion  that  the  enemy  would  run  whenever  seriously  menaced ; 
and  he  declared  that  "  the  great  man  of  the  war  would  be  the 

*  So  called  from  its  having  been  made  by  that  general  on  his  memorable 
march  to  Fort  Duquesne,  in  1754,  which  terminated  in  his  disastrous  defeat 
and  death. 

f  McDowell's  order :  Report  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  vol.  i.,  p.  46. 


48  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

man  that  got  to  Manassas,  and  he  meant  to  go  through  thai 
night. "*  His  notion  of  the  method  of  executing  this  project 
was  to  file  his  brigade  down  to  the  stream,  draw  it  up  parallel 
to  the  other  shore,  and  open  an  unmeaning  fusillade.f  While 
engaged  in  this  foolery,  a  force  crossed  the  stream  from  the 
other  side,  and  striking  his  left  flank  (the  Twelfth  New  York), 
disrupted  it  completely.  This  admonished  General  Tyler  to 
defer  his  intended  visit  to  Manassas  that  night,  and  he  with 
drew.  The  loss  was  inconsiderable,  but  the  effect  on  the 
morale  of  the  raw  troops  was  bad. 

In  consequence  of  the  abandonment  of  the  plan  of  opera 
tion  on  the  Confederate  right,  the  next  two  days  (July  19th 
and  20th)  were  spent  by  the  engineers  in  reconnoitring  and 
determining  how  and  where  the  attack  should  be  made.  It 
was  found  that  there  was  a  good  ford  over  Bull  Bun  at  Sud- 
ley  Spring,  two  miles  above  the  point  where  the  direct  road 
from  Centreville  to  Warrenton  crosses  Bull  Eun  by  the  Stone 
Bridge.  It  was  also  found  that  this  ford  was  unguarded  by 
the  enemy,  and  that  above  that  point  the  stream  was  almost 
everywhere  easily  passable.  On  these  data  was  based  the 
plan  of  attack,  which  was  as  follows :  The  Fifth  Division 
(Miles)  to  remain  in  reserve  at  Centreville,  and  to  make  with 
one  of  its  brigades,  added  to  Eichardson's  brigade  of  Tyler's 
division,  a  false  attack  at  Blackburn's  Ford ;  the  First  Divi 
sion  (Tyler)  to  move  by  the  turnpike  up  to  the  Stone  Bridge 
at  daybreak,  threaten  that  point,  and,  at  the  proper  time,  to 
carry  it  or  cross  if  uncovered  from  above.  Meantime,  the 
principal  column,  consisting  of  the  two  divisions  of  Hunter 
and  Heintzelman,  of  about  twelve  thousand  men,  was  to 
diverge  from  the  turnpike  to  the  right  a  mile  beyond  Centre 
ville,  and,  by  a  detour,  reach  Sudley  Ford ;  thence,  descending 
the  right  bank  of  Bull  Eun,  it  would  take  the  defences  of  the 
Stone  Bridge  in  reverse.  The  united  force  would  then  give 


*  My  authority  for  this  statement  is  Colonel  Alexander,  of  the  Corps  of 
Engineers,  then  engineer  on  Tyler's  staff, 
f  Barnard :  The  Battle  of  Bull  Run,  p.  49. 


THE  THREE  MONTHS'  CAMPAIGN.  49 

battle,  strike  at  the  enemy's  railroad  communications,  or  act 
otherwise  as  circumstances  might  dictate.*  It  was  an  excel 
lent  plan  of  battle. 

The  execution  of  this  plan  was  set  on  foot  three  hours  after 
midnight  of  the  20th,  when  the  troops,  breaking  camp  at 
Centreville,  launched  on  their  novel  adventure,  and,  in  a  dewy 
moonlight  night,  took  up  the  march  destined  to  bring  them 
into  presence  of  the  enemy.  The  divisions  had  been  ordered 
to  march  at  half-past  two  A.  M.,  with  the  view  of  getting  on 
the  ground  early  in  the  morning  of  the  21st.  Tyler's  division 
had  the  advance  on  the  main  road  from  Centreville ;  and,  as 
the  two  divisions  under  Hunter  and  Heintzelman,  to  which 
was  intrusted  the  turning  movement,  had  to  follow  on  this 
road  up  to  the  point  where  they  were  to  diverge  to  the  right, 
it  was  especially  urgent  that  no  obstruction  should  bar  their 
march.  Nevertheless,  there  was  delay  in  getting  Tyler's 
division  out  of  camp  and  on  to  the  road,  and  delay  in  its  ad 
vance,  which,  of  course,  retarded  the  turning  column.  Then 
the  road  over  which  Hunter  and  Heintzelman  had  to  pass 
was  found  to  be  longer  than  was  expected ;  so  that,  instead  of 
getting  into  position  by  six  in  the  morning,  it  was,  as  .will 
subsequently  appear,  nine  before  this  column  debouched  on 
the  southern  side  of  Bull  Kun,  at  Sudley's  Spring.  Tyler, 
meanwhile,  had  pushed  on,  and,  by  six,  drew  up  his  division 
in  front  of  Stone  Bridge,  where  he  opened  an  artillery  fire  on 
the  enemy  on  the  opposite  side  of  Bull  Kun. 

While  the  columns  of  McDowell  were  thus  under  way, 
events  of  equal  moment  were  passing  within  the  Confederate 
camp.  General  Johnston  in  person  had  joined  Beauregard 
during  the  night  of  the  20th  (his  troops,  however,  not  having 
yet  arrived),  and,  being  the  ranking  officer,  he  assumed  com 
mand  of  all  the  Confederate  forces.  Nevertheless,  as  Beau- 
regard  knew  his  ground,  the  plans  he  had  formed  were 
adopted,  and  Johnston  directed  their  execution  under  him. 
This  plan  contemplated  an  offensive  movement  before 

*  McDowell :  Order  of  Battle. 

4 


50  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE   POTOMAC. 

McDowell  should  be  able  to  strike  ;  but,  as  a  body  of  five 
thousand  troops  of  Johnston's  force,  that  were  expected  to 
arrive  during  the  night  from  the  Shenandoah  Yalley,  did  not 
reach  the  ground  till  some  hours  later,  other  dispositions  had 
to  be  made.* 

Beauregard,  in  stationing  his  forces,  had  committed  the 
error  of  treating  the  line  of  Bull  Bun  as  a  real  defensive  line 
that  could  be  passed  only  at  the  fords  ;  and  hence  he  had 
stationed  his  brigades  at  these  several  fords — the  brigades  of 
Ewell  and  Holmes,  at  Union  Mills  Ford,  forming  his  right ; 
the  brigades  of  Jones  and  Early,  at  McLean's  Ford;  the 
brigades  of  Longstreet  and  Jackson,  at  Blackburn's  Ford; 
and  Bonham's  brigade,  at  Mitchell's  Ford.  Other  commands 
were  in  reserve  and  between  these  forces,  while  Colonel 
Evans,  with  a  demi-brigade,  held  Stone  Bridge,  which  formed 
the  Confederate  left.  Meantime,  he  had  neglected  to  note 
that  on  his  left,  from  Sudley  Springs  up,  Bull  Run  could  be 
passed  anywhere.  When,  therefore,  at  six  o'clock  of  the 
morning  of  the  21st,  Beauregard  learned  from  Colonel  Evans 
that  a  Federal  force  (which  was  the  head  of  Tyler's  column) 
had  drawn  up  opposite  Stone  Bridge,  he  assumed  the  attack 
would  be  made  there — that  is,  against  his  left.  He  was 
ignorant  that  the  real  menace  was  a  turning  movement  to 
take  his  whole  line  in  the  rear.  Beauregard' s  military  in 
spirations  were,  however,  always  essentially  aggressive  ;  and, 
on  learning  the  appearance  of  the  hostile  force  at  Stone 
Bridge  (being  still  unaware  of  the  flanking  operation  in  exe 
cution  above),  he  resolved  to  assume  the  offensive  to  relieve 
his  left.  He  judged  the  most  effective  method  of  accomplish 
ing  this,  to  be  a  counter  move  by  his  right  and  centre  on 
the  Union  flank  and  rear  at  Centreville ;  and  with  this  view 
orders  were  dispatched  to  General  Ewell,  whose  brigade 
formed  the  right  of  the  Confederate  line  at  Union  Mills  Ford, 
to  begin  the  movement,  which  was  to  be  followed  up  by  the 
brigades  of  Jones,  at  McLean's  Ford ;  Longstreet,  at  Black- 

*  Beauregard  :  Report  of  the  Battle  of  Manassas. 


THE  THREE  MONTHS'  CAMPAIGN.  51 

burn's  Ford ;  and  Bonham,  at  Mitchell's  Ford.*  I  must  add 
here  a  fact  which  is  an  evidence  that  the  staff-organization  of 
the  Confederate  Army  was,  at  this  time,  little  better  than  that 
of  the  Union  Army — these  orders  did  not  reach  their  destina 
tion  for  four  hours  after  the  time  they  were  sent ;  and  this, 
as  will  presently  appear,  gave  a  very  peculiar  turn  to  the 
whole  earlier  part  of  the  battle. 

Meanwhile,  the  force  of  Tyler  had  deployed  in  front  of 
Stone  Bridge,  and  a  scattering  skirmish  fire  was  opened  be 
tween  his  troops  and  those  of  Evans  on  the  opposite  side 
of  Bull  Eun.  This  served  as  an  excellent  mask  for  the 
column  executing  the  turning  move,  as  it  occupied  the  atten 
tion  of  the  force  behind  Stone  Bridge  for  a  couple  of  hours — 
that  is,  till  about  half-past  eight.  But,  about  that  time, 
Evans  becoming  satisfied  of  the  counterfeit  character  of  the 
demonstrations  on  his  front,  and  persuaded  of  an  attempt  to 
turn  his  left  flank,t  changed  front,  and  marched  towards 
Sudley  Springs,  leaving  a  skirmish  line  to  observe  for  the 
while  the  Federal  force  opposite  the  Stone  Bridge.  Thus  it 
was  that  the  opposing  forces  were  moving  to  meet  each  other ; 
and  when,  towards  ten  o'clock,  the  head  of  Hunter's  column, 
having  passed  to  the  right  bank  of  Bull  Eun,  by  way  of  Sud 
ley  Ford,  and  advanced  for  a  mile  through  a  thick  wood,  de 
bouched  into  the  open  country  beyond,  the  gray-jackets  could 
be  descried  already  drawn  up  in  line  of  battle.  Colonel 
Evans,  with  his  demi-brigade,  had  taken  up  a  position  west 
of  the  Warrenton  road,  almost  at  right  angles  to  Bull  Eun, 
and  considerably  in  advance  of  the  ridge  on  which  the  main 
Confederate  line  was  afterwards  drawn. 

Had  now,  at  the  first  encounter,  a  moderate  degree  of  skill 
or  energy  marked  the  conduct  of  the  Union  commander 
present  on  the  field,  there  is  little  doubt  that  success  was  at 
this  moment  in  the  hands  of  General  McDowell,  who  deserved 

*  "  By  such  a  movement,"  adds  Beauregard,  "  I  confidently  expected  to 
achieve  a  complete  victory  for  my  country  by  12  o'clock  M."  Report  of  the 
Battle  of  Manassas. 

f  Beauregard :  Report  of  the  Battle  of  Manassas. 


52  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

success  for  the  excellence  of  his  generalship.  A  powerful 
body  was,  by  a  flank  movement,  planted  on  the  southern  side 
of  Bull  Run,  and  Beauregard's  defensive  line  was  taken  in 
reverse.  It  is  true  this  part  of  the  plan  should  have  reached 
this  stage  of  development  by  six  o'clock  in  the  morning,  and 
it  was  now  ten ;  but  this  was  not  enough  to  jeopardize  the 
success  of  the  scheme,  for  Beauregard  was  ignorant  of  what 
had  taken  place.  It  is  also  true  that  Colonel  Evans,  divining 
the  move,  had  effected  his  change  of  front  to  meet  the 
Federal  advance  ;  but  his  entire  force  consisted  of  but  nine 
weak  companies,  and  Hunter  had  twelve  thousand  men. 

But  there  was  present  neither  the  skill  nor  the  energy  to 
take  advantage  of  these  circumstances ;  and  the  manner  in 
which  the  troops  were  brought  up  affords  a  striking  illustra 
tion  of  the  then  greenness  of  even  the  foremost  officers  of  the 
army.  In  place  of  making  proper  dispositions  in  a  line  of 
battle,  General  Hunter  caused  a  feeble  fusilade  to  be  opened 
from  the  head  of  the  column ;  and  Colonel  Burnside's  Hhode 
Island  regiments,  thrown  in  alone,  were  speedily  cut  up. 
This  wasted  an  hour.  To  aid  Burnside's  hard-pressed  com 
mand,  the  brigade  of  Colonel  A.  Porter  was  ordered  up  and 
deployed  on  his  right,  and  Sykes'  battalion  of  Begulars  re 
lieved  him  on  the  left.  A  serious  advance  of  this  line  soon 
began  to  press  the  handful  of  Confederates  back ;  but  Evans 
was  speedily  re-enforced  by  portions  of  the  brigades  of  Col 
onels  Bee  and  Barton,  who  were  at  hand  near  the  Stone 
Bridge,  and,  by  these  united  forces,  a  fresh  stand  was  made 
on  a  position  still  west  of  Young's  Branch.  But  the  increas 
ing  pressure  of  the  Union  line,  strengthened  now  by  the  ad 
dition  of  portions  of  Heintzelman's  division  coming  in  on  the 
left,  compelled  the  Confederates  to  yield  ground,  and  they 
were  presently  forced  back  sufficiently  to  allow  Tyler's  force 
near  Stone  Bridge  to  commence  crossing  to  the  south  side 
and  join  in  the  combat. 

Commanding  one  of  Tyler's  brigades  was  one  Colonel  W.  T. 
Sherman,  afterwards  of  some  repute  in  the  world  as  the  man 
who  led  the  armies  that  marched  from  Chattanooga  to 


THE  THREE   MONTHS'   CAMPAIGN.  53 

Atlanta,  and  from  Atlanta  to  the  sea.  This  officer,  who  dis 
played  even  in  the  war's  infancy  something  of  that  same  mil 
itary  talent  that,  developed  by  experience,  made  him  among 
the  foremost  of  Union  commanders,  had  discovered,  while  re 
connoitring  in  the  morning,  an  unknown  ford,  half  a  mile 
above  the  Stone  Bridge.*  Being  ordered  to  cross  Bull  Run 
to  the  assistance  of  the  forces  on  the  other  side,  he  was  en 
abled  to  do  so  by  this  ford  long  before  the  Stone  Bridge  was 
uncovered  for  the  passage.-  Keyes'  brigade  of  the  same  divi 
sion  followed,  and  both  succeeded  in  making  a  junction  with 
the  force  engaged.  This  done,  the  whole  advanced,  and  drove 
the  enemy  back  across  Young's  Branch  and  over  the  Warren- 
ton  road  and  up  the  slopes  on  the  other  side.  The  Confeder 
ates  went  back  in  much  disorder,  and  were  only  rallied  on  an 
elevated  ridge  or  table-land  beyond  Young's  Branch. t 

While  these  events,  in  the  prelude  of  the  battle,  were  going 
on,  Beauregard  and  Johnston,  from  their  headquarters,  near 
the  centre  of  the  line,  marked  the  outburst  of  battle  on  their 
left  flank,  and  listened  eagerly  and  anxiously  for  similar 
sounds  from  the  direction  of  Centreville,  resulting  from  the 
prescribed  counter-attack  in  that  quarter  by  the  Confederate 
right.  "  To  my  profound  disappointment,"  adds  the  Con 
federate  commander,  "  I  learned,  just  about  the  time  that  the 
force  on  the  left  had  been  driven  back  by  the  advance  of  the 
Federals,  that  my  order  to  General  Ewell  had  miscarried." 
Judging  it  too  late  for  the  effective  execution  of  the  contem 
plated  move,  Beauregard  found  himself,  as  he  states,  "  forced 
to  depend  on  new  combinations  to  meet  the  enemy  on  the 
field  upon  which  he  had  chosen  to  give  us  battle.":):  Leaving 
Ewell,  Jones,  Longstreet,  and  Bonham  at  their  positions  along 

*  "  Early  in  the  day,  when  reconnoitring  the  ground,  I  had  seen  a  horse 
man  descend  from  a  bluff  to  the  bank,  cross  the  stream,  and  show  himself  in 
the  open  field.  Inferring  we  could  cross,"  etc.  Sherman:  Report  of  Bull  Run. 

f  The  disorder  that  pervaded  the  Southern  force  at  this  time  is  freely 
acknowledged  by  General  Johnston,  whose  official  report  is  marked  by  a 
candor  not  observable  in  that  of  Beauregard. 

\  Report  of  the  Battle  of  Manassas. 


54  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

the  lower  fords  to  make  demonstrations  against  the  Federal 
forces  opposite  and  prevent  their  going  to  re-enforce  Mc 
Dowell's  right,  the  reserves,  consisting  of  Holmes'  two  regi 
ments  and  a  battery,  Early's  brigade,  and  two  of  Bonham's 
regiments  and  a  battery,  were  immediately  ordered  up  to 
support  the  Confederate  left  flank,  now  so  seriously  imperilled. 
Jackson,  who  with  his  brigade  of  five  regiments  had  been 
in  reserve  not  far  from  the  Stone  Bridge,  went  up  just  at 
the  time  that  Evans,  and  Bee,  and  Barton,  who  had  been 
holding  the  advance  position,  had  given  way,  and  were  at 
tempting  to  rally  and  reform  their  troops  on  the  plateau.* 
At  this  juncture,  Beauregard  and  Johnston  reached  the  field, 
and  it  required  their  best  personal  efforts  to  hold  the  men  to 
their  work.  This  accomplished,  Beauregard  took  command 
on  the  field,  while  Johnston  went  to  the  rear  to  hurry  up  re- 
enforcements  from  his  army  arriving  from  the  Valley. 

The  Confederates  had  now  been  forced  back  a  mile 
and  a  half,  and  the  Union  force  had  cleared  its  front  com 
pletely  across  the  Warrenton  road;  the  Stone  Bridge  was 
uncovered,  and  McDowell  drew  up  his  line  on  the  crest  gained, 
with  Heintzelman's  division  (brigades  of  Wilcox  and  How 
ard)  on  the  right,  supported  by  part  of  Porter's  brigade  and 
the  cavalry  under  Palmer,  and  Franklin's  brigade  of  Heintzel 
man's  division ;  Sherman's  brigade  of  Tyler's  division  in  the 
centre ;  and  Keyes'  brigade  of  Tyler's  division  on  the  left. 
Beauregard  reformed  his  forces  on  the  plateau  beyond.  His 
line  of  battle  consisted  of  about  six  thousand  five  hundred 
men,  thirteen  pieces  of  artillery,  and  two  companies  of  Stuart's 
cavalry. 

The  definitive  possession  of  this  plateau  now  became  the 

*  He  came  not  a  moment  too  soon.  Bee  approaching  Jackson,  and  pointing 
to  the  mingled  remnants  of  his  own  command,  and  the  shattered  brigades  of 
Barton  and  Evans  huddled  up  in  the  woods,  exclaimed,  "  General,  they  are 
beating  us  back."  "  Sir,  we'll  give  them  the  bayonet,"  replied  Jackson  ;  and 
Bee,  rushing  back  to  his  troops,  rallied  them  with  the  words :  "  There  is  Jack 
son,  standing  like  a  stone  wall;  let  us  determine  to  die  here,  and  we  will 
conquer." 


THE  THREE  MONTHS'  CAMPAIGN.  55 

prize  eagerly  contested  by  the  opposing  force.  This  height  is 
on  three  sides  inclosed  by  small  water-courses,  which  empty 
into  Bull  Kun  within  a  few  yards  of  each  other,  and  half  a 
mile  to  the  south  of  Stone  Bridge.  Eising  to  an  elevation  of 
quite  one  hundred  feet  above  the  level  of  Bull  Run  at  the 
bridge,  it  falls  off  on  these  sides  to  the  level  of  the  inclosing 
streams  in  slopes  which  are  gentle,  but  furrowed  by  ravines  of 
irregular  direction  and  length,  and  shaded  with  clumps  and 
patches  of  young  pines  and  oaks.  The  general  direction  of 
the  crest  of  the  plateau  is  oblique  to  the  course  of  Bull  Eun. 
Around  its  eastern  and  southern  brow  an  almost  unbroken 
fringe  of  second- growth  pines  gave  excellent  shelter  to  the 
Southern  sharp-shooters.  To  the  west,  adjoining  the  fields, 
directly  across  the  crest,  on  both  sides  of  the  Sudley  road,  ex 
tends  a  broad  belt  of  oaks,  in  which,  during  the  battle,  regi 
ments  of  both  armies  met  and  contended  for  the  mastery. 

Having  obtained  possession  of  the  ridge,  the  main  effort 
of  the  Union  forces  was  made  to  work  round  and  envelop  the 
left  flank  of  the  Confederate  line.  This  was  a  manoeuvre 
which  promised  well,  but,  unfortunately,  the  army  was 
hardly  in  a  condition  to  execute  it ;  for,  worn  out  in  the  hot 
day's  work,  it  had  already  lost  its  cohesion,  and  errors  were 
committed  of  which  the  Confederates  speedily  took  advan 
tage.  The  batteries  of  Griffin  and  Eicketts,  which  had 
played  a  brilliant  part  during  the  conflict,  had  been  ordered 
by  General  McDowell  to  the  top  of  the  ridge  on  the  right,  so 
as  to  take  advantage  of  the  success  gained.  These  batteries 
were  supported  by  the  Fire  Zouaves  and  Marines,  while  the 
Fourteenth  New  York  regiment  was  directed  into  a  skirt  of 
wood  on  the  right,  to  protect  that  flank.  The  quick  eye  of 
Jackson,  who  held  position  in  front,  saw  the  exposed  position 
and  feeble  support  of  Griffin's  battery,  and  he  threw  forward 
the  Thirty-third  Virginia  to  take  it.  Nor  till  they  emerged 
from  the  skirt  of  woods,  not  a  thousand  yards  distant,  was 
the  danger  known ;  and  when  Griffin  was  about  to  open  on 
them,  the  chief  of  artillery,  Major  Barry,  restrained  him  from 
so  doing,  conceiving  they  were  the  Fourteenth  New  York, 


56  CAMPAIGNS  OF    THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

that  had  been  thrown  into  the  woods  on  the  right  in  support. 
Jackson's  men  made  a  dash  on  the  battery,  and  the  sup 
ports  giving  way,  took  possession  of  the  guns,  many  of 
the  cannoniers  being  shot  down  and  the  horses  killed. 
Fresh  forces  were,  however,  brought  up,  the  Confederates 
were  driven  back,  and  the  guns  retaken.  Beauregard  then 
advanced  the  right  of  his  line  in  an  attempt  to  recover 
the  plateau  and  the  guns.  This  effort  was  partially  suc 
cessful,  but  it  was  met  by  a  fresh  rally  of  the  Union  forces  ; 
and  thus  the  tide  of  battle  repeatedly  surged  backwards  and 
forwards,  with  varying  success  to  each  combatant.  Finally, 
towards  three  in  the  afternoon,  a  fresh  accession  of  force 
having  arrived  from  the  incoming  troops  of  Johnston,  Beau- 
regard  made  a  determined  effort  to  recover  the  disputed 
plateau.  The  attack  was  vigorously  made,  and  swept  back 
the  Union  forces  from  the  whole  open  ground — the  batteries 
of  Griffin  and  Kicketts  being  again  and  finally  captured. 
Still,  the  Union  line,  though  shaken  and  giving  ground, 
did  not  yield  the  field.  A  fresh  effort  was  even  made 
to  extend  the  right  so  as  to  envelop  the  Confederate  left. 
While  this  movement  was  in  execiition,  the  brigade  of 
Early,  the  rear  of  the  army  of  the  Shenandoah,  reached 
the  field  from  Manassas  Junction,  and  coming  in  on 
the  Union  right  flank  (exposed  and  badly  placed),*  deter 
mined  the  action.  Many  of  the  regiments,  especially  on  that 
wing,  were  already  badly  used  up,  and  had  lost  their  organ 
ization.  The  fire  from  the  fresh  arrivals  doubled  up  this 
flank  and  drove  it  back  in  a  confusion  which,  presently, 
involved  the  whole  line,  extending  even  to  the  left,  which  had 
hitherto  shown  more  consistency,  and  was  even  advancing. 
The  whole  force  was  thrown  back  in  disorder,  across  and 
over  the  ridge,  and  over  Young's  Branch,  and,  in  extreme 
confusion,  made  in  all  available  directions  towards  Bull  Run. 
Every  effort  was  made  to  rally  the  troops,  even  beyond  the 

*  "  The  enemy's  new  formation  exposed  his  right  flank  more  even  than 
the  previous  one. '    Johnston :  Report  of  the  Battle  of  Manassas. 


THE  THREE  MONTHS'  CAMPAIGN.  57 

reach  of  fire,  but  in  vain.  The  battalion  of  Regulars,  alone 
justifying  the  traditions  of  military  discipline,  made  a  brief 
stand  on  the  margin  of  the  ridge,  to  allow  the  volunteers  to 
reach  the  Warrenton  road.  But  the  troops  were  rapidly 
reaching  that  condition  when  it  escapes  the  power  of  man  to 
hold  them  :  there  was  running  through  them  that  mysterious 
terror  which  the  Greeks  ascribed  to  the  presence  of  Pan. 

"  The  retreat,"  says  McDowell,  "  soon  became  a  rout,  and 
this  presently  degenerated  into  a  panic."  The  troops  fled 
across  Bull  Run ;  and  once  on  the  road,  the  different  bodies 
coming  together,  and  without  officers,  became  intermingled, 
and  all  organization  was  lost ;  while  army  trains  and  artillery 
blocking  the  road,  produced  a  hideous  debacle.  At  the  same 
time,  Colonel  Miles,  who  commanded  the  division  of  reserves, 
and  to  whom  was  intrusted  the  duty  of  holding  the  Centreville 
ridge  from  Centreville  up  to  Blackburn's  Ford,  withdrew  his 
troops  from  these  positions,  uncovering  the  passage  of  the 
stream  to  the  Confederates,  and  exposing  the  whole  retreating 
mass  to  capture  or  destruction, — a  fate  which  was  averted  by  the 
arrival  of  General  McDowell,  who  ordered  back  Miles'  troops 
to  their  position,  and  by  the  inactivity  of  the  Confederates. 
Nothing  like  systematic  pursuit  was  made,  although  a  small 
party  of  cavalry  followed  the  retreat  as  far  as  Cub  Run.  By 
sundown,  most  of  the  army  was  safe  behind  the  Centreville 
ridge.  There  was,  however,  no  question  of  halting  there  ;  for 
the  condition  of  the  army  and  the  absence  of  supplies  left  no 
alternative  but  to  fall  back;  and  during  the  night  the  army 
made  its  way  to  the  Potomac.  The  retreat  was  marked  by 
great  disorder,  all  semblance  of  military  organization  being 
lost.  Many  did  not  even  stop  on  reaching  the  camps  south 
of  the  Potomac,  but  fled  by  the  bridges  and  ferries  to  Wash 
ington.  This,  however,  was  at  length  stopped  by  Colonel 
Sherman,  who  posted  strong  guards  at  the  points  of  passage. 

The  Confederate  loss  in  this  action  was  1852,  of  whom  269 
were  killed  and  1438  wounded.  The  Union  loss  must  have 
been  nealry  4000 ;  the  prisoners,  well  and  wounded,  left  in 
Beauregard's  hands,  numbered  1460. 


58  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

It  is  hardly  necessary  to  seek  any  explanation  of  the  events 
of  Bull  Run,  other  than  what  arises  from  the  consideration  of 
the  simple  fact  that  the  battle  was  fought  at  all.  McDowell's 
plan  of  battle  was  well-considered,  and  even  bold ;  but  the 
faults  of  execution  were  innumerable.  Owing  to  the  absence 
of  any  thing  like  a  staff,  the  attack  was  made  in  a  most  frag 
mentary  way,  without  order  or  ensemble.  Since  the  close  of 
the  war,  the  writer  of  these  pages  has  had  with  General 
Johnston  a  very  full  conversation  on  this  action  ;  and  on  the 
question  of  the  general  management  of  the  battle  of  Manas- 
sas,  he  spoke  as  follows :  "  The  key-point  was  a  flat,  bare 
crest.  It  was  here  that  the  Federals  made  their  attacks. 
But  they  were  made  by  a  brigade  at  a  time.  The  position 
was  really  hardly  tenable,  and  had  an  attack  been  made  in 
force,  with  double  line  of  battle — such  as  any  major-general 
in  the  United  States  service  would  now  make — we  could  not 
have  held  it  half  an  hour,  for  they  would  have  enveloped  us 
on  both  flanks." 

So  far  as  regards  the  mere  physical  fact  of  fighting,  which 
was  at  the  time  the  all-important  question,  there  was  noth 
ing  of  which  the  Union  soldiers  had  to  be  ashamed — they 
stood  up  to  it  with  the  blood  of  their  race.  The  fault  lay  in 
the  inherently  vicious  organization  of  the  force — in  the  great 
number  of  miserable  subordinate  officers,  which  in  turn  was 
the  natural  result  of  the  method  of  raising  regiments.  Yet, 
with  all  the  faults,  the  action  was  for  a  time  almost  a  success, 
which  shows  that  the  Confederates  were  really  in  not  much 
better  condition.  Their  chief  point  of  advantage  was  in  the 
better  class  of  officers  created  by  their  system.  Nevertheless, 
the  victory  long  hung  in  the  balance,  and  might  readily  have 
declared  itself  on  either  side.*  At  the  close  of  the  action,  the 

*  General  Jordan,  chief  of  staff  to  Beauregard,  informs  me  that  while  con 
ducting  Jefferson  Davis  up  to  the  battle-ground  from  Manassas  Junction 
during  the  progress  of  the  action,  and  just  a  short  time  before  the  giving  way 
of  the  Union  lines,  such  were  the  streams  of  stragglers  and  skulkers  pouring  to 
the  Southern  rear,  that  Mr.  Davis  fancied  Beauregard  had  been  completely 
beaten.  Observing  the  fact  that  each  even  slightly  wounded  man  was  es- 


THE  THREE  MONTHS'  CAMPAIGN.  59 

Southerners  were  hardly  less  demoralized  than  their  oppo 
nents,  so  that  the  idea  of  pursuit  was  not  to  be  entertained. 
On  this  point,  again,  the  testimony  of  General  Johnston  is  of 
the  highest  value.  "  In  our  condition,"  said  he,  "  pursuit 
could  not  be  thought  of ;  for  we  were  almost  as  much  dis 
organized  by  our  victory  as  the  Federals  by  their  defeat. 
Next  day,  many,  supposing  the  war  was  over,  actually  went 
home.  A  party  of  our  soldiers,  hearing  that  a  friend  lay 
wounded  twenty  miles  off,  would  start  out  to  go  and  see  him ; 
or  that  another  acquaintance  was  dead,  and  they  would  go 
and  bury  him.  Our  men  had  in  a  larger  degree  the  instinct 
of  personal  liberty  than  those  of  the  North  ;  and  it  was  found 
very  difficult  to  subordinate  their  personal  will  to  the  needs 
of  military  discipline."  * 

Both  sides,  in  fact,  had  much  to  learn ;  and  it  is  the  fact 
that  the  battle  of  Bull  Kun  was  the  first  great  lesson  which 
tke  two  armies  received,  that  makes  the  events  which  trans 
pired  on  the  plains  of  Manassas  that  July  Sunday,  forever 
memorable  in  the  history  of  the  War. 

corted  by  two  or  tliree  comrades,  Mr.  Davis  exclaimed  to  Jordan,  "  Battles  are 
not  won  where  several  unhurt  men  are  seen  carrying  off  each  wounded  soldier !" 
*  General  Johnston  in  his  official  report  says :  "  The  war  department  has 
already  been  informed  of  all  the  causes  that  prevented  pursuit,  some  of  which 
only  are  proper  to  be  communicated."  I  suppose,  what  is  stated  above,  which  I 
had  from  General  Johnston's  own  lips,  supplies  the  rest. 


60  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY   OF  THE  POTOMAC. 


III. 

THE  ARMY  BEFORE  WASHINGTON. 

JULY,  1861— MARCH,  1862. 


I. 
ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

WHEN  the  army  that  so  lately  had  gone  forth  with  such 
high  hopes  returned  from  Manassas  shattered  and  discom 
fited  to  the  banks  of  the  Potomac,  wise  men  saw  there  was 
that  had  suffered  worse  defeat  than  the  army — it  was  the 
system  under  which  Bull  Eun  had  been  fought  and  lost.  The 
lesson  was  a  severe  one  ;  but  if  it  was  needed  to  demonstrate 
the  legitimate  result  of  the  crude  experimentalism  under  which 
the  war  had  been  conducted, — when  campaigns  were  planned 
by  ignorant  politicians,  and  battles,  precipitated  by  the 
pressure  of  sanguine  journalists,  were  fought  by  raw  three 
months'  levies, — the  price  paid  was  perhaps  not  too  high. 
The  Bull  Kun  experiment  taught  the  country  it  was  a  real  war 
it  had  undertaken,  and  that  success  could  only  be  hoped  for 
by  a  strict  conformity  to  military  principles. 

The  spirit  in  which  the  country  rose  to  meet  the  emergency 
showed  that  it  had  benefited  by  the  experience  ;  and  if  before 
Bull  Bun  the  public  mind  had  been  in  a  mood  to  require  just 
such  a  stern  lesson  for  reproof  and  correction  and  instruction, 
it  soon  appeared  that  there  was  in  it  a  temper  to  rise  above  the 
worst  lapses  and  failures.  For  then  was  seen  that  which  again 
and  again  throughout  the  war  has  been  seen — a  spectacle 


THE  ARMY  BEFORE  WASHINGTON.  61 

marvellous  and  majestic,  when  the  nation,  stirred  to  its  depths, 
uprose  to  meet  the  crisis  that  was  upon  it.  Something  of  the 
kind  had  been  seen  at  the  uprising  that  followed  the  assault 
on  Fort  Sumter.  But  that  was  a  manifestation  less  deep  and 
earnest  than  the  swift,  stern,  almost  savage  vigor  with  which 
the  men  of  the  North,  wounded  in  the  instinct  of  self-love  as 
well  as  in  the  sentiment  of  patriotism,  arose  to  assert  their 
manhood,  impugned  by  the  humiliations  of  Bull  Run.  The 
crisis  was  one  fitted  to  test  the  mettle  of  the  nation  ;  for  had  it 
then  shown  the  least  supineness  or  hesitation,  its  doom  had 
been  sealed.  In  a  fortnight  the  terms  of  service  of  the  sev 
enty-five  thousand  volunteers  would  have  expired ;  and  the 
Southern  army,  flushed  with  victory  and  doubled  in.  material 
strength,  would  have  found  the  capital  of  the  United  States  an 
easy  prey. 

The  nation  sprang  spontaneously  to  arms.  With  incredible 
rapidity  new  battalions  were  formed  and  forwarded  to  "Wash 
ington  ;  and  by  the  time  the  term  of  service  of  the  provisional 
troops  had  expired,  their  number  had  been  more  than  re 
placed  by  fresh  levies  enlisted  for  three  years  or  the  war. 

What  the  country  could  give — men,  material,  money — that 
it  gave  lavishly,  far  outrunning  the  calls  of  the  Government ; 
but  what  it  could  not  give  was  precisely  what  wa,s  most 
urgently  needed  to  vitalize  these  sinews  of  war, — to  wit,  ade 
quate  leadership,  and  that  soul  of  armies,  the  mind  of  a  great 
commander.  For  this  the  nation,  keenly  alive  to  its  need, 
could  only  breathe  passionate  aspirations. 

General  McDowell  vacated  the  command  of  the  army  with 
out  forfeiting  the  respect  of  his  countrymen ;  for,  while  he 
had  lost  a  battle,  there  was  an  instinctive  consciousness  that 
he  had  been  the  victim  of  circumstances  rather  than  of  any 
miscarriage  of  his  own.  And  now  there  could  be  no  doubt 
regarding  his  successor ;  for  the  general  and  consenting  voice 
of  the  North  pointed  to  the  young  general  who  had  just  con 
cluded  his  campaign  in  the  mountains  of  West  Virginia  as 
the  desired  leader  of  the  army.  General  McClellan,  accord 
ingly,  was  summoned  to  Washington  the  day  after  Biill  Run. 


62  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

and  placed  hi  command  of  the  disorganized  forces  that  had 
returned  from  that  untoward  campaign,  and  of  the  rapidly 
arriving  regiments  which  the  "  populous  North"  was  pouring 
down  from  all  directions  to  Washington.  Out  of  these 
elements,  an  army  was,  first  of  all,  to  be  fashioned. 

General  McClellan  brought  to  his  high  trust  proofs  of 
talent  which,  though  not  sufficient  to  show  him  a  proper 
captain  of  a  great  army,  were  yet  enough  to  inspire  the  best 
hopes  of  him.  He  had  served  with  distinction  in  Mexico,  had 
studied  war  in  Europe,  was  in  the  flower  of  his  youth,  and, 
above  all,  had  just  finished  a  campaign  that,  by  its  success 
amidst  general  failure  elsewhere,  seemed  to  furnish  at  once 
the  prestige  and  prophecy  of  victory. 

The  young  chieftain  threw  himself  with  the  utmost  ardor 
and  energy  into  the  work  of  moulding  into  form  an  army  ade 
quate  for  the  nation's  needs.  It  was  a  colossal  task  ;  for  it 
was  necessary  not  merely  to  build  up  an  army,  but  to  make 
the  model  on  which  the  army  should  be  built.  The  military 
traditions  of  the  United  States,  confined  to  the  single  cam 
paign  in  Mexico,  afforded  no  groundwork  for  the  organization 
of  such  a  military  establishment  as  was  now  demanded  for 
the  portentous  task  before  the  country.  The  regular  army 
kept  on.  foot  previous  to  the  war  was  limited  by  law  to 
under  twenty  thousand  men.  But  its  whole  internal  organism 
had  been  disrupted  by  secession,  and  it  did  not  even  form  a 
cadre  on  which  it  was  possible  to  build. 

The  force  around  Washington,  of  which  General  McClellan 
assumed  command  on  the  27th  of  July,  numbered  about  fifty 
thousand  infantry,  less  than  a  thousand  cavalry,  six  hundred 
and  fifty  artillerymen,  with  nine  imperfect  field-batteries  of 
thirty  pieces.  It  still  retained  the  provisional  brigade-organi 
zation  given  it  by  McDowell ;  but  the  utter  collapse  that 
followed  Bull  Run  had  made  it  rather  a  mob  than  an  army. 
Desertions  had  become  alarmingly  numerous,  and  the  streets 
of  Washington  were  crowded  with  straggling  officers  and  men 
absent  from  their  stations  without  authority,  and  indicating 
by  their  behavior  an  utter  want  of  discipline  and  organiza- 


THE  ARMY  BEFORE  WASHINGTON.  63 

tion.*  To  correct  these  abuses  a  stringent  system  of  military 
police  was  ai  once  adopted,  and  this  measure  was  followed  by 
an  immediate  improvement  in  the  morale  of  the  troops.  The 
root  of  the  evil,  however,  lay  deeper — lay  in  the  really  vicious 
system  governing  the  primary  organization  of  regiments  and 
the  appointment  of  their  officers.t  Though  General  McClel- 
lan  was  unable  to  strike  at  this,  he  endeavored,  as  far  as 
might  be,  to  remedy  its  results  ;  and  Congress  having  passed 
a  bill  authorizing  the  President  to  dispense  with  the  services 
of  inefficient  officers,  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  soon 
weeded  of  several  hundred  worthless  wearers  of  shoulder- 
straps.J 

The  problem  of  the  best  organization  to  be  given  a  newly 
formed  army,  is  one  that  to  this  day  has  received  no  final 
solution ;  and  whatever  principle  be  adopted,  the  origi 
nal  organization  will  be  apt  to  require  modification  very 
soon  after  entering  upon  a  campaign.  The  division,  com 
posed  of  two  or  more  brigades,  is,  however,  a  permanent 
unit :  and  General  McClellan,  after  the  regiments  had  been 

*  McClellan  :   Report,  p.  9. 

f  Prince  de  Joinville :  The  Army  of  the  Potomac,  p.  17  ;  Lecomte  :  Guerre 
des  Etats-Unis,  p.  55. 

In  just  views  regarding  this,  as  regarding  most  other  matters  relating  to 
the  war,  the  people  were  much  in  advance  of  the  Government ;  and  one  of  the 
most  curious  instances  of  this  is  a  formal  memorial  at  this  time  addressed  to 
the  President  by  "  property  holders  of  New  York,"  regarding  the  system  of 
officering  regiments.  This  paper,  marked  by  the  soundest  good  sense,  was 
published  in  the  New  York  journals  of  August  1,  1861.  "  They  complain," 
says  the  memorial,  "  that  a  suitable  supervision  has  not  been  extended  by  Gov 
ernment  to  the  officering  of  the  volunteer  forces  ;  that  the  principle  of  allowing 
companies  to  choose  their  own  officers,  or  officers  their  own  colonels,  is  fatal  to 
military  discipline :  that  political,  local,  and  personal  interests  have  had  far 
too  much  sway  in  the  selection  of  officers  ;  that  undue  laxity  prevails  in  the 
control  of  volunteer  officers  by  their  military  superiors  ;  and  that  an  ill-grounded 
apprehension  of  local  or  political  censure  has  prevented  the  proper  authorities 
from  removing  incompetent  commanders,  and  from  placing  in  responsible 
military  positions  those  most  capable  of  filling  them,  without  regard  to  any 
thing  but  their  qualifications,"  etc.,  etc. 

\  After  the  institution  of  the  qualifying  examination,  three  hundred  and  teu 
officers  were  dismissed,  or  their  resignations  accepted,  within  eight  months. 


64  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

organized  into  brigades  of  four  regiments  each,  and  the  bri 
gades  had  been  somewhat  disciplined  and  instructed,  formed 
-divisions  of  three  brigades  each.*  But,  in  armies  of  above 
sixty  thousand  men,  it  has  been  common,  since  the  time  of 
Napoleon,  to  create  from  the  assemblage  of  two  or  more  divi 
sions  the  higher  unit  of  the  corps  cTarmee.  As  a  theoretical 
principle  of  organization,  General  McClellan  was  in  favor  of 
the  formation  of  corps ;  but  he  wished  to  defer  its  practical 
application  until  his  division  commanders  should,  by  actual 
experience  in  the  field,  acquire  the  requisite  training  to  fit 
them  for  commands  so  important,  and  until  he  should  have 
learned  who  of  his  divisional  officers  merited  this  high  trust,  t 
There  was  much  to  justify  this  course,  for  there  are  few  men 
able  to  command  a  body  of  thirty  thousand  men  ;J  and  it  is 
worthy  of  note  that  it  was  not  till  the  Army  of  Northern  "Vir 
ginia  had  seen  eighteen  months  of  service  that  those  at  the 
head  of  military  affairs  in  Richmond  organized  corps.§  This 
hesitation,  however,  proved  unfortunate  for  McClellan  him 
self  ;  for,  several  months  afterwards,  and  just  as  he  was  about 
moving  to  the  Peninsula,  the  President  divided  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  into  four  corps,  and  assigned  to  their  command 
men  whom  General  McClellan  would  not  have  chosen ; 
whereas,  had  he  created  corps  at  first,  he  might  have  made 
his  own  selection.!] 

It  next  became  necessary  to  create  adequate  artillery  and 
engineer  establishments,  to  organize  the  cavalry  arm,  and  to 

*  McClellan :  Report,  p.  11. 

f  Ibid.,  p.  53. 

\  "  An  army  corps  rarely  contains  more  than  thirty  thousand  men,  and  often 
lower,  even  among  nations  who  have  the  greatest  number  of  troops.  Such  a 
command  is  a  great  burden,  and  few  men  are  capable  of  managing  it  credita 
bly."  Dufour:  Strategy  and  Tactics,  p.  81. 

§  The  corps  organization  was  created  in  the  Confederate  service  immediately 
after  the  battle  of  Antietam. 

I  General  Hooker  cannot  be  regarded  as  a  partisan  of  General  McClellan , 
yet  I  have  often  heard  him  say  that  it  would  have  been  impossible  for  General 
McClellan  to  have  succeeded  with  such  corps  commanders  as  he  had  on  the 
Peninsula. 


v        THE  ARMY  BEFORE  WASHINGTON.  65 

provide  for  the  administrative  service  of  the  quartermaster, 
ordnance,  commissary,  and  medical  departments. 

The  task  of  forming  au  artillery  establishment  was  facili 
tated  by  the  fact  that  the  country  possessed  in  the  regular 
service  a  body  of  accomplished  and  energetic  artillery  officers.* 
As  basis  of  organization  it  was  decided  to  form  field-batteries 
of  six  guns  (never  less  than  four  guns,  and  the  guns  of 
each  battery  to  be  of  uniform  calibre) ;  t  and  these  were 
assigned  to  divisions,  not  to  brigades,  in  the  proportion  of 
four  batteries  to  each  division  ;  one  of  which  was  to  be  a  bat 
tery  of  Regulars,  and  the  captain  of  the  Regular  battery  was  in 
each  case  appointed  commandant  of  the  artillery  of  the  divi 
sion.  In  addition,  it  was  determined  to  create  an  artillery 
reserve  of  a  hundred  guns  and  a  siege-train  of  fifty  pieces. 
This  work  was  pushed  forward  with  so  much  energy,  that 
whereas,  when  General  McClellan  took  command  of  the  army, 
the  entire  artillery  establishment  consisted  of  nine  imperfectly 
equipped  batteries  of  thirty  guns,  before  it  took  the  field  this 
service  had  reached  the  colossal  proportions  of  ninety-two 
batteries  of  five  hundred  and  twenty  guns,  served  by  twelve 
thousand  five  hundred  men,  and  in  full  readiness  for  active 
field-duty  4 

With  equal  energy  the  formation  of  the  engineer  establish 
ment  was  entered  upon  ;  and  this  included  not  only  the  train 
ing  of  engineer  companies  and  the  Corps  of  Topographical 
Engineers,  but  the  organization  of  engineer  and  bridge-trains 
and  equipage  adequate  for  an  army  of  first-class  proportions. 
At  the  same  time,  the  entire  system  of  the  defences  of  Wash 
ington,  both  for  the  northern  and  southern  side  of  the  Po- 

*  The  duty  of  organizing  this  arm  was  confided  to  Major  (afterwards  Brig 
adier-General)  Barry,  chief  of  artillery. 

f  "  It  was  decided  that  the  proportion  of  rifled  guns  should  be  one-third, 
and  of  smooth-bores  two-thirds — that  the  rifled  guns  should  be  restricted  to  the 
system  of  the  United  States  ordnance  department  and  of  Parrott,  and  the 
smooth-bores  to  be  exclusively  the  light  twelve-pounder  or  Napoleon  gun." — 
Barry  :  Report  of  Artillery  Operations,  p.  106. 

\  Report  of  the  Engineer  and  Artillery  Operations  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  pp.  106-109. 

5 


66          CAMPAIGNS  OP  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

tomac,  was  planned  and  carried  into  execution.*  Washing 
ton,  in  fact,  assumed  the  aspect  of  a  fortified  capital,  with  a 
system  of  defences  so  formidable  that  the  enemy  at  no  time 
throughout  the  war  attempted  seriously  to  assail  that  city.t 

Such  is  but  a  faint  setting  forth  of  the  manifold  activities 
evoked  and  directed  towards  the  creation  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  by  its  new  commander.  It  was  a  season  of  faithful, 
fruitful  work,  amid  which  that  army  grew  into  shape  and  sub 
stance.  And  with  such  surprising  energy  was  the  work  of 
organization  pushed  forward,  that  whereas  General  McClellan 
in  July  came  into  command  of  a  collection  of  raw,  dispirited, 
and  disorganized  regiments,  without  commissariat  or  quarter 
master  departments,  and  unfitted  either  to  march  or  fight,  he 
had  around  him  at  the  end  of  three  months  a  hundred  thou 
sand  men,  trained  and  disciplined,  organized  and  equipped, 
animated  by  the  highest  spirit,  and  deserving  the  fond  name 
of  THE  GBAND  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC.  And  certainly,  if  there 
are  portions  of  McClellan's  subsequent  military  career  that 
are  open  to  animadversion,  he  yet  challenges  from  all  im 
partial  minds  the  credit  due  this  mighty  performance.^ 

Looking  at  the  work  he  then  initiated,  in  the  only  light  in 
which  we  can  rightly  appreciate  it — as  it  stands  related  to 

*  These  works  were  planned  and  executed  by  Major  (afterwards  Major- 
general)  Barnard,  chief-engineer  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 

f  The  theory  of  the  system  of  defences  of  Washington  is  that  upon  which 
the  works  of  Torres  Vedras  were  based — the  occupation  of  commanding  points 
within  cannon-range  of  each  other  by  field-forts,  the  fire  of  which  shall  sweep 
all  the  approaches,  a  connection  being  formed  by  infantry  parapets  easily  im 
provised.  The  line,  as  it  encircles  the  capital  on  both  sides  of  the  Potomac, 
has  a  development  of  thirty-three  miles.  As  to  the  value  of  this  system  of 
defences  for  the  safeguard  of  Washington,  that  is  a  vast,  complex,  and  difficult 
question,  not  to  be  entered  on  here.  It  has  been  very  severely  criticised  by 
Colonel  Lecomte  in  his  work,  "Campagne  de  Virginie  et  de  Maryland  en 
1862  ;"  and  to  these  animadversions  a  warm  rejoinder  has  been  made  by  Gen 
eral  Barnard  in  "  The  Peninsular  Campaign  and  its  Antecedents." 

^  History  will  not  refuse  to  affirm  of  this  work  the  judgment  pronounced  by 
General  McClellan  himself:  "  The  creation  of  such  an  army  in  so  short  a  time 
from  nothing,  will  hereafter  be  regarded  as  one  of  the  highest  glories  of  th« 
administration  and  the  nation." 


THE  ARMY   BEFORE  WASHINGTON.  67 

what  went  before,  and  what  came  after  it — it  is  manifest  that 
what  gives  it  significance  is  that  it  represents  science  dis 
placing  sciolism,  the  untutored  enthusiasm  of  a  nation  unused 
to  war,  taught  by  a  bitter  experience  to  yield  itself  to  the 
cunning  hand  of  discipline — that  power  which  Carnot  calls  "  the 
glory  of  the  soldier  and  the  strength  of  armies."*  If  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  afterwards  performed  deeds  worthy  to  live  in 
history,  it  is  in  no  small  degree  due  to  the  fact  that  the 
groundwork  of  victory  was  laid  deep  and  broad  in  that  early 
period  of  stern  tutelage,  when  it  learnt  the  apprenticeship  of 
war.  If  other  generals,  the  successors  of  McClellan,  were 
able  to  achieve  more  decisive  results  than  he,  it  was,  again,  in 
no  small  degree,  because  they  had  ready  to  hand  the  perfect 
instrument  which  he  had  fashioned. f 


*  "  It  is  military  discipline  that  is  the  glory  of  the  soldier  and  the  strength 
of  armies,  for  it  is  the  foremost  act  of  its  devotion,  and  the  most  assured  pledge 
of  victory  (le  plus  grand  acte  de  son  denouement  et  le  gage  le  plus  assure  de  la 
mctoire}.  It  is  by  it  that  all  wills  unite  in  one,  and  all  partial  forces  conspire  to 
wards  one  end."  Carnot :  De  la  Defense  des  Places  Fortes,  p.  505. 

f  "  Had  there  been  no  McClellan,"  I  have  often  heard  General  Meade  say, 
"  there  could  have  been  no  Grant ;  for  the  army  made  no  essential  improvement 
under  any  of  his  successors."  It  was  common  throughout  the  war  to  ascribe 
a  high  degree  of  discipline  to  the  Confederate  army — even  higher  than  that  of 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  But  the  revelations  of  the  actual  condition  of  that 
army  since  the  close  of  the  war  do  not  justify  this  assertion.  On  the  contrary, 
they  show  that  the  discipline  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  was  never 
equal  to  that  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  though  in  fire  and  elan  it  was  su 
perior.  "  I  could  always  rely  on  my  army,"  said  General  Lee,  at  the  time  he 
surrendered  its  remnant  at  Appomattox  Courthouse — "  I  could  always  rely  on 
my  army  for  fighting  ;  but  its  discipline  was  poor."  At  the  time  of  the  Mary 
land  invasion,  Lee  lost  above  twenty-five  thousand  men  from  his  effective 
strength  by  straggling,  and  he  exclaimed  witli  tears,  "  My  army  is  ruined  ~by 
straggling  !"  Nothing  could  better  illustrate  the  high  state  of  discipline  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  than  its  conduct  in  such  retreats  as  that  on  the  Pen 
insula  and  in  the  Pope  campaign,  and  in  such  incessant  fighting  as  the  Rapidan 
campaign  of  1864 


68  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 


n. 

PLANS  OF  CAMPAIGNS. 

THREE  months  of  varied  and  fruitful  activity  thus  passed, 
and  the  close  of  autumn  found  around  Washington  an  army 
both  formidable  in  numbers  and  respectable  in  efficiency. 
There  then  arose  the  problem  of  putting  it  in  motion ;  and 
this  problem  involved  two  questions — when  to  strike,  and 
where  ?  The  latter  was  a  question  that  concerned  the 
general-in-chief ;  but  the  former  was  one  that  profoundly 
touched  the  people,  who,  as  the  sustainers  of  the  war, 
"  thronged  in  and  made  their  voice  heard,  and  became  par 
takers  of  the  counsels  of  state."* 

During  that  period  in  which  the  army  was  being  formed 
public  remained  silent.  And  there  was  in  this  silence  some 
thing  almost  pathetic ;  for,  knowing  that  an  undue  urgency 
for  action,  expressed  through  the  public  prints,  had  precipi 
tated  the  disastrous  campaign  that  ended  in  Bull  Bun,  men 
sought  to  make  amends  by  a  sedulous  refraining  from  the  like 
again.  General  McClellan  was  left  free  to  work  his  will ; 
and,  being  strong  in  the  trust  of  the  country,  he  was  "master 
of  the  situation  :"  no  monarch  could  be  more  so. 

Yet  it  was  manifest  that  this  confidence  was  in  pledge  of 
early  and  energetic  action  on  the  part  of  the  commander  ;  for 
the  country  had  too  much  at  stake,  and  the  passions  and 
interests  of  men  were  too  closely  bound  up  with  a  speedy 
suppression  of  the  insurrection,  to  brook  a  Fabian  policy. 
General  McClellan  had,  in  a  public  speech  at  the  time  he 
assumed  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  promised 
that  the  war  should  be  "  short,  sharp,  and  decisive."  This 

*  This  is  the  striking  expression  employed  by  Mr.  Kinglake  in  describing 
the  influence  of  English  public  sentiment  in  enforcing  the  War  of  the 
Crimea. 


THE   AEMY  BEFORE  WASHINGTON.  69 

was  the  very  key-note  on  which  all  the  motions  of  publio. 
sentiment  turned.  It  was,  therefore,  in  the  highest  degree 
important  for  him  to  seize  the  first  opportunity  to  justify,  by 
some  palpable  proof,  that  confidence  which  the  country  had 
spontaneously  extended  to  him.  There  was  too  little  mod 
eration,  too  little  stability  in  the  public  judgment,  to  make  it 
possible  that  this  condition  of  things  should  long  continue. 
The  faith  that  had  been  freely  bestowed  would  presently  dis 
appear,  unless  confirmed  by  deeds. 

A  commander  who,  under  a  popular  government,  is  in 
trusted  with  the  conduct  of  a  war,  has  to  shape  his  acts  not 
alone  according  to  abstract  military  dictates,  but  must  take 
into  account  considerations  of  a  political  and  moral  order  as 
well.  For  the  wishes,  impulses,  prejudices,  ignorances  even 
of  his  countrymen,  enter  as  really  into  the  problem  with  which 
he  has  to  deal  as  the  character  of  his  enemy  or  the  lines 
of  military  operation.  A  captain  who  is  also  king,  may  act 
in  quite  different  wise  from  a  captain  responsible  to  a  Cabinet 
or  Congress.  What  a  Caesar  or  a  Napoleon  might  do,  could 
not  be  imitated  by  a  Wellington  or  a  Eugene ;  and  the  history 
of  the  latter  illustrious  commander,  a'nd  his  equally  illustrious 
colleague — Marlborough — shows,  strikingly,  how  that  even  the 
victor  of  Blenheim  and  Kamilies  had  to  conform  the  inspira 
tions  of  his  military  genius  to  the  dull  wits  of  a  Dutch 
States-General.  McClellan,  who  had  as  yet  done  nothing  to 
prove  himself  either  a  Wellington  or  a  Eugene,  should  have 
made  the  lightest  possible  draft  on  the  indulgence  of  the  people. 

There  is  little  or  no  doubt  that,  thus  far,  General 
McClellan  had  formed  no  other  theory  regarding  the  employ 
ment  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  than  that  which  was 
common  throughout  the  country ;  which,  compendiously 
stated,  was  to  make  a  direct  attack  on  the  enemy  in  front  of 
Washington,  and  to  make  this  attack  as  soon  as  possible.* 

*  Though  General  McClellan  used  to  keep  his  own  counsel,  yet  General 
McDowell  tells  me  he  was  wont,  in  their  rides  over  the  country  south  of  the 
Potomac,  to  point  out  towards  the  flank  of  Manassas  and  say,  "  We  shall 
strike  them,  there" 


70  CAMPAIGNS  OP   THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

All  his  plans  at  this  period  contemplated  a  general  advance 
from  Washington  as  early  as  the  month  of  November  ;  and, 
looking  back  to  the  middle  of  October,  it  appears  from 
General  McClellan's  own  statement  that  he  had  at  that  time 
upwards  of  one  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  men  under  his 
command,  out  of  which,  after  deducting  the  forces  to  be 
employed  in  garrisoning  Washington,  Baltimore,  and  Annap 
olis,  and  those  assigned  for  guarding  the  line  of  the  Potomac, 
he  was  able  to  place  in  the  field  a  column  for  active  operations 
of  above  seventy-five  thousand  men.* 

But  about  the  time  he  had  designed  putting  the  army  in 
motion,  General  McClellan  found  himself,  by  his  appoint 
ment  as  general-in-chief,  charged  not  only  with  the  direc 
tion  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  but  of  all  the  other  armies 
in  the  field.  He  then  began  to  change  his  views  regarding 
the  line  and  method  of  operating  against  the  enemy  in  Vir 
ginia  ;  and  this  led  him  to  the  adoption  of  a  policy  that 
caused  a  delay  of  all  active  operations,  lasting  throughout 
the  whole  winter  and  continuing  till  March,  1862,  when  the 
movement  to  the  Peninsula  was  begun.f  This  inactivity,  by 


*  McClellan  :  Report,  p.  7. 

f  It  would  appear  that  it  was  during  the  month  of  November  that  General 
McClellan  first  began  to  change  his  purpose  of  operating  against  the  enemy  in 
front  of  Washington,  and  determined  to  assail  Richmond  from  the  coast.  The 
earliest  recorded  intimation  of  this  change  of  purpose  appears  in  a  reply  by 
General  McClellan  to  a  memorandum  drawn  up  by  President  Lincoln,  suggest 
ing  a  movement  on  Manassas.  This  paper,  with  many  others  relating  to  his 
own  personal  correspondence  with  General  McClellan,  was  given  the  writer  by 
the  late  President  during  the  summer  of  1864.  It  is  marked  in  Mr.  Lin 
coln's  hand  as  having  been  made  "  about  the  1st  of  December,  1861." 

"  If  it  were  determined  to  make  a  forward  movement  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  without  awaiting  further  increase  of  numbers,  or  better  drill  and  dis 
cipline,  how  long  would  it  require  to  actually  get  in  motion  ? 

"  [Answer  in  pencil  by  McClellan :  '  If  bridge  trains  ready,  by  December  15 
—probably  25th.'] 

"  After  leaving  all  that  would  be  necessary,  how  many  troops  could  join 
the  movement  from  southwest  of  the  river  ? 

"  [Answer  in  pencil,  '  71,000.'] 

"  How  many  from  northwest  of  it  ? 


THE  ARMY  BEFORE  WASHINGTON.  71 

whatever  military  considerations  it  may  have  been  justified 
to  General  McClellan's  own  mind,  was  certainly  very  unfor 
tunate  ;  and,  as  it  had  afterwards  an  important  bearing  on 
that  commander's  relations  to  the  Administration,  and  has 
since  given  rise  to  much  antagonism  of  opinion,  it  will  be 
proper  to  consider  briefly  both  the  reasons  which  are  thought 
to  justify  and  those  which  are  thought  to  condemn  it. 

The  points  of  defence  of  the  inactivity  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  during  the  winter  of  1861-2  may  all  be  included  in 
this  summary :  the  yet  imperfect  organization,  equipment, 

"  [Answer  in  pencil,  '  33,000.'] 

"  Suppose,  then,  that  of  those  southwest  of  the  river  [supplied  in  pencil, 
'  50,000']  move  forward  and  menace  the  enemy  at  Centre ville  ? 

"  The  remainder  of  the  movable  force  on  that  side  move  rapidly  to  the 
crossing  of  the  Occoquan  by  the  road  from  Alexandria  towards  Richmond  ; 
there  to  be  joined  by  the  whole  movable  force  from  northeast  of  the  river,  hav 
ing  landed  from  the  Potomac  just  below  the  mouth  of  the  Occoquan,  move  by 
land  up  the  south  side  of  that  stream,  to  the  crossing  point  named  ;  then  the 
whole  move  together,  by  the  road  thence  to  Brentville,  and  beyond,  to  the  rail 
road  just  south  of  its  crossing  of  Broad  Run,  a  strong  detachment  of  cavalry 
having  gone  rapidly  ahead  to  destroy  the  railroad-bridges  south  and  north  of 
the  point. 

"  If  the  crossing  of  the  Occoquan  by  those  from  above  be  resisted,  those 
landing  from  the  Potomac  below  to  take  the  resisting  force  of  the  enemy  in 
rear  ;  or,  if  landing  from  the  Potomac  be  resisted,  those  crossing  the  Occoquan 
from  above  to  take  that  resisting  force  in  rear.  Both  points  will  probably  not 
be  successfully  resisted  at  the  same  time.  The  force  in  front  of  Centre  ville,  if 
pressed  too  hardly,  should  fight  back  into  the  intrenchments  behind  them. 
Armed  vessels  and  transports  should  remain  at  the  Potomac  landing  to  cover 
a  possible  retreat." 

The  following  reply  is  in  General  McClellan's  handwriting,  dated  Wash 
ington,  December  10,  and  marked  "confidential:" 

"  I  inclose  the  paper  you  left  with  me — filled  as  you  requested.  In  arriving 
at  the  numbers  given,  I  have  left  the  minimum  numbers  in  garrison  and 
observation. 

.  "  Information  recently  [received]  leads  me  to  believe  that  the  enemy  would 
meet  us  in  front  with  equal  forces  nearly — and  I  have  now  my  mind  actually 
turned  towards  another  plan  of  campaign  that  I  do  not  think  at  all  anticipated 
by  tJie  enemy,  nor  by  many  of  our  own  people. 

"GEORGE  B.  MCCLELLAN." 

The  "  other  plan  of  campaign,"  here  foreshadowed,  is  of  course  no  other  than 
the  coast  movement. 


72  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

and  discipline  of  the  army ;  the  inadequacy  of  its  force ;  the 
difficulty  of  winter  campaigning  in  Virginia ;  and  the  neces 
sity  of  a  simultaneous  movement  throughout  the  entire 
theatre  of  war.  Some  of  these  points  are  well  taken,  while 
others  will  not  stand  a  critical  examination. 

It  is  true  that  the  army,  though  composed  of  material  of 
uncommon  excellence,  was  necessarily  green  and  had  the 
imperfections  incident  to  improvised  armaments ;  and,  no 
doubt,  it  was  in  much  better  condition  to  move  in  April, 
1862,  than  it  could  have  been  in  November  or  December, 
1861.  But,  assuredly,  General  McClellan  over-estimates  the 
then  condition  of  his  opponent's  army,  when,  in  his  report, 
he  speaks  of  its  superior  discipline,  drill,  and  equipment. 
There  is  now  overwhelming  evidence  to  show  that,  previously 
at  least  to  the  organization  of  the  permanent  Confederate 
Army  in  April,  1862,  nothing  could  exceed  the  laxity  of  dis 
cipline,  demoralization  of  temper,  and  inferiority  in  arms, 
equipment,  and  means  of  transport  that  marked  the  Southern 
force.  It  is  true,  also,  that  General  McClellan  was  never 
able  to  obtain  quite  the  colossal  force  he  had  called  for — a 
movable  column  of  one  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  men,  to 
gether  with  garrisons  for  "Washington,  Baltimore,  etc.,  and 
corps  of  observation  for  the  line  of  the  Potomac,  making  the 
enormous  aggregate  of  two  hundred  and  forty  thousand  men. 
But  it  should  be  considered  that  this  demand  was  based  on 
the  theory  set  forth  by  General  McClellan  himself,  that  the 
enemy  had,  in  October,  "a  force  on  the  Potomac  not  less 
than  one  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  strong,  well  drilled  and 
equipped ;"  whereas  it  is  certain  that  General  Johnston's 
entire  force  barely  exceeded  one-third  that  number.* 

*  Several  months  ago  General  Johnston  stated  verbally  to  me  that  his  recol 
lection  of  the  maximum  of  his  strength  during  this  period  was  54,000.  Since 
then,  however,  I  have  obtained  in  manuscript  the  consolidated  monthly  re 
ports  of  the  Confederate  armies.  Johnston's  strength,  October  31,  1861,  was 
44,131  present  for  duty  (present  and  absent  66,243) ;  December  31st  it  was 
62,112  present  for  duty  (present  and  absent  98,088) ;  February  28,  1862,  it  was 
47,617  (present  and  absent  84,225). 


OF   T*(  '      M 

UNIVEKS' 


THE  ARMY  BEFORE   WASHINGTON.  73 

It  is  also  true  that  military  operations  in  a  Virginia  wintei 
and  on  a  Virginia  soil  are  attended  with  great  difficulties  ;  and 
no  military  student  will,  after  the  experience  of  the  war,  say 
that  it  would  have  been  practicable  for  General  McClellan  at 
that  season  to  undertake  a  grand  operation,  such  as  a  cam 
paign  against  Richmond.  But  it  was  quite  possible  to  have 
made  a  special  operation  of  the  nature  of  a  movement  against 
Johnston  at  Manassas.  Had  Johnston  stood,  a  battle  with 
good  prospect  of  success  might  have  been  delivered.  But  had 
he,  as  there  was  great  likelihood  he  would  do,  and  as  it  is  now 
certain  he  would  have  done,  fallen  back  from  Manassas  to  the 
line  of  the  Rapidan,  his  compulsory  retirement  would  have 
been  esteemed  a  positive  victory  to  the  Union  arms.*  And, 
even  had  it  been  accounted  impracticable  to  undertake  a 
movement  against  Manassas,  there  were  still  many  incidental 

*  General  McClellan  himself,  in  discussing  the  relative  merits  of  a  direct  ad 
vance  against  the  enemy  at  Manassas  and  a  change  of  base  to  some  point  on 
the  lower  Chesapeake,  makes  certain  admissions  that,  considering-  the  circum 
stances  of  the  case,  might  well  have  decided  him  to  take  the  former  course. 
He  admits  that  an  attack  on  the  Confederate  right  flank  by  the  line  of  the 
Occoquan  would,  if  successful,  "prevent  the  junction  of  the  enemy's  right  with 
his  centre,"  affording  the  opportunity  of  destroying  the  former ;  would  "  remove 
the  obstructions  to  the  navigation  of  the  Potomac;"  would  "reduce  the  length 
of  wagon  transportation,"  and  would  "strike  directly  at  his  main  railway  com 
munication."  Now  assuming  the  successful  execution  of  this  plan,  what  would 
have  been  the  result  ?  General  McClellan  himself  shall  answer : 

"Assuming  the  success  of  this  operation  and  the  defeat  of  the  enemy  as  cer 
tain,  the  question  at  once  arises  as  to  the  importance  of  the  results  gained.  I 
think  these  results  would  be  confined  to  the  possession  of  the  field  of  battle, 
the  evacuation  of  the  line  of  the  upper  Potomac  by  the  enemy,  and  the  moral 
effect  of  the  victory  ;  important  results,  it  is  true,  but  not  decisive  of  the  war, 
nor  securing  the  destruction  of  the  enemy's  main  army,  for  he  could  fall  back 
upon  other  positions,  and  fight  us  again  and  again,  should  the  condition  of  his 
troops  permit." 

A  tactical  victory  in  the  field,  the  compulsory  retreat  of  the  enemy  from  his 
cherished  position,  the  relief  of  the  blockade  of  the  Potomac,  and  the  "  moral 
effect  of  the  victory,"  with  the  losses,  disasters,  and  demoralization  therefrom 
resulting  all  of  which  General  McClellan  admits  were  within  his  grasp  by 
the  movement  indicated — were  surely  well  worth  the  effort.  True,  the  operation 
Avould  not  have  been  "  decisive  of  the  war," — for  such  was  the  grand  but  some 
what  vague  and,  as  has  since  appeared,  misjudged  ambition  that  possessed  him. 


74  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

operations*  that  were  perfectly  feasible,  and  which,  while 
valuable  in  themselves,  would  have  had  the  effect  to  satisfy 
the  country  and  consolidate  the  confidence  of  the  people  and 
the  Administration  in  General  McClellan. 

And  it  is  precisely  in  this  regard  that  General  McClellan 
showed  himself  deficient  in  certain  qualities  of  mind  indis 
pensable  for  one  who  has  to  deal  with  the  larger  questions  of 
war.  If,  as  a  soldier,  he  was  right  in  wishing  to  postpone 
grand  military  operations  till  spring,  when  the  times  and 
seasons  and  circumstances  should  all  favor ;  when  his  army, 
strengthened  in  numbers  and  tempered  by  discipline,  would 
be  fit  for  the  field ;  when  the  full  preparation  of  the  other 
armies  would  enable  him  to  enter  on  large  combinations,  he 
certainly  showed  a  lack  of  that  kind  of  political  savoir  faire 
and  knowledge  of  human  nature  necessary  to  a  great  com 
mander,  in  remaining  perfectly  inactive.  It  was  for  him  to 
consider  whether  the  increase  in  numbers  and  improvement  in 
discipline  likely  to  accrue  to  his  army  in  the  mean  time  would 
at  all  compensate  for  that  loss  of  confidence,  that  popular  impa 
tience,  that  political  obstruction,  which  were  certain  to  arise, 
and  which  actually  did  arise.  For  so  soon  as  the  period  of 
reorganization  had  passed,  the  public  and  the  Administration 
became  naturally  anxious  to  see  the  imposing  army  of  a  hun 
dred  and  fifty  thousand  men  that  had  grown  up  on  the  banks 
of  the  Potomac  turned  to  some  account.  And  this  anxiety 
presently  grew  into  an  impatience,  which  at  length  broke  out 
in  loud  clamor  that  at  once  embarrassed  the  Government  and 
marred  the  harmonious  relations  between  it  and  the  com 
mander  of  the  army. 

It  happened,  too,  that  during  this  period  there  occurred  a 
series  of  untoward  events  that  made  a  deep  impression  on 
the  people  of  the  North,  and  tended  both  to  grieve  patriotic 
men  and  stir  up  a  bitter  opposition  to  the  commander  held 
responsible  for  them.  The  most  important  of  these  were  the 


*  Among  these  General  Barnard  mentions  the  capture  of  Norfolk.     The 
Peninsular  Campaign,  p.  12. 


THE  ARMY  BEFORE  WASHINGTON.  75 

blockade  of  the  Potomac  and  the  disaster  at  Ball's  Bluff,  of 
which  events  I  must  give  a  brief  account. 

Shortly  after  the  battle  of  Bull  Run,  the  Confederates  ad 
vanced  their  outposts  from  Centreville  and  Fairfax  Court 
house  forward  as  far  as  Munson's  Hill,  and  almost  to  the 
banks  of  the  Potomac, — a  move  that  was  of  no  military  value, 
but  which  gave  them  the  prestige  of  flaunting  their  flag  within 
view  of  the  capitol  of  the  nation.  They  then  proceeded  to 
erect  batteries  at  different  points  on  the  Virginia  side  of  the 
Potomac,  with  the  view  of  obstructing  the  navigation  of  the 
river.  So  successfully  was  this  work  performed,  that  early  in 
October  the  flag-officer  of  the  Potomac  flotilla  officially  re 
ported  the  water  highway  by  which  a  large  part  of  the  sup 
plies  for  the  army  around  Washington  was  brought  forward 
from  the  North  to  be  effectually  closed.*  This  event,  the 
actual  blockade  of  the  capital,  produced  throughout  the 
country  a  deep  feeling  of  mortification  and  humiliation,  and 
called  forth  bitter  complaints  against  the  Government.  A 
proposition  was  made  to  destroy  these  batteries  by  an  assault 
ing  force  sent  from  the  Maryland  side  of  the  river ;  but  the 
enterprise  was  abandoned  in  consequence  of  an  adverse  report 
from  General  Barnard,  chief-engineer. f  Meanwhile,  the  com 
mander  was  unwilling  to  undertake  the  destruction  of  the 
batteries  by  the  only  method  that  promised  success — to  wit, 
a  movement  by  the  right  bank  of  the  Potomac, — for  the  reason 
that  it  would  bring  on  a  general  engagement. 

The  affair  of  Ball's  Bluff  was  of  a  kind  to  affect  still  more 
powerfully  the  popular  imagination ;  for,  while  in  itself  a 
lamentable  disaster,  it  seemed  to  reveal  a  strange  looseness 
and  want  of  responsibility  in  the  conduct  of  military  affairs. 
It  appears  that  on  the  19th  of  October,  General  McCall  was 
ordered  to  make,  with  his  division,  a  movement  on  Draines- 
ville,  for  the  purpose  of  covering  reconnoissances  in  all  direc 
tions  to  be  made  the  following  day.  These  reconnoissances 

*  Report  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  vol.  i.,  p.  8. 
|  McClellan  :  Report,  p.  50. 


76  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC 

were  successfully  accomplished  on  the  20th ;  and  General  Mc- 
Clellan,  anticipating  that  this  demonstration  would  hare  the 
effect  of  inducing  the  enemy  to  abandon  Leesburg,  directed 
General  Stone,  whose  division  of  observation  was  guarding 
the  left  bank  of  the  Potomac  above  "Washington,  with  head 
quarters  at  Poolesville,  to  "  keep  a  good  lookout  upon  Lees- 
burg,"  and  suggested  "  a  slight  demonstration"  as  likely  to 
have  the  effect  of  moving  the  enemy  at  that  point.  Accord 
ingly,  on  the  afternoon  of  the  20th,  Gorman's  brigade  was 
sent  to  Edward's  Ferry  to  make  a  display  of  force,  and  the 
Fifteenth  Massachusetts  regiment,  under  Colonel  Devens,  was 
sent  to  Harrison's  Island,  from  which  place  a  small  scouting 
party  was  about  dark  sent  across  by  Ball's  Bluff,  to  the  Vir- 
ginia  side,  and  ordered  to  push  out  towards  Leesburg  and 
report  the  position  of  the  enemy.  The  reconnoitring  party 
having  returned,  bringing  report  of  a  small  encampment  of 
the  enemy  within  a  mile  of  Leesburg,  Colonel  Devens  was 
ordered  by  General  Stone  to  cross  five  companies  of  his  regi 
ment  to  the  Virginia  shore,  and  advancing  under  cover  of  the 
night  to  the  enemy's  camp,  to  destroy  it  at  daybreak,  and,  after 
making  observation  of  the  country,  to  return.  The  report 
touching  the  enemy's  encampment  proved  to  be  a  mistake ; 
but  Colonel  Devens  found  a  wood  in  which  he  concealed  his 
men,  and  proceeded  to  examine  the  space  between  that  and 
Leesburg.  About  eight  o'clock,  however,  finding  his  position 
discovered,  he  retired  to  the  Bluff,  but  presently  returned  to 
wards  Leesburg,  and  occupied  the  ground  till  towards  one 
o'clock ;  when  on  being  attacked  by  a  regiment  of  the  enemy, 
he  again  fell  back  to  a  field  in  front  of  the  bluff,  where  the 
main  action  afterwards  took  place,  and  where  was  posted  a 
small  supporting  force  under  Colonel  Lee.  Meantime,  in 
the  morning,  General  Stone  had  assigned  to  Colonel  Baker 
the  command  of  the  right  wing  at  Ball's  Bluff,  giving  him  a 
discretionary  order  either  to  retire  the  small  force  on  the  Vir 
ginia  side,  or  to  re-enforce  it  from  his  own  brigade.  Colonel 
Baker  determined  on  the  latter  course,  and  succeeded  in  ferry 
ing  over  about  a  thousand  men  of  his  command.  These 


THE  ARMY  BEFORE   WASHINGTON.  77 

he  united  to  the  commands  of  Colonel  Devens,  who  had  mean 
while  retired  to  the  bluff,  and  of  Colonel  Lee ;  and  with  this 
force  of  about  one  thousand  eight  hundred  men  formed  line 
of  battle  in  the  field  at  the  top  of  the  bluff,  where,  about  half- 
past  two  in  the  afternoon,  he  began  to  receive  the  attack  of 
the  enemy.  The  Southern  force  was  composed  of  four  regi 
ments,  under  command  of  Colonel  Evans,  who  with  his  brigade 
had  been  holding  post  at  Leesburg.  Finding  that  the  small 
Union  force,  which  had  been  easily  driven  back  from  its  ad 
vance  towards  Leesburg,  was  constantly  being  re-enforced  by 
the  fresh  troops  which  Baker  was  bringing  across  the  river, 
Evans  ordered  a  general  attack.  The  action  continued  for 
two  hours  ;  the  Confederates  assaulting  impetuously,  and  the 
Union  force  stoutly  resisting,  though  losing  ground.  In  the 
midst  of  the  contest  the  commanding  officer,  Colonel  Baker, 
was  killed ;  and  shortly  afterwards  the  line,  receiving  a  severe 
fire  on  the  left  flank,  retreated  in  disorder  down  the  bluff 
towards  the  river.  Here,  towards  dusk,  an  appalling  scene 
ensued.  The  troops  swarmed  down  the  steep  bluff,  pursued 
by  the  yelling  Southerners,  who  shot  and  bayoneted  them  as 
they  ran.  The  means  of  transportation  had  been  very  in 
adequate  ;  the  one  flat-boat  was  soon  swamped,  the  lifeboat 
drifted  down  the  stream,  and  the  couple  of  skiffs  which  made 
up  the  total  were  soon  lost.  Many  were  shot  while  in  the 
water  ;  many  were  drowned ;  many  surrendered ;  others  suc 
ceeded  in  swimming  to  the  island.  Not  half  of  those  who  went 
over  returned. 

This  lamentable  affair  discouraged  the  people  of  the  North 
as  much  as  it  elated  the  Southerners.*  Its  entire  history 
affords  a  striking  exemplification  of  the  looseness  of  military 
conduct  and  relations  at  that  time.  In  venturing  on  the 
undertaking,  General  Stone  proceeded  on  the  supposition  that 
General  McCall,  who,  as  General  McClellan  informed  him, 

*  In  the  hot  and  suspicious  temper  of  the  hour,  the  gravest  charges  were 
brought  against  the  commanding  officer,  who  some  time  afterwards  was  placed 
in  arrest  and  confined  to  Fort  Lafayette.  From  these  charges  a  calmer  survey 
of  the  events  completely  exonerates  General  Stone. 


78  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

bad  occupied  Drainesville  on  the  20th,  and  was  to  "  send  out 
reconnoissances  in  all  directions,"  still  remained  there  ;  yet 
McCall  was  withdrawn  the  following  morning,  when  Stone 
sent  the  force  across  the  river,  without  the  latter's  being  in 
formed  of  the  fact.  Again,  though  General  McClellan  did  not 
order  the  expedition  across  the  river,  yet  on  being  informed  of 
the  crossing  during  the  day,  he  congratulated  General  Stone, 
thereby  inferentially  approving  it.*  Stone's  plan  of  opera 
tions  lacked  definite  purpose  :  it  was  neither  a  feint  nor  a 
serious  attack.  He  seems  to  have  left  Colonel  Baker  in  mis 
understanding  as  to  the  co-operation  of  the  force  at  Edward's 
Ferry  ;  and  the  conduct  of  Colonel  Baker, — a  high-spirited 
and  patriotic  man,  who  had  quitted  his  seat  in  the  United 
States  Senate  to  take  the  field, — was  without  military  skill  or 
discretion. 

These  events  could  not  fail  to  have  a  deeply  depressing 
effect  on  the  public  mind.  It  is  vain  to  argue  that  the  coun 
try  should  have  subordinated  its  wishes  to  abstract  military 
necessities.  Nor  is  it  strange,  as  month  after  month  passed 
by  in  inaction,  with  the  capital  of  the  nation  under  blockade, 
the  foreign  relations  of  the  United  States  menacing  war, 
Secession  gaining  prestige  day  by  day,  while  an  army  of  por 
tentous  strength  lay  as  under  a  spell,  that  the  deepest  solici 
tude  should  have  overcome  the  hearts  of  men ;  that  the  timid 
should  have  begun  to  despair,  and  the  proudest  to  hang  their 
heads  with  shame.  These  things  came  back  upon  the  Admin 
istration  in  a  pressure  daily  growing  more  and  more  oppres 
sive  ;  and  when,  towards  the  close  of  that  gloomy  year,  the 
commander  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  being  then  sick, 
President  Lincoln  called  in  several  of  the  general  officers  to 
counsel  with  him,  he  declared,  in  his  sad,  homely  way,  that  "  if 
something  could  not  soon  be  done,  the  bottom  would  be  out  of 
the  whole,  affair,  t 

This  exposition  of  the  condition  of  the  public  mind  is  due 


*  Report  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  vol.  ii.,  p.  489. 
f  McDowell :  Manuscript  Minutes  of  Council  of  War. 


THE   ARMY  BEFORE   WASHINGTON.  79 

here  ;  because,  if  we  shall  not  be  able  to  hold  the  Administra 
tion  blameless  in  its  dealings  with  General  McClellan,  a  just 
verdict  will  at  the  same  time  not  omit  to  estimate  how  severe 
a  demand  that  officer — unwisely,  as  we  must  think — made  on 
the  country  and  the  Government. 

I  now  pass  to  the  exposition  of  the  cause  that  produced  this 
long  and  unfortunate  inaction,  and  which  will  be  found  in  the 
already  noted  change  of  the  plan  of  operations.  There  is 
little  doubt  that,  at  the  period  to  which  this  recital  has 
extended — namely,  the  close  of  the  year  1861 — General  Mc 
Clellan  had  fully  resolved  upon  acting  against  the  enemy  by  a 
flank  movement  by  water  instead  of  assailing  him  by  direct 
attack ;  and  as  the  adoption  of  the  former  course  had  a  most 
important  bearing  on  the  relations  between  the  Executive  and 
the  general-in-chief,  I  shall  enter  with  some  detail  into  the 
origin  and  development  of  that  plan  of  campaign  that  removed 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac  from  the  front  of  Washington  to  the 
Peninsula. 

The  first  formal  discussion  of  a  movement  to  the  Lower 
Chesapeake  seems  to  have  taken  place  at  a  series  of  war-coun 
cils  held  at  "Washington  early  in  January,  1862.  It  appears 
that  at  this  time  President  Lincoln,  troubled  in  spirit  at  the 
condition  of  public  affairs,  and  further  distressed  at  the  sick 
ness  of  General  McClellan,  summoned  the  attendance  of  two 
division  commanders,  to  counsel  with  himself  and  the  mem 
bers  of  the  cabinet  as  to  the  propriety  of  commencing  active 
operations  with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  These  officers 
were  Generals  McDowell  and  Franklin.  The  former  officer 
committed  to  writing  the  substance  of  what  passed  at  these 
interviews,  and  the  following  is  a  transcript  of  his  manuscript 
minutes  : 

"  JANTJAET  10,  1862.— At  dinner  at  Arlington,  Va.  Received  a  note  from 
the  Assistant-Secretary  of  War,  saying  the  President  wished  to  «ee  me  that 
evening,  at  eight  o'clock,  if  I  could  safely  leave  my  post.  Soon  after  I  re 
ceived  a  note  from  Quartermaster-General  Meigs,  marked  'private  and  con 
fidential,'  saying  the  President  wished  to  see  me. 


80      CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

u  Repaired  to  the  President's  house  at  eight  o'clock  p.  M.  Found  the 
President  alone.  Was  taken  into  the  small  room  in  the  northeast  corner. 
Soon  after  we  were  joined  by  Brigadier-General  Franklin,  the  Secretary  of 
'State,  Governor  Seward,  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  and  the  Assistant- 
Secretary  of  War.  The  President  was  greatly  disturbed  at  the  state  of 
affairs.  Spoke  of  the  exhausted  condition  of  the  treasury ;  of  the  loss  of 
public  credit ;  of  the  Jacobinism  of  Congress  ;*  of  the  delicate  condition  of 
our  foreign  relations;  of  the  bad  news  he  had  received  from  the  West,  par 
ticularly  as  contained  in  a  letter  from  General  Halleck  on  the  state  of  affairs 
in  Missouri ;  of  the  want  of  co-operation  between  Generals  Halleck  and 
Buell;  but  more  than  all,  the  sickness  of  General  McClellan. 

"  The  President  said  he  was  in  great  distress,  and  as  he  had  been  to  General 
McClellan's  house,  and  the  general  did  not  ask  to  see  him  ;  and  as  he  must 
talk  to  somebody,  he  had  sent  for  General  Franklin  and  myself  to  obtain  our 
opinion  as  to  the  possibility  of  soon  commencing  active  operations  with  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac. 

"  To  use  his  own  expression, '  If  something  was  not  soon  done,  the  bottom 
would  be  out  of  the  whole  affair ;  and  if  General  McClellan  did  not  want  to 
use  the  army,  he  would  like  to  borrow  it,  provided  he  could  see  how  it 
could  be  made  to  do  something.' 

"  The  Secretary  of  State  stated  the  substance  of  some  information  he  con 
sidered  reliable  as  to  the  strength  of  the  forces  on  the  other  side,  which  he 
had  obtained  from  an  Englishman  from  Fort  Monroe,  Richmond,  Manassas, 
and  Centreville,  which  was  to  the  effect,  that  the  enemy  had  twenty  thou 
sand  men  under  Huger,  at  Norfolk  ;  thirty  thousand  at  Centreville ;  and  in 
all  in  our  front,  an  effective  force,  capable  of  being  brought  up  at  short  no 
tice,  of  about  one  hundred  and  three  thousand  men — men  not  suffering,  but 
well  shod,  clothed,  and  fed.  In  answer  to  the  question  from  the  President, 
what  could  soon  be  done  with  the  army,  I  replied  that  the  question  as  to 
the  when  must  be  preceded  by  the  one  as  to  the  how  and  the  where.  That 
substantially  I  would  organize  the  army  into  four  army  corps,  placing  the 
five  divisions  on  the  Washington  side  on  the  right  bank.  Place  three  of 
these  corps  to  the  front — the  right  at  Vienna  or  its  vfcinity,  the  left  beyond 
Fairfax  Station,  the  centre  beyond  Fairfax  Courthouse,  and  connect  the  lat- 

*  General  McDowell's  manuscript  was  submitted  by  the  present  writer  to 
President  Lincoln,  during  the  summer  of  1864,  and  he  indorsed  its  entire  con 
tents  as  a  true  report  of  these  war-councils,  with  the  exception  of  the  above 
phrase,  "  the  Jacobinism  of  Congress."  His  autograph  indorsement  on  the 
manuscript  states  that  he  had  no  recollection  of  using  such  an  expression.  It 
may  be  supposed  that  the  phrase  expresses  the  impression  produced  on  Mc 
Dowell's  mind  by  Mr.  Lincoln's  words,  though  his  precise  language  may  have 
been  different. 


x  THE  ARMY  BEFORE  WASHINGTON.  81 

ter  place  with  the  Orange  and  Alexandria  Railroad  by  a  railroad  now  par 
tially  thrown  up.  This  would  enable  us  to  supply  these  corps  without  the 
use  of  horses,  except  to  distribute  what  was  brought  up  by  rail,  and  to  act 
upon  the  enemy  without  reference  to  the  bad  state  of  country  roads. 

"  The  railroads  all  lead  to  the  enemy's  position  ;  by  acting  upon  them  in 
force,  besieging  his  strongholds  if  necessary,  or  getting  between  them  if  pos 
sible,  or  making  the  attempt  to  do  so  and  pressing  his  left,  1  thought  we 
should  in  the  first  place  cause  him  to  bring  up  all  his  forces  and  mass  them 
on  the  flank  most  pressed,  the  left ;  and  possibly,  I  thought  probably,  we 
should  again  get  them  out  of  their  works  and  bring  on  a  general  engage 
ment  on  favorable  terms  to  us ;  at  all  events  keeping  him  fully  occupied  and 
harrowed.  The  Fourth  Corps,  in  connection  with  a  force  of  heavy  guns 
afloat,  would  operate  on  his  right  flank  beyond  the  Occoquan,  get  behind 
the  batteries  on  the  Potomac ;  take  Aquia,  which  being  supported  by  the 
Third  Corps  over  the  Occoquan  it  could  safely  attempt,  and  then  move  on 
the  railroad  from  Manassas  to  the  Rappahannock,  having  a  large  cavalry 
force  to  destroy  bridges.  I  thought  by  the  use  of  one  hundred  and  thirty 
thousand  men  thus  employed,  and  the  great  facilities  which  the  railroads 
gave  us,  and  the  compact  positiom  we  should  occupy,  we  must  succeed  by 
repeated  blows  in  crushing  out  the  force  in  our  front,  even  if  it  were  equal 
in  numbers  and  strength.  The  road  by  the  Fairfax  Courthouse  to  Centre- 
ville  would  give  us  the  means  to  bring  up  siege-mortars  and  siege  materials; 
and  even  if  we  could  not  accomplish  the  object  immediately,  by  making  the 
campaign  one  of  positions  instead  of  one  of  mano3uvres,  to  do  so  eventually 
and  without  risk.  That  this  saving  of  wagon  transportation  should  be 
effected  at  once  by  connecting  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad  with  the 
Alexandria  roads,  by  running  a  road  over  the  Long  Bridge.  That  when  all 
this  could  be  commenced,  I  could  better  tell  when  I  knew  something  more 
definite  as  to  the  general  condition  of  the  army. 

"General  Franklin  being  asked,  said  he  was  in  ignorance  of  many  things 
necessary  to  an  opinion  on  the  subject,  knowing  only  as  to  his  own  division, 
which  was  ready  for  the  field.  As  to  the  plan  of  operations,  on  being  asked 
by  the  President  if  he  had  ever  thought  what  he  would  do  with  this  army  if 
he  had  it,  he  replied  that  he  had,  and  that  it  was  his  judgment  that  it  should 
be  taken,  what  could  be  spared  from  the  duty  of  protecting  the  capitaly  to 
York  River  to  operate  on  Richmond,  The  question  then  came  up  as  to  the 
means  at  hand  of  transporting  a  large  part  of  the  army  by  water.  The  As 
sistant  Secretary  of  War  said  the  means  had  been  fully  taxed  to  provide 
transportation  for  twelve  thousand  men.  After  some  further  conversation, 
and  in  reference  to  our  ignorance  of  the  actual  condition  of  the  army,  the 
President  wished  we  should  come  together  the  next  night  at  eight  o'clock, 
and  that  General  Franklin  and  I  should  meet  in  the  mean  time,  obtain  such 
further  information  as  we  might  need,  and  to  do  so  from  the  staff  of  the 

6 


82  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

headquarters  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  Immediate  orders  were  to  be 
given  to  make  the  railroad  over  Long  Bridge. 

u  JANTJAET  11. — Held  a  meeting  with  General  Franklin,  in  the  morning,  at 
the  Treasury  Building,  and  discussed  the  question  of  the  operations  which, 
in  our  judgment,  were  best  under  existing  circumstances — as  season,  pre?ent 
position  of  the  forces,  present  condition  of  the  country — to  be  undertaken 
before  going  into  the  matter  as  to  when  those  operations  could  be  set  on 
foot.  I  urged  that  we  should  now  find  fortifications  in  York  Eiver  which 
would  require  a  movement  in  that  direction  to  be  preceded  by  a  naval  force 
of  heavy  guns  to  clear  them  out,  as  well  as  the  works  at  "West  Point.  That 
Eichmond  was  now  fortified;  that  we  could  not  hope  to  carry  it  by  a  simple 
march  after  a  successful  engagement;  that  we  should  be  obliged  to  take  a 
siege-train  with  us.  That  all  this  would  take  time,  which  would  be  im 
proved  by  the  enemy  to  mass  his  forces  in  our  front,  and  we  should  find 
that  we  had  not  escaped  any  of  the  difficulties  we  have  now  before  this  po 
sition  ;  but  simply  lost  time  and  money  to  find  those  difficulties  when  we 
should  not  have  so  strong  a  base  to  operate  from,  nor  so  many  facilities,  nor 
so  large  a  force  as  we  have  here,  nor,  in  proportion,  so  small  a  one  to  over 
come.  That  the  war  now  had  got  to  be  one  of  positions,  till  we  should 
penetrate  the  line  of  the  enemy.  That  to  overcome  him  in  front,  or  cut  his 
communication  with  the  South,  would,  by  its  moral  as  well  as  physical  effect, 
prostrate  the  enemy,  and  enable  us  to  undertake  any  future  operations  with 
ease,  and  certainty  of  success ;  but  that  in  order  of  time,  as  of  importance, 
the  first  thing  to  be  done  was  to  overcome  this  army  in  our  front,  which  is 
beleaguering  our  capital,  blockading  the  river,  and  covering  us  day  by  day 
with  the  reproach  of  impotence,  and  lowering  us  in  the  eyes  of  foreign 
nations,  and  our  people  both  North  and  South ;  and  that  nothing  but  what 
is  necessary  for  this  purpose  should  go  elsewhere. 

"  General  Franklin  suggested  whether  Governor  Chase,  in  view  of  what 
we  were  charged  to  do,  might  not  be  at  liberty  to  tell  us  where  General 
Burnside's  expedition  had  gone?  I  went  and  asked  him.  He  told  me  that, 
under  the  circumstances,  he  felt  he  ought  to  do  so ;  and  said  it  was  destined 
for  Newbern,  N.  C.,  by  the  way  of  Hatteras  Inlet  and  Pamlico  Sound,  to 
operate  on  Raleigh  or  Beaufort,  or  either  of  them.  That  General  McClellan 
had,  by  direction  of  the  President,  acquainted  him  with  his  plans,  which  was 
to  go  with  a  large  force  of  this  Army  of  the  Potomac  to  Urbanna  or  Tappa- 
hannock,  on  the  Rappahannock,  and  then  with  his  bridge-train  move  directly 
to  Richmond.  On  further  consultation  with  General  Franklin,  it  was  agreed 
that  our  inquiries  were  to  be  directed  to  both  cases  of  going  from  our  pres 
ent  position,  and  of  removing  thfe  large  part  of  the  force  to  another  base 
further  South.  A  question  was  raised  by  General  Franklin,  whether  in  de 
ference  to  General  McClellan  we  should  not  inform  him  of  the  duty  we  were 
ordered  to  perform.  I  said  the  order  I  received  was  marked  private  and 


THE  ARMY  BEFORE  WASHINGTON.  83 

confidential ;  and  as  they  came  from  the  President,  our  commander-in-chief, 
I  conceived,  as  a  common  superior  to  General  McClellan  and  both  of  us,  it 
was  for  the  President  to  say  this,  and  not  us.  That  I  would  consult  the 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  who  was  at  hand,  and  could  tell  us  what  was  the 
rule  in  the  cabinet  in  such  matters.  The  secretary  was  of  opinion  that  the 
matter  lay  entirely  with  the  President.  We  went  to  Colonel  Kingsbury, 
chief  of  ordnance  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  Brigadier-General  Van 
"Viiet,  chief  quartermaster,  and  Major  Shiras,  commissary  of  subsistence, 
and  obtained  all  the  information  desired.  Met  at  the  President's  in  the 
evening  at  eight  o'clock.  Present,  the  same  as  on  the  first  day,  with 
the  addition  of  the  Postmaster-General,  Judge  Blair,  who  came  in  after 
the  meeting  had  begun  the  discussion.  I  read  a  paper  containing  both 
General  Franklin's  and  my  own  views,  General  Franklin  agreeing  with 
me — in  view  of  time,  etc.,  required  to  take  this  army  to  another  base — 
that  operations  could  best  now  be  undertaken  from  the  present  base, 
substantially  as  proposed.  The  Postmaster-General  opposed  the  plan,  and 
was  for  having  the  army,  or  as  much  of  it  as  could  be  spared,  go  to  York 
River  or  Fortress  Monroe,  either  to  operate  against  Richmond,  or  to  Suffolk* 
and  cut  off  Norfolk  ;  that  being  in  his  judgment  the  point  (Fortress  Mon 
roe  or  York)  from  which  to  make  a  decisive  blow.  That  the  plan  of  going 
to  the  front  from  this  position  was  Bull  Run  over  again.  That  it  was  stra 
tegically  defective,  as  was  the  effort  last  July.  As  then,  we  would  have  the 
operations  upon  exterior  lines.  That  ^t  involved  too  much  risk.  That  there 
was  not  so  much  difficulty  as  had  been  supposed  in  removing  the  army  down 
the  Chesapeake.  That  only  from  the  Lower  Chesapeake  could  any  thing  de 
cisive  result  against  the  army  at  Manassas.  That  to  drive  them  from  their 
present  position,  by  operating  from  our  present  base,  would  only  force  them 
to  another  behind  the  one  they  now  occupy,  and  we  should  have  all  our 
work  to  do  over  again.  Mr.  Seward  thought  if  we  only  had  a  victory 
over  them  it  would  answer,  whether  obtained  at  Manassas  or  further 
south.  Governor  Chase  replied  in  general  terms  to  Judge  Blair,  to 
the  effect  that  the  moral  power  of  a  victory  over  the  enemy,  in  his  present 
position,  would  be  as  great  as  one  elsewhere,  all  else  equal ;  and  the  danger 
lay  in  the  probability  that  we  should  find,  after  losing  time  and  millions, 
that  we  should  have  as  many  difficulties  to  overcome  below  as  we  now 
have  above.  The  President  wished  to  have  General  Meigs  in  consultation 
on  the  subject  of  providing  water  transportation,  and  desired  General 
Franklin  and  myself  to  see  him  in  the  morning,  and  meet  again  at  three 
o'clock  P.  M.  the  next  day. 

"  JANUAKY  12. — Met  General  Franklin  at  General  Meigs'.  Conversed  with 
him  on  the  subject  of  our  mission  at  his  own  house.  I  expressed  my  views 
to  General  Meigs,  who  agreed  with  me  in  the  main  as  to  concentrating 
our  efforts  against  the  enemy  in  front  by  moving  against  him  from  our 


84:     CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

present  position.  As  to  the  time  in  which  he  could  assemble  water  transpor 
tation  for  thirty  thousand  men,  he  thought  in  about  from  four  to  six  weeks. 
Met  at  the  President's.  General  Meigs  mentioned  the  time  in  which  he 
could  assemble  the  transports  as  a  month  to  six  weeks.  The  general  subject 
of  operations  from  the  present  base  was  again  discussed,  General  Meigs 
agreeing  that  it  was  best  to  do  so,  and  to  concentrate  our  forces  for  the 
purpose.  The  President  and  Mr.  Seward  said  that  General  McCleUan  had 
been  out  to  see  the  President,  and  was  looking  quite  well,  and  that  now. 
as  he  was  able  to  assume  the  charge  of  the  army,  the  President  would 
drop  any  further  proceedings  with  us.  The  general  drift  of  the  conversa 
tion  was  as  to  the  propriety  of  moving  the  army  further  south,  and  as 
to  the  destination  of  Burnside's  expedition.  The  Postmaster-General  said 
that  if  it  was  the  intention  to  fight  it  out  here  (Manassas),  then  we  ought  to 
concentrate.  It  was  suggested  and  urged  somewhat  on  the  President  to 
countermand,  or  have  General  McClellan  countermand  General  Burnside's 
expedition,  and  bring  up  at  Aquia.  The  President  was,  however,  exceed 
ingly  averse  from  interfering,  saying  he  disliked  exceedingly  to  stop  a  thing 
long  since  planned,  just  as  it  was  ready  to  strike.  Nothing  was  done  but 
to  appoint  another  meeting  the  next  day,  at  eleven  o'clock,  when  we  were 
to  meet  General  McClellan  and  again  discuss  the  question  of  the  movement 
to  be  made,  etc.,  etc. 

"MONDAY,  JANTJABY  13. — Went  to  the  President's  with  the  Secretary  of 
Treasury.  Present,  the  President,  Governor  Chase,  Governor  Seward, 
Postmaster-General,  General  McClellan,  General  Meigs,  General  Franklin, 
and  myself,  and,  I  think,  the  Assistant  Secretary  of  War.  The  President, 
pointing  to  a  map,  asked  me  to  go  over  the  plan  I  had  before  spoken  to 
him  of.  He  at  the  same  time  made  a  brief  explanation  of  how  he  came  to 
bring  General  Franklin  and  General  McDowell  before  him.  I  mentioned  in 
as  brief  terms  as  possible  what  General  Franklin  and  I  had  done  under 
the  President's  order,  what  our  investigations  had  been  directed  upon, 
and  what  were  our  conclusions  as  to  going  to  the  front  from  our  present 
base,  in  the  way  I  have  heretofore  stated,  referring  also  to  a  transfer 
of  a  part  of  the  army  to  another  base  further  south.  That  we  had  been  in 
formed  that  the  latter  movement  could  not  be  commenced  under  a  month 
to  six  weeks,  and  that  a  movement  to  the  front  could  be  undertaken  in 
all  of  three  weeks.  General  Franklin  dissented  only  as  to  the  time  I 
mentioned  for  beginning  operations  in  the  front,  not  thinking  we  could 
get  the  roads  in  order  by  that  time.  I  added,  commence  operations  in  all  of 
three  weeks ;  to  which  he  assented.  I  concluded  my  remarks  by  saying 
something  apologetic  in  explanation  of  the  position  in  which  we  were.  To 
which  General  McClellan  replied  somewhat  coldly,  if  not  curtly — 'You  are 
entitled  to  have  any  opinion  you  please  I'  No  discussion  was  entered  into 
bj  him  whatever,  the  above  being  the  only  remark  he  made.  General 


THE  ARMY  BEFORE  WASHINGTON.  &5 

Franklin  said  that,  in  giving  his  opinion  as  to  going  to  York  River,  he  did  it 
knowing  that  it  was  in  the  direction  of  Genera]  McOlellan's  plan.  I  said 
that  I  had  acted  entirely  in  the  dark.  General  Meigs  spoke  of  his  agency 
in  having  us  called  in  by  the  President.  The  President  then  asked  what 
and  when  any  thing  could  be  done,  again  going  over  somewhat  the  same 
ground  he  had  done  with  General  Franklin  and  myself.  General  McClellan 
said  the  case  was  so  clear  a  blind  man  could  see  it,  and  then  spoke  of  the 
difficulty  of  ascertaining  what  force  he  could  count  upon  ;  that  he  did  not 
know  whether  he  could  let  General  Butler  go  to  Ship  Island,  or  whether  he 
could  re-enforce  Burnside.  Much  conversation  ensued,  of  rather  a  general 
character,  as  to  the  discrepancy  between  the  number  of  men  paid  for  and 
the  number  effective.  The  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  then  put  a  direct 
question  to  General  McClellan  to  the  effect  as  to  what  he  intended  doing 
with  his  army,  and  when  he  intended  doing  it  ?  After  a  long  silence,  Gen 
eral  McClellan  answered  that  the  movement  in  Kentucky  was  to  precede  any 
one  from  this  place,  and  that  that  movement  might  now  be  forced;  that  he 
had  directed  General  Buell  if  he  could  not  hire  wagons  for  his  transporta 
tion,  that  he  must  take  them.  After  another  pause  he  said  he  must  say  he 
was  very  unwilling  to  develop  his  plans,  always  believing  that  in  military 
matters  the  fewer  persons  who  were  knowing  to  them  the  better;  that  he 
would  tell  them  if  he  was  ordered  to  do  so.  The  President  then  asked  him 
if  h<j  counted  upon  any  particular  time;  he  did  not  ask  what  that  time  was, 
but  had  he  in  his  own  mind  any  particular  time  fixed  when  a  movement 
could  be  commenced.  He  replied  he  had.  Then,  rejoined  the  President  I 
will  adjourn  this  meeting." 

It  need  hardly  be  said  that  the  plan  of  campaign  that 
General  McClellan  had  in  his  mind,  and  which  he  was  Tin- 
willing  to  disclose  in  presence  of  his  subordinates  and  an  un- 
military  council,  was  the  project  of  attacking  Kichmond  by 
the  lower  Chesapeake.  A  few  days  afterwards  he  fully  de 
veloped  this  plan  in  a  letter  to  the  President,  and  the  result 
was  that  the  President  disapproved  it  and  by  an  order  issued 
on  the  31st  of  January,  substituted  one  of  his  own.*  This 
order  was  as  follows  : 

SPECIAL  WAR  ORDER,  No.  1. 

EXECUTIVE  MANSION,  WASHINGTON,  January  31,  1862. 

Ordered,  That  all  the  disposable  force  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  after 
providing  safely  for  the  defence  of  Washington,  be  formed  into  an  expedi- 

*  McCleUan :  Report,  p.  42 


86  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  AEMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

tion  for  the  immediate  object  of  seizing  and  occupying  a  point  upon  the 
railroad  south  westward  of  what  is  known  as  Manassas  Junction,  all  details 
to  be  in  the  discretion  of  the  commander-in-chief,  and  the  expedition  to 
move  before  or  on  the  22d  day  of  February  next. 

ABEAHAM  LINCOLN. 


The  operation  here  indicated  is  that  of  a  flanking  move 
ment  on  the  enemy's  position  at  Manassas.  Now,  it  is  due  to 
add  that  in  thus  disapproving  the  plan  of  operations  of  Gen 
eral  McClellan  and  substituting  one  of  his  own,  there  is  con 
clusive  evidence  to  show  that  the  President  was  moved  less 
by  any  consideration  of  the  relative  strategic  merits  of  the 
two  plans  of  campaign,  than  by  the  question  of  time  in  regard 
to  the  commencement  of  active  operations.  With  him  this 
was  the  controlling  circumstance ;  for  the  anxiety  on  the 
part  of  the  Administration  for  an  immediate  movement  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  had  become  what  General  McClellan 
calls  "  excessive  ;"*  and  four  days  before  the  order  of  the 
31st  January,  dictating  a  movement  of  the  Army  of  the  Poto 
mac  against  Manassas,  the  President  had  decreed  that  "  a 
general  movement  of  the  land  and  naval  forces  of  the  United 
States  against  the  insurgent  forces  should  be  made  on  the 
22d  day  of  February."!  It  is  obvious,  therefore,  that  the 


*  "  About  the  middle  of  January,  1862,  upon  recovering  from  a  severe  illness, 
I  found  that  excessive  anxiety  for  an  immediate  movement  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  had  taken  possession  of  the  minds  of  the  Administration."  McClellan's 
Eeport,  p.  42. 

f  This  order,  styled  "  President's  General  War  Order,  No.  1,"  was  issued  on 
the  27th  of  January,  without  consultation  with  General  McClellan  (Report, 
p.  42).  It  is  as  follows : 

EXECUTIVE  MANSION,  WASHINGTON,  January  27,  1862. 

Ordered,  That  the  22d  day  of  February,  1862,  be  the  day  for  a  general  move 
ment  of  the  land  and  naval  forces  of  the  United  States  against  the  insurgent 
forces.  That  especially  the  army  at  and  about  Fortress  Monroe,  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac,  the  Army  of  Western  Virginia,  the  army  near  Mumfordsville, 
Kentucky,  the  army  and  flotilla  at  Cairo,  and  a  naval  force  in  the  Gulf  ot 
Mexico,  be  ready  to  move  on  that  day. 

That  all  other  forces,  both  land  and  naval,  with  their  respective  commanders. 


THE  ARMY  BEFORE   WASHINGTON.  37 

President,  having  categorically  ordered  a  general  movement 
of  all  the  armies  to  be  made  on  the  22d  of  February,  was 
forced  to  the  next  step  of  prescribing  for  the  operations  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  a  plan  of  campaign  which  could  be 
undertaken  at  the  time  fixed.  It  was  impossible  that  McClel- 
lan's  project  could  be  initiated  at  the  appointed  period ;  for 
not  only  was  it  necessary  to  put  in  execution  the  difficult  task 
of  moving  the  army  and  all  its  material  to  the  designated 
point  on  the  Lower  Chesapeake,  but  it  was  necessary  first  of 
all  to  provide  the  vast  amount  of  water  transportation  need 
ful  for  so  colossal  an  enterprise.  Hence  the  order  for  a  direct 
movement  on  Manassas.  Upon  the  receipt  of  this  order, 
General  McClellan  lost  no  time  in  seeing  the  President  and 
requesting  to  know  whether  this  order  was  to  be  regarded  as 
final,  and  whether  he  could  be  permitted  to  submit  in  writing 
his  objection  to  the  plan  of  the  Executive  and  his  reasons  for 
preferring  his  own.  Permission  was  accorded,  and  on  the 
3d  of  February  the  general-in-chief  submitted,  in  a  paper  to 
the  Secretary  of  War,  an  elaborate  discussion  of  the  two 
plans  of  campaign.*  Whether  from  the  force  of  reasoning 
of  the  paper,  or  from  other  and  extrinsic  considerations^  the 
result  was  that  the  President  rescinded  his  order  for  the 
movement  on  Manassas ;  and  on  the  27th  of  February  the 
War  Department  instructed  its  agents  to  procure  at  once  the 


obey  existing  orders  for  the  time,  and  be  ready  to  obey  additional  orders  when 
duly  given. 

That  the  heads  of  departments,  and  especially  the  Secretaries  of  War  and  of 
the  Navy,  with  all  their  subordinates,  and  the  general-in-chief,  with  all  other 
commanders  and  subordinates  of  land  and  naval  forces,  will  severally  be  held 
to  their  strict  and  full  responsibilities  for  prompt  execution  of  this  order. 

ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

*  Report,  pp.  43-48. 

f  Mr.  Raymond,  editor  of  the  New  York  Times,  who  had  the  best  means  of 
knowing  the  secrets  of  the  Presidential  mind,  remarks  :  "  The  President  was 
by  no  means  convinced  by  General  McClellan's  reasoning  ;  but  in  consequence 
of  his  steady  resistance  and  unwillingness  to  enter  upon  the  execution  of  any 
other  plan,  he  assented,"  etc.  History  of  the  Administration  of  President  Lin 
coln,  p.  225. 


88  CAMPAIGNS  OP  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

necessary  steamers  and  sailing-craft  to  transport  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  to  its  new  field  of  operations. 

Even  after  this  step  had  been  taken,  however,  the  Presi 
dent,  convinced  against  his  will,  retained  his  aversion  to  the 
proposed  movement.  He  repeatedly  expressed  his  dissatis 
faction  at  the  project  of  removing  the  army  from  Washing 
ton,  and  preferred  that  an  operation  should  be  made  for 
opening  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad  by  a  movement 
across  the  Potomac  at  Harper's  Ferry,  and  another  for  the 
destruction  of  the  enemy's  batteries  on  .the  Potomac.  Gen 
eral  McClellan  seems  to  have  been  able  to  overcome  these 
objections  by  a  recital  of  the  same  considerations  he  had  pre 
viously  presented ;  but,  on  the  8th  of  March,  the  President 
returned  with  renewed  vigor  to  his  old  position,  and  urged 
him  to  submit  his  project  of  campaign  to  a  council  of  his 
division  commanders.  The  meeting  was  accordingly  held  the 
same  day.  The  commanding  general  laid  before  his  officers 
the  inquiry,  whether  it  were  advisable  to  shift  the  base  of 
operations.  The  plan  of  a  change  of  base  to  the  lower  Chesa 
peake  was  approved  by  eight  out  of  the  twelve  generals 
present. 

Impressed  by  the  emphasis  of  the  approval  which  General 
McClellan's  plan  received  in  the  adhesion  thereto  of  two  to 
one  of  the  chief  officers  of  the  army,  the  President,  never 
theless,  saw  fit  to  bind  the  execution  of  the  plan,  which  he 
could  now  do  no  less  than  approve,  by  several  embarrassing 
restrictions,  contained  in  two  important  war-orders  issued  on 
the  8th  of  March.  The  first  of  these  orders  directed  the 
organization  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  into  four  corps,  and 
nominated  four  generals  to  their  command.  These  officers 
were  not  of  General  McClellan's  selection,  while  their  ap 
pointment  excluded  certain  other  officers  upon  whom  he  had 
fixed  for  corps  commanders.*  The  second  of  these  orders 

*  The  officers  nominated  to  the  command  of  the  corps  into  which  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  was  divided  were,  Generals  Keyes,  Sumiier,  Heintzel- 
man,  and  McDowell.  The  latter  was  well  fitted  for  the  command  by  hie 
ability,  but  the  relations  between  him  and  the  commander  were  not  cordial. 


THE  AEMY  BEFORE  WASHINGTON.  89 

prescribed  the  conditions  upon  which  a  change  of  base  would 
be  allowed,  and  is  in  the  following  terms  : 

GENERAL  WAR  ORDER,  No.  3. 

EXECUTIVE  MANSION,  WASHINGTON,  March  8,  1862. 

Ordered,  That  no  change  of  the  base  of  operations  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  shall  be  made  without  leaving  in  and  about  Washington  such  a 
force  as,  in  the  opinion  of  the  general-in-chief  and  the  commanders  of 
army  corps,  shall  leave  said  city  entirely  secure. 

That  no  more  than  two  army  corps  (about  fifty  thousand  troops)  of  said 
Army  of  the  Potomac  shall  be  moved  en  route  for  a  new  base  of  operations, 
until  the  navigation  of  the  Potomac  from  "Washington  to  the  Chesapeake 
Bay  shall  be  freed  from  the  enemy's  batteries  and  other  obstructions,  or 
until  the  President  shall  hereafter  give  express  permission. 

That  any  movement  as  aforesaid,  en  route  for  a  new  base  of  operations, 
which  may  be  ordered  by  the  general-in-chief,  and  which  may  be  intended 
to  move  upon  the  Chesapeake  Bay,  shall  begin  to  move  upon  the  bay  as 
early  as  the  18th  of  March;  and  the  general-in-chief  shall  be  responsible 
that  it  so  moves  as  early  as  that  day. 

Ordered,  That  the  army  and  navy  co-operate  in  an  immediate  effort  to 
capture  the  enemy's  batteries  upon  the  Potomac  between  Washington  and 
the  Chesapeake  Bay.  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

L.  THOMAS,  Adjutant-General. 

It  is  easy  to  see  what  must  have  been  the  result  of  this 
fatal  indecision,  vacillation,  and  want  of  harmony  between  the 
Administration  and  the  chief  of  the  army ;  but  it  happened 
that  this  clash  of  opinion  was  suddenly  interrupted  by  an 
event  that  made  a  complete  change  in  the  military  situation. 
This  event  was  no  less  than  the  sudden  evacuation  of  Manas- 
General  Sumner  was  the  ideal  of  a  soldier ;  but  he  had  few  of  the  qualities 
that  make  a  general.  The  others  do  not  call  for  any  analysis.  I  have,  in  a 
previous  part  of  this  volume  (p.  64),  set  forth  the  views  of  General  McClellan 
touching  the  organization  of  corps  ;  and,  as  there  remarked,  his  failure  to  make 
appointments  to  these  commands  at  the  time  he  was  all-powerful  resulted  in 
his  having  forced  upon  him  as  lieutenants  men  he  did  not  wish  in  that  capacity. 
It  would  appear,  from  a  curious  piece  of  history  detailed  in  the  Journal  of  the 
Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  that  it  was  through  the  pressure  of  the 
members  of  that  committee,  and  of  the  new  Secretary  of  War,  Mr.  Stanton, 
that  corps  were  at  this  time  formed  ;  and,  indeed,  by  them,  as  a  species  of 
Aulic  Council,  that  all  the  larger  war-questions  were  determined. 


90  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

sas  by  the  Confederate  Army,  and  its  retirement  behind  the 
line  of  the  Rappahannock.  General  Johnston,  who,  a  con 
siderable  time  previously,  had  formed  the  design  of  retiring 
nearer  his  base,  had  for  two  weeks  been  preparing  the 
evacuation  by  the  quiet  removal  of  the  army-stores  and  war- 
material  ;  and  when  he  finally  withdrew  his  army  from 
Manassas,  on  the  8th  of  March,  so  skilfully  was  the  enter 
prise  managed,  that  the  first  intimation  thereof  gained  by  the 
Union  forces  was  from  the  smoke  of  the  burning  huts,  fired 
by  the  Confederates  on  their  retirement !  With  a  view  rather 
of  giving  the  troops  some  experience  on  the  march  and  biv 
ouac  than  for  the  purpose  of  pursuit,  General  McClellan 
ordered  a  forward  movement  of  the  army  towards  Centreville 
the  next  day,  and  immediately  dispatched  two  regiments  of 
cavalry  under  Colonel  Averill  to  Manassas.  A  few  days  after 
wards,  a  large  body  of  cavalry,  with  some  infantry,  under 
command  of  General  Stoneman,  was  sent  along  the  Orange 
and  Alexandria  Railroad  to  determine  the  position  of  the 
enemy,  and,  if  possible,  force  his  rear  across  the  Rappahan 
nock;  but  the  roads  were  in  such  condition  that,  finding  it 
impossible  to  subsist  his  men,  Stoneman  was  forced  to  return 
after  reaching  Cedar  Run.  It  was  found  that  the  enemy  had 
destroyed  all  the  bridges.  This  expedition  was  followed  by  a 
strong  reconnoissance  of  Howard's  division  of  Sumner's  corps 
to  the  Rappahannock,  and,  under  cover  of  this  mask,  the  main 
body  of  the  Union  army  was  moved  back  to  the  vicinity  of  Alex 
andria.  Johnston,  who  had  retired  behind  the  Rappahannock, 
finding  on  survey  that  the  Rapidan  afforded  a  better  line,  moved 
his  army  thither,  and  placed  it  in  position  on  that  river.* 

The  Confederate  abandonment  of  Manassas  necessitated 
several  changes  in  the  projected  campaign.  In  his  proposed 
scheme  of  transferring  his  army  to  the  lower  Chesapeake, 
General  McClellan's  favorite  point  for  the  new  base  of  opera 
tions  had  been  Urbana  on  the  Rappahannock.  But  this  en- 

*  I  derive  these  facts  touching  the  evacuation  of  Manassas  from  Genera] 
Johnston  himself. 


THE  ARMY  BEFORE  WASHINGTON.  91 

terprise,  which  had  for  its  object  to  cut  off  the  retreat  of  the 
Confederates  on  Richmond,  of  course  became  impossible  after 
they  had  retired  behind  the  Rappahannock.  There  now  re 
mained  the  move  to  the  Peninsula, — a  move  which  he  had 
considered  in  his  general  plan,  but  which  he  regarded  as  less 
brilliant  and  promising  less  decisive  results.  This  project 
was  submitted  to  a  council  of  the  corps  commanders  while  at 
Fairfax  Courthouse,  on  the  13th  of  March,  and  by  them  it 
was  unanimously  approved,  provided  the  Merrimac  (which  a 
few  days  before  had  made  its  destructive  raid  on  the  vessels 
in  Hampton  Eoads,  and  was  now  at  Norfolk)  could  be  neu 
tralized  ;  that  means  of  transport  for  the  army  were  at  hand ; 
that  a  naval  force  could  be  obtained  to  aid  in  silencing  the 
enemy's  batteries  on  the  York  River  ;  and  that  sufficient  force 
should  be  left  to  cover  Washington,  to  give  an  entire  feeling 
of  security.  The  proceedings  of  this  council  were  submitted 
to  the  President,  by  whom  they  were  approved,  upon  con 
dition  that  Washington  should  be  made  entirely  safe,  and 
Manassas  Junction  occupied  in  sufficient  force  to  prevent  its 
repossession  by  the  enemy. 

General  McClellan  immediately  began  his  preparations  in 
accordance  with  these  instructions.  The  duty  of  covering 
the  line  of  the  Potomac  and  Washington  he  assigned  to 
General  Banks,  commanding  the  Fifth  Corps,  and  at  this 
time  holding  the  Shenandoah  Yalley.  General  Banks  was 
ordered  to  post  the  bulk  of  his  command,  well  intrenched,  at 
Manassas  ;  from  thence  to  repair  the  Manassas  Gap  Railroad 
to  Strasburg — to  be  held  by  a  force  intrenched, — thus  re 
opening  communication  with  the  Shenandoah  Yalley  :  this 
general  line  to  be  held  with  cavalry  well  to  the  front.'55'  Just 
as  General  Banks  was  about  to  move  his  corps  to  Manassas, 
however,  there  occurred  a  series  of  events  that  compelled 
him  to  retain  the  greater  part  of  his  force  in  the  Shenandoah 
Yalley.  At  the  time  of  the  evacuation  of  Manassas  by  the 
enemy,  Stonewall  Jackson,  with  his  division  of  about  eight 

*  Instructions  to  General  Banks  :  Report,  p.  60. 


92  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

thousand  men,  was  posted  at  "Winchester — the  Union  troops 
occupying  Charlestown;  but  on  the  advance  of  General 
Banks'  force,  on  the  12th  of  March,  he  retreated ;  and,  pur 
sued  by  the  division  of  Shields  ,  retired  twenty  miles  south  of 
Strasburg.  Under  cover  of  this  advance,  the  first  division  of 
Banks'  corps  was,  on  the  20th,  put  en  route  for  Manassas,  and 
Shields  fell  back  to  Winchester.  Jackson,  informed  probably 
of  the  withdrawal  of  the  troops  from  the  Yalley,  but  exagger 
ating  its  extent,  returned  upon  his  steps,  and,  on  the 
afternoon  of  the  23d,  attacked  Shields  near  Winchester. 
Jackson  met  a  severe  repulse,  after  which  he  made  his  way 
southward.  This  affair  caused  General  Banks  to  return  him 
self,  as  also  to  recall  the  division  then  on  the  march  for 
Manassas ;  and  after  this,  events  so  shaped  themselves,  that 
Banks'  command  was  retained  in  the  Shenandoah  Yalley,  and 
General  Wadsworth  was  placed  in  command  of  the  forces  for 
the  protection  of  the  national  capital. 

To  provide  for  the  security  of  Washington  was  General 
McClellan's  next  care,  and  for  this  purpose  he  left  behind  a 
force  of  above  seventy  thousand  men,  with  one  hundred  and 
nine  pieces  of  light  artillery.  These  troops  were  not,  it  is 
true,  all  concentrated  at  Washington,  but  they  were  all  avail 
able  for  its  defence.* 

Meantime,  the  task  of  collecting  water  transportation,  and 
embarking  the  troops  for  the  proposed  expedition,  was  being 
pushed  forward  with  the  utmost  energy.  Unhappily,  how 
ever,  while  every  thing  seemed  to  be  under  way,  certain 
occurrences  took  place  that  marred  the  auspicious  circum 
stances  that  should  have  attended  the  expedition. 

*  The  troops  left  "behind  by  General  McClellan  were  as  follows  : 

In  garrison  and  in  front  of  Washington. . , 18,000 

At  Warrenton 7,780 

At  Manassas 10,859 

In  the  Shenandoah  Valley 35,467 

On  the  lower  Potomac 1,350 

Inall..  73,456 


THE  ARMY    BEFORE   WASHINGTON.  93 

Upon  the  evacuation  of  Manassas,  General  McClellan,  who 
bad,  since  the  retirement  of  Lieutenant-General  Scott  in  the 
preceding  November,  exercised  the  functions  of  general-in- 
chief,  was  relieved  from  the  control  of  the  armies  in  the  field, 
and  relegated  to  the  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 
At  the  same  time,  the  troops  in  Western  Virginia  were  placed 
under  General  Fremont,  who  was  assigned  to  what  was  called 
the  "  Mountain  Department."  Now,  a  few  days  before  he 
sailed  for  Fortress  Monroe,  General  McClellan  had  been  in 
formed  by  the  President  that  a  strong  "  pressure"  had  been 
brought  to  bear  at  Washington  to  procure  the  detachment  of 
Blenker's  division  of  ten  thousand  men  from  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  in  order  that  it  might  be  added  to  the  force  under 
General  Fremont.  The  President,  apparently  fully  alive  to 
the  impolicy  of  depriving  him  of  so  considerable  a  body  of 
men,  on  whom  he  had  relied  in  forming  his  plan  of 
campaign,  assured  General  McClellan  that  he  had  decided  to 
allow  the  division  to  remain ;  nevertheless,  the  very  day 
before  that  officer  left  Alexandria,  he  received  a  note  from 
the  President,  stating  that  he  had  been  constrained,  by  the 
severity  of  the  pressure,  to  order  the  division  of  Blenker  to 
Fremont.*  It  will,  moreover,  presently  appear,  that  scarcely 
had  the  army  landed  on  the  Peninsula,  when,  notwith 
standing  the  President's  emphatic  assurances  that  no  more 
troops  should  be  detached  from  McClellan's  command,  the 
whole  of  McDowell's  corps,  whose  arrival  he  was  impatiently 
awaiting,  for  the  purpose  of  making  with  it  a  turning  move 
ment  on  Yorktown,  was  taken  from  him,  and  General 
McDowell  with  his  troops  assigned  to  the  new  department  of 
the  Eappahannock.  The  reason  assigned  for  this  measure 
was,  that  General  McClellan  had  not  left  behind  a  sufficient 
force  for  the  protection  of  the  capital.  The  result  of  this  ao*» 
will  presently  appear. 

It  is  impossible  to  review  the  series  of  events  here  recorded 
*  Report,  p.  63, 


94:  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF    THE  POTOMAC. 

without  a  deep  sense  of  pain  and  humiliation.  A  sufficient 
time  has  since  elapsed  to  permit  those  who  have  at  heart 
rather  the  vindication  of  historic  truth  than  the  partisan  sup 
port  of  either  side,  to  see  that  grave  faults  were  committed 
both  by  the  Administration  and  by  General  McClellan. 
While  we  are  bound  to  believe  that  each  was  moved  by 
the  sincere  desire  to  bring  the  war  to  a  successful  issue,  each 
did  much  to  frustrate  the  very  object  they  had  mutually  at 
heart. 

On  the  part  of  the  Administration,  a  definite  plan  of  cam 
paign  should  have  been  promptly  adopted  and  vigorously 
executed.  When  McClellan  presented  his  scheme  of  a  change 
of  base  to  the  lower  Chesapeake,  the  project  should  either 
have  been  frankly  approved  or  frankly  disapproved.  The 
plan  was  meritorious,  and  promised  brilliant  and  decisive 
results. 

But  the  President  first  disapproved  it,  on  the  ground  that  it 
would  require  too  long  a  time  to  be  put  into  execution. 

He  then  approved  it ;  but  for  almost  a  month  withheld  the 
order  to  provide  water  transportation  to  carry  the  plan  into 
effect. 

Having  at  length  taken  this  step,  and  while  the  costly  prep 
arations  were,  by  his  own  order,  in  the  full  course  of  execu 
tion,  he  renewed  all  his  old  objections  to  removing  the  army 
from  the  front  of  Washington,  and  required  that  the  question 
should  be  submitted  to  a  council  of  McClellan's  generals. 

These  officers  having  approved  the  project,  the  Executive 
once  more  assented ;  but  tied  up  his  approval  with  the  foolish 
restriction  that  not  more  than  one-half  the  army  should  be 
taken  away,  until  the  enemy's  batteries  were  destroyed, — an 
enterprise  which  would  have  involved  a  movement  of  the 
whole  army,  and  which  was,  besides,  certain  to  be  the  blood 
less  fruit  of  the  execution  of  the  general  plan. 

Again,  when  the  evacuation  of  Manassas  had  so  far  neces 
sitated  a  change  of  plan,  that  it  was  determined  to  seek  a  new 
base  of  operations  at  Fortress  Monroe,  and  the  council  of 
corps  commanders,  to  whom  the  President  had  referred  the 


TPIE  ARMY  BEFORE  WASHINGTON.  95 

decision  of  the  question,  had  approved  it  on  certain  conditions 
as  to  the  safety  of  Washington,  etc.,  the  President  further 
embarrassed  the  operation  by  insisting  on  the  presence  of  a 
large  force  at  Manassas, — a  measure  not  dictated  by  any  sound 
military  consideration. 

From  a  still  weaker  motion,  he  ordered  the  detachment  of 
Blenker's  division  from  the  command  of  McClellan,  and  trans 
ferred  it  to  General  Fremont. 

And  finally,  moved  by  morbidly  recurring  fears  for  the  se 
curity  of  the  capital,  no  sooner  had  McClellan  left  for  his  new 
field  of  operations,  than  the  President  further  stripped  him  of 
the  powerful  corps  of  McDowell,  to  retain  it  in  front  of  Wash 
ington. 

The  secret  of  much  of  this  conduct,  were  one  disposed  here 
to  seek  it,  would  doubtless  be  found  in  a  "  pressure"  of  the 
same  kind  and  coming  from  the  same  source  as  that  the 
President  urged  to  General  McClellan  in  excuse  for  depriving 
him  of  Blenker's  troops.  There  had  already  sprung  up  at 
Washington  a  group  of  men,  cherishing  a  violent  hostility  to 
General  McClellan  on  account  of  his  so-called  "  conservative" 
policy.  Uninstructed  in  war,  these  men  were  yet  influential, 
persistent,  and  had  the  ear  of  the  President ;  but  while  it  is 
easy  to  understand  the  ascendency  which  they  gained  over  a 
character  like  that  of  Mr.  Lincoln,  the  concession  is  unfor 
tunate  for  his  reputation  as  a  statesman. 

General  McClellan  should  either  have  been  removed  from 
command,  or  he  should  have  been  allowed  to  work  out  his 
own  plans  of  campaign,  receiving  that  "  confidence  and  cordial 
support"  promised  him  by  the  President  when  he  assumed 
command,  and  "  without  which,"  as  Mr.  Lincoln  justly  added, 
"he  could  not  with  so  full  efficiency  serve  the  country."  It  is 
a  jealous  function  that  of  military  command,  and,  as  the 
whole  history  of  war  teaches,  can  only  be  effectively  exercised 
when  accompanied  with  an  entire  freedom  of  action  on  the 
part  of  the  commander,  and  cordial  co-operation  and  support 
on  the  part  of  the  Government.  If  there  be  any  sure  lesson 
taught  by  the  military  experience  of  nations,  it  is  that  when 


96  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

extrinsic  influences,  whether  from  councils,  or  congresses,  01 
war-offices,  intrude  into  the  direction  of  military  affairs,  al] 
hope  of  success  is  gone.  History  has  chosen  to  express  itr- 
views  of  this  kind  of  interference  in  the  contumely  with  which 
it  has  covered  the  Austrian  Aulic  Council ;  but  the  Aulic  Coun 
cil  was  composed  at  least  of  military  men.  Of  what  was  the 
American  council  composed  ?  True,  it  was  inevitable  that,  in 
a  war  such  as  that  which  fell  upon  the  United  States,  con 
siderations  of  a  kind  that  may  be  called  political  should  have 
a  great  part  to  play ;  and  the  determination  of  the  policy  of 
the  war  was  certainly  a  question  that  came  within  the  prov 
ince  of  statesmanship,  and  which,  when  adopted  in  the  coun 
cils  of  the  Government,  the  commander  in  the  field  was  bound 
to  adhere  to  and  carry  out.  But  beyond  this,  and  in  the 
sphere  of  the  actual  conduct  of  the  war,  the  general  must  be 
head  and  supreme.  "  In  my  judgment,"  says  the  greatest  of 
theoretical  writers  on  the  art  of  war,  discussing  the  part  taken 
by  the  Aulic  Council  of  Vienna  in  directing  the  operations  of 
the  Austrian  armies,  "  the  only  duty  which  such  a  council  can 
safely  undertake  is  that  of  advising  as  to  the  adoption  of  a 
general  plan  of  operations.  Of  course,  I  do  not  mean  by  this 
a  plan  which  is  to  embrace  the  whole  course  of  a  campaign, 
tie  down  the  generals  to  that  course,  and  so  inevitably  lead  to 
their  being  beaten.  I  mean  a  plan  which  shall  determine  the 
objects  of  a  campaign ;  decide  whether  offensive  or  defensive 
operations  shall  be  undertaken,  and  fix  the  amount  of  material 
means  which  may  be  relied  upon  in  the  first  instance  for  the 
opening  of  the  enterprise,  and  then  for  the  possible  reserves 
in  case  of  invasion.  It  cannot  be  denied  that  all  these  things 
may  be,  and  even  should  be,  discussed  in  a  council  of  govern 
ment  made  up  of  generals  and  of  ministers ;  but  here  the  ac 
tion  of  such  a  council  should  stop  ;  for  if  it  pretends  to  say  to 
a  commander-in-chief  not  only  that  he  shall  march  on  Vienna 
or  Paris,  but  also  in  what  way  he  is  to  manoeuvre  to  reach 
those  points,  the  unfortunate  commander-in-chief  will  certainly 
be  beaten,  and  the  whole  responsibility  of  his  reverses  will  rest 
upon  those  who,  two  hundred  miles  off  from  the  enemy,  pre- 


THE  ARMY  BEFORE  WASHINGTON.  97 

tend  to  direct  an  army  which  it  is  difficult  enough  to  handle 
when  actually  in  the  field."  * 

On  the  other  hand,  it  is  to  be  admitted  that  General 
McClellan,  too,  committed  grave  faults.  He  had  already  put 
the  patience  of  the  public  and  the  Administration  to  a  severe 
strain  by  his  six  months'  inactivity  ;  and  in  proposing  to 
remove  his  army  from  the  front  of  Washington,  he  made 
another  and  peculiarly  heavy  draft  upon  their  confidence.  In 
this  he  again  exposed  himself  to  the  criticism  already  made 
respecting  his  deficiency  in  those  statesmanlike  qualities  that 
enter  into  the  composition  of  a  great  general.  Granting  that 
the  lower  Chesapeake  was  the  true  line  of  approach  to  Rich 
mond,  yet  finding  the  project  of  a  removal  of  the  army  from 
the  front  of  Washington  so  peculiarly  repugnant  to  the  wishes 
and  convictions  of  the  President  and  his  councillors  as  to 
have  suggested  grave  doubts  as  to  the  possibility  of  his 
obtaining  a  cordial  support  in  its  execution,  he  should  have 
considered  with  himself  whether  he  could  follow  the  wishes 
of  his  superiors  by  operating  against  the  enemy  at  Manassas  ; 
and  if  not,  he  should  have  resigned.  "  A  general,"  says  Napo 
leon,  in  one  of  his  fine  rulings  regarding  what  may  be  called 
the  ethics  of  war,  "  is  culpable  who  undertakes  the  execution 
of  a  plan  which  he  considers  faulty.  It  is  his  duty  to  repre 
sent  his  reasons,  to  insist  upon  a  change  of  plan ;  in  short,  to 
give  in  his  resignation  rather  than  allow  himself  to  be  made 
the  instrument  of  his  army's  ruin."  But  the  case  before 
General  McClellan  was  in  nowise  of  the  nature  contemplated 
in  this  dictum.  For  the  scheme  of  an  advance  against  Ma 
nassas  cannot  be  called  "  faulty,"  or  of  a  kind  to  hazard  the 
ruin  of  the  army.  It  was  a  question  of  a  choice  of  plans. 
Different  plans  of  campaign  may  be  each  correct,  and  yet 
differ  in  boldness  and  brilliancy ;  and  the  bolder  and  more 
brilliant  plan  may  often  have  to  give  way  to  one  more  feasi 
ble  or  more  opportune.  The  determination  of  this  in  any 
given  case  is  a  problem  in  the  higher  generalship.  Had 

*  Jomini :  Precis  de  1'Art  de  la  Guerre,  vol.  ii,  p.  47. 

7 


98  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  AEMT  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

General  McClellan  brought  a  juster  estimate  to  the  question 
both  of  what  it  was  possible  for  him  to  do  and  what  it  was 
necessary  for  him  to  do,  he  might  have  avoided  these  pain 
ful  entanglements,  from  the  discussion  of  which  I  gladly 
escape  to  follow  the  steps  of  that  master-stroke  by  which  the 
army  was  lifted  from  Washington  and  planted  on  the  Pen 
insula,  and  the  checkered  progress  of  the  campaign  on  the 
new  theatre  of  war. 


THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  99 


IV. 

THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN, 

MAUCH— AUGUST,  1862. 


I. 
BEFORE    YORKTOWN. 

To  take  up  an  army  of  over  one  hundred  thousand  men, 
transport  it  and  all  its  immense  material  by  water,  and  plant 
it  down  on  a  new  theatre  of  action  nearly  two  hundred  miles 
distant,  is  an  enterprise  the  details  of  which  must  be  studied 
ere  its  colossal  magnitude  can  be  adequately  apprehended.* 
It  was  an  undertaking  eminently  characteristic  of  the  Ameri 
can  genius,  and  of  a  people  distinguished  above  all  others  for 
the  ease  with  which  it  executes  great  material  enterprises — 
a  people  rich  in  resources  and  in  the  faculty  of  creating  re 
sources.  Yet,  when  one  reflects  that  at  the  time  the  order 
was  given  to  provide  transportation  for  the  army  to  the 
Peninsula,— the  27th  of  February  1862— this  had  first  of 
all  to  be  created  ;  and  when  one  learns  that  in  a  little  over  a 
month  from  that  date  there  had  been  chartered  and  assem- 

*  Perhaps  the  best  light  in  which  such  an  operation  may  be  read  is  furnished 
in  Napoleon's  elaborate  Notes  on  his  intended  invasion  of  Great  Britain  in  1805, 
when  he  proposed  to  transport  an  army  of  one  hundred  and  fifty  thousand 
men  in  four  thousand  vessels  from  Boulogne  to  the  English  coast.  As  a  mili 
tary  operation,  there  is,  of  course,  no  comparison  to  be  made,  because  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  had  at  Fortress  Monroe  an  assured  base  in  advance.  It 
is  simply  as  a  material  enterprise  that  there  is  a  similarity.  These  notes  are 
given  in  the  collection  of  Memoirs  dictated  to  Montholon  and  Gourgaud  (His 
torical  Miscellanies,  vol.  ii.,  pp.  373,  et  seq.) 


100  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

bled  no  fewer  than  four  hundred  steamers  and  sailing-craft, 
and  that  upon  them  had  been  transported  from  Alexandria 
and  Washington  to  Fortress  Monroe  an  army  of  one  hundred 
and  twenty-one  thousand  five  hundred  men,  fourteen  thou 
sand  five  hundred  and  ninety-two  animals,  forty-four  bat 
teries,  and  the  wagons  and  ambulances,  ponton-trains,  tele 
graph  materials,  and  enormous  equipage  required  for  an  army 
of  such  magnitude,  and  that  all  this  was  done  with  the  loss  of 
but  eight  mules  and  nine  barges  (the  cargoes  of  which  were 
saved),  an  intelligent  verdict  must  certainly  second  the 
assertion  of  the  Assistant  Secretary  of  War,  Mr.  Tucker, 
whose  administrative  talent,  in  concert  with  General  McClel- 
lan,  directed  this  vast  undertaking,  that  "for  economy  and 
celerity  of  movement,  this  expedition  is  without  a  parallel  on 
record."  A  European  critic  calls  it  "  the  stride  of  a  giant" — 
and  it  well  deserves  that  characterization. 

The  van  of  the  grand  army  was  led  by  Hamilton's — after 
wards  Kearney's — division  of  the  Third  Corps  (Heintzel- 
nian's),  which  embarked  for  Fortress  Monroe  on  the  17th  of 
March.  It  was  followed  by  Porter's  division  on  the  22d,  and 
the  other  divisions  took  their  departure  as  rapidly  as 
transports  could  be  supplied.  General  McClellan  reached 
Fortress  Monroe  on  the  2d  of  April,  and  by  that  time  there 
had  arrived  five  divisions  of  infantry,  three  regiments  of 
cavalry,  the  artillery  division,  and  artillery  reserve — making 
in  all  fifty-eight  thousand  men  and  one  hundred  guns.  This 
force  was  at  once  put  in  motion  in  the  direction  of  York- 
town,  in  front  of  which  the  remainder  of  the  army  joined  as 
it  arrived. 

The  region  known  as  "  the  Peninsula,"  on  which  the  army 
thus  found  itself  planted,  is  an  isthmus  formed  by  the  York 
and  the  James  rivers,  which  rising  in  the  heart  of  Virginia, 
and  running  in  a  southeasterly  direction,  empty  into  Chesa 
peake  Bay.  It  is  from  seven  to  fifteen  miles  wide  and  fifty 
miles  long.  The  country  is  low  and  flat,  in  some  places 
marshy,  and  generally  wooded.  The  York  Eiver  is  formed 
by  the  confluence  of  the  Mattapony  and  Pamunkey,  which 


THE  PENINSULAE  CAMPAIGN. 


101 


unite  at  West  Point.  Bichmond,  the  objective  of  the  opera 
tions  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  is  on  the  left  bank  of  the 
James,  at  the  head  of  navigation,  and  by  land  is  distant 
seventy-five  miles  from  Fortress  Monroe. 

From  Fortress  Monroe  the  advance  was  made  in  two 
columns — General  Keyes  with  the  Fourth  Corps  (divisions  of 
Couch  and  Smith)  formed  the  left ;  and  General  Heintzelman 
with  the  Third  Corps  (divisions  of  Fitz-John  Porter  and 
Hamilton,  with  AverilTs  cavalry)  and  Sedgwick's  division  of 
the  Second  Corps,  the  right.  At  the  very  outset  the  roads 
were  found  nearly  impracticable,  the  season  being  unusually 
wet.  No  resistance  of  moment  was  met  on  the  march ;  but 
on  the  afternoon  of  the  5th  of  April  the  advance  of  each 


SKETCH  OF  THE  LINES  OF  YORKTOWN. 


column  was  brought  to  a  halt — the  right  in  front  of  Yorktown 
and  the  left  by  the  enemy's  works  at  Lee's  Mill.     These  ob-  1 
structions  formed  part  of    the    general    defensive    line    of 


102  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

the  Warwick  River,  which  General  Magmder  had  taken  up, 
and  which  stretched  across  the  isthmus  from  the  York  to  the 
James,  an  extent  of  thirteen  and  a  half  miles.  The  Con 
federate  left  was  formed  by  the  fort  at  Yorktown,  the  water 
batteries  of  which,  with  the  guns  at  Gloucester  Point,  on  the 
opposite  bank  of  the  York,  barred  the  passage  of  that  river  ; 
the  right,  by  the  works  on  Mulberry  Island,  which  were  pro 
longed  to  the  James.  Warwick  River,  running  nearly  across 
the  Peninsula  from  river  to  river,  and  emptying  into  the 
James,  heads  within  a  mile  of  Yorktown.  Its  sources  were 
commanded  by  the  guns  of  that  fort,  and  its  fords  had  been 
destroyed  by  dams  defended  by  detached  redoubts,  the  ap 
proaches  to  which  were  through  dense  forests  and  swamps. 
Yery  imperfect  or  inaccurate  information  existed  regarding 
the  topography  of  the  country  at  the  time  of  the  arrival  of 
the  army,  and  the  true  character  of  the  position  had  to  be 
developed  by  reconnoissances  made  under  fire. 

The  Confederate  defence  of  the  peninsular  approach  to 
Richmond  had,  almost  since  the  beginning  of  the  war,  been 
committed  to  a  small  force,  named  the  Army  of  the  Peninsula, 
under  General  Magruder.  When  the  Army  of  the  Poto 
mac  landed  at  Fortress  Monroe,  this  force  numbered  about 
eleven  thousand  men.  At  Norfolk  was  an  independent  bodj' 
of  about  eight  thousand  men  under  General  Huger.  The 
iron-plated  Merrimac,  mistress  of  Hampton  Roads,  barred 
the  mouth  of  the  James,  the  direct  water-line  to  Richmond. 

So  soon  as  his  antagonist's  movement  had  become  fully 
developed,  General  Johnston  put  his  army  in  motion  from 
the  Rapidan  towards  Richmond,  where  for  a  time  he  kept  it 
in  hand.  The  Confederate  leader  did  not  expect  to  hold  the 
Peninsula ;  for  both  he  and  General  Lee,  who  then  held  the 
position  of  chief  of  staff  to  Mr.  Davis,  pronounced  it  unten 
able.  Soon  after  the  advent  of  the  Union  army,  General 
Johnston  went  down  to  Yorktown,  examined  its  line  of  de 
fences,  and  urged  the  military  authorities  at  Richmond  to 
withdraw  the  force  from  the  Peninsula.  Assuming  that  the 
Federal  commander  would,  with  the  aid  of  the  navy,  reduce 


THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  103 

the  fort  at  Yorktown,  thus  opening  up  the  York  River,  and, 
by  means  of  his  numerous  fleet  of  transports,  pass  rapidly  to 
the  head  of  the  Peninsula,  Johnston  regarded  the  capture  of 
any  force  remaining  thereon  as  almost  certain.  The  works  at 
Yorktown  he  found  very  defective  (though  the  position  was 
naturally  strong) ;  for,  owing  to  the  paucity  of  engineers,  re 
sulting  from  the  employment  of  so  many  of  this  class  of  offi 
cers  in  other  arms,  they  had  been  constructed  under  the 
direction  of  civil  and  railroad  engineers.  In  this  state  of 
facts,  General  Johnston  wished  to  withdraw  every  thing  from 
the  Peninsula,  effect  a  general  concentration  of  all  available 
forces  around  Richmond,  and  there  deliver  decisive  battle.* 
These  views  were,  however,  overruled,  and  it  was  determined 
to  hold  Yorktown  at  least  until  Huger  should  have  dis 
mantled  the  fortifications  at  Norfolk,  destroyed  the  naval 
establishment,  and  evacuated  the  seaboard, — a  step  that  was 
now  felt  to  be  a  military  necessity.  To  carry  out  this  policy, 
in  view  of  which  it  was  determined  to  hold  the  lines  of  York- 
town  as  long  as  practicable,  re-enforcements  were  from  time 
to  time  sent  forward  from  the  army  at  Kichmond,  and  soon 
afterwards  General  Johnston  went  down  and  personally  took 
command. 

In  his  plans  for  forcing  the  enemy's  defences,  there  were 
two  auxiliaries  on  which  General  McClellan  had  confidently 
counted,  and  with  these  he  expected  to  make  short  work  of 
the  operation  of  carrying  Yorktown.  The  first  of  these  aux 
iliaries  was  the  navy,  by  the  aid  of  whose  powerful  armament 
he  designed  to  demolish  the  water-batteries  at  Yorktown  and 
Gloucester  Point,  and  then  push  a  force  upon  West  Point, 
at  the  head  of  the  York  River,  thus  turning  the  line  of  de 
fences  on  the  Warwick.  But,  upon  applying  to  Flag-Officer 
Goldsborough  for  the  co-operation  of  the  navy,  he  was  in- 


*  This  exposition  of  the  views  and  counsels  of  General  Johnston  I  derive 
from  himself.  It  is  noteworthy  that  McClellan  expected  to  do  precisely  what 
his  antagonist  assumed  he  would  do — reduce  Yorktown  by  the  aid  of  the  navy, 
and  give  general  battle  before  Richmond. 


104          CAMPAIGNS   OF  THE  ARMY  OF   THE  POTOMAC. 

formed  by  that  officer  that  no  naval  force  could  be  spared  for 
that  purpose,  since  he  regarded  the  works  as  too  strong  for  his 
available  vessels.* 

The  second  project  was  to  land  a  heavy  force  in  the  rear 
of  Gloucester  Point,  turning  Yorktown  by  that  method,  and 
opening  up  the  York  Eiver.  This  task  he  had  assigned  to 
McDowell's  corps,  which  was  to  be  the  last  to  embark  at 
Alexandria,  and  which  should  execute  this  operation  in  case 
the  army  found  itself  brought  to  a  halt  by  the  peninsular  de 
fences.  But  on  the  very  day  on  which  the  army  arrived  be 
fore  Yorktown,  General  McClellan  was  met  by  an  order  f  of 
the  President,  to  which  reference  has  already  been  made,  de 
taching  McDowell's  corps  from  his  command,  and  retaining  it 
in  front  of  Washington. 

That  this  measure  was  faulty  in  principle  and  very  un 
fortunate  in  its  results,  can  now  be  readily  acknowledged 
without  imputing  any  really  unworthy  motive  to  President 
Lincoln.  When  Mr.  Lincoln  saw  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
carried  away  in  ships  out  of  his  sight,  and  learnt  that  hardly 
twenty  thousand  men  had  been  left  in  the  works  of  Washing 
ton  (though  above  thrice  that  number  was  within  call),  it  is 
not  difficult  to  understand  how  he  should  have  become  ner 
vous  as  to  the  safety  of  the  national  capital,  and,  so  feeling, 
should  have  retained  the  corps  of  McDowell  to  guard  it.  In 
this  he  acted  from  what  may  be  called  the  common-sense 
view  of  the  matter.  But  in  war,  as  in  the  domain  of  science, 
the  truth  often  transcends,  and  even  contradicts,  common 
sense.  It  required  more  than  common  sense,  it  required  the 

*  McClellan  :  Report,  p.  79.  It  is  due  to  say,  tliat  Commodore  Goldsborough 
proffered  the  co-operation  of  a  naval  force,  provided  Gloucester  Point  should  be 
first  turned  by  the  army.  Report  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  p.  632. 

f  This  order,  dated  April  4,  and  received  April  5,  is  as  follows : 

"  ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S  OFFICE,  April  4,  1862. 

"  By  direction  of  the  President,  General  McDowell's  army  corps  has  been 
detached  from  the  force  under  your  immediate  command,  and  the  general  ig 
ordered  to  report  to  the  Secretary  of  War.  Letter  by  mail. 

"E.  THOMAS,  Adjutant-General. 
MOCLELLAH." 


THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  105 

intuition  of  the  true  secret  of  war,  to  know  that  the  twenty- 
five  thousand  men  under  General  McDowell  would  really  avail 
more  for  the  defence  of  the  capital,  if  added  to  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  on  the  Peninsula,  thus  enabling  that  army  to 
push  vigorously  its  offensive  intent,  than  if  actually  held  in 
front  of  Washington.  This  Mr.  Lincoln  neither  knew  nor 
could  be  expected  to  know ;  and  it  is  precisely  because  the 
principles  that  govern  military  affairs  are  peculiar  and  of  a 
professional  nature,  that  the  interference  of  civilians  in  the 
war-councils  of  a  nation  must  commonly  be  disastrous.  The 
President,  who  found  himself  by  virtue  of  his  office  made 
commander-in-chief  of  all  the  forces  of  the  United  States,  and 
who  had,  since  the  supersedure  of  McClellan  as  general-in- 
chief,  assumed  a  species  of  general  direction  of  the  war,  had 
passed  his  life  in  the  arena  of  politics ;  and  he  brought  the 
habits  of  a  politician  to  affairs  in  which,  unfortunately,  their 
intrusion  can  only  result  in  a  confusion  of  all  just  relations. 
This  antagonism  between  the  maxims  that  govern  politics 
and  those  that  govern  military  affairs,  is  strikingly  illustrated 
in  a  sentence  of  one  of  Mr.  Lincoln's  dispatches  to  General 
McClellan  about  this  time.  Referring  to  McClellan's  repeated 
requests  that  McDowell's  force  should  be  sent  him,  the  Presi 
dent  says  :  "  I  shall  aid  you  all  I  can  consistently  with  my  vieio 
of  due  regard  to  all  points"  *  Nothing  could  be  more  in 
genuous  than  this  avowal  of  the  policy  of  an  equable  distribu 
tion  of  favors.  But  however  discreet  the  course  may  be  in 
politics,  it  is  fatal  in  Xvar,  and  is  precisely  that  once-honored 
Austrian  principle  of  "  covering  everything,  by  which  one 
really  covers  nothing."  War  is  partial  and  imperious,  and  in 
place  of  having  "  regard  to  all  points,"  it  neglects  many  points 
to  accumulate  all  on  the  decisive  point.  The  decisive  point  in 
the  case  under  discussion  was  assuredly  with  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  confronting  the  main  force  of  the  enemy.  The  proof 
of  this  was  not  long  in  declaring  itself. 

Thus   deprived    of   the   two   auxiliaries   on   which   he  had 

*  McClellan :  Report,  p.  106. 


106  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

counted,  General  McClellan  judged  that  there  remained  but 
one  alternative — either  to  break  the  Confederate  lines  of  the 
Peninsula,  if  a  weak  spot  could  be  found,  or  to  undertake 
systematic  operations  against  Yorktown,  of  the  nature  of  a 
siege.  Such  a  weak  spot  it  was  indeed  thought  had  been 
discovered  about  the  centre  of  the  line,  near  Lee's  Mill,  where 
there  was  a  dam  covered  by  a  battery  ;  and  with  the  view  of 
determining  the  actual  strength  of  this  position,  General  W. 
F.  Smith,  commanding  the  Second  Division  of  the  Fourth 
Corps,  was  ordered  to  push  a  strong  reconnoissance  over  the 
Warwick  at  that  point.  Under  cover  of  a  heavy  artillery  fire 
from  eighteen  guns,  under  Captain  Ayres,  four  companies  of 
Yermont  troops  passed  the  creek,  by  wading  breast-deep,  and 
carried  the  rifle-trenches  held  by  the  Confederates  as  an  ad 
vanced  line.  Here  they  were  re-enforced  by  eight  additional 
companies.  The  enemy,  upon  being  driven  from  the  front 
line,  retired  to  a  redoubt  in  the  rear,  and  there  receiving  a 
re-enforcement,  made  a  counter-charge  on  the  handful  of 
Union  troops,  who  were  driven  across  the  creek,  after  holding 
the  rifle-pits  for  an  hour,  entirely  unsupported.  Many  were 
killed  and  wounded  in  recrossing  the  stream.*  No  subsequent 
attempt  was  made  to  break  the  Confederate  line. 

It  now  remained  to  undertake  the  siege  of  the  uninvested 
fortifications  of  Yorktown, — a  task  to  which  the  army  at  once 
settled  down.  Depots  were  established  at  Shipping  Point,  to 
which  place  supplies  were  brought  direct  by  water;  and 
indeed  it  was  necessary  to  avoid  land  transportation  as  much 
as  possible, — the  roads  being  so  few  and  so  bad  as  to 
necessitate  the  construction  of  an  immense  amount  of  cor 
duroy  highway.  The  first  parallel  was  opened  at  about  a 
mile  from  Yorktown ;  and  under  its  protection,  batteries  were 
established  almost  simultaneously  along  the  whole  front,  ex 
tending  from  York  River  on  the  right  to  the  "Warwick  on  the 
left,  along  a  cord  of  about  one  mile  in  length.  In  all,  fourteen 
batteries  and  three  redoubts,  fully  armed,  and  including  some 

*  Magruder's  Official  Report :  Confederate  Reports  of  Battles,  p.  515. 


THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  1Q7 

unusually  heavy  metal,  such  as  one-hundred  and  two- 
hundred-pounders,  were  erected  to  operate  in  the  reduction 
of  the  earth-works.  The  batteries  as  completed  were,  with  a 
single  exception,*  not  allowed  to  open,  as  it  was  believed  that 
the  return  fire  would  interfere  with  the  labor  on  other  works. 
It  was  preferred  to  wait  till  the  preparations  should  be  com 
plete,  and  then  open  a  simultaneous  and  overwhelming  bom 
bardment.  This  period  would  have  been  reached  by  the  6th 
of  May  at  latest.  The  artillery  and  engineer  officers  judged 
that  a  very  few  hours'  fire  would  compel  the  surrender  or 
evacuation  of  the  works ;  but,  to  their  great  chagrin,  no 
opportunity  was  afforded  to  bring  this  professional  opinion 
to  the  practical  test ;  for  it  was  discovered  on  the  4th  of 
May  that  the  Confederates  had  evacuated  Yorktown.f  The 
retreat  had  been  managed  with  the  same  masterly  skill  that 
marked  the  evacuation  of  Manassas ;  and  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  cheated  of  its  anticipated  brilliant  passage  at  arms, 
came  into  possession  only  of  the  deserted  works  and  some 
threescore  and  ten  siege-guns,  that  the  Confederates  had 
been  obliged  to  leave  as  the  price  of  their  unmolested 
retreat. 

In  the  preceding  outline  of  the  siege  of  Yorktown,  I  have 
confined  myself  to   a  simple  recital  of  events.     It  is  well 


*  The  exception  was  in  the  case  of  what  was  called  Battery  No.  1,  which 
on  one  occasion  opened  on  the  wharf  at  Yorktown  to  prevent  the  enemy's 
receiving  artillery  stores. 

f  "  The  ease  with  which  the  two-hundred  and  one-hundred-pounders  were 
worked,  the  extraordinary  accuracy  of  their  fire,  and  the  since  ascertained 
effects  produced  upon  the  enemy  by  it,  force  upon  me  the  conviction  that  the 
fire  of  guns  of  similar  calibre  and  power,  combined  with  the  cross- vertical  fire  of 
the  thirteen  and  ten-inch  seacoast  mortars,  would  have  compelled  the  enemy  to 
surrender  or  abandon  his  works  in  less  than  twelve  hours."  Barry :  Eeport  of 
Artillery  Operations,  Siege  of  Torktown,  p.  134.  This  opinion  is  not  justified 
by  subsequent  experience  in  the  war,  for  the  rude  improvised  earthworks  of 
the  Confederates  showed  an  ability  to  sustain  an  indefinite  pounding.  General 
Johnston's  evacuation  of  Yorktown  seems  to  have  been  prompted  by  a  like  ex 
aggeration  of  the  probable  effect  of  a  bombardment. 


108  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  AEMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

known,  however,  that  no  portion  of  General  McClellan's  mili 
tary  career  has  given  rise  to  a  greater  amount  of  criticism,  or 
criticism  founded  less  on  the  intrinsic  merits  of  the  case. 

The  judgment  passed  on  the  operations  before  Yorktown 
will  turn  on  the  view  taken  of  the  question  whether  the  siege 
should  have  been  made  at  all,  or  whether  the  Confederate  posi 
tion  should  not  have  been  either  broken  or  turned. 

It  has  already  been  stated  that  the  latter  course — to  wit, 
the  turning  of  Yorktown — was  General  McClellan's  original 
plan.  To  this  duty  McDowell's  corps  was  assigned  ;  but  on 
the  very  day  he  arrived  before  Yorktown  he  received  the 
order  detaching  McDowell's  force  from  his  command.  The 
effect  of  this  measure  is  set  forth  with  much  emphasis  by 
General  McClellan.  "  To  me,"  says  he,  "  the  blow  was  most 
discouraging.  It  frustrated  all  my  plans  for  impending 
operations.  It  fell  when  I  was  too  deeply  committed  to  with 
draw.  It  left  me  incapable  of  continuing  operations  which 
had  been  begun.  It  compelled  the  adoption  of  another,  a 
different  and  less  effective  plan  of  campaign.  It  made  rapid 
and  brilliant  operations  impossible.  It  was  a  fatal  error." 
There  will  probably  be  no  question  as  to  the  merits  of  the 
proposed  movement  by  which  it  was  designed  to  turn 
Gloucester  Point  and  open  up  the  York  Kiver;  and  the 
verdict  will  be  equally  clear  as  to  the  ill-judged  policy — to  put 
it  at  the  mildest — which,  at  such  a  moment,  took  out  of  the 
commander's  hand  a  corps  destined  for  a  duty  so  important. 
But  it  is  not  entirely  clear  that  "  rapid  and  brilliant  opera 
tions"  were  not  still  feasible.  General  McClellan  before  he 
began  the  siege  had  with  him  a  force  of  eighty  thousand 
men ;  and  it  may  be  queried  whether  he  could  not  from  this 
force  have  still  detached  a  corps  of  twenty-five  thousand  men 
to  execute  the  movement  designed  for  McDowell.  The  hold 
ing  of  his  line  in  front  of  Yorktown — a  line  of  seven  or  eight 
miles — would,  to  make  it  secure  against  offensive  action 
on  the  enemy's  part,  require  about  forty  thousand  men.  Now, 
the  detachment  of  a  column  of  twenty-five  thousand  would 
still  have  left  him  fifty-five  thousand  men.  Moreover,  one 


THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  109 

division  of  McDowell's  corps — that  of  Franklin,  eleven 
thousand  strong — did  actually  reach  McClellan  while  the 
siege  was  in  progress,  and  he  held  it  on  shipboard  with  the 
view  of  intrusting  to  it  the  task  which  the  entire  corps  of 
^McDowell  had  originally  been  expected  to  perform.  Subse 
quently,  however,  he  concluded  that  it  was  unequal  to  the 
work.  But,  re-enforced  by  another  division,  might  it  not  have 
been  sufficient  ?  In  proof  of  this  it  may  be  pointed  out  that, 
on  the  retreat  of  Johnston  from  Yorktown,  Franklin's  divi 
sion*  alone  was  assigned  to  a  similar  and  equally  difficult 
duty — to  move  on  the  flank  of  the  Confederate  army  by  way 
of  West  Point. 

The  question  now  remains,  whether  an  attempt  should  have 
been  made  to  break  the  enemy's  lines.  The  total  force  under 
Magruder  at  the  time  of  the  arrival  of  the  Army  of  the  Poto 
mac  before  his  position  was,  according  to  Magruder's  own 
testimony,  eleven  thousand  men.  More  than  half  this  force, 
however,  was  on  garrison  duty.  "  I  was  compelled,"  says  he, 
"  to  place  in  Gloucester  Point,  Yorktown,  and  Mulberry  Island, 
fixed  garrisons,  amounting  to  six  thousand  men.  So  that  it 
will  be  seen  that  the  balance  of  my  line,  embracing  a  length  of 
thirteen  miles,  was  defended  by  about  five  thousand  men."t 
It  appears  that  General  Magruder  fully  expected,  after  the 
preliminary  reconnoissances,  that  a  serious  attack  would  be 
made ;  and  in  this  expectation  his  men  slept  in  the  trenches 
and  under  arms.  "  To  my  surprise,"  he  adds,  "  he  [McClel 
lan]  permitted  day  after  day  to  pass  without  an  assault.  In 
a  few  days,  the  object  of  his  delay  was  apparent.  In  every 
direction  in  front  of  our  lines,  through  the  intervening  woods, 
and  along  the  open  fields,  earthworks  began  to  appear. 
Through  the  energetic  action  of  the  Government,  re-enforce 
ments  began  to  pour  in,  and  each  hour  the  Army  of  the 
Peninsula  grew  stronger  and  stronger,  until  anxiety  passed 
from  my  mind  as  to  the  result  of  an  attack  upon  us."J 

*  Franklin's  division  reached  the  Peninsula  on  the  22d  of  April, 
f  Magruder's  Official  Report :  Confederate  Reports  of  Battles,  p.  51G. 
J  Ibid.,  p.  517. 


HO  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  AEMT  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

It  is  possible,  however — and  there  is  a  considerable  volume 
of  evidence  bearing  upon  this  point — that  General  McClel- 
lan,  during  all  the  earlier  portion  of  the  month  before  York- 
town,  had  it  in  his  mind,  even  without  McDowell's  corps,  to 
undertake  the  decisive  turning  movement  by  the  north  side, 
of  the  York.  In  this  event,  it  would  not  only  be  in  the  direc 
tion  of  his  plan  to  make  no  attack,  but  it  would  play  into  his 
hands  that  his  opponent  should  accumulate  his  forces  on  the 
Peninsula.  Yet  this  halting  between  two  opinions  had  the 
result  that,  when  he  had  abandoned  the  purpose  of  making 
the  turning  movement,  it  had  become  too  late  for  him  to 
make  a  direct  attack — "  all  anxiety"  as  to  the  result  of  which 
had  by  that  time  "  passed  from  the  mind"  of  his  opponent. 
From  subsequent  evidence,  it  would  appear  that  a  movement, 
not  with  the  view  of  assaulting  the  fortifications  of  Yorktown 
(that  would  have  been  a  bloody  enterprise),  but  of  breaking 
the  line  of  the  Warwick,  thus  investing  Yorktown,  if  not  com 
pelling  its  immediate  evacuation,  was  an  operation  holding 
out  a  reasonable  promise  of  success.* 

*  General  Heintzelman,  in  his  evidence  before  the  Committee  on  the  Con 
duct  of  the  War,  states  it  as  his  impression  that,  had  he  been  allowed,  he  could 
have  carried  the  line  of  the  Warwick.  "  I  think,"  says  he,  "  if  I  had  been 
permitted  when  I  first  landed  on  the  Peninsula  to  advance,  I  could  have  isolated 
the  troops  in  Yorktown,  and  the  place  would  have  fallen  in  a  few  days  ;  but 
my  orders  were  very  stringent  not  to  make  any  demonstration.  I  supposed, 
when  I  first  got  there,  that  we  could  force  the  enemy's  lines  at  about  Wynn's 
Mills,  isolate  Yorktown,  so  as  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  re-enforcing  it,  when 
it  would  have  fallen  in  the  course  of  a  little  while."  Report  on  the  Conduct  of 
the  War,  vol.  i.,  p.  347. 

General  McClellan,  however,  expressed  a  contrary  opinion : 

"  Question.  In  your  opinion  could  Heintzelman  have  captured  Yorktown 
by  a  rapid  movement  immediately  upon  his  landing  upon  the  Peninsula  ? 

"  Answer.  No ;  I  do  not  think  he  would  have  done  it.  When  we  did  ad 
vance,  we  found  the  enemy  intrenched  and  in  strong  force  wherever  we  ap 
proached."  Report  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  vol.  i.,  p.  429. 

General  Barnard,  who  was  chief-engineer  of  the  army  on  the  Peninsula,  has, 
in  his  work  on  the  Peninsular  Campaign,  stated  with  much  emphasis,  that 
McClellan  should  have  assaulted ;  but  this  opinion  apres  coup  is  somewhat 
damaged  by  the  fact  that  he,  at  the  time,  gave  a  professional  judgment  against 
assault. 


THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  HI 

It  was  not,  indeed,  a  certain  operation,  for  the  impracticable 
character  of  the  country  made  the  handling  of  troops  very 
difficult;  but  vigorous  measures  were  at  the  time  so  urgent 
that  a  considerable  risk  might  well  have  been  run.  It  was 
certain  that  the  enemy  would  improve  all  the  time  allowed 
him  to  prepare  new  fortifications  before  Richmond,  and  as 
semble  all  his  scattered  forces  for  the  defence  of  his  capital. 
But  just  in  proportion  as  time  was  valuable  to  him  was  the 
obligation  imposed  on  General  McClellan  of  not  allowing  him 
this  time.  It  is  now  known  that  the  Confederate  govern 
ment  made  good  use  of  the  month  of  grace  allowed  it  by  the 
siege  of  Yorktown  ;  for  not  only  were  vigorous  military  meas 
ures  taken,  but  at  this  very  period  the  Confederate  Congress 
passed  the  first  conscription  act,  which  gave  Mr.  Davis  abso 
lute  control  of  the  military  resources  of  the  South. 

The  proper  method  of  meeting  this  was  to  have  re-enforced 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac  and  organized  reserves.  But  this 
was  far  from  the  views  of  those  who  controlled  the  war- 
councils  at  Washington ;  and  the  President,  who  had  for  the 
time  being  taken  into  his  own  hands  the  functions  of  general- 
in-chief,  gave  one  constant  mot  d'ordre — "take  Yorktown," 
— a  command  that  reminds  one  of  the  story  in  Spanish  his 
tory  which  runs  in  this  wise  :  "  When  the  reports  of  these  mat 
ters  reached  Philip  IV.,  he  was  disposed  to  entertain  some 
prejudice  against  his  general,  and  took  on  himself  to  give  his 
own  direction  for  the  war,  without  consulting  Spinola.  His 
majesty  directed  that  Breda  should  be  besieged,  and  when  it 
was  represented  that  it  was  needful  to  make  many  prepara 
tions  for  an  operation  of  that  magnitude,  the  king  sat  down 
and  wrote  this  laconic  order  to  his  general :  '  Marquis,  take 
Breda.  I,  the  King'  (Yo,  el  Key)." 

If  Yorktown  was  at  length  taken  without  a  combat  and 
without  blood,  it  ,was  not  without  severe  and  exhausting 
labors  in  the  siege.  The  victory,  though  apparently  barren, 
was  really  more  substantial  than  it  seemed ;  and  had  General 
Johnston,  in  place  of  becoming  alarmed  at  the  preparations 
against  him,  determined  to  fight  it  out  on  the  line  of  the 


112          CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF   THE  POTOMAC. 

Warwick,  there  is  little  doubt  that  he  might  have  prolonged 
the  siege. 

Meantime  the  morale  of  the  Union  army  was  excellent ;  and 
the  road  to  Richmond  being  now  opened,  the  troops  turned 
their  faces  hopefully  towards  the  capital  of  the  Confederacy. 


II. 
FKOM  YOKKTOWN  TO  THE  CHICKAHOMINY. 

Upon  the  discovery  of  Johnston's  withdrawal  from  York- 
town,  all  the  available  cavalry,  together  with  four  batteries  of 
horse-artillery,  under  General  Stoneman,  was  ordered  in  pur 
suit.  The  divisions  of  Hooker  and  Smith  were  at  the  same 
time  sent  forward  in  support,  and  afterwards  the  divisions  of 
Kearney,  Couch,  and  Casey  were  put  in  motion.  General 
Sunmer,  the  officer  second  in  rank  in  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  was  ordered  to  the  front  to  take  charge  of  opera 
tions,  while  General  McClellan  remained  behind  at  Yorktown 
to  arrange  for  the  departure  of  Franklin's  division  by  water 
to  West  Point.  By  this  move  it  was  expected  to  force  the 
Confederates  to  abandon  whatever  works  they  might  have  on 
the  Peninsula  below  that  point. 

Stoneman  met  little  opposition  till  he  reached  the  enemy's 
prepared  position  in  front  of  Williamsburg,  twelve  miles  from 
Yorktown.  The  Peninsula  here  contracts,  and  the  approach 
ing  heads  of  two  tributaries  of  the  York  and  James  rivers 
form  a  kind  of  narrow  isthmus  upon  which  the  two  roads 
leading  from  Yorktown  to  Williamsburg  unite.  Commanding 
the  debouche  was  an  extensive  work  with  a  bastion  front, 
named  Fort  Magruder,  and,  to  the  right  and  left,  on  the  pro 
longation  of  the  line,  were  twelve  other  redoubts  and  epaul- 
ments  for  field-guns.  These  works  had  been  prepared  by  the 
Confederates  many  months  before. 

Now,  this  position,  though  a  strong  one  so  long  as  its 
flanks  were  secured  by  the  closing  of  the  rivers  on  either 
side,  was  one  which  evidently  General  Johnston  had  no  in- 


THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN. 


113 


tention  of  occupying ;  for,  by  the  opening  up  of  the  York,  the 
line  of  Williamsburg  was  exposed  to  be  immediately  turned. 
The  Confederate  army  had,  in  fact,  passed  through  Williams- 
burg  towards  the  Chickahominy,  and  only  a  rear-guard  re- 


SKETCH  OF  THE  FIELD   OF   WILLIAMSBURG. 

A.  Hooker's  division. 

B.  Tart  of  Couch's  division. 

C.  Smith's  division. 

D.  E.    Works  occupied  by  Hancock's  brigade. 

mained  to  cover  the  trains.  When,  however,  Stoneman,  on 
the  afternoon  of  the  4th,  drew  up  in  front  of  the  redoubts, 
Johnston,  seeing  pursuit  to  be  serious,  brought  back  troops 
into  the  works ;  and  thus,  by  a  kind  of  accident,  there  ensued 
on  the  morrow  the  bloody  encounter  known  as  the  battle  of 
Williamsburg. 

Stoneman,  on  his  arrival  in  front  of  Williamsburg,  had  a 
passage  at  arms  with  the  Confederate  cavalry ;  but,  finding 
the  position  too  strong  to  carry,  he  stood  on  the  defensive, 
awaiting  the  arrival  of  the  infantry.  Now,  such  was  the  con 
fusion  that  attended  this  hurried  march,  that  by  the  time 

Q 


114  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE   ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

Sumner  could  get  up  his  advance  divisions  and  make  disposi 
tions  for  attack,  darkness  ensued,  and  the  men  bivouacked  in 
the  woods.  During  the  night  a  heavy  rain  came  on,  render 
ing  the  roads  almost  impassable. 

In  the  morning,  Hooker's  division  had  taken  position  on 
the  left,  and  Smith's  on  the  right ;  the  other  divisions  had 
not  yet  come  up.  The  attack  was  opened  by  General  Hooker 
in  front  of  Fort  Magruder.  Having  cleared  the  space  in  his 
front,  he  advanced  two  batteries*  to  within  seven  hundred 
yards  of  the  fort,  and,  by  nine  o'clock,  silenced  its  fire.  But 
now  the  enemy  began  to  develop  strongly  on  his  left,f  and,  as 
re-enforcements  arrived,  made  a  series  of  determined  attacks 
with  the  view  of  turning  that  flank.  These  attacks  were 
made  with  constantly  increasing  pressure,  and  bore  heavily 
on  Hooker.  That  officer  had  taken  care  to  open  communica 
tion  with  the  Yorktown  road,  on  which  fresh  troops  were  to 
come  up ;  yet,  notwithstanding  the  repeated  requests  made 
by  him  for  the  assistance  he  sorely  needed,  none  came.J  He 
was  therefore  compelled  to  engage  the  enemy  during  the 
whole  day ;  and,  between  three  and  four  o'clock,  his  ammuni 
tion  began  to  give  out,  so  that  some  of  his  shattered  brigades 
were  forced  to  confront  the  enemy  with  no  other  cartridges 
than  those  they  gathered  from  the  boxes  of  their  fallen  com- 
rades.§  At  length,  between  four  and  five  o'clock,  Kearney's 
division,  which  had  been  ordered  in  the  morning  to  go  to  the 
support  of  Hooker,  but  had  met  great  delay  in  passing  the 
masses  of  troops  and  trains  that  obstructed  the  single  deep 
muddy  defile,  arrived.  Learning  the  condition  of  Hooker's 
men,  Kearney  took  up  his  division  at  the  double-quick,  at- 

*  Batteries  of  Webber  and  Bramlial. 

f  Held  at  first  by  Patterson's  New  Jersey  brigade,  and  then  re-enforced. 

|  It  is  due  to  mention,  however,  that,  about  one  o'clock,  Peck's  brigade 
came  up  and  took  position  on  Hooker's  right,  and,  being  re-enforced  by 
Devin's  brigade,  held  the  centre  of  the  Union  line  with  much  firmness  against 
several  attacks.  Couch :  Report. 

§  Hooker  :  Report  of  Williamsburg.  During  the  action,  five  guns  of  Web 
ber's  battery  (its  support  being  withdrawn  for  service  on  the  left)  fell  into  the 
hands  of  the  enemy. 


THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  115 

tacked  spiritedly,  re-established  the  line,  and  enabled  Hooker's 
worn-out  troops  to  withdraw.  Hooker  lost  one  thousand 
seven  hundred  men. 

While,  during  the  morning,  the  fight  thus  waxed  hot  in 
front  of  Fort  Magruder,  the  troops  on  the  right,  composed 
exclusively  of  General  Smith's  division,  had  not  engaged 
the  enemy ;  but  towards  noon,  Sumner  ordered  General 
Smith  to  send  one  of  his  brigades  to  occupy  a  redoubt  on  the 
extreme  right,  said  to  be  evacuated  by  the  enemy.  For  this 
purpose.  Hancock's  brigade  was  selected.*  Making  a  wide 
detour  to  the  right,  which  brought  him  within  sight  of  the 
York  River,  Hancock  passed  Cub  Dam  Creek  on  an  old  mill- 
bridge,  and  took  possession  of  the  work  indicated,  which  he 
found  unoccupied.  Twelve  hundred  yards  in  advance,  another 
redoubt  was  discovered  in  the  same  condition,  and  this  also 
he  quietly  took  possession  of. 

The  position  which,  through  the  carelessness  of  the  Con 
federates,  t  Hancock  had  thus  seized,  proved  to  be  a  very 
important  one,  having  a  crest  and  natural  glacis  on  either 
side,  and  entirely  commanding  the  plain  between  it  and  Fort 
Magruder.  He  had  in  fact  debouched  on  the  flank  and  rear 
of  the  Confederate  line  of  defence.  On  reconnoitring  what 
lay  beyond,  there  were  found  to  be  two  more  redoubts  between 
the  position  and  the  fort.  These  seemed  to  be  occupied  by 


*  Davidson's  brigade  was  also  under  Hancock's  command  at  this  time,  and 
he  detailed  for  the  movement,  from  his  own  brigade,  the  Fifth  Wisconsin, 
Forty-ninth  Pennsylvania,  and  Sixth  Maine  ;  and  from  Davidson's  brigade,  the 
Seventh  Maine  and  Thirty-third  New  York  volunteers.  To  these  were  attached 
Lieutenant  Crowen's  New  York  battery  of  six  guns.  Hancock's  Official  Report. 

f  General  Johnston,  in  conversation  with  the  writer,  stated  that  neither 
himself  nor  any  of  his  officers  was  even  aware  of  the  existence  of  these  redoubts 
on  the  extreme  left  of  the  Confederate  position, — the  line  of  works  having  been 
prepared  long  before  under  General  Magruder.  The  first  intimation  he  had  of 
their  existence  was  when  Hill  brought  him  report  that  the  enemy  was  in  occu 
pation  of  an  unknown  redoubt  on  the  left,  and  asked  permission  to  drive  him 
off.  Johnston  told  him  to  do  so,  but  to  "act  with  caution."  Accordingly,  Hill 
detached  troops  under  General  Early,  who  led  the  unsuccessful  attack  after 
wards  made  on  Hancock. 


116  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE   ARMY  OF   THE  POTOMAC. 

at  least  some  force.  Hancock  put  his  battery  into  position  to 
play  upon  these  works,  and  a  few  shells  and  the  fire  of  the 
skirmishers  proved  sufficient  to  drive  the  Confederates  from 
their  cover ;  but  he  did  not  deem  it  prudent  to  occupy  them, 
until  re-enforcements  should  arrive. 

It  was  not  till  now  that  the  Confederate  commander,  whose 
attention  had  been  absorbed  in  the  attack  of  Hooker  on  his 
right,  became  aware  of  this  menacing  movement  on  his  left ; 
but  being  apprised  of  the  danger,  he  immediately  took  meas 
ures  to  meet  it.  Now  it  happened  that  precisely  at  this 
juncture,  Hancock,  instead  of  receiving  the  re-enforcements 
he  had  repeatedly  and  urgently  sent  for,  got  a  message  from 
General  Sumner,  instructing  him  to  fall  back  to  his  first  posi 
tion.*  Hancock,  appreciating  the  commanding  importance  of 
his  position,  delayed  doing  so  as  long  as  possible.  But  about 
five  o'clock,  seeing  that  the  Confederates  were  in  motion  on 
his  front,  that  they  had  reoccupied  the  two  redoubts  from 
which  they  were  last  driven,  and  that  they  were  threatening 
both  his  flanks,  he  retired  his  troops  behind  the  crest.  Here 
he  formed  his  line  with  about  one  thousand  six  hundred 
men,  being  determined  to  remain.  Waiting  till  the  advancing 
enemy  got  below  the  rise  of  the  hill,  and  within  thirty  paces, 
he  ordered  a  general  charge.  This  was  executed  in  a  very 
spirited  manner :  a  few  of  the  enemy  who  had  approached 
nearest  were  bayoneted  ;t  the  rest  broke  and  fled  in  all  di 
rections,  and  the  Confederate  flanking  force,  finding  their 
centre  routed,  also  beat  a  hasty  re  treat  .J  Shortly  after  the 
action  was  decided,  General  Smith,  by  order  of  General  Mc- 
Clellan,  who  had  reached  the  front  and  appreciated  the  posi 
tion  secured  by  Hancock,  brought  up  strong  re-enforcements. 
At  the  same  time  the  firing  ceased  in  front  of  Fort  Magruder, 
and  the  troops,  wet,  weary,  and  hungry,  rested  on  their  arms. 
But  "Williamsburg  was  really  won,  for  Hancock  held  the  key 

*  Hancock :  Report  of  Williamsburg. 
f  This  fact  is  vouched  for  by  official  evidence. 

\  The  Confederate  loss  was  heavy,  numbering  over  five  hundred ;  Hancock's 
total  loss  was  one  hundred  and  twenty-nine. 


THE  PENINSULAR   CAMPAIGN.  H7 

of  the  position ;  and  during  the  night,  Longstreet  retired  to 
join  the  body  of  Johnston's  army,  now  rapidly  marching  to 
wards  the  Chickahoininy.* 

While  the  action  before  Williamsburg  was  going  on,  Gen 
eral  Franklin  was  embarking  his  division  for  the  purpose  of 
ascending  the  York  River  by  water.  This  was  accomplished 
on  the  following  day,  and  on  the  morning  of  the  7th  he  had 
completed  the  disembarkation  of  his  division  opposite  West 
Point,  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Pamunkey,  a  short  distance 
above  where  that  river  empties  into  the  York.  But  on  at 
tempting  to  advance,  Franklin  was  met  by  the  Confederate 
division  of  Whiting,  whose  presence,  and  a  spirited  attack  of 
Hood's  Texas  brigade,  served  to  hold  Franklin  in  check. 

The  operations  here  described,  constituting  the  pursuit  of 
the  Confederates  (which  really  ended  at  Williamsburg),  are 
open  to  criticism.  The  pursuit  was  made  on  two  lines,  by 
land  and  by  water,  and  Johnston  skilfully  disposed  his  eche 
lons  to  meet  both  advances.  The  move  by  water,  which  was 
the  most  promising,  since  it  menaced  the  enemy's  flank,  was 
not  made  in  sufficient  force,  and  presented  merely  the  char 
acter  of  a  detachment  on  the  Confederate  rear, — a  species  of 
operation  which  is  seldom  successful.  Besides,  it  started  too 
late  and  arrived  too  late.t  It  could  be  of  no  avail,  unless 
supported  by  the  whole  army  coming  from  Williamsburg.  J 
But  there  was  no  assurance  that  this  could  be,  for  the  exist 
ence  of  the  defences  of  Williamsburg,  where  the  Confederates 
were  sure,  if  need  be,  to  make  a  stand,  was  known.§ 

*  "  At  half-past  three,  A.  M.,  of  the  6th,  the  pickets  reported  that  the  enemy 
appeared  to  be  evacuating  the  works  in  front.  At  sunrise,  these  strong  works 
were  in  the  possession  of  my  division,  and  Heintzelman's  corps  subsequently 
moved  out  and  occupied  Williamsburg."  Couch :  Report  of  Williamsburg. 

f  The  Confederates  evacuated  Torktown  on  the  night  of  May  3-4.  Frank 
lin's  division  had  just  been  disembarked  from  the  transports,  so  that  re-em 
barkation  was  necessary,  and  it  did  not  start  till  the  morning  of  the  6th,  and 
did  not  make  the  landing  near  White  House  till  the  morning  of  the  7th. 

J  Schalk :  Campaigns  of  1862-3,  p.  169. 

§  Barnard :  Report  of  Engineer  Operations,  p.  63. 


118  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

The  action  at  Williamsburg  was  very  unfortunate,  though 
General  McClellan  cannot  be  held  responsible  for  it,  unless 
he  may  be  blamed  for  remaining  behind  at  Torktown  to 
superintend  the  getting  off  of  Franklin's  expedition.  But  to 
blame  him  for  this  would  be  hardly  warrantable.  He  was 
within  easy  communication  with  the  advance,  which  was 
placed  under  orders  of  his  lieutenant,  General  Sumner  ;  and  he 
had  a  right  to  suppose  that  he  would  be  kept  informed  of  every 
thing  of  importance  occurring  in  the  front.  Yet  he  was  left 
entirely  unaware,  till  the  afternoon,  that  any  thing  bat  a  triv 
ial  affair  of  the  rear-guard  had  taken  place.  Sumner,  that 
model  of  a  soldier  though  not  of  a  general,  had  too  much  the 
fire  of  the  vieux  sabreur  to  allow  his  head  to  work  coolly  and 
clearly  in  situations  where  that  temper  of  mind  was  most 
needed  ;  and  his  conduct  of  affairs  at  Williamsburg  was 
marked  by  great  confusion.  So  contradictory  were  his  or 
ders,  that  with  thirty  thousand  men  within  three  or  four  miles 
of  the  position,  the  division  of  Hooker  was  left  to  bear  alone 
the  brunt  of  successive  severe  attacks  ;  and  the  result  was  the 
loss  of  above  two  thousand  men,*  without  any  corresponding 
gain.  Hooker's  fight  was  really  quite  unnecessary  ;  for  the 
difficult  obstacles  against  which  he  had  to  contend  might 
have  been  easily  turned  by  the  right.  This  was  actually  done 
at  last  by  the  flank  movement  of  General  Hancock,  who,  with 
slight  loss,  determined  the  issue. 

On  the  retreat  of  the  Confederates  from  Williamsburg,  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  was  pushed  forward  as  rapidly  as  the 
wretched  condition  of  the  roads  would  permit,  on  a  line  paral 
lel  with  the  York  and  Pamunkey  ;  and  on  the  \6th  of  May 
headquarters  and  the  advance  divisions  reached  White  House, 
at  the  head  of  navigation  of  the  latter  stream.  From  that 
point  the  York  River  Railroad  runs  due  west  to  Richmond, 
distant  eighteen  miles.  Great  depots  were  established  at 


*  The  precise  loss  was  two  thousand  two  hundred  and  twenty-eight  killed, 
wounded,  and  missing. 


THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  119 

White  House,  to  which  supplies  were  brought  by  water,  and 
the  columns  moved  forward  on  the  line  of  the  York  River  and 
Richmond  Railroad ;  which,  repaired  as  the  army  proceeded, 
became  its  line  of  communication  with  the  base  at  White 
House.  Thus  the  divisions  advanced  till  they  reached  the 
Chickahominy,  and  by  the  21st  they  were  posted  in  echelon 
along  the  "left  or  north  bank  of  that  stream,  destined  soon  to 
become  the  scene  of  stirring  events.* 

The  consummate  strategist  that  had  directed  the  skilful 
withdrawal  from  Yorktown  and  checked  the  advance  of  the 
Union  columns  at  Williamsburg  now  proceeded  to  gather  the 
Confederate  forces  around  the  lines  of  Richmond.  In  the 
exposition  I  have  already  given  of  Johnston's  plan  of  opera 
tions  to  meet  the  advance  of  the  Union  army  against  Rich 
mond,  it  has  been  indicated  that  it  was  his  fixed  purpose  to 
refuse  battle  until  his  opponent  should  approach  that  city. 
Having  now  retired  behind  the  line  of  the  Chickahominy,  he 
proceeded  to  urge  upon  the  Richmond  administration  the 
policy  of  an  immediate  concentration  of  all  available  forces  at 
that  point,  as  affording  the  best  means  for  a  true  defence  of 
Richmond  by  a  vigorous  assumption  of  the  offensive  at  the 
proper  moment.  Johnston  found  fully  as  much  difficulty  in 
impressing  his  views  upon  the  cabinet  at  Richmond,  as  Mc- 


*  It  will  thus  appear  that  it  required  two  weeks  for  the  march  of  hft>  miles 
from  White  House  to  the  Chickahominy.  Regarded  as  a  pursuit  of  the  ene 
my,  this  was  certainly  tardy.  But  the  nature  of  McClellan's  opeiation  can 
hardly  be  so  defined.  His  ultimate  aim  was  directed  against  Richmond,  and 
he  expected  that  McDowell's  corps  would  make  a  junction  with  him.  His  opera 
tions  were  necessarily  of  a  somewhat  methodical  character,  and  he  was  forced  to 
open  up  a  new  base,  and  form  depots  of  supplies.  Besides,  the  roads  were  bad 
Deyond  all  precedent.  This  tardiness  has  not  escaped  the  censure  of  the  Com 
mittee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  who,  without  admitting  any  mitigating 
circumstances,  thus  deliver  verdict :  "  The  distance  between  Williamsburg  and 
the  line  of  operations  on  the  Chickahomimy  was  from  forty  to  fifty  miles,  and 
the  army  was  about  two  weeks  in  moving  that  distance."  (Report  on  the  Con 
duct  of  the  War,  vol.  i  ,  p.  20.)  But  perhaps  military  men  may  be  disposed  to 
dispute  the  justness  of  the  judgment  of  a  body  of  strategists  with  whom  the 
Chickahominy  figures  as  a  "line  of  operations!" 


120  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

Clellan  did  in  impressing  his  on  the  cabinet  at  Washington. 
Nevertheless,  in  accordance  with  his  counsels,  the  abandon 
ment  of  Norfolk  was  ordered ;  and  General  Huger,  after  de 
stroying  the  dockyards  and  removing  the  stores,  evacuated 
that  place  on  the  10th  of  May,  and  withdrew  its  garrison  to 
unite  with  the  army  in  front  of  Kichmond.  On  the  next  day 
it  was  occupied  by  a  Union  force,  led  by  General  Wool,  from 
Fortress  Monroe.  One  important  consequence  of  the  evacua 
tion  of  Norfolk  was  the  destruction  of  the  Merrimac,  which 
vessel  proving  to  have  too  great  a  draft  of  water  to  proceed 
up  the  James  to  Richmond,  was  on  the  following  day  blown 
up  by  order  of  her  commander,  Commodore  Tatnall.  This  at 
once  opened  the  river  to  the  advance  of  the  Union  gunboats ; 
and  immediately  afterwards  a  fleet,  composed  of  the  Monitor, 
Galena,  Aroostook,  Port  Eoyal,  and  Naugatuck,  under  Com 
modore  Kodgers,  ascended  the  James,  with  the  view  of  open 
ing  the  water  highway  to  Richmond.  Within  twelve  miles  of 
the  city,  however,  the  vessels  were  arrested  by  the  guns  of 
Fort  Darling,  on  Drury's  Bluff,  and  after  a  four  hours'  en 
gagement,  in  which  the  Galena  received  severe  damage,  and 
the  one-huiidred-pounder  Parrott  on  the  Naugatuck  was 
burst,  the  fleet  was  compelled  to  withdraw. 

It  was  not  these  events,  however,  that  determined  Mc- 
Clellan's  line  of  advance  on  Richmond  by  the  York  rather 
than  by  the  James ;  for  the  former  course  had  already  been 
dictated  to  him  by  antecedent  circumstances.  Before  the 
destruction  of  the  Merrimac  had  opened  the  opportunity  of 
swinging  across  to  the  James,  the  army  was  already  well 
en  route  by  the  York  and  Pamunkey,  under  injunctions  to 
push  forward  on  that  line  for  the  purpose  of  uniting  with  a 
column  under  McDowell,  which  was  about  to  move  from 
Fredericksburg  towards  Richmond.  As  this  circumstance 
exercised  a  controlling  influence  on  the  campaign,  and  power 
fully  affected  its  character  and  results,  I  shall  enter  into  its 
exposition  at  some  length  in  the  succeeding  chapter. 


THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  121 


III. 

CONFEDERATE  STRATEGY  ON  THE  CHICKAHOMINY  AND 
IN  THE  VALLEY  OF  THE  SHENANDOAH. 

The  brilliant  historian  of  the  war  in  the  Spanish  Peninsula 
lays  down  the  maxim  that  "military  operations  are  so 
dependent  upon  accidental  circumstances,  that,  to  justly  cen 
sure,  it  should  always  be  shown  that  an  unsuccessful  general 
Has  violated  the  received  maxims  and  established  principles 
of  war.".*  Now  as  General  McGlellan's  offensive  movement 
towards  Richmond  really  ended  with  the  establishment  of  his 
army  on  the  Chickahominy,  and  as  the  narrative  of  events  to 
follow  will  show  the  enemy  in  an  offensive  attitude,  and  the 
army  whose  proper  role  was  the  aggressive  reduced  to  the 
defensive,  and  finally  compelled  to  retreat,  it  will  be  in  place 
to  follow  attentively  the  course  and  causes  of  action  with  the 
view  to  discover  whether  the  untoward  events  that  befell  the 
Union  arms  be  traceable  to  any  departure  from  those  "estab 
lished  principles  of  war,"  the  violation  of  which  furnishes  a 
just  ground  of  censure. 

Upon  McClellan's  arrival  on  the  Chickahominy,  there  were 
two  objects  which  he  had  to  keep  in  view :  to  secure  a  firm 
footing  on  the  Richmond  side  of  that  stream  with  the  view 
of  carrying  out  the  primal  purpose  of  the  campaign,  and  at 
the  same  time  to  so  dispose  his  forces  as  to  insure  the  junc 
tion  of  McDowell's  column  from  Fredericksburg  with  the 
force  before  Richmond.  The  former  purpose  was  accom 
plished  by  throwing  the  left  wing  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
across  the  Chickahominy  at  Bottom's  Bridge,  which  the  Con 
federates  had  left  uncovered.  Casey's  division  of  Keyes' 
corps  crossed  on  the  20th  of  May,  and  occupied  the  opposite 

*  Napier :  History  of  the  Peninsular  War,  vol.  i.,  p.  8. 


122  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF   THE  POTOMAC. 

heights.  Heintzelman's  corps  was  then  thrown  forward  in 
support,  and  Bottom's  Bridge  was  immediately  rebuilt. 

To  secure  the  second  object,  McClellan  extended  his  right 
wing  well  northward,  and  on  the  24th  carried  the  village  of 
Mechanicsville,  forcing  the  enemy  across  the  Chickahominy 
at  the  Mechanicsville  Bridge  which  the  Confederates  after 
crossing  destroyed.  He  then  awaited  the  march  of  McDowell 
to  join  him,  in  order  to  initiate  operations  against  Richmond. 
I  must  now  turn  aside  to  show  in  what  manner  the  object  of 
this  movement  was  baulked  by  the  skill  of  the  Confederates 
and  the  folly  of  those  who  controlled  the  operations  of  the 
Union  armies. 

At  the  time  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  toiling  pain~ 
fully  up  the  Peninsula  towards  Richmond,  the  remaining 
forces  in  Northern  Virginia  presented  the  extraordinary 
spectacle  of  three  distinct  armies,  planted  on  three  separate 
lines  of  operations,  under  three  independent  commanders. 
The  highland  region  of  "West  Virginia  had  been  formed  into 
the  "  Mountain  Department"  under  command  of  General 
Fremont ;  the  Valley  of  the  Shenandoah  constituted  the 
"  Department  of  the  Shenandoah"  under  General  Banks ; 
and  the  region  covered  by  the  direct  lines  of  approach  to 
Washington  had  been  erected  into  the  "  Department  of  the 
Rappahannock,"  and  assigned  to  General  McDowell  at  the 
time  his  corps  was  detached  from  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 
About  the  period  reached  by  the  narrative  of  events  on 
the  Peninsula,  these  armies  were  distributed  as  follows : 
General  Fremont  with  a  force  of  fifteen  thousand  men  at 
Franklin,  General  Banks  with  a  force  of  about  sixteen 
thousand  men  at  Strasburg,  and  General  McDowell  with  a 
force  of  thirty  thousand  men  at  Fredericksburg  on  the 
Rappahannock.  It  need  hardly  be  said  that  this  arrange 
ment,  the  like  of  which  has  not  been  seen  since  Napoleon 
scandalized  the  Austrians  by  destroying  in  succession  half  a 
dozen  of  their  armies  distributed  after  precisely  this  fashion — • 
nor  indeed  was  ever  seen  before,  save  in  periods  of  the 
eclipse  of  all  military  judgment — was  in  violation  of  the  true 


THE  PENINSULAE  CAMPAIGN.  123 

principles  of  war.  One  hardly  wishes  to  inquire  by  whose 
crude  and  fatuitous  inspiration  these  things  were  done ;  but 
such  was  the  spectacle  presented  by  the  Union  forces  in 
Virginia  :  the  main  army  already  held  in  check  on  the  Chicka- 
hominy,  and  these  detached  columns  inviting  destruction  in 
detail.  Not  to  have  taken  advantage  of  such  an  opportunity 
would  have  shown  General  Johnston  to  be  a  tyro  in  his 
trade. 

It  came  about,  after  the  commencement  of  active  opera 
tions  on  the  Peninsula  had  drawn  towards  Richmond  the  main 
force  of  the  Confederates  and  relieved  the  front  of  Washing 
ton  from  the  pressure  of  their  presence,  that  the  Administra 
tion,  growing  more  easy  touching  the  safety  of  the  capital, 
determined,  in  response  to  General  McClellan's  oft-repeated 
appeals  for  re-enforcements,  to  send  forward  McDowell's 
corps, — not,  indeed,  as  he  desired,  to  re-enforce  him  by  water, 
but  to  advance  overland  to  attack  Richmond  in  co-operation 
with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  To  this  end,  the  division  of 
Shields  was  detached  from  the  command  of  General  Banks  in 
the  Shenandoah  Valley,  and  given  to  General  McDowell ;  and 
this  addition  brought  the  latter's  force  up  to  forty-one  thou 
sand  men  and  one  hundred  guns.  General  McClellan  had 
received  official  notification  of  this  intended  movement ;  and 
on  the  march  from  Williamsburg  to  the  Chickahominy,  as  has 
been  shown,  he  threw  his  right  wing  well  forward,  so  as  to 
insure  the  junction  of  McDowell's  force,  when  it  should  move 
forward  from  Fredericksburg.*  After  numerous  delays,  the 
time  of  advance  of  this  column  was  at  length  fixed  for  the 
26th  of  May,  a  date  closely  coincident  with  the  arrival  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  on  the  Chickahominy.  The  head  of 
McDowell's  column  had  already  been  pushed  eight  miles 

*  It  should  not  be  forgotten  that  this  was  the  controlling  consideration  in 
the  choice  by  General  McClellan  of  the  line  of  advance  by  the  Pamunkey, 
instead  of  swinging  his  army  across  to  the  James  immediately  after  the  battle 
of  Williamsburg  and  the  destruction  of  the  Merrimac  immediately  thereon, — 
a  course  the  adoption  of  which  would,  in  all  probability,  have  altered  the  en  tins 
character  of  the  campaign. 


124  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

south  of  Fredericksburg ;  and  McClellan,  to  clear  all  opposi 
tion  from  his  path,  sent  forward  Porter's  corps  to  Hanover 
Junction,  where  he  had  a  sharp  encounter  with  a  force  of  the 
enemy  under  General  Branch,  whom  he  repulsed  with  a  loss 
of  two  hundred  killed  and  seven  hundred  prisoners,  and  estab 
lished  the  right  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  within  fifteen 
miles,  or  one  march,  of  McDowell's  van.  McDowell  was 
eager  to  advance,  and  McClellan  was  equally  anxious  for 
his  arrival,  when  there  happened  an  event  which  frustrated 
this  plan  and  all  the  hopes  that  had  been  based  thereon. 
This  event  was  the  irruption  of  Stonewall  Jackson  in  the 
Shenandoah  Yalley.  The  keen-eyed  soldier  at  the  head  of  the 
main  Confederate  army,  discerning  the  intended  junction 
between  McDowell  and  McClelian,  quickly  seized  his  oppor 
tunity,  and  intrusted  the  execution  of  a  bold  coup  to  that  vig 
orous  lieutenant  who  had  already  made  the  Valley  ring  with 
his  exploits. 

Jackson,  on  retiring  from  his  last  raid  in  the  Shenandoah 
Yalley,  which  had  ended  in  his  repulse  by  Shields  at  Win 
chester  (March  27),  had  retreated  up  the  Valley  by  way  of 
Harrisonburg,  and  turning  to  the  Blue  Bidge,  took  up  a 
position  between  the  south  fork  of  the  Shenandoah  and  Swift 
Bun  Gap.  Here  he  was  retained  by  Johnston,  after  the  main 
body  of  the  Confederate  army  had  been  drawn  in  towards 
Bichmond.  Jackson  was  joined  by  Swell's  division  from 
Gordonsville  on  the  30th  April,  and  at  the  same  time  he 
received  the  further  accession  of  the  two  brigades  of  General 
Edward  Johnson,  who  had  held  an  independent  command  in 
Southwest  Virginia.  This  raised  his  force  to  about  fifteen 
thousand  men.  Banks'  force,  reduced  by  the  detachment  of 
Shields'  division,  sent  to  General  McDowell,  to  about  five 
thousand  men,  was  posted  at  Harrisonburg.  Fremont  was  at 
Franklin,  across  the  mountains ;  but  one  of  his  brigades, 
under  Milroy,  had  burst  beyond  the  limits  of  the  Mountain 
Department,  and  seemed  to  be  moving  to  make  a  junction  with 
Banks,  with  the  design,  as  Jackson  thought,  of  advancing  on 
Staunton.  Jackson  determined  to  attack  these  forces  in 


THE   PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  125 

detail.  Accordingly,  he  posted  Ewell  so  as  to  hold  Banks  in 
check,  whilst  he  himself  moved  to  Staunton.  From  here  he 
threw  forward  five  brigades,  under  General  Edward  Johnson 
(May  7),  to  attack  Milroy.  The  latter  retreated  to  his  moun 
tain  fastness,  and  took  position  at  a  point  named  McDowell, 
where,  re-enforced  by  the  brigade  of  Schenck,  he  engaged 
Johnson,  but  was  forced  to  retire  on  Fremont's  main  body  at 
Franklin.  Having  thus  thrown  off  Milroy  eccentrically  from 
communication  with  Banks,  Jackson  returned  (May  14)  to 
destroy  the  force  under  that  officer.  But  during  Jackson's 
pursuit  of  Milroy,  Banks,  discovering  his  danger,  had  retired 
to  Strasburg,  followed  by  Ewell.  Jackson  therefore  followed 
also,  and  at  New  Market  he  formed  a  junction  with  Ewell. 
Instead  of  marching  direct  on  Strasburg,  however,  Jackson 
diverged  on  a  line  to  the  eastward  by  way  of  Luray  Valley, 
and  moved  on  Front  Eoyal,  with  the  view  of  cutting  off  Banks' 
retreat  from  Strasburg,  interposing  between  him  and  re- 
enforcements,  and  compelling  his  surrender.  The  23d  he 
entered  Front  Eoyal,  capturing  the  garrison  of  seven  hundred 
men  there  under  Colonel  Kenly  ;  and  thence  he  moved  to 
Middletown  by  a  road  to  the  right  of  the  main  Valley  road, 
hoping  there  to  cut  off  Banks.  But  the  latter  was  too  quick 
for  him  :  so  that  when  he  reached  Middletown,  he  struck  only 
the  rear  of  the  retreating  Union  column.  Banks,  with  his 
small  force,  offered  such  resistance  as  he  could  to  the 
advance  of  Jackson,  and  took  position  on  the  heights 
of  "Winchester  (May  24),  where  he  gave  fight,  till,  being  as 
sailed  on  both  flanks,  he  retired  hastily  to  the  north  bank  of 
the  Potomac  (May  25),  making  a  march  of  fifty-three  miles  in 
forty-eight  hours.  Jackson  continued  the  pursuit  as  far  as 
Halltown,  within  two  miles  of  Harper's  Ferry,  where  he 
remained  till  the  30th,  when,  finding  heavy  forces  converging 
on  his  rear,  he  began  a  retrograde  movement  up  the  Valley. 

The  tidings  of  Jackson's  apparition  at  Winchester  on  the 
24th,  and  his  subsequent  advance  to  Harper's  Ferry,  fell  like 
a  thunderbolt  on  the  war-council  at  Washington.  The  order 
for  McDowell's  advance  from  Fredericksburg,  to  unite  with 


126  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

McClellan,  was  instantly  countermanded  ;  and  he  was  directed 
to  put  twenty  thousand  men  in  motion  at  once  for  the  Shen- 
andoah  Valley,  by  the  line  of  the  Manassas  Gap  Kailroad.* 
McDowell  obeyed,  but,  to  use  his  own  language,  "with  a 
heavy  heart,"  for  he  knew,  what  any  man  capable  of  survey 
ing  the  situation  with  a  soldier's  eye  must  have  known,  that 
the  movement  ordered  was  not  only  most  futile  in  itself,  but 
certain  to  paralyze  the  operations  of  the  main  army  and  frus 
trate  that  campaign  against  Richmond  on  the  issue  of  which 
hung  the  fortune  of  the  war.  In  vain  he  pointed  out  that  it 
was  impossible  for  him  either  to  succor  Banks  or  co-operate 
with  Fremont ;  that  his  line  of  advance  from  Fredericksburg 
to  Front  Koyal  was  much  longer  than  the  enemy's  line  of  re 
treat  ;  that  it  would  take  him  a  week  or  ten  days  to  reach  the 
Valley,  and  that  by  this  time  the  occasion  for  his  services 
would  have  passed  by.  In  vain  General  McClellan  urged  the 
real  motive  of  the  raid — to  prevent  re-enforcements  from 
reaching  him.  Deaf  to  all  sounds  of  reason,  the  war-council 
at  Washington,  like  the  Dutch  States-General,  of  whom 
Prince  Eugene  said,  that  "  always  interfering,  they  were  al 
ways  dying  with  fear,"  t  heard  only  the  reverberations  of  the 
guns  of  the  redoubtable  Jackson.  To  head  off  Jackson,  if 
possible  to  catch  Jackson,  seemed  now  the  one  important 
thing ;  and  the  result  of  the  cogitations  of  the  Washington 
strategists  was  the  preparation  of  what  the  President  called  a 
"  trap"  for  Jackson — a  "  trap"  for  the  wily  fox  who  was  mas 
ter  of  every  gap  and  gorge  in  the  Valley !  Now  this  pretty 
scheme  involved  the  converging  movements  of  Fremont  from 

*  Dispatch  from  President  Lincoln :  Report  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War, 
vol.  i.,  p.  274. 

f  This  expression  of  Prince  Eugene  is  used  by  him  in  a  passage  of  his 
Memoires,  descriptive  of  an  event  curiously  analogous  to  that  to  which  the 
above  text  has  relation :  "  Marlborough,"  says  he,  "  sent  me  word  that  Ber 
wick  having  re-enforced  the  duke  of  Burgundy,  the  army,  which  was  now  a 
hundred  and  twenty  thousand  strong,  had  marched  to  the  assistance  of  Lisle. 
The  deputies  from  the  States-General,  always  interfering,  and  always  dying 
with  fear,  demanded  of  me  a  re-enforcement  for  him,"  etc. — Memoirs  of  Prince 
Eugene,  p.  10G. 


THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  127 

the  west,  and  McDowell  from  the  east,  upon  Strasburg.  The 
two  columns  moved  rapidly ;  they  had  almost  effected  a  junc 
tion  on  the  3 1st ;  but  that  very  day  Jackson,  falling  back 
from  Harper's  Ferry,  slipped  between  the  two,  and  made 
good  his  retreat  up  the  Valley,  leaving  his  opponents  to  follow 
in  a  long  and  fruitless  chase,  all  the  time  a  day  behind 
him. 

The  pursuers  did  their  best :  they  pushed  on,  Fremont  fol 
lowing  in  the  path  of  Jackson  up  the  Valley  of  the  Shenan- 
doah ;  while  McDowell  sent  forward  Shields'  division  by  the 
lateral  Luray  Valley,  with  a  view  to  head  him  off  when  he 
should  attempt  to  break  through  the  gaps  of  the  Blue  Ridge. 
Jackson  reached  Harrisonburg  on  the  5th  of  June  ;  Fremont 
the  next  day.  There  Jackson  diverged  eastward  to  cross  the 
Shenandoah  at  Port  Republic,  the  only  point  where  there  was 
a  bridge.  Shields  was  moving  up  the  east  side  of  the  river, 
w^as  close  at  hand,  and  might  prevent  his  crossing,  or  might 
form  a  junction  with  Fremont.  Both  results  were  to  be  pre 
vented.  Jackson  threw  forward  his  own  division  to  Port  Re 
public  (June  7)  to  cover  the  bridge ;  and  left  Ewell's  division 
five  miles  back  on  the  road  on  which  Fremont  was  following — 
the  road  from  Harrisonburg  to  Port  Republic.  Next  day  Fre 
mont  attacked  Ewell's  five  brigades,  with  the  view  of  turning 
his  right  and  getting  through  to  the  bridge  at  Port  Republic 
to  make  a  junction  with  Shields.  At  the  same  time  Shields 
attacked  the  bridge  on  the  east  side,  to  make  a  junction  with 
Fremont.  The  result  was  that  Ewell  repulsed  Fremont,  while 
Jackson  held  Shields  in  check.  Early  next  morning,  drawing 
in  Ewell  and  concentrating  his  forces,  Jackson  threw  himself 
across  the  river,  burned  the  bridge  to  prevent  Fremont  from 
following ;  fell  upon  Shields'  advance,  consisting  of  two  bri 
gades  under  General  Tyler,  and  repulsed  him,  capturing  his 
artillery.  The  former  of  these  affairs  figures  in  history  as  the 
battle  of  Cross  Keys,  and  the  latter  as  the  battle  of  Port  Re- 
pub  ic. 

In  this  exciting  month's  campaign,  Jackson  made  great 
captures  of  stores  and  prisoners;  but  this  was  not  its  chief 


128  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF   THE  POTOMAC. 

result.  Without  gaining  a  single  tactical  victory  he  had  yet 
achieved  a  great  strategic  victory,  for  by  skilfully  manoeuvring 
,  fifteen  thousand  men  he  succeeded  in  neutralizing  a  force  of 
sixty  thousand.  It  is  perhaps  not  too  much  to  say  that  he 
saved  Richmond  ;  for  when  McClellan,  in  expectation  that  Mc 
Dowell  might  still  be  allowed  to  come  and  join  him,  threw 
forward  his  right  wing,  under  Porter,  to  Hanover  Courthouse, 
on  the  26th  of  June,  the  echoes  of  his  cannon  bore  to  those  in 
Richmond  who  knew  the  situation  of  the  two  Union  armies 
the  knell  of  the  capital  of  the  Confederacy.*  McDowell  never 
went  forward — was  never  allowed,  eager  though  he  was,  to  go 
forward.  Well-intentioned  though  we  must  believe  the  mo 
tives  to  have  been  of  those  who  counselled  the  course  that  led 
to  the  consequences  thus  delineated,  the  historian  must  not 
fail  to  point  out  the  folly  of  an  act  that  will  remain  an  im 
pressive  illustration  of  what  is  to  be  expected  when  men  vio 
late  the  established  principles  of  war. 


IV. 
THE  BATTLE  OF  FAIR  OAKS. 

It  is  easy  to  see  the  perilous  position  in  which  the  events 
just  recited  placed  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  Had  McClellan 
been  free  immediately  after  the  battle  of  Williamsburg,  when 
the  destruction  of  the  Merrimac  opened  up  the  James  Eiver 
as  a  highway  of  supplies,  to  transfer  his  army  to  that  line,  it 
is  easy  to  see  that  he  would  have  avoided  those  dangers  of 
the  other  line  whereof  the  enemy  finally  took  such  energetic 
advantage.  I  have  already  set  forth  the  circumstances  that 
dictated  his  advance  by  the  line  of  the  York  and  the 
Pamunkey — to  wit,  the  expected  march  of  McDowell's 
column  from  Fredericksburg  for  the  purpose  of  joining  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac — and  I  have  detailed  the  events 
whereby  that  column  was  prevented  from  making  its  antici- 

*  Prince  de  Joinville  :  The  Army  of  the  Potomac,  p.  112,  note 


THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  129 

pated  march.  Now,  it  was  almost  simultaneous  with  the 
establishment  of  the  base  at  White  House  that  McDowell's 
column  was  turned  aside  from  its  contemplated  co-operation 
with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  diverted  to  the  Shenan- 
doah  Valley.  Knowing  this  fact,  General  McClellan  knew 
that  the  hope  of  further  re-enforcements  was  vain,  and  it  was 
incumbent  on  him  to  act  vigorously  with  his  proper  force. 
He  knew  that  the  presence  of  Jackson's  corps  in  the  Shenan- 
doah  Valley  neutralized  a  force  of  fifteen  thousand  men  that 
was  certain  to  be  brought  against  him  if  he  should  delay. 
Besides,  he  was  making  an  offensive  movement  in  which 
vigorous  action  was  above  all  requisite ;  for  when  once  the 
offensive  has  been  assumed,  it  must  be  sustained  to  the  last 
extremity.  Yet,  having  reached  the  Chickahominy,  he 
assumed  an  almost  passive  attitude,  with  his  army,  too,  cut 
in  twain  by  that  fickle  and  difficult  stream. 

Now,  though  a  position  d  cheval  on  a  river  is  not  one  which 
a  general  willingly  assumes,  it  is  frequently  a  necessity,  and 
in  that  case  he  spans  the  stream  with  numerous  bridges.*  It 
was  necessary  for  General  McClellan  to  pass  the  Chicka 
hominy  because  it  crossed  his  line  of  manoeuvre  against 
Richmond  ;  and  it  was  also  necessary  for  him  to  leave  a  force 
on  the  eastern  side  to  cover  his  communications  with  his 
base  at  the  "White  House  ;  but  this  is  not  a  situation  in 
which  one  would  assume  a  passive  attitude  with  few  and  very 
imperfect  connections  between  the  divided  wings.  The  passage 
of  the  Chickahominy  was  made  by  Casey's  division  at  Bot 
tom's  Bridge  on  the  20th  of  May,  and  by  the  25th  the  corps 
of  Keyes  and  Heintzelman  were  established  on  the  right 
bank.  Meantime,  the  corps  of  Sumner,  Porter,  and  Frank 
lin  remained  on  the  left  bank.  By  the  28th,  Sumner  had 
constructed  two  bridgesf  for  the  passage  of  his  corps;  but 

*  "  If  a  stream  divide  a  position  at  right  angles,,  it  should  be  spanned  with 
»  as  many  bridges  as  would  enable  troops  and  guns  to  pass  from  one  side  to  the 
other,  as  if  no  such  feature  existed."     General  McDougall :  Modern  Warfare 
and  Modern  Artillery,  p.  107. 

f  Known  as  "  Sumner's  Upper  Bridge"  and  "  Sumner's  Lower  Bridge." 

9 


130  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF   THE  POTOMAC. 

up  to  the  time  when  the  Confederate  commander  assumed 
the  initiative  on  the  31st,  no  provision  was  made  for  the 
crossing  of  the  right  wing,  and  the  re-enforcement  of  that 
wing  by  the  left  involved  a  detour  of  twenty-three  miles,— 
a  distance  quite  too  great  for  the  possibility  of  re-enforcement 
in  the  fierce  emergency  of  battle.  Materials  for  three 
bridges*  to  be  used  in  the  passage  of  the  right  wing  were 
indeed  prepared,  and  by  the  28th  of  Mayf  these  bridges  were 
all  ready  to  be  laid.  But,  meantime,  they  were  not  laid,  and 
the  two  wings  were  suffered  to  remain  separated  by  the 
Chickahominy,  and  without  adequate  means  of  communica 
tion. 

The  Chickahominy  rises  in  the  highlan  is  northwest  of 
Richmond,  and  enveloping  it  on  the  north  and  east,  emp 
ties  into  the  James  many  miles  below  that  city,  and  after 
describing  around  it  almost  the  quadrant  of  a  circle.  In 
itself  this  river  does  not  form  any  considerable  barrier  to  the 
advance  of  an  army  ;  but  with  its  accessories  it  constitutes  one 
of  the  most  formidable  military  obstacles  imaginable.  The 
stream  flows  through  a  belt  of  heavily  timbered  swamp.  The 
tops  of  the  trees  rise  just  about  to  the  level  of  the  crests  of 
the  highlands  bordering  the  bottom,  thus  perfectly  screening 
from  view  the  bottom-lands  and  slopes  of  the  highlands  on  the 
enemy's  side.  Through  this  belt  of  swamp  the  stream  flows 
sometimes  in  a  single  channel,  more  frequently  divided  into 
several,  and  when  but  a  foot  or  two  above  its  summer  level, 
overspreads  the  whole  swamp.  The  bottom-lands  between 
the  swamp  and  the  highlands,  in  width  from  three-quarters  of 
a  mile  to  a  mile  and  a  quarter,  are  little  elevated  at  their 
margin  above  the  swamp,  so  that  a  rise  of  the  stream  by  a 

*  These  bridges  were  the  "  New  Bridge"  and  two  other  bridges,  the  one 
half  a  mile  above  and  the  other  half  a  mile  below. 

f  "  So  far  as  engineering  preparations  were  concerned,  the  army  could  have 
been  thrown  over  as  early  as  the  28th  of  May,  Sumner  uniting  his  corps  with 
those  of  Heintzelman  and  Keyes,  and  taking  the  enemy's  position  at  New 
Bridge  in  flank  and  rear.  Thus  attacked,  the  enemy  could  have  made  no 
formidable  resistance  to  the  passage  of  our  right  wing."  Barnard :  Report 
of  Engineer  Operations,  p.  21. 


THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  131 

few  feet,  overflows  large  areas  of  these  bottoms,  and  even 
when  not  overflowed  they  are  spongy  and  impracticable  for 
cavalry  and  artillery.* 

In  this  state  of  facts,  McClellan's  disposition  of  his  army 
must  be  considered  a  grave  fault,  and  inaction  in  such  a  situ 
ation  was  in  the  highest  degree  dangerous.  "  A  general," 
says  the  Archduke  Charles,  "  must  suppose  that  his  opponent 
will  do  against  him  whatever  he  ought  to  do."  Now,  for 
Johnston  to  omit  to  strike  one  or  the  other  of  these  exposed 
wings,  was  to  neglect  that  principle  which  forms  the  whole 
secret  of  war — to  >be  superior  to  your  enemy  at  the  point  of 
collision :  it  wac,  in  fact,  to  neglect  a  unique  opportunity  of 
delivering  a  debisive  blow. 

The  Confederate  commander  was  not  the  man  to  let  slip 
such  an  opportunity ;  and,  as  soon  as  reconnoissances  had 
fully  developed  the  position  of  that  portion  of  the  Union 
army  which  lay  on  the  Eichmond  side  of  the  Chickahomy,  he 
determined  to  act.  It  was  a  situation  in  which,  by  bringing 
two-thirds  of  his  own  force  to  bear  against  one-third  of  the 
Union  force,  he  might  hope  not  merely  to  defeat  but  to  de 
stroy  the  exposed  wing.  By  the  30th  of  May  he  had  formed 
his  resolution,  and  he  immediately  made  preparations  for 
carrying  it  into  effect  on  the  following  day.f  During  the 

*  Barnard :  Report  of  Engineer  Operations,  pp.  18,  19. 

f  It  is  commonly  supposed  that  it  was  the  freshet  in  the  Chickahominy, 
caused  by  the  storm  of  the  night  of  the  30th,  that  prompted  General  Johnston 
to  attack  ;  but  he  had  fully  resolved  to  strike  before  the  storm  came  on,  on  the 
mere  chances  of  the  situation  of  the  Union  army.  The  storm  did  not  come  on 
till  the  night  of  the  30th,  and  the  following  extract  from  the  official  report  of 
Major-General  D.  H.  Hill  will  show  that  General  Johnston  had  made  disposi 
tions  for  the  attack  as  early  as  noon  of  that  day  :  "  These  reconnoissances  (of 
Hill's  brigade  commanders)  satisfied  me  that  the  enemy  was  not  in  force  on 
the  Charles  City  road,  but  was  on  the  Williamsburg  road,  and  that  he  had 
fortified  himself  about  the  Seven  Pines.  The  fact  was  further  established,  that 
the  whole  of  Keyes'  corps  had  crossed  the  Chickahominy.  These  facts  I  com 
municated  to  General  Johnston  about  noon  on  Friday,  30th  of  May.  I  received 
a  prompt  answer  from  him,  that,  being  satisfied  by  my  report  of  the  presence 
of  the  enemy  in  force  in  my  immediate  front,  he  had  resolved  to  attack  them." 
Official  Reports  of  Battles.  Richmond,  1864. 


132 


CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 


night  of  the  30th,  there  came  a  storm  of  unwonted  violence ; 
and  this  circumstance,  while  it  would  embarrass  the  execu 
tion  of  Johnston's  proposed  plan,  at  the  same  time  gave 
that  general  the  hope  of  making  the  operation  still  more 
complete  from  the  situation  in  which  it  would  place  his  op 
ponent. 

The  reconnoissances  of  the  Confederates  had  disclosed  the 
fact  that  Casey's  division  of  Keyes'  corps  held  an  advanced 


SKETCH  OF  THE   FIELD   OF   FAIR  OAKS. 

position  on  the  Williamsburg  road,  three-quarters  of  a  mile 
beyond  the  point  known  as  Seven  Pines  and  about  six  miles 
from  Eichmond.  Couch's  division  of  the  same  corps  was 
stationed  at  Seven  Pines,  on  both  sides  of  the  "Williamsburg 
road  and  along  the  Nine-mile  road,  his  right  resting  at  Fair 
Oaks  Station,  on  the  Eichmond  and  York  Eiver  Eailroad. 
Of  the  two  divisions  of  Heintzelman's  corps,  that  of  Kear 
ney  was  on  the  Williamsburg  road  and  the  railroad,  three- 
quarters  of  a  mile  in  advance  of  Savage  Station;  and  that 


THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  133 

of  Hooker  was  guarding  the  approaches  of  the  White  Oak 
Swamp. 

In  this  state  of  facts,  Johnston  made  the  following  disposi 
tions  for  attack  :  Hill  (D.  H.),  who  had  been  covering  the 
Williamsburg  and  Charles  City  road,  was  directed  to  move 
his  division,  supported  by  the  division  of  Long-street,  out  on 
the  Williamsburg  road,  but  not  to  move  till  Huger's  division, 
which  was  to  move  out  on  the  Charles  City  road,  should  re 
lieve  him.  Huger's  duty  was  to  strike  the  left  flank  of  the 
Union  force  which  Hill  and  Longstreet  should  engage  in 
front.  G.  W.  Smith,  with  his  division,  was  to  advance  on  the 
right  flank  of  the  Union  force,  to  the  junction  of  the  New 
Bridge  road  with  the  Nine-mile  road,  there  to  be  in  readiness 
either  to  fall  on  Keyes'  right  or  to  cover  Longstreet's  left.* 
The  divisions  were  to  move  at  daybreak  ;  but  the  wretched 
condition  of  the  roads,  resulting  from  the  storm,  greatly  re 
tarded  the  movement  of  the  troops.  Hill,  Longstreet,  and 
Smith,  indeed,  were  in  position  by  eight  o'clock ;  but  not  so 
Huger.  For  hour  after  hour,  Longstreet  and  Hill  awaited  in 
vain  the  signal-gun  that  was  to  announce  Huger's  arrival  in  his 
proper  position.  At  length,  at  ten  o'clock,  Hillf  went  forward 
on  the  Williamsburg  road,J  and  presently  struck  Casey's  divi 
sion.  The  advance  position  beyond  Seven  Pines,  held  by  that 
officer,  was  defended  by  a  redoubt,  rifle-pit,  and  abatis  ;  but, 
at  this  time,  these  works  were  only  in  process  of  construction, 
and  the  troops  were,  indeed,  engaged  at  this  work  when  the 
attack  was  made.§  The  pickets  were  quickly  driven  in,  and 

*  Johnston :  Report  of  Seven  Pines :  Confederate  Reports  of  Battles,  Rich' 
mond,  1864. 

f  Hill  was  acting  under  Longstreet's  orders  during  the  day. 

t  Hill's  Report :  Official  Reports  of  Battles.     Richmond,  1864. 

§  The  attack  was  not,  however,  a  surprise,  for  the  movement  of  the 
enemy's  troops  had  been  observed  for  several  hours  before.  It  appears,  more 
over,  that  about  half-past  ten  an  aid-de-camp  of  General  Johnston  was  cap 
tured  by  the  pickets  of  General  Naglee.  His  presence  so  near  the  lines,  and 
his  "  very  evident  emotion"  when  a  few  shots  were  fired  in  front  of  Casey's 
headquarters  (Keyes'  Report),  caused  increased  vigilance,  and  the  troops  were 
rirdered  to  be  under  arms  at  eleven  o'clock. 


134  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

the  more  so  that  a  regiment*  sent  forward  to  support  the 
picket-line  gave  way  without  making  much  if  any  resistance. 
The  first  blow  fell  upon  Naglee'st  brigade,  which  held  a  posi 
tion  in  advance  of  the  redoubt,  where  it  made  a  good  fight 
and  held  the  enemy  in  check  for  a  considerable  time,  and 
then  retired  and  fought  with  the  rest  of  the  division  in  the 
redoubt  and  rifle-pits — the  force  being  strengthened  by  Peck's 
brigade  sent  forward  by  General  Couch.  The  Confederates  ad 
vanced  in  close  columns,  and  suffered  severely  from  the  fire  of 
the  batteries  in  front  of  and  in  the  redoubt.  Presently,  how 
ever,  one  of  their  brigades,  which  had  been  sent  round  on  the 
left  of  Casey,  gained  the  rear  of  the  redoubt. J  When,  there 
fore,  a  severe  flank  fire  was  opened  by  the  force  that  had  made 
this  detour,  the  division  crumbled  away,  the  guns  in  the  redoubt 
and  a  portion  of  those  of  the  battery  in  front  were  captured,§ 


*  The  One  Hundred  and  Third  Pennsylvania.  See  McClellan's  Report, 
p.  108.  But  for  a  statement  that  this  regiment  did  better  than  had  been  re 
ported,  see  testimony  of  General  Casey,  in  Report  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War, 
vol.  i.,  p.  445. 

\  In  addition  to  Naglee's  brigade,  the  position  of  which  is  given  above,  the 
other  two  brigades  of  Casey's  division  were  posted  as  follows :  General  Wea 
sel's  brigade  in  the  rifle-pits,  and  General  Palmer's  in  rear  of  Wessel's.  Of  the 
artillery,  one  battery  was  in  advance  with  Naglee ;  one  in  rear  of  the  rifle-pits 
to  the  right  of  the  redoubt ;  a  third  in  rear  of  the  redoubt ;  and  a  fourth,  un 
harnessed,  in  the  redoubt. 

$  General  Johnston's  account  of  the  manner  in  which  Casey's  position  was 
carried  is  as  follows:  "Hill's  brave  troops,  admirably  commanded  and  gal 
lantly  led,  forced  their  way  through  the  abatis,  which  formed  the  enemy's 
external  defences,  and  stormed  their  intrenchments  by  a  determined  and  irre 
sistible  rush.  Such  was  the  manner  in  which  the  enemy's  first  line  was  car 
ried."  (Johnston :  Official  Report.)  But  this  does  not  give  an  accurate  repre 
sentation  of  the  case.  Hill,  who  was  in  command  of  the  attacking  columns, 
says :  "  General  Rains  had  now  gained  the  rear  of  the  Yankee  redoubt,  and 
opened  fire  on  the  infantry  posted  in  the  woods.  I  now  noticed  commotion  in 
the  camps  and  redoubts,  and  indications  of  evacuating  the  position.  Rodes 
took  skilful  advantage  of  this  commotion,  and  moved  up  his  brigade  in  beauti 
ful  order,  and  took  possession  of  the  redoubts  and  rifle-pits."  Official  Reports 
of  Battles.  Richmond,  1864. 

§  Among  those  who  fell  in  the  redoubt  were,  Colonel  G.  D.  Bailey,  Major 
Van  Valkenberg,  and  Adjutant  Ramsay,  all  of  the  First  New  York  Artillery. 


THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  135 

and  sucli  of  the  troops  as  held  together  were  brought  to  a 
stand  at  General  Couch's  position  at  Seven  Pines.* 

Early  in  the  action,  General  Keyes,  whose  troops  were  those 
upon  whom  the  attack  had  thus  far  fallen,  finding  he  was 
being  hard  pushed,  had  sent  to  General  Heintzelman,  who 
commanded  the  whole  left  wing  of  the  army,  and  whose  two 
divisions  were  close  at  hand,  to  send  him  aid.  But  the  mes 
sage  was  both  delayed  in  reaching  that  officer,!  and  when  he 
sent  forward  re-enforcements,  they  were,  through  some  misun 
derstanding,  very  tardy  in  reaching  the  front ;  so  that  it  was 
past  four  o'clock  when  Kearney,  with  his  foremost  brigade,:); 
arrived  at  the  position  where  Couch's  troops  and  the  wreck  of 
Casey's  division  were  struggling  to  hold  their  own.§  Berry's 
brigade  was  immediately  thrown  into  the  woods  on  the  left, 
where  his  rifles  commanded  the  left  of  the  camp  and  works 
occupied  by  Casey  in  the  morning,  and  now  held  by  the 
enemy. 

Meantime,  though  the  divisions  of  Long-street  and  Hill  had 
thus  for  three  hours  been  vigorously  pushing  forward  on  the 
Williamsburg  road,  the  column  of  G.  TV.  Smith,  to  which  was 
intrusted  the  important  flanking  operation  already  indicated 
in  Johnston's  original  plan,  had  not  yet  moved.  The  Confed 
erate  commander  had  placed  himself  with  this  column  ;  but 
failing  to  hear  the  musketry  of  Longstreet  and  HillJ  he 
waited  till  four  o'clock,  when,  learning  how  these  generals  had 
been  engaged,  he  immediately  threw  forward  Smith's  com 
mand.  Thus  it  happened  that  when  Casey  had  been  driven 
back  to  Couch's  line  at  the  Seven  Pines,  and  the  latter  with  two 
regiments  of  his  division  had  advanced  to  relieve  the  pressure 
on  Casey's  flank  by  an  attack  of  the  hostile  left,  he  was  met 


*  "  On  my  arrival  at  the  second  line,  I  succeeded  in  rallying  a  portion  of 
my  division." — Casey's  Report. 

t  He  received  it  at  two  P.  M. — Heintzelman's  Report. 

\  Berry's  brigade. 

§  Hooker's  division  did  not  reach  the  ground  till  the  action  was  decided. 

|  "  Owing  to  some  peculiar  condition  of  the  atmosphere,  the  sound  of  th« 
musketry  did  not  reach  us." — Johnston :  Report  of  Seven  Pines. 


136  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

by  large  masses  of  the  enemy  bursting  out  on  his  right  by  the 
rear  of  the  Nine-mile  road,  and  another  heavy  column  moving 
towards  Fair  Oaks  Station.  This  was  Smith's  column,  which 
had  at  length  got  fairly  to  work.  Couch,  who  had  been  re- 
enforced  by  two  additional  regiments,  made  fight,  but  was 
overpowered  and  thrown  off  eccentrically  to  the  right, — the 
enemy  penetrating  between  the  force  with  which  Couch  was 
executing  this  manoeuvre  and  the  main  body  of  his  division.* 
And  now,  between  five  and  six  o'clock,  it  seemed  that  the 
whole  left  wing  of  the  army  across  the  Chickahominy  was 
doomed ;  for  not  only  was  Couch  bisected,  but  the  brigades  of 
Berry  and  Jameson,  of  Kearney's  division,  which  had  gone 
up  on  the  left,  were  thrown  back  by  the  enemy  on  White  Oak 
Swamp,  only  regaining  the  main  body  under  cover  of  night ; 
and  the  centre  was  struggling  with  indifferent  success  to  hold 
its  own,  after  being  driven  from  two  positions.  But  just  at 
this  crisis,  when  the  fate  of  the  day  was  trembling  in  the 
balance,  the  action  was  determined  by  the  sudden  apparition 
of  a  column  from  the  north  bank  of  the  Chickahominy. 

Upon  first  learning  the  state  of  affairs  on  the  left  wing, 
McClellan  sent  orders  to  General  Sumner,  who  held  the  centre 
of  the  general  line  of  the  army,  on  the  north  side  of  the 
Chickahominy,  and  about  six  miles  from  the  scene  of  action, 
to  hold  his  corps  in  readiness  to  move.  But  as  soon  as  the 
sounds  of  battle  from  the  west  side  of  the  Chickahominy 
reachedf  him,  Sumner,  divining  the  situation,  had,  with  that 
soldierly  instinct  that  characterized  him,  put  his  corps  under 
arms,  and  marched  it  out  of  camp ;  so  that  when,  at  two 
o'clock,  he  was  ordered  to  cross  his  command  without  delay, 
and  proceed  to  the  support  of  Heintzelman,  no  time  was  lost. 


*  "  In  twenty  minutes,  the  enemy  had  passed  over  the  road  leading  to  my 
centre,  cutting  me  off  from  the  rest  of  the  division." — Couch  :  Report  of 
Fair  Oaks. 

f  "  General  Sumner,  as  soon  as  he  heard  the  firing,  and  without  waiting 
for  orders,  had  pui  his  troops  under  arms  and  marched  them  out  of  camp,  thus 
saving  an  hour  or  so,  which  was  of  great  service  to  us."  Heintzelmau's  testi 
mony  in  Report  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  vol.  i.,  p.  351. 


THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  137 

For  the  passage  of  the  Chickahominy  there  were,  at  that 
time,  only  Bottom's  Bridge,  the  railroad-bridge,  and  two 
bridges  built  by  Sumner  himself  intermediate  between  the 
two  above  mentioned.  But  to  reach  the  battle-field  that  day 
by  Bottom's  Bridge  or  the  railroad-bridge  was  out  of  the 
question ;  his  sole  reliance,  therefore,  was  on  his  own  two 
bridges.  Now,  however,  a  new  and  dire  difficulty  presented 
itself :  the  lower  bridge  had  been  carried  away  by  the  freshet ; 
the  upper  one  was  half  adrift.  When  the  head  of  Sunmer's 
column,  composed  of  Sedgwick's  division,  reached  it,  the 
rough  logs  forming  the  corduroy  approaches  over  the  swamp 
were  mostly  afloat,  and  were  only  kept  from  drifting  off  by 
the  stumps  of  trees  to  which  they  were  fastened.  The  por 
tion  over  the  body  of  the  stream  was  suspended  from  the 
trunks  of  trees  by  ropes,  on  the  doubtful  staunchness  of 
which  depended  the  possibility  of  making  the  passage. 

"The  possibility  of  crossing,"  says  Colonel  Alexander  of 
the  engineers,  "  was  doubted  by  all  present,  including  General 
Sumner  himself.  As  the  solid  column  of  infantry  entered  upon 
the  bridge,  it  swayed  to  and  fro  to  the  angry  flood  below  or 
the  living  freight  above,  settling  down  and  grasping  the  solid 
stumps  by  which  it  was  made  secure,  as  the  line  advanced. 
Once  filled  with  men,  however,  it  was  safe  till  the  corps  had 
crossed  ;  it  then  soon  became  impassable."* 

Sumner,  debouching  from  the  bridge  with  Sedgwick's  divi 
sion  (Richardson's  division  did  not  arrive  till  about  sunset), 
pushed  impetuously  forward  through  the  deep  mud,  guided 
only  by  the  firing.  To  move  the  artillery  was  found  impossi 
ble,  t  At  about  six  o'clock  the  head  of  Sedgwick's  column:]: 
deployed  into  line  in  the  rear  of  Fair  Oaks,  in  a  position 
where  Couch,  when  separated  from  the  main  body,  had  taken 
his  stand  to  oppose  the  enemy's  advance.  They  were  no 
more  than  in  time ;  for  at  that  moment  Smith's  troops, 

*  "  The  Peninsular  Campaign  :"  Atlantic  Monthly,  March,  1864. 
f  Lieutenant  Kirby,  Company  I,  First  United  States  Artillery,  by  fair!: 
carrying  his  guns  to  firmer  ground,  succeeded  in  getting  up  his  battery. 
\  Formed  by  Gorman's  brigade. 


138  CAMPAIGNS   OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE   POTOMAC. 

having  been  gotten  well  in  hand  under  the  personal  direction 
of  General  Johnston,  moved  forward,  opening  a  heavy  fusillade 
upon  the  line.  They  made  several  determined  charges,  but 
were  each  time  repulsed  with  great  loss  by  the  steady  fire  of 
the  infantry  and  the  excellent  practice  of  the  batteries.* 
After  sustaining  the  enemy's  fire  for  a  considerable  time, 
General  Sumner  ordered  five  regimentsf  to  make  a  charge 
with  the  bayonet  into  the  woods  occupied  by  the  enemy. 
This  operation  was  handsomely  executed,  and  resulted  in 
driving  back  the  Confederates  in  confusion.  Thus,  when  all 
was  lost,  Sunmer's  soldierly  promptitude  saved  the  day,  as 
Moreau,  flying  to  the  assistance  of  Napoleon  when  hard 
pressed  by  the  Austrians  in  Italy,  chained  victory  to  the  stand 
ards  of  the  French.  "  O  Moreau  !"  exclaimed  that  illustrious 
war-minister  Carnot,  on  hearing  of  this ;  "  oh,  my  dear  Fabius, 
how  great  you  were  in  that  circumstance !  how  superior  to 
the  wretched  rivalries  of  generals,  which  so  often  cause  the 
best-laid  enterprises  to  miscarry !" J  The  brave  old  Sumner 
now  sleeps  in  a  soldier's  grave ;  but  that  one  act  of  heroic 
duty  must  embalm  his  memory  in  the  hearts  of  his  country 
men. 

In  this  bloody  encounter  the  Confederates  lost  nearly  seven 
thousand  men,  and  the  Union  army  upwards  of  five  thousand. 
But  a  severer  loss  befell  the  Confederates  than  is  expressed 
even  in  this  heavy  aggregate  ;  for  the  able  chief  of  the  Army 
of  Northern  Virginia  was  struck  down  with  a  severe  hurt. 
The  command,  for  the  time  being,  devolved  on  General  G.  W. 
Smith ;  but  the  failure  to  make  good  the  purpose  of  the 
attack,  the  heavy  losses  already  suffered,  and  the  disabling  of 


*McClellan:  Report,  p.  110.  General  Johnston  simply  says:  "The 
strength  of  the  enemy's  position  enabled  him  to  hold  it  till  dark." 

f  The  Thirty-fourth  New  York,  Colonel  Sinter ;  Eighty-second  New  York, 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Hudson  ;  Fifteenth  Massachusetts,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Kim 
ball ;  Twentieth  Massachusetts,  Colonel  Lee  ;  Seventh  Michigan,  Major  Richard 
son — the  three  former  of  General  Gorman's  brigade,  the  latter  two  of  General 
Dana's  brigade. 

\  Alison :  History  of  Europe,  vol.  iii.,  p.  327. 


THE   PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  139 

General  Johnston,  determined  General  Smith  to  retire  his 
forces.  Preparations  for  withdrawal  were  actively  pushed 
forward  during  the  night ;  but  through  some  accidental  cir 
cumstances,  a  portion  of  Sumner's  line  having  become  en 
gaged  on  the  morning  of  the  1st  of  June,  there  ensued  a 
rencounter  of  some  severity,  which  lasted  for  two  or  three 
hours.  It  ended,  however,  after  some  brisk  sallies,  in  the 
withdrawal  of  the  entire  Confederate  force  to  the  lines 
around  Richmond.  The  Union  troops  were  immediately 
pushed  forward,  and  occupied  the  positions  held  previous  to 
the  action.* 


*  Through  one  of  those  odd  freaks  that  sometimes  overtake  the  record  of 
military  events,  the  history  of  the  operation  of  the  1st  of  June  has  been  made 
to  assume  a  magnitude  altogether  beyond  its  real  proportions.  There  are  on 
record  official  reports  and  official  testimony  that  would  make  one  believe  that 
the  action  on  the  morning  following  Fair  Oaks  assumed  the  volume  of  a  battle — 
and  a  battle,  too,  if  one  were  to  credit  the  oft-recurring  "  bayonet  charges,"  and 
attacks  in  solid  column,  of  little  less  than  first-class  magnitude.  There  is  little 
doubt,  however,  that  these  details  are  largely,  if  not  altogether  apochryphal. 
There  was,  indeed,  a  rencounter  on  the  morning  of  the  1st,  but  it  was  the  result 
not  of  a  plan  and  purpose  of  aggressive  action  on  the  part  of  the  Confederates, 
but  an  incident  in  the  withdrawal  of  the  enemy  from  the  Union  front.  Gen 
eral  Johnston  has  frequently  expressed  to  the  writer  his  amazement  at  the 
swelling  bulk  assumed  by  the  "  skirmish"  of  the  1st.  Though  not  present, 
having  been  removed  to  Richmond  after  his  hurt,  General  Johnston  yet  knew 
by  constant  reports  from  the  field  what  was  going  on,  and  asserts  that  nothing 
more  severe  than  an  affair  of  the  rear-gua"rd  took  place.  In  his  official  report, 
General  Johnston  simply  says:  "Major-General  Smith  was  prevented  from  re 
suming  his  attack  on  the  enemy's  position  next  morning  by  the  discovery  of 
strong  intrenchments  not  seen  on  the  previous  evening.  On  the  morning  of 
June  1st  the  enemy  attacked  the  brigade  of  General  Pickett,  which  was  sup 
ported  by  that  of  General  Pryor.  The  attack  was  vigorously  repelled  by  these 
two  brigades,  the  brunt  of  the  fight  falling  on  General  Pickett.  Tiiis  was  the 
last  demonstration  made  by  the  enemy.  In  the  evening  oui  troops  quietly 
returned  to  their  own  camps." 


140  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 


V. 

THE  SEVEN  DAYS'  RETREAT. 

The  attitude  of  the  army  during  the  month  succeeding  the 
action  of  Fair  Oaks  was  not  imposing.  It  was  seemingly  a 
body  that  had  lost  its  momentum  ;  and  the  troops,  sweltering 
through  all  that  hot  month  amid  the  unwholesome  swamps  of 
the  Chickahominy,  sank  in  energy.  McClellan's  position  was 
a  trying  one  :  he  realized  the  full  necessity  of  action ;  but  he 
also  realized  better  than  any  of  his  contemporaries  the  enor 
mous  difficulty  of  the  task  laid  upon  him.  Feeling  deeply 
the  need  of  new  accessions  to  his  strength,  in  order  to  permit 
him  to  carry  out  his  plans,  and  seeing  almost  as  large  a  force 
as  he  had  to  confront  the  enemy  with  scattered  in  unmili- 
tary  positions  throughout  Virginia,  he  was  naturally  urgent 
that  they  should  be  forwarded  from  where  they  were  useless 
to  where  they  might  be  so  advantageously  employed. 

Yet  the  situation  was  not  one  that  permitted  inaction ;  for 
the  position  of  the  army  astride  a  fickle  river,  and  the  ex 
perience  already  had  of  the  danger  to  which  that  division  of 
its  strength  exposed  it,  should  have  been  a  sufficient  admoni 
tion  of  the  necessity  of  a  change.  The  fundamental  vice  was 
the  direction  of  McClellan's  line  of  communications  almost 
on  the  prolongation  of  his  front  of  operations.  Pivoting  011 
the  York  River  Kailroad,  and  drawing  his  supplies  from  White 
House,  it  became  absolutely  necessary  for  him  to  hold  a  large 
part  of  his  effective  strength  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Chicka 
hominy  for  the  protection  of  that  line, — a  situation  that  at 
once  prevented  his  using  his  whole  force,  and  exposed  him  to 
attack  in  detail.  This  false  position  might  have  been  recti 
fied  in  two  ways  :  1.  By  a  change  of  base  to  the  James,  which 
would  have  given  a  line  of  manoeuvre  against  Richmond,  en 
tirely  free  from  the  objections  inherent  in  that  by  the  York, 


THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  141 

and  whereon  lie  would  have  had  choice  either  of  moving 
against  Richmond  by  the  north  bank  of  the  James,  or,  by  a 
transfer  to  the  south  side,  of  operating  against  its  communica 
tions,  which  was  altogether  the  bolder  and  more  decisive 
method ;  2.  By  the  transfer  of  the  whole  force  to  the  right 
bank  of  the  Chickahominy,  abandoning  the  line  of  the  York, 
and  then  making  a  prompt  advance  against  Richmond,  with 
the  advantage  that,  if  unsuccessful  in  the  battle  against  the 
adverse  force,  the  line  of  the  James  might  be  taken  up.  The 
latter  was  the  preferable  course,  as  it  avoided  the  ill  moral  ef 
fect  that  might  be  expected  to  attend  a  change  of  base  without 
a  battle.  But  either  would  have  been  better  than  inaction, 
which,  in  the  actual  situation,  was  more  hazardous  than  the 
boldest  procedare,  and  was  an  eminent  example  of  that  kind 
of  false  prudence  that  is  often  the  greatest  rashness. 

General  McClellan  knew  that  the  adoption  of  the  one 
course  or  the  other  was  necessary;  but  unfortunately  the 
case  was  one  presenting  an  alternative,  and  it  was  the  nature 
of  that  commander's  mind  to  so  balance  between  conflict 
ing  views,  to  so  let  "  I  dare  not  wait  upon  I  would,"  that  he 
was  apt  to  hesitate  even  in  conjunctures  wherein  the  worst 
course  was  preferable  to  doing  nothing.  To  whatever  sub 
tile  cause,  deep  seated  in  the  structure  of  his  mind — to 
whatever  excess  of  lymph  in  his  blood  this  may  have  been 
due — it  certainly  marred  his  eminent  capacity  as  a  soldier. 
There  is  something  painful  and  at  the  same  time  almost 
ludicrous  in  the  evidence,  found  in  his  official  dispatches,  of 
this  ever-about-to- do  non-performance.  On  the  day  succeed 
ing  the  action  of  Fair  Oaks,  the  2d  of  June,  he  wrote  :  "  I  only 
wait  for  the  river  to  fall  to  cross  with  the  rest  of  the  force  and 
make  a  general  attack.  Should  I  find  them  holding  firm  in  a 
very  strong  position,  I  may  wait  for  what  troops  I  can  bring 
up  from  Fort  Monroe."  On  the  7th  of  June  :  "  I  shall  be  in 
perfect  readiness  to  move  forward  and  take  Richmond  the 
moment  that  McCall  reaches  here,  and  the  ground  will  admit 
the  passage  of  artillery."  McCall's  division  (of  McDowell's 
force)  arrived  on  the  12th  and  13th,  which  increased  his 


CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

effective  to  one  hundred  and  fifteen  thousand  men.*  On  the 
16th  he  wrote  :  "  I  hope  two  days  more  will  make  the  ground 
practicable.  I  shall  advance  as  soon  as  the  bridges  are  com 
pleted  and  the  ground  fit  for  artillery  to  move."  On  the  18th  : 
"  A  general  engagement  may  take  place  any  hour."  On  the 
25th  :  "  The  action  will  probably  occur  to-morrow,  or  within  a 
short  time," — and  so  on  and  on  in  the  like  tenor,  until  the  time 
when  the  enemy  cut  short  the  endless  debate  by  seizing  the 
initiative.  Now  it  cannot  be  said  that  the  obstacles  indicated 
were  not  real  difficulties  in  the  way  of  an  advance ;  that 
the  successive  conditions  precedent  of  action  were  not  well 
taken,  and  based  on  sound  military  reasoning.  "What  Gen 
eral  McClellan  should  have  seen,  however,  is  that  his  proper 
course  of  action  was  determined  not  by  these  circumstances 
at  all,  but  was  dictated  by  the  necessity  of  extricating  himself 
from  a  situation  intrinsically  false.  This  became  only  too 
soon  manifest. 

"When  the  hurt  that  General  Johnston  had  received  at  Fair 
Oaks  was  seen  to  be  one  that  must  long  keep  him  out  of  the 
field,  General  Kobert  E.  Lee  was  nominated  to  succeed  him  in 
the  command  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia.  Of  this  sol 
dier,  destined  to  so  large  a  fame,  men  had  at  this  time  to  judge 
by  promise  rather  than  by  proof.  General  Lee's  actual  experi 
ence  in  the  field  had  been  confined  to  a  trivial  campaign  in 
the  mountains  of  "Western  Virginia,  in  which  he  had  been  in  a 
remarkable  manner  foiled  by  General  Eosecrans ;  and  this, 
with  his  reflective  habits  and  cautious  temper,  promised  a 
commander  of  the  Fabian  mould.  Yet  there  is  nothing  in 
which  one  may  more  readily  judge  wrongly  than  in  the  at 
tempt  to  prognosticate  from  the  plane  of  every-day  experience 

*  The  rolls  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  showed  on  the  26th  of  June  the 
following  figures :  Total  aggregate  of  present  and  absent,  one  hundred  and 
fifty-six  thousand  eight  hundred  and  thirty-eight ;  aggregate  absent,  twenty- 
nine  thousand  five  hundred  and  eleven  ;  aggregate  on  special  duty,  sick,  etc , 
twelve  thousand  two  hundred  and  twenty-five ;  aggregate  present  for  duty,  one 
hundred  and  fifteen  thousand  one  hundred  and  two.  Official  Records  :  Adjutant 
General's  Office. 


THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  143 

the  behavior  of  a  man  placed  in  command  of  an  army.  Lee, 
whose  characteristic  trait  was  caution,  marked  the  commence 
ment  of  his  career  by  a  stroke  brilliant  in  its  boldness. 

It  has  been  seen  that  in  General  Johnston's  theory  of  ac 
tion  for  the  defence  of  Richmond,  he  judged  that  the  course 
best  suited  to  the  circumstances  was  to  draw  in  around  the 
Confederate  capital,  concentrate  there  all  the  available  re 
sources  of  the  South,  and  then  fall  with  crushing  weight  upon 
the  Union  army,  divided  by  the  Chickahominy.  Accidental 
circumstances  had  made  the  blow  which  he  delivered  ineffect 
ual.  General  Lee  determined  to  continue  the  same  line  of 
action  ;  and  this  he  was  enabled  to  carry  out  under  more  favor 
able  auspices.  Johnston's  views  touching  the  necessity  of  a 
powerful  gathering  of  force  at  Richmond  fell  comparatively 
unheeded ;  but  his  successor  had  better  fortune,  and  having 
decided  to  assume  the  offensive,  he  was  able  to  draw  in  the 
Confederate  detachments  scattered  along  the  coast  and 
throughout  Virginia,  and  by  this  means  raise  his  effective  to 
near  one  hundred  thousand  men.  Lee's  policy  of  concentration 
included  the  withdrawal  of  Jackson's  force  from  the  Valley  of 
the  Shenandoah, — and  a  withdrawal  so  secret,  that  its  first 
announcement  should  be  the  blow  struck.  Before  commencing 
operations,  however,  he  sent  Stuart,  with  a  body  of  fifteen 
hundred  Virginia  troopers,  to  make  the  circuit  of  the  Union 
army,  by  a  swoop  around  its  rear.  This  having  been  success 
fully  accomplished  about  the  middle  of  June,  Lee  was  ready, 
with  the  knowledge  thus  gained,  to  strike. 

To  mask  Jackson's  intended  withdrawal  from  the  Valley, 
General  Lee  detached  a  division  from  the  force  around  Eich 
mond  (the  division  of  "Whiting)  and  sent  it  to  join  Jackson. 
This  was  done  ostentatiously,  and  in  such  a  way  that  it  should 
become  known  to  General  McClellan ;  Lee  judging  that  the 
intelligence  of  this  movement  would  give  his  antagonist  the 
impression  of  a  revival  of  operations  in  the  Shenandoah  re 
gion.  If  there  was,  as  seemed  likely,  a  renewed  intention  of 
sending  forward  McDowell's  army  to  join  McClellan,  a  fresh 
appeal  to  the  fears  of  the  administration  for  the  safety  of 


144  CAMPAIGNS  OF    THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

Washington  was  the  shrewdly  chosen  means  of  again  divert 
ing  that  force. 

When  this  had  had  its  intended  effect,  Jackson,  with  his 
whole  command,  now  raised  to  about  twenty-five  thousand 
men,  was  ordered  to  march  rapidly  and  secretly  in  the  direc 
tion  of  Eichmond.  He  set  out  from  the  vicinity  of  Port  Ee- 
public  (where  he  had  remained  since  the  termination  of  the 
Valley  campaign)  on  the  17th  of  June,  and  moving  by  way  of 
Gordonsville  and  the  line  of  the  Virginia  Central  Eailroad, 
pushed  his  advance  so  vigorously  that  on  the  25th  he  struck 
Ashland,  on  the  Fredericksburg  Eailroad,  twelve  miles  from 
Eichmond.  With  such  skill  did  Jackson  manage  his  march, 
that  not  General  McClellan,  nor  yet  Banks,  nor  Fremont,  nor 
McDowell,  knew  aught  of  it  ;*  and  when,  on  the  25th,  Jack 
son  had  reached  Ashland,  and  was  within  striking  distance  of 
the  right  wing  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  McClellan,  ab 
sorbed  in  his  proposed  operations  on  the  Eichmond  side  of 
the  Chickahominy,  was  that  very  day  advancing  his  pickets 
on  the  Williamsburg  road,  preparatory  to  a  general  forward 
movement  in  that  direction.  Jackson  had  now  reached  a 
point  where  the  other  Confederate  columns  could  begin  the 
parts  assigned  to  them. 

Lee's  plan  contemplated  that  as  soon  as  Jackson,  by  his 
manoeuvres  on  the  north  bank  of  the  Chickahominy,  should 
have  uncovered  the  passage  of  the  stream  at  Meadow  and 
Mechanicsville  bridges,  the  divisions  on  the  south  bank  should 
cross  and  join  Jackson's  column,  when  the  whole  army  should 
sweep  down  the  north  side  of  the  Chickahominy,  towards  the 
York  Eiver,  laying  hold  of  McClellan's  communications  with 
White  House.f 

The  only  interference  with  this  plan  was  caused  by  a  day's 
delay  in  Jackson's  movement  whereby  it  occurred  that 

*  A  deserter  from  Jackson's  force  came  into  the  Union  lines  on  the  24th, 
and  stated  that  Jackson  was  moving  from  Gordonsville,  along  the  line  of  the 
Virginia  Central  Railroad,  to  strike  the  right  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac ;  but 
his  story  was  not  credited. 

f  Lee  :  Reports  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  vol.  i.,  p.  6. 


THE   PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  145 

when,  on  the  afternoon  of  the  26th,  General  A.  P.  Hill,  after 
crossing  the  Chickahominy  at  Meadow  Bridge  and  driving 
away  the  small  force*  in  observation  at  Mechanicsville  (thus 
enabling  the  divisions  of  Longstreet  and  D.  H.  Hill  to  cross  at 
Mechanicsville  Bridge  and  join  him),  attempted  to  proceed  in 
the  movement  down  the  north  bank  of  the  Chickahominy,  the 
columns  were  brought  to  a  halt  by  a  part  of  the  corps  of 
Fitz-John  Porter,  which  held  an  intrenched  position  on  the 
left  bank  of  Beaver  Dam  Creek,  a  small  tributary  of  the  Chick 
ahominy.  The  position  was  a  strong  one,  the  left  bank  of  the 
creek  being  high  and  almost  perpendicular,  and  the  approach 
being  over  open  fields,  swept  by  artillery  fire  and  obstructed 
by  abatis.  This  position  was  held  by  the  brigades  of  Rey 
nolds  and  Seymour;  but  when  the  Confederates  showed  a 
determination  to  force  the  passage,  General  Porter  called  up 
the  remainder  of  his  corps,  consisting  of  Meade's  brigade  and 
the  division  of  Morell.  The  Mechanicsville  road,  on  which 
the  Confederate  divisions,  under  General  Longstreet,  moved 
to  make  the  passage  of  Beaver  Dam  Creek,  turns  when  near 
the  creek  and  runs  nearly  parallel  to  it,  thus  causing  an  ad 
vancing  force  to  present  a  flank.  The  Federal  troops  were 
concealed  by  earthworks  commanding  this  road ;  and,  reserv 
ing  their  fire  until  the  head  of  the  Confederate  column  was 
nearly  across  the  ravine,  they  opened  a  terribly  destructive 
volley  in  the  face  and  on  the  flank  of  the  advancing  force  :  the 
survivors  fled,  and  no  additional  attempt  was  made  to  force 
the  passage  that  night ;  but  brisk  firing  was  continued  till 
nine  o'clock. t  The  enemy  lost  between  three  and  four  thou 
sand  men,  while  the  Union  loss  was  quite  inconsiderable.:): 


*  The  force  here  consisted  of  a  regiment  and  a  battery. 

f  Porter  :  Report  of  Mechanicsville.  This  statement  is  fully  borne  out  by 
Lee :  "  After  sustaining  a  destructive  fire  of  musketry  and  artillery,  at  short 
range,  the  troops,"  says  he,  "  were  withdrawn."  Reports  of  the  Army  of  North 
ern  Virginia,  vol.  i.,  p.  9. 

\  I  derive  this  statement  of  the  heavy  Confederate  loss  from  General  Long- 
Btreet  himself.  It  does  not  appear  in  the  official  reports,  and  is  much  larger 
than  had  hitherto  been  supposed. 

10 


146  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

The  attempt  was  renewed  at  dawn  of  the  following  morning, 
with  equally  ill  success ;  but  while  the  Confederates  were 
thus  engaged,  Jackson  passed  Beaver  Dam  Creek  above  and 
turned  the  position. 

By  the  night  of  the  26th  of  June,  the  intelligence  which 
McClellan  received  from  his  outposts  left  no  doubt  of  Jack 
son's  approach,  and,  divining  now  the  true  nature  of  Lee's 
move,  he  resolved  to  withdraw  his  right  wing  under  Gen 
eral  Porter  from  its  position  at  Beaver  Dam,  where  it  was 
too  far  from  the  main  body  and  too  much  "  in  the  air."  The 
answer  to  the  question,  what  should  be  done  with  the  right 
wing,  would  determine  the  entire  situation. 

The  disclosure  of  Lee's  bold  initiative  made  action  indis 
pensable.  Three  courses  were  open  to  McClellan  :  1.  To 
effect  a  concentration  of  the  whole  army  on  the  north  side 
of  the  Chickahominy,  and  there  deliver  general  battle  ;  2.  To 
effect  a  concentration  on  the  south  bank,  and  march  directly 
for  Bichmond ;  3.  To  transfer  the  right  wing  to  the  south 
bank,  and  make  a  change  of  base  to  the  James  River. 

The  first  plan  was  not  conformable  to  military  principles ; 
for  Lee  already  laid  hold  of  McClellan's  communications  with 
White  House,  and  the  Confederate  force  on  the  Bichmond 
side  of  the  Chickahominy  imperilled  his  line  of  retreat  to  the 
James  Biver.  To  have  given  general  battle  on  the  north 
bank  would,  therefore,  have  been  to  risk  his  army  without  an 
assured  line  of  retreat.* 

The  second  project,  that  of  making  a  counter-move 
on  Bichmond,  would  have  been  correct  and  at  the  same 
time  very  bold  and  brilliant.  Such  an  operation  has 
several  illustrious  precedents,  of  which  one  of  the  best 
known  and  most  striking  is  Turenne's  counter  to  Monte- 

*  This  is  something  which  even  Napoleon  was  unwilling  to  do.  Discuss 
ing  the  lines  of  conduct  open  to  him  after  crossing  the  Alps  into  Italy,  he 
says  :  "  Of  these  three  courses,  the  first — to  march  upon  Turin — was  contrary 
to  the  true  principles  of  war,  as  the  French  would  run  the  risk  of  fighting 
without  having  a  certain  retreat,  Fort  Bard  not  being  then  taken."  Gour- 
gaud  and  Montholon :  Memoirs  of  Napoleon,  vol.  i.,  p.  276. 


THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  147 

cuculi  in  1675.  Montecuculi,  commanding  the  Imperial 
army,  after  a  series  of  beautiful  manoeuvres,  began  to 
cross  the  Rhine  at  Strasburg  for  the  purpose  of  falling  upon 
the  French  force  ;  but  Turenne,  nothing  disconcerted,  threw 
a  bridge  over  the  river  three  miles  below  Strasburg,  and, 
transferring  his  whole  army  to  German  ground,  compelled 
Montecuculi  to  make  a  hasty  return.  There  is  little  doubt 
that  a  direct  march  of  the  whole  army  on  Richmond  on  the 
morning  of  the  27th,  would  have  had  the  effect  to  recall  Lee  to 
the  defence  of  his  own  communications  and  the  Confederate 
capital,  which  was  defended  by  only  twenty-five  thousand 
men.*  McClellan  held  the  direct  crossings  of  the  Chicka- 
hominy  on  the  south  bank,  while  the  Confederate  bridges 
were  destroyed,  and  Lee  would  have  been  compelled  to  make 
a  detour  of  at  least  a  day  to  rejoin  the  force  in  front  of 
Richmond.  Why,  therefore,  did  not  General  McClellan  exe 
cute  this  operation  ?  He  answers  this  question  by  a  reference 
to  the  limited  quantity  of  supplies  on  hand  ;  but  this  can 
not  be  accepted  as  valid,  for  the  army  had  at  this  time 
rations  for  many  days,  and  large  stores  had  eventually  to  be 
burnt  previous  to  the  retreat.  The  real  reason  is,  that  the 
operation  overleaped  by  its  boldness  the  methodical  genius 
of  the  Union  commander. 

It  resulted,  therefore,  that  he  adopted  the  alternative  of  a 
change  of  base  to  the  James  Eiver.  In  deciding  upon  this 
plan,  which  was  judicious  if  not  brilliant,  and  which  was 
executed  in  a  manner  to  reflect  high  credit  on  the  army  and 
its  commander,  the  only  sacrifice  made  by  General  McClellan 
— and  indeed  it  was  no  inconsiderable  one — was  that  he 
did  on  compulsion  what  he  might  have  done  before  from 

*  General  Magrader,  who  had  command  of  the  Confederate  forces  on  the 
right  bank  of  the  Chickahominy,  says :  "  I  considered  the  situation  of  our 
army  as  extremely  critical  and  perilous.  The  larger  part  of  it  was  on  the 
opposite  side  of  the  Chickahominy,  the  bridges  had  been  all  destroyed,  but 
one  was  rebuilt,  and  there  were  but  twenty-five  thousand  men  between  his  - 
McClellan's — army  of  one  hundred  thousand  men  and  Richmond."  Reports  of 
the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  vol.  i.,  p.  191. 


148  CAMPAIGNS  OF   THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

choice — what,  indeed,  lie  appears  to  have  intended  to  do,  but 
what,  halting  as  that  general  so  often  did  in  the  perilous 
half-way-house  between  the  offensive  and  the  defensive, 
never  ivas  done ;  thus  turning  awry  the  current  of  an  enter 
prise  of  great  pith  and  moment  and  losing  the  name  of  action. 

In  determining  to  withdraw  Porter's  corps  to  the  south 
bank  of  the  Chickahominy  and  effect  with  his  united  army  a 
change  of  base  to  the  James  Eiver,  General  McClellan  took  a 
preliminary  step  which,  though  seemingly  dictated  by  the  ne 
cessities  of  his  difficult  situation,  enabled  the  Confederates  to 
inflict  a  heavy  blow  on  that  corps,  and  beclouded  the  com 
mencement  of  the  retrograde  movement  by  a  severe  disaster  to 
the  Union  arms.  It  appeared  that  an  immediate  withdrawal 
of  the  right  wing  over  the  Chickahominy  after  Jackson  had 
turned  its  position  on  Beaver  Dam  Creek  would  expose  the 
rear  of  the  army,  placed  as  between  two  fires,*  and  enable 
Jackson  by  moving  direct  on  the  lower  bridges  of  the  Chicka 
hominy,  and  even  on  Malvern  Hill,  to  interrupt  the  movement 
to  the  James  Kiver.  He  resolved,  therefore,  to  engage  Jack 
son  with  Porter's  corps,  re-enforced  by  whatever  troops  might 
be  available  from  the  south  bank  of  the  Chickahominy,  in 
order  to  cover  the  withdrawal  of  the  trains  and  heavy  guns 
and  to  gain  time  for  arrangements  looking  to  the  change  of 
base  to  the  James.  It  was  indeed  an  unhappy  plight  in  which 
the  commander  found  himself  placed, — condemned  either  to 
hazard  the  safety  of  his  whole  army,  or  doom  a  portion  of  it 
to  almost  assured  destruction.  For  it  was  not,  as  he  con 
ceived,  with  Jackson  alone  that  Porter  would  have  to  deal, 
but  with  more  than  two-thirds  of  the  entire  Confederate  army, 
with  Jackson,  and  Longstreet,  and  the  two  Hills :  it  was  in 
fact  twenty-seven  thousand  against  sixty  thousand, — an  over 
weight  of  opposition  that  lent  to  the  task  assigned  to  Porter 
almost  the  character  of  a  forlorn  hope. 

In  execution  of  this  design,  the  greater  part  of  the  heavy 
guns  and  wagons  were  removed  from  Beaver  Dam  to  the 

*  McClellan :  Report,  p.  125. 


THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN. 


149 


south  bank  of  tlie  Chickahominy  during  the  night  of  the  26th  ; 
and  shortly  before  daylight  the  delicate  operation  of  with 
drawing  the  troops  to  the  position  where  it  was  determined  to 
make  the  new  stand,  was  commenced  and  skilfully  and  suc 
cessfully  executed ;  for,  though  the  Confederates  followed 
closely,  skirmishing,  yet  Porter  was  able  to  take  up  his  new 
position  before  they  appeared  in  force  in  his  front.  The  rear 
was  handsomely  covered  by  Seymour's  brigade  and  the  horse 
batteries  of  Robertson  and  Tidball. 


SKETCH  OP  THE  FIELD  OF  GAINES'  MILL. 

The  position  on  the  north  bank  of  the  Chickahominy  taken 
up  for  resistance,  was  well  chosen,  on  a  range  of  heights  be 
tween  Cold  Harbor  and  the  Chickahominy.  The  line  of  battle 
formed  the  arc  of  a  circle,  covering  the  approaches  to  the 
bridges  which  connected  the  right  wing  with  the  troops  on  the 
south  side  of  the  river.  The  left  (Morell's  division)  rested  on 
a  wooded  bluff,  which  rose  abruptly  from  a  deep  ravine  lead 
ing  down  to  the  Chickahominy  ;  the  right  (Sykes'  division  of 
Regulars)  posted  in  woods  and  clearings,  extended  to  the  rear 


150  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE   ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

of  Cold  Harbor.  The  ground,  generally  open  in  front,  was 
bounded  on  the  side  of  the  Confederate  approach  by  a  wood 
with  dense  and  tangled  undergrowth  and  traversed  by  a 
-sluggish  stream.  McCall's  division  was  formed  in  a  second 
line.*  This  field  was  destined  to  a  historic  character ;  for  two 
years  afterwards,  General  Grant,  in  his  campaign  from  the 
Kapidan  to  Richmond,  delivered  a  bloody  battle  on  the  same 
ground.  Yet  between  the  circumstances  of  the  two  battles, 
there  was  one  point  of  difference ;  and  it  is  a  point  of  difference 
that  epitomizes  the  whole  progress  of  the  war  from  1862  to 
1864.  By  the  time  Lee  found  himself  on  the  defensive  along 
the  Chickahominy,  a  long  experience  had  taught  the  enor 
mous  advantage  of  those  rude  breastworks  of  logs  and  earth, 
which  the  troops  of  both  armies  had  acquired  such  a  marvel 
lous  facility  in  constructing.  But  in  the  earlier  action  the  art 
of  preparing  defensive  positions  was  yet  in  its  infancy,  and 
the  ground  on  which  Porter  disposed  his  force — a  position 
that  in  two  hours'  vigorous  use  of  the  axe  and  spade  might 
have  been  rendered  impregnable — remained  guarded  by  little 
more  than  the  naked  valor  of  the  troops. 

The  dispositions  had  hardly  been  made,  when  at  two  o'clock 
General  A.  P.  Hill,  who  had  the  advance  of  Lee's  column,  swung 
round  by  New  Cold  Harbor,  and  advanced  his  division  to  the 
attack.  Jackson,  who  was  to  form  the  left  of  the  Confederate 
line,  had  not  yet  come  up,  and  Long-street  was  held  back  un 
til  Jackson's  arrival  on  the  left  should  compel  an  extension  of 
the  Federal  line.  Hill,  accordingly,  attacked  alone ;  but  he 
gained  no  advantage,  for  after  piercing  the  line  at  one  point, 
he  was  repulsed  and  forced  to  yield  ground,  his  troops  being 
driven  back  in  great  disorder  and  with  heavy  loss.f  To  re- 

*  Reynolds'  brigade  was  posted  on  the  extreme  right  to  cover  the  approaches 
from  Cold  Harbor  and  Dispatch  Station  to  Sumner's  Bridge. 

f  Even  a  stronger  statement  than  that  above  made  would  be  justified  by 
the  Confederate  official  reports.  Thus  General  Whiting  says:  "Men  were 
leaving  the  field  in  every  direction  and  in  great  disorder ;  two  regiments,  one 
from  South  Carolina  and  one  from  Louisiana,  were  actually  marching  back 
from  the  fire.  Men  were  skulking  from  the  front  in  a  shameful  manner."  Re- 


THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  151 

lieve  Hill,  the  Confederate  commander  now  ordered  Long- 
street,  who  held  the  right  of  the  Confederate  line,  to  make  a 
feint  on  the  left  of  the  Union  position ;  but  Longstreet  soon 
discovered  that,  owing  to  the  strength  of  this  point,  the  feint 
to  be  effective  would  have  to  be  converted  into  a  real  attack.* 
While  dispositions  for  this  were  in  progress,  Jackson's  corps 
together  with  D.  H.  Hill's  division  arrived ;  and  when  disposi 
tions  had  been  completed,  a  general  advance  from  right  to 
left  was  made  at  six  o'clock.  Previous  to  this,  General 
Porter,  finding  himself  hard  pressed,  had  called  for  re-enforce 
ments,  and  in  response,  General  McClellan,  at  half-past  three, 
sent  him  Slocum's  division  of  Franklin's  corps,  which  increased 
his  force  to  thirty-five  thousand  men.  It  was  evident,  how 
ever,  that,  beyond  this,  Porter  could  expect  little  or  no  aid,  for 
the  troops  on  the  south  bank  of  the  Chickahominy  had  at  the 
same  time  their  attention  fully  engaged  by  the  demonstrations 
of  Magruder,  who  by  energetic  handling  of  his  troops,  making 
a  great  show  and  movement  and  clatter,  held  the  corps  com 
manders  on  the  south  side,  to  whom  McClellan  appealed  for 
aid  in  behalf  of  Porter,  so  fully  occupied  that  they  declared 
they  could  with  safety  spare  none.J  And  thus  it  happened 
that,  while  on  the  north  side  of  the  Chickahominy  thirty  thou 
sand  Union  troops  were  being  assailed  by  seventy  thousand 
Confederates,  twenty-five  thousand  Confederates  on  the  south 
side  held  in  check  sixty  thousand  Union  troops ! 

When,  therefore,  Lee,  with  all  his  divisions  in  hand,  made 
a  general  advance,  it  was  with  an  overwhelming  weight  and 


ports  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  vol.  i.,  p.  154.  General  Lee  explains 
this  by  the  statement  that  "  most  of  these  men  had  never  been  under  fire  till 
the  day  before."  (Ibid.,  p.  8.)  This  furnishes  an  additional  proof  that  Lee  had 
been  re-enforced  by  troops  from  the  coast. 

*  "  I  found  I  must  drive  the  enemy  by  direct  assault,  or  abandon  the 
idea  of  making  the  diversion.  From  the  urgent  nature  of  the  message  from 
the  commanding  general,  I  determined  to  change  the  feint  into  an  attack." 
Report  of  Longstreet :  Reports  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  vol  i.,  p.  124 

f  Sumner  proflered  two  brigades,  if  General  McClellan  was  willing  he  should 
intrust  the  defence  of  his  position  to  his  front  line  alone. 


452  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

pressure.  The  right*  held  its  ground  with  much  stubborn 
ness,  repulsing  every  attack.  The  left,  too,  fought  stoutly, 
but  was  at  length  broken  by  a  determined  charge,  led  by 
Hood's  Texan  troops.  This,  however,  would  not  have  sufficed 
to  entail  any  great  disaster  ;  and  Porter  was  withdrawing  his 
infantry  under  cover  of  the  fire  of  fifty  guns,  when  the  artil 
lery  on  the  height  on  the  left  was  thrown  into  great  confusion 
by  a  mass  of  cavalry  rushing  back  from  the  front ;  and  the 
batteries,  being  without  support,  retired  in  haste,  overrunning 
the  infantry,  and  throwing  the  whole  mass  into  most  admired 
disorder.  The  explanation  of  this  is  as  follows.  The  cavalry 
had  been  directed  to  keep  below  the  hill,  and  under  no  cir 
cumstances  to  appear  on  the  crest,  but  to  operate  in  the  bot 
tom  land  against  the  enemy's  flank  :  nevertheless  its  com 
mander,  General  Philip  St.  George  Cook,  doubtless  misin 
formed,  ordered  it  to  charge  between  the  infantry  and  artillery 
upon  the  enemy  on  the  left,  who  had  not  yet  emerged  from 
the  woods. t  This  charge,  executed  in  the  face  of  a  withering 
fire,  resulted,  of  course,  in  the  cavalry's  being  thrown  back  in 
confusion  ;  and  the  bewildered  horses,  regardless  of  the  efforts 
of  the  riders,  wheeled  about,  and  dashing  through  the  bat 
teries,  convinced  the  gunners  that  they  were  charged  by  the 
enemy.  Jackson,  following  up,  carried  the  height  on  the  left 
by  an  impetuous  rush  of  Longstreet's  and  Whiting's  divisions, 
capturing  fourteen  pieces  of  artillery  ;  and  the  Union  division 
under  Morell,  which  held  that  wing,  was  driven  back  to  the 
woods  on  the  banks  of  the  Chickahominy.J  The  right  con- 

*  The  right  wing  was  held  by  Sykes'  division  of  Regulars  and  Griffin's  bri 
gade,  and  was  subsequently  re-enforced  by  Bartlett's  brigade  of  Slocum's 
division. 

f  Porter  :  Report  of  Games'  Mill. 

:£  Stonewall  Jackson,  in  his  official  report  of  the  battle  of  Games'  Mill,  gives 
the  following  spirited  description  of  the  decisive  charge  by  Hood's  and  Law's 
brigades  of  Whiting's  division,  which  resulted  in  carrying  the  fortified  crest  on 
the  Union  left :  "  Dashing  on  with  unfaltering  step  in  face  of  those  murderous 
discharges  of  canister  and  musketry,  General  Hood  and  Colonel  Law,  at  the 
head  of  their  respective  brigades,  rushed  to  the  charge  with  a  yell.  Moving 
down  a  precipitous  ravine,  leaping  ditch  and  stream,  clambering  up  a  difficult 


THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  153 

tinned  to  maintain  its  ground  against  the  attacks  of  Ewell's 
and  D.  H.  Hill's  divisions  ;  but  the  key-point  being  carried, 
retreat  was  compulsory.  This  was  attended  with  much  con 
fusion,  and  the  stragglers  were  thronging  to  the  bridge,  when 
French's  and  Meagher's  brigades,  sent  across  from  the  south 
side  of  the  river  by  General  Sumner,  appeared,  and  under 
cover  of  their  firm  line  the  shattered  troops  were  finally  rallied 
and  reformed.  Yet,  if  alone  on  that  small  re-enforcement 
had  depended  the  safety  of  that  terribly  shattered  wing,  hope 
would  have  been  slender  indeed ;  but  the  growing  darkness, 
the  disorder  which  lines  of  battle  necessarily  suffer  in  charging 
over  thickly  wooded  ground,  and  the  severe  punishment  the 
Confederates  had  received,  prevented  Lee  from  pushing  his 
victory  to  the  dreadful  extremity  to  which  that  routed  force, 
with  a  river  at  its  back,  was  exposed.  Thus,  when  friendly 
night — so  often  awaited  with  such  passionate  longing  by 
wrecked  armies  and  distraught  commanders — shut  down  on 
the  dark  and  bloody  thickets  of  the  Chickahominy,  the  worn 
and  weary  troops  were  silently  drawn  over  to  the  south  bank, 
and  at  six  of  the  morning  the  rear-guard  of  Regulars  crossed 
and  destroyed  the  bridge  behind  them.  The  losses  numbered 
many  thousands  on  each  side,  but  no  precise  aggregate  is 
known.* 

With  the  transfer  of  the  right  wing  to  the  south  side  of  the 
Chickahominy,  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  turned  its  back  on 
the  Confederate  capital  and  all  the  high  hopes  the  advance 
had  inspired.  It  was  no  longer  a  question  of  taking  Rich- 
ascent,  and  exposed  to  an  incessant  and  deadly  fire  from  the  intrenchments, 
these  brave  and  determined  men  pressed  forward,  driving  the  enemy  from  his 
well-selected  and  fortified  position.  In  this  charge — in  which  upwards  of  a 
thousand  men  fell,  killed  and  wounded,  and  in  which  fourteen  pieces  of  artil 
lery  and  nearly  a  regiment  were  captured — the  Fourth  Texas,  under  the  lead 
of  General  Hood,  was  the  first  to  pierce  the  stronghold  and  seize  the  guns." — 
Reports  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  vol.  i.,  p.  133. 

*  No  estimates  whatever  are  given  either  by  General  McClellan  or  General 
Porter.  Jackson  states  his  loss  at  three  thousand  two  hundred  and  eighty- 
four  ;  and  in  the  same  proportion  for  the  other  corps,  it  would  put  the  Confed 
erate  casualties  at  above  ten  thousand. 


154  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

mond,  but  of  making  good  the  retreat  to  the  James,  with  a 
victorious  enemy  in  the  rear.  McClellan  had  still,  however,  a 
certain  advantage  of  his  opponent :  he  had  a  determinate 
course  of  action  resolved  on  during  the  night  of  the  27th,  and 
already  in  process  of  execution ;  while  Lee  remained  still  in 
doubt  as  to  his  adversary's  design.  He  saw  that  McClellan 
might  still  throw  his  united  force  to  the  north  side  of  the 
Chickahominy  and  give  battle  to  preserve  his  communications 
by  the  White  House  ;  and  he  saw  that,  holding  the  lower 
bridges  of  the  Chickahominy,  he  might  retreat  down  the 
Peninsula  over  the  same  route  by  which  Johnston  retreated 
up  the  Peninsula.  In  either  case,  it  was  necessary  to  hold  his 
entire  force  in  hand  on  the  north  side  of  the  river.  Yet  Mc 
Clellan  had  adopted  neither  of  these  courses,  but  one  different 
from  either,  and  which  his  adversary  had  not  divined.  And 
thus  it  happened  that  when,  on  the  day  after  the  battle  of  the 
Chickahominy — Sunday,  the  28th  of  June — Lee  threw  forward 
Ewell's  division  and  Stuart's  cavalry  corps  to  seize  the  York 
River  Railroad,  he  discovered  he  had  been  anticipated ;  for 
the  line  of  supplies  by  the  York  River  Railroad  had  been 
already  abandoned  two  days  before,  the  water-transportation 
had  been  ordered  round  to  the  James  River,  the  vast  supplies 
had  been  run  across  to  the  south  side  of  the  Chickahominy, 
and  the  enemy  on  his  arrival  found  nothing  save  the  burning 
piles  in  which  the  remnant  of  stores  it  had  been  impossible  to 
carry  off  were  being  consumed.  In  fact,  the  army  was  rapidly 
in  motion  for  the  James  River ;  and  so  skilfully  was  the  retreat 
masked  by  the  troops  holding  the  line  of  works  on  the  Rich 
mond  side  of  the  Chickahominy,  that  Magruder  and  Huger, 
who  had  been  charged  with  the  duty  of  watching  closely  the 
movements  of  the  Union  force,  were  quite  unaware  of  what 
was  going  on.  "  Late  in  the  afternoon  (of  the  28th)  the 
enemy's  works,"  says  General  Lee,  "  were  reported  to  be  fully 
manned.  The  strength  of  these  fortifications  prevented  Gen 
erals  Huger  and  Magruder  from  discovering  what  was  passing 
in  their  front."  It  was  night,  in  fact,  before  the  movement 
was  disclosed ;  and  next  morning  (29th),  before  Longstreet 


THE  PENINSULAK  CAMPAIGN.  155 

and  Hill  and  Jackson  could  be  sent  across  to  the  south  side  of 
the  Chickahominy,  and,  with  Huger  and  Magruder,  put  in 
pursuit,  McClellan  had  gained  twenty-four  hours — hours  of 
infinite  price  in  the  execution  of  his  delicate  and  difficult 
enterprise. 

The  line  of  retreat  to  the  James  passes  across  White  Oak 
Swamp,  and  the  difficulty  of  the  passage  for  the  retreating 
army  with  its  enormous  trains  was,  at  least,  partially  compen 
sated  by  the  barrier  it  opposed  to  reconnoissances  and  flank 
attacks  by  the  pursuing  foe.  Keyes'  corps,  which  had  been 
holding  a  position  on  the  margin  of  White  Oak  Swamp, 
naturally  took  the  advance,  and,  traversing  this  region,  had 
by  noon  of  the  28th  seized  strong  positions  on  the  opposite 
side  to  cover  the  passage  of  the  troops  and  impedimenta. 
Then  followed  the  long  train  of  five  thousand  wagons,  with 
a  herd  of  twenty-five  hundred  beef-cattle,  all  of  which  had  to 
traverse  the  morass  by  the  one  narrow  defile.  It  was  success 
fully  accomplished,  however,  and,  during  the  same  night, 
Porter's  corps  headed  towards  the  James.  Meanwhile,  to 
allow  the  trains  to  get  well  on  their  way,  Sumner's  corps  and 
Heintzelman's  corps  and  Smith's  division  of  Franklin's  corps 
were  ordered  to  remain  on  the  Eichmond  side  of  tne  White 
Oak  Swamp  during  the  whole  of  the  29th  and  until  dark,  in  a 
position  covering  the  roads  from  Eichmond,  and  covering  also 
Savage  Station  on  the  railroad. 

Upon  learning  definitely  the  withdrawal  of  the  army,  Lee, 
on  the  morning  of  the  29th,  put  his  columns  in  motion  in  pur 
suit.  Magruder  and  Huger  were  ordered  to  follow  up  on  the 
Williamsburg  and  Charles  City  roads,  while  Longstreet  and 
A.  P.  Hill  were  to  cross  the  Chickahominy  at  New  Bridge, 
and  move  by  flank  routes  near  the  James,  so  as  to  intercept 
the  retreat ;  and  Jackson,  making  the  passage  at  Grape-vine 
Bridge,  was  to  sweep  down  the  south  bank  of  the  Chicka 
hominy. 

Now,  when  Sumner,  on  the  morning  of  the  29th,  learnt  that 
the  enemy  was  recrossing  the  Chickahominy  and  advancing 
in  the  direction  of  Savage  Station,  he  moved  his  corps  from 


156  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

the  position  it  had  held  at  Allen's  farm  to  that  place,  uniting 
there  with  Smith's  division  of  Franklin's  corps.  Heintzelman, 
who  held  position  on  the  left  of  Sumner,  had  been  ordered 
to  hold  the  Williamsburg  road  ;  but,  when  Sumner  shifted  his 
force  on  to  Savage  Station,  Heintzelman  feh1  back  entirely 
and  crossed  White  Oak  Swamp.  Thus,  when  Magruder 
pushed  forward  on  the  Williamsburg  road,  he  found,  in  con 
sequence  of  Heintzelman's  withdrawal,  no  force  to  oppose ; 
and  Sumner,  who  was  not  aware  of  Heintzelman's  retirement, 
was  surprised  to  find  the  enemy  debouching  on  his  front  at 
Savage  Station.  Such  were  the  circumstances  that,  on  the 
afternoon  of  the  29th,  brought  on  the  action  known  as  the 
battle  of  Savage  Station, — an  action  that  forms  the  second  of 
the  series  of  blows  dealt  by  Lee  on  the  retreating  army  in 
its  arduous  passage  to  the  James. 

Magruder  attacked  in  front  with  characteristic  impetuosity, 
about  four  in  the  afternoon,  momentarily  expecting  that 
Jackson,  whose  route  led  to  the  flank  and  rear  of  Savage 
Station,  would  arrive  to  decide  the  action.  But  Jackson  was 
delayed  nearly  all  day  by  the  rebuilding  of  the  bridge  over 
the  Chickahominy,  and  did  not  get  up,  and  Sumner  held  his 
own  with  the  stubbornness  that  marked  that  soldier  ;  so 
that  Magrudei,  assailing  his  position  in  successive  charges 
till  dark,  met  only  bloody  repulses.  Thus,  stout  Sumner 
stood  at  bay,  while,  thanks  to  the  barrier  he  opposed,  the 
mighty  caravan  of  artillery  and  wagons  and  ambulances 
moved  swiftly,  silently  through  the  melancholy  woods  and 
wilds,  all  day  and  ah1  night,  without  challenge  or  encounter, 
on  its  winding  way  to  the  James.  During  the  night,  the  rear 
guard  also  withdrew  across  White  Oak  Swamp.* 

By  the  morning  of  the  30th,  the  army,  with  all  its  belong 
ings,  had  crossed  White  Oak  Swamp,  and  debouched  into  the 
region  looking  out  towards  the  James;  the  artillery-parks 


*  By  orders  from  General  McClellan,  Sumner  was  under  the  sad  necessity  of 
leaving  behind  at  Savage  Station  the  general  hospital,  containing  twenty-five 
hundred  sick  and  wounded  men. 


THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  157 

had  gained  Malvern  Hill,  and  the  van  of  the  army  had 
already  reached  the  river,  the  sight  of  which  was  greeted 
with  something  of  the  joy  with  which  the  Ten  Thousand,  re 
turning  from  the  expedition  immortalized  by  Xenophon, 
hailed  the  Sea. 

The  Confederate  pursuit  was  made  in  two  columns.  Jack 
son,  with  five  divisions,  pressed  on  the  heels  of  the  retreat 
ing  army  by  way  of  White  Oak  Swamp ;  while  Longstreet, 
with  a  like  force?  making  a  detour  by  the  roads  skirting  the 
James  River,  hurried  forward  with  the  view  to  cut  oft7  the 
column  from  its  march.  But,  as  long  as  the  two  Confederate 
columns  were  thus  placed,  it  is  obvious  that  they  were  hope 
lessly  separated,  and  the  retreating  army  had  less  to  fear 
from  their  partial  blows.  Jusif  as  soon,  however,  as  Jackson 
should  emerge  from  White  Oak  Swamp,  he  would  come  in 
immediate  communication  with  the  force  under  Longstreet, 
and  the  whole  of  Lee's  army  would  then  be  united.  To  pre 
vent  this  junction,  so  as  to  make  time  for  the  ongoing  of  the 
menaced  and  jealously  guarded  trains,  became  now  the  prime 
object.  And  this  necessity  it  was  that  gave  rise  to  the  next 
serious  encounter,  known  as  the  battle  of  Glendale  or  New 
market  cross-roads. 

By  noon  of  the  30th,  Jackson  reached  the  White.  Oak 
Swamp  ;  but  he  found  the  bridge  destroyed,  and  on  attempt 
ing  to  pass  by  the  ordinary  place  of  crossing,  the  head  of  his 
column  was  met  by  a  severe  artillery  fire  from  batteries  on 
the  other  side.  He  then  essayed  to  force  the  passage ;  but 
each  attempt  was  met  with  such  determined  opposition*  that, 
obstructed  in  his  design,  he  was  compelled  to  give  over. 
Meantime,  the  column  of  Longstreet,  whose  line  of  march 
flanked  the  swamp  and  gave  free  motion,  was  pushing  rap 
idly  forward  on  the  Long  Bridge  or  New  Market  road,  which 
runs  at  right  angles  to  the  Quaker  road,  on  which  the  army 
and  its  trains  were  hurrying  towards  the  James.  At  the  very 

*  The  crossing  was  held  by  General  Franklin,  with  the  divisions  of  Smith 
and  Richardson  and  Naglee's  brigade.  Captain  Ayres  directed  the  artillery. 


158  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE   POTOMAC. 

time  Jackson  was  arrested  at  White  Oak  Swamp,  Long- 
street  had  arrived  within  a  mile  of  the  point  of  intersection 
of  these  two  roads.  Should  he  be  able  to  seize  it,  the  army 
would  be  cut  in  twain.  But  Longstreet  found  this  important 
point  already  covered,  and  if  gained  it  would  be  at  the  price 
of  a  battle.  The  force  at  the  point  of  contact  was  McCall's 
division  of  Pennsylvania  Eeserves,  formed  at  right  angles 
across  the  New  Market  road,  in  front  of,  and  parallel  to,  the 
Quaker  road.*  Sumner  was  at  some  distance  to  the  left,  and 
somewhat  retired ;  Hooker  was  on  Sumner's  left,  and  some 
what  advanced ;  Kearney  was  to  the  right  of  McCall.  The 
brunt  of  the  attack,  however,  fell  upon  McCall's  division.  In 
the  Confederate  line  the  division  of  Longstreet  held  the  right, 
and  that  of  A.  P.  Hill  the  left.  *  Longstreet  opened  the  attack 
at  about  three  o'clock,  by  a  threatening  movement  on  McCall's 
left,  which  was  met  by  a  change  of  front  on  that  flank,  in 
which  position  a  severe  fight  was  maintained  for  two  hours, 
the  Confederates  making  ineffectual  attempts  to  force  the  po 
sition.  At  the  same  time  the  batteries  on  the  centre  and 
right  became  the  aim  of  determined  assaults,  which  were 
repeatedly  repulsed ;  till  finally  Randol's  battery  was  captured 
by  a  fierce  charge  made  by  two  regimentsf  advancing  in 
wedge  shape,  without  order,  but  with  trailed  arms.  Bushing 
up  to  the  muzzles  of  the  guns,  they  pistoled  or  bayoneted  the 
cannoniers.  The  greater  part  of  the  supporting  regiment 
fled ;  but  those  who  remained  made  a  savage  hand  to  hand 
and  bayonet  fight  over  the  guns,^:  which  were  finally  yielded 

*  McCall's  disposition  was  as  follows :  Meade's  brigade  on  the  right,  Sey 
mour's  on  the  left,  and  Simmons'  (Reynolds')  in  reserve.  Randol's  (Regular) 
battery  in  front  of  the  line  on  the  right,  Cooper's  and  Kern's  opposite  the  cen 
tre,  and  Dietrich's  and  Kennerheim's  (twenty-pounder  Parrotts)  on  the  left. 

f  These  regiments  were  the  Fifty-fifth  and  Sixtieth  Virginia. 

\  "The  Sixtieth  Virginia  crossed  bayonets  with  the  enemy,  who  obstinately 
contested  the  possession  of  these  guns."  Report  of  General  A.  P.  Hill :  Reports 
of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  vol.  i.,  p.  177. 

General  McCall  is  more  magniloquent  in  his  account :  "  Bayonets  were  crossed 
and  locked  in  the  struggle  ;  bayonet  wounds  were  freely  given  and  received. 
I  saw  skulls  crushed  by  the  heavy  blow  of  the  butt  of  the  musket ;  and  in 


THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  159 

to  the  enemy.  Meantime,  a  renewed  attempt  on  the  left  shat 
tered  and  doubled  up  that  flank,  held  by  Seymour's  brigade  ; 
and  the  enemy  following  up,  drove  the  routed  troops  between 
Sumner  and  Hooker,  till,  penetrating  too  far,  he  was  caught 
himself  on  the  flank  by  Hooker's  fire,  and,  driven  across  Sum- 
ner's  front,  was  thrown  against  McCall's  centre,  which,  with 
the  right,  had  remained  comparatively  firm.  An  advance  by 
Kearney  ard  Hooker  now  regained  a  portion  of  the  lost 
ground,  and  repulsed  all  further  attacks.  Darkness  coming 
.on,  ended  the  action. 

While  these  events  were  passing  at  Glendale,  Jackson,  de 
tained  by  the  vigorous  opposition  he  met  on  the  other  side  of 
White  Oak  Swamp,  could  only  hear  the  tell-tale  guns :  he 
was  impotent  to  help.*  Thus  it  was  that  McClellan,  holding 
paralyzed,  as  it  were,  the  powerful  corps  of  Jackson  with  his 
right  hand,  with  his  left  was  free  to  deal  blows  at  the  force 
menacing  his  flanks.  The  action  at  Glendale  insured  the  in 
tegrity  of  the  army,  imperilled  till  that  hour.  During  the 
night  the  troops  that  had  checked  Jackson  and  repulsed 
Longstreet  silently  withdrew,  and  when  Lee  was  next  able  to 
strike  it  was  at  a  united  army,  strongly  posted  on  the  heights 
of  Malvern,  with  assured  communication  with  its  new  base  on 
the  James. 

On  the  following  morning  (July  1st)  Lee  had  his  whole 
force  concentrated  at  the  battle-field  of  New  Market  cross 
roads  :  but  he  could  not  fail  even  then  to  realize  that,  though 
the  pursuit  might  be  continued,  it  was  under  circumstances 
that  made  the  hope  of  any  decided  success  now  very  distant. 

short,  the  desperate  thrusts  and  parries  of  a  life  and  death  encounter,  proving 
indeed  that  Greek  had  met  Greek  when  the  Alabama  boys  fell  upon  the  sons  of 
Pennsylvania."  McCall's  Report :  Pennsylvania  Reserves  in  the  Peninsula, 
pamphlet,  p.  5. 

*  "  A  heavy  cannonading  in  front  announced  the  engagement  of  General 
Longstreet  at  Frazier's  farm,  and  made  me  eager  to  press  forward ,  but  the 
marshy  character  of  the  soil,  the  destruction  of  the  bridge  over  the  marsh  and 
creek,  and  the  strong  position  of  the  enemy  for  defending  the  passage,  pre 
vented  my  advancing  till  the  following  morning."  Jackson's  Report :  Reports 
of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  vol.  i.,  p.  134. 


160 


CAMPAIGNS  OF   THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 


Still  it  remained  to  try  the  issue  of  a  general  battle  between 
the  two  united  armies.  The  Confederate  columns  were  ac 
cordingly  put  in  motion  on  the  morning  of  the  1st  of  July, 
Jackson's  corps  leading.  A  march  of  a  few  miles  brought  the 
pursuers  again  in  contact  with  the  army,  which  was  found 
occupying  a  commanding  ridge,  extending  obliquely  across 


SKETCH  OF  MALVERN  HILL. 

the  line  of  march,  in  advance  of  Malvern  Hill.  In  front  of 
this  strong  position  the  ground  was  open,  varying  in  width 
from  a  quarter  to  half  a  mile,  sloping  gradually  from  the 
crest,  and  giving  a  free  field  of  fire.  The  approaches  were 
over  a  broken  and  thickly  wooded  country,  traversed  nearly 
throughout  its  whole  extent  by  a  swamp  passable  at  but  few 
places,  and  difficult  at  those.*  On  this  admirable  position 
General  McClellan  had  concentrated  his  army,  prepared  to 
receive  final  battle. 

*  Lee's  Report :  Reports  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  vol.  i.,  p.  12. 


THE  PENINSULAR   CAMPAIGN. 

The  left  and  centre  were  posted  on  Malvern  Hill,  an  ele 
vated  plateau  about  a  mile  and  a  half  by  three-fourths  of  a  mile 
in  area ;  the  right  was  "  refused,"  curving  backward  through 
a  wooded  region  towards  a  point  below  Haxall's  Landing,  on 
James  Kiver.  Judging  from  the  obvious  lines  of  attack  that 
the  main  effort  would  be  made  against  his  left,  General  Mc- 
Clellan  posted  on  Malvern  Hill  heavy  masses  of  infantry  and 
artillery.  Porter's  corps  held  the  left,  and  the  artillery  of  his 
two  divisions,  with  the  artillery  reserve,  gave  a  concentrated 
fire  of  sixty  guns.  Couch's  division  was  placed  on  the  right 
of  Porter ;  next  came  Kearney  and  Hooker ;  next,  Sedgwick 
and  Richardson ;  next,  Smith  and  Slocum ;  then  the  remainder 
of  Keyes'  corps,  extending  by  a  backward  curve  nearly  to  the 
river.  While  the  left  was  massed,  the  right  was  more  de 
ployed,  its  front  covered  by  slashings.  The  gunboats  in  the 
James  River  protected  the  left  flank.* 

Lee  formed  his  line  with  Jackson's  divisionsf  on  the  left, 
and  those  under  Magruder  and  Huger  on  the  right.  A.  P. 
Hill  and  Longstreet  were  held  in  reserve  to  the  left,  and  took 
no  part  in  the  engagement 4  Owing  to  ignorance  of  the 


*  McClellan's  Report,  p.  138. 

f  Divisions  of  Jackson,  Ewell,  Whiting,  and  D.  H.  Hill. 

:£  General  McClellan,  mistaking  the  movements  of  these  two  divisions,  fell 
into  an  erroneous  apprehension  regarding  the  part  they  played  in  the  battle. 
In  his  Report  (p.  139)  he  says  :  "  About  two  o'clock  a  column  of  the  enemy  was 
observed  moving  towards  our  right.  Arrangements  were  at  once  made  to 
meet  the  anticipated  attack  in  that  quarter ;  but  though  the  column  was  long, 
occupying  two  hours  in  passing,  it  disappeared,  and  was  not  again  heard  of. 
The  presumption,  is  that  it  retired  by  the  rear,  and  participated  in  the  attack 
Afterwards  made  on  our  left."  This  was  the  column  of  Longstreet  and  A.  P. 
Hill,  getting  into  its  position  in  reserve  on  the  Confederate  left ;  but,  as  above 
stated,  it  took  no  part  in  the  action.  During  the  battle,  the  observed  move 
ment  of  this  column  gave  McClellan  great  concern  for  his  right,  as  he  con 
ceived  it  was  making  a  detour  with  the  view  to  fall  upon  that  flank  ;  and  this 
caused  him  to  remain  on  his  right.  "  My  apprehensions,"  he  says,  "  were 
for  the  extreme  right.  I  felt  no  concern  for  the  left  and  centre." — Report 
on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  vol.  i.,  p.  437.  Such  troublesome  errors  are  the 
necessary  result  of  the  nature  of  such  a  theatre  of  war  as  that  on  which  the 
two  armies  were  operating, 


162  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

country  on  the  part  of  the  Confederates,  and  the  difficulty  oi 
the  ground,  the  line  was  not  formed  until  late  in  the  after 
noon,  though  a  brisk  artillery  duel  was  kept  up,  and  about 
three  o'clock  a  single  brigade  (Anderson's,  of  D.  H.  Hill's 
division)  attacked  Couch's  front  and  was  repulsed.*  As 
McClellan  expected,  Lee's  purpose  was  to  force  the  plateau 
of  Malvern  on  the  left.  With  this  view  he  had  massed  Jack 
son's  force  and  the  troops  under  Huger  and  Magruder  well 
on  his  right,  being  resolved  to  carry  the  heights  by  storm. 
Previously  to  the  attack,  the  Confederate  commander  issued 
an  order  stating  that  positions  were  selected  from  which  his 
artillery  could  silence  that  of  his  opponent,  and  as  soon  as 
that  was  done,  Armistead's  brigade  of  Huger 's  division  would 
advance  with  a  shout  and  carry  the  battery  immediately  in 
his  front.  This  shout  was  to  be  the  signal  for  a  general  ad 
vance,  and  all  the  troops  were  then  to  rush  forward  with 
fixed  bayonets.  Now  towards  six  o'clock,  General  D.  H.  Hill, 
commanding  one  of  Jackson's  divisions,  heard  what  he  took 
to  be  the  signal.  "  While  conversing  with  my  brigade  com 
manders,"  says  he,  "  shouting  was  heard  on  our  right,  followed 
by  the  roar  of  musketry.  We  all  agreed  this  was  the  signal 
determined  upon,  and  I  ordered  my  division  to  advance. 
This,  as  near  as  I  could  judge,  was  about  an  hour  and  a  half 
before  sundown. "t  But  whether  the  others  did  not  hear 
what  Hill  heard,  or  whether  what  they  heard  was  not  taken 
for  the  signal,  no  advance  by  them  was  made ;  so  that  when 
Hill  went  forward,  it  was  alone.  Neither  Whiting  on  the  left, 
nor  Magruder  or  Huger  on  the  right,  moved  forward  an  inch. 
Hill's  point  of  attack  was  directly  against  the  crest  of  Malvern, 
bristling  with  cannon.  "  Tier  after  tier  of  batteries,"  says  he, 
"  were  grimly  visible  on  the  plateau,  rising  in  the  form  of  an 
amphitheatre."  In  such  cases,  where  cannoniers  stand  to 

*  This  repulse  was  determined  by  the  excellent  practice  of  Kingsbury's 
battery,  together  with  the  steady  fire  of  the  Tenth  Massachusetts  and  a  charge 
of  the  Thirty-sixth  New  York — the  latter  regiment  capturing  the  colors  of  the 
Fourteenth  North  Carolina  in  a  hand-to-hand  conflict. 

f  Reports  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  vol.  i.,  p.  186. 


THE  PENINSULAS  CAMPAIGN.  1(53 

their  guns,  and  faithful  hands  grasp  the  rifle,  it  is  easy  to 
predict  the  result.  Every  assault  met  a  bloody  repulse.  The 
promised  artillery  aid  was  not  rendered :  the  few  batteries 
used  were  beaten  in  detail.*  Afterwards,  Magruder  and 
Huger  attacked,  but  it  was  without  order  or  ensemble,  a  bri 
gade,  or  even  a  regiment,  being  thrown  forward  at  a  time. 
Each,  in  succession,  met  a  like  reception  from  the  steady  lines 
of  infantry  and  the  concentrated  fire  from  the  artillery  re 
serve,  under  its  able  commander,  Colonel  Hunt.  The  attacks 
fell  mainly  on  Porter  on  the  left,  and  on  Couch  ;  and  the  suc 
cess  of  the  day  was  in  a  large  degree  due  to  the  skill  and 
coolness  of  the  latter,  who,  as  holding  the  hottest  part  of  the 
Union  line,  was  gradually  re-enforced  by  the  brigades  of 
Caldwell,  Sickles,  Meagher,  and  several  of  Porter's,  till  he  came 
to  command  the  whole  left  centre,  displaying  in  his  conduct  of 
the  battle  a  high  order  of  generalship. 

Night  closed  on  the  combatants  still  fighting,  the  oppos 
ing  forces  being  distinguishable  only  by  the  lurid  lines  of  fire. 
Thus  till  near  nine  o'clock,  when  the  fire,  slackening  gradually, 
died  out  altogether,  and  only  an  occasional  shot  from  the 
batteries  broke  the  silence  that  pervaded  the  bloody  field. 
The  repulse  of  the  Confederates  was  most  complete,  and  en 
tailed  a  loss  of  five  thousand  men,  while  the  Union  loss  was 
not  above  one-third  that  number.  Lee  never  before  nor  since 
that  action  delivered  a  battle  so  ill-judged  in  conception, 
or  so  faulty  in  its  details  of  execution.  It  was  as  bad  as  the 
worst  blunders  ever  committed  on  the  Union  side  ;  but  he 
profited  by  the  experiment,  and  never  repeated  it. 


*  "  Instead  of  ordering  up  one  or  two  hundred  pieces  of  artillery  to  play  on 
the  Yankees,  a  single  battery  was  ordered  up  and  knocked  to  pieces  in  a  few 
minutes ;  one  or  two  others  shared  the  same  fate  of  being  beaten  in  detail. 
The  firing  from  our  batteries  was  of  the  most  farcical  character." — Report  of 
General  D  H.  Hill :  Reports  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  vol.  i.,  p.  186. 
General  Lee  says  :  "  The  obstacles  presented  by  the  woods  and  swamps  made  it 
impracticable  to  bring  up  a  sufficient  amount  of  artillery  to  oppose  successfully 
the  extraordinary  force  of  that  arm  employed  by  the  enemy."— Ibid.,  p.  12 
See  also  report  of  General  Pendleton,  Chief  of  Artillery,  Ibid.,  p.  227. 


164          CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

Victorious  though  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  on  the 
field  of  Malvern,  the  position  was  not  one  that  could  be  held ; 
for  the  army  was  under  the  imperious  necessity  of  reaching 
its  supplies.  During  the  night,  accordingly,  the  troops  were 
withdrawn  to  Harrison's  Bar,  on  the  James.  Colonel  Averill, 
with  a  regiment  of  cavalry,  a  brigade  of  regular  infantry,  and 
a  battery,  covered  the  rear.  Lee  threw  forward  Stuart  (who 
with  his  troopers  had  been  absent  during  the  whole  pursuit 
on  an  expedition  to  White  House  and  the  lower  fords  of 
the  Chickahominy,  and  only  rejoined  the  army  after  the  battle 
of  Malvern),  and  followed  up  with  columns  of  infantry ;  but 
finding  that  McClellan  had  taken  up  a  strong  position,  he 
retired  on  the  8th  of  July,  and  took  his  army  back  to  Rich- 
mond. 

Thus  ended  the  memorable  peninsular  campaign,  which,  in 
the  brief  interval  of  three  months,  had  seen  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  force  its  way  through  siege  and  battle  to  within 
sight  of  the  spires  of  Richmond,  only  to  reel  back  in  the 
deadly  clinch  of  a  seven  days'  combat  to  the  James  River. 

Viewed  with  reference  to  its  aim — the  capture  of  Rich 
mond — the  campaign  was  a  failure,  as  were  so  many  subse 
quent  campaigns  having  the  same  object  in  view.  The 
judgments  of  men,  accordingly,  have  turned  rather  on  the 
resiilt  than  on  the  causes  that  produced  it.  The  theory  of 
the  campaign,  primarily  offensive,  from  necessity  changed 
into  the  defensive.  The  theory  of  the  Confederates,  primarily 
defensive,  was  skilfully  converted  into  the  offensive.  Thus 
the  prestige  remained  with  the  Confederates ;  and  the  faults 
of  Lee's  offensive  receive  as  little  attention  as  the  merits  of 
McClellan's  defensive.  For,  in  an  unsuccessful  campaign,  the 
slightest  fault  is  accounted  mortal.  Men  regard  only  the  ill 
that  has  happened,  and  not  the  worse  that  might  have  hap 
pened  had  it  not  been  prevented.  In  a  fortunate  issue,  how 
ever,  the  eyes  of  the  public,  dazzled  by  the  glitter  of  a 
brilliant  achievement,  are  blind  both  to  the  faults  of  what  has 
been  gained  and  to  the  failure  to  gain  much  besides.  Lee 


THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  1(55 

himself,  conscious  of  the  skilful  manner  in  which  his  antago 
nist  parried  his  blows,  attempts  to  explain  the  failure  to 
achieve  a  more  decisive  result  by  the  enumeration  of  obstruc 
tions  which,  as  they  beset  McClellan  himself,  can  hardly 
be  considered  a  valid  explanation.  "Under  ordinary  cir 
cumstances,"  says  he,  "the  Federal  army  should  have 
been  destroyed.  Its  escape  was  due  to  the  causes  already 
stated.  Prominent  among  these  is  the  want  of  correct  and 
timely  information.  This  fact,  attributable  chiefly  to  the 
character  of  the  country,  enabled  General  McClellan  skilfully 
to  conceal  his  retreat,  and  to  add  much  to  the  obstructions 
with  which  nature  had  beset  our  pursuing  columns."  * 

The  losses  of  the  campaign  were,  on  the  Union  side, 
15,249;  on  the  Confederate  side,  above  19,000.  The  blows 
dealt  by  each  were  not  less  severe  than  the  blows  received  by 
each.  In  a  military  sense,  Eichmond's  danger  was  really 
greater  when,  after  its  retreat,  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
based  itself  on  the  James,  than  when  it  stood  astride  the 
Chickahominy.  Yet,  so  potent  is  the  sway  that  general  re 
sults  have  over  the  imaginations  of  men,  that,  while  the  raising 
of  the  siege  was  the  occasion  to  Jefferson  Davis  for  a  pro 
clamation  of  thanksgiving,  and  thrilled  the  whole  South  with 
joy,  the  North  was  stunned  with  grief  and  despair  at  the 
thought  that  the  army  that  was  the  brave  pillar  of  its  hopes 
was  thus  struck  down. 

It  is  true  these  moral  results  count  for  much  in  war,  and 
the  historian  must  not  fail  duly  to  note  and  weigh  them. 
Yet  if,  anticipating  the  spirit  of  a  historical  judgment,  wo 
essay  to  estimate  the  events  of  the  war  by  their  intrinsic, 
value,  we  shall  not  fail  to  see  something  meritorious,  as  well 
as  something  blameworthy,  in  this  unsuccessful  campaign. 
For  the  commander  to  have  extricated  his  army  from  a  diffi 
cult  situation,  in  which  circumstances  quite  as  much  as  his 
own  fault  had  placed  it,  and,  in  presence  of  a  powerful,  skilful, 
and  determined  adversary,  to  have  transferred  it  to  a  position 

*  Lee :  Reports  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  vol.  i.,  p.  14. 


166  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC 

whence  it  could  act  with  effect,  was  of  itself  a  notable  achieve 
ment.  For  the  army  to  have  fought  through  such  a  campaign 
was  creditable,  and  its  close  found  inexperienced  troops  trans 
formed  into  veteran  soldiers.  And,  if  alone  from  the  appeal 
which  great  sufferings  and  great  sacrifices  always  make  to  a 
generous  people,  the  story  of  that  eventful  march  and  arduous 
retreat,  when,  weary  and  hungry  and  foot-sore,  the  army 
marched  by  night  and  fought  by  day  through  a  whole  week 
of  toil,  and  never  gave  up,  but  made  a  good  fight  and  reached 
the  goal,  cannot  fail  to  live  in  grateful  remembrance. 


POPE'S   CAMPAIGN  IN  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA.  167 


Y. 

POPE'S  CAMPAIGN  IN  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA, 

AUGUST,  1862. 


I. 
REMOVAL   OF   THE   ARMY   FROM   THE   PENINSULA. 

IT  will  have  appeared  from  the  exposition  of  the  motives 
that  prompted  the  change  of  base,  that,  in  transferring  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  to  the  James  River,  the  fundamental 
idea  of  its  commander  was  to  secure  a  line  of  operations 
whereby,  with  a  refreshed  and  re-enforced  army,  a  new  cam 
paign,  under  more  promising  auspices,  might  be  undertaken. 
The  position  of  the  army,  at  once  threatening  the  communi 
cations  of  Richmond  and  enabling  it  to  spring  on  the  rear  of 
the  Confederate  force  should  it  attempt  an  aggressive  move 
ment  northward,  seemed  the  most  advantageous  possible, 
whether  for  offensive  operations  or  for  insuring  the  safety  of 
the  national  capital.  General  McClellan  brought  back  to 
Harrison's  Landing  between  eighty-five  thousand  and  ninety 
thousand  men ;  and  his  view  was,  that  all  the  resources  at 
the  command  of  the  Government  should  be  at  once  for 
warded  to  him.  Having  the  James  River  now  open  as  a  line 
of  supplies,  he  had  formed  the  bold  design  of  transferring  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  to  the  south  bank  of  that  river,  and 
operating  against  the  communications  of  Richmond  by  way 
of  Petersburg.* 

*  That  this  was  General  McClellan's  purpose  is  vouched  for  by  no  less  an 
authority  than  General  Halleck,  who,  in  a  memorandum  of  a  visit  to  the  head 
quarters  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  at  Harrison's  Landing,  on  the  25th  of 


168  CAMPAIGNS  OF    THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

There  appears  to  have  been  at  first  an  intention  on  the  part 
of  the  Administration  to  adopt  this  judicious  course ;  but  a 
train  of  events,  partly  the  work  of  man  and  partly  the  effect 
of  circumstances,  presently  arose,  that  not  only  frustrated  this 
design,  but  removed  the  army  wholly  from  the  Peninsula, 
and  transferred  the  theatre  of  operations  to  the  front  of 
Washington  and  then  to  the  soil  of  the  loyal  States.  What 
these  events  were  I  shall  now  set  forth. 

Just  before  the  commencement  of  Lee's  offensive  operations, 
the  military  councils  at  Washington,  taught  a  lesson  by  the 
events  of  Jackson's  campaign  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  had 
gathered  together  the  disjointed  fag-ends  of  armies  in  Northern 
Virginia  under  McDowell  and  Banks  and  Fremont,  and  had 
consolidated  them  into  the  "Army  of  Virginia,"  which  was 
intrusted  to  the  command  of  Major-General  John  Pope."x" 
That  officer  brought  with  him  from  the  West,  where  he  had 
held  command  under  General  Halleck,  the  reputation  for  a 
species  of  aggressive  energy  that  was  supposed  to  characterize 
the  Western  style  of  warfare,  in  contradistinction  to  the  me 
thodical  campaigning  of  the  East,f  and  he  signalized  his  advent 

July,  1862,  says :  "  I  stated  to  him  [McClellan]  that  the  object  of  my  visit  was 
to  ascertain  from  him  his  views  and  wishes  in  regard  to  future  operations.  He 
said  that  he  proposed  to  cross  the  James  River  at  that  point  [Harrison's  Land 
ing.  General  Grant,  two  years  afterwards,  crossed  a  few  miles  beiow],  attack 
Petersburg,  and  cut  off  the  enemy's  communications  by  that  route  South,  mak 
ing  no  further  demonstration,  for  the  present,  against  Richmond.  /  stated  to 
him  very  frankly  my  mews  in  regard  to  the  danger  and  impracticability  of  the 
plan,"  etc.  (Report  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  vol.  i.,  p.  454.)  It  would  ap 
pear  that  General  Grant  had  less  respect  for  General  Halleck's  views  of  "  the 
danger  and  impracticability  of  the  plan,"  seeing  that  two  years  afterwards  he 
adopted  that  precise  plan,  and  took  Richmond  and  destroyed  Lee  by  it !  Nor 
can  it  be  said  that  circumstances,  so  far  as  regards  the  defence  of  Washington, 
differed  in  the  one  case  from  those  in  the  other — excepting  that  they  were  such 
as  to  warrant  the  adoption  of  the  plan  by  General  McClellan  much  more  than 
by  General  Grant — for  in  1862  there  were  ten  men  left  behind  for  the  defence 
of  Washington  to  one  in  1864. 

*  The  appointment  of  General  Pope  to  the  command  of  the  "  Army  of  Vir 
ginia"  bears  date  the  26th  of  June,  the  day  before  the  battle  of  Games'  Mill. 

f  This  supposed  distinction  between  the  Western  and  Eastern  mode  of  mat 
ing  war  is  thus  expressed  in  Pope's  address  to  his  army :  "  I  have  come  to  you 


Rj 


POPE'S  CAMPAIGN  IN  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA.  169 

to  command  by  the  promulgation  of  a  pseudo-Napoleonic  pro 
clamation,  in  which  he  expressed  his  contempt  for  "  certain 
phrases  he  found  much  in  vogue,  such  as  bases  of  supplies, 
and  lines  of  retreat," — phrases  which  he  enjoined  his  army  to 
discard  as  unworthy  of  soldiers  destined  to  follow  the  leader 
ship  of  one  who  had  never  seen  any  thing  but  the  "  backs  of 
his  enemies."  Underneath  all  its  bombastic  nonsense,  Pope's 
proclamation  contained  one  grain  of  sense,  which  was  the 
rebuke  it  gave  the  ignorant  use  of  military  terms  common  at 
the  North ;  and  though  there  was  an  execrable  want  of  taste 
in  the  pointed  satire  directed  at  McClellan's  methodical  tac 
tics,  there  is  no  doubt  that  the  declaration  of  a  more  vigorous 
war-policy  quite  met  the  views  of  the  mass  of  the  people. 

In  assigning  Pope  to  the  command  of  the  "Army  of 
Virginia,"  although  his  first  duty  was  to  cover  "Washington, 
yet  his  ultimate  object  and  avowed  purpose  was  to  take  Rich 
mond  by  an  overland  advance  ;  and  he  had  charmed  the  ears 
of  the  members  of  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War 
by  his  facile  expositions  of  the  manner  in  which  he  meant  to 
"  lie  off  on  the  flanks  of  the  rebels,"  and  even — had  he  only 
such  an  army  as  McClellan's — march  straight  to  New  Orleans!* 
Before  General  Pope  could  set  out  in  the  execution  of  this  de 
sign,  however,  there  occurred  the  series  of  events  culminating 
in  the  retreat  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 

No  sooner  had  this  taken  place,  than  the  powerful  faction 
opposed  to  McClellan  and  his  plan  of  campaign,  united 
in  bringing  to  bear  on  the  President  a  weighty  "pressure" 
for  the  removal  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  from  the  Pen- 


from  the  West,  where  we  have  always  seen  the  backs  of  the  enemies — from  an 
army  whose  business  it  has  been  to  seek  the  adversary,  and  to  beat  him  when 
found;  whose  policy  has  been  attack  and  not  defence.  I  presume  I  have  been 
called  here  to  pursue  the  same  system." 

*  "  Question.  Suppose  that  you  had  the  army  that  was  here  on  the  1st  day 
of  March  last,  do  you  suppose  you  would  find  any  obstacle  to  prevent  your 
marching  from  here  to  New  Orleans  ? 

"  Pope.  I  should  suppose  not."  Report  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  vol.  i., 
p.  282. 


170  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

m 

insula.  Among  the  strongest  in  urging  this  measure  was 
General  Pope,  who,  as  soon  as  the  intelligence  of  McClellan's 
retreat  to  the  James  River  was  received,  began  to  play  upon 
the  fears  of  the  Administration  touching  the  safety  of  Wash 
ington.  To  the  President  he  expressed  the  opinion  that  Mc 
Clellan's  supplies  would  certainly  be  cut  off;*  pointed  out  that 
co-operation  between  the  Army  of  Virginia  and  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac,  in  their  then  situations,  was  next  to  impossible ; 
and  strongly  urged  the  recall  of  McClellan's  force  to  the  front 
of  Washington,  t 

It  happened,  too,  that  at  this  crisis  those  who  were  urging 
these  views  received  a  powerful  re-enforcement  in  the  per 
son  of  General  Halleck,  who  had  about  this  time  been  re 
called  from  his  Western  field  of  operations  and  placed  in 
supreme  command  of  all  the  armies  in  the  field  by  his  ap 
pointment  to  the  office  of  general-in-chief, — an  office  which,  to 
the  incalculable  obstruction  of  the  conduct  of  the  war  and  the 
intolerable  annoyance  of  every  general  commanding  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac,  he  continued  to  hold  till  "pushed  from  his 
stool "  by  the  elevation,  two  years  afterwards,  of  General  Grant 
to  the  lieutenant-generalship. 

General  Halleck  added  his  strident  voice  in  favor  of  the 
withdrawal  of  the  army  from  the  Peninsula,  although,  owing 
to  a  sincere  anxiety  now  cherished  by  Mr.  Lincoln  that  Gen 
eral  McClellan  should  be  allowed  his  "  own  way,"  he  was  not 
at  first  able  to  make  the  order  imperative.  The  President,  in 
response  to  General  McClellan's  appeals  for  re-enforcements 
to  enable  him  to  renew  operations  against  Richmond,  had 
promised  him  an  addition  to  his  strength  of  twenty  thousand 
men,  to  be  drawn  from  Burnside's  command  in  North  Caro 
lina  and  Hunter's  command  in  South  Carolina.  With  this 
re-enforcement,  McClellan  expressed  his  readiness  to  renew 
operations,  and  he  had  proceeded  to  make  a  reconnoissance  in 
force  with  the  divisions  of  Hooker  and  Sedgwick,  who  ad- 

*  Report  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  vol.  i.,  p.  279. 
f  Ibid,  p.  279. 


POPE'S  CAMPAIGN  IN  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA.  171 

vauced  and  reoccupied  Malvern,  when  he  was  met  by  a  tele 
gram  from  the  new  general-in-chief,  dated  August  3d,  oidering 
him  to  withdraw  the  entire  army  from  the  Peninsula  to  Aquia 
Creek,  there  to  make  a  junction  with  Pope.  After  an  urgent 
appeal  from  this  order,  General  McClellan  proceeded  to  carry 
out  his  instructions. 

The  judgment  of  the  act  that  removed  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  from  the  Peninsula  must  turn  on  the  one  fact, 
whether  or  not  it  was  really  designed  to  re-enforce  that  army. 
If  it  was  not  designed  to  re-enforce  it  to  an  effective  that 
would  enable  it  to  immediately  recommence  active  operations, 
then  undoubtedly  the  wisest  course  was  to  withdraw  it  from 
the  Peninsula ;  for  a  concentration  of  the  divided  forces  was 
so  prime  a  necessity,  that  if  a  junction  of  the  two  armies 
was  not  to  be  allowed  on  the  James,  a  junction  in  front  of 
Washington  was  preferable  to  their  continued  isolation, — a 
situation  in  which  neither  could  operate  with  much  effect.* 

If,  however,  there  had  been  on  the  part  of  the  Administra 
tion  any  intention  of  giving  effect  to  the  views  of  General 
McClellan,  by  furnishing  such  accessions  to  his  strength  as 
would  permit  his  moving  upon  Eichmond,  the  army  should 
assuredly  have  remained  on  the  line  of  the  James. 

Now,  it  is  a  curious  circumstance,  that  at  this  time  there 
was  another  person  full  as  anxious  as  General  Halleck  to 
have  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  leave  the  Peninsula.  That 
person  was  General  Lee.  And  if  there  be  any  force  in  that 
military  maxim,  which  admonishes  "  never  to  do  what  the 


*  There  is  another  consideration  that  prompted  certain  officers  of  the  army 
to  urge  the  removal  of  the  army  from  the  Peninsula,  if  it  was  not  to  be  re-en- 
forced ;  and  that  is  the  unhealthy  situation  in  which  the  army  would  find  itself 
lying  in  inaction  amid  the  swamps  of  the  James  during  the  hot  months  of 
August  and  September.  This  was  the  reason  why  several  of  the  officers  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac— among  them  Generals  Franklin  and  Newton — ex 
pressed  to  President  Lincoln,  during  a  visit  he  made  to  McClellan's  camp 
in  July,  1862,  an  opinion  in  favor  of  withdrawing  the  army  from  the  Penin 
sula.  I  make  this  statement  on  the  authority  of  the  officers  named.  If  re- 
enforcements  were  to  be  expected,  they  were  altogether  in  favor  of  remaining 


172  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

enemy  wants  you  to  do,"  this  notable  coincidence  should 
raise  grave  suspicions  touching  the  wisdom  of  a  measure  in 
which  the  opposing  chiefs  were  in  such  entire  harmony. 

To  dislodge  the  army  from  its  threatening  position  on  the 
James,  Lee  determined  to  menace  its  communications  ;  and 
with  this  view  he  moved  a  force  to  the  south  bank  of  the 
James,  seized  a  position  immediately  opposite  Harrison's 
Landing,  placed  forty-three  guns  in  position,  and  on  the  31st 
of  July  opened  fire  on  the  shipping.*  This  did  little  damage, 
however,  and  on  the  following  morning  General  McClellan 
threw  a  force  across  the  river,  seized  the  position — Coggin's 
Point — fortified  it,  and  was  never  troubled  more.  But  little 
did  the  Confederate  commander  dream,  when  he  was  thus 
laboring  to  cause  McClellan  to  withdraw,  that  the  general-in- 
chief  of  the  United  States  army  was  co-operating  to  the  same 
end.  Moreover,  it  happened  that,  while  General  Halleck 
was  willing  to  remove  the  army  from  the  Peninsula  before 
Lee  made  any  effort  with  the  same  view,  a  certain  measure 
taken  by  the  Confederate  commander  with  an  entirely  different 
aim,  greatly  expedited  the  withdrawal.  For  the  just  appre 
ciation  of  this  it  will  be  necessary  to  glance  a  moment  at 
General  Pope's  contemporaneous  operations  in  Northern  Yir- 
ginia. 

Upon  assuming  command  of  the  Army  of  Virginia,  General 
Pope,  whose  military  conduct  was  considerably  sounder  than 
his  military  principles,  had  concentrated  his  scattered  com 
mands  into  one  body  in  front  of  Washington,  and  thrown  it 
forward  along  the  line  of  the  Orange  and  Alexandria  Bail- 
road,  in  the  direction  of  Gordonsville  and  Charlottesville. 
His  force  numbered  near  fifty  thousand  men.  As  the  seizure 
of  the  points  named  would  tap  the  Confederate  communica- 

*  General  Lee's  own  evidence  leaves  no  doubt  regarding  the  object  of  this 
operation  :  "  In  order  to  keep  McClellan  stationary,  or,  if  possible,  to  cause 
him  to  withdraw,  General  D.  H.  Hill,  commanding  south  of  James  River 
was  directed  to  threaten  his  communications  by  seizing  favorable  positions 
below  Westover,  from  which  to  attack  the  transports  in  the  river."  Lee's 
Report :  Reports  of  the  Operations  of  Northern  Virginia,  vol.  i.,  p.  15. 


POPE'S   CAMPAIGN  IN  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA.  173 

tions  with  Southwestern  Virginia,  Lee,  to  meet  Pope's  ad 
vance,  sent  forward  General  Jackson,  with  his  own  and 
Swell's  divisions,  towards  Gordonsville.  Jackson  reached 
that  place  on  the  19th  of  July ;  but  from  what  he  learned  of 
Pope's  strength  he  feared  to  risk  offensive  operations  and 
called  for  re-enforcements.*  Lee  then  increased  his  force  by 
General  A.  P.  Hill's  division,  which  joined  Jackson  on  the  2d 
of  August.  At  that  time  Pope's  army  was  along  the  turnpike 
from  Culpepper  to  Sperryville,  near  the  Blue  Ridge — his  left 
at  Culpepper ;  while  with  the  cavalry  brigades  of  Buford  and 
Bayard  he  observed  the  line  of  the  Rapid  an. 

The  7th  and  8th  of  August,  Jackson  crossed  the  Kapidan, 
and  moved  towards  Culpepper.  Pope  met  this  by  throwing 
forward  Banks'  corps  to  a  position  eight  miles  south  of  Cul 
pepper,  near  Cedar  Mountain,  where  a  severe  action  ensued  on 
the  9th  between  Banks'  corps  and  the  three  divisions  under 
Jackson.  Banks,  with  much  spirit,  assumed  the  offensive, 
although  doubly  outnumbered,  and  attacked  Jackson's  right, 
under  General  Ewell.  He  then  fell  with  much  impetuosity 
upon  his  left,  turned  that  flank,  and  poured  a  destructive  fire 
into  his  rear,  which  caused  the  Confederate  centre  and  nearly 
the  whole  line  to  give  way  in  confusion.  The  assailants  were, 
however,  considerably  broken  in  moving  through  the  woods ; 
and  Jackson,  receiving  an  accession  of  fresh  troops,  was  able 
to  check  Banks,  and  finally  force  him  back.  The  latter  re 
tired  a  short  distance,  but  again  took  up  position :  so  that 
when  Jackson,  under  the  impression  of  having  gained  a  vic 
tory,  attempted  to  follow  up  with  the  view  of  making  Culpep 
per,  he  found  himself  checked.  He  remained  in  front  of 
Banks  until  the  night  of  the  llth,  and  then  being  apprehen 
sive  of  being  again  attacked,  he  retreated  to  Gordonsville. 
The  Confederate  loss  was  about  thirteen  hundred ;  the  Union 
loss  about  eighteen  hundred. t 

*  Jackson's  Report :  Reports  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  vol.  ii.,  p.  3. 

f  It  is  proper  to  add  here  that  the  above  too  brief  statement  of  Banks'  at 
tack  of  Jackson  is  based  on  the  official  report  of  Jackson  himself,  and  is  there 
fore  not  likely  to  be  over-colored.  "  Whilst  the  Federal  attack  upon  Early  was 


174  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

The  encounter  between  Jackson  and  Banks  raised  in  the 
mind  of  General  Halleck  the  liveliest  apprehensions  touching 
the  safety  of  Washington,  and  he  sent  General  McClellan 
urgent  orders  to  hasten  the  removal  of  his  army.  The  sick, 
to  the  number  of  ten  thousand,  had  already  been  shipped ; 
then  followed  Burnside's  corps  (eleven  thousand  strong), 
which  had  been  brought  from  North  Carolina  for  the  purpose 
of  re-enforcing  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  but  was  not  allowed 
to  debark,  and  was  sent  forward  to  Aquia  Creek  and  thence 
to  Fredericksburg.  McClellan  then  put  his  whole  army  in 
motion,  marched  back  from  Harrison's  Landing  to  Fortress 
Monroe,  and  thence,  by  successive  shipments,  forwarded  it  to 
Aquia  Creek  and  Alexandria. 

Not  till  this  movement  had  been  fully  disclosed  did  General 
Lee  form  the  resolve  of  striking  northward.  The  column  de 
tached  under  Jackson  to  operate  against  Pope  was  no  larger 
than  that  he  had  had  in  his  previous  campaign,  and  was  infe 
rior  in  numbers  to  Pope's  force  ;  and  the  menacing  position 
held  by  General  McClellan  while  at  Harrison's  Landing  had 
retarded  Lee  from  sending  any  additional  troops  to  Jackson.* 
But  now  that  he  was  being  relieved  from  the  pressure  of  Me 
Clellan's  presence,  there  was  nothing  to  prevent  his  moving 

in  progress,"  says  Jackson,  "  the  main  body  of  the  Federal  infantry  moved 
down  from  the  woods,  through  the  corn  and  wheat  fields,  and  fell  with  great 
vigor  upon  our  extreme  left ;  and  by  the  force  of  superior  numbers,  bearing 
down  all  opposition,  turned  it  and  poured  a  destructive  fire  into  its  rear. 
Campbell's  brigade  fell  back  in  disorder.  The  enemy  pushing  forward,  and 
the  left  flank  of  A.  G.  Taliaferro's  brigade  being  by  these  movements  exposed 
to  a  flank  fire,  fell  back,  as  did  also  the  left  of  Early's  line.  General  W.  B. 
Taliaferro's  division  (Jackson's  old  division)  becoming  exposed,  they  were  with 
drawn/' — Jackson's  Report  of  Cedar  Mountain  :  Reports  of  the  Army  of  North 
ern  Virginia,  vol.  ii.,  p.  5.  These  are  the  words  in  which  a  general  is  apt  to 
describe  a  serious  defeat,  and  they  justify  a  higher  estimate  of  General  Banks' 
conduct  than  his  countrymen  have  yet  accorded  him. 

*  On  this  point  General  Lee  says :  "  Jackson,  on  reaching  Gordonsville,  ascer 
tained  that  the  force  under  General  Pope  was  superior  to  his  own,  but  the  un 
certainty  that  then  surrounded  the  designs  of  General  McClellan,  rendered  it 
inexpedient  to  re-enforce  him  from  the  army  at  Richmond." — Lee :  Reports  of 
the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  vol.  ii.,  p.  15. 


POPE'S  CAMPAIGN  IN  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA.  175 

forward  his  entire  army  to  destroy  Pope,  and  he  instantly 
took  measures  accordingly.*  Thus  it  was  that  at  the  very 
moment  McClellan  was  turning  an  unwilling  back  on  Bich- 
mond  and  leaving  the  course  open  to  his  mighty  rival,  Lee 
was  putting  his  columns  in  motion  towards  the  Potomac.  I 
shall  accordingly  leave  for  a  while  the  army  undergoing  the 
laborious  process  of  transfer  by  water,  and  trace  that  fierce 
outburst  of  battle  that  swept  from  the  Blue  Bidge  to  the  fore 
ground  of  Washington. 

II. 
POPE'S   RETROGRADE  MOVEMENT. 

After  the  action  of  Cedar  Mountain,  Jackson  retired  to 
Gordonsville,  fearing  an  attack  from  Pope's  superior  force.f 
The  15th  of  August  he  was  joined  at  that  place  by  the  van 
of  Lee's  army,  composed  of  Longstreet's  division,  two 
brigades  under  Hood,  and  Stuart's  cavalry.  Pope  advanced 
his  line,  resting  his  left  (Beno's  corps  of  Burnside's  army) 
on  the  Bapidan  near  Baccoon  Ford ;  his  centre  (McDowell's 
corps)  on  Cedar  Mountain,  and  his  right  (Sigel's  corps)  on 
Bobertson's  Biver,  a  branch  of  the  Bapidan.  Banks  was 
posted  at  Culpepper. 

On  the  arrival  of  Longstreet,  Jackson  advanced  from  Gor 
donsville  to  the  Bapidan,  waited  till  the  20th  of  August  for 
Longstreet  to  come  up,  when  they  crossed  at  Baccoon  and 
Somerville  fords.  . 

*  Nothing  could  be  clearer  than  the  evidence  of  General  Lee  on  this  point 
"  The  corps  of  General  Burnside,"  says  he,  "  had  reached  Fredericksburg,  and 
apart  of  General  McGlellan's  army  was  believed  to  have  left  Westover  [Harri 
son's  Landing]  to  unite  with  Pope.    It  therefore  seemed  that  active  operatiot 
on  the  James  were  no  longer  contemplated,  and  that  the  most  effectual  way  to 
relieve  Richmond  from  any  danger  of  attack  from  that  quarter  would  be  to  re- 
enforce  General  Jackson,  and  advance  upon  General  Pope." — Lee :  Reports  of 
the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  vol.  ii.,  p.  18.    Veracious  prophecy,  showing 
that  insight  which  is  one  of  the  highest  marks  of  generalship  I 

f  Jackson's  Report :  Reports  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  vol.  ii.,  p  7. 


176  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  AKMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

Learning  the  approach  of  this  force,  Pope  on  the  18th 
and  19th  drew  his  army  back  behind  the  Rappahannock,  his 
•left  at  Kelly's  Ford,  and  his  right  three  miles  above  Rappa 
hannock  Station.  This  was  a  judicious  measure  on  the  part 
of  General  Pope ;  but  it  was  not  carrying  out  his  own  prin 
ciples.  In  expounding  before  the  war  committee,  a  month 
before  this  time,  what  he  proposed  doing,  he  held  the  follow 
ing  language  :  "  By  lying  off  on  their  flanks,  if  they  should 
have  only  forty  thousand  or  fifty  thousand  men,  I  could  whip 
them.  If  they  should  have  seventy  thousand  or  eighty 
thousand  men,  I  would  attack  their  flanks,  and  force  them,  in 
order  to  get  rid  of  me,  to  follow  me  out  into  the  moun 
tains,  which  would  be  what  you  would  want,  I  should  suppose. 
They  would  not  march  on  Washington,  with  me  lying  with 
such  a  force  as  that  on  their  flanks."*  Now,  though  the  force 
which  Lee  had  at  this  time  did  not  exceed  the  smallest  of 
these  hypothetical  numbers,  and  the  force  with  which  Pope 
proposed  this  operation  had  been  increased  by  the  addition 
of  Reno's  command,  he  did  not  attempt  to  carry  it  out, 
finding  Lee,  perhaps,  less  impressed  than  he  should  have 
been  with  the  apparition  of  Pope  "lying  off  on  his  flanks." 

Pope  having  withdrawn  behind  the  Rappahannock,  Lee  ad 
vanced  his  army  to  that  stream,  but  finding  that  the  Union 
commander  covered  the  fords  in  force,  he  left  Longsfaeet 
opposite  these,  to  mask  a  turning  movement  by  Jackson  on 
Pope's  right,  by  way  of  Warrenton.t  Jackson  accordingly 
ascended  the  Rappahannock  by  the  south  bank,  and  crossed 
the  head  of  his  column  (Early 's  brigade)  at  Sulphur  or 
Warrenton  Springs  on  the  22d  August.  But  that  day  a 
severe  storm  rendered  the  river  impassable,  and  Early  was 
compelled  to  recross  the  Rappahannock,  which  he  did  the 
following  night  on  an  improvised  bridge.  While  these 
manoeuvres  were  under  way,  Stuart  with  fifteen  hundred 
horsemen,  made  an  expedition  to  cut  the  railroad  communica- 


*  Report  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  vol.  i.,  p.  278. 

\  Lee's  Report :  Reports  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  vol.  i.,  p.  19. 


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POPE'S   CAMPAIGN  IN  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA.  177 

tions  in  rear  of  Pope's  army.  Stuart  succeeded  in  reaching 
Catlett's  Station  in  the  dead  of  an  exceedingly  dark  night, 
fired  the  camp  and  captured  three  hundred  prisoners,  with 
Pope's  official  papers  and  his  baggage.  He  failed,  however,  to 
burn  the  railroad-bridge,  and  does  not  seem  to  have  been 
aware  that  Pope's  entire  army  train  was  parked  there.* 


III. 

JACKSON'S  FLANK  MARCH. 

The  movement  of  Jackson  up  the  south  bank  of  the  Eappa- 
hannock  to  turn  Pope's  right  was  met  by  a  corresponding 
movement  of  Pope  up  the  Eappahannock  on  the  north  bank, 
so  that  on  the  24th,  Sigel  and  Banks  and  Eeno  occupied  Sul 
phur  Springs,  and  Jackson's  main  body  lay  on  the  opposite 
side  of  the  stream  ;  but  on  the  25th,  Jackson,  striking  out 
still  further  to  his  left  by  Amissville,  crossed  the  upper 
Eappahannock  —  here  called  the  Hedgeman  Eiver  —  at  Hen- 
son's  Mill,  turned  Pope's  right,  and  moving  by  Orleans, 
bivouacked  at  Salem,  after  a  forced  march  of  thirty-five  miles. 
Next  day  (26th)  Jackson  continued  the  advance.  Diverging 
eastward  at  Salem,  he  crossed  the  Bull  Eun  Mountain 
through  Thoroughfare  Gap,  and  passing  Gainesville,  he,  at 
sunset,  reached  Bristoe  Station  on  the  Orange  and  Alexandria 
Eailroad.  This  he  proceeded  to  destroy,  while  he  at  the 
same  time  dispatched  Stuart  with  his  cavalry  and  a  force  of 
infantry  to  Manassas  Junction,  seven  miles  nearer  Washing 
ton.  Here  Stuart  took  several  hundred  prisoners,  eight 
guns,  and  immense  supplies  of  commissary  and  quarter 
master's  stores.  Jackson's  instructions  from  his  chief  had 


*  Tliis  enterprise  to  the  rear  of  his  army  must  have  given  Pope  an  occa 
sion  to  realize  the  truth  of  his  own  maxim,  that  "  faster  and  shame  lurk  in 
the  rear." 

12 


178  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  AKMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

been  to  "  throw  his  command  between  Washington  City  and 
the  army  of  General  Pope  and  to  break  up  his  railroad  com 
munications  with  the  Federal  capital."  *  That  energetic 
lieutenant  had  carried  them  out  to  the  letter.  It  is  now  time 
to  look  to  Pope's  movements. 

While  Jackson's  column  was  executing  this  flank  move 
ment  to  the  rear  of  Pope,  Lee  retained  Longstreet's  command 
in  his  front  to  divert  his  attention,  and  learning  that  Pope 
was  about  to  receive  re-enforcements  from  McClellan,  he 
ordered  forward  the  remainder  of  his  army  from  Kichmond.t 
Nevertheless,  the  stealthy  march  of  Jackson  did  not  pass  un 
noted  by  the  Union  commander,  who  received  very  precise 
information  respecting  his  movement  northward,  though  he 
was  unable  to  divine  its  aim4  Bewildered  by  his  antagonist's 
manoeuvres,  Pope  made  a  series  of  ridiculous  tentatives ;  but 
finally,  on  the  26th,  he  determined  to  fall  back  from  the  Eap- 
pahannock  nearer  to  Washington.  During  the  day  he  learned 
that  Jackson  was  already  on  his  rear  at  Manassas,  and  had 
cut  his  railway  communications  with  Washington  ! 

It  must  be  admitted  the  situation  was  a  difficult  one,  but 
it  was  one  that  afforded  a  vigorous  commander  opportunity 
for  a  decisive  blow.  Lee  had  in  fact  committed  an  act  of  un 
wonted  rashness,  and  voluntarily  placed  himself  in  such  a 
position  that  when  Jackson  had  reached  Bristoe  Station  and 
Manassas,  Longstreet,  with  the  van  of  the  main  column,  mov 
ing  by  the  same  route  taken  by  that  officer,  was  still  distant 
two  marches.  Pope  was  therefore  left  free  to  place  himself 
between  the  two,  and  beat  them  in  detail.  Such  a  piece  of 


*  Jackson's  Report:  Reports  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  vol.  ii., 
p.  92. 

f  This  force  consisted  of  D.  H.  Hill's  and  McLaws'  divisions,  two  brigades 
under  General  Walker,  and  Hampton's  cavalry  brigade. 

|  The  information  was  derived  from  Colonel  J.  S.  Clark,  of  the  staff  of  Gen 
eral  Banks.  That  officer  remained  all  day  in  a  perilous  position  within  sight 
of  Jackson's  moving  column,  and  counted  its  force,  which  he  found  to  be  thirty- 
BIX  regiments  of  infantry,  with  the  proper  proportion  of  batteries  and  a  con 
siderable  cavalry  force. 


POPE'S  CAMPAIGN  IN  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA.  179 

temerity  is  only  justifiable  when  a  general  has  a  great  and 
well-grounded  contempt  for  his  adversary. 

Pope  was  at  this  time  in  a  condition  to  undertake  a  bold 
stroke  ;  for  he  had  already  been  re-enforced  by  a  considerable 
body  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  arriving  from  the  Peninsula. 
Eeynolds'  division  of  Pennsylvania  Reserves  had  joined  him 
at  Eappahannock  Station  on  the  23d ;  the  corps  of  Porter 
and  Heintzelman  at  Warrenton  Junction,  on  the  26th  and 
27th;  and  the  remainder  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  (corps 
of  Sumner  and  Franklin)  was  en  route  from  Alexandria. 

The  measures  taken  by  Pope  to  meet  the  new  turn  of  affairs 
showed  an  appreciation  of  the  line  of  action  suited  to  the  cir 
cumstances  ;  but  he  was  incapable  of  carrying  it  out,  for  he 
had  completely  lost  his  head.  The  obvious  move  was  to 
throw  forward  his  left  so  as  to  seize  the  road  by  which  Long- 
street  would  advance  to  join  Jackson.  With  this  view,  he,  on 
the  morning  of  the  27th,  directed  General  McDowell,  with  his 
own  and  Sigel's  corps  and  the  division  of  Eeynolds,  upon 
Gainesville, — a  movement  that  would  plant  that  powerful 
force  of  forty  thousand  men  on  the  road  by  which  Lee's  main 
column,  moving  through  Thoroughfare  Gap,  must  advance  to 
join  Jackson.  This  force  was  to  be  supported  by  Eeno's 
corps  and  Kearney's  division  of  Heintzelman's  corps,  which 
were  directed  on  Greenwich,  while  he  moved  with  Hooker's 
division  along  the  Orange  and  Alexandria  Eailroad  towards 
Manassas  Junction.  Porter's  corps  (when  relieved  at  Warren- 
ton  Junction  by  Banks,  who  was  to  remain  at  that  point, 
covering  the  trains  and  repairing  the  railroad)  was  also 
directed  upon  Gainesville.  These  dispositions  were  not  only 
correct — they  were  brilliant.  The  lame  and  impotent  sequel 
is  now  to  be  seen. 

The  main  or  interposing  column  under  McDowell  was  to 
reach  its  assigned  position  at  Gainesville  and  Greenwich  that 
night,  the  27th.  This  was  successfully  accomplished.  At  the 
same  time,  Pope,  with  Hooker's  command,  moved  along  the 
railroad  to  come  up  with  Jackson  at  Bristoe  Station.  Near 
that  place  Hooker,  late  in  the  afternoon,  came  up  with  a  Con- 


180  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

federate  force  under  Ewell,  whom  Jackson  had  that  morning 
left  there,  while  he,  with  his  other  divisions,  pushed  forward  to 
Manassas  Junction.  A  brisk  engagement  ensued,  but  Ewell, 
finding  himself  unable  to  maintain  his  ground,  withdrew  across 
Broad  Bun,  under  orders  from  Jackson,  and  joined  the  latter 
at  Manassas  Junction.  Thinking  that  the  engagement  might 
be  renewed  in  the  morning  at  Bristoe  Station,  Pope  instructed 
General  Porter  to  move  up  from  Warrenton  Junction  at  one 
A.  M.,  and  be  at  Bristoe  by  dawn  of  the  28th.  Porter  was 
not  able  to  start  till  three  o'clock,  owing  to  the  darkness  of 
the  night  and  the  obstruction  of  the  road,  and  did  not  reach 
Bristoe  till  between  eight  and  nine  o'clock.  As  it  happened, 
however,  there  was  no  immediate  occasion  for  him,  as  Ewell 
had,  during  the  night,  moved  forward  to  rejoin  Jackson  at 
Manassas  Junction. 

And  now,  as  it  appeared  on  the  morning  of  the  28th,  there 
was  no  escape  for  Jackson  ;  and  Pope  boldly  proclaimed  it.* 
Jackson  was  at  Manassas  Junction;  a  powerful  force  was 
coming  up  in  his  rear.  McDowell,  at  Gainesville,  with  forty 
thousand  men,  interposed  between  him  and  Lee,  the  remain 
der  of  whose  force  was  still  west  of  the  Bull  Eun  Mountains, 
distant  a  full  day's  march.  But  fortune  and  the  errors  of  his 
adversary  favored  Jackson ;  and  at  the  very  time  he  seemed 
to  be  nearing  the  crisis  of  his  fate,  events  were  occurring  that 
were  destined  to  extricate  him  from  his  seemingly  perilous 
position. 

When,  on  the  night  of  the  27th,  Pope  learnt  that  Jackson 
was  in  the  vicinity  of  Manassas,  he  directed  McDowell,  with 
all  his  force,  to  take  up  the  march  early  on  the  morning  of  the 
28th,  and  move  eastward  from  Gainesville  and  Greenwich 
upon  Manassas  Junction,  following  the  line  of  the  Manassas 
Gap  Eailroad ;  while  he  ordered  Hooker  and  Kearney  and 
Porter  to  advance  northward  from  Bristoe  Station  upon  the 
same  place.  From  Gainesville  to  Manassas  Junction  the  dis- 

*  "If  you  will  march  promptly  and  rapidly  at  the  earliest  dawn  upon 
Manassas  Junction,  we  shall  bag  the  whole  crowd." — Pope's  order  of  27th  to 
Genera]  McDowell :  Report,  p.  41 


POPE'S  CAMPAIGN  IN  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA. 

tance  is  fifteen  miles  ;  from  Bristoe  Station,  it  is  eight  miles  ; 
and  from  Manassas  Junction  west  to  Thoroughfare  Gap, 
where  Lee  must  debouch  through  the  Bull  Run  Mountains  to 
unite  with  Jackson,  is  twenty  miles. 

This  move  was  a  great  error.  Pope's  left  (McDowell's  col 
umn)  was  his  strategic  flank,  and  should  have  been  thrown 
forward,  rather  then  retired  ;  for  in  withdrawing  from  the 
line  of  the  Warrenton  turnpike  to  Manassas  Junction,  he 
permitted  Jackson,  by  a  move  from  Manassas  Junction  to 
the  north  of  the  turnpike,  to  do  precisely  what  he  should  at 
all  hazards  have  been  prevented  from  doing — namely,  to  put 
himself  in  the  way  of  a  junction  with  the  main  body  of  Lee's 
army.  Could  Jackson,  indeed,  have  been  induced  to  remain 
at  Manassas  Junction  for  the  convenience  of  Pope,  that  gen 
eral's  strategy  would  have  worked  to  a  charm  ;  but  Jackson 
was  fully  alive  to  the  peril  of  his  position,  and  while  Pope 
thought  he  was  in  the  act  of  "  bagging"  Jackson,  Jackson  was 
giving  Pope  the  slip.  The  details  are  as  follows  :  During 
the  night  of  the  27th  and  morning  of  the  28th  Jackson  moved 
his  force  from  Manassas,  by  the  Sudley  Springs  road,  across 
to  the  "Warrenton  turnpike ;  crossing  which,  he  gained 
the  high  timber-land  north  and  west  of  Groveton,  in  the 
vicinity  of  the  battle-field  of  the  21st  July,  1861.  When, 
therefore,  Pope,  with  the  divisions  of  Hooker  and  Kearney 
and  Reno,  reached  Manassas  Junction,  about  noon  of  the 
2Sth,  he  found  that  Jackson  had  already  gone !  Pope  then 
tried  to  correct  his  error  by  calling  back  McDowell's  column 
from  its  march  towards  Manassas  Junction  and  directing  it  on 
Centreville,  to  which  point  he  also  ordered  forward  Hooker. 
Kearney,  and  Reno,  and  afterwards  Porter.  But  much  time  had 
been  lost;  the  columns  on  the  march  towards  Manassas  had 
been  forced  to  take  other  roads  than  those  indicated  for  them  ; 
and  it  was  late  in  the  afternoon  when  McDowell,  with  one  divi 
sion  of  his  whole  command  (King's),  regained  the  Warrenton 
turnpike  and  headed  towards  Centreville.  Now  Jackson,  as  al 
ready  seen,  had  taken  position  on  the  north  side  of  the  turnpike, 
near  Groveton  ;  so  that  on  the  approach  of  King's  column,  it 


182  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

unwittingly  presented  a  flank  to  Jackson,  who  assailed  it  furi 
ously.  Jackson  attacked  with  two  divisions  (the  Stonewall 
division,  then  under  General  Taliaferro,  and  Ewell's  division), 
while  the  fight  was  sustained  on  the  Union  side  by  King's 
division  alone.  The  behavior  of  his  troops  was  exceedingly 
creditable,  and  they  maintained  their  ground  with  what  Jack 
son  styles  "  obstinate  determination."  The  loss  on  both  sides 
was  severe,  and  on  the  part  of  the  Confederates  included  Gen 
erals  Ewell  and  Taliaferro,  both  of  whom  were  severely  wounded 
— the  former  losing  a  leg.  Unfortunately,  during  the  night, 
King  withdrew  his  command  to  Manassas,  leaving  the  War- 
renton  turnpike  available  for  Jackson's  withdrawal  or  Long- 
street's  advance.  That  same  night,  too,  Gen.  E-icketts  (whom 
McDowell  had  detached  with  his  division  to  dispute  the  pass 
age  of  Thoroughfare  Gap  with  Longstreet)  also  withdrew  to 
Manassas.  Thus  affairs  went  from  bad  to  worse. 


IV. 
THE   SECOND  BATTLE  OF  MANASSAS. 

By  the  morning  of  the  29th,  General  Pope  had  learnt  the 
real  position  of  the  adversary  who  had  hitherto  so  adroitly 
eluded  him  ;  but  his  troops  had  become  so  scattered  by  his 
contradictory  orders,  that  it  could  hardly  be  said  he  had  an 
army  at  all.  Sigel  and  Eeynolds  had,  however,  turned  up 
near  Groveton  ;  and  Pope  directed  them  to  develop  the  posi 
tion  of  the  enemy,*  while  he  sought  to  get  his  remaining 
forces  in  hand.  Beno's  corps,  and  Heintzelman  with  his  two 
divisions  under  Hooker  and  Kearney,  were  ordered  to  coun 
termarch  from  Centreville ;  while  Porter,  with  his  corps  and 
King's  division  of  McDowell's  command,  was  directed  to 

*  General  Pope,  in  his  official  report  (p.  20),  states  that  the  attack  by  Sigel 
was  for  the  purpose  of  "  bringing  Jackson  to  a  stand,  if  it  were  possible  to  do  so," 
thus  intimating  that  Jackson  was  moving  off.  There  does  not  seem  to  have  been 
any  occasion  for  this  solicitude. 


POPE'S  CAMPAIGN  IN  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA.  183 

advance  on  Gainesville,  a  position  it  had  been  more  easy  to 
abandon  the  day  before  than  to  regain  now. 

Jackson  continued  to  hold  his  vantage-ground  upon  the 
highlands  northwest  of  Groveton  ;  and  as  he  now  commanded 
the  Warrenton  road,  by  which  Lee  was  moving  to  join  him, 
and  had  intelligence  that  his  chief  was  close  at  hand,  he  had 
ceased  to  fear  the  result  of  an  encounter  with  Pope.  Jackson 
disposed  his  troops  along  the  cut  of  an  unfinished  railroad,* 
with  his  right  resting  on  the  Warrenton  turnpike,  and  his  left 
near  Sudley  Mill.  The  mass  of  his  troops  were  sheltered  in 
dense  woods  behind  the  railroad  cut  and  embankment,  which 
formed  a  ready-made  parapet. 

General  Sigel,  as  ordered,  attacked  in  the  morning,  pushing 
forward  his  line  under  a  warm  fire,  under  which  he  suffered 
severely ;  and,  towards  noon,  he  was  joined  by  Reno's  com 
mand  and  the  divisions  of  Hooker  and  Kearney.  Meanwhile, 
Porter,  in  the  morning,  moved  forward  from  Manassas  Junc 
tion  to  turn  Jackson's  right  by  an  advance  on  Gainesville. 

Had  the  position  of  the  Confederates  been  as  Pope  im 
agined,  the  latter  move  should  have  been  decisive,  and  must 
have  seriously  jeopardized  Jackson's  safety.  But,  while 
Porter's  column  was  yet  in  motion,  and  before  it  could  reach 
Jackson's  flank,  the  van  of  Lee's  main  body  began  to  reach 
the  field  from  Thoroughfare  Gap.  In  fact,  by  ten  in  the 
morning,  Long-street  had  come  up,  and,  taking  position  on 
Jackson's  right,  drew  an  extension  of  the  Confederate  line 
across  the  Warrenton  turnpike  and  the  Manassas  Gap  Rail 
road,  thus  covering  all  the  lines  of  approach  by  which  the 
column  of  Porter  might  advance  towards  Gainesville.  Upon 


*  "  My  troops  on  this  day  were  distributed  along  and  in  the  vicinity  of  the  cut 
of  an  unfinished  railroad  (intended  as  a  part  of  the  track  to  connect  the  Manassas 
road  directly  with  Alexandria),  stretching  from  the  Warrenton  turnpike  in  the 
direction  of  Sudley  Mill.  It  was  mainly  along  the  unfinished  excavation  of  this 
unfinished  road  that  my  line  of  battle  was  formed  on  the  29th :  Jackson's  division, 
under  Brigadier-General  Starke,  on  the  right ;  Ewell's  division,  under  Briga 
dier-General  Lawton,  in  the  centre  ;  and  Hill's  division  on  the  left  " — Jackson's 
Report :  Reports  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  vol.  ii.,  p.  95. 


184  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ABMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

finding  himself  thus  estopped,  Porter  was  proceeding  to  form 
his  line  when  he  was  overtaken  by  General  McDowell,  under 
whose  orders  the  former  then  came.  The  precise  tenor  of  the 
instructions  which,  at  this  moment,  McDowell  gave  Porter 
is  a  point  in  dispute, — McDowell  asserting  that  he  ordered 
Porter  to  move  against  the  enemy,  and  Porter  claiming  that 
McDowell  directed  him  to  remain  where  he  was.  However 
this  may  be,  McDowell  took  King's  division,  which  belonged 
to  his  own  corps,  from  under  Porter,  and,  uniting  it  with  Rick- 
ett's  division  (also  of  McDowell's  corps),  headed  his  column 
northward  to  the  battle-field  near  Groveton,  where  he  arrived 
late  in  the  afternoon.  Porter  held  his  command  for  the  rest  of 
the  day  in  the  position  taken  up, — Morell's  division  being  de 
ployed  and  in  contact  with  the  enemy ;  the  other  divisions 
massed. 

Thus  it  was  that,  by  contradictory  orders  and  the  useless 
marches  and  counter-marches  they  involved,  Pope's  oppor 
tunity  was  thrown  away,  and  instead  of  fighting  Jackson's 
corps  alone,  it  was  the  entire  army  of  Lee  with  which  he  had 
to  deal, — this,  too,  with  his  forces  very  much  out  of  position, 
and  he  himself  ignorant  both  of  his  own  situation  and  that  of 
the  enemy.  When,  towards  noon,  Pope,  coming  from  Cen- 
treville,  reached  the  field  near  Groveton,  he  found  the  situa 
tion  as  follows :  Heintzelman's  two  divisions,  under  Hooker 
and  Kearney,  on  the  right,  in  front  and  west  of  the  Sudley 
Springs  road;  Reno  and  Sigel  holding  the  centre, — Sigel's 
line  being  extended  a  short  distance  south  of  the  "Warrenton 
turnpike  ;  Reynolds  with  his  division  on  the  left.  But  the 
commander  was  ignorant  of  the  whereabouts  of  both  Porter 
and  McDowell,  and  he  knew  not  that  Longstreet  had  joined 
Jackson !  The  troops  had  been  considerably  cut  up  by  the 
brisk  skirmishing  that  had  been  kept  up  all  the  morning.  An 
artillery  duel  had  also  been  waged  all  the  forenoon  between 
the  opposing  lines ;  but  it  was  at  long  range  and  of  no  effect. 

The  position  of  the  troops  in  front  of  Jackson's  intrenched 
line  was  one  that  promised  very  little  success  for  a  direct 
attack,  and  especially  for  a  partial  attack.  Nevertheless,  at 


POPE'S  CAMPAIGN  IN  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA.  185 

three  o'clock,  Pope  ordered  Hooker  to  assault.  The  attempt 
was  so  unpromising  that  that  officer  remonstrated  against  it ; 
but  the  order  being  imperative,  he  made  a  very  determined 
attack  with  his  division.  The  action  was  especially  brilliant 
on  the  part  of  Grover's  brigade,  which,  advancing  with  the 
bayonet,  succeeded  in  penetrating  between  the  two  extreme 
left  brigades  of  Jackson's  line,*  and  got  possession  of  the  rail 
road  embankment  which,  by  a  savage  hand-to-hand  fight,  it 
held  for  some  time,  till  driven  back  by  the  arrival  of  re- 
enforcements  to  the  Confederate  left.f  Too  late  for  united 
action,  Kearney  was  sent  to  Hooker's  assistance,  and  he  also 
suffered  repulse. 

Meanwhile,  Pope  had  learnt  the  position  of  Porter's  com 
mand,  and,  at  half-past  four  in  the  afternoon,  sent  orders  to 
that  officer  to  assail  the  enemy's  right  flank  and  rear, — Pope 
erroneously  believing  the  right  flank  of  Jackson,  near  Grove- 
ton,  to  be  the  right  of  the  Confederate  line.  Towards  six, 
when  he  thought  Porter  should  be  coming  into  action,  he 
directed  Heintzelman  and  Reno  to  assault  the  enemy's  left. 
The  attack  was  made  with  vigor,  especially  by  Kearney,  who 
struck  Jackson's  left  under  Hill,  at  a  moment  when  the  Con 
federates  had  almost  exhausted  their  ammunition.^  Doubling 
up  HiU's  flank  on  his  centre,  Kearney  seized  the  railroad  em 
bankment  and  that  part  of  the  field  of  battle.  "This,"  as 
Kearney  says,  "  presaged  a  victory  for  us  all.  Still,"  he  goes 
on  to  observe,  "  our  force  was  too  light.  The  enemy  brought 
up  rapidly  heavy  reserves,  so  that  our  further  progress  was 
impeded."  §  In  fact,  Kearney  was  compelled  to  fall  back 

*  These  were  the  brigades  of  Gregg  and  Thomas. — Jackson :  Report,  p.  95. 

f  Reports  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  vol.  ii.,  p.  252. 

J  "  The  enemy  prepared  for  a  last  and  determined  attempt.  Their  serried 
masses,  overwhelming  superiority  of  numbers  [absurd  exaggeration  common 
to  both  sides],  and  bold  bearing  [it  was  Kearney],  made  the  chance  of  victory 
to  tremble  in  the  balance  ;  my  own  division,  exhausted  by  seven  hours  unre- 
mitted  fighting,  had  hardly  one  round  per  man  remaining,  and  was  weakened 
in  all  things  save  its  unconquerable  spirit." — Report  of  General  A.  P.  Hill : 
Reports  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  vol.  ii.,  p.  125. 

§  Kearney's  Report :  Report  of  General  Pope,  p.  79. 


186  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  AKMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

altogether  from  the  railroad,  and  the  "presage  of  victory" 
was  turned  to  naught.* 

Turning  now  to  the  left,  where  Porter  was  to  have  assailed  the 
Confederate  right,  it  appears  that  the  order  which  Pope  sent 
at  half-past  four,  did  not  reach  Porter  till  about  dusk.  He 
then  made  dispositions  for  attack,  but  it  was  too  late.  It  is, 
however,  more  than  doubtful  that  even  had  the  order  been 
received  in  time,  any  thing  but  repulse  would  have  resulted 
from  its  execution.  Porter  was  reduced  to  the  necessity  of 
making  a  direct  attack  in  front ;  for  there  was  no  opportunity 
of  making  a  turning  movement,  seeing  that,  contrary  to  Pope's 
opinion,  he  had  then,  and  had  had  since  noon,  Longstreet's 
entire  corps  before  him.f  So  as  firing  now  died  away  in  the 

*  The  Confederate  re-enforcements,  of  which  Kearney  speaks,  consisted  of 
the  brigades  of  Early  and  Lawton.  (See  Report  of  General  A.  P.  Hill :  Re 
ports  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  vol.  ii.,  p.  125.)  General  Early  says,  in 
his  report :  "  My  brigade  and  the  Eighth  Louisiana  advanced  upon  the  enemy 
through  a  field,  and  drove  him  from  the  woods  and  out  of  the  railroad-cut, 
crossing  the  latter  and  following  in  pursuit  several  hundred  yards  beyond." — 
Ibid.,  p.  184. 

f  As  the  view  above  taken  of  the  action  of  that  part  of  the  "  Second  Bull 
Run,"  fought  on  the  29th  of  August,  differs  in  some  important  particulars  from 
previous  accounts,  and  especially  from  the  official  report  of  General  Pope,  I 
shall  here  substantiate  by  Confederate  official  records  the  truth  of  such  points 
of  difference  as  are  of  moment.  The  question  foremost  in  interest  has  relation 
to  the  time  at  which  Longstreet's  corps  joined  Jackson.  General  Pope  re 
peatedly  states  that  this  did  not  take  place  till  "  about  sunset"  (see  Pope's  Of 
ficial  Report,  p.  21) ;  and  it  is  on  this  ground  that  he  and  the  court-martial  that 
tried  General  Porter  based  their  condemnation  of  that  officer  for  not  turning 
Jackson's  right.  Says  Pope  :  "  I  believe — in  fact,  I  am  positive — that  at  five 
o'clock  in  the  afternoon  of  the  29th,  General  Porter  had  in  his  front  no  consid 
erable  body  of  the  enemy.  I  believed  then,  as  I  am  very  sure  now,  that  it  was 
easily  practicable  for  him  to  have  turned  the  right  flank  of  Jackson,  and  to 
have  fallen  upon  his  rear ;  that  if  he  had  done  so,  we  should  have  gained  a  de 
cisive  victory  over  the  army  under  Jackson  before  he  could  have  been  joined  ~by 
any  of  the  forces  of  Long  street  "  (Pope's  Report,  p.  22.)  Now  this  assertion  is 
traversed  by  the  positive  evidence  of  the  official  reports  of  several  of  the  gen 
erals  under  Longstreet's  command,  who  show  conclusively  that  Longstreet 
pined  Jackson  as  early  as  noon.  Says  Longstreet  himself:  "Early  on  the 
Idth  the  columns  were  united,  and  the  advance,  to  join  General  Jackson,  was 
resumed.  The  noise  of  battle  was  heard  before  we  reached  Gainesville.  The 


POPE'S  CAMPAIGN  IN  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA.  187 

darkling  woods  on  the  right,  a  pause  was  put  for  the  day  to 
the  chaos  and  confusion  of  this  mismanaged  battle,  in  which 
many  thousand  men  had  fallen  on  the  Union  side. 

It  would  have  been  judicious  for  General  Pope,  in  the  then 
condition  of  his  army,  to  have  that  night  withdrawn  across 
Bull  Run  and  taken  position  at  Centreville,  or  even  within  the 
fortifications  of  Washington.  By  doing  so  he  would  have 
united  with  the  corps  of  Franklin  and  Sumner,  then  between 

march  was  quickened  to  the  extent  of  our  capacity.  The  excitement  of  battle 
seemed  to  give  new  life  and  strength  to  our  jaded  men,  and  the  head  of  my 
column  soon  reached  a  position  in  rear  of  the  enemy's  left  flank."  (Reports  of 
the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  vol.  ii.,  p.  8.)  See  also  Hood.  (Ibid.,  p.  209.) 
But  General  D.  R.  Jones,  who  commanded  the  rear  division  of  Longstreet's 
corps  is  still  more  explicit.  "  Early  on  the  morning  of  the  29th,  I  took  up  the 
march  in  the  direction  of  the  old  battle-ground  of  Manasses,  whence  heavy 
firing  was  heard.  Arriving  on  the  ground  about  noon,  my  command  was  sta 
tioned  on  the  extreme  right  of  our  line,"  etc.  (Ibid.,  p.  217.)  This  would  appear 
to  settle  the  time  of  arrival  of  Longstreet  ;  and  I  shall  now  show  that  before 
Porter  came  up  from  Manassas,  Longstreet  had  taken  up  such  a  position  as  to 
bar  his  advance  towards  Gainesville.  On  this  head  Longstreet's  own  testi 
mony  will  suffice,  and  it  is  as  complete  as  could  be  desired.  After  giving  his 
dispositions  for  his  connection  with  Jackson's  right,  he  states  that  "  Hood's  di 
vision  was  deployed  on  the  right  and  left  of  the  Warrenton  turnpike,  at  right 
angles  with  it.  General  D.  R.  Jones'  division  was  placed  upon  the  Manassas 
Gap  Railroad,  to  the  right,  and  in  echelon  with  regard  to  the  three  last  bri 
gades."  (Ibid.,  pp.  81,  82.)  Now  it  is  quite  obvious  that  this  disposition  covered 
Porter's  whole  front,  and  that  it  barred  his  approach  to  Gainesville.  Any  at 
tack  by  Porter  would  therefore  necessarily  be  made  in  front.  When  he  re 
ceived  Pope's  order  to  attack  the  enemy's  right  and  turn  his  rear,  Morell's  di 
vision  was  already  deployed  in  front  of  Longstreet,  and  it  was  near  dark  when 
the  order  came  to  hand.  Probably  there  is  no  military  man  who  will  now  say 
that  the  operation  indicated  by  Pope  was  at  that  time  possible.  General  Por 
ter  many  months  subsequent  to  these  events,  and  after  having  in  the  mean 
while  had  command  of  the  forces  for  the  defence  of  the  capital,  and  been  at 
the  head  of  his  corps  at  the  battle  of  Antietam,  was  arraigned  before  a  court- 
martial  at  Washington,  and  dismissed  the  service  of  the  United  States,  for  al 
leged  disobedience  to  the  above  orders  of  Pope.  I  do  not  constitute  myself  the 
champion  of  General  Porter,  or  of  any  other  officer  ;  but  having  become  pos 
sessed  of  the  Confederate  official  reports,  and  having  been  struck  with  the  new 
light  thrown  on  these  events  by  the  unconscious  testimony  given  above  by  the 
Confederate  generals,  I  should  have  violated  the  first  duty  of  a  historian  had  I 
suppressed  these  facts. 


188  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

Washington  and  Centreville,  whereas  at  Manassas  Lee  was  sure 
to  receive  fresh  accessions  of  force,  while  Pope  could  hope  for 
none.  The  army  was  much  cut  up  ;  thousands  had  straggled 
from  their  commands ;  the  troops  had  had  little  to  eat  for  two 
days  previously  ;  the  artillery  and  cavalry  horses  had  been 
in  harness  and  saddled  continually  for  ten  days. 

With  untimely  obstinacy,  Pope  determined  to  remain  and 
again  try  the  issue  of  battle.  To  utilize  Porter's  corps,  he 
drew  it  over  from  the  isolated  position  it  had  held  the  pre 
vious  day  to  the  Warrenton  road,  on  which  he  pivoted,  dis 
posing  his  line  in  the  form  of  a  Y  reversed — Reynolds'  com 
mand  forming  the  left  leg,  and  Porter,  Sigel,  and  Reno  the 
right,  with  Heintzelman's  two  divisions  holding  the  extreme 
right.  Lee  retained  the  same  relative  position  he  had  held 
the  day  before — Longstreet  on  the  right,  and  Jackson  on  the 
left ;  but  he  drew  back  his  left  considerably,  abandoning  dur 
ing  the  night  some  of  the  ground  he  had  held  on  that  flank. 

Now,  by  one  of  those  curious  conjunctures  which  sometimes 
occur  in  battle,  it  so  was  that  the  opposing  commanders  had 
that  day  formed  each  the  same  resolution  :  Pope  had  deter 
mined  to  attack  Lee's  left  flank,  and  Lee  had  determined  to 
attack  Pope's  left  flank.  And  thus  it  came  about  that  when 
Heintzelman  pushed  forward  to  feel  the  enemy's  left,  the  re 
fusal  of  that  flank  by  Lee,  and  his  withdrawal  of  troops  to 
his  right  for  the  purpose  of  making  his  contemplated  attack 
on  Pope's  left,  gave  the  impression  that  the  Confederates  were 
retreating  up  the  Warrenton  turnpike  towards  Gainesville. 
This  impression  was  further  strengthened  by  the  report  of  a 
wounded  Confederate  soldier  who  fell  into  the  hands  of  the 
Union  pickets,  and  reported  that  he  had  heard  his  comrades 
say  that  "Jackson  was  retiring  to  unite  with  Longstreet." 
Now  this  statement  was  quite  correct  in  the  sense  in  which 
Lee's  manoeuvres  have  already  been  presented — that  is,  as  a 
tactical  change  of  Jackson's  position  on  the  left  to  re-enforce 
Longstreet  on  the  right.  But  Pope,  who  had  not  that  day 
been  to  the  front,  accepted  the  story  as  indicating  a  real  fall 
ing  back,  and  telegraphed  to  Washington  that  the  enemy  was 


POPE'S  CAMPAIGN  IN  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA.  189 

"retreating  to  the  mountains," — a  dispatch  which,  flashed 
throughout  the  land,  gave  the  people  a  few  hours,  at  least,  of 
unmixed  pleasure. 

To  take  advantage  of  the  supposed  "  retreat"  of  Lee,  Pope 
ordered  McDowell  with  three  corps — Porter's  in  the  ad 
vance — to  follow  up  rapidly  on  the  "Warrenton  turnpike,  and 
"press  the  enemy  vigorously  during  the  whole  day."  But 
no  sooner  were  the  troops  put  in  motion  to  make  this  pur< 
suit  of  a  supposed  flying  foe,  than  the  Confederates,  hither 
to  concealed  in  the  forest  in  front  of  Porter,  uncovered 
themselves,  and  opened  a  heavy  fire  from  their  numerous 
artillery;*  and  while  King's  division  was  being  formed 
on  Porter's  right  in  order  to  press  an  attack,  clouds  of 
dust  on  the  extreme  left  showed  that  the  enemy  was  moving 
to  turn  the  Union  line  in  that  direction ;  and  that,  instead 
of  retiring,  he  was  in  the  full  tide  of  an  offensive  move 
ment.  To  meet  this  manoeuvre,  General  McDowell  detached 
Reynolds'  command  from  the  left  of  Porter's  force  north  of 
the  Warrenton  turnpike,  and  directed  it  on  a  position  south 
of  that  road  to  check  this  menace.  The  Warrenton  turnpike, 
which  intersects  the  Manassas  battle-field,  runs  westward  up 
the  valley  of  the  little  rivulet  of  Young's  Branch.  From  the 
stream  the  ground  rises  on  both  sides,  in  some  places  quite 
into  hills.  The  Sudley  Springs  road,  on  crossing  the  stream 
at  right  angles,  passes  directly  over  one  of  these  hills,  just 
south  of  the  Warrenton  turnpike ;  and  this  hill  has  on  it  a  de 
tached  road  with  fields  stretching  back  away  from  it  some 
hundreds  of  yards  to  the  forest.  This  is  the  hill  whereon  what 
is  known  as  the  "  Henry  House"  stood.  To  the  west  of  it  is 
another  hill — the  Bald  Hill,  so  called — which  is  in  fact  a  rise 
lying  between  the  roads,  and  making  about  the  same  angle 

*  "  As  soon  as  Butterfield's  brigade  advanced  up  the  hill,  there  was  great 
commotion  among  the  rebel  forces,  and  the  whole  side  of  the  hill  and  edges  of 
the  woods  swarmed  with  men  before  unseen.  The  effect  was  not  unlike  flush 
ing  a  covey  of  quail.  The  enemy  fell  back  to  the  line  of  the  railroad,  and  took 
shelter  in  the  cut  and  behind  the  embankment."— Warren :  Report  of  the 
Second  Battle  of  Manassas. 


190  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

with  each,  and  running  back  to  the  forest.  Between  the  two 
hills  is  a  brook,  a  tributary  of  Young's  Branch.  "Upon  the 
latter  hill  General  McDowell  directed  Reynolds'  division  and 
a  portion  of  Eickett's  command,  so  as  to  check  the  flank  ma 
noeuvre  that  menaced  seizure  of  the  Warrenton  turnpike,  which 
was  the  line  of  retreat  of  the  whole  army. 

The  occupation  of  this  position  was  judicious  on  the  part  of 
General  McDowell;  but  the  detachment  of  Eeynolds  from 
Porter's  left  for  that  purpose  had  an  unfortunate  result  ;*  for 
it  exposed  the  key-point  of  Porter's  line.  Colonel  G.  K.  War 
ren,  who  then  commanded  one  of  Porter's  brigades,  seeing 
the  imminence  of  the  danger,  at  once,  and  without  waiting  for 
orders,  moved  forward  with  his  small  but  brave  brigade  of 
about  a  thousand  men,t  and  occupied  the  important  position 
abandoned  by  Eeynolds ;  Porter  then,  as  well  to  sustain  "War 
ren,  as  to  fulfil  his  orders  of  pursuit,  his  column  of  attack 
being  formed,  made  a  vigorous  assault  on  the  Confederate 
position ;  but  beyond  driving  back  the  advanced  line  so  as  to 
develop  the  Confederate  array  as  formed  behind  the  railroad 
embankment,  he  was  able  to  accomplish  nothing.  Line  after 
line  was  swept  away  by  the  enemy's  artillery  and  infantry  fire, 
and  so  destructive  was  its  effect  that  Porter's  troops  finally 
were  compelled  to  withdraw.  Porter's  attack  had  been  di 
rected  against  Jackson ;  but  Longstreet,  on  Jackson's  right, 
found  a  commanding  point  of  ground,  whence  he  could  rake 
the  assaulting  columns  with  an  enfilading  fire  of  artillery. 
"From  an  eminence  near  by,"  says  that  officer,  "  one  portion 
of  the  enemy's  masses,  attacking  General  Jackson,  were  imme 
diately  within  my  view,  and  in  easy  range  of  batteries  in  that 
position.  It  gave  me  an  advantage  I  had  not  expected  to 
have,  and  I  made  haste  to  use  it.  Two  batteries  were  ordered 
for  the  purpose,  and  one  placed  in  position  immediately  and 
opened.  Just  as  this  fire  began,  I  received  a  message  from 

*  Sigel's  corps  should  have  been  taken  in  place  of  Reynolds'  division,  01 
anybody  else  rather  than  Reynolds.  / 

f  Warren's  command  consisted  of  the  Fifth  and  Tenth  New  York  Volun 
teers. 


POPE'S   CAMPAIGN  IN  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA.  l^J 

the  commanding  general,  informing  me  of  General  Jackson's 
condition  and  his  wants.  As  it  was  evident  that  the  attack 
against  General  Jackson  could  not  be  continued  ten  minutes 
under  the  fire  of  these  batteries,  I  made  no  movement  with 
my  troops.  Before  the  second  battery  could  be  placed  in  po 
sition  the  enemy  began  to  retire,  and  in  less  than  ten  minutes 
the  ranks  were  broken,  and  that  portion  of  his  army  put  to 
flight."*  Warren  occupying  the  important  point  he  had 
seized,  held  on  stoutly  and  against  a  fearful  loss  till  all  the 
rest  of  Porter's  troops  had  been  retired,  and  only  withdrew 
when  the  enemy  had  advanced  so  close  as  to  fire  in  the  very 
faces  of  his  men. 

Such  was  the  situation  of  affairs  at  five  o'clock  in  the  after 
noon  :  Porter's  troops,  fearfully  cut  up  in  repeated  assaults 
of  a  position  which  it  was  hopeless  to  attempt  to  carry,  were 
retiring  from  the  field.  Jackson  immediately  took  up  the 
pursuit,  and  was  joined  by  a  general  advance  of  the  whole 
Confederate  line — Longstreet  extending  his  right  so  as,  if 
possible,  to  cut  off  the  retreat  of  the  Union  forces.  By  an 
impetuous  rush,  Longstreet  carried  the  "  Bald  Hill,"  held  by 
Reynolds  and  Ricketts  ;  and  it  then  became  doubtful  whether 
even  the  "Henry  House  Hill"  could  be  maintained  so  as  to 
cover  the  retreat  of  the  army  over  Bull  Run,  for  Longstreet 
had  thrown  around  his  right  so  as  to  menace  that  position. 
This,  however,  was  happily  provided  for  by  the  firmness  of 
some  battalions  of  Regulars,  which  held  the  ground  until  re 
lieved  by  the  brigades  of  Meade  and  Seymour  and  other 
troops,  that  maintained  the  position  and  permitted  the  with 
drawal  of-  the  army.  Under  cover  of  the  darkness  the  wea 
ried  troops  retired  across  Bull  Run,  by  the  stone  bridge,  and 
took  position  on  the  heights  of  CentreviUe.  Owing  to  the  ob 
scurity  of  the  night,  and  the  uncertainty  of  the  fords  of  Bull 
Run,  Lee  attempted  no  pursuit. t 

*  Longstreet:  Reports  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  vol.  ii.,  p.  83. 

f  "  The  obscurity  of  the  night,  and  the  uncertainty  of  the  fords  of  Bui] 
Run,  rendered  it  necessary  to  suspend  operations  until  morning."  Tree's  Re 
port :  Reports  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  vol.  i.,  p.  25. 


192  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE    POTOMAC, 


V. 

EXIT  POPE. 

At  Centreville,  Pope  united  with  the  corps  of  Franklin 
and  Sumner,  and  he  remained  there  during  the  whole  of  the 
31st.  But  Lee  had  not  yet  given  up  the  pursuit.  Leaving 
Longstreet  on  the  battle-field,  he  sent  Jackson  by  a  detour  on 
Pope's  right,  to  strike  the  Little  Hiver  turnpike,  and  by  that 
route  to  Fairfax  Courthouse,  to  intercept,  if  possible,  Pope's 
retreat  to  Washington.  Jackson's  march  was  much  retarded 
by  a  heavy  storm  that  commenced  the  day  before  and  still 
continued.  Pope,  meantime,  fell  back  to  positions  covering 
Fairfax  Courthouse  and  Germantown ;  and  on  the  evening  of 
the  1st  of  September,  Jackson  struck  his  right  posted  at  Ox 
Hill,  near  Germantown.  He  immediately  engaged  the  Union 
force  with  Hill's  and  Swell's  divisions  in  the  midst  of  a  cold 
and  drenching  rain.  The  attack  fell  upon  Reno,  Hooker,  a 
part  of  McDowell,  and  Kearney.  A  firm  front  was  main 
tained  till  Stevens'  division  of  Eeno's  corps,  owing  to  the  ex 
haustion  of  its  ammunition,  and  the  death  of  its  general,  was 
forced  back  in  disorder.  To  repair  this  break,  Kearney,  with 
the  promptitude  that  marked  him,  sent  forward  Birney's 
brigade  of  his  own  division ;  and  presently,  all  aglow  with 
zeal,  brought  up  a  battery  which  he  placed  in  position.  But 
there  still  remained  a  gap  on  Birney's  right,  caused  by  the 
retirement  of  Stevens'  division.  This  Birney  pointed  out  to 
Kearney,  and  that  gallant  soldier,  dashing  forward  to  recon 
noitre  the  ground,  unwittingly  rode  into  the  enemy's  lines  and 
was  killed.  In  his  death,  the  army  lost  the  living  ideal  of  a 
soldier — a  preux  chevalier,  in  whom  there  were  mixed  the 
qualities  of  chivalry  and  gallantry  as  strong  as  ever  beat 
beneath  the  mailed  coat  of  an  olden  knight.  Like  Desaix, 
whom  Napoleon  characterized  as  "  the  man  most  worthy  to 


POPE'S  CAMPAIGN  IN  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA.  193 

be  his  lieutenant,"  Kearney  died  opposing  a  heroic  breast  to 
disaster. 

On  the  following  day,  September  2d,  the  army  was,  by 
order  of  General  Halleck,  drawn  back  within  the  lines  of 
Washington,  and  Lee,  abandoning  direct  pursuit,  began  to 
turn  his  eyes  towards  the  north  of  the  Potomac. 

Within  the  fortifications  of  Washington  the  army  now 
rested  from  the  labors,  fatigues,  and  privations  of  this  trying 
campaign,  in  which,  from  the  Rapidan  to  the  front  of  the 
capital,  it  had  fought  and  retreated,  and  retreated  and  fought. 
It  had  passed  through  an  experience  calculated  to  dislocate 
the  structure  of  most  armies ;  and  if  it  reached  the  lines  of 
Washington  in  any  military  order  whatsoever,  it  was  because 
the  individual  patriotism  of  the  rank  and  file  supplied  a  bond 
of  cohesion  when  the  bond  of  military  discipline  failed. 
Of  the  losses  in  killed  and  wounded  during  this  campaign, 
no  official  record  is  found ;  but  the  Confederate  commander 
claims  the  capture  of  nine  thousand  prisoners,  thirty  pieces  of 
artillery,  and  upwards  of  twenty  thousand  stands  of  arms  in 
the  engagement  on  the  plains  of  Manassas  alone.  Untold 
thousands  had  straggled  from  their  commands  during  the  re 
treat. 

As  for  Pope,  it  is  hardly  possible  to  feel  for  him  less  than 
pity,  in  spite  of  the  bombastic  pretensions  with  which  he  set 
out.  The  record  already  given  does  not  justify  the  assertion 
that  he  was  not  obeyed  by  his  subordinates  ;  but  it  cannot  be 
denied  that  the  estimate  of  his  character  held  by  the  officers 
under  his  command  was  not  of  a  kind  to  elicit  that  hearty 
and  zealous  co-operation  needed  for  the  effective  conduct  of 
great  military  operations.  He  had  the  misfortune  to  be  of 
all  men  the  most  disbelieved.  General  Pope  took  the  first 
opportunity  on  his  return  to  Washington  to  vacate  the  com 
mand  ;  the  Army  of  Virginia  passed  out  of  existence,  and  its 
corps,  were  united  with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 

13 


194  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  AEMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 


YI. 

THE  MARYLAND  CAMPAIGN. 

SEPTEMBER— OCTOBER,  1862. 


I. 
MANOEUVRES  PREVIOUS  TO  ANTIETAM. 

WBEN  Lee  put  his  columns  in  motion  from  Richmond,  it 
was  with  no  intent  of  entering  upon  a  campaign  of  invasion 
across  the  great  river  that  formed  the  dividing  line  between 
the  warring  powers.  But  who  can  foretell  the  results  that 
may  spring  from  the  simplest  act  in  that  complex  interplay  of 
cause  and  effect  we  name  war  ?  A  secondary  operation,  hav 
ing  in  view  merely  to  hold  Pope  in  check,  had  effected  not  only 
its  primal  aim,  but  the  infinitely  more  important  result  of  dis 
lodging  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  from  the  Peninsula.  Thus 
relieved  of  all  care  touching  Richmond,  Lee  was  free  to 
assume  a  real  offensive  for  the  purpose  not  merely  of  check 
ing  but  of  crushing  Pope.  The  success  of  the  campaign 
had  been  remarkable.  From  the  front  of  Richmond  the  thea 
tre  of  operations  had  been  transferred  to  the  front  of  Wash 
ington  ;  the  Union  armies  had  been  reduced  to  a  humiliating 
defensive,  and  the  rich  harvests  of  the  Shenandoah  Valley 
and  Northern  Virginia  were  the  prize  of  the  victors.  To 
crown  and  consolidate  these  conquests,  Lee  now  determined 
to  cross  the  frontier  into  Maryland. 

The  prospective  advantages  of  such  a  transfer  of  the 
theatre  of  war  to  the  north  of  the  Potomac  seemed  strongly 
to  invite  it ;  for,  in  addition  to  the  telling  blows  Lee  might 


THE  MARYLAND  CAMPAIGN.  195 

hope  to  inflict  in  the  demoralized  condition  of  the  Union 
army,  and  the  prestige  that  the  enterprise  would  lend  th© 
Confederate  cause  abroad,  it  was  judged  that  the  presence  of 
the  hostile  force  would  detain  McClellan  on  the  frontier  long 
enough  to  render  an  invasion  of  Virginia  during  the  ap 
proaching  winter  difficult,  if  not  impracticable.* 

Yet,  if  the  enterprise  had  promised  only  such  military  gain, 
it  is  doubtful  whether  the  Richmond  government  would  have 
undertaken  a  project  involving  the  renunciation  of  the  proved 
advantages  of  their  proper  defensive  ;  but  it  seemed,  in  ad 
dition,  to  hold  out  certain  ulterior  inducements,  which  were 
none  the  less  alluring  for  being  somewhat  vague.  The  theory 
of  the  invasion  assumed  that  the  presence  of  the  Confederate 
army  in  Maryland  would  induce  an  immediate  rising  among 
the  citizens  of  that  State  for  what  General  Lee  calls  "  the  re 
covery  of  their  liberties."  If  it  did  not  prompt  an  armed 
insurrection,  it  was,  at  least,  expected  that  the  people  of 
Maryland  would  assume  such  an  attitude  as  would  seriously 
embarrass  the  Government  and  necessitate  the  retention  of 
a  great  part  of  its  military  force  for  the  purpose  of  prevent 
ing  anticipated  risings.  By  this  means  it  was  believed  that  it 
would  be  difficult  for  the  Union  authorities  to  apply  a  concen 
trated  effort  to  the  expulsion  of  the  invading  force.f 

Without  the  prospect  of  some  such  incidental  and  ulterior 
advantages  as  these,  the  enterprise  would  hardly  have  been 
undertaken;  for,  not  only  was  it  perilous  in  itself,  but  the 
Confederate  army  was  not  properly  equipped  for  invasion  :  it 
lacked  much  of  the  material  of  war  and  was  feeble  in  trans 
portation,  while  the  troops  were  so  wretchedly  clothed  and 


*  Lee :  Report  of  the  Maryland  Campaign,  in  Reports  of  the  Army  oi 
Northern  Virginia,  vol.  i.,  p.  27. 

f  General  Lee's  statement  on  this  head  is  somewhat  vague;  but  it  can 
hardly  mean  any  thing  else  than  what  is  indicated  above  :  "  The  condition  of 
Maryland  encouraged  the  belief  that  the  presence  of  our  army,  however  in 
ferior  to  that  of  the  enemy,  would  induce  the  Washington  Government  to  retain 
all  its  available  force  to  provide  against  contingencies  which  it*  course  towards 
the  people  of  that  8tate  gave  it  reason  to  appreJiend." — Ibid. 


196  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  AEMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

shod  that  little  else  could  be  claimed  for  them  than  what 
Tilly  boasted  of  his  followers — that  they  were  an  army  of 
"  ragged  soldiers  and  bright  muskets."  * 

Plausible  though  this  anticipation  of  a  secessionist  uprising 
in  Maryland  seemed,  it  rested  on  a  false  basis  and  was  not 
more  emphatically  belied  by  experience  than  it  was  con 
demned  by  sound  reasoning  before  the  fact.  Nevertheless, 
misled  by  this  illusion,  Lee  turned  the  heads  of  his  columns 
away  from  the  direction  of  Washington,  which  he  never  seems 
to  have  dreamed  of  assailing  directly,  and  put  them  in  motion 
towards  Leesburg.  Between  the  4th  and  7th  of  September 
the  whole  Confederate  army  crossed  the  Potomac  by  the  fords 
near  that  place,  and  encamped  in  the  vicinity  of  Frederick, 
where  the  standard  of  revolt  was  formally  raised,  and  the 
people  of  Maryland  invited  by  proclamation  of  General  Lee 
to  join  the  Confederate  force.  But  it  soon  became  manifest 
that  the  expectation  of  practical  assistance  from  the  Mary- 
landers  was  destined  to  grievous  disappointment ;  and  the 
ragged  and  shoeless  soldiers  who  entered  the  State  chanting 
the  song  in  which  Maryland  was  made  passionately  to  invoke 
Southern  aid  against  Northern  despotism  found,  instead  of  the 
rapturous  reception  they  had  anticipated,  cold  indifference 
or  ill-concealed  hostility.  Of  the  citizens  of  Maryland  a  large 
number  (and  notably  the  population  of  the  western  counties) 
were  really  loyal,  a  considerable  number  indifferent,  and  a 
smaller  number  bitterly  secessionist.  But  to  permit  the  seces 
sionists  to  move  at  all,  it  was  necessary  that  Lee  should  first 
of  all  demonstrate  his  ability  to  remain  in  the  State  by  over 
throwing  the  powerful  Union  force  that  was  moving  to  meet 
him  ;  while  the  lukewarm,  whom  the  romance  of  the  invasion 
might  have  allured,  were  repelled  by  the  wretchedness,  the 
rags,  and  the  shocking  filth  of  the  "  army  of  liberation." 

*  "  Thousands  of  the  troops,"  says  Lee,  "  were  destitute  of  shoes." — Re 
ports  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  vol.  i.,  p.  27.  "  Never,"  says  General 
Jones,  who  commanded  Jackson's  old  "  Stonewall"  division,  "  had  the  army 
been  so  dirty,  ragged,  and  ill  provided  for,  as  on  this  march." — Ibid.,  vol.  ii., 
p.  221. 


THE  MARYLAND  CAMPAIGN.  197 

In  the  dark  hour  when  the  shattered  battalions  that  sur 
vived  Pope's  campaign  returned  to  Washington,  General  Mc- 
Clellan,  at  the  request  of  the  President,  resumed  command  of 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  with  the  addition  thereto  of  Burn- 
side's  command  and  the  corps  composing  the  late  Army  of 
Virginia.  Whatever  may  have  been  the  estimate  of  McClel- 
lan's  military  capacity  at  this  time  held  by  the  President,  or 
General  Halleck,  or  Mr.  Secretary  Stanton,  or  the  Committee 
on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  there  appears  to  have  been  no 
one  to  gainsay  the  propriety  of  the  appointment  or  dispute 
the  magic  of  his  name  with  the  soldiers  he  had  led.  McClel- 
lan's  reappearance  at  the  head  of  affairs  had  the  most  bene 
ficial  effect  on  the  army,  whose  morale  immediately  underwent 
an  astonishing  change.  The  heterogeneous  mass  made  up  of 
the  aggregation  of  the  remnants  of  the  two  armies,  and  the 
garrison  of  Washington,  was  reorganized  into  a  compact 
body — a  work  that  had  mostly  to  be  done  while  the  army  was 
on  the  march  ;*  and  as  soon  as  it  became  known  that  Lee  had 
crossed  the  Potomac,  McClellan  moved  towards  Frederick  to 
meet  him.  The  advance  was  made  by  five  parallel  roads,  and 
the  columns  were  so  disposed  as  to  cover  both  Washington 
and  Baltimore  ;  for  the  left  flank  rested  on  the  Potomac,  and 
the  right  on  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad.  The  right 
wing  consisted  of  the  First  and  Ninth  corps,  under  General 
Burnside  ;  the  centre,  of  the  Second  and  Twelfth  corps,  under 
General  Sumner ;  and  the  left  wing,  of  the  Sixth  Corps,  under 
General  Franklin. t 

*  "  Like  the  rest  of  the  army,  the  artillery  may  be  said  to  have  been  organ 
ized  on  the  march  and  in  the  intervals  of  conflict." — Hunt :  Report  of  Artillery 
Operations  of  the  Maryland  Campaign. 

f  The  First  Corps  (McDowell's  old  command)  had  been  placed  under  Gen 
eral  Hooker.  The  Ninth  Corps,  of  Burnside's  old  force,  was  under  General 
Reno.  Sumner  continued  to  command  his  own  (Second)  corps,  and  also  con 
trolled  the  Twelfth  (Banks'  old  command),  which  was  placed  under  General 
Mansfield,  a  veteran  soldier,  but  who  had  not  thus  far  been  in  the  field.  The 
Sixth  Corps,  under  General  Franklin,  embraced  the  divisions  of  Smith  (W.  F.), 
Slocum,  and  Couch.  Porter's  did  not  leave  Washington  until  the  12th  of 
September,  and  rejoined  the  army  at  Antietam.  General  H.  J.  Hunt,  who  had 


198  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

The  uncertainty  at  first  overhanging  Lee's  intentions  caused 
the  advance  from  Washington  to  be  made  with  much  circum 
spection;  and  it  might,  perhaps,  be  fairly  chargeable  with 
tardiness,  were  there  not  on  record  repeated  dispatches  of  the 
time  from  the  general-in-chief,  charging  McClellan  with  too 
great  a  precipitancy  of  movement  for  the  safety  of  the  capi 
tal.  The  van  of  the  army  entered  Frederick  on  the  12th 
of  September,  after  a  brisk  skirmish  at  the  outskirts  of  the 
town  with  the  Confederate  troopers  left  behind  as  a  rear 
guard.  It  was  found  that  the  main  body  of  Lee's  army  had 
passed  out  of  Frederick  two  days  before,  heading  westward 
towards  Harper's  Ferry.  * 

It  is  now  necessary,  for  a  just  appreciation  of  the  events  of 
the  Maryland  campaign,  that  I  should  give  an  outline  of  the 
plan  of  operations  which  the  Confederate  commander  had 
marked  out  for  himself.  This  plan  was  simple,  but  highly 
meritorious.  Lee  did  not  propose  to  make  any  direct  move 
ment  against  Washington  or  Baltimore  with  the  Union  army 
between  him  and  these  points,  but  aimed  so  to  manoeuvre  as 
to  cause  McClellan  to  uncover  them.  With  this  view,  he  de 
signed,  first  of  all,  to  move  into  Western  Maryland  and  estab 
lish  his  communications  with  Richmond  through  the  Shenan- 
doah  Valley.  Then,  by  a  northward  movement,  menacing 
Pennsylvania  by  the  Cumberland  Valley,  he  hoped  to  draw 
the  Union  army  so  far  towards  the  Susquehanna  as  to  afford 
him  either  an  opportunity  of  seizing  Baltimore  or  Washington, 
or  of  dealing  a  damaging  blow  at  the  army  far  from  its  base 
of  supplies.  His  first  movement  from  Frederick  was,  there 
fore,  towards  the  western  side  of  that  mountain  range  which, 
named  the  Blue  Ridge  south  of  the  Potomac,  and  the  South 
Mountain  range  north  of  the  Potomac,  forms  the  eastern 
wall  of  the  Shenandoah  and  Cumberland  valleys — the  former 

been  in  command  of  the  reserve  artillery  on  the  Peninsula,  relieved  General 
Barry  as  chief  of  artillery,  and  remained  in  that  position  till  the  close  of  the 
war.  General  Pleasonton  commanded  the  cavalry  division.  The  army  with 
which  McClellan  set  out  on  the  Maryland  campaign,  made  an  aggregate  of 
eighty-five  thousand  men,  of  all  arms. 


THE  MARYLAND  CAMPAIGN. 


199 


his  line  of  communications  with  Bichrnond  and  the  latter 
his  line  of  manoeuvre  towards  Pennsylvania. 


SKETCH  OP  MAN(EUVRES  ON  ANTIETAM. 

Now,  at  the  time  Lee  crossed  the  Potomac,  the  Federal 
post  at  Harper's  Ferry,  commanding  the  debouche  of  the 
Shenandoah  Yalley,  was  held  by  a  garrison  of  about  nine 
thousand  men,  under  Colonel  D.  H.  Miles,  while  a  force  of 
twenty-five  hundred  men,  under  General  White,  did  outpost 
duty  at  Martinsburg  and  "Winchester.  These  troops  received 
orders  direct  from  General  Halleck. 

Lee  had  assumed  that  his  advance  on  Frederick  would 
cause  the  immediate  evacuation  of  Harper's  Ferry*  by  the 


*  "  It  "had  been  supposed  that  the  advance  upon  Frederick  would  lead  to  the 
evacuation  of  Martinsburg  and  Harper's  Ferry,  thus  opening  the  line  of  com 
munication  through  the  Valley." — Lee's  Report :  Reports  of  the  Army  of  North- 
ern  Virginia,  vol.  i.,  p.  28. 


200  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

Union  force,  because  that  position,  important  as  against  a 
menace  by  way  of  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  became  utterly 
useless  now  that  the  Confederates  were  actually  in  Maryland  ; 
and  the  garrison,  while  subserving  no  purpose,  was  in  immi 
nent  danger  of  capture.  In  this  anticipation,  Lee  had  pro 
ceeded  solely  on  a  correct  military  appreciation  of  what  ought 
to  have  been  done  ;  and  indeed  General  McClellan,  who  had 
no  control  over  this  force,  urged  the  evacuation  of  the  post 
the  moment  he  learned  Lee  was  across  the  Potomac.  But 
it  was  the  whim  of  General  Halleck  to  regard  Harper's 
Ferry  as  a  point  per  se  and  in  any  event  of  the  first  import 
ance  to  be  held ;  and  he  would  listen  to  no  proposition  looking 
to  its  abandonment.  It  is  a  remarkable  illustration  of  the 
mighty  part  played  in  war  by  what  is  called  accident  that 
this  gross  act  of  folly  which,  as  might  have  been  expected, 
resulted  in  the  capture  of  the  entire  garrison  of  Harper's 
Ferry,  was,  nevertheless,  as  will  presently  appear,  a  main 
cause  of  the  ultimate  failure  of  the  Confederate  invasion. 

Finding  that,  contrary  to  his  expectation,  Harper's  Ferry 
was  not  evacuated,  it  became  necessary  for  Lee  to  dislodge 
that  force  before  concentrating  his  army  west  of  the  moun 
tains,  and  to  this  duty  Jackson,  with  his  own  three  divisions, 
the  two  divisions  of  McLaws,  and  the  division  of  Walker,  was 
assigned.  Jackson  was  to  proceed  by  way  of  Sharpsburg, 
crossing  the  Potomac  above  Harper's  Ferry,  and,  investing  it 
by  the  rear ;  McLaws  was  to  move  by  way  of  Middletown  on 
the  direct  route  to  the  ferry,  and  seize  the  hills  on  the  Mary 
land  side  known  as  Maryland  Heights ;  Walker  was  to  cross 
the  Potomac  below  Harper's  Ferry  and  take  possession  of  the 
Loudon  Heights.  The  advance  was  begun  on  the  10th  :  the 
several  commanders  were  all  to  be  at  their  assigned  positions 
by  the  night  of  the  12th,  cause  the  surrender  by  the  following 
morning,  and  immediately  rejoin  the  remainder  of  the  army, 
with  which  Lee  was  to  move  to  Boonsboro'  or  Hagerstown. 

Up  to  the  time  of  Lee's  leaving  Frederick,  McClellan's 
advance  had  been  so  tardy  as  to  justify  the  Confederate  com 
mander  in  the  belief  that  the  reduction  of  Harper's  Ferry 


THE  MARYLAND  CAMPAIGN.  201 

would  be  accomplished  and  his  columns  again  concentrated 
before  he  would  be  called  upon  to  meet  the  Union  army. 
But  this  expectation  was  disappointed,  and  all  Lee's  plans  for 
ulterior  operations  in  Maryland  were  thwarted  by  a  piece  of 
good  fortune  that  befell  General  McClellan  at  this  time. 
There  accidentally  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  Union  com 
mander  on  the  day  of  his  arrival  at  Frederick  a  copy  of  Lee's 
official  order  for  the  above  movements  of  his  troops,  whereby 
his  whole  plan  was  betrayed  to  his  antagonist.  Instructed 
of  the  project  of  his  rival,  McClellan  immediately  ordered  a 
rapid  movement  towards  Harper's  Ferry ;  and  Lee,  unaware 
of  what  had  happened,  suddenly  found  the  Union  army  press 
ing  forward  with  an  unwonted  rapidity  that  threatened  to 
disconcert  all  his  plans.  On  the  afternoon  of  the  13th,  be 
fore  Lee  had  received  any  word  from  Jackson,  Stuart,  who 
with  his  troopers  was  covering  the  Confederate  rear,  reported 
McClellan  approaching  the  passes  of  South  Mountain,  and  it 
became  evident  that  if  he  were  allowed  to  force  these,  he 
would  be  in  position  to  strike  Lee's  divided  columns,  relieve 
the  garrison  at  Harper's  Ferry,  and  put  a  disastrous  termi 
nation  to  the  Confederate  campaign.  Lee  had  not  intended 
to  oppose  any  resistance  to  the  passage  of  the  South  Moun 
tain,  and  had  already  moved  to  Boonsboro'  and  Hagerstown 
to  await  Jackson's  operations.  But  when  the  news  of  McClel- 
lan's  approach  reached  him,  he  instantly  ordered  Hill's  divi 
sion  back  from  Boonsboro'  to  guard  the  South  Mountain 
passes,  and  instructed  Longstreet  to  countermarch  from  Ha 
gerstown  to  Hill's  support. 

McClellan,  by  his  knowledge  of  Lee's  movements,  was  so 
perfectly  master  of  the  situation,  and  the  stake  was  so  great 
as  to  authorize,  indeed  to  demand,  the  very  boldest  action  on 
his  part.  He  knew  the  imperilled  condition  of  the  garrison  at 
Harper's  Ferry,  which  had  by  this  time  been  placed  under  his 
control,  and  though  its  investment  was  the  result  of  that  ab 
surd  policy  that,  against  his  protest  and  in  violation  of  sound 
military  principle,  had  retained  it  in  an  untenable  position, 
still  he  was  bound  to  do  his  utmost  to  relieve  it.  McClellan 


202  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

acted  with  energy  but  not  with  the  impetuosity  called  for. 
If  he  had  thrown  forward  his  army  with  the  vigor  used  by 
Jackson  in  his  advance  on  Harper's  Ferry,  the  passes  of  South 
Mountain  would  have  been  carried  before  the  evening  of  the 
13th,  at  which  time  they  were  very  feebly  guarded,  and  then 
debouching  into  Pleasant  Valley,  the  Union  commander 
might  next  morning  have  fallen  upon  the  rear  of  McLaws  at 
Maryland  Heights,  and  relieved  Harper's  Ferry,  which  did 
not  surrender  till  the  morning  of  the  15th.  But  he  did  not 
arrive  at  South  Mountain  until  the  morning  of  the  14th; 
and  by  that  time  the  Confederates,  forewarned  of  his  ap 
proach,  had  recalled  a  considerable  force  to  dispute  the  pas 
sage. 

The  line  of  advance  of  the  Union  right  and  centre  con 
ducted  across  South  Mountain  by  Turner's  Gap,  that  of  the 
left  by  Crampton's  Gap,  six  miles  to  the  southward.  Frank 
lin's  corps  was  moving  towards  the  latter ;  and  Burnside's 
command  (the  corps  of  Reno  and  Hooker)  had  the  advance 
by  the  former.  The  Confederate  defence  of  Crampton's  Pass 
was  left  to  McLaws,  who  was  engaged  in  the  investment  of 
Harper's  Ferry  from  the  side  of  Maryland  Heights;  but 
Turner's  Pass,  as  commanding  the  debouche  of  the  main  high 
way  from  Frederick  westward,  was  committed  to  the  com 
bined  commands  of  Hill  and  Longstreet.  This  pass  is  a  deep 
gorge  in  the  mountains,  the  crests  of  which  on  each  side  rise  to 
the  height  of  one  thousand  feet.  The  gap  itself  is  unassailable ; 
but  there  is  a  practicable  road  over  the  crest  to  the  right  of 
the  pass,  and  another  to  the  left.  The  key-point  of  the  whole 
position  is  a  rocky  and  precipitous  peak  which  dominates  the 
ridge  to  the  right  of  the  pass.  With  a  considerable  force 
this  position  is  very  defensible ;  but  when  the  advance  of  the 
Union  force  reached  the  mountain,  on  the  morning  of  the 
14th,  it  was  guarded  only  by  D.  H.  Hill's  division  of  five 
thousand  men.  Reno's  corps  arrived  near  the  pass  early  in 
the  forenoon ;  but  that  officer  directed  all  his  efforts  to  the 
assault  of  the  crest  on  the  left — the  key-point  being  over 
looked.  After  a  sharp  fight  Eeno  succeeded  in  dislodg- 


THE  MARYLAND  CAMPAIGN.  203 

ing  the  Confederate  brigade  opposed  to  him,  and  estab 
lished  his  troops  on  the  first  ridge,  but  was  unable  to 
push  beyond.*  The  commanding  importance  of  the  ground 
to  the  right  of  the  pass  soon  developed  itself,  however, 
and  on  the  arrival  of  Hooker's  corps  in  the  middle  of  the 
afternoon,  he  was  directed  to  assault  that  position.  By  this 
time  Hill  had  been  re-enforced  by  two  divisions  of  Long- 
street.  The  ridge  to  the  north  of  the  turnpike  is  divided  into 
a  double  crest  by  a  ravine,  and  Hooker  put  in  Meade's  divi 
sion  on  the  right,  and  Hatch's  on  the  left ;  Kickett's  division 
being  held  in  reserve.  The  ground  is  very  difficult  for  the 
movement  of  troops,  the  hill-side  being  steep  and  rocky  ;  but 
the  advance  was  made  with  much  spirit — the  light-footed 
skirmishers  leaping  and  springing  up  the  slopes  and  ledges  with 
the  nimbleness  of  the  coney.  It  was  found  that,  owing  to  the 
precipitous  figure  of  the  mountain  sides,  the  hostile  artillery 
did  little  hurt ;  but  the  Confederate  riflemen,  fighting  behind 
rocks  and  trees  and  stone  walls,  opposed  a  persistent  re 
sistance.  They  were,  however,  forced  back,  step  by  step ;  and 
by  dark,  Hooker's  troops  had  carried  the  crest  on  the  right 
of  the  gap.  Now,  as  simultaneous  with  this,  Gibbon  with  his 
brigade  had  worked  his  way  by  the  main  road  well  up 
towards  the  top  of  the  pass,  and  as  Eeno's  corps  had  gained 
a  firm  foothold  on  the  crest  to  the  left  of  the  pass,  it  seemed 
that  the  position  was  carried;  and  though  it  was  by  this 
time  too  dark  to  push  through  to  the  western  side  of  the 
mountain,  yet  the  whole  army  was  up,  and  with  the  position 
secured  would  in  the  morning  force  an  issue  by  its  own  press 
ure.  Yet  these  successes  were  not  gained  without  a  heavy 
sacrifice.  Fifteen  hundred  men  were  killed  and  wounded  in 
this  severe  struggle,  and  among  those  who  fell  was  General 
Reno,  commander  of  the  Ninth  Corps,  an  able  and  respected 

*  The  Confederate  brigade  opposed  to  Reno  was  under  General  Garland, 
who  was  killed  early  in  the  action.  "  Garland's  brigade,"  says  General  Hill, 
"  was  much  demoralized  by  his  fall,  and  the  rough  handling  it  had  received ; 
and  had  the  Yankees  pressed  vigorously  forward,  the  road  might  have  been 
gained." — Reports  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  vol.  ii.,  p.  112. 


204  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

officer.  The  Confederate  loss  was  above  three  thousand  men, 
whereof  fifteen  hundred  were  prisoners. 

The  action  at  South  Mountain  deservedly  figures  as  a  bril 
liant  affair  ;  and  the  only  adverse  comment  that  may  be  made 
thereon  will  turn  on  the  tardiness  in  commencing  the  attack ; 
for,  with  a  more  vigorous  conduct  on  the  part  of  General 
Burnside,  he  might  have  forced  the  pass  during  the  forenoon, 
while  yet  defended  only  by  Hill's  small  force ;  and  notwith 
standing  the  previous  delay,  this  would  still  have  put  Mc- 
Clellan  in  position  to  succor  Harper's  Ferry. 

During  the  contest  at  Turner's  Gap,  Franklin  was  strug 
gling  to  force  the  passage  of  the  ridge  at  Crampton's  Pass,  de 
fended  by  a  part  of  the  force  of  McLaws,  who  was  then  en 
gaged  in  the  investment  of  Harper's  Ferry.*  The  position 
here  was  similar  to  that  at  Turner's  Gap,  and  the  operations 
were  of  a  like  kind.  Forming  his  troops  with  Slocum's  di 
vision  on  the  right  of  the  road  and  Smith's  on  the  left, 
Franklin  advanced  his  line,  driving  the  Confederates  from 
their  position  at  the  base  of  the  mountain,  where  they  were 
protected  by  a  stone  wall,  and  forced  them  back  up  the  slope 
of  the  mountain  to  near  its  summit,  where,  after  an  action  of 
three  hours,  the  crest  was  carried. f  Four  hundred  prisoners, 
seven  hundred  stand  of  arms,  one  piece  of  artillery,  and  three 
colors  were  captured  in  this  spirited  action.  Franklin's  total 
loss  was  five  hundred  and  thirty-two,  and  the  corps  rested  on 
its  arms,  with  its  advance  thrown  forward  into  Pleasant 
Yalley.  During  the  night,  the  Confederates  at  Turner's  Gap 

*  Crampton's  Pass  debouches  into  Pleasant  Valley  directly  in  the  rear  of 
and  but  five  miles  from  Maryland  Heights,  opposite  Harper's  Ferry.  McLaws 
on  learning  the  approach  of  the  Union  force,  and  seeing  the  danger  of  this  attack 
in  his  rear,  sent  back  General  Cobb,  with  three  brigades,  instructing  him  to 
hold  Crampton's  Pass  until  the  work  at  Harper's  Ferry  should  be  completed, 
*'  even  if  he  lost  his  last  man  in  doing  it."  McLaws'  Report :  Reports  of  the 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  vol.  ii.,  p.  165. 

f  Slocum's  line,  on  the  right,  formed  of  Bartlett's  and  Torbett's  brigades,  sup 
ported  by  Newton,  carried  the  crest.  Smith's  line,  formed  of  Brooks'  and  Invin's 
brigades,  was*  disposed  for  the  protection  of  Slocum's  flank,  and  charged  up  the 
mountain  simultaneously.  The  brunt  of  the  action  fell  upon  Bartlett's  command. 


THE  MARYLAND  CAMPAIGN. 


withdrew,  and  the  Union  right  and  centre  in  the  morning 
passed  through  to  the  west  side  of  the  mountain. 

If  not  too  late,  McClellan  was  now  in  a  position  to  succor 
the  garrison  at  Harper's  Ferry,  whose  situation  was  one  of 
almost  tragic  interest.*  But  by  a  hapless  conjuncture,  on 
the  very  morning  that  the  army  broke  through  the  South 
Mountain,  and  was  in  position  to  relieve  the  beleaguered 
force,  it  was  surrendered  by  its  commander.  I  shall  briefly 
detail  the  circumstances  under  which  this  took  place. 

Leaving  Frederick  on  the  10th,  Jackson  made  a  very  rapid 
march  by  way  of  Middletown,  Boonsboro',  and  Williamsport, 
and  on  the  following  day  crossed  the  Potomac  into  Vir 
ginia,  at  a  ford  near  the  latter  place.  Disposing  his  forces  so 
that  there  should  be  no  escape  for  the  garrison  from  that 
side,  he  moved  down  towards  Harper's  Ferry.  On  his  ap 
proach,  General  White  with  the  garrison  of  Martinsburg 
evacuated  that  place,  and  retired  to  Harper's  Ferry,  the  rear 
of  which,  at  Bolivar  Heights,  Jackson  reached  on  the  13th, 
and  immediately  proceeded  to  put  himself  in  communication 
with  Walker  and  McLaws,  who  were  respectively  to  co-op 
erate  in  the  investment  from  Loudon  and  Maryland  heights. 
Walker  was  already  in  position  on  Loudon  Heights,  and 
McLaws  was  working  his  way  up  Maryland  Heights.  The 
latter  position  is  the  key-point  to  Harper's  Ferry,  as  a  brief 
description  will  show. 

The  Elk  Kidge,  running  north  and  south  across  parts  of 
Maryland  and  Virginia,  is  rifted  in  twain  by  the  Potomac, 
and  the  cleavage  leaves  on  each  side  a  bold  and  lofty  abut 
ment  of  rock.  Maryland  Heights  is  the  name  given  the  steep 
on  the  north  bank,  and  Loudon  Heights  the  steep  on  the 
south  bank.  Between  Loudon  Heights  and  Harper's  Ferry 
the  Shenandoah  breaks  into  the  Potomac,  and  to  the  rear  of 


*  To  convey  to  Colonel  Miles  the  information  that  the  army  was  coming  to 
his  relief,  he  sent  repeated  couriers  to  run  the  gauntlet  of  the  investing  lines, 
and  all  along  the  march  he  fired  signal  guns  to  announce  the  progress  of  his 
approach. 


206  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  AEMT  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

the  ferry  is  a  less  bold  ridge,  named  Bolivar  Heights,  which 
falls  off  in  graceful  undulations  southward  into  the  Valley 
of  the  Shenandoah.  The  picturesque  little  village  of  Har 
per's  Ferry  lies  nestling  in  the  basin  formed  by  these-  three 
heights,  which  tower  into  an  almost  Alpine  sublimity.  A  line 
drawn  from  any  one  mountain-top  to  either  of  the  others  must 
be  two  miles  in  stretch ;  yet  rifle-cannon  crowning  these 
heights  can  easily  throw  their  projectiles  from  each  to  other — 
a  sort  of  Titanic  game  of  bowls  which  Mars  and  cloud-com 
pelling  Jove  might  carry  on  in  sportive  mood.  But  the 
Maryland  Height  is  the  Saul  of  the  triad  of  giant  mountains, 
and  far  o'ertops  its  fellows.  Of  course,  it  completely  com 
mands  Harper's  Ferry,  into  which  a  plunging  fire  even  of 
musketry  can  be  had  from  it.  While  therefore  Harper's 
Ferry  is  itself  the  merest  military  trap,  lying  as  it  does  at 
the  bottom  of  this  rocky  funnel,  yet  the  Maryland  Height  is 
a  strong  position,  and  if  its  rearward  slope  were  held  by  a 
determined  even  though  small  force,  it  would  be  very  hard 
and  hazardous  to  assail. 

Colonel  Miles,  in  the  distribution  of  his  command,  had 
posted  on  Maryland  Heights  a  force  under  Colonel  Ford,  re 
taining  the  bulk  of  his  troops  in  Harper's  Ferry.  This  was 
a  faulty  disposition.  He  should  have  evacuated  the  latter 
place,  and  transferred  his  whole  force  to  Maryland  Heights, 
which  he  could  readily  have  held  till  McClellan  came  up. 
Under  his  instructions  from  General  Halleck,  lie  was  bound, 
however,  to  hold  Harper's  Ferry  to  the  last  extremity,  and, 
interpreting  this  order  literally  as  applying  to  the  town  itself, 
he  refused  to  take  this  step  when  urged  to  it  by  his  sub 
ordinates.  But  what  was  worse,  Ford,  after  opposing  a  very 
feeble  and  unskilful  resistance  to  McLaws'  attack  on  the 
13th,  retired  to  Harper's  Ferry,  spiking  his  guns  and  top 
pling  them  down  the  declivity.  Thus  Maryland  Heights 
was  abandoned  altogether.  McLaws  succeeded  in  dragging 
some  pieces  up  the  rugged  steep,  and  Jackson  and  "Walker 
being  already  in  position,  the  investment  of  Harper's  Ferry 
was  by  the  morning  of  the  14th  complete.  The  Bolivar  and 


THE  MARYLAND   CAMPAIGN.  207 

London  heights  were  crowned  with  artillery  during  the  day, 
and  at  dawn  of  the  15th  the  three  co-operating  forces  opened 
fire  upon  the  garrison.  They  were  already  doomed  men  •  and 
in  two  hours  or  less  the  white  flag  was  raised  in  token  of  sur 
render. 

The  actual  surrender  was  made  by  General  White,  Colonel 
Miles  having  been  mortally  wounded  in  the  operations  attend 
ing  the  reduction  of  the  place. 

Jackson  received  the  capitulation  of  eleven  thousand  men, 
and  came  into  possession  of  seventy-three  pieces  of  artillery, 
thirteen  thousand  small-arms,  and  a  large  quantity  of  mili 
tary  stores.  But  leaving  the  details  to  be  arranged  by  his 
lieutenant,  General  Hill  (A.  P.),  the  swift-footed  Jackson  turned 
his  back  on  the  prize  he  had  secured,  and  headed  towards 
Maryland  to  unite  with  Lee,  who  was  eagerly  awaiting  his 
arrival  at  Sharpsburg. 

The  successful  lodgment  McClellan  had  gained  on  the  crest 
of  South  Mountain  by  the  night  of  the  14th  admonished  Lee 
that  he  might  no  longer  hope  to  hold  Turner's  Pass.  He 
therefore  withdrew  Longstreet  and  D.  H.  Hill  across  Pleasant 
Valley  and  over  Elk  Kidge  into  the  valley  beyond — the  valley 
of  the  Antietam.  In  the  morning  McClellan  passed  through 
his  right  and  centre  and  took  position  at  Boonsboro'.  Mean 
time,  Franklin,  having  the  night  previously  swept  away  tho 
adverse  force,  passed  through  Crampton's  Pass  and  debouched 
into  Pleasant  Valley  in  the  rear  of  McLaws.  This  seemed  a 
favorable  opportunity  to  destroy  that  force,  which  was  isolated 
from  all  the  rest  of  Lee's  army ;  but,  appreciating  his  danger, 
the  Confederate  officer,  in  the  morning,  withdrew  all  his  force 
from  Maryland  Heights,  with  the  exception  of  a  single  regi 
ment,  and  formed  his  troops  in  battle  order  across  Pleasant 
Valley  to  resist  any  sudden  attack,  and  before  Franklin  could 
make  his  dispositions  to  strike,  the  garrison  at  Harper's  Ferry 
had  surrendered.  This  left  free  exit  for  McLaws,  who  skil 
fully  retired  down  the  Valley  towards  the  Potomac,  which  he 
repassed  at  Harper's  Ferry,  and  by  a  detour  by  way  of  Shep- 
herdstown  joined  Lee  at  Sharpsburg. 


208  CAMPAIGNS  OP    THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

Upon  the  retirement  of  the  Confederates  on  the  morning  of 
the  15th,  McClellan  pushed  forward  his  whole  army  in  pur 
suit  ;  but  after  a  few  miles'  march,  the  heads  of  the  columns 
were  brought  to  a  sudden  halt  at  Antietam  Creek,  a  rivulet 
that,  running  obliquely  to  the  course  of  the  Potomac,  empties 
into  it  six  miles  above  Harper's  Ferry.  On  the  heights 
crowning  the  west  bank  of  this  stream,  Lee,  with  what  force 
he  had  in  hand,  took  his  stand  to  oppose  McClellan's  pursuit, 
and  form  a  point  of  concentration  for  his  scattered  columns. 


H. 

THE  BATTLE   OF   ANTIETAM. 

"Whatever  ulterior  purposes  Lee  may  have  had  touching 
the  prosecution  of  the  Maryland,  invasion,  affairs  had  so 
worked  together  that  it  had  become  now  absolutely  necessary 
for  him  to  stand  and  give  battle.  Whether  he  designed  aban 
doning  the  aggressive  and  repassing  the  Potomac,  or  pur 
posed  manoeuvring  by  the  line  of  Western  Maryland  towards 
Pennsylvania,  he  was  obliged  first  of  all  to  take  up  a  position 
on  which  he  might  unite  his  divided  forces,  closely  pressed  by 
the  advancing  Union  columns,  and  receive  the  attack  of  his 
antagonist.  The  circumstances  were  such  that  a  battle  would 
necessarily  decide  the  issue  of  the  invasion. 

It  was  late  in  the  afternoon  of  the  15th  when  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  drew  up  on  the  left  bank  of  Antietam  Creek, 
on  the  opposite  side  of  which  the  Confederate  infantry  was 
seen  ostentatiously  displayed.  The  day  passed  in  observa 
tion  of  the  position,  and  next  morning  that  portion  of  the 
Confederate  force  that  had  been  engaged  in  the  investment 
of  Harper's  Ferry  rejoined  Lee.  The  Confederate  com 
mander  formed  his  troops  on  a  line  stretched  across  the 
angle  formed  by  the  Potomac  and  Antietam ;  and  as  the  Poto 
mac  here  makes  a  sharp  curve,  Lee  was  able  to  rest  both 


MAP  OF  THE 

trim  ANTIETAM1 

Fought  Sept.  16  &  17th  1862  . 

E/igrwed  for  Campaigns  ofttifArnu/  oftfte  Potomac  " 
.     Scale     of  MUes. 


Union-  Troops 


Troops. 


THE  MARYLAND  CAMPAIGN.  209 

flanks  on  that  stream,  while  his  front  was  covered  by  the 
Antietam.  The  Confederate  line  was  drawn  in  front  of  the 
town  of  Sharpsburg — Longstreet's  command  being  placed  on 
the  right  of  the  road  from  Sharpsburg  to  Boonsboro',  and ' 
D.  H.  Hill's  command  on  the  left.  From  Sharpsburg  a  turn 
pike  runs  northward  across  the  Potomac  to  Hagerstown,  from 
which  direction  the  •  position  might  be  turned  ;  and  to  guard 
against  this,  Hood's  two  brigades  were  placed  on  the  left. 
Jackson's  command  was  placed  in  reserve  near  the  left.  The 
16th  saw  the  whole  Confederate  force  concentrated  at  Sharps 
burg,  except  the  divisions  of  McLaws,  Anderson,  and  A.  P. 
Hill,  which  had  not  yet  returned  from  Harper's  Ferry.  So 
greatly  had  the  Confederate  army  become  reduced  by  its  pre 
vious  losses  and  by  straggling,  that  Lee  was  unable  to  count 
above  forty  thousand  bayonets. 

In  this  vicinity,  the  Antietam  is  crossed  by  four  stone 
bridges  ;  but  three  of  these  were  covered  by  the  hostile  front,, 
and  so  guarded  as  to  forbid  the  hope  of  forcing  a  direct 
passage.  McClellan  therefore  determined  to  throw  his  right 
across  the  creek  by  an  upper  and  unguarded  bridge,  beyond 
the  Confederate  left  flank,  and  when  this  manoeuvre  should 
have  shaken  the  enemy,  the  centre  and  left  were  to  carry  the 
bridges  in  their  front.  Porter's  corps  was  posted  on  the  left 
of  the  turnpike,  opposite  Bridge  No.  2 ;  Burnside's  Ninth 
Corps  on  the  Hohrersville  and  Sharpsburg  turnpike,  directly 
in  front  of  Bridge  No.  3.  The  turning  movement  was  in 
trusted  to  Hooker's  corps,  to  be  followed  by  Sumner's  two 
corps.  The  examination  of  the  ground,  and  the  posting  of 
troops,  and  of  artillery  to  silence  the  fire  of  the  enemy's  guns 
on  the  opposite  side  of  the  Antietam,  occupied  the  hours  of 
the  16th  till  the  afternoon, — a  lively  artillery  duel  being, 
meanwhile,  waged  between  the  opposing  batteries.*  Then, 


*  The  Union  batteries  were  those  of  Taft,  Langner,  Von  Kleizer,  and 
Weaver,  placed  on  the  ridge  on  the  east  side  of  the  Antietam,  between  the 
turnpike  bridge  and  the  house  occupied  as  general  headquarters  (Pry's). 
The  practice  of  these  batteries  was  excellent,  and  their  superiority  over  the- 

14 


210  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

towards  the  middle  of  the  afternoon,  Hooker's  corps  was  put 
in  motion,  and  crossed  the  stream  at  the  upper  bridge  and 
ford,  out  of  range  of  the  hostile  fire.  Advancing  through  the 
woods,  Hooker  soon  struck  the  left  flank  of  the  Confederate 
line,  held  by  Hood's  two  brigades.  Lee  had  anticipated  a 
menace  on  that  flank,  and  had  made  his  dispositions 
accordingly, — Hood's  brigades  forming  a  crotchet  on  the  Con 
federate  left.*  It  was  towards  dusk  when  the  troops  of 
Hooker  and  Hood  met ;  and  after  a  smart  skirmish  between 
the  Confederates  and  the  division  of  Pennsylvania  Eeserves 
under  General  Meade,  the  opposing  forces  rested  on  their 
arms  for  the  night,  both  occupying  a  skirt  of  woods  which 
forms  the  eastern  and  northern  inclosure  of  a  considerable 
clearing  on  both  sides  of  the  Hagerstown  road. 

This  movement  across  the  Antietam  on  the  16th  was  of  no 
advantage :  it  was  made  too  late  in  the  day  to  accomplish 
any  thing,  and  it  served  to  disclose  to  Lee  his  antagonist's 
purpose.  The  Confederate  commander  made  no  change  in 
his  dispositions,  save  to  order  Jackson,  who  lay  in  reserve  in 
the  rear  of  the  left,  to  substitute  a  couple  of  his  brigades  in 
the  room  of  Hood's  worn-out  command.  General  McClellan 
strengthened  the  turning  column  by  directing  Sumner  to 
throw  over,  during  the  night,  the  Twelfth  Corps  under 
General  Mansfield  to  the  support  of  Hooker  ;  and  he  ordered 
Sumner  to  hold  his  own  corps  (the  Second)  in  readiness  to 
cross  early  in  the  morning. 

At  the  first  dawn  of  the  17th  the  combat  was  opened  by 
Hooker,  who  assailed  the  Confederate  left,  now  held  by 

Confederate  artillery  was  soon  apparent.  Of  this  there  is  a  very  frank  con 
fession  in  the  Report  of  General  D.  H.  Hill :  "  An  artillery  duel  between  the 
Washington  (New  Orleans)  Artillery  and  the  Yankee  batteries  across  the 
Antietam  on  the  16th  was  the  most  melancholy  farce  in  the  war.  They 
could  not  cope  with  the  Yankee  guns." — Reports  of  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia,  vol.  ii.,  p.  119. 

*  "  In  anticipation  of  a  movement  to  turn  the  line  of  Antietam,  Hood's  two 
brigades  had  been  transferred  from  the  right  to  the  left,  and  posted  between 
D.  H.  Hill  and  the  Hagerstown  road." — Lee  :  Reports  of  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia,  vol.  i.,  p.  32. 


THE   MARYLAND  CAMPAIGN.  211 

Jackson's  force.  The  ground  on  which  the  battle  opened  was 
the  same  field  on  which  the  action  continued  to  be  waged 
during  the  day  ;  and  it  has  already  been  indicated  in  that 
opening  extending  to  the  east  and  west  of  the  Hagerstown 
road  bounded  on  each  side  by  woods.  In  the  fringe  of  forest 
on  the  eastern  side  of  the  road,  Hooker  had  the  previous 
evening  effected  a  lodgment,  though  morning  found  the  Con 
federate  riflemen  still  clinging  to  its  margin,  while  the  main 
force  of  Jackson  lay  in  the  low  timbered  ground  on  the  west 
side  of  the  road,*  where  the  Confederate  troops  were  pretty 
well  protected  by  outcropping  ledges  of  rock.  But  though  it 
had  this  tactical  advantage  for  the  defence,  the  position  was 
really  untenable  ;  for  it  was  completely  commanded  and  seen 
in  reverse  by  high  ground  a  little  to  the  right  of  where 
Hooker  formed  his  line  of  battle.  This  height  was  the  key- 
point  of  all  that  part  of  the  field,  and  had  it  been  occupied  by 
Union  batteries,  as  it  should  have  been,  the  low  timbered 
ground  around  the  Dunker  church  where  Jackson's  line  lay 
could  not  have  been  held  fifteen  minutes.  It  is  a  noteworthy 
fact,  thayfc  neither  General  Hooker,  nor  General  Sumner  who 
followed  him  in  command  on  this  part  of  the  field,  at  all 
appreciated  the  supreme  importance  of  this  point. f  The 
former,  beginning  the  combat,  opened  a  direct  attack  with 
the  view  of  carrying  the  Hagerstown  road  and  the  woods  on 
the  west  side  of  it ;  and  this  continued  to  be  the  aim  of  all 
the  subsequent  attacks,  which  were  made  very  much  in  detail, 
and  thus  lost  the  effective  character  they  might  have  had 
with  more  comprehensive  dispositions. 

Hooker  formed  his  corps  of  fourteen  thousand  men,  with 
Doubleday's  division  on  the  right,  Meade's  in  the  centre,  and 
Bicketts'  on  the  left.  Jackson  opposed  him  with  two  divi 
sions,  E well's  division  being  advanced  to  command  the  open 
ground,  while  the  Stonewall  division  lay  in  reserve  in  the 

*  This  road  will  be  noted,  in  the  accompanying  sketch,  as  that  on  the  mar 
gin  of  which  stands  what  is  known  as  the  "  Dunker  church." 

f  It  is  equally  remarkable  that  its  importance  was  overlooked  by  the  Con 
federates  until  several  hours  after  the  action  opened. 


212  CAMPAIGNS  OF    THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

woodland  on  the  west  side  of  the  Hagerstown  road.  His  en 
tire  force  present  numbered  four  thousand  men — a  great  dis 
proportion  of  numbers.*  After  an  hour's  bloody  "bush 
whacking,"  Hooker's  troops  succeeded  in  clearing  the  hither 
woods  of  the  three  Confederate  brigades,  which  retired  in 
disorder  across  the  open  fields,  with  a  loss  of  half  their  re 
duced  numbers. t  The  Union  batteries  on  the  opposite  bank 
of  the  An  tie  tarn  had  secured  an  enfilade  fire  on  Jackson's  ad 
vanced  and  reserve  line,  and,  together  with  the  batteries  in 
front,  inflicted  severe  loss  on  the  enemy.  Hooker  then  ad 
vanced  his  centre  under  Meade  to  seize  the  Hagerstown  road 
and  the  woods  beyond.  In  attempting  to  execute  this  move 
ment,  the  troops  came  under  a  very  severe  fire  from  Jackson's 
reserve  division,  which,  joined  by  the  two  brigades  of  Hood 


*  Incredible  though  this  return  of  the  strength  of  Jackson's  two  divisions 
may  appear,  it  is  vouched  forxby  official  evidence.  So  reduced  had  his  num 
bers  become  by  the  heavy  losses  of  the  campaign,  and  by  the  great  straggling 
that  attended  the  march  through  Maryland,  that  Jackson's  old  (Stonewall) 
division  numbered  but  one  thousand  six  hundred  men.  General  J.  R.  Jones, 
who  commanded  this  division  at  Antietam,  says  of  it :  "  The  division  was  re 
duced  to  the  numbers  of  a  small  brigade,  and,  at  the  beginning  of  the  fight, 
numbered  not  over  one  thousand  six  hundred  men." — Reports  of  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia,  vol.  ii.,  pp.  222, 223.  Of  the  number  of  the  three  brigades  of 
Ewell's  division  holding  the  advanced  line,  General  Early,  who,  at  a  subse 
quent  part  of  the  day,  came  into  command  of  it,  reports  as  follows :  Lawton's 
brigade,  one  thousand  one  hundred  and  fifty ;  Hayes'  brigade,  five  hundred  and 
fifty  ;  Walker's  brigade,  seven  hundred.  This  would  make  a  total  for  the  two 
divisions  of  four  thousand  men — the  number  above  given. 

f  "  The  terrible  nature  of  the  conflict  in  which  these  brigades  had  been  en 
gaged,  and  the  steadiness  with  which  they  maintained  their  position,  is  shown 
by  the  losses  they  sustained.  They  did  not  retire  from  the  field  until  General 
Lawton  (commanding  division)  had  been  wounded  and  borne  from  the  field ; 
Colonel  Douglas,  commanding  Lawton's  brigade,  had  been  killed;  and  the 
brigade  had  sustained  a  loss  of  five  hundred  and  fifty-four  killed  and  wounded 
out  of  one  thousand  one  hundred  and  fifty,  losing  five  regimental  commanders 
out  of  six.  Hayes'  brigade  had  sustained  a  loss  of  three  hundred  and  twenty- 
three  out  of  five  hundred  and  fifty,  including  every  regimental  commander  and 
all  of  his  staff;  and  Colonel  Walker  and  one  of  his  staff  had  been  disabled,  and 
the  brigade  he  was  commanding  had  sustained  a  loss  of  two  hundred  and 
twenty-eight  out  of  less  than  seven  hundred  present,  including  three  out  of  foul 
regimental  commanders." — Ibid.,  pp.  190,  191. 


THE  MARYLAND   CAMPAIGN.  213 

that  had  moved  up  in  support,  issued  from  the  woods,  and 
threw  back  Meade's  line,  which  was  much  broken.  At  the 
same  time,  Ricketts'  division  on  the  left  became  hotly  en 
gaged  with  three  brigades  of  Hill's  division,  which  were  at 
this  time  closed  up  on  the  right  of  Jackson  in  support ;  and 
Hooker's  right  division,  under  Doubleday,  was  held  in  check 
by  the  fire  of  several  batteries  of  Stuart's  horse-artillery 
posted  on  commanding  ground  on  his  right  and  front. 

Hooker  had  suffered  severely  by  the  enemy's  fire ;  but, 
worse  still,  had  lost  nearly  half  his  effective  force  by  strag 
gling.*  In  this  state  of  facts,  his  offensive  power  was  com 
pletely  gone ;  and,  at  seven  o'clock,  Mansfield's  corps,  which 
had  crossed  the  Antietarn  during  the  night  and  lay  in  reserve 
a  mile  to  the  rear,  was  ordered  up  to  support  and  relieve 
Hooker's  troops.  Of  this  corps,  the  first  division,  under  Gen 
eral  Williams,  took  position  on  the  right,  and  the  second, 
under  General  Greene,  on  the  left.  During  the  deployment, 
that  veteran  soldier,  General  Mansfield,  fell  mortally  wounded. 
The  command  of  the  corps  fell  to  General  Williams,  and  the 
division  of  the  latter  to  General  Crawford,  who,  with  his  own 
and  Gordon's  brigade,  made  an  advance  across  the  open  field, 
and  succeeded  in  seizing  a  point  of  woods  on  the  west  side  of 
the  Hagerstown  road.  At  the  same  time,  Greene's  division 
on  the  left  was  able  to  clear  its  front,  and  crossed  into  the  left 
of  the  Duriker  church.  Yet  the  holding  of  the  positions  was 
attended  with  heavy  loss  ;  the  troops,  reduced  to  the  attempt 
to  hold  their  own,  began  to  waver  and  break,  and  General 
Hooker  was  being  carried  from  the  field  severely  wounded, 
when,  opportunely,  towards  nine  o'clock,  General  Sumner 
with  his  own  corps  reached  the  field. t 


*  McClellan  :  Report ;  Meade  :  Report. 

f  Of  the  extraordinary  statement  respecting  this  part  of  the  battle  made  by 
General  Hooker,  in  his  evidence  before  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the 
War,  it  must  be  said,  at  least,  that  it  is  not  justified  by  facts  :  "At  that  time 
[nine  o'clock],"  says  he,  "  my  troops  were  in  the  finest  spirit :  they  had 
whipped  Jackson,  and  compelled  the  enemy  to  fly,  throwing  away  their  arms, 
their  banners,  and  saving  themselves  as  best  they  could."  (Report,  vol.  i.,  p 


214          CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

The  battle  had  now  declared  itself  with  great  obstinacy  be 
tween  the  Union  right  and  Confederate  left  without  having 
burst  forth  on  any  other  part  of  the  line.  The  action  was 
fought  very  much  in  detail  by  both  sides — each,  as  from  time 
to  time  re-enforcements  reached  it,  being  able  to  claim  a 
partial  success.  Hooker,  after  driving  one  of  Jackson's  divi 
sions,  was  in  turn  forced  back  by  the  other ;  and  Mansfield's 
corps,  having  caused  this  to  retreat,  found  itself  overmastered 
by  the  fresh  battalions  of  Hood.*  The  combat,  though  very 
murderous  to  each  side,  had  been  quite  indecisive.  It  was  in 
this  situation  of  affairs  that  Sumner's  force  reached'  the 
ground;  and  it  seemed  at  first  that  this  preponderance  of 
weight  thrown  into  the  Union  scale  would  give  it  the  victory. 
The  troops  of  Jackson  and  Hood  had  been  so  severely  pun 
ished  as  to  leave  little  available  fight  in  them ;  so  that,  when 
Sumner  threw  Sedgwick's  divisions  on  his  right  across  the 
open  field  into  the  woods  opposite — the  woods  in  which 
Crawford  had  been  fighting — he  easily  drove  the  shattered 
Confederate  troops  before  him,  and  held  definitive  possession 
of  the  woods  around  the  Dunker  church.  At  the  same  time, 
Sumner  advanced  French's  division  on  what  had  hitherto 
been  the  left,  and  Bichardson's  division  still  further  to  the 
left  to  oppose  the  Confederate  centre  under  Hill.  Richardson 


581.)  Now  not  only  is  this  contradicted  by  the  facts  above  recited,  and  which 
are  derived  from  the  reports  of  both  sides  ;  but  General  Sumner,  who  at  the 
time  spoken  of  by  General  Hooker  reached  the  field,  says :  "  On  going  upon 
the  field  I  found  that  General  Hooker's  corps  had  been  dispersed  and  routed. 
I  passed  him  some  distance  in  the  rear,  where  he  had  been  carried  wounded, 
but  I  saw  nothing  of  his  corps  at  all  as  I  was  advancing  with  my  command  on 
the  field.  I  sent  one  of  my  staff-officers  to  find  where  they  were,  and  General 
Ricketts,  the  only  officer  we  could  find,  stated  that  he  could  not  raise  three 
hundred  men  of  the  corps."  Sumner :  Evidence  on  Antietam,  vol.  i.,  p.  368. 

*  General  Sumner  afterwards  held  the  following  language  in  regard  to 
these  partial  attacks  :  "  I  have  always  believed  that,  instead  of  sending  these 
troops  into  that  action  in  driblets,  had  General  McClellan  authorized  me  to 
march  these  forty  thousand  on  the  left  flank  of  the  enemy,  we  could  not  have 
failed  to  throw  them  right  back  in  front  of  the  other  divisions  of  our  army 
on  the  left."— Report  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  vol.  i.,  p.  368. 


THE  MARYLAND  CAMPAIGN.  215 

had  got  handsomely  to  work,  and  French  had  cleared  his 
front,  when  disaster  again  fell  on  the  fatal  right.  At  the 
moment  that  Sedgwick  appeared  to  grasp  victory  in  his 
hands,  and  the  troops  of  Jackson  and  Hood  were  retiring  in 
disorder,*  two  Confederate  divisions,  under  McLaws  and 
Walker,  taken  from  the  Confederate  right,  reached  the  field 
on  the  left,  and  immediately  turned  the  fortunes  of  the  day.f 
A  considerable  interval  had  been  left  between  Sunmer's  right 
division  under  Sedgwick  and  his  centre  division  under  French. 
Through  this  the  enemy  penetrated,  enveloping  Sedgwick' s 
left  flank,  and,  pressing  heavily  at  the  same  time  on  his  front, 
forced  him  out  of  the  woods  on  the  west  side  of  the  Hagers- 
town  road,  and  back  across  the  open  field  and  into  the  woods 
on  the  east  side  of  the  road — the  original  position  held  in  the 
morning.  J  The  Confederates,  content  with  dislodging  the 
Union  troops,  made  no  attempt  to  follow  up  their  advantage, 
but  retired  to  their  original  position  also. 

We  must  now  look  a  little  to  Sumner's  other  divisions — to 
French  and  Eichardson  on  his  centre  and  left.  When  the 
pressure  on  Sedgwick  became  the  hardest,  Sumner  sent 
orders  to  French  to  attack,  as  a  diversion  in  favor  of  the 
former.  French  obeyed,  with  the  brigades  of  Kimball  and 


*  Jackson  admits  that  his  troops  had  "  fallen  back  some  distance  to  the 
rear"  (Reports  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  vol.  ii.,  p.  104) ;  but  the  re 
ports  of  the  commanders  that  came  upon  the  ground  to  take  the  place  of  his 
troops  give  this  "  falling  back"  the  character  of  a  disorderly  rout. 

f  The  fact  that  it  was  the  oncoming  of  these  divisions  that  decided  the 
action  on  Sumner's  right  is  plainly  marked  by  the  time  of  their  arrival,  which 
is  put  down  in  all  the  Confederate  reports  at  ten  o'clock.  Sumner's  corps  had 
arrived  at  nine. 

J  Of  this  attack,  McLaws  says :  "  The  troops  were  immediately  engaged, 
driving  the  enemy  before  them  in  magnificent  style,  at  all  points,  sweeping  the 
woods  with  perfect  ease.  They  were  driven  not  only  through  the  woods,  but 
over  a  field  in  front  of  the  woods,  and  over  two  high  fences  beyond,  and  into 
another  body  of  woods  over  half  a  mile  distant  from  the  commencement  of  the 
fight." — Reports  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  vol.  ii.,  p.  170.  See  also 
reports  of  his  brigade  commanders — Semnes,  Ibid.,  p.  349 ;  Barksdale,  p.  351  ; 
Kershaw,  p.  353. 


216          CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

Weber,  and  succeeded  in  forcing  back  the  enemy  to  a  sunken 
road  which  runs  almost  at  right  angles  with  the  Hagerstown 
road.  This  position  was  held  by  the  division  of  D.  H.  Hill, 
three  of  whose  brigades  had  been  advanced  to  assist  Jackson 
in  his  morning  attacks ;  and  it  was  these  that  were  assailed 
by  French  and  driven  back  in  disorder  to  the  sunken  road.* 
Uniting  here  with  the  other  brigades  of  Hill,  they  received 
the  attacks  both  of  French  and  of  [Richardson's  division  to 
his  left. 

The  latter  division  was  composed  of  the  brigades  of 
Meagher,  Caldwell,  and  Brooke.  Meagher  first  attacked,  and 
fought  his  way  to  the  possession  of  a  crest  overlooking  the 
sunken  road  in  which  Hill's  line  was  posted.  After  sustaining 
a  severe  musketry  fire,  by  which  it  lost  severely,  this  brigade, 
its  ammunition  being  expended,  was  relieved  by  the  brigade 
of  Caldwell — the  former  breaking  by  companies  to  the  rear, 
and  the  latter  by  companies  to  the  front.  Caldwell  immedi 
ately  became  engaged  in  a  very  determined  combat,  and  was 
supported  by  part  of  Brooke's  brigade,  the  rest  of  the  latter 
being  posted  on  the  right  to  thwart  an  effort  on  the  part  of 
the  enemy  to  flank  in  that  direction.  The  action  here  was  of 
a  very  animated  nature ;  for  Hill,  being  re-enforced  by  the 
division  of  Anderson,t  assumed  a  vigorous  offensive,  and  en 
deavored  to  seize  a  piece  of  high  ground  on  the  Union  left, 


*  These  brigades  were  respectively  those  of  Colquitt,  Ripley,  and  McRae ; 
and  General  Hill  mentions  the  following  curious  circumstance  as  the  cause  of 
the  repulge  that  befell  them :  "  The  men  advanced  with  alacrity,  secured  a 
good  position,  and  were  fighting  bravely,  when  Captain  Thompson,  Fifth  North 
Carolina,  cried  out,  '  They  are  flanking  us !'  This  cry  spread  like  an  electric 
shock  along  the  ranks,  bringing  up  vivid  recollections  of  the  flank  fire  at  South 
Mountain.  In  a  moment  they  broke  and  fell  to  the  rear.  Efforts  were  made 
to  rally  them  in  the  bed  of  an  old  road,  nearly  at  right  angles  to  the  Hagers 
town  pike,  and  which  had  been  their  position  previous  to  the  advance." — Re 
ports  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  vol.  ii.,  p.  115. 

f  "  In  the  mean  time,  General  R.  H.  Anderson  reported  to  me  with  some 
three  or  four  thousand  men  as  re-enforcements  to  my  command.  I  directed 
him  to  form  immediately  behind  my  men." — Hill :  Reports  of  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia,  vol.  ii.,  p.  116. 


THE  MARYLAND  CAMPAIGN.  217 

with  the  view  of  turning  that  flank.  This  manoeuvre  was, 
however,  frustrated  by  the  skill  and  promptitude  of  Colonel 
Cross  of  the  Fifth  New  Hampshire  (Caldwell's  brigade),  who, 
detecting  the  danger,  moved  his  regiment  towards  the  men 
aced  point.  Between  his  command  and  the  Confederate  force 
there  then  ensued  a  spirited  contest — each  endeavoring  to 
reach  the  high  ground,  and  both  delivering  their  fire  as  they 
marched  in  parallel  lines  4by  the  flank.*  The  race  was  won 
by  Cross.  The  effort  to  flank  on  the  right  was  handsomely 
checked  by  Brooke,  French,  and  Barlow — the  latter  of  whom, 
changing  front  with  his  two  regiments  obliquely  to  the  right, 
poured  in  a  rapid  fire,  compelling  the  surrender  of  three 
hundred  prisoners  with  two  standards.  A  vigorous  direct 
attack  was  then  made,  and  the  troops  succeeded  in  carrying 
the  sunken  road  and  the  position,  in  advance,  around  what  is 
known  as  Piper's  House,  which,  being  a  defensible  building, 
formed,  with  its  surroundings,  the  citadel  of  the  enemy's 
strength  at  this  part  of  the  line.  The  enemy  was  so  much 
disorganized  in  this  repulse  that  only  a  few  hundred  men 
were  rallied  on  a  crest  near  the  Hagerstown  road.  This  slight 
array  formed  the  whole  Confederate  centre  ;  and  there  is  little 
doubt  that  a  more  energetic  following  up  of  the  success 
gained  would  have  carried  this  position  and  fatally  divided 
Lee's  wings. f  The  few  Confederates  showed  a  very  bold 
front,  however,  and,  deceived  by  this,  Richardson  contented 


*  Report  of  Richardson's  division.  (This  report  is  made  by  General  Han 
cock,  who  was  assigned  to  the  command  on  the  field-  of  Antietam — General 
Richardson  having  been  mortally  wounded  during  the  forenoon.) 

f  This  inference  is  strongly  justified  by  the  evidence  of  the  Confederate  re 
ports.  General  Hill  says :  "  There  were  no  troops  near  to  hold  the  centre 
except  a  few  hundred  rallied  from  various  brigades.  The  Yankees  crossed  the 
old  road,  which  we  had  occupied  in  the  morning,  and  occupied  an  orchard  and 
cornfield  in  advance  of  it.  Affairs  looked  very  critical.  They  had  now  got 
within  a  few  hundred  yards  of  the  hill  which  commanded  Sliarpsburg  and  our 
rear.  I  was  satisfied,  however,  that  the  Yankees  were  so  demoralized  that  a 
single  regiment  of  fresh  men  could  drive  the  whole  of  them  in  our  front  across 
the  Antietam.  I  got  up  about  two  hundred  men,  who  said  that  they  were  will- 
Ing  to  advance  to  the  attack  if  I  would  lead  them.  We  met,  however,  with  a 


218  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

himself  with  taking  up  a  position  to  hold  what  was  already 
won. 

Three  out  of  the  six  corps  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
and  they  the  strongest,  had  thus  been  drawn  into  the  seeth 
ing  vortex  of  action  on  the  right ;  and  each  in  succession, 
while  exacting  heavy  damage  of  the  enemy,  had  been  so  pun 
ished  as  to  lose  all  offensive  energy ;  so  that  noon  found  them 
simply  holding  their  own.  Porte*  with  his  small  reserve 
corps,  numbering  some  fifteen  thousand  men,  held  the  centre, 
while  Burnside  remained  inactive  on  the  left,  not  having  yet 
passed  the  Antietam.*  Now,  between  twelve  and  one  o'clock, 
Franklin  with  two  divisions  of  his  corps,  under  Slocum  and 
W.  F.  Smith  (Couch  remaining  behind  to  occupy  Maryland 
Heights),  reached  the  field  of  battle,  from  where  the  action  at 
Crampton's  Pass  had  left  him.  General  McClellan  had  de 
signed  retaining  Franklin  on  the  east  side  of  the  Antietam, 
to  operate  on  either  flank  or  on  the  centre,  as  circumstances 
might  require.  But  by  the  time  he  neared  the  field,  the 
strong  opposition  developed  by  the  attacks  of  Hooker  and 
Sumner  rendered  it  necessary  for  him  to  be  immediately 
pushed  over  the  creek  to  the  assistance  of  the  right. t  The 
arrival  of  Franklin  was  opportune,  for  Lee  had  now  accu 
mulated  so  heavily  on  his  left,  and  the  repulse  of  Sumner 's 
right  under  Sedgwick  had  been  so  easily  effected,  that  the 
enemy  began  to  show  a  disposition  to  resume  the  offensive — 
directing  his  efforts  against  that  still  loose-jointed  portion  of 
Sumner's  harness,  between  his  right  and  centre.  General 

warm  reception,  and  the  little  command  was  broken  and  dispersed.  Colonel 
Iverson  had  gathered  up  about  two  hundred  men,  and  I  sent  them  to  the  right 
to  attack  the  Yankees  in  flank.  They  drove  them  back  a  short  distance,  but, 
in  turn,  were  repulsed.  These  two  attacks,  however,  had  a  most  happy  effect. 
The  Yankees  were  completely  deceived  by  their  boldness,  and  induced  to  be 
lieve  that  there  was  a  large  force  in  our  centre." — Reports  of  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia,  vol.  ii.,  p.  117. 

*  The  left  of  Sumner's  command  was  sustained  by  Pleasonton's  cavalry  di 
vision  and  the  horse  batteries,  to  whose  support  most  of  Sykes'  division 
(Porter's  corps)  in  the  afternoon  crossed  the  Antietam 

f  McClellan :  Report,  pp.  385,  386. 


THE  MARYLAND   CAMPAIGN.  219 

Smith,  with  quick  perception  of  the  needs  of  the  case,  of  his 
own  accord  filled  up  this  interval  with  a  part  of  his  division ; 
and  his  third  brigade,  under  Colonel  Irwin,  charged  forward 
with  much  impetuosity,  and  drove  back  the  advance  until 
abreast  the  Dunker  church.  Though  Irwin  could  not  hold 
what  he  had  wrested  from  the  Confederates,  his  boldness, 
seconded  by  another  charge  made  soon  after  by  the  Seventh 
Maine  Regiment  alone,  served  to  quell  the  enemy's  aggressive 
ardor.  Franklin  then  formed  the  rest  of  his  available  force 
in  a  column  of  assault,  with  the  intent  to  make  another  effort 
to  gain  the  enemy's  stronghold  in  the  rocky  woodland  west 
of  the  Hagerstown  turnpike — the  woods  Hooker  had  striven 
for,  and  Sunnier  had  snatched  and  lost.  But  Sumner  having 
command  on  the  right,  now  intervened  to  postpone  further 
operations  on  that  flank,  as  he  judged  the  repulse  of  the  only 
remaining  corps  available  for  attack  would  peril  the  safety  of 
the  whole  army.* 

It  is  now  necessary  to  look  to  the  other  end  of  the  Union 
line,  held  by  the  Ninth  Corps  under  Burnside.  This  force 
lay  massed  behind  the  heights  on  the  east  bank  of  the 
Antietam,  and  opposite  the  Confederate  right,  which  it  was 
designed  he  should  assail  after  forcing  the  passage  of  the 
Antietam  by  the  lower  stone-bridge.  The  part  assigned  to 
General  Burnside  was  of  the  highest  importance,  for  a 
successful  attack  by  him  upon  the  Confederate  right  would, 
by  carrying  the  Sharpsburg  crest,  force  Lee  from  his  line  of 
retreat  by  way  of  Shepherdstown.  General  McClellan,  ap 
preciating  the  full  effect  of  an  attack  by  his  left,  directed 
Burnside  early  in  the  morning  to  hold  his  troops  in  readinessf 
to  assault  the  bridge  in  his  front.  Then,  at  eight  o'clock,  on 
learning  how  much  opposition  had  been  developed  by  Hooker, 
he  ordered  Burnside  to  carry  the  bridge,  gain  possession  of 


*  Franklin :  Report  of  Antietam. 

f  "  Early  on  the  morning  of  the  17th,  I  ordered  General  Burnside  to  form 
his  troops  and  hold  them  in  readiness  to  assault  the  bridge  in  Ms  front  and  to 
await  further  orders."— McClellan  :  Report,  p.  389. 


220  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  AKMY  OF    THE  POTOMAC. 

the  heights,  and  advance  along  their  crest  upon  Sharpsburg,* 
as  a  diversion  in  favor  of  the  right.  Burnside's  tentatives 
were  frivolous  in  their  character ;  and  hour  after  hour  went 
by,  during  which  the  need  of  his  assistance  became  more  and 
more  imperative,  and  McClellan's  commands  more  and  more 
urgent.  Five  hours,  in  fact,  passed,  and  the  action  on  the 
right  had  been  concluded  in  such  manner  as  has  been  seen, 
before  the  work  that  should  have  been  done  in  the  morning 
was  accomplished.  Encouraged  by  the  ease  with  which  the 
left  of  the  Union  force  was  held  in  check,  Lee  was  free  to 
remove  two-thirds  of  the  right  wing  under  Longstreet — 
namely,  the  divisions  of  McLaws  and  Walker — and  this  force 
he  applied  at  the  point  of  actual  conflict  on  his  left,  where, 
as  has  already  been  seen,  the  arrival  of  these  divisions  served 
to  check  Sumner  in  his  career  of  victory,  and  hurl  back  Sedg- 
wick.  This  step  the  Confederate  commander  never  would 
have  ventured  on  had  there  been  any  vigor  displayed  on  the 
part  of  the  confronting  force  ;  yet  this  heavy  detachment 
having  been  made  from  the  hostile  right,  should  have  ren 
dered  the  task  assigned  to  General  Burnside  one  of  com 
parative  ease,  for  it  left  on  that  entire  wing  but  a  single  hos 
tile  division  of  twenty-five  hundred  men  under  General  Jones, 
and  the  force  actually  present  to  dispute  the  passage  of  the 
bridge  did  not  exceed  four  hundred.f  Nevertheless,  it  was 
one  o'clock,  and  after  the  action  on  the  right  had  been  deter 
mined,  before  a  passage  was  effected ;  and  this  being  done, 
two  hours  passed  before  the  attack  of  the  crest  was  made.J 

*  McClellan :  Report,  p.  390. 

f  These  statements,  surprising  though  they  may  seem,  are  not  made  at 
random,  but  rest  on  a  sure  basis  of  official  evidence.  General  Jones,  who 
commanded  the  entire  right,  says :  "  When  it  is  known  that  on  that  morning 
my  whole  command  of  six  brigades,  comprised  only  two  thousand  four  hun 
dred  and  thirty  men,  the  enormous  disparity  of  force  with  which  I  contended 
can  be  seen." — Reports  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  vol.  ii.,  p.  219. 
The  force  covering  the  bridge-head  consisted  of  two  regiments  under  General 
Toombs,  numbering  four  hundred  and  three  men. — Ibid. 

^  "  Though  the  bridge  and  upper  ford  were  thus  left  open  to  the  enemy,  he 
moved  with  such  extreme  caution  and  slowness,  that  he  lost  nearly  two  hours 


THE  MARYLAND  CAMPAIGN.  221 

This  was  successfully  executed  at  three  o'clock,  the  Sharps- 
burg  ridge  being  carried  and  a  Confederate  battery  that  had 
been  delivering  an  annoying  fire,  captured.  It  was  one  of  the 
many  unfortunate  results  of  the  long  delay  in  this  operation 
on  the  left  that  just  as  this  success  was  gained,  the  division  of 
A.  P.  Hill,  which  Jackson  had  left  behind  to  receive  the  sur 
render  of  Harper's  Ferry,  reached  the  field  from  that  place  by 
way  of  Shepherdstown,*  and  uniting  his  own  re-enforcement 
of  two  thousand  menf  with  the  troops  of  Jones  that  had  been 
broken  through  in  the  attack,  he  assumed  the  offensive, 
recaptured  the  battery,  and  drove  back  Burnside  over  ah1  the 
ground  gained,  and  to  the  shelter  of  the  bluff  bordering  the 
Antietam.  Tliis  closed  the  action  on  the  left,  and  as  that  on 
the  right  had  been  suspended,  the  battle  ceased  for  the  day. 
It  was  found  that  the  losses  on  the  Union  side  made  an  ag 
gregate  in  killed  and  wounded  of  twelve  thousand  five  hun 
dred  men ;  while  the  Confederate  loss  proves  to  have  been 
above  eight  thousand.^ 


in  crossing  and  getting  into  action  on  our  side  of  the  river ;  about  which 
time  General  A.  P.  Hill's  division  arrived  from  Harper's  Ferry." — Toombs' 
Report :  Ibid.,  p.  324. 

*  This  conjuncture  is  obtained  by  a  comparison  of  the  time  of  the  attack 
and  of  the  arrival  of  Hill.  The  assault  was  made  about  three  o'clock,  and 
Hill  began  to  arrive  about  half-past  two.  "  The  head  of  my  column  arrived 
upon  the  battle-field  of  Sharpsburg,  a  distance  of  seventeen  miles,  at  half-past 
two,  and,  reporting  in  person  to  General  Lee,  he  directed  me  to  take  position 
on  our  right." — Hill :  Reports  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  vol.  ii.,  p.  128. 

f  "  The  three  brigades  of  my  division  actively  engaged  did  not  number 
over  two  thousand  men,  and  these,  with  the  help  of  my  splendid  batteries, 
drove  back  Burnside's  corps  of  fifteen  thousand  men."— Hill :  Ibid.,  p.  129. 
It  appears,  however,  from  Toombs'  Report  (Ibid.,  p.  325),  that  his  brigade  also 
aided  in  this  counter-attack. 

\  I  give  this  only  as  an  approximate  estimate.  General  Lee  gives  his  ag 
gregate  loss  in  killed  and  wounded  in  the  Maryland  campaign  as  ten  thousand 
two  hundred  and  ninety-one.  As  the  killed  and  wounded  in  all  the  other  ac 
tions  save  Antietam  were  not  above  two  thousand  two  hundred  and  ninety- 
one,  it  leaves  about  eight  thousand  for  the  casualties  of  that  battle.  General 
McClellan  states  that  about  two  thousand  seven  hundred  of  the  Confederate 
dead  were  buried ;  and  taking  this  as  a  basis,  and  counting  the  usual  proper- 


222  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE   ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

The  morning  of  the  18th  brought  with  it  the  grave  question 
for  McClellan  whether  to  renew  the  attack  or  to  defer  it, 
even  with  the  risk  of  Lee's  retirement.  After  anxious  de 
liberation,  he  resolved  to  defer  attack*  during  the  18th,  with 
the  determination,  however,  to  renew  it  on  the  19th,  if 
re-enforcements,  expected  from  Washington,  should  arrive. 
But  during  the  night  of  the  18th,  Lee  withdrew  across  the 
Potomac,  and  by  morning  he  stood  again  with  his  army  on 
the  soil  of  Virginia.  This  inactivity  of  McClellan  after  An- 
tietam,  has  been  made  the  theme  for  so  much  animadversion, 
that  it  may  be  proper  to  set  forth  briefly  the  facts  that 
should  guide  criticism  in  this  case. 

It  should  first  of  all  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  action  at 
Antietam,  though  a  victory  in  its  results,  seeing  that  it  so 
crippled  Lee's  force  as  to  put  an  end  to  the  invasion,  was 
tactically  a  drawn  battle — a  battle  in  which  McClellan  had 
suffered  as  much  as  he  had  inflicted.  In  such  cases,  it  re 
quires  in  the  commander  a  high  order  of  moral  courage  to 
renew  battle.  An  ordinary  general,  overwhelmed  with  his 
own  losses,  the  sum  and  details  of  which  forcibly  strike  his 
mind,  and  powerfully  appeal  to  his  sensibilities,  is  apt  to  lose 
sight  of  those  equal,  or  perhaps  greater,  suffered  by  the 
enemy;  and  hence  indecision,  timidity,  and  consequent  in 
action.  What  McClellan  knew  was  that  the  battle  had  cost 
the  terrible  sacrifice  of  over  twelve  thousand  men ;  that  two 
of  his  corps  were  completely  shattered,  and  that  his  oldest 
generals  counselled  a  cessation  of  operations.  He  did  not 
know,  what  is  now  a  matter  of  historic  certainty,  that  the 
Confederate  army  was  by  this  time  frightfully  disorganized 
and  almost  at  the  end  of  its  supplies  both  of  food  and  am 
munition.  The  general  situation  was,  moreover,  such  as  to 
inspire  a  circumspect  policy  on  the  part  of  McClellan ;  for 
Virginia  had  been  lost,  and  Maryland  was  invaded,  and  his 

tion  of  five  wounded  to  one  killed,  the  aggregate  would  be  very  much  in  excess 
of  General  Lee's  statement.  But  it  is  needless  to  sound  deeper  in  this  sea  of 
blood. 

*  aicClellan's  Report,  p.  211, 


THE  MARYLAND  CAMPAIGN.  223 

army  was  all  that  stood  between  Lee  and  Washington,  Balti 
more,  and  Philadelphia. 

The  conduct  of  a  commander  should  be  judged  from  the 
facts  actually  known  to  him  ;  and  these  were  the  facts  known 
to  General  McClellan.  Nevertheless,  I  make  bold  to  say 
(and  in  doing  so  I  think  I  am  seconded  by  the  opinion  of  a 
majority  of  the  ablest  officers  then  in  the  army*),  that  Gen 
eral  McClellan  should  have  renewed  the  attack  on  the  morn 
ing  of  the  18th.  This  opinion  is  grounded  in  two  reasons — 
the  one,  general  in  its  nature ;  the  other,  specific  and  tactical. 

If  it  is  possible  to  imagine  a  conjuncture  of  circumstances 
that  would  authorize  a  general  to  act  a  Voutrance  and  with 
out  too  nice  a  calculation  of  risks,  it  is  when  confronting  an 
enemy  who,  having  moved  far  from  his  base,  has  crossed  the 
frontier,  and  being  foiled  in  his  plan  of  invasion,  is  seeking 
to  make  good  his  retreat.  This  was  the  situation  of  Lee. 
He  was  removed  a  very  great  distance  from  his  base  ;  his  plan 
of  campaign  had  been  baulked ;  his  army,  reduced  to  half 
the  effective  of  that  of  his  opponent,  was  in  a  condition  of 
great  demoralization,  and  he  had  a  difficult  river  at  his  back. 
McClellan  stood  on  his  base,  with  every  thing  at  his  hand, 
and  his  troops,  doing  battle  on  loyal  soil,  fought  with  a  verve 
and  moral  force  they  never  had  in  Virginia  and  could  be 
called  on  for  unwonted  exertion. 

But  in  addition  to  these  considerations  there  is  a  special 
reason  that  promised  a  more  successful  result  of  an  attack  on 
the  18th  than  that  which  had  attended  the  action  of  the  17th. 
The  battle-field  was  by  this  time  better  understood ;  and 
notably  General  McClellan  had  had  his  attention  directed  to 
that  commanding  ground  on  the  right,  before  mentioned, 
which  formed  the  key-point  of  the  field ;  but  which,  strange 
to  say,  had  been  overlooked  the  day  before.  It  was  proposed 
to  seize  this  point  with  a  part  of  Franklin's  corps ;  and  had 

*  I  may  here  say  that  this  opinion  is  shared  by  General  Franklin,  an  officer 
distinguished  for  the  maturity  of  his  military  judgments.  He,  at  the  time 
urged  a  renewal  of  the  attack  on  the  morning  of  the  18th. 


224  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

this  been  done,  Jackson's  position  would  have  been  wholly 
untenable.  Besides,  Burnside  held  the  debouche  of  the  bridge 
on  the  extreme  left,  and  threatened  the  Confederate  right; 
and  Porter's  corps  was  fresh — having  been  in  reserve  the  day 
previous.  If  these  considerations  may  be  regarded  as  over 
ruling  the  reasons  that  prompted  McClellan  to  postpone  at 
tack,  then  his  conduct  must  be  looked  upon  as  an  error. 

The  Confederate  campaign  in  Maryland  lasted  precisely 
two  weeks.  Its  failure  was  signal.  Designed  as  an  invasion, 
it  degenerated  into  a  raid.  Aiming  to  raise  the  standard  of 
revolt  in  Maryland,  and  rally  the  citizens  of  that  State  around 
the  secession  cause,  it  resulted  in  the  almost  complete  dis 
ruption  of  that  army  itself.  Instead  of  the  flocks  of  recruits 
he  had  expected,  Lee  was  doomed  to  the  mortification  of 
seeing  his  force  disintegrating  so  rapidly  as  to  threaten  its 
utter  dissolution,  and  he  confessed  with  anguish  that  his 
army  was  "  ruined  by  straggling.'7  *  Having,  therefore,  lost 
all  illusion  respecting  co-operation  in  Maryland,  on  which 
he  had  counted  so  confidently,  it  is  not  probable  that  Lee 
would  have  sought  to  push  the  invasion  far,  even  had  its 
military  incidents  turned  out  better  for  him ;  but  from  the 
moment  he  set  foot  across  the  Potomac  circumstances  so 
shaped  themselves  as  to  thwart  his  designs.  The  retention  of 
the  garrison  at  Harper's  Ferry  compelled  him  to  turn  aside 

*  The  Confederate  reports  are  replete  with  evidence  of  the  enormous  strag 
gling  that  attended  the  Maryland  campaign.  Says  Lee :  "  The  arduous  service 
in  which  our  troops  had  been  engaged,  their  great  privations  of  rest  and  food, 
and  the  long  marches  without  shoes  over  mountain  roads,  had  greatly  reduced 
our  ranks  before  the  action  began.  These  causes  had  compelled  thousands  of 
brave  men  to  absent  themselves,  and  many  more  had  done  so  from  unworthy  mo 
tives.  This  great  battle  was  fought  by  less  than  forty  thousand  men  on  our 
side." — Report,  p.  35.  Says  Hill :  "  Had  all  our  stragglers  been  up,  McClellan's 
army  would  have  been  completely  crushed  or  annihilated.  Thousands  of  thiev 
ish  poltroons  had  kept  away  from  sheer  cowardice.  The  straggler  is  generally 
a  thief,  and  always  a  coward,  lost  to  all  sense  of  shame :  he  can  only  be  kept  in 
the  ranks  by  a  strict  and  sanguinary  discipline." — Reports  of  Maryland  Cam 
paign,  vol.  ii.,  p.  119. 


THE  MARYLAND  CAMPAIGN.  225 

and  reduce  that  place.  This  required  the  presence  of  his 
whole  army  to  cover  the  operation;  and  before  it  was  com 
pleted,  McClellan  had  come  up  and  forced  him  into  a  corner, 
so  that  he  never  was  able  to  carry  out  his  original  design  of 
taking  up  a  position  in  Western  Maryland,  whence  to  threaten 
Pennsylvania.  Crippled  at  Antietam,  he  was  fain  to  cross 
the  Potomac,  and  seek  in  Virginia  the  opportunity  to  gather 
up  the  fragments  of  his  shattered  strength;  for  he  had  no 
longer  the  army  with  which  the  campaign  was  begun.  More 
than  thirty  thousand  men  of  the  seventy  thousand  with  which 
he  set  out  from  Eichmond,  were  already  dead  or  hors  de 
combat.  The  remainder  were  in  a  sorry  plight.  Both  armies 
in  fact  felt  the  need  of  some  repose ;  and,  glad  to  be  freed 
from  each  other's  presence,*  they  rested  on  their  arms — the 
Confederates  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  in  the  vicinity  of 
Winchester,  and  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  near  the  scene  of 
its  late  exploits,  amid  the  picturesque  hills  and  vales  of 
Southwestern  Maryland. 


III. 
CLOSE   OF   McCLELLAN'S   CAREER. 

The  movement  from  Washington  into  Maryland  to  meet 
Lee's  invasion,  was  defensive  in  its  purpose,  though  it  asr 
sumed  the  character  of  a  defensive-offensive  campaign.  Now 
that  this  had  been  accomplished  and  Lee  driven  across 
the  frontier,  it  remained  to  organize  on  an  adequate  scale  the 
means  of  a  renewal  of  grand  offensive  operations  directed  at 
the  Confederate  army  and  towards  Eichmond.  The  comple 
tion  of  this  work,  including  the  furnishing  of  transportation, 
clothing,  supplies,  etc.,  required  upwards  of  a  month,  and 


*  On  the  retreat  of  Lee,  a  not  very  judicious  pursuit  into  Virginia  was  made 
by  a  part  of  Porter's  corps,  but  tile  pursuing  column  was  soon  driven  back 
across  the  Potomac  with  considerable  loss. 

15 


226  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  AKMT  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

during  this  period  no  military  movement  occurred,  with  the 
exception  of  a  raid  into  Pennsylvania  by  Stuart.  About  the 
middle  of  October,  that  enterprising  officer,  with  twelve  or 
fifteen  hundred  troopers,  crossed  the  Potomac  above  Williams- 
port,  passed  through  Maryland,  penetrated  Pennsylvania, 
occupied  Chambersburg,  where  he  burnt  considerable  govern 
ment  stores,  and  after  making  the  entire  circuit  of  the  Union 
army,  recrossed  the  Potomac  below  the  mouth  of  the  Monoc- 
acy.  He  was  all  the  way  closely  pursued  by  Pleasonton  with 
eight  hundred  cavalry,  but  though  that  officer  marched 
seventy-eight  miles  in  twenty-four  hours,  he  was  unable  to 
intercept  or  overtake  his  fast-riding  rival. 

On  the  recrossing  of  the  Potomac  by  Lee  after  Antietam, 
McClellan  hastened  to  seize  the  debouche  of  the  Shenandoah 
Valley,  by  the  possession  of  Harper's  Ferry.  Two  corps 
were  posted  in  its  vicinity,  and  the  Potomac  and  Shenandoah 
spanned  by  ponton-bridges.  At  first  McClellan  contemplated 
pushing  his  advance  against  Lee  directly  down  the  Shenan 
doah  Valley,  as  he  found  that,  by  the  adoption  of  the  line 
east  of  the  Blue  Eidge,  his  antagonist,  finding  the  door  open, 
would  again  cross  to  Maryland.  But  this  danger  being  re 
moved  by  the  oncoming  of  the  season  of  high-water  in  the 
Potomac,  McClellan  determined  to  operate  by  the  east  side  of 
the  Blue  Eidge,  and  on  the  26th  his  advance  crossed  the 
Potomac  by  a  ponton-bridge  at  Berlin,  five  miles  below  Har 
per's  Ferry.  By  the  2d  November  the  entire  army  had 
crossed  at  that  point.  Advancing  due  southward  towards 
"Warrenton,  he  masked  the  movement  by  guarding  the  passes 
of  the  Blue  Eidge,  and  by  threatening  to  issue  through  these, 
he  compelled  Lee  to  retain  Jackson  in  the  Valley.  With 
such  success  was  this  movement  managed,  that  on  reaching 
Warrenton  on  the  9th,  while  Lee  had  sent  half  of  his  army 
forward  to  Culpepper  to  oppose  McClellan's  advance  in  that 
direction,  the  other  half  was  still  west  of  the  Blue  Eidge, 
scattered  up  and  down  the  Valley,  and  separated  from  the 
other  moiety  by  at  least  two  days'  march.  McClellan's  next 
projected  move  was  to  strike  across  obliquely  westward  and 


THE  MAEYLAND  CAMPAIGN.  227 

interpose  between  the  severed  divisions  of  the  Confederate 
force;  but  this  step  he  was  prevented  from  taking  by  his 
sudden  removal  from  the  command  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  while  on  the  march  to  Warrenton.  Late  on  the 
night  of  November  7th,  amidst  a  heavy  snow-storm,  General 
Buckingham,  arriving  post-haste  from  Washington,  reached 
the  tent  of  General  McClellan  at  Rectortown.  He  was  the 
bearer  of  the  following  dispatch,  which  he  handed  to  Genera] 
McClellan : 

GENERAL  ORDERS,  No.  182. 

WAR  DEPARTMENT,  AD  JUT  ANT- GENERAL'S  OFFICE, 
WASHINGTON,  November  5,  1862. 

By  direction  of  the  President  of  the  United  States,  it  is  ordered  that 
Major-General  McClellan  be  relieved  from  the  command  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,    and  that  Major-General  Burnside   take  the  command  of  that 
army. 
By  order  of  the  Secretary  of  War. 

E.  D.  TOWNSEND, 
Assistant  Adjutant-General. 

It  chanced  that  General  Burnside  was  at  the  moment  with 
him  in  his  tent.  Opening  the  dispatch  and  reading  it,  with 
out  a  change  of  countenance  or  of  voice,  McClellan  passed 
over  the  paper  to  his  successor,  saying,  as  he  did  so  :  "  Well,. 
Burnside,  you  are  to  command  the  army."  * 

Thus  ended  the  career  of  McClellan  as  head  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac — an  army  which  he  had  first  fashioned,  and  then- 
led  in  its  maiden  but  checkered  experience,  till  it  became 
a  mighty  host,  formed  to  war,  and  baptized  in  fierce  battles 
and  renowned  campaigns.  From  the  exposition  I  have  given 
of  the  relations  which  had  grown  up  between  him  and  those 
who  controlled  the  war-councils  at  Washington,  it  will  have 
appeared  that,  were  these  relations  to  continue,  it  would  have 
been  better  to  have  even  before  this  removed  McClellan— 
better  for  himself,  and  better  for  the  country.  This,  indeed, 

*  Hurlbut :  McClellan  and  the  Conduct  of  the  War. 


228  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

was  practically  done,  when,  on  the  return  from  the  Peninsula, 
his  troops  were  sent  forward  to  join  Pope ;  but  the  disastrous 
termination  of  that  campaign  prompted  the  recall  of  McClel- 
lan  as  the  only  man  who  could  make  the  army  efficient  for 
the  trying  emergency.  Having  accomplished  his  work  of 
expelling  Lee  from  Maryland,  he  entered,  after  a  brief  repose, 
on  a  new  campaign  of  invasion ;  and  it  was  in  the  midst  of 
this,  and  on  the  eve  of  a  decisive  blow,  that  he  was  suddenly 
removed.  The  moment  chosen  was  an  inopportune  and  an 
ungracious  one ;  for  never  had  McClellan  acted  with  such 
vigor  and  rapidity — -never  had  he  shown  so  much  confidence 
in  himself  or  the  army  in  him.  And  it  is  a  notable  fact  that 
not  only  was  the  whole  body  of  the  army — rank  and  file  as 
well  as  officers — enthusiastic  in  their  affection  for  his  person, 
but  that  the  very  general  appointed  as  his  successor  was  the 
strongest  opponent  of  his  removal. 

The  military  character  of  McClellan  will  not  be  difficult  to 
define,  however  much  it  is  yet  obscured  by  malicious  detrac 
tion  on  the  one  hand,  or  blind  admiration  on  the  other. 
He  was  assuredly  not  a  great  general ;  for  he  had  the  pedan 
try  of  war  rather  than  the  inspiration  of  war.  His  talent 
was  eminently  that  of  the  cabinet ;  and  his  proper  place  was 
in  "Washington,  where  he  should  have  remained  as  general-in- 
chief.  Here  his  ability  to  plan  campaigns  and  form  large 
strategic  combinations,  which  was  remarkable,  would  have  had 
full  scope  ;  and  he  would  have  been  considerate  and  helpful 
to  those  in  the  field.  But  his  power  as  a  tactician  was  much  in 
ferior  to  his  talent  as  a  strategist,  and  he  executed  less  boldly 
than  he  conceived  :  not  appearing  to  know  well  those  counters 
with  which  a  commander  must  work — time,  place,  and  circum 
stance.  Yet  he  was  improving  in  this  regard,  and  was  like 
Turenne,  of  whom  Napoleon  said  that  he  was  the  only  exam 
ple  of  a  general  who  grew  bolder  as  he  grew  older. 

To  General  McClellan  personally  it  wa&  a  misfortune  thai 
he  became  so  prominent  a  figure  at  the  commencement  of  the 
contest ;  for  it  was  inevitable  that  the  first  leaders  should  be 
sacrificed  to  the  nation's  ignorance  of  war.  Taking  this  into 


THE  MARYLAND  CAMPAIGN.  229 

account,  estimating  both  what  he  accomplished  and  what  he 
failed  to  accomplish,  in  the  actual  circumstances  of  his  per 
formance,  I  have  endeavored  in  the  critique  of  his  campaigns 
to  strike  a  just  balance  between  McClellan  and  history.  Of 
him  it  may  be  said,  that  if  he  does  not  belong  to  that  fore 
most  category  of  commanders  made  up  of  those  who  have 
always  been  successful,  and  including  but  a  few  illustrious 
names,  neither  does  he  rank  with  that  numerous  class  who 
have  ruined  their  armies  without  fighting.  He  ranges  with 
that  middle  category  of  meritorious  commanders,  who,  like 
Sertorius,  Wallenstein,  and  William  of  Orange,  generally  un 
fortunate  in  war,  yet  were,  in  the  words  of  Marmont,  "  never 
destroyed  nor  discouraged,  but  were  always  able  to  oppose  a 
menacing  front,  and  make  the  enemy  pay  dear  for  what  he 
gained." 


230  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 


YTL 

THE  CAMPAIGN  ON  THE  RAPPAHANNOCK 

NOVEMBER,  1862— JANUARY,  1863. 


I. 
CHANGE  OF  BASE  TO  FREDERICKSBURG. 

To  the  general  on  whose  shoulders  was  placed  at  this 
crisis  the  weighty  burden  of  the  conduct  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  the  great  responsibility  came  unsought  and  unde- 
sired.  Cherishing  a  high  respect  for  McClellan's  military 
talent,  and  bound  to  him  by  the  ties  of  an  intimate  affection, 
General  Burnside  naturally  shrank  from  superseding  a  com 
mander  whom  he  unfeignedly  regarded  as  his  superior  in 
ability.  The  manly  frankness  with  which  Burnside  laid  bare 
at  once  his  feelings  towards  his  late  chief  and  his  own  sense 
of  inadequacy  for  so  great  a  trust  was  creditable  to  him,  and 
absolved  him  in  advance  from  responsibilities  half  the  weight 
of  which  at  least  was  assumed  by  those  who  thrust  the  baton 
into  his  unwilling  hands.*  To  the  public  his  modest  shrink- 

*  General  Burnside  in  his  testimony  before  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct 
of  the  War  makes  a  very  frank  statement  of  his  opinion  touching  his  own 
unfitness  for  the  command  of  the  army.  "  After  getting  over  my  surprise,  the 
shock,  etc.,  I  told  General  Buckingham  [the  officer  who  brought  the  order  from 
Washington  assigning  him  to  the  command]  that  it  was  a  matter  that 
required  very  serious  thought ;  that  I  did  not  want  the  command  ;  that  it  had 
been  offered  to  me  twice  before,  and  I  did  not  feel  that  I  could  take  it.  *  *  I 
told  them  [his  staff]  what  my  views  were  with  reference  to  my  ability  to 
exercise  such  a  command,  which  views  were  those  I  had  always  unreservedly 


Li  AN  NOW 


232  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

placed  under  General  Sumner,  the  Centre  Grand  Division 
under  General  Hooker,  and  the  Left  Grand  Division  under 
General  Franklin. 

It  need  hardly  be  said  that  this  protracted  delay  at  the 
moment  the  army  was  manoeuvring  to  fight  a  great  battle, 
however  necessary  General  Burnside  may  have  deemed  it,* 
was  likely  seriously  to  jeopardize  the  opportunity  presented 
by  the  scattered  condition  of  Lee's  forces  when  the  army 
reached  "Warrenton.  At  that  time  the  Confederate  right, 
under  Longstreet,  was  near  Culpepper,  and  the  left,  under 
Jackson,  in  the  Shenandoah  Yalley — the  two  wings  being 
separated  by  two  marches ;  and  it  had  been  General 
McClellan's  intent,  by  a  rapid  advance  on  Gordonsville,  to 
interpose  between  Lee's  divided  forces.  But  this  was  not  a 
matter  that  touched  Burnside's  plan ;  for  he  had  already 
resolved  to  abandon  offensive  action  on  that  line,  and  was 
determined  to  make  a  change  of  base  to  Fredericksburg  on 
the  Rappahannock. 

It  would  be  difficult  to  explain  this  determination  on  any 
sound  military  principle  ;  for  while  the  destruction  of  the  hos 
tile  army  was,  in  the  very  nature  of  things,  the  prime  aim 
and  object  of  the  campaign,  General  Burnside  turned  his  back 
on  that  army,  and  set  out  upon  a  seemingly  aimless  adven 
ture  to  the  Rappahannock,  whither,  in  fact,  Lee  had  to  run  in 
search  of  him.  If  it  be  said  that  Richmond  was  General 
Burnside's  objective  point,  and  that,  regarding  this  rather 
than  the  hostile  force,  he  chose  the  Fredericksburg  line  as 
one  presenting  fewer  difficulties  than  that  on  which  the  army 
was  moving  (the  line  of  the  Orange  and  Alexandria  Railroad), 
the  reply  is,  that  an  advance  against  Richmond  was,  at  this 
season,  impracticable  by  any  line  ;  but  a  single  march  would 


*  In  a  like  case,  when  the  army  was  manoeuvring  to  meet  Lee's  invasion  01 
Pennsylvania,  General  Meade  being  nominated  to  succeed  General  Hooker, 
put  the  troops  in  motion*  without  an  hour's  delay — the  columns  moving  on  as 
if  no  change  had  taken  place.  There  were  no  circumstances  that  made  the 
task  easier  in  his  case  than  in  that  of  Burnside. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  ON  THE  RAPPAHANNOCK.  233 

have  put  him  in  position  to  give  decisive  battle  under  circum 
stances  eminently  advantageous  to  him.* 

Military  history  is  a  repository  of  the  brightest  inspirations 
of  genius  and  the  wildest  excesses  of  folly.  It  is  therefore 
difficult  for  a  general  to  commit  a  blunder  so  gross  but  that  it 
can  be  matched  by  a  precedent.  Burnside's  change  of  line 
of  manoeuvre  from  one  on  which  he  had  a  positive  objective — 
to  wit,  Lee's  army — to  Fredericksburg,  where  he  had  no  ob 
jective  at  all,  is  paralleled  by  Dumourier's  conduct  in  Holland 
in  1793,  respecting  which  Jomini  remarks,  that  he  "  foolishly 
abandoned  the  pursuit  of  the  allies  in  order  to  transfer  the 
theatre  from  the  centre  to  the  extreme  left  of  the  general 
field."f  But  such  instances  are  for  the  warning,  rather  than 
the  imitation  of  commanders. 

The  project  of  changing  the  line  of  operations  to  Freder 
icksburg  was  not  approved  at  Washington,  but  it  was  assented 
to  ;J  and  on  the  15th  of  November,  General  Burnside  put  his 
columns  in  motion1  from  Warrenton.  In  the  march  towards 
Fredericksburg,  it  was  determined  that  the  army  should 


*  General  Burnside,  on  coming  into  command  of  the  army,  drew  up  a  plan 
of  operations,  which  bears  date,  Warrenton,  November  9,  1862,  and  is  ad 
dressed  to  the  general-in-chief.  In  this  paper,  urging  the  adoption  of  the 
Fredericksburg  route,  he  states  his  intention  of  making  "  a  movement  upon 
Richmond  from  that  point ;"  but  the  statement  is  made  vaguely,  and  he  post 
pones  giving  "  the  details  of  the  movement"  till  some  time  "  hereafter."  In 
point  of  fact,  General  Burnside  had  not  matured  any  definite  plan  of  action,  for 
the  reason  that  he  hoped  to  be  able  to  postpone  operations  till  the  spring.  He 
did  not  favor  operating  against  Richmond  by  the  overland  route,  but  had  his 
mind  turned  towards  a  repetition  of  McClellan's  movement  to  the  Peninsula ; 
and  in  determining  to  march  to  Fredericksburg  he  cherished  the  hope  of  being 
able  to  winter  there  upon  an  easy  base  of  supplies,  and  in  the  spring  embark 
ing  his  army  for  the  James  River.  How  he  could  have  counted  on  being  allowed 
to  carry  out  a  plan  so  adverse  to  the  wishes  of  the  Administration,  and  involv 
ing  what  the  public  temper  could  not  be  expected  to  brook,  the  inaction  ol 
the  army  for  the  winter,  I  do  not  undertake  to  say.  I  derive  these  revelations 
of  General  Burnside's  motives  and  purposes  from  the  corps-commander  then 
Most  intimate  in  his  confidence. 

\  Art  of  War,  p.  106. 

J  Halleck :  Report  of  Military  Operations,  1862-8. 


234  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

move  by  the  north  bank  of  the  Kappahannock  to  Falmouth, 
where  by  a  ponton-bridge,  the  boats  for  which  were  to  be 
forwarded  from  Washington,  it  would  cross  to  Fredericksburg 
and  seize  the  bluffs  on  the  south  bank.  It  had  been  also  de 
signed  to  march  a  force  by  the  south  side  of  the  Kappahan 
nock  to  anticipate  the  possession  of  the  heights,  but  this 
was  not  done.  Sumner's  Grand  Division  led  the  van,  and 
on  the  afternoon  of  the  17th  it  reached  Falmouth,  opposite 
Fredericksburg.  The  town  was  at  this  time  occupied  by  a 
regiment  of  Yirginia  cavalry,  four  companies  of  Mississippi 
infantry,  and  one  light  battery.  When  the  head  of  Sumner's 
column  reached  the  river  these  guns  opened  upon  it  from  the 
heights  above  Fredericksburg,  but  they  were  in  a  few  minutes 
silenced  by  a  Union  battery.  The  Eappahannock  was  at  this 
time  fordable  at  several  points  near  Fredericksburg,  and 
Sumner  was  exceedingly  anxious  to  cross  and  take  possession 
of  the  town  and  the  heights  in  its  rear,  but  was  prevented 
from  doing  so  by  instructions  from  General  Burnside.*  The 


*  Sumner :  Report  of  Operations  on  the  Rappahannock.  In  his  evidence 
before  the  Congressional  Committee,  General  Sumner  says:  "My  orders  were 
not  to  cross.  But  the  temptation  was  strong  to  go  over  and  take  those  guns 
the  enemy  had  left.  That  same  night  I  sent  a  note  to  General  Burnside,  asking 
if  I  should  take  Fredericksburg  in  the  morning,  should  I  he  able  to  find  a 
practicable  ford,  which,  by  the  way,  I  knew  when  I  wrote  the  note  I  could 
find.  The  general  replied  that  he  did  not  think  it  advisable  to  occupy  Freder 
icksburg  until  his  communications  were  established,"  etc. — Report,  p.  657. 

From  the  above  it  will  be  seen  how  erroneous  is  the  statement  of  General 
Lee,  who,  in  his  official  report,  says  :  "  The  advance  of  General  Sumner  reached 
Falmouth  on  the  afternoon  of  the  17th,  and  attempted  to  cross  the  Rappahan 
nock,  but  was  driven  lack  by  Colonel  Ball,  with  the  Fifteenth  Virginia  Cavalry, 
four  companies  of  Mississippi  infantry,  and  Lewis's  light  battery." — Report  ol 
Movements  on  the  Rappahannock,  p.  38.  In  point  of  fact,  the  only  engage 
ment  was  a  brief  artillery  duel  between  the  Confederate  battery  above  men 
tioned  and  Petitt's  battery  of  ten-pounder  Parrotts.  The  writer  stood  beside 
this  battery  at  the  time,  and  can  testify  that  Petitt  in  fifteen  minutes,  by  his 
excellent  shots,  caused  the  Confederate  gunners  to  leave  their  guns ;  and  the 
pieces  were  only  dragged  off  by  the  men  crawling  up  and  attaching  prolongea 
to  them.  General  Lee's  statement  is  almost  too  absurd  to  require  serious 
reply. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  ON  THE  BAPPAHANNOCK.  235 

following  days,  19th  and  20th,  Hooker's  and  Franklin's  grand 
divisions  reached  the  Rappahannock,  near  which  the  entire 
Union  army  was  now  concentrated. 

At  the  time  the  army  began  its  march  from  Warrenton, 
Longstreet's  corps  was  at  Culpepper  Courthouse,  and  Jack 
son's  corps  (with  the  exception  of  one  division  that  had  been 
transferred  to  the  east  side  of  the  Blue  Ridge)  was  still  in  the 
Shenandoah  Valley.  In  this  situation,  nothing  can  be  ima 
gined  easier  than  for  Lee,  by  a  simple  manoeuvre  towards 
Warrenton,  to  have  quickly  recalled  Burnside  from  his  march 
towards  Fredericksburg.  The  line  of  the  Orange  and  Alex 
andria  Railroad  is  the  real  defensive  line  for  Washington; 
and  experience  has  proved  that  a  hostile  force  might  always, 
by  a  mere  menace  directed  against  that  line,  compel  the 
Union  army  to  seek  its  recovery.  General  Lee  either  felt 
himself  to  be  not  in  condition  to  attempt  any  offensive  enter 
prise  at  this  time,  or  he  was  prevented  from  doing  so  by 
instructions  from  Richmond;  for  he  adopted  the  less  brilliant 
alternative  of  planting  himself  directly  in  the  path  of  the 
Union  army.*  As  soon  as  Burnside's  intention  of  moving 
towards  Fredericksburg  was  fully  disclosed,  Jackson's  corps 
was  directed  on  Orange  Courthouse,  and  Longstreet  was  in 
structed  to  march  from  Culpepper  Courthouse  on  Fredericks 
burg,  which  point  his  van  reached  two  days  after  Sumner's 
arrival  at  Falmouth.  A  few  days  afterwards,  Jackson's  corps 
also  was  called  up  to  the  Rappahannock,  which  Lee  assumed 
as  his  new  defensive  line.f 

Whatever  may  have  been  General  Burnside's  purpose  in 
this  transfer  of  the  army,  he  could  hardly  have  anticipated 
the  result  to  which  it  conducted;  for  having  voluntarily 
moved  away  from  the  hostile  force,  that  much  more  than  any 
geographical  point  was  the  proper  objective  of  his  efforts,  he 

*  "  It  is  not  always  by  taking  position  in  the  direct  path  of  an  enemy  that 
his  advance  is  opposed ;  but  sometimes  points  may  be  occupied  on  the  flank 
with  much  advantage,  so  as  to  threaten  his  line  of  operations,  if  he  ventures  to 
pass." — Dufour:  Strategy  and  Tactics,  p.  41. 

f  Lee :  Reports  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  vol.  i.,  p.  38. 


236  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

chose  a  new  route  to  Bichmond  only  to  find  his  antagonist 
confronting  him  thereon ! 

It  was  now  even  questionable  whether  he  would  be  able  to 
obtain  possession  of  Fredericksburg.  The  passage  of  the 
Eappahamiock  was  no  longer  the  simple  problem  it  had  been 
when  Sumner  first  drew  up  at  Falmouth ;  for  the  rapidly  ar 
riving  forces  of  Lee,  gathering  in  strength  on  the  menacing 
heights  opposite,  showed  that  the  passage  of  the  Bappahan- 
nock  would  cost  a  great  battle.  Nor  was  there  at  hand  the 
means  of  making  the  crossing ;  for  by  a  blunder,  the  respon 
sibility  of  which  seems  to  be  divided  equally  between  General 
Halleck  and  General  Burnside  himself,  no  ponton-train  had 
reached  the  army;  and  when,  a  week  afterwards,  it  arrived, 
Lee's  whole  army  had  arrived  also.  Lee  distributed  his 
corps  along  the  south  bank  of  the  river,  and  began  the 
rapid  construction  of  defences  along  the  crest  of  hills  in  rear 
of  Fredericksburg,  extending  from  the  river  about  a  mile  and 
a  half  above  the  town  to  the  Fredericksburg  and  Bichmond 
B.ailroad,  three  miles  below  the  town.*  Day  by  day,  new 
earthwork  epaulements  for  the  protection  of  artillery  made 
their  appearance  on  the  Fredericksburg  ridge,  till,  at  the  end 
of  a  few  weeks,  its  terraced  heights,  crowned  with  the  formi 
dable  enginery  of  war,  presented  an  inferno  of  fire  into  which 
no  man  nor  army  would  willingly  venture. 

Nevertheless,  action  was  imperative  ;  and  as  soon  as  Burn- 
side  had  established  his  base  at  Aquia  Creek,  and  connected 
it  with  his  front  of  operations  by  the  restoration  of  the  rail 
road,  preparations  were  begun  for  a  crossing  of  the  Bappa- 
hannock.  Now,  from  the  situation  of  the  opposing  forces, 
this  operation  obviously  resolved  itself  into  the  alternative  of 
forcing  a  direct  passage  at  Fredericksburg,  or  of  making  a 
turning  movement  on  one  or  the  other  of  the  Confederate 
flanks.  The  formidable  character  of  the  Fredericksburg  de 
fences,  plainly  visible  from  the  north  bank,  seemed  to  pre 
clude  the  former  plan.  A  turning  operation  on  the  Con- 

*  Lee :  Report  of  Operations  on  the  Rappaliannock,  p.  39. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  ON  THE  RAPPAHANNOCK.  237 

federate  right,  by  a  movement  down  the  E  appall  anno  ck,  was 
therefore  discussed,  and  it  was  at  first  determined  to  make 
the  passage  at  Skenker's  Neck,  twelve  miles  below  Falmouth. 
But  the  preparations  for  this  move  were  discovered  by  the 
enemy,  who  concentrated  below  to  meet  the  threatened  ad 
vance,  and  the  purpose  was  abandoned.* 

There  remained  the  operation  against  the  Confederate  left 
by  a  movement  up  the  Rappahannock.  This  plan  does  not, 
however,  appear  to  have  been  entertained  at  this  time,  not 
withstanding  that  it  was  what  seemed  to  be  dictated  by  sound 
military  considerations.  As  a  tactical  operation,  it  was  easier 
than  to  make  the  passage  below  Fredericksburg,  t  and  it  gave 
the  direction  of  attack  on  Lee's  left,  which  was  his  strategic 
flank ;  for  the  manoeuvre,  if  successful,  would  throw  the  en 
emy  back  towards  the  coast.  But  there  were  other  consider 
ations  that  determined  Burnside's  plan.  It  was  discovered 
that  the  preparations  that  had  been  made  to  cross  at  Skenk 
er's  Neck  had  so  engaged  Lee's  attention,  that  he  continued, 
to  hold  a  considerable  force  near  that  point ;  and  Burnside 
judged  that  by  making  a  direct  crossing  at  Fredericksburg, 
he  might  surprise  Lee  thus  divided.  It  will  be  conceded  that 
if  this  purpose  could  have  been  successfully  executed,  the 
result  would  have  been  eminently  advantageous ;  but  it  is  far 
from  clear  how  its  successful  execution  could  have  been 
reasonably  expected.  The  passage  of  a  river  by  a  great 

*  "  On  the  3d  of  December,  my  division  was  sent  to  Port  Royal,  a  few  miles 
below  Skenker's  Neck,  to  prevent  the  crossing  of  the  Yankees  at  or  near  that 
point." — General  D.  H.  Hill:  Report  of  Operations  on  the  Rappahannock. 
Up  to  the  time  of  the  battle  of  Fredericksburg,  Longstreet's  command  held  the 
heights  at  the  town ;  Hill  remained  at  Port  Royal,  and  the  rest  of  Jackson's 
corps  "  was  so  disposed  as  to  support  Hill  or  Longstreet,  as  occasion  might  re 
quire." — Lee :  Report  of  Fredericksburg,  p.  38.  Hill  on  the  5th  succeeded  in 
driving  off  several  Union  gunboats  that  attempted  to  ascend  the  Rappahannock 
towards  Fredericksburg. 

f  The  Rappahannock  below  Fredericksburg  increases  rapidly  in  width,  and 
at  the  first  available  point  below  Skinker's  Neck  would  require  one  thousand 
feet  of  bridging,  whereas  above  Banks'  Ford  from  two  to  three  hundred  feet 
would  suffice. — Warren  :  Report  of  Engineer  Operations  on  the  Rappahannock. 


238  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

army,  observed  by  a  watchful  opponent,  is  not  an  operation 
of  the  nature  of  a  coup  de  main;  and  unless  the  enemy  could 
•neither  see  nor  act,  it  was  manifest  he  might  concentrate  his 
force  as  rapidly  as  the  assailant  could  defile  on  the  south 
ern  bank.  Now  this  remote  contingency  of  a  surprise  was 
the  sole  recommendation  of  the  operation ;  for,  otherwise,  the 
attack  of  the  fortified  position  behind  Fredericksburg  was 
not  of  a  kind  to  be  voluntarily  undertaken.  It  was  certainly  a 
slender  chance  on  which  to  hazard  the  issue  of  a  great  battle  : 
but  Burnside  boldly  accepted  the  risk.  The  10th  of  December 
found  the  preliminary  preparations  completed,  and  it  was 
determined  to  force  the  passage  of  the  Rappahannock  the 
following  day. 


II. 

THE  BATTLE  OF  FREDERICKSBURG. 

Yiewed  as  a  tactical  operation,  the  passage  of  the  Rappa 
hannock  at  Fredericksburg  presented  no  formidable  diffi 
culties  ;  and,  indeed,  the  configuration  of  the  ground  is  such 
that  it  is  not  in  the  power  of  an  enemy  occupying  the  south 
side  to  prevent  it.  On  both  banks  of  the  stream,  and  parallel 
with  its  course,  there  runs  a  well-defined  crest  of  hills ;  but 
that  on  the  northern  side,  named  the  Stafford  Heights,  ap 
proaches  close  to  the  river's  margin  and  commands  the  oppo 
site  side,  where  the  heights  stand  at  a  distance  of  from  three- 
quarters  of  a  mile  to  a  mile  and  a  half  from  the  bank.  Union 
artillery  could  therefore  control  the  intermediate  plain,  and  it 
was  believed  that  it  could  neutralize  the  efforts  of  the  enemy 
to  oppose  the  construction  of  bridges.  But  the  thought  of 
what  must  come  after  the  crossing  was  one  to  give  pause  to 
every  reflecting  mind. 

During  the  night  of  the  10th,  under  direction  of  Chief-of- 
Artillery  Hunt,  the  Stafford  Heights  were  crowned  by  a  power- 


Map  of  the 

BATTLE  w 

DEC.  13  TH.  1862 

i«__  /.  a 

^  =1 

REFERENCES: 

=  •  -  -  l/mon  Tfoo/)!?  .  -  .  -  -  -  (vft/f>rfesttfc  Troaptt. 

\^   furthest  adi-anrj  a,  C/itt/r)e  of  Trembler's  tiriq  . 

s         "  b 

C  .  French  ,  Hancock  &  Howard 


.^  for^ttVftw/flA.  gfttejm,,  ^^ 


THE  CAMPAIGN  ON  THE  RAPPAHANNOCK.  239 

ful  artillery  force,  consisting  of  twenty-nine  batteries  oi  one 
hundred  and  forty-seven  guns,  destined  to  reply  to  the  enemy's 
batteries,  to  control  his  movements  on  the  plain,  to  command 
the  town,  and  to  protect  and  cover  the  crossing.  At  the  same 
time,  the  troops  were  moved  forward  to  positions  immediately 
behind  the  ridge,  and  the  ponton-trains  were  drawn  down  to 
the  river's  brink.  It  had  been  determined  to  span  the  stream 
by  five  ponton-bridges — three  directly  opposite  the  city,  and 
two  a  couple  of  miles  below.  On  the  former,  Sumner's  and 
Hooker's  Grand  Divisions  were  to  cross,  while  Franklin's 
Grand  Division  was  to  make  the  passage  by  the  lower  bridge. 

Before  dawn  of  the  morning  of  the  llth,  the  boats  were  un 
shipped  from  the  teams  at  the  river's  brink ;  and,  swiftly  and 
silently,  the  engineer  troops  proceeded  to  their  work,  amid 
a  dense  fog  that  filled  the  valley  and  water-margins,  and 
through  which  the  moving  bridge-builders  appeared  as  spec 
tral  forms.  But  no  sooner  did  the  artificers  attempt  to  begin 
the  construction  of  the  bridges  than  they  were  met  by  volleys 
of  musketry  at  short  range  from  the  riflemen  posted  opposite, 
behind  the  stone  houses  and  walls  of  the  river-street  of  Fred 
ericksburg  ;  and  instantly  the  double  report  of  a  piece  of 
ordnance  boomed  out  on  the  dawn.  This  was  the  signal-gun 
that  summoned  the  scattered  Confederate  corps  to  assemble 
for  the  long-expected  attack.* 

Aware,  from  the  configuration  of  the  ground,  that  he  could 
not  hope  to  prevent  the  passage  of  the  stream,  Lee  made  his 
dispositions  to  resist  the  advance  after  crossing. f  He,  how- 

*  "  The  artificers  had  but  got  fairly  to  work  when  the  firing  of  two  guns  from 
one  of  the  enemy's  batteries  announced  that  we  were  discovered.  They  were, 
doubtless,  signal-guns." — W.  Swinton :  Correspondence  of  New  York  Times, 
December  13,  1862.  General  Longstreet  says:  "At  three  o'clock,  our  signal- 
guns  gave  notice  of  the  enemy's  approach.  The  troops,  being  at  their  different 
camp-grounds,  were  formed  immediately,  and  marched  to  their  positions  along 
the  line." — Confederate  Reports  of  Fredericksburg,  p.  428. 

f  "  The  plain  of  Fredericksburg  is  so  completely  commanded  by  the  Stafford 
Heights  that  no  effectual  opposition  could  be  made  to  the  construction  of 
bridges  or  the  passage  of  the  river.  Our  position  was  therefore  selected  with  a 
view  to  resist  the  enemy's  advance  after  crossing." — Lee :  Report  of  the  Battle 
of  Fredericksburg,  p.  39. 


240  CAMPAIGNS  OP  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

ever,  caused  a  couple  of  regiments  of  Mississippi  riflemen  to 
be  posted  behind  the  stone  walls  of  the  river-street  of  Fred- 
ericksburg,  to  resist,  as  long  as  might  be,  the  construction  of 
the  bridges.  An  unexpected  success  attended  their  efforts. 
At  the  point  assigned  for  Franklin's  crossing,  two  miles  below 
the  town,  there  was  no  such  protection  for  the  sharp-shooters, 
and  they  were  therefore  covered  by  rifle-trenches  near  the 
river's  brink.  But  Franklin  soon  succeeded  in  dislodging 
this  force,  and  by  noon  two  bridges  were  available  for  the 
passage. 

The  attempt  to  construct  the  bridges  opposite  the  town, 
however,  met  a  different  fate ;  for  the  keen- eyed  marksmen 
opposed  so  vigorous  an  opposition  to  the  laying  of  the  pon 
tons  that  the  little  band  of  engineers,  murderously  thinned, 
was  presently  compelled  to  slacken  work,  and  then  cease 
altogether.*  Several  hours  passed  in  renewed  but  unavailing 
efforts,  and  it  became  clear  that  nothing  could  be  done  until 
the  sharp-shooters  were  dislodged  from  their  lurking-places. 
To  accomplish  this,  Burnside,  at  ten  o'clock,  gave  the  com 
mand  to  concentrate  the  fire  of  all  the  artillery  on  the  city  and 
batter  it  down.  On  this  there  opened  from  the  massive  con 
centration  of  artillery  a  terrific  bombardment  that  was  kept 
up  for  above  an  hour.  Each  gun  fired  fifty  rounds,  and  I 
know  not  how  many  hundred  tons  of  iron  were  thrown  into 
the  town.  Of  the  effect  of  this,  however,  nothing  could  be 
seen,  for  the  city  was  still  enveloped  in  mist ;  but  presently  a 
dense  pillar  of  smoke,  defining  itself  on  the  background  of  fog, 
showed  that  the  town  had  been  fired  by  the  shells ;  and  at 
noon  the  curtain  rolled  up,  and  it  was  seen  that  Fredericks- 
burg  was  in  flames  at  several  points.  Appalling  though  the 
bombardment  was  as  a  spectacle,  it  was  of  very  slight  military 

*  Two  regiments  of  Hancock's  division,  sent  to  cover  the  working  parties 
engaged  in  building  the  bridge  directly  opposite  Fredericksburg,  soon  lost  from 
their  thin  ranks  one  hundred  and  fifty  men. — Hancock :  Report  of  Fredericks- 
burg.  These  regiments  were,  the  Fifty-Seventh  New  York,  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Chapman,  and  the  Sixty-Sixth  New  York,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Bull,  of  Zook's 
brigade,  Hancock's  division,  Couch's  corps. 


THE    CAMPAIGN  ON  THE  BAPPAHANNOCK.  241 

advantage  ;*  the  hostile  force  lay  out  of  range  behind  the  hills 
in  rear  of  the  town,  and  the  artillerists  were  unable  to  give 
sufficient  depression  to  their  guns  to  reach  the  river-front  of 
the  city,  along  which  the  marksmen  were  posted,  and  the  con 
flagration  did  not  extend  but  died  out. 

During  the  thick  of  the  bombardment,  a  fresh  attempt  was 
made  to  complete  the  one  half-finished  bridge  opposite  the 
town ;  but  this  too  failed.  The  day  was  wearing  away,  and 
affairs  were  at  a  dead-lock.  In  this  state  of  facts,  the  chief 
of  artillery,  Brigadier-General  Hunt,  an  officer  of  a  remark 
ably  clear  judgment,  made  a  suggestion  that  proved  the  fit 
thing  to  be  done.  He  proposed  that  a  party  should  be  sent 
across  the  river  in  the  open  ponton-boats,  and  that  after  dis 
lodging  or  capturing  the  opposing  force,  the  bridges  should 
be  rapidly  completed.  The  Seventh  Michigan  Begiment  and 
the  Nineteenth  and  Twentieth  Massachusetts  regiments  of 
Howard's  division  volunteered  for  this  perilous  enterprise.t 

Ten  ponton-boats  were  lying  on  the  brink  of  the  river 
waiting  to  be  added  to  the  half-finished  bridge.  Bushing 
down  the  steep  bank,  the  party  found  shelter  behind  these 
and  behind  the  piles  of  planking  destined  for  the  covering  of 
the  bridge  ;  and  in  this  situation  they  acted  for  fifteen  or 
twenty  minutes  as  sharp-shooters,  to  hold  in  check  the  South 
ern  tirailleurs  opposite,  while  the  boats  were  pushed  into  the 
stream.  This  being  accomplished,  the  men  quickly  sought 
the  boats,  pushed  off,  and  the  oarsmen  pulling  lustily,  they  in 
a  few  minutes,  notwithstanding  the  severe  fire  by  which 
several  were  killed  or  wounded,  came  under  cover  of  the 
opposite  bluff.  Other  boats  followed,  and  so  soon  as  an 
adequate  number  of  men  were  assembled  on  the  Southern 

*  It  has,  indeed,  seldom  been  found  that  such  bombardments  of  towns  are 
of  any  avail,  and,  as  Carnot  observes,  they  are  generally  adopted  only  when 
real  means  are  lacking.  "  Les  bombardemens  sont  en  general  beaucoup  moina 
a  craindre  qu'on  ne  le  pense  ordinairement.  On  les  employe  lorsqu'on 
manque  de  moyens  reels." — De  la  Defense  des  Places  Fortes :  Bibliotheque 
Militaire,  tome  v.,  p.  523. 

f  Couch's  Report  of  Fredericksburg. 

16 


242  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

side,  tliey  rushed  up  the  steep  bank,  when  the  Confederate 
marksmen,  seeing  the  new  turn  of  affairs,  emerged  from 
cellar,  rifle-pit,  and  stone  wall,  and  scampered  off  up  the 
streets  of  the  town;  but  upwards  of  a  hundred  of  them 
were  captured.  The  buildings  that  had  afforded  shelter  for 
the  sharp-shooters  were  taken  possession  of,  and  the  ponton- 
bridges  were  in  a  few  minutes  completed. 

Thus  by  a  simple  stroke  of  genius  was  accomplished  what 
the  powerful  enginery  of  a  hundred  guns  had  failed  to  effect. 
The  affair  was  gallantly  executed,  and  the  army,  assembled  on 
the  northern  bank,  spectators  of  this  piece  of  heroism,  paid 
the  brave  fellows  the  rich  tribute  of  soldiers'  cheers. 

That  evening  Howard's  division  of  Couch's  corps  crossed 
the  river  and  occupied  Fredericksburg,  having  a  sharp  skir 
mish  in  the  upper  streets  of  the  town ;  and  the  next  day,  under 
cover  of  a  fog,  the  other  divisions  of  Couch's  corps,  and  the 
Ninth  Corps  under  General  "Wilcox  (thus  including  the  entire 
Eight  Grand  Division  under  Sumner),  passed  to  the  south  side 
of  the  Kappahannock.  At  the  same  time,  Franklin  crossed 
several  divisions  of  his  command  by  the  bridges  he  had  con 
structed  below.  The  Centre  Grand  Division  under  Hooker 
was  still  held  on  the  north  bank  of  the  river.  The  whole  of 
the  12th  of  December  was  consumed  in  passing  over  the 
columns  and  reconnoitring  the  Confederate  position.  The 
troops  lay  on  their  arms  for  the  night  under  that  December 
sky:  then  dawned  the  morning  of  Saturday,  the  13th,  and 
this  was  to  be  the  day  of  the  battle. 

Eight -and-forty  hours  had  now  passed  since  that  signal 
gun,  booming  out  on  the  dawn,  sounded  the  note  of  concen 
tration  for  the  Confederate  forces.  Long-street's  corps  was 
already  at  Fredericksburg ;  Jackson  held  the  stretch  of  river 
below — his  right  at  a  remove  of  eighteen  miles.  But  he  had 
had  abundant  time  to  call  in  his  scattered  divisions,  and  the 
morning  of  the  13th  found  the  entire  Confederate  army  in 
^position.*  Whatever  hope  of  a  successful  issue  attached  to 

*  "  Early  on  the  morning  of  the  13th,  Ewell's  division  under  General 


THE  CAMPAIGN  ON  THE  RAPPAHANNOCK.  243 

General  Burnside's  plan  of  attack  rested  on  the  hypothesis 
that  the  crossing  of  the  Eappahannock  at  Fredericksburg 
could  be  made  a  surprise.*  But  this  expectation  had  been 
grievously  disappointed,  and  it  would  have  been  a  judicious 
measure  then  to  have  made  other  dispositions  ;t  for  the  naked 
enterprise,  stripped  of  this  hope,  was  of  a  very  desperate 
character.  A  brief  description  of  the  terrain  will  serve  to 
prove  this. 

The  battle-field  of  Fredericksburg  presents  the  character 
of  a  broken  plain  stretching  back  from  the  southern  margin 
of  the  Eappahannock  from  six  hundred  yards  to  two  miles, 
at  which  distance  it  rises  into  a  bold  ridge  that  forms  a 
slight  angle  with  the  river,  and  is  itself  dominated  by  an 
elevated  plateau.  This  ridge  is,  from  Falmouth  down  to 
where  it  touches  Massaponax  Creek  about  six  miles  long,  and 
this  was  the  vantage-ground  of  the  Confederates  which  they 
had  strengthened  with  earthworks  and  crowned  with  artillery. 
In  rear  of  the  town  the  plain  is  traversed  by  a  canal,  at  right 
angles  with  which  run  two  roads  leading  up  to  the  heights,^ 
which  rise  abruptly  at  the  distance  of  a  few  hundred  yards. 


Early,  and  the  division  of  D.  H.  Hill,  arrived  after  a  severe  night's  march  from 
their  respective  encampments  in  the  vicinity  of  Buckner's  Neck  and  Port 
Royal—  the  troops  of  Hill  being  from  fifteen  to  eighteen  miles  distant  from 
the  point  to  which  they  were  ordered." — Jackson :  Report  of  Fredericksburg 
in  Reports  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  vol.  ii.,  p.  434. 

*  "  I  decided  to  cross  here  because  I  felt  satisfied  that  they  did  not  expect  u& 
to  cross  here,  but  down  below." — Burnside's  Evidence :  Report  on  the  Conduct 
of  the  War,  vol.  i.,  p.  653. 

f  A  commander  of  any  fertility  of  resource  might  readily  have  devised 
modifications  of  the  plan  adapted  to  the  altered  state  of  affairs.  I  shall  men 
tion  one  move  that  would  have  been  promising.  The  passage  of  the  river  at 
Fredericksburg  was  made  for  a  real  attack.  Burnside  might  have  converted 
it  into  a  feint ;  he  might  have  made  threatening  demonstrations  of  attack 
with  Sumner's  command,  and  meanwhile,  he  might  have  thrown  Hooker's 
two  corps  up  by  Banks'  or  United  States  Ford,  to  execute  a  turning  movemen 
on  Lee's  left.  Hooker  could  have  been  strengthened  almost  indefinitely,  and  it 
is  difficult  to  see  why  this  operation  should  have  failed  of  success. 

J  The  road  to  the  right  leads  from  Fredericksburg  to  Culpepper ;  that  to 
the  left,  named  the  "  Telegraph  Road,"  from  Fredericksburg  to  Richmond. 


244  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

Tliis  position  formed  the  left  of  the  Confederate  line,  and 
here  Lee  disposed  Longstreet's  corps.  It  was  these  heights 
that  the  right  of  the  Union  army  under  Sumner  was  destined 
to  assail.  The  left  of  the  Union  line  composed  of  the  Grand 
Division  of  Franklin  was,  as  already  stated,  two  miles  below 
Fredericksburg.  The  plain  here  stretches  to  a  width  of  two 
miles,  and  is  scolloped  by  spurs  of  hills,  less  elevated  than 
those  in  the  rear  of  the  town  and  clothed  with  dark  pines 
and  leafless  oaks.  This  position,  forming  the  right  of  the 
Confederate  line,  was  held  by  Jackson's  corps ;  Stuart,  with 
two  brigades  of  cavalry  and  his  horse  artillery,  formed  the 
extreme  right  extending  to  Massaponax  Creek.* 

The  nature  of  the  ground  manifestly  indicated  that  the 
main  attack  should  be  made  by  Franklin  on  the  left ;  for  the 
field  there  affords  ample  space  for  deployment  out  of  hostile 
range,  whereas  the  plain  in  the  rear  of  Fredericksburg,  re 
stricted  in  extent  and  cut  up  by  ditches,  fences,  and  a  canal, 
caused  every  movement  to  be  made  under  fire,  presented  no 
opportunity  for  manoeuvre,  and  compelled  a  direct  attack  on 
the  terraced  heights,  whose  frowning  works  looked  down  in 
grim  irony  on  all  attempt  at  assault. 

In  the  framing  of  his  plan  of  battle,  General  Bumside  con 
formed  to  the  obvious  conditions  of  the  problem  before  him, 
and  caused  it  to  be  understood  that  General  Franklin,  who, 
in  addition  to  his  own  two  corps,  had  now  with  him  one  of 
Hooker's  corps — that  is,  about  one-half  the  whole  army — 
should  make  the  main  attack  from  the  left,  and  that  upon  his 
success  should  be  conditioned  the  assault  of  the  heights  in 
rear  of  the  town  by  Sumner.  Such,  at  least,  was  the  plan  of 
action  as  understood  by  his  lieutenants,  who  were  to  carry  it 
into  execution.  When,  however,  on  the  morning  of  the  13th, 
the  commanders  of  the  two  bodies  on  the  left  and  right,  Gen 
erals  Franklin  and  Sumner,  received  their  instructions,  it  was 
found  that  having  framed  one  plan  of  battle,  General  Burnside 
had  determined  to  fight  on  another.  I  must  add  that  the  dis- 

*  Lee's  Report :  Reports  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  vol.  i.,  p.  40. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  ON  THE  RAPPAHANNOCK.  245 

positions  were  such  that  it  would  be  difficult  to  imagine  any 
worse  suited  to  the  circumstances. 

Franklin,  in  place  of  an  effective  attack,  was  directed  to 
make  a  partial  operation  of  the  nature  of  a  reconnoissance  in 
force,  sending  "  one  division,  at  least,  to  seize,  if  possible,  the 
heights  near  Hamilton's  Crossing,  and  taking  care  to  keep  it 
well  supported  and  its  line  of  retreat  open,"  while  he  was  to 
hold  the  rest  of  his  command  "  in  position  for  a  rapid  move 
ment  down  the  old  Richmond  road."*  General  Sumner's 
instructions  were  of  a  like  tenor :  he  was  to  "  form  a  column 
of  a  division  for  the  purpose  of  pushing  in  the  direction  of  the 
telegraph  and  plankroads,  for  the  purpose  of  seizing  the 
heights  in  rear  of  the  town,"  and  "  hold  another  division  in 
readiness  to  support  in  advance  of  this  movement."! 

General  Burnside's  plan  thus  contemplated  two  isolated 
attacks  by  fractional  forces,  each  of  one  or  at  most  two  divi 
sions,  one  on  the  right  and  the  other  on  the  left.  Such  par 
tial  attacks  seldom  succeed,  and  directed  against  such  a  citadel 
of  strength  as  the  Confederate  position  at  Fredericksburg, 


*  For  the  full  text  of  the  order  from  Burnside  to  Franklin,  see  Report  on 
the  Conduct  of  the  War,  vol.  i.,  p.  701. 

On  receipt  of  this  order  by  Franklin,  at  half-past  seven  of  the  morning  of 
the  13th,  it  was  so  different  from  what  he  had  expected — so  different  from  what 
General  Burnside  had  given  him  reason  to  expect  the  night  before — that  he 
consulted  with  his  two  corps-commanders,  General  Reynolds  and  Smith,  and 
they  concluded  from  its  terms  that  it  meant  there  should  be  simply  an  armed 
reconnoissance  with  a  single  division,  especially  as  the  main  point  of  the  order, 
twice  referred  to,  was  that  the  command  should  be  "  kept  in  readiness  for  a 
rapid  movement  along  the  old  Richmond  road" — Franklin's  testimony :  Report 
on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  vol.  i.,  p.  708. 

I  have  in  my  possession  a  copy  of  an  elaborate  statement  on  this  point  by 
General  W.  F.  Smith,  sworn  to  by  him  before  a  magistrate.  In  this  he  says . 
"  General  Franklin  showed  the  order  immediately  to  General  Reynolds  and 
myself,  and  the  conclusion  of  all  of  us  was  that  General  Burnside  had  deter 
mined  not  to  adopt  the  plan  of  making  the  attack  in  force  from  the  left.  No 
one  differed  in  what  was  intended  by  the  order." 

f  I  derive  this  statement  of  General  Sumner's  instructions  from  Couch's 
Report  of  the  Battle  of  Fredericksburg,  in  which  Burnside's  orders  to  Sumnei 
are  given. 


246  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE   ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

such  feeble  sallies  were  simply  ludicrous.  Not  a  man  in  the 
ranks  but  felt  the  hopelessness  of  the  undertaking.* 

The  morning  of  the  13th  found  the  sun  struggling  with  a 
thick  haze  that  enveloped  Fredericksburg  and  overhung  the 
circumjacent  valley,  delaying  operation  for  some  hours.t 
But  towards  ten  o'clock  the  lifting  fog  revealed  the  left  of  the 
army,  under  Franklin,  spread  out  on  the  plain,  and  showed 
the  gleaming  bayonets  of  a  column  advancing  to  the  attack. 
I  shall  first  detail  the  operations  on  the  left  and  then  return 
to  Sumner's  force,  which  remained  yet  in  the  town. 

In  obedience  to  his  instructions,  Franklin  threw  forward 
Meade's  division,  supported  by  Gibbon's  division  on  the  right, 
with  Doubleday's  in  reserve  for  any  emergency.  Meade  ad 
vanced  across  the  plain,  but  had  not  proceeded  far  before  he 
was  compelled  to  stop  and  silence  a  battery  that  Stuart  had 
posted  on  the  Port  Eoyal  road,  and  which  had  a  flank  fire  on 
his  left.  This  done,  he  pushed  on,  his  line  preceded  by  a 
cloud  of  skirmishers,  and  his  batteries  vigorously  shelling  the 
heights  and  woods  in  his  front.  This  caused  considerable  loss 
to  Hill,  who  held  Jackson's  advanced  line  ;{  but  the  Confed 
erates  concealed  in  the  woods  made  no  reply  from  artillery  or 
infantry,  until  Meade  arrived  within  point-blank  range,  when, 
suddenly  opening,  shell  and  canister  were  poured  in  from  the 
long  silent  Confederate  batteries.  Yet  this  did  not  stay  him  ; 

*  That  it  may  appear  this  is  not  a  judgment  penned  apres  coup,  I  add 
the  following,  written  by  the  author  of  this  volume  on  the  field  :  "  It  was  with 
pain  and  alarm  I  found  this  morning  a  general  want  of  confidence  and  gloomy 
forebodings  among  officers  whose  sound  judgment  I  had  learned  to  trust.  The 
plan  of  attacking  the  rebel  stronghold  directly  in  front  would,  it  was  feared, 
prove  a  most  hazardous  enterprise.  It  was  doubted  that  the  co-operation  of 
the  right  and  left  could  be  effective.  '  The  chess-board/  said  Napoleon,  in 
1813,  'is  dreadfully  confused  (embrouille).  There  is  but  I  that  see  through 
it.'  We  all  felt  the  application  of  the  first  part  of  this  saying  to  our  case. 
But  did  we  feel  equally  confident  that  there  was  in  our  case  an  '  I'  that  saw 
through  it  ?"— W.  Swinton :  Correspondence  of  N.  Y.  Times,  Dec.  13,  1862. 

f  "  The  dense  fog  in  the  twilight  concealed  the  enemy  from  view ;  but  his 
commands,  '  Forward,  guide  centre,  march !'  were  distinctly  heard  at  different 
points  near  my  right." — Longstreet :  Report  of  Fredericksburg. 

t  Hill's  Report :  Reports  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  vol.  ii.,  p.  464. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  THE  RAPPAHANNOCK.  247 

and  tlie  line  advanced  so  boldly  that  the  three  Confederate 
batteries  posted  in  advance  of  the  railroad  had  to  be  hastily 
withdrawn. 

The  division  of  Hill  which  held  Jackson's  advanced  line  was 
thus  disposed :  the  brigades  of  Archer,  Lane,  and  Pender 
from  right  to  left,  with  Gregg's  in  rear  of  the  interval  between 
Archer  and  Lane,  and  Thomas's  in  rear  of  that  between  Lane 
and  Pender.  Meade  pushed  forward  his  line  impetuously, 
drove  back  Lane  through  the  woods,  and  then,  wedging  in  be 
tween  Lane  and  the  brigade  on  his  right  (Archer's)  swept  back 
the  right  flank  of  the  one  and  the  left  flank  of  the  other,  cap 
turing  above  two  hundred  prisoners  and  several  standards, 
crossed  the  railroad,  pushed  up  the  crest,  and  reached  Gregg's 
position  on  a  new  military  road  which  Lee  had  made  for  the 
purpose  of  establishing  direct  connection  between  his  two 
wings,  and  behind  which  Jackson's  second  line  was  posted.* 

And  now  was  seen  the  farcical  character  of  Burnside's  order 
of  attack,  by  which  a  single  division  of  five  thousand  men  was 
assigned  the  work  of  fifty  thousand.  For,  in  assaults  of  this 
kind,  there  comes  a  moment  of  supreme  importance,  when  the 
attacking  column,  having  carried  the  enemy's  first  line,  must 
assure  its  victory  by  a  decisive  blow,  or  be  driven  back  by  the 
hostile  reserves  and  lose  the  fruit  of  all  its  toil.  In  this 
moment  of  intoxication  and  peril,  the  attacking  line,  confused 
and  disintegrated  by  its  advance,  must  be  instantly  supported 
by  a  fresh  body,  to  consolidate  and  crown  the  victory,  or  else 
the  enemy  rallies  and  repels  the  victors. 

Such  was  precisely  the  result  that  happened  to  Meade  ;  for 
no  sooner  had  he  penetrated  to  the  military  road  behind 
which  the  Confederate  second  line  lay,  than  he  was  met  by  a 
fire  for  which  he  was  not  at  all  prepared.  "  The  advancing 


*  The  importance  of  this  road  has  been  greatly  exaggerated  by  General 
Burnside  :  it  was  made  merely  for  convenience  of  transportation,  and  was  in 
no  sense  a  key-point.  Meade  'a  attack  was  certainly  made  in  a  spirited  manner, 
but  its  success  has  also  been  much  over-estimated.  The  dispositions  and  force 
of  the  Confederates  plainly  show  that  nothing  could  have  resulted  even  had 
Franklins  entire  Grand  Division  been  put  in. 


248  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

columns  of  the  enemy,"  says  General  Hill,*  "  had  encountered 
an  obstacle  in  the  military  road  which  they  little  expected — 
Gregg's  brigade  of  South  Carolinians  stood  in  the  way."  It 
appears  that  the  advancing  Federals  were  mistaken  for  a 
body  of  Confederate  troops,  and  Gregg  would  not  allow  his  men 
to  open  on  them.  When  their  true  character  was  revealed, 
the  brigade  poured  a  withering  fire  into  the  faces  of  Meade's 
men  ;  and,  at  that  moment,  Early's  division — one  of  the  two 
divisions  of  Jackson's  second  line — swept  forward  at  the 
double-quick,  and  instantly  turned  the  tide.t  Exposed  to  fire 
on  both  flanks,  Meade  was  forced  to  draw  back,  losing 
severely  in  the  process;  and  the  disaster  would  have  been 
much  greater  had  not  supports  been  at  hand.  General  Frank 
lin,  giving  a  liberal  interpretation  to  Burnside's  prescription  of 
"  one  division  at  least"  for  the  column  of  attack,  had  put  in  not 
only  Meade's  division  but  Gibbon's  division  and  Doubleday's 
division,  making  the  whole  of  Reynolds'  corps.  Doubleday, 
early  in  the  attack,  was  turned  off  to  the  left  to  meet  a  menace 
by  the  enemy  from  that  direction  ;  but  Gibbon  advanced  on  the 
right  of  Meade,  and,  though  he  did  not  push 'on  as  far  as  the 
latter,  he  helped  stem  the  hostile  return,  and  assisted  in  the 
withdrawal  of  Meade's  shattered  Iine4  In  addition  to  these 
two  divisions,  General  Franklin  ordered  forward  Birney's  divi 
sion  of  Stoneman's  corps ;  and  Birney  arrived  in  such  time 
that,  when  the  troops  of  Meade  and  Gibbon  were  broken  and 
flying  in  confusion,  he  presented  a  firm  line  that  checked  the 
Confederate  pursuit.§  Meade's  loss  was  very  heavy — upwards 

*  Reports  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  vol.  ii.,  p.  463. 

f  I  learn  from  Colonel  Marshall  of  the  staff  of  General  Lee,  that  General 
Gregg  was  killed  on  the  military  road  while  beating  down  the  muskets  of  his 
men  to  prevent  them  firing  into  what  he  supposed  was  a  body  of  Confederate 
troops. 

\  Meade  :  Report  of  Fredericksburg. 

§  "  As  I  advanced  with  my  command  to  the  crest  of  the  hill,  I  found 
Meade's  entire  command — two  divisions — in  utter  confusion,  and  flying  in  all 
directions  without  order  from  the  field.  At  General  Meade's  request  I  tried  to 
stop  the  rout  with  my  command,  and  deployed  two  regiments  to  try  to  stop 
the  fugitives ;  but  it  was  useless— they  went  right  through  us.  The  enemy 


THE  CAMPAIGN  ON  THE  RAPPAHANNOCK.  249 

of  forty  per  cent,  of  his  whole  command ;  and  the  aggregate 
loss  in  Reynolds'  corps  was  upwards  of  four  thousand  men. 

At  the  time  the  attack  on  the  left  was  fully  developed, 
Suinner,  on  the  right,  was  instructed  to  assail  the  height  back 
of  Fredericksburg.  He  also  was  ordered  to  make  the  attack 
with  a  single  division,  supported  by  another.  Of  the  two 
corps  composing  Sumner's  Grand  Division,  Couch's  (Second) 
corps  occupied  the  town,  and  Wilcox's  (Ninth)  held  the  inter 
val  between  the  left  of  Couch  and  the  right  of  Franklin's 
command.  The  attack,  therefore,  fell  to  the  lot  of  Couch ; 
and,  in  accordance  with  instructions,  he  ordered  forward 
French's  division  from  the  town  at  noon,  to  be  followed  and 
supported  by  Hancock's  division.* 

French,  debouching  from  the  town,  moved  out  on  the  plank 
and  telegraph  roads,  and,  crossing  the  canal,  found  a  rise  of 
ground,  under  cover  of  which  he  deployed  his  troops  in 
column  of  attack  with  brigade  front.f  Hancock's  division 
followed  and  joined  the  advance  of  French. J  Even  while 
moving  through  the  town,  and  marching  by  the  flank,  the 
troops  were  exposed  to  a  very  severe  fire  from  the  enemy's 

pursued  them  closely  with  great  slaughter,  as  they  fled  from  the  field.  The 
pursuit  was  so  close  that  they  came  within  fifty  yards  of  my  guns.  I  think  it 
was  Early's  division,"  etc. — Testimony  of  General  Birney  :  Report  on  the  Con 
duct  of  the  War,  vol.  i.,  p.  705.  General  Meade's  own  report,  as  well  as  the 
Confederate  reports,  agree  substantially  with  this  account.  See  Hill's  Report : 
Reports  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  vol.  ii.,  p.  463 ;  Early's  Report : 
Ibid.,  p.  469.  Birney 's  statement,  regarding  the  pursuing  column  being  that  of 
Early,  is  curiously  corroborated  by  the  official  report  of  the  latter,  in  which  he 
states  that  his  division  "  was  compelled  to  fall  back  from  the  pursuit  by  a 
large  column  on  its  right  flank,  which  proved  to  be  Birney's  division,"  etc  — 
Ibid.,  p.  470. 

*  Couch :  Report  of  Fredericksburg. 

f  "  General  Kimball's  brigade  was  in  front,  and  by  its  subsequent  conduct 
showed  itself  worthy  to  lead.  It  was  followed  in  succession  by  the  brigades  of 
Colonel  J.  W.  Andrews,  First  Delaware,  and  Colonel  Palmer,  One  Hundred 
and  Eighth  New  York." — Couch :  Report  of  Fredericksburg. 

t  Hancock's  formation  was  the  same  as  that  of  French  :  "  brigade  front  with 
intervals  of  t-wo  hundred  paces — the  brigades  in  the  order  of  Zook,  Meagher, 
and  Caldwell." — Hancock  :  Report  of  Fredericksburg. 


250  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

batteries  on  the  heights,  against  which  it  soon  became  im 
possible  for  the  numerous  Union  artillery  on  the  north  bank 
of  the  Kappahannock  to  direct  its  fire,  seeing  that  the  missiles 
presently  began  to  play  havoc  with  the  columns  advancing 
over  the  plain.* 

Longstreet,  who  held  the  position  in  the  rear  of  Fredericks- 
burg,  forming  the  Confederate  left,  had  taken  up  as  his  ad 
vance  line  the  stone  wall  and  rifle-trenches  along  the  telegraph 
road,  at  the  foot  of  Marye's  Heights  ;  and  here  he  posted  a 
brigade,  afterwards  re-enforced  by  another  brigade. t  But 
the  whole  plain  was  swept  by  a  direct  and  converging  fire 
from  the  numerous  batteries  on  the  semicircular  crest  above, 
and  behind  this  lay  the  heavy  Confederate  reserves — un- 
needed,  as  it  proved,  for  a  few  men  were  enough  to  do  the 
bloody  work.  Under  orders,  nothing  was  left  but  to  assail 
this  position ;  so  French  first  was  thrown  forward  from  the 
rise  of  ground,  where  he  had  formed,  towards  the  foot  of  the 
heights.  No  sooner  had  this  division  burst  out  on  the  plain, 
than  from  the  batteries  above  came  a  frightful  fire — cross 
showers  of  shot  and  shell  opening  great  gaps  in  the  ranks ; 
but  "  closing  up,"  the  ever-thinning  lines  pressed  on,  and  had 
passed  over  a  great  part  of  the  interval,  when  met  by  volleys 
of  musketry  at  short  range.  They  fell  back,  shattered  and 
broken,  with  a  loss  of  near  half  their  number,  amid  shouts 
and  yells  from  the  enemy.  Close  behind  French  came  up 
Hancock,  and,  being  joined  by  such  portions  of  French's 
command  as  still  preserved  their  formation,  his  three  bri 
gades  valiantly  advanced  under  the  same  terrific  fire,  passed 


*  "  Our  artillery  being  in  position,  opened  fire  as  soon  as  the  masses  be 
came  dense  enough  to  warrant  it.  This  fire  was  very  destructive  and  demoral 
izing  in  its  effects,  and  frequently  made  gaps  in  the  enemy's  ranks  that  could 
be  seen  at  the  distance  of  a  mile." — Longstreet :  Report  of  Fredericksburg. 

f  This  position  was  first  held  by  the  brigade  of  R.  R.  Cobb,  re-enforced  in 
the  afternoon  by  Kershaw's  brigade,  both  of  McLaws'  division  ;  and  this  small 
force,  not  exceeding  seventeen  hundred  men,  was  all  that  was  found  necessary 
to  repulse  the  numerous  assaults  made  by  the  Union  columns.  — McLaws :  Ro« 
ports  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  vol.  ii.,  p.  445. 


THE    CAMPAIGN  ON  THE  RAPPAHANNOCK.  251 

the  point  French  had  reached,  and  like  those  that  went  before 
them,  were  forced  back  after  little  more  than  fifteen  im 
mortal  minutes.  Of  the  five  thousand  men  Hancock  led  into 
action,  more  than  two  thousand  fell  in  that  charge  ;  and  it 
was  found  that  the  bravest  of  these, had  thrown  up  their 
hands  and  lay  dead  within  five-and-twenty  paces  of  the  stone 
wall.*  To  relieve  Hancock's  and  French's  hard-pressed  bat 
talions,  Howard's  division  now  came  up,  and  Sturgis'  and 
Getty's  divisions  of  the  Ninth  Corps  advanced  on  Couch's 
left,  and  made  several  attacks  in  support  of  the  brave  troops 
of  the  Second  Corps,  who  could  not  advance  and  would  not 
retire ;  but  all  these  could  do  was  to  hold  a  line  well  ad 
vanced  on  the  plain  under  a  continual  murderous  fire  of  ar 
tillery. 

It  is  hardly  to  be  supposed  that  General  Burnside  had  con 
templated  the  bloody  sequence  to  which  he  was  committing 
himself  when  first  he  ordered  a  division  to  assail  the  heights 
of  Fredericksburg ;  but  having  failed  in  the  first  assault,  and 
then  in  the  second  and  third,  there  grew  up  in  his  mind  some 
thing  which  those  around  him  saw  to  be  akin  to  desperation. 
Eiding  down  from  his  headquartersf  to  the  bank  of  the  Eap- 
pahannock,  he  walked  restlessly  up  and  down,  and  gazing 
over  at  the  heights  across  the  river,  exclaimed  vehemently, 
"  That  crest  must  be  carried  to-night."J  Already,  however, 
every  thing  had  been  thrown  in,  except  Hooker,  and  he  was 
now  ordered  over  the  river. 

Crossing  with  three  of  his  divisions,  Hooker  went  forward, 
reconnoitred  the  ground,  consulted  with  those  who  had  pre- 


*  Hancock  took  five  thousand  and  six  men  into  action,  and  his  loss. num 
bered  two  thousand  and  thirteen  men,  of  whom  one  hundred  and  fifty-six  were 
commissioned  officers.  The  losses  in  some  of  the  regiments  were  of  a  severity 
seldom  seen  in  any  battle,  no  matter  how  prolonged.  "  These  were  veteran 
regiments,"  says  Hancock,  "led  by  able  and  tried  commanders."— Report  ol 
Fredericksburg. 

f  At  the  "  Phillips  House,"  a  mile  or  so  back  from  the  river. 

|  These  statements  are  made  from  the  personal  knowledge  of  the  writer,  in 
whose  presence  what  is  related  occurred. 


252  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

ceded  him  in  action,  saw  that  the  case  was  hopeless,  and 
went  to  beg  Burnside  to  cease  the  attack.  But  Burnside  in 
sisted.*  Couch  had  already  thrown  forward  two  batteries  to 
within  one  hundred  and  fifty  yards  of  the  enemy's  works,  and 
endeavored  to  make  a  breach  large  enough  for  the  entrance 
of  a  forlorn  hope.  After  a  vigorous  cannonading,  without 
any  perceptible  effect,  Humphrey's  division  was  formed  in 
column  of  assault  and  ordered  in.  They  were  directed  to 
make  the  assault  with  empty  muskets,  for  there  was  no  time 
there  to  load  and  fire.f 

When  the  word  was  given,  the  men  moved  forward  with 
great  impetuosity,  and  advanced  to  nearly  the  same  point  Han 
cock  had  previously  reached,  close  up  to  the  stone  wall :  they 
advanced,  in  fact,  over  a  space  the  traversing  of  which  by  any 
column  would  result  in  the  destruction  of  half  its  numbers, 
when  they  were  thrown  swiftly  back,  leaving  behind  seven 
teen  hundred  of  the  four  thousand  that  had  gone  forward. J 
What  else  might  have  followed  in  the  commander's  then 
mood  of  mind,  it  is  impossible  to  say ;  but  it  was  already  late 
when  Hooker's  attack  was  begun,  and  night  now  dropped  its 
curtain  on  a  tragic  scene,  that  might  be  fitly  written  only  in 
the  blood  of  the  thousands  of  brave  men  who  lay  dead  or 
moaning  in  agony  worse  than  death  on  the  plains  of  Freder- 
icksburg. 

So  decisive  was  the  action  of  the  day  that  it  is  difficult  to 
see  how  there  could  be  any  question  touching  the  propriety 
of  recrossing  the  Eappahannock.  This  course  was  earnestly 
urged  by  the  chief  commanders ;  but  General  Burnside  judged 


*  "  I  had  the  matter  so  much  at  heart  that  I  put  spurs  to  my  horse,  and  rode 
over  myself,  and  tried  to  dissuade  General  Burnside  from  making  the  attack. 
Be  insisted  on  its  being  done."— Hooker's  testimony :  Report  on  the  Conduct  of 
the  War,  vol.  i.,  p.  668. 

f  Hooker  :  Report  of  Fredericksburg. 

|  There  is  an  almost  savage  irony  in  the  manner  in  which  General  Hooker 
states  the  result  of  this  attack.  "  Finding,"  says  he,  "  that  I  had  lost  as  many 
men  as  my  orders  required  me  to  lose,  I  suspended  the  attack." — Report  on  the 
Conduct  of  the  War,  vol.  i.,  p.  668. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  ON  THE  RAPPAHANNOCK.  253 

otherwise,  and  determined  to  renew  the  assault  on  the 
morrow.  The  form  this  determination  took  was  an  evidence 
that  he  had  lost  that  mental  equipoise  essential  for  a  com 
mander  in  the  difficult  situation  in  which  he  found  himself. 
He  resolved  to  form  the  Ninth  Corps  (which  he  had  himself 
formerly  commanded)  in  a  column  of  attack  by  regiments, 
and  lead  it  in  person  to  the  assault  of  the  heights.  All  the 
preparations  had  been  completed,  and  the  attack  was  about 
to  be  made  when,  moved  by  the  urgent  entreaties  of  Gen 
eral  Sumner,  Burnside  desisted  from  his  purpose.  The 
troops,  however,  still  lay  on  their  arms  during  Sunday,  the 
14th,  and  Monday,  the  15th,  of  December,  and,  during  the 
night,  in  the  midst  of  a  violent  storm,  the  army  was  with 
drawn  to  the  north  side  of  the  Bappahannock.  General  Lee, 
unaware  of  the  extent  of  the  disaster  the  Union  army  had 
suffered,  hourly  expecting  a  renewal  of  the  attack,  and  deem 
ing  it  inexpedient  to  expose  his  troops  to  the  fire  of  the 
batteries  on  the  north  bank,  refrained  during  all  this  time 
from  assuming  the  offensive,*  and  the  withdrawal  eluded  his 
knowledge. 

The  loss  on  the  Union  side  was  twelve  thousand  three  hun 
dred  and  twenty-one,  killed,  wounded,  and  missing  ;f  and  on 
the  part  of  the  Confederates,  it  was  five  thousand  three  hun 
dred  and  nine,  killed,  wounded,  and  missing.  £ 

There  is  little  need  for  comment  on  this  battle,  or  for  other 
reflection  than  must  spontaneously  arise  from  the  simple 
recital  of  its  incidents.  Such  slaughters  stand  condemned  in 
the  common  voice  of  mankind,  which  justly  holds  a  com- 


*  Lee :  Report  of  Fredericksburg  in  Reports  of  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia,  vol.  i.,  p.  43. 

f  Halleck :  Report  of  Military  Operations  for  1863.  General  Halleck  adds 
that  a  good  many  of  the  Union  "  missing"  afterwards  turned  up. 

$  This  aggregate  I  make  up  from  the  returns  of  the  two  corps  of  Lee's  army 
—the  First  (Longstreet's)  losing  three  thousand  four  hundred  and  fifteen,  and 
the  Second  (Jackson's)  one  thousand  eight  hundred  and  ninety-four.  Confed 
erate  Reports  of  Fredericksburg. 


254          CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC 

mander  accountable  for  the  useless  sacrifice  of  human  life. 
There  are  occasions  when,  as  at  Thermopylae,  a  general  is 
doomed  to  the  tragic  fate  of  immolating  himself  and  his 
army ;  but  such  cases  are  rare  and  exceptional.  It  was  not 
necessary  for  General  Burnside,  in  a  problem  that  admitted 
of  very  many  solutions,  to  give  to  his  army  the  character  of  a 
forlorn  hope,  in  the  assault  of  positions  chosen,  long-prepared, 
and  impregnable,  when  he  was  free  by  manoeuvres  to  select 
his  own  field  of  battle. 

But  even  with  the  choice  made  of  a  direct  attack  of  the 
fortified  ridge,  the  plan  of  battle — if  such  fatuitous  devise- 
ment  as  has  seldom  been  seen  can  be  called  a  plan — was 
exceedingly  faulty.  The  conditions  of  attack  and  defence, 
and  the  nature  of  the  position  already  set  forth,  dictated  that 
the  principal  operation  should  be  made  from  the  left,  where 
Franklin  held  one-half  the  army  in  hand.  It  is  true  that 
General  Burnside,  at  a  period  subsequent  to  the  battle, 
asserted  that  this  was  his  purpose,  and  endeavored  to  fasten 
the  responsibility  of  the  disaster  on  General  Franklin's 
alleged  failure  to  make  an  adequate  attack.  But  judging  by 
the  orders  in  which  General  Burnside's  original  intent  and 
will  are  revealed,  rather  than  by  the  inspirations  of  after 
thought,  it  is  manifest  that,  if  he  designed  to  make  the  main 
attack  from  the  left,  he  at  least  made  no  provisions  for  giving 
effect  to  this  intention.  It  would  appear  from  his  own  state 
ment,  that  he  made  his  theory  of  battle  to  hinge  on  a  con 
tingency  which  he  used  no  adequate  means  to  bring  about, 
unless  it  be  thought  that  two  isolated  attacks  on  the  for 
tified  stronghold  of  the  Confederates,  made  by  a  single 
division  each,  were  adequate  means  to  this  end,  and  af 
forded  a  reasonable  hope  of  carrying  the  position.  That 
they  were  wholly  inadequate  was  proved  by  the  terrible 
experiences  of  the  day,  both  on  the  right  and  the  left ; 
and  the  preliminary  attacks  having  failed,  as  they  must,  I 
can  only  account  for  the  tragic  sequence,  on  the  supposition 
I  have  already  stated,  that,  distraught  and  demented  with 
the  failure,  General  Burnside  continued  in  sheer  despera- 


THE  CAMPAIGN  ON  THE  RAPPAHANNOCK.  255 

tion  to  throw  in  division  after  division,  to  foredoomed  de 
struction. 

But  while  this  may  explain,  it  will  not  justify  General 
Burnside's  conduct.  It  would  have  been  well  for  him  had 
the  failure  of  the  first  assaults,  and  the  disclosures  they  made 
of  the  strength  and  position  of  the  enemy,  given  him 
pause  in  their  repetition.  When  General  Warren  at  Mine 
Kun,  after  viewing  the  enemy's  line,  which,  like  that  at  Fred- 
ericksburg,  was  manifestly  impregnable,  declined  to  throw 
away  the  lives  that  had  been  placed  in  his  charge,  preferring 
with  a  noble  sense  of  honor  and  duty  to  sacrifice  himself 
rather  than  his  command,  that  instinct  of  right  which  is  never 
absent  in  a  generous  people,  appreciated  the  motive  and 
applauded  the  act. 

Had  General  Burnside  followed  the  like  prompting,  he 
would  have  saved  his  name  from  association  with  a  slaughter 
the  most  bloody  and  the  most  useless  of  the  war. 


III. 
ABORTIVE  MOVEMENTS   ON  THE   RAPPAHANNOCK. 

In  tracing  the  development  of  military  operations  as  they 
stand  related  to  the  army  that  was  the  agent  of  their  execu 
tion,  it  is  important  to  mark  not  only  the  army's  condition  of 
material  strength  and  well-being,  but  those  moral  transforma 
tions  with  which,  in  so  large  a  degree,  its  efficiency  as  a  living 
organism  is  bound  up. 

Nothing  is  more  difficult  than  to  indicate,  in  precise  terms, 
that  blending  of  qualities,  passions,  prejudices,  and  illusions, 
that  at  any  given  time  make  up  what  is  expressively  called 
the  morale  of  an  army.  Like  the  imponderable  forces  of 
physical  philosophy,  it  is  inappreciable  by  material  weight 
and  measure.  Yet,  if  difficult  of  analysis,  it  does  not  fail  to 
make  itself  felt  as  a  palpable  power  ;  and  the  foremost  master 


256  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

of  war  attempted  to  convey  his  sense  of  its  potency  by  the 
expression  that  in  military  affairs,  "  the  moral  is  to  the  physi 
cal  as  three  to  one." 

That  the  morale  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  became 
seriously  impaired  after  the  disaster  at  Fredericksburg  was 
only  too  manifest.  Indeed  it  would  be  impossible  to  imagine 
a  graver  or  gloomier,  a  more  sombre  or  unmusical  body  of 
men  than  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  a  month  after  the  battle. 
And  as  the  days  went  by,  despondency,  discontent,  and  all 
evil  inspirations,  with  their  natural  consequence,  desertion, 
seemed  to  increase  rather  than  to  diminish,  until,  for  the  first 
time,  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  could  be  said  to  be  really 
demoralized.* 

The  cause  of  all  this  could  not  be  concealed ;  it  was  the 
lack  of  confidence  in  General  Burnside — a  sentiment  that  was 
universal  throughout  the  army.  Troops  who  have  by  experi 
ence  learned  what  war  is,  become  severe  critics.  It  is  a  mis 
take  to  suppose  that  soldiers,  and  especially  such  soldiers  as 
composed  the  American  army,  are  lavish  of  their  lives ;  they 
are  chary  of  their  lives,  and  are  never  what  newspaper  jargon 
constantly  represented  them  to  be — "eager  for  the  fray." 
"  The  soldier,"  says  Marmont,  "  acquires  the  faculty  of  dis 
criminating  how  and  when  he  will  be  able,  by  offering  his  life 
as  a  sacrifice,  to  make  the  best  possible  use  of  it."  But  when 
the  time  comes  that  he  discovers  in  his  commander  that  which 
will  make  this  rich  offering  vain,  from  that  moment  begin  to 
work  those  malign  influences  that  disintegrate  and  destroy 
the  morale  of  armies.  General  Burnside  had  brought  his 
army  to  that  unhappy  pass  that,  with  much  regard  for  his 
person  and  character,  it  distrusted  and  feared  his  leadership ; 
while  the  general  officers  had  little  belief  in  or  respect  for  his 

*  The  form  which  this  demoralization  assumed  was  aptly  expressed  by 
General  Sumner,  in  his  official  testimony  before  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct 
of  the  War  touching  the  battle  and  the  condition  of  the  army  as  a  general 
spirit  of  "  croaking."  "  It  is  difficult,"  said  he,  "  to  describe  the  state  of  the 
army  in  other  way  than  by  saying  there  is  a  great  deal  too  much  croaking — 
there  is  not  sufficient  confidence." 


THE  CAMPAIGN  ON  THE  RAPPAHANNOCK.  257 

military  plans.  It  is  easy  to  see  how  fatal  to  the  success  of 
any  military  operations  must  have  been  this  state  of  affairs  ; 
and  this  received  striking  illustration  in  the  two  attempted 
movements  which  fill  up  the  remainder  of  General  Burnside's 
career  as  commander  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  The  first 
of  these  movements  was  undertaken  a  fortnight  after  the  bat 
tle  of  Fredericksburg,  towards  the  close  of  December.  Gen 
eral  Burnside  had  determined  to  cross  the  Eappahannock 
seven  miles  below  Fredericksburg,  with  a  view  to  turn  the 
Confederate  position,  and  in  connection  with  this  operation 
he  resolved  to  send  a  cavalry  expedition  to  the  rear  of  Lee's 
army  for  the  purpose  of  cutting  the  railroad  communications 
of  the  Confederates.  Now  the  raiding  column  had  actually 
got  under  way,  and  the  whole  army  was  in  readiness  for  an 
immediate  move,  when,  on  the  30th  of  December,  General 
Burnside  received  a  dispatch  from  President  Lincoln  instruct 
ing  him  not  to  enter  on  active  operations  without  letting  the 
President  know  of  it.  Surprised  at  this  message,  General 
Burnside  recalled  the  cavalry  expedition,  and  proceeded  per 
sonally  to  Washington  to  ascertain  the  cause  of  the  presiden 
tial  prohibition.  On  seeing  Mr.  Lincoln,  he  was  informed  by 
him  that  certain  general  officers  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
had  come  up  to  see  him,  and  had  represented  that  the  army 
was  on  the  eve  of  another  movement ;  that  all  the  preliminary 
arrangements  were  made,  and  that  they,  and  every  prominent 
officer  in  the  army,  were  satisfied,  if  the  movement  was 
entered  upon,  it  would  result  in  disaster.  In  consequence  of 
this  condition  of  facts,  the  President,  without  prohibiting  a 
move,  judged  that  any  large  enterprise,  at  that  time,  would 
be  injudicious ;  and  General  Burnside  returned  to  his  head 
quarters  amazed  at  the  revelation  of  the  state  of  feeling  in  the 
army  that  was  notorious  to  every  one  in  it  save  the  com 
mander  himself. 

The  position  in  which  that  officer  now  found  himself  was 
as  false  as  it  was  humiliating ;  and  was  one  that  neither  his 
own  sense  of  honor,  nor  the  Government's  sense  of  the  public 
welfare,  should  have  permitted  him  to  occupy.  He  had  lost 

17 


258  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  AKMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

the  confidence  of  the  army ;  he  was  unable  to  obtain  the 
sanction  of  the  general-in-chief  to  any  proposition  for  a  move 
ment,  and  at  the  same  time  the  country  looked  to  him  for 
action.  In  this  unhappy  situation,  General  Burnside's  con 
duct  was  marked  by  a  self-sacrificing  and  patriotic  spirit ; 
but  he  was  utterly  helpless  to  extricate  himself  from  the  coil 
that  enveloped  him.  At  length,  as  the  be-all  and  the  end-all 
of  his  hopes,  he  resolved  to  again  try  the  fortune  of  battle,  in 
the  expectation  that  if  successful  it  would  rehabilitate  him  in 
the  confidence  of  the  army. 

Unfortunately,  success  was  already  too  necessary  to  him, 
and  he  made  too  much  contingent  upon  it ;  for  if  success  was 
needful  as  the  means  of  recovering  the  confidence  of  the 
army,  this  very  confidence  was  itself  indispensable  as  a  con 
dition  of  success. 

The  point  at  which  General  Burnside  resolved  this  time  to 
essay  the  passage  of  the  Rappahannock  was  Banks'  Ford  (not 
then  fordable),  about  six  miles  above  Fredericksburg.  As, 
however,  the  enemy  had  a  force  in  observation  at  ah1  the 
practicable  crossings  of  the  Rappahannock,  and  as  there  was 
no  possibility  of  making  preparations  for  the  passage  at  any 
one  point  with  such  secrecy  that  he  should  not  become  aware 
of  it,  it  was  resolved  to  make  feints  of  crossing  at  several 
distinct  points,  both  above  and  below  Fredericksburg,  and 
thus  mask  the  real  intent.  Accordingly,  new  roads  were  cut 
through  the  woods  to  afford  readier  access  to  the  fords,  bat 
teries  were  planted,  rifle-trenches  were  formed,  and  cavalry 
demonstrations  made  along  the  line ;  and  these  manifesta 
tions  were  made  impartially  at  a  variety  of  points. 

The  weather  and  roads  had  been  in  excellent  condition 
since  the  late  battle,  and  on  the  19th  of  January,  1863,  the 
columns  were  put  in  motion  with  such  secrecy  as  could  be 
observed.  The  Grand  Divisions  of  Franklin  and  Hooker 
ascended  the  river  by  parallel  roads,  and  at  night  encamped 
in  the  woods  at  convenient  distance  from  the  fords.  Couch's 
corps  was  moved  below  Fredericksburg  to  make  demonstra 
tions  there,  and  the  reserve  corps  under  Sigel,  which  had 


THE  CAMPAIGN  ON  THE  EAPPAHANNOCK.  259 

been  united  with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  was  assigned 
the  duty  of  guarding  the  line  of  the  river  and  the  commu 
nications  of  the  army.  Preparations  for  crossing  were  pushed 
on  during  the  20th,  positions  for  artillery  were  selected,  the 
guns  were  brought  up,  the  pontons  were  within  reach  a  short 
distance  back  from  the  river,  and  it  was  determined  to  make 
the  passage  on  the  following  morning. 

But  during  the  night  a  terrible  storm  came  on,  and  then 
each  man  felt  that  the  move  was  ended.  It  was  a  wild 
"Walpurgis  night,  such  as  Goethe  paints  in  the  Faust.  Yet 
there  was  brave  work  done  during  its  hours,  for  the  guns  were 
hauled  painfully  up  the  heights  and  placed  in  their  positions, 
and  the  pontons  were  drawn  down  nearer  to  the  river.  But 
it  was  already  seen  to  be  a  hopeless  task ;  for  the  clayey 
roads  and  fields,  under  the  influence  of  the  rain,  had  become 
bad  beyond  all  former  experience,  and  by  daylight,  when  the 
boats  should  all  have  been  on  the  banks  ready  to  slide  down 
into  the  water,  but  fifteen  had  been  gotten  up — not  enough 
for  one  bridge,  and  five  were  wanted.  Moreover,  the  night 
operations  had  not  escaped  the  notice  of  the  wary  enemy, 
and  by  morning  Lee  had  massed  his  army  to  meet  the  men 
aced  crossing. 

In  this  state  of  facts,  when  all  the  conditions  on  which  it 
was  expected  to  make  a  successful  passage  had  been  baulked, 
it  would  have  been  judicious  in  General  Burnside  to  have 
promptly  abandoned  an  operation  that  was  now  hopeless. 
But  it  was  a  characteristic  of  that  general's  mind  (a  char 
acteristic  that  might  be  good  or  bad  according  to  the 
direction  it  took),  never  to  turn  back  when  he  had  once 
put  his  hand  to  the  plough ;  and  it  had  already  more  than 
once  "been  seen  that  the  more  hopeless  the  enterprise 
the  greater  his  pertinacity.  The  night's  rain  had  made 
deplorable  havoc  with  the  roads ;  *  but  herculean  efforts 

*  The  nature  of  the  upper  geologic  deposits  of  this  region  affords  unequalled 
elements  for  bad  roads,  for  it  is  a  soil  out  of  which,  when  it  rains,  the  bottom 
drops,  and  yet  which  is  so  tenacious  that  extrication  from  its  clutch  is  next  to 
impossible. 


260  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

were  made  to  bring  pontons  enough  into  position  to  I  mild  a, 
bridge  or  two  withal.  Double  and  triple  teams  of  horses  and 
mules  were  harnessed  to  each  boat ;  but  it  was  in  vain.  Long 
stout  ropes  were  then  attached  to  the  teams  and  a  hundred 
and  fifty  men  put  to  the  task  on  each.  The  effort  was  but 
little  more  successful.  Floundering  through  the  mire  for  a 
few  feet,  the  gang  of  Liliputians  with  their  huge-ribbed 
Gulliver,  were  forced  to  give  over,  breathless.  Night  arrived, 
but  the  pontons  could  not  be  got  up,  and  the  enemy's  pickets, 
discovering  what  was  going  on,  jocularly  shouted  out  their 
intention  to  "  come  over  to-morrow  and  help  build  the 
bridges." 

Morning  dawned  upon  another  day  of  rain  and  storm. 
The  ground  had  gone  from  bad  to  worse,  and  now  showed 
such  a  spectacle  as  might  be  presented  by  the  elemental 
wrecks  of  another  Deluge.  An  indescribable  chaos  of  pon 
tons,  vehicles,  and  artillery  encumbered  all  the  roads — supply- 
wagons  upset  by  the  road-side,  guns  stalled  in  the  mud, 
ammunition-trains  mired  by  the  way,  and  hundreds  of  horses 
and  mules  buried  in  the  liquid  muck.  The  army,  in  fact,  was 
embargoed  :  it  was  no  longer  a  question  of  how  to  go  forward 
— it  was  a  question  of  how  to  get  back.  The  three-days' 
rations  brought  on  the  persons  of  the  men  were  exhausted, 
and  the  suppiy-trains  could  not  be  moved  up.  To  aid  the 
return  all  the  available  force  was  put  to  work  to  corduroy  the 
rotten  roads.  Next  morning  the  army  floundered  and  stag 
gered  back  to  the  old  camps,  and  so  ended  a  movement  that 
will  always  live  in  the  recollection  of  the  army  as  the  "  Mud 
March,"  and  which  remains  a  striking  exemplification  of  the 
enormous  difficulties  incident  to  winter  campaigning  in 
Virginia. 

The  failure  of  this  movement  is  sufficiently  accounted  for 
by  those  "  slings  and  arrows  of  outrageous  fortune"  the  effect 
of  which  I  have  endeavored  to  portray ;  and  the  commander 
was  certainly  justified  in  suspending  it,  and  recalling  the  army 
to  its  quarters,  when  the  operation  was  seen  to  be  hopeless. 
But  General  Burnside  had  fancied  that  he  discovered  another 


THE  CAMPAIGN  ON  THE  RAPPAHANNOCK.  261 

and  deeper  cause,  that,  aside  from  the  interference  of  the 
weather,  would  have  baulked  his  projected  campaign.  This 
cause  was  a  lack  of  confidence  in  him  which  he  believed  to  be 
entertained  by  the  leading  officers  of  the  army.  Among  these 
officers  were  Generals  Franklin  and  Hooker,  respectively  com 
manders  of  Grand  Divisions ;  and  his  first  act  on  the  return 
of  the  expedition  was  to  prepare  an  order  dismissing  from 
the  service  of  the  United  States  Generals  Hooker,  Brooks, 
Cochrane,  and  Newton,  and  relieving  from  their  commands  in 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  Generals  Franklin,  W.  F.  Smith, 
Sturgis,  Ferrero,  and  Colonel  Taylor.  Upon  this  order  he 
resolved  to  make  issue  with  the  Government ;  and  he  immedi 
ately  took  this  paper  to  Washington,  demanding  of  the  Presi 
dent  its  approval  or  the  acceptance  of  his  resignation.  It  was 
not  asserted  by  General  Burnside  that  the  officers  named  had 
been  guilty  of  any  dereliction  of  duty,  but  simply  that  they 
lacked  confidence  in  him  as  commander.  This  charge  was 
probably  true  ;  but,  as  this  issue  involved  the  alternative  of 
relieving  nearly  the  whole  body  of  the  officers  of  the  army  or 
of  relieving  General  Burnside  himself,  the  President  was  com 
pelled  to  refuse  to  sanction  the  order.  General  Burnside' s 
resignation  was  accepted;  and  General  Hooker,  the  officer 
whose  name  stood  in  the  order  as  head  and  front  of  all  the 
offending,  and  who,  by  its  terms,  was  dismissed  the  service  of 
the  United  States,  was  by  the  President  placed  in  command 
in  his  stead. 

General  Burnside's  career  as  head  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  was  as  unfortunate  as  it  was  brief;  and  there  is 
much  in  its  circumstances  and  in  his  character  to  inspire  a 
lenient  judgment.  His  elevation  to  the  command  was  un 
sought  by  him ;  for,  with  a  good  sense  that  was  creditable  to 
him,  he  knew  and  proclaimed  his  unfitness  for  the  trust.  It 
was  right  to  try  him,  because  it  was  impossible  to  tell  whether 
his  own  gauge  of  his  fitness  was  correct,  or  whether  he  wronged 
himself  by  a  self-distrust  that  he  might  soon  surmount. 
When,  however,  the  trial  had  proved  the  absolute  justness  of 


262  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

his  measure  of  his  own  incapacity  (and  there  can  be  no  doubt 
that  this  was  fully  proved  by  the  events  of  the  battle  of  Fred- 
ericksburg),  they  must  be  held  accountable  for  the  conse 
quences  who  retained  him  in  a  position  which  his  own  judg 
ment,  now  fortified  by  the  general  verdict  of  the  army, 
pronounced  him  unequal  to  fill.  His  retention  after  this,  if 
there  be  any  fidelity  in  the  portrayal  I  have  presented  of  the 
condition  of  the  army,  imperilled  not  only  its  efficiency  but  its 
existence.  Desertions  were  going  on  at  the  rate  of  about 
two  hundred  a  day,  and  the  official  rolls  at  the  time  he 
was  relieved  showed  an  absence  from  the  Army  of  the  Poto 
mac  of  above  eighty  thousand  men — "  absent  from  causes 
unknown."* 

I  must  here  add  that,  while  the  superior  officers  had  little 
respect  for  Burnside's  military  plans,  they,  nevertheless,  did 
not  allow  their  personal  views  to  influence  in  the  least  their 
conduct.  And  it  is  the  more  'important  to  state  this  con 
viction  with  emphasis,  because  it  was  commonly  believed 
throughout  the  country  that  General  Burnside,  especially  in 
the  last  operation  attempted,  failed  to  receive  from  his  sub 
ordinates  that  hearty  co-operation  absolutely  necessary  to  the 
success  of  any  military  enterprise. f  It  is  not  unlikely  that 
General  Burnside  himself  had  the  same  suspicion ;  for,  though 
he  did  not  put  it  forth,  yet  it  is  hardly  to  be  supposed  that 
he  would  have  demanded  the  dismissal  of  the  officers  named 
in  his  expurgatorial  index  on  the  mere  ground  of  their  ab 
stract  military  views — for  it  is  vain  for  any  commander  to  ex 
pect  to  control  these.  General  Burnside  was,  and  would  have 
been,  obeyed  in  the  execution  of  all  his  plans  of  operation ; 


*  Report  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  second  series,  vol.  i.,  p.  112. 

f  It  was  one  of  the  traits  of  the  public  temper  during  the  war  to  be  in  con 
stant  suspicion  of  disaffection  and  disloyalty  on  the  part  of  officers.  Yefc,  if 
there  be  one  characteristic  of  that  period  more  remarkable  than  another,  it  is 
the  absence  of  these  things.  And,  in  this  regard,  it  strikingly  contrasts  with 
the  common  experience  of  nations  at  war ;  for  even  Napoleon,  wielding  im 
perial  power,  found  it  next  to  impossible  to  subordinate  the  individual  wills  of 
his  lieutenants. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  ON  THE  RAPPAHANNOCK.  263 

for  there  was  that  loyal  alacrity  among  the  officers  that  would 
have  prompted  this  in  any  circumstances  of  personal  relation. 
If,  however,  he  was  unable  to  command  the  homage  of  their 
intellectual  approval,  that  was  his  own  misfortune.* 

*  It  may  be  observed  that  many  of  the  leading  officers  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  were  not  in  favor  of  operating  by  the  Fredericksburg  line.  The  fol 
lowing  correspondence  between  Generals  Franklin  and  Smith  and  President 
Lincoln  has  relation  to  this  question.  It  is  of  great  interest  and  has  not  before 

been  published. 

HEADQUARTERS  LEFT  GRAND  DIVISION, 

December  21,  1862. 
To  THE  PRESIDENT  : 

The  undersigned,  holding  important  commands  in  the  Army  of  the  Poto 
mac,  impressed  with  a  belief  that  a  plan  of  operations  of  this  army  may  be 
devised  which  will  be  crowned  with  success,  and  that  the  plan  of  campaign 
which  has  already  been  commenced,  cannot  possibly  be  successful,  present  with 
diffidence  the  following  views  for  consideration.  Whether  the  plan  proposed 
be  adopted  or  not,  they  consider  it  their  duty  to  present  these  views,  thinking 
that  perhaps  they  may  be  suggestive  to  some  other  military  mind  in  discuss 
ing  plans  for  the  future  operations  of  our  armies  in  the  East. 

I. — We  believe  that  the  plan  of  campaign  already  commenced  will  not  be 
successful  for  the  following  reasons,  viz. : 

1.  The  distance  from  this  point  to  Richmond  is  sixty-one  miles. 

It  will  be  necessary  to  keep  open  our  communications  with  Aquia  Creek 
Landing  from  all  points  of  this  route.  To  effect  this,  the  presence  of  large 
bodies  of  troops  on  the  road  will  be  necessary  at  many  points.  The  result  of 
making  these  detachments  would  be,  that  the  enemy  will  attack  them,  inter 
rupt  the  communications,  and  the  army  will  be  obliged  to  return  to  drive  him 
away. 

If  the  railroad  be  rebuilt  as  the  army  marches,  it  will  be  destroyed  at 
important  points  by  the  enemy. 

If  we  do  not  depend  upon  the  railroad,  but  upon  wagon  transportation,  the 
trains  will  be  so  enormous  that  a  great  deal  of  the  strength  of  the  army  will 
be  required  to  guard  them,  and  the  troops  will  be  so  separated  by  the  trains, 
and  the  roads  so  blocked  by  them,  that  the  advance  and  rear  of  the  army  could 
not  be  within  supporting  distance  of  each  other. 

2.  It  is  in  the  power  of  the  enemy  at  many  points  on  this  route  to  post 
himself  strongly  and  defy  us.    The  whole  strength  of  our  army  may  not  be 
sufficient  to  drive  him  away ;  and  even  were  he  driven  away  at  great  sacrifice 
of  blood  on  our  part,  the  result  would  not  be  decisive.   The  losses  to  him  in  his 
strong  positions  would  be  comparatively  slight,  while  ours  will  be  enormous. 

II. — In  our  opinion,  any  plan  of  campaign  to  be  successful  should  possess 
the  following  requisites,  viz. : 


264  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE   ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

It  was  not  possible  to  continue  a  condition  of  affairs  that 
neutralized  the  best  forces  of  the  army,  and  the  President 
wisely  relieved  General  Burnside  from  a  position  deeply 

1.  All  of  the  troops  available  in  the  East  should  be  massed. 

2.  They  should  approach  as  near  to  Richmond  as  possible  without  an  en- 
gagement. 

3.  The  line  of  communication  should  be  absolutely  free  from  danger  of 
interruption. 

A  campaign  on  the  James  River  enables  us  to  fulfil  all  these  conditions 
more  absolutely  than  any  other,  for, 

1.  On  the  James  River  our  troops  from  both  North  and  South  can  be  con 
centrated  more  rapidly  than  they  can  be  at  any  other  point. 

2.  They  can  be  brought  to  points  within  twenty  miles  of  Richmond  with 
out  the  risk  of  an  engagement. 

3.  The  communication  by  the  James  River  can  be  kept  up  by  the  assist 
ance  of  the  navy,  without  the  slightest  danger  of  interruption. 

Some  of  the  details  of  this  plan  are  the  following : 

We  premise  that  by  concentrating  our  troops  in  the  East,  we  will  be  able 
to  raise  two  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  men. 

Let  them  be  landed  on  both  sides  of  the  James  River  as  near  Richmond  as 
possible,  one  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  on  the  north  bank,  and  one  hundred 
thousand  or  more  on  the  south  bank.  All  of  them  to  carry  three  days'  pro 
visions  on  their  persons  and  one  hundred  rounds  of  ammunition,  without  any 
other  baggage  than  blankets,  and  shelter-tents,  and  a  pair  of  socks,  and  a  pair 
of  drawers.  Let  it  be  understood  that  every  third  day  a  corps  or  grand 
division  is  provisioned  from  the  river.  If  this  arrangement  be  practicable 
(and  we  think  it  is),  we  get  rid  of  all  baggage,  provision,  and  infantry  ammu 
nition  wagons,  and  the  only  vehicles  will  be  the  artillery  and  its  ammunition 
wagons  and  the  ambulances.  The  mobility  of  the  army  caused  by  .carrying 
out  these  views  will  be  more  like  that  of  an  immense  partisan 'corps  than  a 
modern  army. 

The  two  armies  marching  up  the  banks  may  meet  the  enemy  on  or  near 
the  river.  By  means  of  pontons  kept  afloat,  and  towed  so  as  to  be  reached  at 
any  point,  one  army  can  in  a  few  hours  cross  to  assist  the  other.  It  is  hardly 
supposable  that  the  enemy  can  have  force  enough  to  withstand  the  shock  of 
two  such  bodies. 

If  the  enemy  declines  to  fight  on  the  river,  the  army  on  the  south  bank,  or 
a  portion  of  it,  will  take  possession  of  the  railroads  running  south  from  Rich 
mond,  while  the  remainder  will  proceed  to  the  investment  or  attack  upon. 
Richmond,  according  to  circumstances. 

Whether  the  investment  of  Richmond  leads  to  the  destruction  or  capture 
of  the  enemy's  army  or  not,  it  certainly  will  lead  to  the  capture  of  the  rebel 


THE   CAMPAIGN  ON  THE  RAPPAHANNOCK.  265 

humiliating  to  any  man  of  honor.     He  lapsed  from  the  great 
ness  thrust  upon  him  without  forfeiting  the  respect  of  the 

capital,  and  the  war  will  be  on  a  better  footing  than  it  is  now  or  has  any 
present  prospect  of  being. 

The  troops  available  for  the  movement  are  :  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  the 
troops  in  Florida,  South  Carolina,  and  North  Carolina,  with  the  exception  of 
those  necessary  to  hold  the  places  now  occupied,  the  regiments  now  in  process 
of  organization,  and  those  who  are  on  extra  duty  and  furlough,  deserters,  and 
stragglers. 

The  number  of  these  last  is  enormous*,  and  the  most  stringent  measures 
must  be  taken  to  collect  them — no  excuse  should  be  received  for  absence. 

Some  of  the  troops  in  Western  Virginia  might  also  be  detached. 

The  transports  should  consist  of  ordinary  steamers  and  large  ferrv-boats 
and  barges.  The  ferry-boats  may  become  of  the  greatest  use  in  transporting 
troops  across  the  James  River. 

With  the  details  of  the  movement  we  do  not  trouble  you.    Should  the 
general  idea  be  adopted,  these  can  be  thoroughly  digested  and  worked  out  by 
the  generals  and  their  staffs  to  whom  the  execution  of  the  plan  is  committed. 
Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servants, 

W.  B.  FRANKLIN,  Major-General. 
W.  F.  SMITH,  Major-General. 

EXECUTIVE  MANSION,  WASHINGTON,  December  22,  1862. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  FRANKLIN  AND  MAJOR-GENERAL  SMITH: 

Yours  of  the  21st,  suggesting  a  plan  of  operations  for  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  is  received.  I  have  hastily  read  the  plan  and  shall  yet  try  to  give  it 
more  deliberate  consideration,  with  the  aid  of  military  men.  Meanwhile,  let 
me  say  it  seems  to  me  to  present  the  old  questions  of  preference  between  the 
line  of  the  Peninsula  and  the  line  you  are  now  upon.  The  difficulties  you 
point  out  pertaining  to  the  Fredericksburg  line  are  obvious  and  palpable. 
But  now,  as  heretofore,  if  you  go  to  the  James  River,  a  large  part  of  the  army 
must  remain  on  or  near  the  Fredericksburg  line  to  protect  Washington.  It 
is  the  old  difficulty. 

When  I  saw  General  Franklin  at  Harrison's  Landing  on  James  River,  last 
July,  I  cannot  be  mistaken  in  saying  that  he  distinctly  advised  the  bringing  of 
the  army  away  from  there.  Yours,  very  truly, 

A.  LINCOLN. 

HEADQUARTERS  LEFT  GRAND  DIVISION,  December  26,  1862. 
To  THE  PRESIDENT: 

I  respectfully  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  your  letter  of  the  22d  inst.  In 
arguing  the  propriety  of  a  campaign  on  the  James  River,  we  supposed  Wash 
ington  to  be  garrisoned  sufficiently,  and  the  Potomac  impassable  except  by 
bridges.  The  fortification  of  Harper's  Ferry  is  another  important  requisite. 


266  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

country  for  his  zeal  and  patriotism  ;  but  he  left  behind  him  no 
illusions  respecting  his  capacity  for  the  command  of  an  army. 

These  matters  were  considered  as  of  course,  and  did  not  enter  into  our  discus 
sion  of  the  two  plans  of  campaign.  I  presume  that  you  are  right  in  supposing 
that  I  advised  the  withdrawal  of  the  army  from  James  River  in  July  last.  I 
think  that  under  the  same  circumstances  I  would  give  the  same  advice.  The 
army  was  debilitated  by  what  it  had  already  gone  through,  was  in  an  un 
healthy  position,  its  sick  list  was  enormous,  and  there  was  a  prospect  that  we 
would  have  to  remain  in  that  position  during  the  two  worst  months — August 
and  September.  The  effect  of  this  would  have  been  to  ruin  the  army  in 
health.  Circumstances  are  very  different  now.  The  army  is  in  good  health, 
and  the  best  months  of  the  year  are  before  us. 

Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

W.  B.  FRANKUN,  Major-GeneraL 


THE  CHANCELLORSVILLE  CAMPAIGN.  267 


YIII. 

THE  CHANCELLOBSVILLE  CAMPAIGN. 

APRIL— MAY,  1863. 


I. 

THE  ARMY  UNDER  HOOKER. 

IN  an  army  composed  of  citizens  of  a  free  country  who 
have  taken  up  arms  from  patriotic  motives  in  a  war  they  con 
sider  just,  there  is  a  perennial  spring  of  moral  renovation. 
Such  armies  have  constantly  exhibited  an  astonishing  endu 
rance,  and,  possessing  a  bond  of  cohesion  superior  to  disci 
pline,  have  shown  their  power  to  withstand  shocks  that  would 
dislocate  the  structure  of  other  military  organizations. 

The  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  of  this  kind.  Driven  hither 
and  thither  by  continual  buffets  of  fortune ;  losing  its  strength 
in  unavailing  efforts ;  changing  its  leaders,  and  yet  finding  no 
deliverance ;  misunderstood  and  unappreciated  by  the  people 
whose  battles  it  was  fighting — it  was  not  wonderful  that  it 
had  lost  in  spirit.  Yet,  notwithstanding  the  untoward  for 
tunes  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  had  suffered,  it  could  hardly 
be  said  to  be  really  demoralized,  for  its  heart  was  still  in  the 
war ;  it  never  failed  to  respond  to  any  demand  made  upon  it, 
and  it  was  ever  ready  to  renew  its  courage  at  the  first  ray  of 
hope. 

Such  a  day-spring  came  with  the  appointment  of  General 
Hooker  to  the  chief  command,  and  under  his  influence  the 
tone  of  the  army  underwent  a  change  that  would  appear 
astonishing,  had  not  its  elastic  vitality  been  so  often  proved. 


270  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

relying  on  the  strength  of  the  b'ne  of  the  Rappahannock,  he 
had,  in  February,  detached  two  divisions,  under  Longstreet, 
to  operate  south  of  the  James  River,*  and  the  remainder  did 
not  exceed  an  effective  of  fifty-five  thousand  men.f  Hooker, 
therefore,  was  in  a  situation  to  attempt  a  bold  enterprise,  and 
the  close  of  April  found  him  ready  to  cross  the  Rappahan 
nock  and  give  battle. 


II. 
THE   PASSAGE   OF  THE   RAPPAHANNOCK. 

The  opposing  armies  had  so  long  faced  each  other  on  the 
banks  of  the  Rappahannock,  that  it  may  well  be  supposed 
there  remained  no  point  in  the  problem  of  the  attack  or  de 
fence  of  that  line  that  had  not  been  thoroughly  considered. 
Since  the  battle  of  Fredericksburg  and  the  subsequent  at 
tempts  to  pass  the  Rappalianriock,  Lee  had  made  such  dis 
positions  as  to  guard  all  the  available  crossings  of  that 
stream.  At  the  time  the  operations  resulting  in  the  battle  of 
Chancellorsville  began,  he  occupied  in  force  the  heights  south 
of  the  Rappahannock  from  Skenker's  Creek  to  United  States 
Ford  (a  distance  of  about  twenty-five  miles),  having  continu 
ous  lines  of  infantry  parapets  throughout,  and  his  troops  so 
disposed  as  to  be  readily  concentrated  on  any  given  point. 
Interspersed  along  these  lines  of  intrenchments  were  battery- 
epaulements,  advantageously  located,  for  sweeping  the  hill- 
slopes  and  bottom-lands  over  which  an  assailing  force  would 
have  to  march — the  crests  of  the  main  hills  being  from  three- 
quarters  of  a  mile  to  a  mile  and  a  half  from  the  river's  mar- 


*  "  General  Longstreet,  with  two  divisions  of  his  corps,  was  detached  for 
service  south  of  James  River  in  February,  and  did  not  rejoin  the  army  until 
after  the  battle  of  Chancellorsville." — Lee:  Report  of  Chancellorsville,  p.  5. 

f  The  rolls  of  Lee's  army  showed,  the  31st  of  March,  1863,  a  force  of  60,298. 
But  at  the  battle  of  Chancellorsville,  the  reports  of  the  subordinates  make  it 
fully  ten  thousand  less. 


THE  CHANCELLORSVILLE  CAMPAIGN.  07} 

gin.*  To  gain  the  immediate  banks  opposite  the  centre  of 
the  enemy's  line  was,  however,  practicable  in  several  places 
where  the  high  ground  on  the  north  side  approached  the 
stream  and  enabled  artillery  to  command  it ;  but  the  prospect 
of  then  gaining  a  footing  on  the  heights  was,  from  past  expe 
rience,  hopeless.  The  Confederate  right  flank  was  so  dis 
posed  that  Lee  was  secure  against  attack  in  that  direction ; 
while  above  his  left,  at  United  States  Ford,  the  junction  of 
the  Eapidan  with  the  Kappahannock  involved  the  passage  of 
the  former  also  in  any  attempt  to  turn  that  flank.  Indeed, 
the  execution  of  a  movement  to  turn  the  Confederate  left  by 
the  Union  army,  at  such  a  distance  from  its  base,  and  with 
heavy  ponton  and  artillery  trains,  and  in  face  of  means  of  in 
formation  such  as  Lee  had  at  his  command,  seemed  very  un 
likely,  and  he  gave  himself  very  little  concern  about  it. 

Difficult  as  was  the  problem  in  all  its  aspects,  and  debarred 
as  Hooker  was  from  making  a  direct  attack,  the  most  prom 
ising  enterprise  was  nevertheless  an  operation  against  Lee's 
left.  This,  after  much  cogitation,  Hooker  resolved  to  execute, 
and  he  formed  a  very  bold  plan  of  operation.  He  determined 
to  make  his  main  movement  against  the  enemy's  left  by  a 
strong  column,  that  by  a  wide  detour  up  the  Kappahannock 
to  Kelly's  Ford  (twenty-seven  miles  above  Fredericksburg) 
should  pass  round  Lee's  flank  to  Chancellorsville ;  while  he 
resolved  to  mask  this  turning  operation  by  forcing  the  Eappa- 
hannock  near  Fredericksburg  with  a  considerable  body,  and 
ostentatiously  threatening  direct  attack.  He  expected  that 
the  successful  execution  of  the  turning  operation  would  have 
the  effect  to  cause  Lee  to  abandon  his  defences  along  the 
Rappahannock,  when  battle  might  be  given  with  great  ad 
vantage.  In  co-operation  with  this  attack,  he  prepared  a 
powerful  cavalry  column  of  ten  thousand  sabres,  destined  to 
operate  simultaneously  on  Lee's  railroad  communication  with 
Richmond. 


*  Warren :  Report  of  Engineer  Operations  connected  with  the  Battle  of 
Chancellorsville. 


272  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

The  turning  column  was  composed  of  three  corps — the 
Fifth  (Meade),  the  Eleventh  (Howard),  and  the  Twelfth 
(Slocum).  Marching  on  the  morning  of  Monday,  April  27, 
this  force  reached  the  vicinity  of  Kelly's  Ford  on  the  follow 
ing  day.  During  the  night  of  the  28th,  and  next  morning, 
the  passage  of  the  Eappahannock  was  made  at  Kelly's  Ford 
on  a  canvas  ponton-bridge,  laid  with  but  slight  opposition 
from  a  small  observing  force ;  and  the  three  corps,  being 
divided  into  two  columns,  moving  on  parallel  roads,  took  up 
the  line  of  march  towards  Chancellorsville,  to  reach  which  it 
was  necessary  first  to  cross  the  Eapidan.  The  right  column 
(Eleventh  and  Twelfth  corps)  struck  the  Eapidan  at  Ger- 
manna  Ford,*  the  left  column  (Fifth  Corps)  at  Ely's  Ford. 
The  stream  proved  to  be  barely  fordable;  but  celerity  of 
movement  being  an  object  of  the  first  importance,  it  was  im 
mediately  resolved  to  cross  the  troops  by  wading — an  arduous 
and  somewhat  dangerous  feat ;  for  the  stream  is  rapid,  and 
even  at  the  fords  came  up  to  the  shoulder.  The  men,  how 
ever,  plunged  in — the  greater  part  stripping  and  carrying 
their  clothes  and  cartridge-boxes  on  their  bayonets — and  amid 
shouts  and  scenes  of  Homeric  laughter  and  gayety  waded 
through  the  water,  which  reached  to  their  arm-pits.  Such  as 
were  carried  away  by  the  current  were  caught  by  a  cavalry 
picket  stationed  below.  After  dark  (the  crossing  being  con 
tinued  all  night)  huge  bonfires  were  kindled,  and  by  the  aid 
of  the  lurid  light  thus  cast  over  the  wild  scene,  the  troops 
filed  over  the  river,  and  next  mornirig  all  were  across.  The 
soldiers  were  in  the  highest  spirits  ;  for,  acute  judges  of  mili 
tary  movements  as  the  rank  and  file  always  are,  they  knew 
that  the  march  they  had  made  was  one  of  those  pregnant 
marches  that  are  in  themselves  victories :  so  they  gayly 
headed  towards  Chancellorsville,  which  was  the  assigned 
point  of  concentration  and  which  they  reached  in  the  after 
noon  of  the  30th. 


*  At  this  ford,  a  party  of  Confederates  were  found  engaged  in  rebuilding  the 
bridge ;  but  by  a  well-executed  movement  most  of  them  were  captured. 


THE  CHANCELLORS  VILLE  CAMPAIGN.  273 

While  the  three  corps,  whose  movements  I  have  indicated, 
had  passed  far  up  the  Eappahannock  to  Kelly's  Ford,  the 
Second  Corps  under  General  Couch  had  moved  no  further 
than  United  States  Ford,  where  it  was  directed  to  remain  on 
the  north  bank  of  the  Eappahannock  till  the  turning  column 
sweeping  down  the  south  bank  should  have  uncovered  United 
States  Ford,  when  it  was  to  cross  and  move  also  to  Chancel- 
lorsville.  This  object  was,  of  course,  accomplished  the  mo 
ment  the  Eapidan  was  crossed ;  and  the  same  afternoon, 
Couch  threw  a  ponton-bridge  over  the  Eappahannock,  and 
marched  on  Chancellorsville,  at  which  point  the  four  corps 
bivouacked  that  night  (Thursday,  April  30).  The  same  night, 
General  Hooker  removed  his  headquarters  to  Chancellors 
ville.*  He  had  secured  a  position  which  took  in  reverse  Lee's 
entire  fortified  line,  and  he  held  in  his  hand  a  puissant  force 
of  fifty  thousand  men. 

The  remarkable  success  attending  this  movement,  of  which 
Lee  did  not  become  aware  till  the  Eappahannock  had  been 
crossed,  was  the  result  of  a  secrecy  and  a  celerity  of  march 
new  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  To  have  marched  a  column 
of  fifty  thousand  men,  laden  with  sixty  pounds  of  baggage, 
and  encumbered  with  artillery  and  trains,  thirty-seven  miles 
in  two  days ;  to  have  bridged  and  crossed  two  streams,  guarded 
by  a  vigilant  enemy,  with  the  loss  of  half-a-dozen  men,  one 
wagon,  and  two  mules,  is  an  achievement  which  has  few  paral 
lels,  and  which  well  deserves  to  rank  with  Prince  Eugene's 
famous  passage  of  the  Adige. 

In  securing  this  result,  important  service  was  rendered  by 
the  skilful  manner  in  which  the  flank  march  was  masked  by 
General  Sedgwick,  under  whom  had  been  placed  for  the  exe 
cution  of  this  duty  the  First  Corps  (Eej^nolds)  and  the  Third 
Corps  (Sickles),  in  addition  to  his  own  Sixth  Corps.  As  soon 
as  the  column  destined  to  make  the  turning  movement  was 
well  under  way,  Sedgwick  was  ordered  to  cross  the  river  in 
the  vicinity  of  Fredericksburg  for  the  purpose  of  making  a 

*  This  place  consisted  of  a  single  large  brick  house. 
18 


274  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE   ARMY  OF   THE  POTOMAC. 

direct  demonstration.  Accordingly,  before  dawn  of  the  29th, 
while  the  flanking  force  was  passing  the  Kappahannock  thirty 
miles  above,  ponton-boats,  borne  noiselessly  on  men's  shoul 
ders,  were  launched  three  miles  below  the  town,  near  the  point 
at  which  Franklin  had  made  his  crossing  on  the  occasion  of 
the  battle  of  Fredericksburg.  In  these  a  party  passed  to  the 
south  bank,  capturing  the  small  force  in  observation.  Two 
bridges  were  then  constructed,  and  two  divisions  thrown 
across.  This  menace  immediately  engaged  the  attention  of 
the  Confederates,  who  promptly  began  intrenching  their  en 
tire  front,  as  fearing  a  direct  attack.*  Demonstrations  as 
though  with  that  intent  were  made  during  the  29th  and  30th, 
and  as,  by  the  night  of  the  30th,  the  feint  had  subserved  its 
purpose,  and  a  lodgment  had  been  gained  at  Chancellor sville, 

*  There  was  much  in  what  was  visible  to  the  Confederates  of  Sedgwick's 
operation  to  inspire  them  with  the  belief  that  Hooker  was  preparing  his  main 
attack  at  that  point ;  and  an  accidental  circumstance,  the  details  of  which  are 
given  below,  tended  greatly  to  confirm  this  impression.  Being  a  spectator  of 
Sedgwick's  operations,  I  at  the  time  interpreted  certain  movements  as  a  ruse 
de  guerre,  designed  to  give  the  enemy  an  exaggerated  notion  of  the  strength 
of  the  force  present  at  that  point,  whereas  they  were  the  necessary  result  of  an 
entirely  different  operation  ;  and  I  elaborated  this  point  with  some  fulness  in  a 
letter  on  the  battle  of  Chancellorsville  in  the  New  York  Times.  What  was 
there  stated  has  already  passed  into  history  ;  and  Colonel  MacDougall,  an  Eng 
lish  military  writer  of  repute,  following  that  account  (without  credit  given, 
however),  thus  writes : 

"The  four  remaining  divisions  of  these  two  corps  [Sedgwick's  and  Rey 
nolds']  remained  on  the  north  bank,  and  an  ingenious  ruse  was  practised  to 
deceive  the  enemy  into  the  belief  that  the  greater  part  of  the  Northern  army 
was  there  massed  with  the  intention  of  crossing.  It  is  to  be  noted  that,  from 
the  configuration  of  the  ground,  the  enemy  could  not  see  the  bridges,  neither 
could  they  see  the  four  divisions  on  the  north  bank,  which  were  behind  the 
fringe  of  hills  aforesaid.  These  troops  were  then  put  in  motion,  and,  mounting 
the  ridge,  which,  sloping  both  ways,  served  as  a  screen,  marched  along  the  top 
in  full  view  of  the  Confederates,  and  then  dipped  down  out  of  sight  towards  the 
bridges.  Instead  of  crossing  these,  however,  they  turned  back  through  a  gully 
round  the  rear  of  the  ridge,  round  again  on  the  top,  and  again  disappeared 
from  sight  to  play  the  same  game — just  the  same  evolution  as  is  practised  by 
the  '  brave  army'  on  the  stage  of  a  theatre,  and  with  the  same  intent  of  deceiv 
ing  the  spectators  as  to  their  numbers.  The  like  stage  effect  was  practised  by 
the  artillery  and  wagon-trains,  until  the  Confederates  had  seen  defile  before 


THE  CHANCELLORSVILLE  CAMPAIGN.  275 

Sickles'  corps  was  directed  to  join  the  force  at  that  point — 
Sedgwick,  with  two  corps,  meanwhile  remaining  below  to 
await  developments  on  the  right. 

The  success  that  had  crowned  these  operations,  which,  as 
they  were  executed  out  of  sight  of  the  enemy,  may  be  called 
the  strategy  of  the  movement,  inspired  the  army  with  the 
highest  hopes  and  greatly  elated  the  commander.  On  reach 
ing  Chancellorsville  on  Thursday  night,  he  issued  an  order  to 
the  troops,  in  which  he  announced  that  "the  enemy  must 
either  ingloriously  fly,  or  come  out  from  behind  his  defences 
and  give  us  battle  on  our  own  ground,  where  certain  destruc 
tion  awaits  him."  This  boast,  so  much  in  the  style  of  Hooker, 
was  amplified  by  the  whole  tenor  of  his  conversation.  "  The 
rebel  army,"  said  he,  "  is  now  the  legitimate  property  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac.  They  may  as  well  pack  up  their 
haversacks  and  make  for  Eichmond;  and  I  shall  be  after 
them,"  etc.,  etc.*  And,  indeed,  there  was  much  in  the  aspect 
of  affairs  to  justify  jubilant  expectations  ;  for,  of  the  two  lines 

them  a  force  which  they  might  well  conclude  to  be  the  whole  Northern  army." 
— MacDougall :  Modern  Warfare  and  Modern  Artillery,  pp.  334,  335. 

The  following  note  from  Major-General  McMahon  explains  the  real  purpose 
of  the  operation  misinterpreted  by  me  : 

NEW  YORK,  January,  1866. 

MY  DEAR  SIR — The  movement  of  troops  under  General  Sedgwick,  to  which 
our  conversation  referred,  was  not  for  the  purpose  of  deceiving  the  enemy  into 
the  belief  that  we  were  re-enforcing  the  left  wing,  although  such  probably  was 
its  effect. 

The  movements  consisted  of  the  withdrawal  of  Eeynolds'  corps  from  the 
lower  crossing,  which  was  effected  without  attracting  the  attention  of  the  enemy  ; 
and  the  transfer  of  one  division  of  the  Sixth  Corps  from  the  upper  to  the  lower 
bridges,  to  hold  the  position  abandoned  by  the  First  Corps.  The  march  of  this 
division  was  so  ordered  that  only  its  arrival  at  the  lower  bridges  could  be  seen 
by  the  enemy.  It  was  a  necessary  movement,  made  so  by  the  departure  of  the 
First  Corps  for  Chancellorsville,  and  not  a  stratagem.  Of  course,  in  this  as  in 
all  similar  movements,  advantage  was  taken  of  the  nature  of  the  ground,  to 
conceal  our  intention  from  the  enemy  as  far  as  it  was  practicable. 
Very  respectfully,  etc., 

M.  T.  McMAHON, 

Late  Chief  of  Staff  to  Major-General  Sedgwick. 
W.  SWINTON,  Esq. 

*  These  observations  were  made  in  presence  of  the  writer. 


276  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

of  retreat  open  to  Lee,  Hooker  already  laid  hold  of  that  by 
Gordonsville,  and  threatened  that  by  Eichmond.  The  former 
he  could  not  take  up  ;  and,  if  he  chose  the  latter,  he  would 
have  Hooker  with  five  corps  on  his  flank,  and  Sedgwick 
with  two  corps  pressing  his  rear.  The  bright  promise  of 
these  initial  operations  was  beclouded  by  but  one  fact — the 
cavalry  column  which  was  to  cross  the  Eappahannock  on  the 
right  of  the  infantry,  and  cut  Lee's  communications  at  the 
same  time  that  the  infantry  was  operating  on  his  army,  had 
been  so  delayed  by  the  rise  of  the  river  that  it  did  not  cross 
the  Eappahannock  till  the  morning  of  the  29th,  and  had  thus 
far  made  very  insufficient  progress. 

But,  instead  of  "  ingloriously  flying,"  Lee  preferred  to 
"  come  out  of  his  defences"  and  give  battle  to  Hooker ;  and, 
unhappily  for  that  general,  the  circumstances  under  which  he 
chose  to  receive  battle,  in  place  of  insuring  Lee's  "  certain 
destruction,"  as  he  had  vaunted,  resulted  in  the  disastrous 
termination  of  a  campaign  thus  brilliantly  opened.  Now,  as 
these  circumstances  furnish  the  key  to  the  right  apprecia 
tion  of  the  whole  action,  I  shall,  in  the  succeeding  chapter, 
set  them  forth  with  some  fulness  of  detail. 


III. 
AT  CHANCELLORSVILLE— FRIDAY. 

When,  on  Thursday  night,  Hooker  had  concentrated  his 
four  corps  at  Chancellorsville,  the  real  character  of  the  move 
ment,  which,  up  to  that  point,  had  been  so  admirably  con 
cealed  from  his  antagonist,  became  fully  disclosed.  The 
Confederate  leader  saw  that  the  demonstrations  near  Fred- 
ericksburg  that  had  engaged  his  attention  were  but  a  mask, 
and  that  the  turn  of  affairs  called  for  the  promptest  action. 
Lee,  with  instant  perception  of  the  situation,  now  seized  the 
masses  of  his  force,  and  with  the  grasp  of  a  Titan  swung 
them  into  position  as  a  giant  might  fling  a  mighty  stone  from 


FROM  APRIL29tL-ro  MAY  5th.  1863 


tteferetices  . 
{rnivtt    Lin  e 
Confederate 


THE  CHANCELLORSVILLE  CAMPAIGN.  277 

a  sling.*  One  division  and  one  brigade — the  division  of 
Early  and  the  brigade  of  Barksdale — were  intrusted  with  the 
duty  of  holding  the  heights  of  Fredericksburg  ;  and,  at  mid 
night  of  Thursday,  Jackson  and  McLaws,  and  the  rest  of  his 
divisions,  recalled  from  Fredericksburg,  and  from  far  below 
Fredericksburg,  were  put  in  motion  towards  Chancellor sville 
to  meet  Hooker  with  a  front  of  opposition,  before  he  should 
be  able,  by  advancing  from  Chancellorsville,  to  seize  the 
direct  Confederate  communications  with  Kichmond. 

If  the  Confederate  commander  was  able  to  effect  this  pur 
pose,  it  was  because  the  Union  commander  allowed  him  so  to 
do ;  and  this  voluntary  act  on  the  part  of  the  latter  devolves 
upon  him  the  responsibility  for  all  the  consequences  flowing 
therefrom. 

Chancellorsville,  where  Hooker  had  drawn  up  his  forces, 
lies  ten  miles  west  and  south  of  Fredericksburg,  with  which 
it  is  connected  by  two  excellent  roads — the  one  macadamized, 
the  other  planked.  It  stands  in  the  midst  of  a  region  extend 
ing  for  several  miles  south  of  the  Eapidan  and  westward  as 
far  as  Mine  Run,  localized,  in  common  parlance,  as  "the 
Wilderness" — a  region  covered  with  dense  woods  and  thickets 
of  black-jack  oak  and  scrub-pines,  and  than  which  it  is  im 
possible  to  conceive  a  field  more  unfavorable  for  the  move 
ments  of  a  grand  army.  But,  advancing  from  Chancellorsville 
towards  Fredericksburg,  the  country  becomes  more  open  and 
clear  as  you  approach  the  latter  place,  and  affords  a  fine  field 
for  the  use  of  all  arms. 

Now,  there  is  evidence  that  General  Hooker  did  not  originally 
design  to  allow  himself  to  be  shut  up  in  this  tangled  thicket ; 
and,  on  Friday  morning,  May  1st,  he  began  to  push  forward 
his  columns  to  gain  the  open  country  beyond  the  bounds  of  the 
Wilderness.  The  two  roads  running  from  Chancellorsville  to 

*  "The  enemy  in  our  front  [Sedgwick],  near  Fredericksburg,  continued  in 
active  ;  and  it  was  now  apparent  that  the  main  attack  would  be  made  upon 
our  flank  and  rear.  It  was,  therefore,  determined  to  leave  sufficient  troops  to 
hold  our  lines,  and,  with  the  main  body  of  the  army,  to  give  battle  to  the  ap 
preaching  column." — Lee :  Report  of  Chancellorsville,  p.  7. 


278  CAMPAIGNS   OF  THE   ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

Fredericksburg  (the  plankroad  on  the  right  and  the  turnpike 
on  the  left)  unite  near  Tabernacle  Church,  about  midway 
between  the  former  two  places  ;  and  to  the  left  of  the  turn 
pike  there  runs  a  river  road  leading  along  the  Bappahannock 
to  Banks'  Ford.  On  the  latter  road  two  divisions  of  Meade's 
corps  were  pushed  out,  while  on  the  turnpike  Sykes'  division 
of  the  same  corps  was  thrown  forward,  and  Slocum's  corps 
was  given  the  same  direction  on  the  plankroad.  This  was  a 
movement  to  take  up  a  line  of  battle  about  two  and  a  half 
miles  in  front,  preparatory  to  a  simultaneous  advance  along 
the  whole  line,  set  down  for  two  o'clock  in  the  afternoon.*  I 
shall  trace  briefly  the  experience  of  each  column. 

The  left  column,  composed  of  the  divisions  of  Griffin  and 
Humphreys,  moved  out  on  the  river  road  for  five  miles,  and 
came  within  sight  of  Banks'  Ford,  without  encountering  any 
opposition. 

The  centre  column,  made  up  of  the  division  of  Sykes,  sup 
ported  by  the  division  of  Hancock,  advanced  on  the  turnpike, 
and  on  gaining  the  first  of  a  series  of  ridges  that  cross  the 
roads  between  Chancellorsville  and  Fredericksburg,  somewhat 
over  a  mile  in  advance  of  the  former  place,  the  mounted  men 
in  front  were  met  and  driven  in  by  the  enemy.  This  small 
force  resisted  handsomely,  riding  up  and  firing  almost  in  the 
faces  of  the  Eleventh  Virginia  Infantry,  which  formed  the 
enemy's  advance.  Thereupon,  General  Sykes  moved  forward 
in  double-quick  time,  attacked  the  opposing  force,  and  drove 
it  back  till,  at  noon,  he  had  gained  the  position  assigned 
him.f 

The  column  on  the  right,  composed  of  Slocum's  entire 
corps,  pushed  out  on  the  plankroad  in  the  same  general  direc 
tion  with  the  two  other  columns,  and  gained  a  point  as  far 
advanced  as  the  others  without  meeting  any  opposition  of 
moment. 

*  Hooker's  Circular  Order,  May  1  :  Report  of  the  Conduct  of  the  War, 
second  series,  vol.  i.,  p.  124. 

f  Warren :  Report  of  Operations  connected  with  the  Chancellorsville  Cam- 
paign. 


THE  CHANCELLORSVILLE  CAMPAIGN  279 

The  position  secured  by  this  movement  of  Friday  forenoon 
was  a  ridge  of  some  elevation,  perfectly  commanding  Chan- 
cellorsville,  out  of  the  Wilderness,  and  giving  the  debouche 
into  the  open  country  in  rear  of  Fredericksburg,  while  the 
left  column  had  practically  uncovered  Banks'  Ford,  thus 
shortening  by  twelve  miles  the  communication  between  the 
main  force  on  the  Chancellorsville  line,  and  the  two  corps 
near  Fredericksburg  under  Sedgwick.  That  a  position  afford 
ing  such  advantages — a  position  which  Lee  was  then  exert 
ing  all  his  efforts  to  secure — would  be  held  at  all  hazards, 
and  the  possession  insured  by  a  general  advance  of  the  whole 
force,  was  what  was  naturally  expected ;  yet,  strange  to  say, 
just  at  this  moment  the  three  columns  received  orders  from 
the  commanding  general  to  withdraw  back  to  Chancellors 
ville.  With  mingled  amazement  and  incredulity,  this  com 
mand  was  received  by  the  officers,  who  sent  to  beg  Hooker  to 
allow  the  army  to  push  on  and  hold  the  front  thus  gained.* 
It  was  urged  in  the  warmest  terms  that  the  occupation 
of  that  fine  position  would  uncover  Banks'  Ford,  thus,  as 
I  have  said,  giving  easy  communication  with  Sedgwick  ;  that 
it  secured  the  dominating  heights  which,  if  not  held,  would 
instantly  be  seized  to  his  great  disadvantage  by  his  antagonist ; 
that  it  would  take  the  army  beyond  the  densely  wooded 
region  in  which  manoeuvring  was  impossible,  and  that  it 
would  enable  it  to  command  the  open  country  on  the 
posterior  slope  of  the  Fredericksburg  heights  soon  to  be 
carried  by  Sedgwick.  It  was  in  vain  that  these  considera 
tions,  whose  supreme  importance  must  be  apparent  from  a 


*  "  The  ground  on  which  I  had  posted  Hancock  in  support  of  Sykes,  was 
about  one  and  a  half  miles  from  Chancellorsville,  and  commanded  it.  Upon 
receiving  orders  from  General  Hooker  to  come  in,  I  sent  Major  Burt  to  him 
urging  that,  on  account  of  the  great  advantages  of  that  position,  it  should  be 
held  at  all  hazards.  The  reply  was,  to  return  at  once.  General  Warren  also 
went  in  person  and  urged  the  necessity  of  holding  on." — Couch :  Report  of 
Chancellorsville.  For  confirmation  of  the  same,  see  Warren :  Report ;  Hum 
phreys:  Evidence  on  Chancellorsville ;  Report  of  the  Conduct  of  the  War, 
second  series,  vol.  i.,  p  63. 


280  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  AKMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

moment's  glance  at  the  topography  of  the  region,  were  urged 
by  his  ablest  advisers.  Hooker  had  assumed  the  defensive 
and  was  waiting  for  the  enemy  to  attack  him  "  on  ground  of 
his  own  selection."  From  that  moment  he  flung  away  the 
initiative  with  all  its  mighty  gains  and  far-reaching  hopes. 

It  is  difficult  to  account  for  a  line  of  action  so  faulty  in  a 
conjuncture  of  circumstances  in  which  the  fitting  course  was 
so  manifestly  marked  out.  Having  studied  the  case  at  the 
time  when  a  spectator  of  these  events,  I  have  returned  to  its 
examination  in  the  light  of  the  whole  body  of  evidence  since 
developed,  and  the  riddle  remains  still  unsolved.  Till  he  met 
the  enemy,  Hooker  showed  a  master-grasp  of  the  elements  of 
war,  but  the  moment  he  confronted  his  antagonist,  he  seemed 
to  suffer  collapse  of  all  his  powers,  and  after  this  his  conduct, 
with  the  exception  of  one  or  two  momentary  flashes  of  talent, 
was  marked  by  an  incomprehensible  feebleness  and  faulti- 
ness  ;  for  in  each  crisis,  his  action  was  not  only  bad — it  was, 
with  a  fatal  infelicity,  the  worst  that  could  have  been  adopted. 
It  is  probable  that  Hooker  never  expected  that  Lee  would 
turn  to  meet  him  on  that  line,  but  that,  disconcerted  by  the 
suddenness  and  success  of  the  primal  stroke,  he  would  beat  a 
hasty  retreat  southward  towards  Richmond.  When,  on  the 
contrary,  he  found  his  antagonist  making  a  rapid  change  of 
front  and  hurrying  forward  to  accept  the  gage  of  battle  in 
the  Wilderness,  the  general  whose  first  stride  had  been  that 
of  a  giant,  shrunk  to  the  proportions  of  a  dwarf. 

The  columns  that  had  advanced  so  handsomely  towards 
Fredericksburg  returned  to  Chancellorsville ;  and  having 
shown  that  this  was  a  position  relatively  inferior  to  that 
which  had  been  gained,  it  remains  to  add  that  it  was  abso 
lutely  a  bad  position.  It  had  been  taken  up  by  tired  troops, 
towards  the  close  of  the  previous  day,  without  any  prospect 
of  fighting  a  pitched  battle  upon  it ;  it  had  several  command 
ing  positions  in  its  front  for  the  enemy  to  occupy,  and  the 
thicket  was  so  dense  as  not  only  to  rule  out  of  use  the  cavalry 
and  artillery  arms,  but  to  make  the  movements  of  infantry 
very  difficult,  indeed  almost  impossible  except  by  trailing 


THE  CHANCELLORSVILLE  CAMPAIGN.  281 

muskets.  If  it  be  added  that  any  line  drawn  thereon  would 
throw  the  right  flank  "  in  the  air,"  while  the  woods  would 
form  a  perfect  screen  for  any  hostile  movements  of  the 
enemy,  the  military  disadvantages  of  the  locality  will  be  fully 
appreciated. 

The  withdrawal  of  the  column  that  had  moved  out  on  the 
right,  and  that  which  had  moved  out  on  the  left,  was  made 
without  difficulty,  though  the  Confederates  followed  up  with 
some  show  of  force ;  but  the  retirement  of  Sykes,  who  had 
the  centre,  was  an  operation  of  more  delicacy,  for  he  had  met 
a  considerable  body  of  the  enemy,  and  had  gained  his  posi 
tion  by  a  smart  fight  which  cost  him  seventy  men ;  and  now 
the  constantly  arriving  forces  of  the  Confederates  began  to 
overlap  both  his  flanks.  Hancock's  division,  however,  had 
moved  up  to  Sykes'  support,  and,  under  cover  of  his  line, 
Sykes  was  retired,  and  then  Hancock  also  withdrew,  and  the 
enemy  followed  up,  skirmishing,  closing,  and  firing  artillery 
from  the  crest,  which  Sykes  had  been  ordered  to  abandon.* 

The  force  that  had  been  met  in  this  series  of  simultaneous 
reconnoissances  was  the  van  of  Jackson's  command,  which, 
on  the  disclosure  to  Lee  of  the  real  character  of  Hooker's 
move,  had  been  recalled  from  the  direction  of  Fredericksburg, 
and  after  marching  all  Thursday  night  and  Friday  morning, 
had  just  arrived  on  the  ground.  On  finding  the  Union  force 
returning  from  its  advance,  Lee  pushed  forward  the  heads  of 
his  columns  rapidly  and  deployed  in  front  of  Hooker's  posi 
tion  at  Chancellorsville. 

Hooker  disposed  his  line  of  battle,  running  east  and  west, 
along  the  Fredericksburg  and  Orange  Courthouse  plankroad, 
on  which,  at  the  point  of  intersection  of  that  road  with  the 
road  from  Fredericksburg  to  United  States  Ford,  stands  the 
Chancellor  House — that  is,  Chancellorsville.  Chancellorsville 
is  placed  in  the  middle  of  a  clearing  some  three  hundred 
yards  in  extent,  and  all  around  are  the  thickets  of  the  Wilder 
ness.  The  line  of  battle,  as  formed  on  Friday  evening,  was 

*  Hancock :  Report  of  Chancellorsville. 


2S2  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

about  five  miles  in  extent,  stretching  from  a  short  distance 
east  of  Chancellorsyille  (where  the  left  wing  was  somewhat 
refused),  westward,  in  front  of  the  Orange  plankroad  for  about 
three  miles,  when  the  right  flank  bent  sharply  back  in  a  de 
fensive  crotchet.  Meade's  corps  (Fifth),  with  one  division  of 
Couch's  (Second),  formed  the  left ;  Slocum's  corps  (Twelfth), 
and  one  division  of  Sickles'  (Third),  the  centre  ;  and  Howard's 
(Eleventh)  the  right.  The  other  divisions  were  held  in  re 
serve.  As  General  Hooker  had  concluded  to  fight  a  defensive 
battle,  trees  were  felled  in  front  of  the  line  to  form  abatis, 
and  rifle-pits  were  thrown  up ;  and  during  the  whole  night 
the  woods  resounded  with  the  strokes  of  a  thousand  Con 
federate  axe-men  engaged  at  the  same  work. 

Next  morning  (Saturday,  May  2d)  Hooker  stood  on  the 
defensive  awaiting  battle,  and  it  seemed  at  first  that  his  oppo 
nent  had  been  beguiled  into  playing  into  his  hands  by  making 
a  direct  attack  ;  for  the  Confederates  began  early  to  make 
threatening  demonstrations.  First  they  felt  Couch's  line,  but 
it  proved  to  be  well  intrenched  ;  then  they  assailed  Slocum's 
front,  moving  down  on  the  plankroad,  and  throwing  shells 
into  the  clearing  at  the  Chancellor  House,  where  Hooker's 
headquarters  were  established  and  the  wagons  were  parked  ;* 
afterwards  they  menaced  the  line  still  further  to  the  right, 
and  these  operations  they  kept  up  at  intervals  during  the 
whole  day.  But  Lee  had  quite  another  object  in  view :  he 
knew  too  well  the  risks  of  a  direct  attack  with  a  force  so  in 
ferior  in  numbers  as  he  could  dispose  of ;  and  while  he  en 
gaged  Hooker's  attention  with  these  front  demonstrations, 
he  was  putting  into  execution  a  bold  move  such  as  he  may 
have  learned,  in  his  military  studies,  from  Frederick  the 
Great.  I  shall  in  the  following  section  indicate  the  nature  of 
this  operation,  and  detail  the  manner  of  its  execution. 

*  "In  the  morning  about  six  or  seven,  the  enemy  opened  his  artillery 
from  our  left  on  the  open  field  in  front  of  the  Chancellorsville  House,  and  drove 
out  all  our  wagons  and  every  thing  that  was  loose  into  position." — Warren's 
Report. 


THE  CHANCELLORSVILLE  CAMPAIGN.  283 

IV. 
JACKSON'S  FLANK  MARCH— SATURDAY. 

False  as  was  the  situation  in  which  the  Union  commander 
had  placed  his  force  in  causing  it  to  assume  a  defensive  atti 
tude  at  a  moment  when  offensive  action  promised  so  much, 
Lee  was,  nevertheless,  environed  with  peril.  Strategically 
Hooker's  position  was  a  menacing  one  ;  tactically,  it  was  un 
assailable  by  a  front  attack.  In  this  dilemma  Lee  determined 
on  a  move  which,  considering  the  inferiority  of  his  force,  must 
be  accounted  astonishingly  bold.  He  resolved  by  a  flank 
march  to  assail  Hooker's  right  and  rear,  with  a  view  of  doub 
ling  up  that  flank,  taking  his  line  in  reverse,  and  seizing  his 
communications  with  United  States  Ford. 

This  suggestion  was,  it  is  said,  made  to  Lee  in  council  during 
Friday  night  by  Stonewall  Jackson,  who  having,  in  his  inde 
pendent  operations  in  the  Valley,  practised  with  great  success 
the  like  manoeuvre,  now  burned  to  execute,  on  a  grander 
scale,  one  of  these  sudden  and  mortal  blows.  The  plan, 
though  full  of  risk,  was  immediately  adopted  by  Lee,  and,  as 
a  matter  of  course,  its  execution  committed  to  his  daring 
lieutenant,  who  was  destined,  in  the  climax  of  his  power,  to 
end  his  career  in  the  world  and  the  world's  wars  in  this 
supreme  exhibition  of  military  genius. 

The  force  with  which  Jackson  was  to  make  this  movement 
consisted  of  his  own  three  divisions,  numbering  about  twenty- 
two  thousand  men.  Of  the  Confederate  force  on  the  Chan- 
cellorsville  line  there  then  remained  only  the  two  divisions  of 
McLaws  and  Anderson.  These  Lee  retained  in  hand  to  hold 
Hooker  in  check. 

No  man  knew  better  than  Jackson  the  enormous  importance 
of  secrecy  in  the  execution  of  such  a  design  as  that  he  took 
in  hand  on  Saturday  morning ;  and  he  had  often  repeated  to 
his  staff  a  saying,  that  was  to  him  a  fundamental  axiom  of 
war — "Mystery,  mystery  is  the  secret  of  success."  Nothing 


284          CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  AEMT  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

was  omitted  to  secure  this  indispensable  requisite  in  the  task 
he  had  undertaken.  Hooker's  attention  was  to  be  engaged 
and  the  movement  masked  by  energetic  demonstrations  of 
front  attack  to  be  made  by  Lee.  Then,  as  the  woods  were 
thick  and  nearly  impenetrable,  Jackson  hoped  that,  by  taking 
a  road  some  distance  to  the  south  of  Chancellorsville,  he  would 
be  able  to  pass  unobserved  ;  yet  he  took  care,  in  addition,  to 
throw  out  Fitz-Lee's  brigade  of  cavalry  on  the  right  of  his 
column  to  screen  his  perilous  flank  march  across  the  whole  of 
Hooker's  front.  Diverging  westward  from  the  Fredericksburg 
plankroad,  Jackson  pursued  his  march  by  a  forest-path  a 
couple  of  miles  south  of,  and  parallel  with,  the  Orange  plank- 
road,  on  which  the  Union  force  was  planted ;  and,  after  pass 
ing  the  point  known  as  the  "Furnace,"  struck  somewhat  south 
by  west  into  the  Brock  road,  and  thence  northward  to  seize 
the  Orange  plankroad  and  turn  Hooker's  right  flank. 

This  movement,  skilfully  masked  as  it  was,  was  not  made 
with  such  secrecy  but  that  those  who  held  the  front  of  the 
Union  line  saw  that  something  was  going  on.  And  more  espe 
cially,  in  passing  over  a  hill  near  the  "  Furnace,"  the  column 
plainly  disclosed  itself  to  General  Sickles,  who  held  a  posi 
tion  within  sight  of  that  point.  Now,  it  happened  that  the 
road  along  which  Jackson's  column  was  filing  there  bends 
somewhat  southward,  so  that,  though  the  movement  was  dis 
covered,  it  was  misinterpreted  as  a  retreat  towards  Richmond 
on  the  part  of  Lee ;  or,  if  the  idea  suggested  itself  that  it 
might  be  a  movement  to  turn  the  right,  it  was  still  judged,  on 
the  whole,  to  be  a  retreat.  With  the  view  of  determining  this, 
but  yet  more  under  the  conviction  that  Lee  was  withdrawing, 
Sickles  was  sent  out  with  two  divisions  to  reconnoitre  and 
attack  him.*  At  about  three  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  he  ad- 


*  General  Hooker,  in  his  evidence  on  the  battle  of  Chancellorsville,  insinu 
ates  that  he  was  all  the  time  aware  of  the  true  character  of  Jackson's  move, 
and  that  he  made  adequate  preparations  to  meet  a  flank  attack  ;  but  he,  at  the 
time,  gave  a  very  different  view  to  General  Sedgwick,  to  whom  he  wrote,  on 
Saturday  afternoon,  as  follows :  "  We  know  the  enemy  is  flying,  trying  to  saw 
his  trains  ;  two  of  Sickles'  divisions  are  among  them." 


THE  CHANCELLORSVILLE  CAMPAIGN.  285 

vanced  through  the  "Wilderness  for  a  mile  and  a  half,  or  two 
miles,  reached  the  road  on  which  Jackson  had  moved,  struck 
the  rear  of  his  column,  and  began  to  take  prisoners.  Elated 
by  his  success,  the  result  of  which  he  communicated  to 
Hooker,  General  Sickles  asked  for  re-enforcements ;  and,  at 
his  request,  Pleasonton's  cavalry  and  two  brigades  of  in 
fantry  were  sent  him.  As  one  of  these  brigades  was  taken 
from  the  Twelfth  Corps,  and  the  other  from  the  Eleventh 
Corps,*  holding  the  right  of  the  general  line,  it  is  hardly  to 
be  supposed  that  Hooker  would  have  made  the  detachment 
had  he  thought  that  flank  was  to  be  attacked. 

While  this  manoeuvre,  under  a  false  lead,  was  going  on, 
Jackson  was  getting  into  position  for  his  meditated  blow.  He 
had  already  reached  the  Orange  plankroad,  on  which  the 
Union  line  was  drawn,  and  near  the  point  at  which  it  is 
crossed  by  the  road  from  Germanna  Ford ;  but,  ascending  a 
hill  in  the  vicinity,  he  saw  that  disposition  of  the  Union  force 
by  which  its  right  flank  was  thrown  sharply  back  in  a  crochet, 
extending  northward  and  at  right  angles  with  the  general 
line,  which  ran  east  and  west.  He,  therefore,  perceived  that 
he  would  have  to  move  further  to  his  left,  and  further  to  the 
north,  and,  in  order  to  strike  the  rear  of  Hooker's  defensive 
position,  would  have  to  reach  the  old  turnpike  which  runs 
parallel  with  and  north  of  the  plankroad.f  Turning,  there 
fore,  after  a  rapid  reconnoitring  glance,  to  one  of  his  aids,  he 
instantly  said,  "  Tell  my  column  to  cross  that  road" J  (mean 
ing,  thereby,  the  plankroad,  so  as  to  move  up  and  strike  the 
old  turnpike). 

Beaching  the  turnpike  about  five  o'clock,  Jackson  saw  the 
Union  line  in  reverse,  and  had  only  to  advance  in  order  to 


*  Williamson's  brigade,  of  Slocum's  corps,  and  Barlow's  brigade,  of 
Howard's  corps. — Sickles'  Evidence :  Report  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  second 
series,  vol.  i.,  p.  5. 

f  The  "  old  turnpike"  may,  roughly  speaking,  be  said  to  be  parallel  with 
the  plankroad,  though  it  really  joins  near  Dondall's  tavern,  about  two  and  a 
half  miles  west  of  Chancellorsville. 

\  Cooke's  Life  of  Stonewall  Jackson,  p.  251. 


286  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE   POTOMAC. 

crown  his  perilous  operation  with  complete  success.  The 
right  of  the  Union  line  was,  as  before  stated,  held  by  the 
Eleventh  Corps,  under  General  Howard  ;*  and,  while  the 
major  part  of  this  corps  formed  line  of  battle  along  the  plank- 
road,  and  faced  southward,  the  extreme  right  brigadef  was 
"  refused,"  and  made  to  face  westward,  from  which  direction, 
towards  six  o'clock,  Jackson  burst  out  with  resistless  impetu 
osity.  The  dispositions  to  meet  such  an  attack  were  utterly 
inadequate.  The  right  brigade,  after  two  or  three  hasty 
rounds,  was  forced  back;  and  the  next  brigade  to  the  left 
(McLean's),  surprised  on  its  flank,  broke  and  fled.  The  route 
of  retreat  of  these  troops,  and  that  of  some  artillery  caissons 
that  were  at  the  same  time  galloped  off  the  ground,  was  down 
the  road  on  which  the  entire  balance  of  the  corps  was  posted ; 
so  that  the  confused  mass  overran  the  next  division J  to  the 
left,  which  was  compelled  to  give  way  before  the  enemy  even 
reached  its  position.§  Bushbeck,  holding  with  his  brigade 
the  extreme  left  of  the  Eleventh  Corps,  made  a  good  fight, 
and  only  retired  after  both  his  flanks  were  turned,  and  then 
in  good  order. ||  But  the  result  was,  that  the  whole  corps  was 

*  Sigel's  old  corps ;  Howard  had  very  recently  taken  command. 

f  Gilsa's  brigade  of  Devens'  division. 

\  Sclmrz's  division. 

§  Schimmelfennig's  brigade,  of  Schurz's  division,  made  a  rapid  change 
of  front  to  the  west,  and  resisted  the  advance  of  the  enemy  for  an  hour  or 
upwards. 

||  The  rout  of  the  Eleventh  Corps  was  bad  enough  without  the  exag 
gerated  coloring  in  which  it  has  been  painted.  Much  was  said  in  the  news 
paper  accounts  of  the  time  regarding  the  "  cowardly  Dutchmen,"  and  the  fact 
that  this  corps  was  supposed  to  be  made  up  of  German  elements  was  empha 
sized  as  lending  additional  opprobrium  to  the  affair ;  yet,  "  of  the  eleven  thou 
sand  five  hundred  men  composing  the  Eleventh  Corps,  but  four  thousand  five 
hundred  were  Germans." — The  Eleventh  Corps  and  the  Battle  of  Chancellors- 
ville.  Pamphlet,  New  York,  1863. 

The  disposition  of  the  corps  to  meet  such  an  attack  was  excessively  defective ; 
and,  in  so  far  as  the  rout  was  owing  to  this  circumstance,  the  author  of  this 
disposition  must  assume  the  responsibility.  General  Warren,  in  his  evidence 
before  the  Congressional  committee,  propounds  a  theory  of  his  own  touching 
the  disaster,  which  he  attributes  to  the  fact  that  the  ambulances,  ammunition- 
wagons,  pack-mule  train,  and  even  beef-cattle,  had  actually  been  allowed  to  come 


THE  CHANCELLORSVILLE   CAMPAIGN.  287 

soon  in  utter  rout.  It  was  now  seven  o'clock,  and  growing 
dark  ;  but  Jackson  had  seized  the  breastworks,  had  taken  the 
whole  line  in  reverse,  pushed  forward  to  within  half  a  mile  of 
headquarters,  and  now  proceeded  to  make  preparations  for 
following  up  his  success  by  a  blow  that  should  be  decisive. 

The  situation  at  this  moment  was  extremely  critical,  for 
the  Eleventh  Corps  having  been  brushed  away,  it  was  abso 
lutely  necessary  to  form  a  new  line,  and  it  was  difficult  to  see 
whence  the  troops  were  to  be  drawn ;  for  just  at  that  moment 
Lee  was  making  a  vigorous  front  attack  on  Hooker's  left  and 
centre,  formed  by  Couch's  and  Slocum's  corps.  Hancock's 
front  especially  was  assailed  with  great  impetuosity ;  but  the 
attacking  column  was  held  in  check  in  the  most  intrepid  man 
ner  by  Hancock's  skirmish  line  under  Colonel  Miles.* 

The  open  plain  around  Chancellorsville  now  presented  such 
a  spectacle  as  a  simoom  sweeping  over  the  desert  might 
make.  Through  the  dusk  of  nightfall,  a  rushing  whirlwind 
of  men  and  artillery  and  wagons  swept  down  the  road,  and 


up  on  the  line  of  battle  of  the  Eleventh  Corps  ;  and  that,  when  the  fighting  be- 
gan,  all  these,  as  a  matter  of  course,  ran  away,  greatly  increasing  the  con 
fusion. — Report  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  second  series,  vol.  i.,  p.  45. 

*  Amid  much  that  is  dastardly  at  Chancellorsville,  the  conduct  of  this 
young  but  gallant  and  skilful  officer  shines  forth  with  a  brilliant  lustre.  Being 
intrusted  with  the  charge  of  the  skirmish  line  covering  Hancock's  front,  he  so 
disposed  his  thin  line,  well  intrenched,  that  the  Confederates,  though  making 
repeated  charges  in  columns,  on  Saturday  and  Sunday,  were  never  able  to 
reach  Hancock's  line  of  battle.  "  On  the  3d  of  May,"  says  Hancock,  "  the  enemy 
frequently  opened  with  artillery  from  the  heights  towards  Fredericksburg,  and 
from  those  on  my  right,  and  with  infantry  assaulted  my  advanced  line  of  rifle- 
pits,  but  was  always  handsomely  repulsed  by  the  troops  on  duty  there,  consist 
ing  of  the  Fifty-seventh,  Sixty-fourth,  and  Sixty-sixth  New  York  Volunteers, 
and  detachments  from  the  Fifty-second  New  York,  Second  Delaware,  and  One 
Hundred  and  Forty-eighth  Pennsylvania  Volunteers,  under  Colonel  N.  A.  Miles. 
Daring  the  sharp  contest  of  that  day,  the  enemy  were  never  able  to  reach  my 
line  of  battle,  so  strongly  and  successfully  did  Colonel  Miles  contest  the 
ground." — Report  of  Chancellors ville.  Colonel  Miles  was  on  Sunday  morning 
wounded  severely,  and  it  was  supposed  fatally ;  but  he  afterwards  recovered 
to  share  the  glories  of  his  corps  to  the  close  of  the  war,  and  he  rose  to  tl  e  rank 
of'  major-general. 


288  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

past  headquarters,  and  on  towards  the  fords  of  the  Kappa- 
hannock;  and  it  was  in  vain  that  the  staff  opposed  then 
,  persons  and  drawn  sabres  to  the  panic-stricken  fugitives. 
But  it  chanced  that  at  this  moment,  General  Pleasonton,  whc 
had  gone  out  with  his  cavalry  to  re-enforce  Sickles,  was  re 
turning,  and  on  learning  the  giving  way  of  the  right  wing,  he 
moved  forward  rapidly,  sent  his  horsemen  on  the  charge  into 
the  woods,  and,  bringing  into  position  his  own  battery  of 
horse  artillery,  and  such  guns,  twenty-two  in  all,  as  he  could 
collect,  he  poured  double  charges  of  canister  into  the  advan 
cing  line.  Hooker,  too,  flaming  out  with  the  old  fire  of  battle, 
called  for  his  own  old  division,  the  darling  child  of  his  crea 
tion,  now  under  General  Berry,  and  shouted  to  its  com 
mander  :  "  Throw  your  men  into  the  breach — receive  the 
enemy  on  your  bayonets — don't  fire  a  shot — they  can't  see 
you!"*  Berry's  division,  unaffected  by  the  flying  crowd 
streaming  past  it,  hastened  forward  at  the  double-quick,  in 
the  most  perfect  order,  with  fixed  bayonets,  and  took  position 
on  a  crest  at  the  western  end  of  the  clearing  around  Chan- 
cellorsville.  Here  General  Warren  with  Berry's  men,  and 
the  artillery  of  the  Twelfth  Corps,  under  Captain  Best,  and 
Hay's  brigade  of  the  Second  Corps,  formed  a  line  to  check  the 
enemy  in  front,  while  Pleasonton  and  Sickles  assailed  his 
right  flank ;  and  fifty  pieces  of  artillery,  vomiting  their  mis 
siles  in  wild  curves  of  fire  athwart  the  night-sky,  poured  swift 
destruction  into  the  Confederate  ranks.  Thus  the  torrent 
was  stemmed.  But,  more  than  all,  an  unseen  hand  had  struck 
down  the  head  and  front  of  all  this  hostile  menace.  Jackson 
had  received  a  mortal  hurt. 

On  seeing  the  success  that  attended  the  first  blow,  Jack 
son,  quick  to  perceive  the  immense  consequences  that  might 
be  drawn  from  this  victory,  proceeded  to  make  dispositions 
to  press  on  at  once,  extending  his  left  so  as  to  cut  ofi 
Hooker  from  United  States  Ford.  To  relieve  Eodes'  division 


*  Correspondence  of  William  Swinton  in  the  New  York  Times,  May  5 
1863. 


THE   CHANCELLOKSVILLE  CAMPAIGN.  289 

which  had  made  the  attack,  he  sent  forward  A.  P.  Hill's 
division ;  and  being  intensely  anxious  to  learn  the  true  posi 
tion  of  his  antagonist,  he  personally  went  forward  through 
the  dark  woods,  and  with  a  portion  of  his  staff  rode  out 
beyond  his  own  lines  to  reconnoitre  the  ground,  instructing 
the  troops  not  to  fire,  "  unless  cavalry  approached  from  the 
direction  of  the  enemy."  *  Finishing  his  examination  of  the 
ground,  he  turned  back  with  his  staff  to  re-enter  his  own  lines ; 
but  in  the  darkness,  his  troops,  mistaking,  as  it  is  supposed, 
the  party  for  a  body  of  Federal  cavalry  on  the  charge,  fired  a 
volley  which  killed  and  wounded  several  of  his  staff,  and 
pierced  Jackson  with  three  bullets.  On  being  removed  to 
the  rear,  his  arm  .was  amputated,  and  he  seemed  in  the  way 
of  recovery,  but  pneumonia  supervening,  he  expired  at  the 
end  of  a  week.  As  the  dying  Napoleon  is  recorded  to  have 
murmured,  "Tete  d'armee"  so  Jackson,  his  unconscious  mind 
still  busy  with  the  mighty  blow  he  was  executing  when 
wounded,  breathed  out  his  life  in  the  order,  "A.  P.  Hill, 
prepare  for  action  !"f 

Thus  died  Stonewall  Jackson,  the  ablest  of  Lee's  lieuten 
ants.  Jackson  was  essentially  an  executive  officer,  and  in 
this  sphere  he  was  incomparable.  Devoid  of  high  mental 
parts,  and  destitute  of  that  power  of  planning  and  combina 
tion,  and  of  that  calm,  broad,  military  intellect,  which  distin 
guished  General  Lee,  whom  he  regarded  with  a  childlike 
reverence,  and  whose  designs  he  loved  to  carry  out,  he  had 
yet  those  elements  of  character  that,  above  ah1  else,  inspire 
troops.  A  fanatic  in  religion,  fully  believing  he  was  destined 
by  Heaven  to  beat  his  enemy  whenever  he  encountered  him, 


*  Life  of  General  Jackson,  by  an  Ex-Cadet  (Richmond,  1864),  p.  182.  The 
same  circumstance  is  detailed  in  Cooke  :  Life  of  Jackson,  p.  253. 

f  Cooke :  Life  of  Jackson,  p.  270.  Life  of  Jackson,  by  an  Ex-Cadet,  p.  190. 
During  his  illness,  Jackson,  speaking  of  the  attack  he  had  made,  said  with  a 
glow  of  martial  ardor :  "  If  I  had  not  been  wounded,  I  would  have  cut  the 
enemy  off  from  the  road  to  United  States  Ford ;  we  would  have  had  them  en 
tirely  surrounded,  and  they  would  have  been  obliged  to  surrender  or  cut  their 
way  out — they  had  no  other  alternative." 

19 


290  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE   ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

he  infused  something  of  his  own  fervent  faith  into  his  men, 
and  at  the  time  of  his  death  had  trained  a  corps,  whose  at 
tacks  in  column  were  unique  and  irresistible ;  and  it  was 
noticed  that  Lee  ventured  upon  no  strokes  of  audacity  after 
Jackson  had  passed  away. 

The  operation  of  Jackson,  resulting  in  the  doubling  up  of 
Hooker's  right,  made  important  changes  in  the  line  indispen 
sable  :  so  during  the  night  a  new  front  was  formed  on  that 
flank,  with  Sickles  and  Berry.  The  Eleventh  Corps  was  for 
the  time  out  of  the  fight ;  but  Reynolds'  corps,  which  had  up 
to  this  time  been  operating  with  Sedgwick  on  the  left,  below 
Fredericksburg,  arrived  that  evening,  and  with  its  firm  metal 
more  than  supplied  the  temporary  loss.  No  idea  was  enter 
tained  of  retreating ;  and  if  Lee  did  not  retire,  it  was  evident 
that  the  morrow  must  bring  with  it  a  terrible  struggle.  But 
before  detailing  the  events  of  Sunday,  as  the  action  becomes 
then  more  complicated,  and  flames  out  in  a  double  battle, 
it  will  be  necessary  to  indicate  what  had  been  passing  with 
that  portion  of  the  army  under  Sedgwick,  and  to  point  out 
the  relations  between  these  two  parts  of  one  and  the  same 
drama. 

It  was  not  until  after  Friday's  developments  near  Chan- 
cellorsville,  when  the  reconnoitring  columns  that  went  out 
towards  Fredericksburg  had  met  the  enemy,  and  had  been 
recalled,  and  Lee  followed  up  and  drew  his  lines  around 
Chancellorsville,  that  Hooker  became  convinced  that  Lee  was 
not  minded  to  fall  back.  Seeing  this,  he,  on  Saturday  morn 
ing,  withdrew  Reynolds'  corps  also  from  the  force  under 
Sedgwick,  and  it  reached  Chancellorsville  late  that  night. 
This  left  Sedgwick  with  only  his  own  (Sixth)  corps ;  but  it  was 
a  powerful  corps,  numbering  some  twenty-two  thousand 
num.* 

Now,  it  is  a  question  which  will  present  itself  to  the  military 


*  In  addition  to  this,  Gibbon's  division  of  Couch's  corps  held  Falmouth, 
and  observed  the  river  and  the  north  side  of  Banks'  Ford. 


THE  CHANCELLORSVILLE  CAMPAIGN.  291 

student,  whether  it  would  not  have  been  better,  the  moment 
a  lodgment  was  gained  at  Chancellorsville,  on  Thursday,  to 
have  at  once  brought  the  three  corps  under  Sedgwick  up  to 
that  point  and  united  the  army.  Their  presence  below  Fred- 
ericksburg,  while  the  turning  operation  was  in  execution,  was 
correct ;  but  after  that  purpose  was  accomplished,  the  three 
corps  near  Fredericksburg,  and  the  four  corps  at  Chancellors 
ville,  presented  the  character  of  a  divided  army,  separated 
from  each  other  by  twenty  miles,  a  river  to  be  twice  passed, 
and  the  enemy  between  the  two  parts.  And  especially  when 
Friday's  developments  had  proved  that  Lee  would  not  re 
treat  but  offer  battle  at  Chancellorsville  was  such  a  junction 
desirable.  Nor  was  this  necessity  lessened,  but  rather  greatly 
heightened  by  the  fact  that  Hooker's  order  to  withdraw  from 
the  advanced  position  gained  on  Friday,  by  forfeiting  pos 
session  of  Banks'  Ford  (the  tenure  of  which  would  have 
practically  brought  the  two  parts  of  his  army  together),  de 
finitively  severed  Sedgwick  from  the  force  at  Chancellorsville, 
and  made  a  junction  possible  only  on  one  of  two  conditions  : 
firstly,  a  detour  by  the  north  bank  of  the  Kappahannock, 
making  the  passage  at  United  States  Ford — but  this  was  one 
entire  day's  march ;  secondly,  by  a  direct  march  of  Sedgwick 
from  Fredericksburg  to  Chancellorsville,  with  Lee  interposing 
between  him  and  Hooker. 

Now  when,  on  Saturday  night,  the  disruption  of  the  right 
wing  had  given  a  blow  to  all  his  hopes,  and  seriously  im 
perilled  his  army,  Hooker  resolved  to  adopt  the  latter  course, 
and  with  a  view  to  relieve  the  pressure  that  was  upon  him, 
sent,  late  at  night,  orders  to  Sedgwick  to  put  himself  in 
motion  immediately,  occupy  Fredericksburg,  seize  its  heights, 
gain  the  plankroad  from  that  place  to  Chancellorsville,  and 
move  out  to  join  the  main  body,  destroying  any  force  ho 
might  meet,  and  reaching  his  assigned  position  by  daylight 
the  next  morning.  This  was  precisely  one  of  those  movements 
which,  according  as  they  are  wrought  out,  may  be  either  the 
height  of  wisdom  or  the  height  of  folly.  Its  successful 
accomplishment  certainly  promised  very  brilliant  results. 


292  CAMPAIGNS  OF    THE  ARM'S  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

It  is  easy  to  see  how  seriously  Lee's  safety  would  be  com 
promised,  if,  wliile  engaged  with  Hooker  in  front,  he  should 
suddenly  find  a  powerful  force  assailing  his  rear,  and  grasp 
ing  already  his  direct  line  of  communications  with  Eichmond. 
But  if,  on  the  other  hand,  Lee  should  be  able  by  any  slack 
ness  on  the  part  of  his  opponent,  to  engage  him  in  front 
with  a  part  of  his  force,  while  he  should  turn  round  swiftly  to 
assail  the  isolated  moving  column,  it  is  obvious  that  he  would 
be  able  to  repulse  or  destroy  that  column,  and  then,  by  a 
vigorous  return,  meet  or  attack  his  antagonist's  main  body. 
For  the  successful  execution  of  this  plan  not  only  was  Sedg- 
wick  bound  to  the  most  energetic  action,  but  Hooker  also  was 
engaged  by  every  consideration  of  honor  and  duty  to  so  act 
as  to  make  the  dangerous  task  he  had  assigned  to  Sedgwick 
possible.  And  now  premising  that  Sedgwick,  immediately  on 
receipt  of  the  order  at  eleven  o'clock  of  Saturday  night, 
put  his  force  in  motion  from  its  position  three  miles  below 
Fredericksburg  and  moved  forward  to  effect  a  junction  with 
the  main  body,  I  shall  return  to  the  recital  of  events  at  Chan- 
cellorsville  at  the  time  the  action  burst  forth  anew  on  Sunday 
morning. 


Y. 
SUNDAY'S  ACTION  AT  CHANCELLORSVILLE 

When,  some  hours  before  dawn  of  Sunday,  Lee  received 
word  of  the  wounding  of  Jackson,  the  messenger  who  con 
veyed  to  him  the  tidings,  added  that  it  had  been  Jackson's 
intent,  had  he  been  spared,  "  to  have  pressed  the  enemy  on 
Sunday."  "  These  people  shall  be  pressed  to-day !"  ex 
claimed  Lee,  with  deep  emotion.* 

Stuart  had  succeeded  for  the  time  being  to  Jackson's  com 
mand,  and  forming  the  corps  in  three  lines,  he  advanced  it  at 

*  Life  of  Jackson,  by  an  Ex-Cadet,  p.  185. 


THE   CHANCELLORSVILLE  CAMPAIGN.  293 

daylight  to  the  attack,  with  the  battle-cry,  "  Charge,  and 
remember  Jackson!" *  Swinging  round  his  right  so  as  to  bring 
it  perpendicular  with  the  plankroad,  he  seized  the  crest  which 
had  the  day  before  been  occupied  by  the  left  of  the  Eleventh 
Corps,  got  thirty  pieces  of  artillery  rapidly  into  position 
thereon,  and  opened  a  heavy  fire  on  the  plain  around  the 
Chancellor  House."  t 

The  attitude  of  Hooker  had  not  now  even  the  pretence  of 
an  offensive  character.  The  line  he  held,  however,  on  Sunday 
morning,  still  covered  the  angle  of  roads  at  the  Chancel- 
lorsville  House.  Sickles'  corps,  and  Berry's  division  of 
Slocum's  corps,  and  French's  division  of  Couch's  corps 
formed  the  right,  and  faced  westward  to  meet  Stuart's  attack, 
while  the  rest  of  Slocum's  corps  and  Hancock's  division  of 
Couch's  corps  formed  the  centre  and  left  and  covered  the  two 
roads  from  Chancellorsville  to  Fredericksburg  to  meet  any 
assault  from  the  remainder  of  Lee's  army,  while  part  of  Han 
cock  was  thrown  back,  facing  eastward,  so  as  to  guard  the 
communications  with  United  States  Ford.  The  corps-com 
manders  saw  that  it  was  only  a  question  of  saving  what 
they  could  of  the  army's  honor,  for  the  army  was  without  a 
head.J  During  the  night  the  engineers  had  traced  out  a  new 
line  three-quarters  of  a  mile  to  the  rear  of  Chancellorsville, 

*  Life  of  Jackson,  by  an  Ex-Cadet,  p.  187. 

f  Stuart's  Report  of  the  Battle  of  Chancellorsville,  p.  18.  "  In  course  of 
the  morning,  the  corps  on  our  right  was  pushed  in,  enabling  the  enemy  to  con 
centrate  his  artillery  fire  on  Chancellorsville  with  effect." — Couch's  Report. 
This  swinging  round  of  Stuart's  right  was  made  under  the  following  cir 
cumstances.  It  will  be  remembered  that  Sickles,  from  the  movement  he 
had  made  on  Saturday  afternoon  to  attack  the  rear  of  Jackson's  corps,  reached 
a  position  on  the  right  flank  of  that  corps  ;  but  a  little  before  daybreak,  Sickles 
was  ordered  to  retire  from  that  position  to  his  place  in  the  new  line.  It  was 
when  the  withdrawal  had  been  nearly  accomplished  that  Stuart  advanced  his 
right,  and  in  so  doing  engaged  Sickles'  rear,  consisting  of  the  brigade  of  Gra 
ham,  who  manoeuvred  his  command  with  address  and  made  good  his  escape. — 

\  When  Slocum,  after  fighting  long  and  hard,  sent  to  inquire  if  other 
movements  were  being  made  that  might  relieve  him,  or  if  he  might  expect  re- 
enforcements  and  ammunition,  Hooker  replied,  that  ht  could  not  make  soldiers 
or  ammunition.  This,  too,  when  two  corps  lay  idle  ! 


294  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

towards  the  river,  and  covering  the  roads  to  United  States 
and  Ely's  fords.  To  this  line  Hooker  had  resolved  to  retire, 
and  he  seemed  to  be  incapable  of  other  resolve. 

Sickles  and  Berry  and  French  made  good  fight  at  their 
position,  receiving  Stuart's  impetuous  attacks ;  but  the  result 
was  that,  after  a.  severe  struggle,  Sickles  was  forced  from  hi* 
front  line.  Carroll,  with  a  few  regiments  of  French's  division, 
assailed  Stuart's  left  flank,  and  threw  it  into  much  confusion, 
capturing  several  hundred  prisoners,*  but  that  flank  being  re- 
enforced,  Stuart  pressed  back  French  in  turn,  and  his  right 
renewed  the  attack  on  Sickles.t 

While  Stuart  was  thus  bearing  down  on  the  right  wing, 
Lee  with  his  remaining  divisions  attacked  the  centre  and 
left  under  Slocum  and  Hancock.  He  threw  forward  Ander 
son's  division  on  the  plankroad  connecting  Fredericksburg 
and  Chancellorsville  to  attack  Slocum,  and  assailed  Hancock 
with  McLaws'  division.  The  latter  was  repulsed  in  the 
most  brilliant  manner  by  the  skirmish  line  of  Hancock's  divi 
sion  ;  but  Anderson  pressed  hard  on  Slocum,  and  throw 
ing  round  his  left,  succeeded  in  making  a  connection  with 
Stuart  by  a  thin  line.  This  done,  Lee  advanced  his  whole 
line,  when  Sickles  and  Slocum  were  forced  back.  The  line 
melted  away  and  the  whole  front  appeared  to  pass  out,  and 
Hancock,  with  a  portion  of  Slocum' s  corps  under  General 
Geary,  alone  held  the  extreme  point  of  the  line  on  the  side  of 
the  Chancellorsville  House  towards  the  enemy .  J  Drawing  back 


*  "  French  drove  the  enemy,  taking  about  three  hundred  prisoners  and 
recapturing  a  regiment  of  one  of  the  corps  in  the  hands  of  the  rebels." — 
Couch :  Report  of  Chancellorsville. 

f  "  In  the  mean  time  the  enemy  was  pressing  our  left  with  infantry,  and 
all  the  re-enforcements  I  could  obtain  were  sent  there." — Stuart :  Report  of 
Chancellorsville,  p.  18. 

|  Hancock's  testimony :  Report  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  second  series, 
vol.  i.,  p.  67.  Geary,  however,  went  out  some  time  before  Hancock,  who 
remained  till  the  last.  It  is  proper  to  state  that  Sickles'  ammunition  had 
become  exhausted,  and  no  re-enforcements  were  sent  him,  notwithstanding 
that  Meade  and  Reynolds  were  both  disengaged.  Sickles,  with  the  bayonet 
alone,  repelled  several  successive  assaults,  and  Mott's  New  Jersey  brigade  oi 


THE   CHANCELLORS VILLE   CAMPAIGN.  295 

to  the  Chancellor  House,  a  struggle  was  made  for  a  time  at 
the  angle  of  roads ;  but  the  line  soon  began  to  waver.  De 
tecting  this,  the  Confederates  sprang  forward,  and  at  ten 
o'clock  seized  Chancellorsville.  * 

A  short  time  before  the  action  thus  culminated,  General 
Hooker  was  thrown  down  by  the  concussion  of  a  shot  that 
struck  one  of  the  pillars  of  the  Chancellor  House,  on  the  bal 
cony  of  which  he  was  standing.  This  prostrated  him  for  a 
brief  period,  and  he  instructed  General  Couch  to  superintend 
the  withdrawal  of  the  troops  to  the  new  line  in  rear,  which 
had  been  prepared  and  fortified  during  the  previous  night. 
This  line  had  the  form  of  a  redan  thrown  forward  in  the  angle 
between  the  Rapidan  and  the  Rappahannock — the  right  flank 
resting  on  the  former,  and  the  left  on  the  latter  stream.  The 
corps  of  Meade  and  Reynolds,  which  had  held  position  on  the 
right  in  reserve,  and  had,  strange  to  say,  not  been  called  into 
action  during  the  terrible  struggle  of  the  morning,  were  formed 
on  the  new  line,  where  they  were  joined  by  the  rest  of  the 
army  falling  back  from  Chancellorsville.  Lee,  gathering  up 
his  forces,  was  about  to  renew  the  attack  on  this  fresh  posi 
tion,  when  his  upraised  arm  was  suddenly  arrested  by  tidings 
of  great  purport  from  Fredericksburg.f 

Sickles'  corps  alone  captured  seven  or  eight  colors  from  the  enemy's  second  line 
and  took  several  hundred  prisoners. 

*  "  Artillery  was  pushed  forward  to  the  crest,  sharp-shooters  were  posted  in 
a  house  in  advance,  and  in  a  few  minutes  Chancellorsville  was  ours  (ten  o'clock, 
A.M.)" — Stuart:  Report,  p.  18.  Lee  states  the  same  time. — Report,  p.  10. 
Most  of  the  Union  reports  make  it  eleven  o'clock. 

f  "Our  preparations  were  just  completed,  when  further  operations  were 
arrested  by  intelligence  received  from  Fredericksburg." — Lee's  Report,  p.  10 


296  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

VI. 
THE   STORMING   OF   THE   HEIGHTS. 

It  was  towards  midnight  of  Saturday  when  Sedgwick  re 
ceived  his  orders  to  move  through  Fredericksburg  and  pro 
ceed  towards  Chancellorsville  to  unite  with  the  main  body. 
This  command  found  him  holding  his  position  on  the  south 
bank  of  the  Kappahannock,  three  miles  below  Fredericksburg. 
He  immediately  put  his  corps  in  motion  by  the  flank,  and 
proceeded  to  the  town,  skirmishing  sharply  with  the  enemy 
all  the  way  up — the  Confederate  force  falling  back  slowly.* 
Some  hours  before  dawn  of  Sunday,  Sedgwick  occupied  Fred 
ericksburg,  but  a  small  force  thrown  forward  before  daylight 
to  seize  the  enemy's  works  behind  the  town  was  immediately 
repulsed.  Gibbon's  division  of  Couch's  corps,  which  had  been 
holding  Falmouth,  then  crossed  to  join  him. 

For  the  defence  of  Fredericksburg,  General  Lee  had  left 
behind  Early's  division  of  four  brigades  and  Barksdale's  bri 
gade  of  McLaws'  division.f  Barksdale  occupied  the  heights 
immediately  in  rear  of  the  town,  including  Marye's  Hill  and 
the  stone  wall  at  its  base,  famous  in  the  story  of  Burnside's 
attack.  Early's  own  division  held  the  Confederate  right 
below  the  town.  Three  companies  of  the  Washington  Artil 
lery  occupied  the  crest,  and  as  soon  as  Sedgwick's  movement 
was  disclosed,  on  Sunday  morning,  Early  sent  Hays'  brigade 
to  re-enforce  Barksdale.  As  it  had  required  scarcely  more 
than  this  force  to  repulse  Burnside's  successive  columns  ol 
attack  on  the  13th  of  December,  Barksdale  had  probably  little 
doubt  of  his  ability  to  give  a  like  reception  to  those  now 
threatening  assault. 

*  Sedgwick :  Report  of  Fredericksburg  Heights. 

f  In  addition  to  this  force,  the  Confederate  General  Wilcox,  who,  with  his 
brigade,  had  been  holding  position  at  Banks'  Ford,  moved  up  to  join  Barksdale, 
but  arrived  too  late  to  take  part  in  the  action,  though  he  played  a  part  in  the 
afterpiece. 


THE  CHANCELLORSVILLE  CAMPAIGN.  297 

Sedgwick's  first  efforts  were  of  a  tentative  nature.  Howe's 
division,  occupying  the  left  of  his  line,  made  an  effort  against 
the  Confederate  right  with  a  view  to  turn  the  heights.  It  had 
no  serious  character,  however,  and  was  not  successful.*  Gib 
bon's  division,  on  the  right  of  Sedgwick,  then  essayed  to  move 
round  the  left  of  the  Confederate  position ;  but  this  was  foiled 
by  the  canal  covering  that  entire  flank.  A  partial  attack  in 
front  was  not  more  successful.  Every  action  has  these  pe 
riods  of  prelude,  from  which  the  proper  course  at  length  dis 
closes  itself.  That  which  now  presented  itself  as  best  suited 
to  the  circumstances,  and  promising  the  best  results,  was  to 
form  a  powerful  assaulting  column  and  carry  Marye's  Heights 
by  storm. 

The  preliminary  endeavors  and  the  preparations  for  attack 
had  consumed  considerable  time,  and  it  was  towards  eleven 
o'clock  when  it  began.  Two  columns  were  formed  from  New 
ton's  division — the  right  column  of  four  regiments,  and  the  left 
column  of  two  regiments — and  on  the  left  of  this  a  line  of 
battle  of  four  regiments  was  thrown  out.  The  columns  moved 
on  the  plankroad  and  to  the  right  of  it  directly  up  the  heights. 
The  line  of  battle  advanced  on  the  left  of  the  road  on  the 
double-quick  against  the  rifle-pits,  neither  halting  nor  firing  a 
shot  until  they  had  driven  the  enemy  from  their  lower  line  of 
works  along  the  stone  wall  at  the  base  of  Marye's  Hill.  In  the 
mean  time  the  storming  parties  had  rushed  forward  to  the 
crest  and  carried  the  works  in  rear  of  the  rifle-pits,  capturing 
the  guns  and  many  hundred  prisoner s.f  The  assault  was 
executed  with  great  gallantry,  under  a  very  severe  fire  that 
cost  Sedgwick  a  thousand  men ;  and  the  Confederates  made  a 
savage  hand-to-hand  fight  on  the  crest  and  over  the  guns. 


*  "  The  enemy  made  a  demonstration  against  the  extreme  right,  which 
was  easily  repulsed  by  General  Early." — Lee :  Report  of  Chancellorsville,  p.  11. 

f  "  A  large  portion  of  the  Eighteenth  Mississippi  Regiment  and  a  part  of 
the  Twenty-first  were  taken  prisoners,  and  a  company  of  the  Washington 
Artillery,  with  its  guns,  were  captured." — Report  of  General  Ear]  y,  p.  34.  The 
Sixth  Maine,  of  the  light  brigade  under  Colonel  Burnham,  was  the  first  to  plant 
its  colors  on  the  works. 


298  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

As,  simultaneous  with  these  events,  Howe's  division  on  the 
left  carried  the  crest  below  Fredericksburg,  capturing  a  num 
ber  of  prisoners  and  five  guns,  the  whole  ridgo  wars  now  in 
Sedgwick's  possession.  Early's  troops  retreated  southward 
over  the  telegraph  road,  leaving  the  plankroad  from  Freder 
icksburg  to  Chancellorsville  open  to  an  advance  of  Sedgwick. 
This  the  latter  proceeded  with  all  haste  to  set  on  foot. 

Such  was  the  startling  intelligence  that,  in  the  climax  of 
his  triumph,  reached  General  Lee,  who  suddenly  found  him 
self  summoned  to  meet  this  new  and  unexpected  menace. 
The  course  adopted  by  Lee  in  this  emergency  was  precisely 
the  course  prescribed  by  the  highest  principles  of  war — the 
principles  on  which  Caesar,  and  Gustavus,  and  Frederick 
fought  battles  ;  but  it  was  a  course  very  bold — unusually  bold 
for  the  cautious  and  methodical  mind  of  the  Confederate 
commander.  Belying  on  the  repulse  Hooker  had  received 
to  hold  him  inactive,  Lee  instantly  countermarched  from 
Hooker's  front  a  force  sufficient,  in  conjunction  with  the 
troops  under  Early,  to  check  or  destroy  Sedgwick.  Wilcox's 
brigade,  which  had  been  held  at  Banks'  Ford,  was  already  in 
position  to  meet  him ;  and  in  addition,  Lee  forwarded  the 
brigade  of  Mahone  of  Anderson's  division  and  the  brigades 
of  Kershaw,  Wofford,  and  Semmes  under  General  McLaws.* 
These,  with  the  five  brigades  of  Early,  who  was  in  position 
to  place  himself  on  Sedgwick's  rear,  he  judged  adequate  to 
the  work.  While,  therefore,  this  force  was  countermarching 
from  Chancellorsville  towards  Fredericksburg,  Sedgwick  was 
advancing  from  Fredericksburg  towards  Chancellorsville ;  and 
it  happened  that  the  heads  of  the  columns  came  together 
just  about  midway — at  Salem  Heights,  near  the  junction  of 
the  plankroad  and  the  turnpike.  It  was  now  towards  four 
o'clock  in  the  afternoon.  One  of  the  Confederate  brigades, 
under  "Wilcox,  already  held  the  crest  at  Salem  Chapel,  and 
McLaws  was  proceeding  to  form  his  brigades  on  his  right 
and  left ;  but  Sedgwick  threw  forward  Brooks'  division,  sup- 

*  Lee :  Report  of  Chancellorsville,  p.  12. 


THE  CHANCELLORSVILLE  CAMPAIGN.  299 

porting  it  with  Newton's  division  on  the  right,  and,  advancing, 
gained  the  crest  after  a  sharp  conflict.*  This  was  a  momen 
tary  triumph,  for  he  was  soon  pushed  slowly  back  through 
the  woods.  The  falling  back  was  covered,  and  the  advance 
of  the  enemy  checked  by  the  excellent  firing  of  the  batteries 
under  Colonel  Tompkins.t  Sedgwick,  in  fact,  was  checked. 
His  loss  was  severe,  and  with  that  suffered  in  carrying  the 
heights  of  Fredericksburg,  brought  the  total  up  to  five  thou 
sand  men.J  Such  was  the  situation  in  which  night  found 
this  column. 


VII. 
THE   COUP  DE  GRACE. 

Monday,  May  4th,  found  both  armies,  and  the  opposing 
halves  of  each  army,  in  a  curious  dead-lock.  Hooker  had 
assumed  a  strictly  defensive  attitude  in  his  new  line.  Lee 
felt  unable  to  attack  with  less  than  his  whole  force,  which 
could  not  be  concentrated  until  he  was  relieved  of  the  danger 
that  menaced  his  rear  in  the  person  of  Sedgwick.§  Sedgwick, 
on  the  other  hand,  while  able  to  hold  his  own,  was  unable 
to  advance  in  face  of  the  opposition  he  encountered.  This 
was  now  not  lessened  but  rather  increased,  for  General  Early 

*  Sedgwick's  Report. 

f  "  The  advance  of  the  enemy  was  checked  by  the  splendid  firing  of  our 
batteries — Williston's,  Rigby's,  and  Parsons1." — Sedgwick's  Report.  The  Con 
federate  General  McLaws  testifies  to  the  excellence  of  the  artillery  service : 
"  The  batteries  of  the  enemy  were  admirably  served,  and  played  over 
the  whole  ground." — Report  of  the  Battle  of  Chancellorsville,  p.  30. 

^  "  My  strength  yesterday  was  twenty-two  thousand  men ;  I  do  not  know 
my  losses,  but  they  were  large — probably  five  thousand  men." — Dispatch  from 
Sedgwick  to  Hooker,  May  4th  :  Report  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  second 
series,  vol.  1,  p.  109.  The  precise  loss  was  four  thousand  nine  hundred  and 
twenty-five  killed,  wounded,  and  missing. — Sedgwick's  Report. 

§  "  In  the  mean  time  the  enemy  had  so  strengthened  his  position  near 
Chancellorsville,  that  it  was  deemed  inexpedient  to  assail  it  with  less  than  our 
whole  force,  which  could  not  be  concentrated  until  we  were  relieved  from  the 
danger  that  menaced  our  rear." — Lee  :  Report,  p.  12. 


300  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  AKMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

on  Monday  morning  retook  the  heights  of  Fredericksburg, 
thus  cutting  off  Sedgwick  from  communication  with  that 
place,  and  enveloping  him  on  three  sides. 

To  cut  this  knot,  Lee  resolved  to  further  re-enforce  the 
troops  opposed  to  Sedgwick  and  drive  him  across  the  Eappa- 
hannock,  thus  eliminating  from  the  problem  one  important 
factor.  Accordingly,  on  Monday  morning  Anderson  was 
directed  to  proceed  with  his  remaining  three  brigades  to  join 
MeLaws.*  Reaching  Salem  Heights  about  noon,  he  threw  his 
force  around  on  Sedgwick' s  left,  with  the  view  of  cutting  his 
command  off  from  the  river.  The  Confederates,  however,  met 
considerable  delay  in  getting  into  position,  and  the  attack 
was  not  begun  till  six  o'clock,  when  it  was  made  with  great 
impetuosity — Sedgwick  resisting  with  the  utmost  stubborn 
ness,  but  forced  to  yield  ground,  especially  on  the  left.  Hap 
pily,  darkness  soon  ensued  to  prevent  the  enemy's  following 
up  his  advantage,  and,  under  cover  of  night,  Sedgwick  safely 
withdrew  his  corps  across  the  Eappahannock  at  Banks'  Ford, 
where  a  ponton-bridge  had  been  laid  the  day  before. 

Thus  it  was  that  Lee  on  Tuesday  morning  (May  5th)  saw 
himself  relieved  from  this  menace  in  his  rear ;  and  having 
now  but  a  single  foe  to  cope  with,  he  promptly  recalled  the 
divisions  of  McLaws  and  Anderson,  united  them  with  his 
main  force  at  Chancellorsville,  and  resolved  to  give  the 
remaining  section  of  the  Union  army  the  coup  de  grace.  Prep 
arations  were  made  during  the  afternoon  and  evening  to  as 
sail  Hooker's  position  at  daylight  the  following  morning  (Wed 
nesday,  May  6th).  When  daybreak,  however,  came,  and  the 
Confederate  skirmishers  advanced,  it  was  found  that  the  army 
had,  during  the  night,  withdrawn  across  the  Eappahannock. 

Hooker  had  determined,  on  Monday  night,  to  recross  the 
river ;  but  when  the  question  was  submitted  to  the  judgment 
of  his  corps-commanders,  it  was  found  that  a  majority  of 
those  present  were  in  favor  of  an  advance  rather  than  a  with 
drawal.  Hooker,  however,  had  lost  all  stomach  for  fight. 

*  Lee  :  Report  of  Cliancellorsville,  j.  12. 


THE  CHANCELLORSVILLE  CAMPAIGN.  301 

Accordingly  on  Tuesday,  the  engineers  were  instructed  to 
prepare  a  new  line  near  the  river  to  cover  the  crossing,  and 
for  this  purpose  they  constructed  a  continuous  cover  and 
abatis,  from  the  Eappahannock  at  Scott's  Dam  around  to 
the  mouth  of  Hunting  Creek  on  the  Eapidan,  a  distance  of 
three  miles.  During  the  afternoon  a  heavy  rain  set  in  which 
lasted  till  late  at  night. 

The  movement  to  recross  was  begun  by  the  artillery  at 
dark  of  Tuesday,  and  was  suddenly  interrupted  by  a  rise  in 
the  Eappahannock  so  great  as  to  submerge  the  banks  at  the 
end  of  the  bridges,  which  the  current  threatened  to  sweep 
away — a  consummation  most  devoutly  wished  by  many  of 
the  leading  officers  of  the  army,  who  were  bitterly  opposed 
to  recrossing  the  river.  But  fate  willed  otherwise,  and  in  the 
midst  of  a  night  as  gloomy  as  the  mood  of  the  army,  the 
troops  filed  across  to  the  north  bank. 

The  losses  in  the  battle  of  Chancellorsville  can  be  stated 
with  accuracy.  On  the  side  of  the  Confederates,  they  made 
an  aggregate  of  ten  thousand  two  hundred  and  eighty-one.* 
On  the  Union  side,  they  were  seventeen  thousand  one  hun 
dred  and  ninety-sevent  killed,  wounded,  and  missing.  The 
army  left  behind  its  killed,  its  wounded,  fourteen  pieces  of 
artillery,  and  twenty  thousand  stand  of  arms. 

It  remains  now  to  glance  a  moment  at  the  operations  of 
the  cavalry  column  under  Stoneman.  As  this  was  a  powerful 
corps,  numbering  some  ten  thousand  sabres,  and  as  its  move 
ment  was  intended  to  precede  by  a  fortnight  the  commence 
ment  of  operations  by  the  army,  very  important  results  were 
expected  from  it.  But  the  cavalry  was  delayed  a  long  time  by 
the  swollen  condition  of  the  upper  Eappahannock,  so  that  it 
did  not  cross  till  the  time  the  infantry  made  the  passage, 
April  29.  Hooker  then  divided  the  command  into  two 


*  Lee  :  Report  of  Chancellorsville,  p.  131. 

f  Report  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  second  series,  vol.  i.,  p.  143.  Of  this 
number  Lee  claims  five  thousand  prisoners,  besides  the  wounded.  He  also 
claims  the  prize  of  seventeen  standards,  nineteen  thousand  and  five  hundred 
stand  of  arms,  and  much  ammunition. — Lee  :  Report  of  Chancellorsville,  p.  15. 


302  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF    THE  POTOMAC. 

columns,  sending  one,  under  General  Averill,  to  move  to 
Louisa  Courthouse,  threaten  Gordonsville,  and  engage  the 
Confederate  mounted  force,  while  the  other,  under  General 
Buford,  should  break  up  the  Richmond  and  Fredericksburg 
Eailroad,  destroying  its  bridges,  etc. 

The  only  mounted  force  the  Confederates  could  oppose  to 
these  columns  was  a  small  brigade  of  two  regiments  under 
General  W.  H.  F.  Lee.*  That  officer  fell  back  before  the 
Union  cavalry,  which  advanced  on  Louisa  Courthouse,  and 
proceeded  to  destroy  the  Yirginia  Central  road.  Stoneinan 
divided  Buford's  force  into  six  bodies,  throwing  them  out  in 
all  directions  ;  but  the  important  line  of  communications  by 
the  Fredericksburg  and  Eichmond  Eailroad  was  not  struck 
till  the  3d  of  May,  and  the  damage  done  it  was  very  slight.f 
This  is  sufficiently  shown  by  the  fact  that  on  the  5th  the  cars 
conveyed  to  Eichmond  the  Confederate  wounded  and  the 
Union  prisoners^  captured  in  the  battle  of  Chancellorsville. 
The  raid  had,  undoubtedly,  the  effect  to  alarm  the  country 
through  which  the  columns  moved,  and  much  property  was 
destroyed;  but  its, military  result,  as  bearing  on  the  main 
operation,  was  quite  insignificant. 

*  Report  of  General  R.  E.  Lee  on  the  Battle  of  Chancellorsville,  p.  15 ;  Re 
port  of  General  Stuart,  p.  38  ;  Report  of  General  W.  H.  F.  Lee,  p.  49. 

f  "  The  damage  done  to  the  railroad  was  small  and  soon  repaired,  and  the 
James  River  Canal  was  saved  from  injury." — Report  of  General  Lee,  p.  15. 

\  Hooker's  testimony :  Report  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  second  series, 
vol.  i.,  p.  140. 


THE  CHANCELLORSVILLE  CAMPAIGN.  3Q3 


VIII. 
OBSERVATIONS  ON  THE  BATTLE  OF  CHANCELLORSVILLE. 

The  simple  recital  I  have  made  of  the  operations  attending 
the  battle  of  Chancellorsville  will  have  served  to  reveal  the 
extraordinary  character  of  that  action,  which,  opening  with  an 
exhibition  of  grand  tactics  marked  by  masterly  skill,  sank 
into  conduct  so  feeble  and  faulty,  as  to  be  almost  beneath 
criticism. 

1.  It  is  in  war  as  in  life :  a  single  false  step  often  involves 
an  endless  train  of  swift-succeeding  misfortune.     This  false 
step  in  the  conduct  of  Hooker  was  that,  having  started  out  to 
fight  an  offensive  battle,  he  reduced  himself,  at  the  very  mo 
ment  when  action  was  above  all  imperative,  to  a  perilous 
defensive.     The  strategic  operation  of  crossing  the  Rappa- 
hannock  merits  all  the  praise  it  has  received.     It  was  ac 
complished  with  complete  success,  and  resulted  in  placing  at 
Chancellorsville  on  the  night  of  Thursday,  April  30,  four  corps, 
in  a  position  on  the  rear  of  the  left  of  the  Confederate  de 
fensive  line,  with  Lee's  forces  scattered  down  the  Eappahan- 
nock,  a  distance  of  five-and-twenty  miles.      All  the  enemy 
between  Hooker  and  Fredericksburg  was  a  mere  handful  of 
a  division.     Then   was  the   moment  for  a  bold    initiative  on 
the  part  of  Hooker.     Then  was  the  time  for  vigorous  impulse 
and  fiery  action  before  his  opponent  recovered  himself.     By 
what  prompting  of  chivalrous  generosity,  rare  in  war — and 
eclipsing  forever  the  conduct  of  the  commander  of  the  Eng 
lish  Guards,  who  at  Fontenoy  insisted  on  the  French  deliver 
ing  the  first  fire — was  it  that  in  this  situation  he  voluntarily 
resigned  all  the  advantage  of*  the  surprise,  and  allowed  Lee 
forty-eight  hours  to  concentrate  against  him  ? 

2.  That  delay  at  Chancellorsville  from  Thursday  afternoon 
till  Saturday  afternoon  undid  all  that  had  been  accomplished. 


304  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE   ARMY  OF  THE   POTOMAC. 

It  is  true  that  the  Wilderness  is  a  region  unfavorable  foi 
manoeuvring  a  large  army ;  but  it  was  as  bad  for  Lee  as  for 
Hooker,  and  the  latter  is  estopped  from  availing  himself  of 
this  excuse  by  his  own  order,  in  which  he  declared  it  to  be 
"  ground  of  his  own  selection."  Besides,  this  objection 
wholly  disappears  in  face  of  the  fact  that  the  reconnoissances 
of  Friday,  May  1st,  showed  he  might  have  pushed  out  beyond 
the  woods,  thus  uncovering  Banks'  Ford,  reducing  the  line  of 
communications  by  twelve  miles,  and  practically  uniting  both 
his  wings.  To  the  "special  wonder"  of  all  the  commanders, 
he  relinquished  the  fine  position  then  gained,  and  stood  on 
the  defensive  in  the  Wilderness. 

3.  But  for  a  defensive  battle  the  disposition  of  his  army  was 
faulty — the  ground  being  commanded  in  front,  and  the  right 
flank  thrown  out  "in  the  air,"  whereas  it  might  have  been  se 
curely  rested  on  the  Rapidan.    This  afforded  Lee  his  opportu 
nity,  and  with  consummate  address,  and  a  marvellous  bold 
ness,  considering  the  disparity  of  his  force,  he  on  Saturday 
morning  set  on  foot  the  execution  of  Jackson's  flank  march 
to   attack   the   Union   right.      This   is  an  operation  usually 
condemned  in  war ;    but   the   conditions   justified  it,  seeing 
that  Jackson  was  able  to  mask  his  movement,  and  success 
crowned  it. 

4.  During  the  whole  of  Saturday,  while  Jackson  was  exe 
cuting  his  flank   march,   the   Confederate   commander  held 
Hooker's  fifty  thousand  men  with  the  division  of  Anderson 
and  part  of  McLaws — eight  brigades,   or  twelve  thousand 
men.     Not  a  motion  of  offence  was  made  by  Hooker  all  this 
time. 

5.  After  the  disaster  to  the  Eleventh  Corps  on  Saturday 
night,  Hooker  made  every  thing  to  hinge  on  Sedgwick's  ad 
vance  to  join  him,  which  was  to  make  the  greater  contingent 
on  the  lesser.     His  orders  to  Sedgwick,  sent  at  ten  o'clock  of 
Saturday  night,  and  received  about  midnight,  were  to  move  up 
from  his  position  below  Fredericksburg,  take  the  heights,  and 
move  out  by  the  plankroad  towards  Chancellorsville,  distant 
fourteen  miles.     This  move  would,  under  the  circumstances, 


THE  CHANCELLORSVILLE  CAMPAIGN.  305 

have  been  an  impossibility,  even  had  no  enemy  interposed. 
Sedgwick,  after  a  gallant  assault  in  which  he  suffered  heavy 
loss,  carried  the  Fredericksburg  heights  on  Sunday  forenoon  ; 
and  he  then  moved  out  to  obey  Hooker's  instructions  to  fall 
upon  Lee's  rear  at  Chancellorsville,  but  was  stopped  by  the 
enemy  at  Salem  Heights. 

6.  But  meanwhile,  on  Sunday  morning  Hooker  had  been 
driven  back  at  Chancellorsville.  Moreover,  the  operations 
ending  in  the  giving  ground  of  the  army  at  Chancellorsville 
were  over  five  hours  before  Sedgwick  attacked  Salem  Heights. 
It  is  therefore  evident,  that  unless  the  Sixth  Corps  could, 
single-handed,  fight  all  the  force  brought  against  it,  the  sole 
object  of  taking  the  heights  of  Fredericksburg,  or  uncovering 
Banks'  Ford,  was  to  hold  a  position  from  which  the  army 
might  debouch.  Therefore  the  attack  on  Salem  Heights  was 
mere  waste  of  men ;  and  if  those  heights  had  been  taken,  the 
Sixth  Corps  never  could  have  extricated  itself.  Sedgwick 
should  not  have  been  called  forward  from  Fredericksburg,  be 
cause  to  abandon  the  possession  of  the  heights  was  to  give  up 
a  positive  gain  for  a  remote  possibility.  If,  however,  Sedgwick 
was  to  be  expected  to  make  a  junction  with  the  force  at 
Chancellorsville,  Hooker  was  committed  by  every  considera 
tion  of  honor  and  duty  to  so  act  as  to  make  the  junction 
possible.  Yet  he  did  not  make  the  slightest  effort  as  a  diver 
sion  in  Sedgwick's  favor ;  but  allowed  Lee  to  countermarch  at 
pleasure  from  his  front  a  force  sufficient  to  first  check  and 
then  overwhelm  Sedgwick.  General  Hooker  lays  the  blame 
of  the  disaster  at  Chancellorsville  to  Sedgwick's  failure  to 
join  him  on  Sunday  morning.  "In  my  judgment,"  says  he, 
"  General  Sedgwick  did  not  obey  the  spirit  of  my  order,  and 
made  no  sufficient  effort  to  obey  it.  His  movement  was 
delayed  so  long  that  the  enemy  discovered  his  intentions ; 
and  when  that  was  done,  he  was  necessarily  delayed  in  the 
further  execution  of  the  order."  *  This  is  a  cruel  charge  to 
bring  against  a  commander  now  beyond  the  reach  of  de- 

*  Hooker's  testimony  before  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War. 


306  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

traction  ;  whose  brilliant  exploit  in  carrying  the  Fredericks- 
burg  heights  and  his  subsequent  fortitude  in  a  trying  situa 
tion,  shine  out  as  the  one  relieving  brightness  amid  the  gloom 
of  that  hapless  battle. 

7.  From  the  time  when,  at  noon  of  Sunday,  Hooker  was 
driven  from  the  line  at  Chancellorsville,  to  his  new  line  in  the 
rear,  he  remained  perfectly  passive.     "Was  all   fight  out   of 
him  ?    Had  the  disaster  to  the  Eleventh  Corps,  which  nobody 
in  the  army  regarded  as  of  any  moment  (that  corps  hardly 
being  accounted  as  belonging  to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac), 
so  paralyzed  him  that  he  could  do  nothing  ?     Yet  the  disrup 
tion  of  the  Eleventh  Corps  had  been  more  than  made  up  by 
the  arrival  of  Eeynolds'  corps  (First)  on  Saturday  night ;  and 
in  the  decisive  action  of  Sunday,  he  employed  little  more 
than  half    his   force — neither  Keynolds    nor    Meade   being 
allowed  to  go  into  action,  though  eager  to  do  so.     Hooker 
allowed  a  position  to  be  lost  when  he  had  more  men  at  hand 
that  did  not  draw  trigger  than  Lee  had  in  his  entire  army  ! 

8.  It  was  Monday  evening  before  Sedgwick  was  attacked ; 
and    the    whole    interval  from  noon  of  Sunday,  when  the 
action  of  Chancellorsville  ceased,  till  six  o'clock  on  Monday 
evening — thirty  hours — was  available  to  re-enforce  Sedgwick, 
which   might  readily  have  been   done   on   a   short  line  via 
United  States  and  Banks'  fords.     Yet  no  attempt  was  made 
to  do  so.     Lee  made  good  use  of  this  time  in  re-enforcing  the 
wing  opposed  to  Sedgwick,  so  that  he  was  able  at  night  to 
drive  the  Sixth  Corps  across  the  river  after  a  severe  action, 
in  which  Sedgwick's  guns  booming  out  like  signals  of  distress 
were  heard  at  Chancellorsville.     Indeed,  such  was  Hooker's 
delusion  (to  use  the  mildest  term)  regarding  the  situation, 
that  on  Sunday  afternoon,  at  the  time  Sedgwick  was  com 
pletely  enveloped,  he  sent  word  to  that  officer  stating  that  he 
(Hooker)  "  had  driven  the  enemy,  and  all  it  wanted  was  for 
him  (Sedgwick)  to  come  up  and  complete  Lee's  destruction  !" 

9.  Even  after  Sedgwick  had  withdrawn  across  the  Bappa- 
hannock  at  Banks'  Ford  on  Monday,  Hooker  might  have  re 
mained  indefinitely  on  the  third  line  he  had  caused  to  be 


THE  CHANCELLORSVILLE  CAMPAIGN.  307 

prepared.  It  was  of  impregnable  strength — both  flanks  rest 
ing  on  the  river ;  and  the  army  could  here  have  repelled  all 
assaults.  The  whole  army  wished  this ;  and  a  successful 
action,  ending  in  Lee's  repulse,  would  have  saved  the  morale 
and  pride  of  the  troops.  It  has  been  said  that  the  storm  of 
May  5th,  which  caused  a  rise  in  the  Rappahannock,  and  en 
dangered  the  supplies  of  the  army,  was  a  motive  for  retreat. 
But  the  order  to  retire  was  given  twelve  hours  before  any 
rain  and  during  a  cloudless  sky. 

10.  Not  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  beaten  at  Chancel 
lors  ville,  but  its  commander  ;  and  General  Hooker's  conduct 
inflicted  a  very  severe  blow  to  his  reputation.  The  officers 
despised  his  generalship,  and  the  rank  and  file  were  puzzled 
at  the  result  of  a  battle  in  which  they  had  been  foiled  without 
being  fought,  and  caused  to  retreat  without  the  consciousness 
of  having  been  beaten. 


308  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OP  THE  POTOMAC. 


IX. 

THE   GETTYSBUEG  CAMPAIGN 

JUNE— JTJLT,  1863. 


I. 

THEORY  OF  THE  CONFEDERATE  INVASION. 

IN  the  minds  of  that  group  of  able  and  sagacious  men  that 
at  Richmond  controlled  the  course  of  the  mighty  experiment 
of  war,  there  had  early  grown  up  a  theory  of  military  conduct 
that  was  undoubtedly  the  best  adapted  to  the  circumstances, 
and,  indeed,  is  the  only  theory  on  which  a  defensive  war  can 
be  maintained  with  any  hope  of  success. 

It  is  now  generally  conceded  that  a  Power  that  either  vol 
untarily  or  by  compulsion  allows  itself  to  be  reduced  to  a 
purely  defensive  attitude  is  certain  to  be  compelled,  sooner  or 
later,  to  succumb.  On  the  other  hand,  military  history  affords 
many  memorable  illustrations  of  the  marvellous  results  that 
may  be  accomplished  by  nations  that,  forced  to  the  defensive 
by  the  superiority  of  the  assailant,  are  yet  able  at  the  oppor 
tune  moment  to  assume  the  offensive,  and  inflict  blows  as 
well  as  receive  them.  It  was  by  acting  on  this  principle  that 
Frederick  the  Great,  in  that  everlasting  model  of  a  defensive 
campaign,  the  Seven  Years'  War,  was  able  to  make  head 
against  the  seemingly  overwhelming  combination  brought 
against  him  ;  and  that  Napoleon,  in  1814,  in  that  other  bright 
exemplar  of  the  defence  of  a  country  by  boldly  taking  the 
offensive,  was  able  to  confront  the  invading  Allies,  and  at 
length  make  them  pay  so  dearly  for  the  capture  of  his 
capital. 


Su  H.BXall  &  Sons,  New  Tori-- 


310  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

and  to  this  relative  increase  of  Lee's  army  was  now  added  a 
positive  increase  by  a  large  force  of  conscripts,  and  a  more 
important  re-enforcement  by  the  two  divisions  of  Long-street's 
corps,  which,  having  been  operating  south  of  James  River  at 
the  time  of  the  battle  of  Chancellorsville,  were  immediately 
thereafter  recalled  to  take  part  in  the  meditated  movement.  If 
Hooker's  force  of  infantry  was  at  this  time  reduced,  as  he  de 
clares,  to  an  effective  of  eighty  thousand  men,*  there  was  now 
less  disproportion  between  the  two  armies  than  generally  ob 
tained,  for  at  the  end  of  May,  Lee's  force  had  reached  an  ag 
gregate  of  sixty-eight  thousand  infantry  and  a  considerable 
body  of  cavalry.t  The  Confederate  army  had,  moreover,  been 
lately  mobilized  and  increased  in  efficiency  by  its  reorganiza 
tion  into  three  corps  d'armee,  under  Generals  Longstreet,  Hill,  • 
and  Ewell — three  able,  energetic,  and  trusted  lieutenants.  In 
respect  of  transportation,  equipment,  and  clothing,  though 
not  in  respect  of  supplies,  the  Southern  force  in  Virginia  was 
in  better  condition  than  at  any  previous  time.  And  if  its 
commissariat  was  deficient,  the  rich  granaries  of  the  North 
lay  open — the  inviting  spoils  of  a  successful  blow.J 

*  Letter  from  General  Hooker  to  President  Lincoln,  May  13,  1863 :  "  My 
marching  force  of  infantry  is  cut  down  to  about  eighty  thousand  men."  The 
cavalry  corps  which,  on  Hooker's  entrance  into  command,  had  been  rendered 
stronger  and  more  effective  than  ever  before,  was  much  reduced  by  the  severe 
service  to  which  it  had  been  put.  General  Pleasonton,  who  succeeded  General 
Stoneman  in  the  command  of  the  cavalry,  gives  its  effective,  at  the  end  of  May, 
at  four  thousand  six  hundred  and  seventy-seven  horses — one-third  its  strength 
by  the  March  report. — Report  of  General  Pleasonton,  May  27th. 

f  This  is  the  number  present  for  duty  the  31st  of  May :  it  was  precisely 
08,352 ;  the  aggregate  present  was  88,754.  I  learn  from  General  Longstreet 
that  General  Lee,  when  at  Chambersburg,  estimated  that  his  force  when  con 
centrated  would  reach  a  trifle  over  70,000  men.  General  Longstreet  added, 
fchat  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  was  at  this  time  in  condition  to  under 
take  any  thing. 

%  There  is  no  doubt  that  the  condition  of  Lee's  commissariat  at  this  time 
had  considerable  to  do  with  the  invasion.  General  Longstreet  told  me  a  story 
to  this  point,  the  authenticity  of  which,  however,  he  did  not  vouch  for.  Shortly 
before  the  movement,  it  seems,  General  Lee  sent  to  Richmond  a  requisition  for 
a  certain  amount  of  rations.  The  Commissary-General  Northrup  indorsed  OD 
it :  "  If  General  Lee  wishes  rations,  let  him  seek  them  in  Pennsylvania  I" 


THE  GETTYSBURG  CAMPAIGN.  311 

Thus  prompted,  the  Confederate  leaders  resolved  upon  a 
movement  that  should  not  only  have  the  effect  of  causing  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  to  loose  its  hold  upon  the  Rappahan- 
nock,  but  should  initiate  a  campaign  of  invasion  on  the  soil 
of  the  loyal  States.  And  it  is  proper  to  point  out  here  that  in 
coming  to  this  determination,  those  who  controlled  the  war- 
councils  at  Richmond  would  seem  to  have  been  influenced 
rather  by  the  excited  condition  of  the  army  and  the  South, 
than  by  a  just  appreciation  of  their  proper  defensive  policy. 
This  not  only  did  not  exclude,  but  it  invited  the  seizing  of  favor 
able  opportunities  to  throw  back  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
from  its  aggressive  advances  into  Virginia,  and,  if  possible, 
force  it  across  the  Potomac.  But  to  convert  these  offensive 
returns  into  out-and-out  invasion  was  to  overleap  their  true 
policy  and  enter  upon  an  enterprise  uncertain,  perilous,  and 
costly.  The  experience  of  the  Maryland  campaign  of  the 
previous  year  might  already  have  made  this  manifest ;  and 
hence  it  would  appear  that  the  Eichmond  leaders,  in  resolving 
«fco  push  the  aggression  into  Pennsylvania,  took  counsel  not  so 
much  from  prudence  as  from  the  clamors  of  the  Hotspurs  of 
the  South,  who,  fretting  at  the  defensive  attitude  held  by  Lee 
during  the  past  twelve  months,  now  burned  to  see  the  theatre 
of  war  transferred  to  Northern  soil.*  The  close  of  May  found 
the  army  ready  to  launch  on  this  seductive  but  fatal  adven 
ture. 

*  The  vague  flying  rumors  and  the  significant  intimations  of  the  Southern 
press  had  given  Hooker  reason  to  anticipate  some  hostile  movement  on  the 
part  of  Lee,  and  on  the  28th  of  May  he  communicated  this  conviction  to  Wash 
ington.  "  You  may  rest  assured,"  said  he,  "  that  important  movements  are 
being  made.  .  .  .  I  am  in  doubt  as  to  the  direction  he  [Lee]  will  take,  but 
probably  the  one  of  last  year,  however  desperate  it  may  appear." — Dispatch 
from  Hooker  to  Secretary  Stanton. 


312  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC 


II. 
MANOEUVRES  TO   DISENGAGE  HOOKEik 

In  execution  of  this  project  the  first  object  with  Lee  was  to 
disengage  Hooker  from  the  Eappahannock,  and  with  this 
view  secret  movements  were  begun  on  the  3d  of  June.  Mc- 
Laws'  division,  of  Longstreet's  corps,  that  day  left  Fredericks- 
burg  for  Culpepper  Courthouse,  and  at  the  same  time  Hood's 
division,  of  Longstreet's  corps,  which,  since  its  arrival  from 
Richmond,  had  been  encamped  on  the  Eapidan,  marched 
to  the  same  place.  On  the  4th  and  5th  Swell's  corps  was 
given  the  same  direction.  Meanwhile,  the  corps  of  A.  P. 
Hill  was  left  to  occupy  the  lines  of  Fredericksburg.* 

Made  aware  of  some  movement  in  the  enemy's  camp,  but 
unable  to  determine  its  precise  nature,  Hooker,  with  the  view 
of  a  closer  reconnoissance,  threw  Sedgwick's  corps,  on  the  6tlr* 
across  the  Eappahannock  at  Franklin's  Crossing  ;  but  as  Hill 
remained  in  position  to  mask  the  march  of  the  other  corps, 
all  that  Sedgwick  discovered  was  that  the  enemy  was  in  force. 
Lee,  therefore,  did  not  interrupt  the  march  of  Longstreet  and 
Ewell  towards  Culpepper,  which  place  they  reached  on  the 
Sth.f  Hooker  was  still  in  ignorance  of  Lee's  purpose,  which 
was  at  length  disclosed  in  the  following  manner. 

Stuart's  cavalry  had  already  been  concentrated  at  Culpepper 
some  time  before  the  commencement  of  the  main  movement ; 
and  the  knowledge  of  this  fact,  which  seemed  to  indicate  some 
hostile  intent,  determined  Hooker  to  send  his  whole  cavalry 
corps  to  break  up  Stuart's  camp4  Accordingly,  on  the  9th, 


*  Lee  :  Report  of  the  Gettysburg  Campaign. 

flbid. 

|  "  As  the  accumulation  of  the  heavy  rebel  force  of  cavalry  about  Culpepper 
may  mean  mischief,  I  am  determined,  if  practicable,  to  break  it  up  in  its  incipi- 
«mcy.  I  shall  send  all  my  cavalry  against  them,  stiffened  by  about  three  thou- 
eand  iii  fantry." — Dispatch  of  General  Hooker  to  General  Halleck,  June  6th. 


THE  GETTYSBURG  CAMPAIGN.  3]  3 

General  Pleasonton,  with  two  divisions  of  cavalry  under 
Buford  and  Gregg,  supported  by  two  picked  brigades  of  in 
fantry  under  Russell  and  Ames,  crossed  the  Rappahannock 
at  Kelly's  and  Beverley's  fords,  to  move  by  converging  roads 
on  Culpepper.  But  Stuart,  having  already  moved  forward 
from  Culpepper  to  Brandy  Station,  en  route  to  form  the  ad 
vance  and  cover  the  flank  of  the  main  movement,  a  rencounter 
took  place  soon  after  the  Union  cavalry  passed  the  river. 

Crossing  at  Beverley's  Ford,  and  advancing  through  the 
woodland,  Buford  immediately  encountered  a  Confederate  bri 
gade  under  General  Jones,  which,  after  a  considerable  com 
bat,*  he  drove  back  for  a  couple  of  miles,  when  he  found 
himself  checked  by  the  arrival  of  the  brigades  of  W.  H.  F.  Lee 
and  "Wade  Hampton  to  the  support  of  Jones.  Hereupon 
severe  fighting  followed ;  but  presently  Stuart  was  compelled 
to  draw  off  to  face  a  menace  by  another  force  threatening  his 
rear.f  This  threat  came  from  the  column  under  Gregg, 
which  had  crossed  at  Kelly's  Ford,  and  advanced  towards 
Brandy  Station,  its  progress  being  disputed  by  a  Confederate 
brigade  under  General  Kobertson.  Pushing  on  towards 
Brandy  Station,  a  spirited  passage  at  arms  took  place  for  the 
possession  of  the  heights,  which  were  at  length  carried  by 
Gregg.  Stuart  having  withdrawn  the  main  portion  of  the 
three  brigades  from  Buford's  front,  then  approached  quickly, 
and  a  determined  combat  ensued.  Considerable  loss  occurred 
on  both  sides,  and  finally  Gregg,  finding  that  the  other  col 
umn  had  not  been  able  to  move  up  to  make  a  junction  with 
him,  fell  back  towards  his  right  and  rear  and  united  with  the 
division  under  Buford,  whereupon  General  Pleasonton  retired 
his  command  across  the  Rappahannock.  This  engagement 
between  the  entire  mounted  force  of  the  opposing  armies  was 
an  interesting  one,  because  it  was  of  the  few  encounters  on  a 

*  In  this  action,  Colonel  B.  F.  Davis,  of  the  Eighth  New  York  Cavalry,  was 
killed.  Colonel  Davis  was  a  gallant  officer,  and  during  the  investment  of  Colo 
nel  Miles  at  Harper's  Ferry  cut  his  way  through  Jackson's  lines,  saving  his 
force  and  capturing  a  portion  of  Longstreet's  trains. 

f  General  Stuart :  Report  of  the  Battle  of  Fleetwood. 


314  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

large  scale  in  which,  the  cavalry  fought  in  legitimate  cavalry 
style  ;  for  the  troopers  commonly  dismounted  and  used  their 
carbines — a  circumstance  that  ordinarily  made  these  affairs 
quite  insignificant  and  indecisive.  The  loss  was  between  five 
and  six  hundred  on  each  side.* 

This  engagement  had  the  important  result  of  developing  at 
once  Lee's  presence  at  Culpepper  and  his  design  of  invasion, 
disclosures  of  both  of  which  facts  were  found  in  captured  cor 
respondence.  To  meet  this  menace,  Hooker  advanced  his 
right  up  the  Bappahannock,  throwing  forward  the  Third 
Corps,  on  the  llth,  to  Bappahannock  Station  and  Beverley, 
while  the  cavalry  observed  the  upper  forks  of  the  river.  But 
while  Hooker  had  his  attention  thus  directed  towards  Cul 
pepper  and  to  guarding  the  line  of  the  Eappahannock,  with 
the  view  to  prevent  a  crossing  of  that  stream  by  the  enemy, 
— who,  it  was  supposed,  would  follow  the  same  line  of  ma- 
noauvre  adopted  in  the  advance  during  the  preceding  summer 
against  Pope, — Lee  had  taken  another  leap  in  advance,  and 
thrust  forward  his  left  into  the  Shenandoah  Yalley.  Leaving 
Hill's  corps  still  in  the  position  at  Fredericksburg,  and  Long- 
street's  corps  at  Culpepper,  Swell's  corps  was,  on  the  10th, 
put  in  motion  westward  and  northward,  avoiding  the  Bappa- 
hannock  altogether  till  he  reached  the  Blue  Eidge,  through 
which  he  passed  at  Chester  Gap.  Then  striking  Front  Eoyal, 
he  crossed  the  Shenandoah  Eiver,  and  burst  into  the  Yalley. 
Advancing  rapidly  towards  Winchester,  he  arrived  before  that 
place  on  the  evening  of  the  13th,  after  an  advance  from  Cul 
pepper  of  seventy  miles  in  three  days. 

Such  was  the  startling  intelligence  that  now  reached 
Hooker,  who  still  lay  on  the  Eappahannock ;  and  action, 
prompt  and  vigorous,  was  seen  to  be  instantly  necessary.  A 
glance  at  the  map  will  reveal  the  extraordinary  situation  of 
the  Confederate  force  at  this  time.  On  the  13th  of  June,  with 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac  yet  lying  on  the  Eappahannock, 
Lee's  line  of  battle  was  stretched  out  over  an  interval  of  up- 

*  General  W.  H.  F.  Lee  was  among  the  wounded. 


THE  GETTYSBURG  CAMPAIGN.  316 

wards  of  a  hundred  miles  :  for  his  right  (Hill's  corps)  still 
held  the  lines  of  Fredericksburg  ;  his  centre  (Long-street's 
corps)  lay  at  Culpepper ;  and  his  left  (Swell's  corps)  was  at 
the  mouth  of  the  Shenandoah  Yalley ! 

Now,  it  will  doubtless  not  be  difficult  for  any  one  capable 
of  looking  at  the  map  of  Northern  Virginia  with  a  military 
eye,  to  base  on  these  data  a  plan  of  action  which  it  may  be 
supposed  would  be  the  plan  of  action  suited  to  the  circum 
stances.  But  it  would  be  altogether  unjust  to  judge  what 
General  Hooker  did,  or  what  he  failed  to  do,  by  the  simple 
results  of  military  reasoning ;  for  in  the  relations  which  he 
held  to  the  central  military  authority  at  Washington — an 
authority  to  which  his  own  views  were  completely  subordi 
nated — he  had  neither  the  freedom  of  willing  nor  of  acting. 

It  would  appear  obvious  that  in  the  audacious  situation 
of  Lee's  army  (and  this  very  boldness  would  seem  to  imply  a 
great  contempt  for  his  opponent),  the  proper  place  for 
Hooker  to  strike  was  at  that  exposed  rear  of  his  long  line 
formed  by  Hill's  corps  ;  for  it  is  as  sure  an  inference  as  any 
inference  in  war  can  be,  that  a  force  of,  say,  two  or  three 
corps,  thrown  across  the  Rappahannock  at  Banks'  or  United 
States  ford,  could  interpose  itself  between  Hill  (at  Fredericks- 
burg)  and  Longstreet  (at  Culpepper).  And  if  the  movement 
did  not  insure  Hill's  destruction  (which  it  ought  to  do,  in 
vigorous  hands),  his  jeopardized  situation  would  certainly 
recall  Lee's  other  forces  to  his  support.  This  interruption 
of  the  plan  of  invasion  would  be  its  ending. 

It  is  an  interesting  fact  that  precisely  this  method  of  action 
was  suggested  by  General  Hooker  a  short  time  before  he 
became  aware  of  Lee's  actual  movement,*  and  authority  for 
its  execution  was  asked  in  case  the  Confederate  force  should 
move  northward.f  To  this  most  judicious  suggestion  two 
replies,  or  rather  two  forms  of  the  same  reply — for  the  opinion 
Halleck's — were  returned.  The  one  was  from  the  Pres- 


*  Dispatch  from  Hooker  to  Halleck. 
f  Report  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  second  series,  vol.  i.,  p.  153. 


316  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

ident,  disapproving  the  project,  and  couched  in  that  quaint 
imagery  which  Mr.  Lincoln  was  wont  to  employ  in  the  expres 
sion  of  his  thoughts  on  the  gravest  subjects.  "  If  Lee,"  said 
he,  "should  leave  a  rear  force  at  Fredericksburg,  tempting 
you  to  fall  upon  it,  he  would  fight  you  in  intrenchments,*  and 
have  you  at  disadvantage ;  and  so,  man  for  man,  worst  you 
at  that  point,  while  his  main  force  would  in  some  way  be  get 
ting  an  advantage  of  you  northward.  In  a  word,  I  would  not 
take  any  risk  of  being  entangled  upon  the  river,  like  an  ox 
jumped  half  over  a  fence,  and  liable  to  be  torn  by  dogs  front  and 
rear,  without  a  fair  chance  to  gore  one  way  or  to  kick  the  other ."f 
The  other  reply  was  from  General  Halleck,  and  it  expressed, 
in  solemn  military  jargon,  the  same  opinion  so  pungently 
conveyed  by  the  President  ;J  but  suggested  an  operation 
against  the  "flank  of  the  moving  column" — a  suggestion 
that  is  nothing  better  than  a  mask,  for  General  Halleck  must 
have  known  such  an  operation  to  be  perfectly  impracticable, 
if  Hooker  was  to  have  any  observance  of  his  express  instruc 
tions  to  cover  Washington. § 


III. 
HOOKER'S  RETROGRADE  MOVEMENT. 

Thus  prevented  from  taking  the  only  step  that  would  have 
given  him  the  initiative,  Hooker  was  fain  to  fall  back  on  the 
interior  line  towards  Washington,  taking  positions  defensive 

*  Nothing  easier  than  to  turn  the  Fredericksburg  defences  by  Banks'  or 
United  States  ford. 

f  Dispatch  from  President  Lincoln  to  General  Hooker,  June  5. 

J  Dispatch  from  General  Halleck  to  General  Hooker :  Report  on  the  Conduct 
of  the  War,  second  series,  vol.  i.,  p.  154. 

§  Any  possible  movement  by  Hooker,  in  execution  of  this  suggestion,  would 
have  uncovered  his  light,  and  given  General  Lee  precisely  the  opening  for 
such  a  dash  on  Washington  which  the  report  of  that  general  shows  he  was 
warily  watching. 


THE  GETTYSBURG  CAMPAIGN.  317 

as  regards  the  capital,  and  which  would  enable  him  to  await 
the  development  of  Lee's  designs.  Upon  learning  the  move 
ment  of  the  enemy  into  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  Hooker,  on 
the  13th,  broke  up  his  camps  along  the  Rappahannock,  and 
moved  rapidly  on  the  direct  route  towards  Washington,  fol 
lowing,  and  covering  the  line  of  the  Orange  and  Alexandria 
Railroad.  The  first  move  was  to  Bealton,  Warrenton,  and 
Catlett's  Station,  on  the  13th  and  14th ;  next  to  Fairfax  Sta 
tion  and  Manassas,  on  the  15th  and  16th.  Here  he  re 
mained  several  days,  while  awaiting  the  disclosure  of  a  series 
of  movements  which  Lee  was  then  making,  and  to  the  expo 
sition  of  which  I  now  return. 

When  on  the  13th  Hill,  holding  the  lines  of  Fredericks- 
burg,  saw  the  Union  army  disappear  behind  the  Stafford 
hills,  he  knew  that  that  for  which  he  had  remained  behind 
was  accomplished,  and  he  then  took  up  his  line  of  march 
towards  Culpepper,  where  Longstreet's  corps  still  held  posi 
tion.  Meantime,  Ewell  was  making  his  Jackson-like  swoop 
into  the  Yalley.  General  Jenkins  with  his  cavalry-brigade 
had  been  ordered  to  advance  towards  Winchester,  in  co 
operation  with  Ewell,  and  Imboden  with  his  troopers  had 
been  thrown  out  in  the  direction  of  Romney,  to  cover  the 
movement  on  Winchester,  and  prevent  its  garrison  from  re 
ceiving  re-enforcements  from  the  troops  on  the  line  of  the 
Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad.  Both  these  officers  were  in 
position  when  Ewell  reached  the  Valley.  On  crossing  the 
Shenandoah  River  near  Front  Royal,  Ewell  detached  Rodes' 
division  to  Berryville,  to  cut  off  communication  between 
Winchester  and  the  Potomac,  while  with  the  divisions  of 
Early  and  Johnson  he  advanced  directly  upon  that  Federal 
post,  driving  Milroy  into  his  works  around  the  town  on  the 
13th.  The  following  night,  Milroy  abandoned  his  position, 
but  his  force  being  intercepted,  a  good  part  of  it  was  cap 
tured  in  the  confused  melee.  As,  at  the  same  time,  General 
Rodes  took  Berryville  with  seven  hundred  prisoners,  and  the 
garrison  at  Harper's  Ferry  withdrew  to  Maryland  Heights, 
the  Valley  was  now  cleared  of  all  Union  force. 


318  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC 

In  this  exploit  Ewell  captured  over  four  thousand  prisoners, 
twenty-nine  pieces  of  artillery,  and  large  stores.  Milroy  with 
a  handful  of  men  escaped  across  the  Potomac.  His  defence 
of  the  post  intrusted  to  his  care  was  infamously  feeble,  and 
the  worst  of  that  long  train  of  misconduct  that  made  the 
Valley  of  the  Shenandoah  to  be  called  the  "Valley  of  Hu 
miliation." 

Turning  back  to  the  other  two  corps  of  Lee's  army,  it  ap 
pears  that  on  Hill's  advance  from  Fredericksburg  to  Cul- 
pepper,  Longstreet,  who  had  been  retained  at  the  latter  place, 
was  pushed  northward ;  but  instead  of  following  the  route  of 
Ewell,  he  moved  along  the  eastern  side  of  the  Blue  Eidge, 
taking  position  at  Ashby's  and  Snicker's  Gaps.  This  served 
as  a  cover  to  Hill,  who  slipped  through  behind  Longstreet 
into  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  and  took  position  at  Winchester, 
while,  at  the  same  time,  it  served  as  a  lure  to  draw  Hooker 
from  his  base.* 

During  the  progress  of  these  movements,  Hooker,  being  de 
termined  not  to  be  drawn  into  a  manoeuvre  that  would  expose 
his  right,  continued  to  hold  position  in  the  vicinity  of  Fairfax 
and  Manassas,  covering  the  approaches  to  "Washington,  while 
the  cavalry  under  Pleasonton  was  thrown  out  to  feel  towards 
the  passes  of  the  Blue  Eidge.  Here  Longstreet's  corps  con 
tinued  still  to  hold  post,  while  his  whole  front  was  secured  by 
Stuart's  troopers.  At  Aldie,  the  opposing  cavalry  had,  on  the 
17th,  a  rencounter,  which  partly  developed  Lee's  position  to 
Hooker,  who  then  felt  forward  cautiously,  sending  the  Twelfth 
Corps  to  Leesburg,  the  Fifth  to  Aldie,  and  the  Second  to 
Thoroughfare  Gap.  Pleasonton,  meanwhile,  followed  up 
Stuart,  driving  him  on  the  20th  through  Middleburg,  and  on 
the  21st  through  Upperville  and  beyond.  But  Hooker  did 
not  continue  a  movement  which  he  felt  to  be  compromising. 

*  General  Lee  in  his  report  explicitly  declares  this  to  have  been  his  purpose. 
"  With  a  view  to  draw  Mm  [Hooker]  further  from  Ms  base,  etc.,  Longstreet  ad 
vanced  along  the  east  side  of  the  Blue  Ridge,  occupying  Ashby's  and  Snicker's 

Gap It  seemed  to  be  the  purpose  of  General  Hooker  to  take  a  position 

which  would  enable  him  to  cover  the  approaches  to  Washington  City." 


THE  GETTYSBURG  CAMPAIGN.  319 

Meantime,  Lee  seemed  to  be  master  of  the  situation.  He 
held  strong  positions  in  the  Shenaiidoah  Valley  where  he  was 
ready  to  welcome  battle  from  his  opponent,  should  he  ad 
vance,  while  he  was  free  to  cut  loose  a  raiding  column  into 
Maryland  and  Pennsylvania.  The  longer  Hooker -remained 
on  the  south  bank  of  the  Potomac,  the  freer  would  be  the 
scope  of  the  foraging  forces,  and  when  he  should  cross  to  the 
north  side,  Lee,  relieved  from  the  danger  to  his  communica 
tions,  would  be  able  to  pass  to  the  north  bank  also,  which 
was  altogether  in  the  line  of  his  plan  of  invasion. 

In  pursuance  of  this  purpose,  as  soon  as  Hill  and  Long- 
street  had  relieved  Ewell  in  the  Valley,  that  general  with  the 
van  of  the  invading  columns  passed,  on  the  22d,  into  Mary 
land,  while  Imboden's  cavalry  was  thrown  out  westward,  and 
effectually  destroyed  the  great  lines  of  communication  by  the 
Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad,  and  the  Chesapeake  and  Ohio 
Canal.  Jenkins'  troopers  had  already  preceded  Swell's  ad 
vance  by  a  week,  and  had  penetrated  Pennsylvania  as  far  as 
Chambersburg,  throwing  the  whole  north  country  into  a 
wild  blaze  of  excitement.  After  gathering  in  much  cattle  and 
horses,  which  he  headed  towards  the  Potomac,  Jenkins 
turned  back  to  join  Ewell's  force,  which,  after  crossing  the 
Potomac,  on  the  22d,  at  Williamsport  and  Shepherdstown, 
moved  by  two  columns  on  Hagerstown,  and  thence,  crossing 
the  boundary  into  Pennsylvania,  passed  up  the  Cumberland 
Valley,  reaching  Chambersburg  on  the  following  day.  The 
whole  region  of  Western  Pennsylvania  up  to  the  Susque- 
hannah  was  now  open  to  Ewell,  free  to  come  and  to  go, 
without  any  other  fear  than  that  which  might  be  inspired  by 
the  not  very  formidable  aspect  of  the  Pennsylvania  militia.* 

*  Forewarned  of  the  designs  of  the  invading  army,  the  War  Department 
had  detached  General  Couch  from  the  command  of  the  Second  Corps  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  assigned  him,  on  the  llth  of  June,  to  the  Depart 
ment  of  the  Susquehanna,  with  his  headquarters  at  Harrisburg,  the  capital  of 
Pennsylvania.  General  Brooks  was  at  the  same  time  appointed  to  the  com- 
mand  of  the  Department  of  the  Monongaliela,  with  his  headquarters  at  Pitts 
burgh.  But  commanders  without  troops  to  command  cannot  be  considered  very 


320  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

He  had,  therefore,  free  scope  for  an  extensive  commerce 
in  horses  and  cattle,  vast  herds  of  which  he  sent  southward, 
while  for  the  subsistence  of  his  troops  he  levied  subsidies  from 
the  population  of  the  country.  Thousands  of  Pennsylvania 
farmers,  panic-stricken,  hastened  with  their  cattle  and  house 
hold  goods  to  the  north  of  the  Susquehanna.  From  Cham- 
bersburg,  Ewell  moved  northward,  sending  Bodes'  division  to 
Carlisle,  while  Early's  division,  moving  to  the  east  side  of  the 
South  Mountain  ridge,  passed  by  way  of  Gettysburg  to  York, 
and  thence  to  Wrightsville  on  the  Susquehanna — the  militia 
retiring  and  destroying  the  splendid  bridge  over  the  river  at 
Columbia. 


IV. 

ACROSS  THE  BORDER. 

However  galling  the  intelligence  of  the  ravaging  of  Penn 
sylvania  may  have  been,  General  Hooker  at  least  felt  himself 
powerless  to  help,  for  it  was  impossible  for  him  to  pass  to  the 
north  side  of  the  Potomac  until  his  opponent's  purpose  should 
be  more  fully  disclosed.  It  was  not,  therefore,  until  he 
learned  that  the  remaining  corps  of  Lee  were  passing  into 
Maryland  that  he  also  crossed  the  river.  The  corps  of  Long- 
street  and  Hill  made  the  passage  of  the  Potomac  at  Williams- 
port  and  Shepherdstown  on  the  24th  and  25th,  and  followed 
the  path  of  Ewell  into  Pennsylvania. 

The  entire  army  of  the  Potomac  then  crossed  on  the  25th 
and  26th  at  Edwards'  Ferry,  and  made  a  movement  of  con 
centration  on  Frederick — a  position  from  which  Hooker  might 

formidable  barriers  to  an  invasion ;  and  though  Governor  Curtin  issued  procla 
mations  and  General  Couch  calls,  the  response  was  neither  prompt  nor  enthu 
siastic,  and  when  at  length  a  few  thousand  men  had  been  raised,  and  New 
York  had  sent  forward  some  of  her  militia  regiments,  these  officers  did  not  find 
It  practicable  to  carry  their  views  of  defence  beyond  the  line  of  the  Susqua 
hanna. 


THE  GETTYSBURG  CAMPAIGN.  321 

either  debouch  through  the  South  Mountain  passes  to  plant 
himself  upon  Lee's  line  of  retreat,  or  moving  northward  on 
the  eastern  side  of  the  mountains,  follow  Lee's  movement  in 
the  direction  of  the  Susquehanna. 

The  former  course  is  of  the  two  the  bolder  and  more  deci 
sive  move,  and  though  there  is  no  proof  that  is  conclusive  re 
specting  which  of  these  courses  General  Hooker  designed  to 
adopt,  there  is  yet  evidence  that  he  purposed  making,  at 
least,  a  strong  demonstration  on  Lee's  Ime  of  communications. 
With  this  view  he  threw  out  his  left  well  westward  to  Middle- 
town,  and  ordered  the  Twelfth  Corps,  under  General  Slocum, 
to  march  to  Harper's  Ferry.  Here  Slocum  was  to  be  joined 
by  the  garrison  of  that  post,  eleven  thousand  strong,  under 
General  French,  and  the  united  force  was  to  menace  the 
Confederate  rear  by  a  movement  towards  Chambersburg. 
Unhappily,  this  project  traversed  the  pet  crotchet  of  General 
Halleck  respecting  Harper's  Ferry,  and  thence  began  griefs 
for  Hooker,  and  an  imbroglio  more  and  more  involved  till  it 
resulted  in  his  supersedure  from  command  at  the  critical  mo 
ment  when  the  two  armies  were  manoeuvring  towards  a  col 
lision  the  weightiest  of  the  war.  The  circumstances  under 
which  this  took  place  are  as  follows. 

At  the  time  Lee's  advance  was  set  on  foot,  the  distribution 
of  the  Union  forces  showed  the  same  vicious  amorcellemenl 
under  independent  commanders  that  had  marked  the  worst 
period  of  1862.  General  Heintzelrnan  commanded  the  De 
partment  of  Washington,  with  a  force  of  about  thirty-six 
thousand  men  ;*  General  Schenck  controlled  the  Middle  De 
partment,  east  of  Cumberland,  including  the  garrisons  at 
Harper's  Ferry,  Winchester,  etc.  ;  while  General  Dix,  with  a 
considerable  force,  lay  for  some  purpose  inconceivable  on  the 
Peninsula.  Now,  about  the  time  Hooker  crossed  the  Potomac, 
the  general-in-chief,  awakening  at  length  to  the  fatal  folly  of 
this  untimely  waste  of  valuable  force,  placed  the  troops  of 


*  General  Heintzelman's  tri-monthly  report  for  June  10,  showed  thirty-six 
thousand  six  hundred  and  forty  men. 

21 


322  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

Generals  Heintzelman  and  Schenck  under  his  control.  But 
it  was  soon  proved  that  this  control  was  rather  in  name  than 
in  reality ;  for  when  he  attempted  to  fit  out  from  these  de 
partments  a  column  of  fifteen  thousand  men  to  move  on  Fred 
erick,  he  found  himself  estopped  by  General  Halleck's  fears 
touching  the  safety  of  Washington — a  circumstance  for  which 
General  Hooker  conceived  he  provided  sufficiently  by  the 
presence  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  covering  the  capital ; 
and  when,  after  advancing  on  Frederick,  he  had  planned  the 
movement  on  the  rear  of  Lee,  and  for  that  purpose  had 
directed  the  temporary  abandonment  of  Harper's  Ferry,  with 
the  view  of  uniting  its  garrison  of  eleven  thousand  men  under 
General  French  with  the  column  of  General  Slocum  destined 
to  make  the  proposed  movement,  he  asked  General  Halleck, 
on  the  26th  of  June,  "  if  there  was  any  reason  why  Maryland 
Heights  should  not  be  abandoned  after  the  removal  of  the 
public  stores  and  property,"  he  was  met  by  the  foUowing 
reply  from  the  general-in-chief  :  "  Maryland  Heights  have 
always  been  regarded  as  an  important  point  to  be  held  by  us, 
and  much  expense  and  labor  incurred  in  fortifying  them.  I  can 
not  approve  their  abandonment  except  in  case  of  absolute  ne 
cessity."'*  It  was  in  vain  that  General  Hooker  urged  in 
rejoinder  of  this  fatuitous  objection  that  Harper's  Ferry 
was,  under  the  circumstances,  a  point  of  no  importance  ;  that 
it  defended  no  ford  of  the  Potomac  ;  that  its  fortifications 
would  remain  after  the  troops  were  withdrawn  ;  nor  was  there 
the  slightest  probability  that  the  enemy  would  take  possession 
of  them,  and  that,  therefore,  the  ten  thousand  men  that  re 
mained  there  useless,  should  be  marched  to  a  point  where 
they  could  be  of  service.f 

*  Telegram  from  General  Halleck  to  General  Hooker,  June  27 :  Report  on 
the  Conduct  of  the  War,  second  series,  vol.  i.,  p.  292. 
f  The  text  of  General  Hooker's  dispatch  is  as  follows  : 

SANDY  HOOK,  June  27,  186? 
MAJOR-GENERAL  HALLECK,  General-in-chief: 

I  have  received  your  telegram  in  regard  to  Harper's  Ferry.    I  find  ten 
thousand  men  here  in  condition  to  take  the  field.    Here  they  are  of  no  earthly 


THE  GETTYSBURG  CAMPAIGN.  323 

Against  stupidity,  sings  Schiller,  gods  and  men  fight  in 
vain. 

Finding  himself  deprived  of  that  freedom  of  action  on 
which,  in  so  large  a  degree,  the  success  of  military  opera 
tions  depends,  General  Hooker  requested,  on  the  27th  of  June, 
to  be  relieved  from  the  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Poto 
mac  ;  and  early  the  following  morning,  a  messenger  reached 
Frederick  from  Washington  with  an  order  appointing  Major- 
General  G.  G.  Meade,  commanding  the  Fifth  Army  Corps,  in 
his  stead. 

Provoking  as  was  the  behavior  of  General  Halleck,  the 
conduct  of  General  Hooker  cannot  be  accounted  noble  or 
high-minded.  A  truly  lofty  sense  of  duty  would  have  dic 
tated  much  long-suffering,  in  a  conjuncture  of  circumstances 
amid  which  the  success  of  the  campaign  might  be  seriously 
compromised  by  the  sudden  change  of  commanders.  Yet  it 
was  fortunate  for  the  Union  cause  at  this  crisis,  that  the 
choice  of  the  Government  for  the  commander  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  fell  upon  one  who  proved  fitted  for  the  high 
trust ;  and  fortunate,  too,  that  that  oft-displayed  steadfast 
ness  of  the  army,  "  unshaked  of  motion  "  and  committed  to  the 
death  to  a  duty  self-imposed,  rendered  such  transitions,  else 
where  dangerous,  here  safe  and  easy.  Meade  put  his  hand 
to  his  work  in  a  quiet,  practical,  business-like  way  ;  and  it 
was  remarked  that  his  undemonstrative  temper,  and  the 
aspect  he  wore  of  a  scholar  rather  than  a  soldier,  were 
no  drawback  to  the  confidence  of  the  troops,  who  had  learned 
from  the  experience  of  his  predecessor,  that  high-flown 


account.  They  cannot  defend  a  ford  of  the  river ;  and  as  far  as  Harper's  Ferry 
is  concerned,  there  is  nothing  in  it.  As  for  the  fortifications,  the  work  of  the 
troops,  they  remain  when  the  troops  are  withdrawn.  No  enemy  will  ever  take 
possession  of  it  for  them.  This  is  my  opinion.  All  the  public  property  could 
have  been  secured  to-night,  and  the  troops  marched  to  where  they  could  have 
been  of  some  service.  Now,  they  are  but  a  bait  for  the  rebels  should  they  re 
turn.  I  beg  that  this  may  be  presented  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  and  his  ex 
cellency  the  President. 

JOSEPH  HOOKEK,  Major-General. 


324  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

promise  is  often  associated  with  very  disproportionate  per 
formance.  Without  being  what  is  called  a  popular  officer, 
General  Meade  was  much  respected  by  his  comrades  in  arms. 
He  was  known  in  the  army  as  one  who  had  grown  up  with  it, 
whose  advancement  was  due  to  merit,  and  who  had  shown  a 
special  steadfastness  in  many  trying  hours.  The  command 
of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  put  into  his  hand  without 
any  lets  or  hindrances,  the  President  expressly  waiving  all 
the  powers  of  the  Executive  and  the  Constitution,  so  as  to 
enable  General  Meade  to  make,  untrammelled,  the  best  dis 
positions  for  the  emergency. 

Immediately  the  columns  moved  on  as  if  no  change  had 
occurred. 


Y. 

CONCENTRATION  ON  GETTYSBURG. 

At  the  time  General  Meade  took  command,  the  army  was 
lying  around  and  near  Frederick— its  left  at  Middletown ; 
and  all  he  knew  touching  the  enemy  was,  that  Lee,  after 
crossing  the  Potomac,  had  marched  up  the  Cumberland  Val 
ley,  and  that  Swell's  corps  occupied  York  and  Carlisle,  and 
threatened  the  passage  of  the  Susquehanna  at  Columbia  and 
Harrisburg. 

In  this  state  of  facts,  Meade  adopted  the  only  course  then 
considered  by  him  practicable,  which  was  to  move  his  army 
by  the  inner  line  from  Frederick  towards  Harrisburg,  con 
tinuing  the  movement  until  he  should  meet  Lee,  or  make  him 
loose  his  hold  on  the  Susquehanna. 

He  therefore  put  his  army  in  motion  on  the  morning  of  the 
29th,  taking  a  course  due  northward,  and  keeping  east  of  the 
South  Mountain  range.  The  army  moved  in  three  columns, 
covering,  as  it  advanced,  the  lines  of  approach  to  Baltimore 
and  Washington.  The  First  and  Eleventh  corps  were 
directed  on  Emmettsburg  ;  the  Third  and  Twelfth  on  Taney- 


THE  GETTYSBURG  CAMPAIGN. 


32S 


town ;  the  Second  on  Frizzleburg ;  the  Fifth  to  Union,  and  the 
Sixth  to  Windsor. 

Now,  on  the  very  day  that  Meade  began  to  move  north 
ward,  Lee,  apprised  of  those  previous  manoeuvres  that 
seemed  to  threaten  an  irruption  into  the  Cumberland  Valley 
(a  step  which  would  imperil  his  communications  with  the  Po 
tomac),  discovered  it  would  be  necessary  to  do  something  to 
check  this  menace.  At  this  time  Longstreet  and  Hill  were  at 


SKETCH  OF  MANOEUVRES  ON  GETTYSBURG. 

Chambersburg,  Ewell  was  at  York  and  Carlisle,  and  Lee  was 
just  on  the  point  of  moving  his  whole  force  northward  to 
cross  the  Susquehanna  and  strike  Harrisburg  ;*  when,  learn 
ing  the  already  mentioned  menace,  he  resolved  to  concentrate 
on  the  east  side  of  the  South  Mountain  range  as  a  diversion 

*  "  Preparations  were  now  made  to  advance  upon  Harrisburg  ;  but  on  the 
night  of  the  28th  information  was  received  from  a  scout  that  the  Federal 
army,  having  crossed  the  Potomac,  was  advancing  northward,  and  that  the 
head  of  the  column  had  reached  South  Mountain.  As  our  communicationa 


326  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

in  favor  of  his  line  of  retreat,  touching  which  he  was  justifi 
ably  nervous.  Accordingly,  instead  of  directing  Longstreet 
and  Hill  to  join  Ewell  on  the  intended  invasion,  he  ordered 
them  to  march  from  Chambersburg,  defiling  through  the 
South  Mountain  range,  towards  Gettysburg,  distant  twenty 
miles  eastward ;  and  he  instructed  Ewell  to  countermarch 
from  York  and  Carlisle  on  the  same  point.  These  move 
ments  were  begun  on  the  morning  of  Monday,  the  29th  of 
June. 

It  was  not  until  the  night  of  the  30th,  after  the  army  had 
made  two  marches,  that  General  Meade  became  satisfied  that 
Lee,  apprised  of  his  movement,  had  loosed  his  hold  on  the 
Susquehanna  and  was  concentrating  his  forces  east  of  the 
South  Mountain  to  meet  him.  But  when  and  where  the  shock 
of  battle,  which  was  now  seen  to  be  imminent,  would  take 
place  it  was  impossible  to  tell.  Under  these  circumstances, 
he  set  about  to  select  a  position  on  which,  by  a  rapid 
movement  of  concentration,  he  might  be  prepared  to  receive 
battle  on  advantageous  terms.  With  this  view,  the  general 
line  of  Pipe  Creek,  on  the  dividing  ridge  between  the  Mono- 
cacy  and  the  waters  running  into  the  Chesapeake  Bay,  was 
selected  as  a  favorable  position,  though  its  ultimate  adoption 
was  held  contingent  on  developments  that  might  arise. 
Accordingly,  orders  were  issued  on  the  night  of  the  30th  for 
the  movements  of  the  different  corps  on  the  following  day  :  the 
Sixth  Corps,  forming  the  right  wing  of  the  army,  was  ordered 
to  Manchester  in  rear  of  Pipe  Creek ;  headquarters  and  the 
Second  Corps  to  Taneytown ;  the  Twelfth  and  Fifth  corps, 
forming  the  centre,  were  directed  on  Two  Taverns  and  Han 
over,  somewhat  in  advance  of  Pipe  Creek ;  while  the  left  wing, 
formed  of  the  First,  Third,  and  Eleventh  corps  under  General 
Eeynolds,  as  it  was  closest  to  the  line  of  march  of  the  enemy, 
was  thrown  forward  to  Gettysburg,  towards  which,  as  it  hap 
pened,  Lee  was  then  heading. 

with  the  Potomac  were  thus  menaced,  it  was  resolved  to  prevent  his  further 
progress  in  that  direction  by  concentrating  our  army  on  the  east  side  of  th<* 
mountains."— Lee  :  Report  of  the  Gettysburg  Campaign. 


THE  GETTYSBURG   CAMPAIGN.  327 

Strategically,  the  position  at  Gettysburg  was  of  supreme 
importance  to  Lee  ;  for  it  was  the  first  point  in  his  eastward 
march  across  the  South  Mountain  that  gave  command  of 
direct  lines  of  retreat  towards  the  Potomac  :  but  it  was  not  of 
the  same  moment  to  Meade,  especially  if  a  defensive  rather 
than  an  offensive  battle  was  to  be  fought ;  and  the  topo 
graphical  features  of  Gettysburg,  that  make  it  so  advanta 
geous  for  the  defence,  were  then  wholly  unknown  to  him. 
While,  therefore,  the  left  wing,  under  Eeynolds,  was  thus 
thrown  forward  in  advance  of  the  rest  of  the  army  as  far  as 
Gettysburg,  it  was  not  with  any  predetermined  purpose  of 
taking  up  position  there ;  but  rather  to  serve  as  a  mask  while 
the  line  of  Pipe  Creek  was  assumed. 

But  while,  in  war,  commanders  propose,  fate  or  accident 
(so-called)  often  disposes ;  and  at  the  time  these  movements 
were  in  execution,  events  were  occurring  that  were  to  lift  the 
obscure  and  insignificant  hamlet  of  Gettysburg  into  a  historic 
immortality  as  the  scene  of  the  mightiest  encounter  of  modern 
days. 

While  the  army  was  marching  northward,  Buford's  division 
of  cavalry  was  thrown  out  well  on  the  left  flank  ;  and  moving 
from  near  Middleburg  on  the  29th  of  June,  it  occupied  Gettys 
burg  at  noon  of  the  following  day — the  day  before  Eeynolds 
was  directed  on  that  point.  Passing  through  Gettysburg, 
Buford  pushed  out  in  reconnoissances  west  and  north,  over 
the  routes  on  which  it  was  supposed  Lee's  army  was  moving. 
Now,  Lee  had  that  morning  put  his  columns  in  motion  towards 
Gettysburg — Hill  and  Longstreet  moving  due  eastward  from 
Chambersburg  and  Fayetteville,  and  Ewell  southward  from 
Carlisle.  Hill's  corps  had  the  advance  on  the  great  road 
from  Chambersburg  to  Baltimore,  which  passes  through  Get 
tysburg.  The  march  was  made  with  much  deliberation  :  so 
that  night  found  only  two  divisions  through  the  South  Moun 
tain  ;  while  the  remaining  division  and  Longstreet's  corps 
remained  west  of  the  mountains.  The  advance  divisions  of 
Hill's  command  bivouacked,  on  the  night  of  the  30th  June, 
within  six  or  seven  miles  of  Gettysburg  ;  while  Ewell,  march- 


328  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

ing  on  a  line  perpendicular  with  the  route  of  Hill  and  Long- 
street,  encamped  at  Heildersburg,  distant  nine  miles.  Of  the 
Union  force,  Buford's  cavalry  division  alone  was  at  Gettys 
burg  that  night ;  and  Reynolds,  with  the  First  and  Eleventh 
corps,  bivouacked  on  the  right  bank  of  Marsh  Creek,  distant 
four  miles,  under  orders  to  make  Gettysburg  the  next  morn 
ing.  The  corps  of  Sickles  (Third)  and  Slocum  (Twelfth)  were 
within  call.  The  remaining  corps  were  further  off. 

It  is  easy  to  see,  from  the  relative  situations  of  the  hostile 
armies,  that  unless  one  or  the  other  should  fall  back,  a  battle 
was  inevitable  in  the  vicinity  of  Gettysburg.  But  these  facts 
were  unknown  to  both  the  opposing  commanders  ;  and  I  shall 
in  the  next  chapter  relate  how,  contrary  to  the  expectations  of 
each,  the  action  was  precipitated. 


VI. 
GETTYSBURG— FIRST  DAY. 

On  the  morning  of  "Wednesday,  the  1st  of  July,  the  two 
Confederate  columns  continued  their  march  towards  Gettys 
burg  ;  and  Buford,  holding  position  on  the  Chambersburg 
road,  by  which  Hill  and  Longstreet  were  advancing,  suddenly 
found  himself  engaged,  a  little  past  nine  in  the  morning,  with 
Hill's  van,  about  a  mile  west  of  the  town.  As  he  knew  that 
Reynolds  was  moving  up  to  join  him,  he  made  dispositions  to 
retard  the  enemy,  holding  back  Hill's  column  by  skilful  de 
ployments  and  the  use  of  his  horse-artillery.  Eeynolds,  who 
(with  his  own  First  Corps  and  the  Eleventh  Corps,  under  Gen 
eral  Howard)  was  then  en  route  from  his  place  of  bivouac  at 
Marsh  Creek,  hearing  Buford's  guns,  pressed  forward  with  all 
haste.  At  ten  o'clock  he  came  upon  the  field  with  the  leading 
division  of  the  First  Corps,  under  General  Wadsworth.  While 


MAP  OF  THE  BATTLE 

OF 

@  KITTYS 

showing  Ifoitionf  field 
JULY  I'&S1?  1863 


THE   GETTYSBURG   CAMPAIGN.  329 

yet  forming  line,  Wadsworth's  troops  were  assailed  ;  and  they 
had  to  be  thrown  quickly  into  battle  array  under  fire. 

Looking  westward  from  Gettysburg  the  horizon  of  vision  is 
bounded  at  a  distance  of  ten  miles  by  the  mountain  range 
known  as  the  South  Mountain,  which  running  north  and 
south  forms  the  eastern  wall  of  the  Cumberland  Yalley.  When 
the  force  which  folded  and  raised  up  the  strata  that  form  the 
South  Mountain  was  in  action,  it  produced  fissures  in  the 
strata  of  red  shale  which  cover  the  surface  of  this  region  of 
country,  permitting  the  fused  material  from  beneath  to  rise 
and  fill  them  on  cooling  with  trap-dykes  or  greenstone  and 
syenitic  greenstone.  The  rock,  being  for  the  most  part  very 
hard,  remained  as  the  axes  and  crests  of  hills  and  ridges 
when  the  softer  shale  in  the  intervening  spaces  was  excavated 
by  great  water- currents  into  valleys  and  plains.*  These 
ridges  run  in  a  direction  nearly  parallel  with  the  South  Moun 
tain  range,  and  give  a  rolling  and  diversified  surface  to  the 
landscape.  The  town  of  Gettysburg  nestles  at  the  base  of 
one  of  these  ranges.  At  the  distance  of  half  a  mile  to  the 
west  of  the  town  is  another  ridge,  called,  from  the  theological 
seminary  that  stands  thereon,  Seminary  Biclge,  and  a  mile 
further  west  run  two  other  parallel  swells  of  ground  separated 
by  Willoughby  Eun.  It  was  in  the  plain  between  these  two 
latter  ridges,  the  westernmost  of  which  was  occupied  by  the 
Confederates  and  the  nearer  by  the  Union  troops,  that  the 
action  of  July  1st  opened ;  for  Buford's  deployments  had  suc 
ceeded  in  detaining  the  hostile  column  on  the  farther  side  of 
the  run  till  Wadsworth's  division  came  on  the  ground.  As 
this  force  arrived,  Eeynolds  hurried  its  two  brigades  into 
action,  placing  Cutler's  brigade,  with  the  battery  of  Hall — 
the  only  battery  in  the  division — on  the  right  and  left  of  the 
Chambersburg  road  and  across  an  old  railroad  grading  (part 
of  it  in  deep  cut  and  part  in  embankment)  near  by  and  par 
allel  with  the  road ;  while  he  directed  General  Doubleday 

*  Professor  Jacobs :  "  Later  Rambles  over  the  Field  of  Gettysburg ;"  United 
States  Service  Magazine,  1864. 


330  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE   ARMY  OF   THE  POTOMAC. 

who  had  reached  the  ground  with  the  van  of  the  infantry, 
to  move  the  other  brigade,  usually  called  the  "  Iron  Brigade," 
under  General  Meredith,  to  the  left  of  the  road  to  occupy  a 
piece  of  woods  skirting  Willoughby  Eun,  across  which  and 
into  the  woods  the  Confederate  right  was  at  the  same  time 
pushing.  Only  the  advanced  division  of  Hill's  corps,  under 
Heth,  had  yet  come  up,  so  that  the  opening  combat  which 
might  fitly  be  called  the  battle  of  Willoughby 's  Run,  was 
engaged  between  one  division  on  each  side.  Heth,  with  his 
four  brigades,  attacked  simultaneously  the  two  brigades  of 
Waclsworth's  division  under  Generals  Meredith  and  Cutler. 
The  latter  was  assailed  by  Davis' s  Mississippi  brigade,  and 
with  such  success,  that  the  three  right  regiments  found  them 
selves  flanked,  whereupon  they  were  withdrawn  over  the 
Seminary  Eidge,  leaving  the  battery  unsupported.  Mean 
while,  the  skirmishers  of  Cutler's  other  two  regiments  (the 
Fourteenth  Brooklyn,  under  Colonel  Fowler,  and  the  Ninety- 
fifth  New  York,  under  Colonel  Biddle)  were  disputing  with 
the  Confederate  brigade  of  Archer  the  passage  of  Willoughby 
Eun,  and  skirmishing  in  a  skirt  of  woods  along  the  brook 
with  such  as  had  crossed.  At  this  moment,  the  "  Iron  Bri 
gade"  opportunely  swept  down  from  the  left,  struck  the  flank 
of  the  Confederate  brigade,  and  captured  several  hundred 
that  had  already  crossed,  including  the  commander,  Brigadier- 
General  Archer.*  The  dispositions  at  this  point  were  made 
by  General  Eeynolds  in  person ;  and  it  was  at  the  moment 
when,  after  urging  on  his  men  with  animating  words,  he  saw 
this  successful  charge  under  way,  and  turned  to  leave  the 
woods,  that  he  was  struck  with  a  rifle-shot  that  caused  almost 
instant  death — a  grievous  loss  to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
one  of  whose  most  distinguished  and  best-beloved  officers  he 
was ;  one  whom,  by  the  steady  growth  of  the  highest  military 
qualities,  the  general  voice  of  the  whole  army  had  marked  out 
for  the  largest  fame. 

*  This  movement  was   led  by  the  Second  Wisconsin,  under  Colonel  Fair- 
child,  supported  by  the  remainder  of  the  Iron  Brigade. 


THE  GETTYSBURG   CAMPAIGN.  331 

In  thus  engaging  with  the  enemy,  Reynolds  has  been 
charged  with  rashness  in  prematurely  precipitating  a  battle. 
But  wrongly ;  for  rashness  was  not  a  fault  of  that  officer,  as 
all  who  know  his  character  are  well  aware ;  and  though  he 
had  no  orders  to  bring  on  a  general  action  (being,  indeed, 
under  instructions  to  fall  back  on  the  proposed  line  of  Pipe 
Creek),  he  was  necessarily  drawn  into  this  engagement  in  aid 
of  Buford's  hard-pressed  cavalry.  His  real  motives,  whatever 
they  were,  remain  buried  with  him  :  but  it  is  more  than  prob 
able  that,  in  hastening  forward  the  head  of  his  column  to  the 
plain  beyond  the  town,  his  quick  military  eye  had  taken  in 
at  a  glance  the  figure  of  that  rocky  bulwark  around  Gettys 
burg  as  a  vantage  point  where  the  army  could  most  favorably 
receive  battle,  and  in  going  out  to  oppose  a  front  of  resist 
ance  to  the  near-approaching  enemy,  and  allow  the  army 
time  to  concentrate  at  Gettysburg,  he  knew  he  was  doing 
what  General  Meade,  who  reposed  the  highest  confidence  in 
his  judgment,  would  quite  approve. 

While  these  events  were  passing  on  the  left  of  Wads- 
worth's  force,  the  retirement  of  Cutler's  right  left  Hall's  bat 
tery  unsupported ;  and  it  was  in  imminent  peril  of  capture, 
w^hen  the  Fourteenth  Brooklyn  and  the  Ninety-fifth  New 
York,  joined  by  the  Sixth  Wisconsin,  under  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Dawes,  made  a  change  of  front,  and  charged  to  the 
relief  of  the  guns.  This  manoeuvre  was  so  well  managed  that 
Davis's  two  Mississippi  regiments,  having  sought  shelter  in 
the  railroad  cut,  were  there  surrounded  and  compelled  to  sur 
render  with  their  battle-flags.  Upon  this,  that  part  of  Cut 
ler's  command  that  had  previously  fallen  back,  having  in  the 
mean  time  been  reformed,  returned  and  united  with  the  three 
regiments  engaged  in  this  spirited  affair,  when  the  force  was 
moved  still  further  to  the  right  to  meet  the  extension  of  the 
enemy's  lines  in  that  direction. 

By  the  time  these  initial  successes  were  gained,  the  combat, 
bursting  out  anew,  was  increased  in  volume  by  the  arrival  of 
fresh  forces  on  each  side.  On  the  Union  side,  the  two  re 
maining  divisions  of  the  First  Corps,  under  Generals  How- 


332  CAMPAIGNS   OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

ley*  and  Kobinson,  reached  the  ground.  The  former  division 
was  immediately  thrown  in  to  sustain  the  now  hard-pressed 
Left,  and  was  precipitated  into  close  action.  The  men  were 
in  the  highest  spirits,  as  was  shown  by  their  behavior,  and 
by  one  incident  among  others.  One  of  the  brigades  of  this 
division,  under  command  of  Colonel  Roy  Stone,  had  been  as 
signed  to  a  position  where  it  came  under  a  heavy  artillery 
fire ;  and  as  the  troops  took  their  post,  Colonel  Stone  re 
marked,  "We  have  come  to  stay."  This  went  quickly  through 
the  brigade,  the  men  adopting  it  as  a  watchword — "  We  have 
come  to  stay."  And  a  very  large  part  of  them  never  left  that 
ground,  t 

Meantime,  Robinson's  division  remained  for  awhile  in  re 
serve  on  the  Seminary  Ridge  ;  but  almost  simultaneously 
with  the  arrival  of  these  re-enforcements,  the  advance  divi 
sion  of  Ewell's  corps,  under  General  Rodes,  came  in  from  the 
direction  of  Carlisle,  and,  swinging  round  under  cover  and  un- 
perceived,  seized  a  position  menacing  the  right  of  the  Union 
line.  This  brought  a  heavy  pressure  to  bear  on  that  flank, 
held  by  Cutler's  command,  and  to  relieve  it  Robinson's  divi 
sion  was  moved  forward  from  the  Seminary.  First,  Baxter's 
brigade  of  this  division  took  position  on  the  right  of  Cutler, 
resting  its  right  on  the  Mummasburg  Road,  and  then,  as  the 
needs  became  more  urgent,  Baxter's  command  relieved  Cut 
ler,  and  the  brigade  of  General  Paul  was  brought  up  on  Bax 
ter's  right.  These  troops  opposed  a  vigorous  resistance  to 
Rodes'  attack,  and  early  in  the  action,  by  a  skilful  movement, 
captured  three  North  Carolina  regiments  under  General 
Iverson. 

With  this  series  of  successes  the  combat  opened ;  but  it  was 
destined  soon  to  be  beclouded  by  an  untoward  sequel.  Thus 
far  the  action  had  been  sustained  on  the  Union  side  by  the 
First  Corps  alone,  and  on  the  Confederate  side  by  the  advance 

*  This  officer  commanded  Doubleday's  division,  the  latter  officer  being,  for 
the  time,  in  command  of  the  corps. 

f  Testimony  of  General  Doubled  ay :  Report  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War 
vol.  i.,  p.  307. 


THE  GETTYSBURG  CAMPAIGN.  333 

divisions  of  the  corps  of  Hill  and  Ewell.  But  new  actors  now 
appeared  on  the  stage.  Hill  was  re-enforced  by  another  divi 
sion  under  General  Fender,  and  towards  one  o'clock  the 
Eleventh  Corps  came  tip — General  Howard  having  arrived 
some  time  before  and  by  virtue  of  his  rank  assumed  com 
mand  of  the  field.  General  Howard  left  a  division-"  in  reserve 
on  Cemetery  Hill,  and  placed  the  divisions  of  Schurzf  and 
Barlow  to  the  right  of  the  First  Corps,  on  a  prolongation  of 
its  general  line,  and  covering  the  approaches  to  Gettysburg 
from  the  north  and  northwest.  Almost  simultaneously  with 
the  forming  of  the  Eleventh  Corps,  a  fresh  division  of  E well's 
corps,  under  General  Early,  arrived  from  the  direction  of 
York  and  took  position  on  Barlow's  front. 

It  has  been  seen  how,  by  fresh  arrivals,  the  Union  line  was 
gradually  extended,  till  now  it  made  a  wide  curve  of  several 
miles  around  the  west  and  north  of  the  town.  In  this  dispo 
sition  of  his  troops  General  Howard  fell  into  an  error  that 
has  been  common  throughout  the  war — the  error  of  attempt 
ing  to  cover  too  much  ground,  by  which  it  comes  about  that 
these  long  lines  are  everywhere  weak,  and  that  in  attempting 
to  cover  every  thing  one  really  covers  nothing.  It  would 
have  been  a  disposition  much  better  suited  to  the  nature  of 
the  ground  had  General  Howard  massed  a  heavy  force  of  his 
newly  arrived  corps  on  the  right  of  the  First  Corps,  where  the 
line  ended  in  Robinson's  division — sweeping  the  plain  to  the 
north  by  its  fire,  in  place  of  attempting  to  hold  the  whole 
stretch  by  a  line  thinly  drawn  out. 

This  faulty  placing  of  the  force  had  a  powerful  influence  on 
the  result  that  followed ;  and  taken  in  connection  with  another 
circumstance,  accounts  quite  as  much  as  the  alleged  misbe 
havior  of  some  of  the  troops  for  the  disastrous  sequel.  The 
circumstance  to  which  I  have  made  reference  is  this.  When 
Rodes  threw  forward  his  division  to  connect  with  the  left  of 
Hill's  troops,  he  secured  a  commanding  position  on  an  ele- 

*  Steinwehr's  division. 

f  This  division  was,  for  the  time  being,  under  General  Scliimmelpfenig, 
Schurz  commanding  the  corps. 


334  CAMPAIGNS  OF    THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

vated  ridge  known  as  Oak  Hill,  situate  between  the  Mum- 
masburg  and  Carlisle  roads.  This  position  was  the  key -point 
of  the  entire  field,  and  gave  Eodes  an  advantageous  point 
of  attack  on  the  centre  of  the  line  as  now  drawn ;  or  rather, 
as  the  corps  did  not  connect,  on  the  right  flank  of  the  First 
Corps  and  the  left  flank  of  the  Eleventh  Corps.  The  effect  of 
this  was  soon  seen.  It  required  but  a  slight  pressure  for 
Early  to  throw  back  the  right  division,  under  Barlow,  who 
found  it  impossible  to  hold  his  command  to  their  work,  and 
who  was  himself  left  on  the  field  severely  wounded.  And 
when,  towards  three  o'clock,  a  general  advance  was  made  by 
the  Confederates,  Eodes  speedily  broke  through  the  Union 
centre,  carrying  away  the  right  of  the  First  Corps  and  the  left 
of  the  Eleventh,  and,  entering  the  interval  between  them, 
disrupted  the  whole  line.  The  troops  fell  back  in  much 
disorder  into  Gettysburg.  At  the  same  time  the  right  of  the 
First  Corps,  giving  way,  also  retreated  to  the  town,  where 
they  became  entangled  with  the  disordered  mass.  Early, 
launching  forward,  captured  above  five  thousand  prisoners.* 
The  left  of  the  First  alone  drew  back  in  some  order,  mak 
ing  a  stand  on  Seminary  Ridge  until  the  artillery  and  ambu 
lances  had  been  withdrawn,  and  then  fell  back  behind  the 
town. 

At  the  time  the  confused  throng  was  pouring  through  Get 
tysburg,  General  Hancock  arrived  on  the  ground.  He  had 
not  brought  with  him  his  tried  Second  Corps,  but  had  ridden 
forward  from  Taneytown  under  orders  from  General  Meade,  on 
learning  the  death  of  Eeynolds,  to  assume  command  and  use 
discretionary  power  either  to  retain  the  force  at  Gettysburg, 
or  retire  it  to  the  proposed  line  on  Pipe  Creek.  General 
Hancock  was  instructed  to  examine  the  ground,  and  if  he 
found  the  position  under  the  circumstances  a  better  one  than 
that  contemplated,  he  should  so  advise  the  commander,  and 
the  army  would  be  ordered  up.  But  on  his  arrival  he  found 
a  more  pressing  duty  forced  upon  him  ;  for  it  was  clear  that 

*  Lee  :  Report  of  Gettysburg,  MS. 


THE  GETTYSBURG  CAMPAIGN.  335 

if  the  flight  of  the  shattered  masses  of  the  "First  and 
Eleventh  corps  was  not  stayed,  a  great  disaster  must  follow. 
The  sole  nucleus  of  stability  was  presented  by  a  single  bri 
gade  of  Steinwehr's  division  which  General  Howard,  on  arriv 
ing,  had  left  in  reserve  on  Cemetery  Hill,  and  the  cavalry  of 
Buford,  which,  deployed  on  the  plain  to  the  left  -of  the  town, 
and  in  front  of  the  ridge,  presented  a  bold  and  firm  front. 
Everywhere  else  was  confusion,  and  the  enemy  coming  on. 

In  such  an  emergency  it  is  the  personal  qualities  of  the 
commander  alone  that  tell.  If,  happily,  there  is  in  him  that 
mysterious  but  potent  magnetism  that  calms,  subdues,  and  in 
spires,  there  results  one  of  those  sudden  moral  transformations 
that  are  among  the  marvels  of  the  phenomena  of  battle. 
This  quality  Hancock  possesses  in  a  high  degree,  and  his 
appearance  soon  restored  order  out  of  seemingly  hopeless 
confusion — a  confusion  which  Howard,  an  efficient  officer,  but 
of  a  rather  negative  nature,  had  not  been  able  to  quell.  Nor, 
fortunately,  could  there  be  any  question  as  to  the  right  posi 
tion  to  be  taken  up,  for  nature  had  already  traced  it  out  in  a 
bold  relief  of  rock.  On  the  ridge  of  Gettysburg — the  ridge 
Reynolds  had  mentally  marked  as  he  impetuously  hurried 
forward  to  buffet  the  advancing  enemy,  and  which,  by  the 
rich  sacrifice  of  his  life,  he  purchased  for  the  possession  of 
the  army  and  for  the  possession  of  history  forever— -Han 
cock  disposed  the  remnants  of  the  two  corps. 

The  Gettysburg  ridge  is  an  irregular,  interrupted  line  of 
heights  and  hills  running  due  south  from  the  town  of  Gettys 
burg.  At  the  town  the  ridge  bends  back,  eastward  and 
southward,  in  a  crotchet  formed  by  Cemetery  and  Gulps'  hills. 
The  former  is  so  called  from  the  burying-place  of  the  town 
situate  thereon.  It  commands  the  positions  available  for  the 
enemy  on  the  north  and  northwest.  The  latter  forming  the 
right  knob  of  the  line  is  in  rough  and  rocky  ground,  much 
wooded  and  very  unfavorable  to  the  use  of  artillery.  Along 
its  eastern  base  runs  Rock  Creek,  one  of  the  tributaries  of  the 
Monocacy.  From  Cemetery  Hill  the  line  runs  southward  for 
about  three  miles,  in  a  well-defined  ridge,  which  may 


336  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

properly  be  termed  Cemetery  Ridge,  and  which  terminates,  at 
that  distance,  in  a  high,  rocky,  and  wooded  peak  named 
Round  Top,  the  less  elevated  portion  near  where  the  crest 
rises  into  Round  Top  being  termed  Little  Round  Top,*  a  rough 
and  bald  spur  of  the  former.  The  broken  character  of  the 
ground  in  front  of  the  southern  flank  of  the  line  renders  it 
also  unfavorable  to  the  use  of  artillery.  The  general  position 
is  thus  about  four  miles  in  extent ;  but  while  Cemetery 
and  Gulps'  hills  require  the  formation  of  a  line  of  battle  to 
face  northward,  the  direction  of  Cemetery  Ridge  (north 
and  south)  causes  the  line  to  front  westward.  The  crest, 
mainly  in  cultivated  fields,  but  with  occasional  fringes  of 
woods,  has,  throughout,  a  good  slope  to  the  rear,  affording 
excellent  cover  for  the  reserves  and  trains.  To  the  west,  the 
ridge  falls  off  in  a  cultivated  and  undulating  valley,  which  it 
commands,  and  at  the  distance  of  a  mile  or  less  is  a  parallel 
crest  which  has  already  been  marked  as  Seminary  Ridge, 
and  which  the  Confederates  occupied  during  the  succeeding 
battle.  In  the  valley  between  these  two  ridges  the  ground 
rises  into  an  intermediate  swell  of  land,  along  which  runs  the 
Emmettsburg  road. 

Such  was  the  ground  destined  to  form  the  scene  of  the 
approaching  shock  of  the  two  armies  ;  and  on  which  Han 
cock,  assisted  by  Generals  Howard,  Warren,  and  Buford, 
now  disposed  his  preliminary  line  of  battle.  Cemetery  Hill 
was  already  partially  held  by  Howard's  troops.  On  the  right 
of  these,  and  occupying  the  important  position  of  Gulps'  Hill, 
was  placed  Wadsworth's  division  of  the  First  Corps,  and  his 
line  completely  commanded  the  approaches  from  the  town  of 
Gettysburg,  now  held  by  Ewell.  The  remaining  two  divisions 
of  the  First  Corps  under  General  Doubleday  were  posted  on 
the  left  of  the  Eleventh,  along  Cemetery  Ridge ;  and  Geary's 
division  of  the  Twelfth  Corps  (Slocum)  just  then  arriving,  was 
ordered  by  Hancock  to  the  high  ground  on  the  left.  Towards 
six  o'clock,  the  remaining  division  of  that  Corps  came  up, 

*  This  spur  appears  on  the  map  of  Colonel  Batchelder,  as  Weed's  Hill. 


THE  GETTYSBURG  CAMPAIGN.  337 

having  been  urgently  summoned  by  General  Howard  during 
the  afternoon.  The  command,  thereupon,  devolved  on  Gen 
eral  Slocum ;  and  Hancock,  having  ordered  all  the  trains  to 
the  rear,  so  as  not  to  interfere  with  any  movement  of  troops 
that  might  be  ordered,  returned  to  headquarters  at  Taney- 
town,  where  General  Meade  still  remained. 

General  Hancock  reported  that  the  position  at  Gettysburg 
was  a  very  strong  one,  and  advantageous  for  a  defensive 
battle,  having  for  its  only  disadvantage  that  it  might  be 
turned :  in  fact,  Hancock's  representations  were  such  that 
General  Meade  instantly  gave  orders  for  the  forward  move 
ment  and  concentration  of  all  the  corps  on  Gettysburg,  and 
he  advanced  his  headquarters  to  that  point,  reaching  it  at  one 
o'clock  of  the  morning  of  the  2d.  The  Third  Corps  (Sickles) 
had  early  in  the  day  been  summoned  up  by  General  Howard. 
Its  van  reached  Gettysburg  at  sunset  of  the  1st,  and  was 
joined  by  the  remainder  of  the  corps  during  the  night  and 
following  morning.  The  Second  Corps,  having  only  to  make 
the  inarch  of  thirteen  miles  from  Taneytown,  arrived  in  the 
vicinity  when  General  Hancock  was  on  his  way  back,  and 
was  by  him  placed  in  position  two  miles  in  rear  of  the  town 
to  cover  the  flank  and  communications.  The  Fifth  Corps 
(Sykes),  when  ordered  forward,  was  at  Union  Mills,  dis 
tant  twenty-three  miles ;  but  by  a  night-march  might  reach 
the  ground  early  in  the  morning.  The  Sixth  Corps,  forming 
the  right  wing  of  the  army  as  it  moved,  was  furthest  off, 
being  at  Manchester,  thirty-six  miles  from  Gettysburg ;  but 
the  .known  character  of  General  Sedgwick  ga^te  assurance  that 
all  the  resources  of  skill  and  zeal  would  be  employed  to  bring 
it  up  at  the  earliest  possible  moment. 

The  important  action  of  Wednesday,  opening  with  success, 
foUowed  by  repulse,  and  ending  in  the  occupation  of  the  ridge 
of  Gettysburg,  was,  as  has  been  seen,  fought  by  only  the  ad 
vanced  portion  of  the  two  armies  :  by  the  First  and  Eleventh 
corps  on  the  Union  side,  and  on  the  Confederate  side  by  the 
divisions  of  Heth  and  Fender  of  Hill's  corps,  and  the  divisions 
of  Early  and  Kodes  of  Swell's  corps.  As  it  has  been  seen 


338  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

that  the  columns  of  Hill  and  Longstreet  moyed  from  Cham- 
bersburg  and  Fayetteville  towards  Gettysburg  on  the  morn 
ing  of  the  29th,  and  as  the  distance  is  not  above  twenty  miles, 
it  is  evident  that  the  march  was  conducted  much  more  slowly 
than  was  usual  with  Lee,  and  this  he  attributes  to  his  igno 
rance  of  the  movements  of  his  antagonist — an  ignorance  due 
to  the  absence  of  Stuart's  cavalry,  the  vigilant  eyes  of  the 
Confederate  commander.* 

From  the  exposition  already  given  it  will  have  appeared 
that  by  the  encounter  of  "Wednesday,  the  opposing  armies 
were  precipitated  into  general  conflict  sooner  than  the  chief 
commanders  on  each  side  expected ;  but  when  Lee,  on  the 
one  hand,  and  Meade,  on  the  other,  reached  the  front  late  at 
night,  they  found  themselves  by  the  events  of  the  day  already 
committed  to  battle,  and  rapid  concentration  at  Gettysburg 
became  imperative.  Having  shown  Meade's  dispositions  to 
this  end,  it  remains  to  add  that  Lee  also  sent  urgent  orders 
to  his  remaining  divisions  to  hasten  their  march.  Meantime, 
Ewell  was  instructed  to  carry  Cemetery  Hill  if  he  found  it 
practicable,  but  to  avoid  a  general  engagement  until  the  arri 
val  of  the  other  divisions  of  the  army.  He  decided  to  await 
the  arrival  of  Johnston's  division ;  but  as  that  officer  did  not 
arrive  till  a  late  hour,  and  in  the  mean  time  it  was  found  that 


*  The  absence  of  Stuart  happened  in  this  manner  :  When  Lee  crossed  the 
Potomac  from  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  Stuart  was  left  on  the  east  side  of  the 
Blue  Ridge,  under  instructions  to  harass  Ho'oker  as  much  as  possible  in  cross 
ing  the  Potomac,  and  then  pass  into  Maryland,  either  east  or  west  of  the  Blue 
Ridge,  and  take  position  on  the  right  of  the  advancing  column.  This  would 
have  put  him  in  his  proper  place  to  watch  the  Union  cavalry  thrown  out  on 
the  left  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  Stuart,  however,  finding  himself  unable 
to  impede  the  passage  of  the  Potomac,  advanced  eastward  as  far  as  Fairfax 
Courthouse,  and  then  crossed  the  Potomac  at  Seneca.  But  Hooker  having 
crossed  above,  Stuart  found  the  entire  Union  army  interposed  between  him  and 
Lee,  so  that  he  was  compelled  to  make  a  wide  detour  on  the  exterior  line : 
marching  by  way  of  Westminster,  he  advanced  to  Carlisle,  but  did  not  reacli 
that  point  till  the  1st  of  July,  the  day  after  Ewell  had  left  for  Gettysburg,  tc 
which  point  he  was  then  immediately  summoned  by  Lee,  who  had  during  all 
these  movements  been  deprived  of  the  important  services  of  his  cavalry. 


THE  GETTYSBURG  CAMPAIGN.  339 

the  Union  force  had  fully  occupied  the  heights,  it  was  resolved 
not  to  attack  until  the  arrival  of  Longstreet,  two  of  whose 
divisions,  those  of  Hood  and  McLaws,  had  encamped  within 
three  miles  of  Gettysburg.  Hill's  remaining  division  under 
Anderson  reached  the  ground  soon  after  the  close  of  the  en 
gagement. 

Nevertheless,  to  neither  of  the  opposing  chiefs  could  the 
situation,  as  it  presented  itself  on  their  arrival  that  night,  be 
either  encouraging  or  satisfactory.  General  Meade  found 
affairs  pressing  to  a  culmination,  and  the  rolls  of  the  First 
and  Eleventh  corps  showed  as  the  result  of  an  encounter 
which  in  its  general  relations  was  but  a  reconnoissance  in 
force,  the  formidable  loss  of  near  ten  thousand  men !  He 
did  not  know  but  that  Lee  had  his  whole  force  massed  in 
front  of  him,  while  his  own  army  was  much  scattered,  and  a 
part  distant  by  a  full  day's  march.*  Yet  the  position 
seemed  favorable,  and  above  all  it  secured  to  him  the  advan 
tage  of  the  defensive,  forcing  upon  his  antagonist  all  the 
perils  of  attack.f  Dropping  at  once,  therefore,  as  now  ob 
solete,  all  previous  contingent  plans  looking  to  other  lines  of 
defence,  he  had  the  moment  he  learnt  the  nature  of  the  posi 
tion  given  orders  for  the  rapid  concentration  of  the  whole 
army  at  Gettysburg. 

To  Lee,  on  the  other  hand,  though  the  action  of  the  1st 
had  been  on  the  whole  favorable,  yet  the  situation  in  which 
he  found  himself  was  very  different  from  what  he  desired.  It 
must  be  borne  in  mind  that  Lee's  sudden  movement  to  the 
east  side  of  the  South  Mountain  range,  just  at  the  moment  he 
was  heading  his  columns  to  cross  the  Susquehanna  and  ad- 


*  The  two  corps  furthest  off  were  the  Fifth  and  Sixth,  the  former  of  which 
was  distant  twenty-three,  and  the  latter  upwards  of  thirty  miles. 

f  General  Meade  makes  no  secret  of  his  strong  desire,  at  the  time,  to  secure 
the  advantage  of  the  defensive.  "  It  was  my  desire,"  says  he  in  his  testimony 
before  the  War  Committee  (Report,  p.  439),  "  to  fight  a  defensive  rather  than  an 
offensive  battle,  for  the  reason  that  I  was  satisfied  my  chances  of  success  were 
greater  in  a  defensive  battle  than  in  an  offensive  one  ;  and  I  knew  the  moment 
ous  consequences  dependent  upon  the  result  of  that." 


340  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

vance  on  Harrisburg,  was  solely  prompted  by  the  menace  to 
his  communications  with  the  Potomac  resulting  from  the  ma 
noeuvres  of  his  antagonist.  It  was,  therefore,  with  the  view 
of  checking  the  latter  that  Lee  threw  his  forces  to  the  east 
side  of  the  mountain  :  but  in  doing  so,  he  was  far  from 
expecting  or  desiring  to  take  upon  himself  the  risk  of  a  general 
battle,  at  a  point  so  distant  from  his  base.  He  was  willing  to 
do  so  only  in  case  he  should,  by  manoeuvring,  secure  the  advan 
tage  of  the  defensive,  or  some  special  opening  for  a  blow, 
should  his  opponent  make  a  false  move.  Indeed,  in  enter 
ing  upon  the  campaign,  General  Lee  expressly  promised  his 
corps-commanders  that  lie  would  not  assume  a  tactical  offensive, 
but  force  his  antagonist  to  attack  him.  Having,  however, 
gotten  a  taste  of  blood  in  the  considerable  success  of  the  first 
day,  the  Confederate  commander  seems  to  have  lost  that 
equipoise  in  which  his  faculties  commonly  moved,  and  he 
determined  to  give  battle.* 

In  adopting  this  course  he  committed  a  grave  error,  as 
the  event  proved,  and  judging  from  a  merely  military  point 
of  view ;  but  this  is  not  the  first  case  in  which  it  has  been 
seen  that  other  considerations  than  those  of  a,  purely  mili 
tary  order  enter  into  the  complex  problem  of  war.  General 
Lee  states  as  his  main  motive  for  giving  battle,  the  diffi 
culty  that  would  have  been  experienced  in  withdrawing 
through  the  mountains  with  his  large  trains — an  excuse  that 
can  hardly  be  considered  valid.  A  considerable  part  of  the 
trains  had  not  been  advanced  to  the  east  of  the  mountains, 
and  he  could  readily  have  withdrawn  all  under  cover  of  his 
line  of  battle  ;  and  then  retired  his  army  by  the  same  routes — 
the  Cashtown  and  Fairfield  roads — over  which  he  ultimately 
retreated.  Besides,  there  was  open  another  and  still  bolder 
move.  Longstreet,  holding  the  right  of  the  Confederate  line, 


*  Tliis,  and  subsequent  revelations  of  the  purposes  and  sentiments  of  Lee,  I 
derive  from  General  Longstreet,  who,  in  a  full  and  free  conversation  with  the 
writer,  after  the  close  of  the  war,  threw  much  light  on  the  motives  and  conduct 
oi  Lee  during  this  campaign. 


THE  GETTYSBURG  CAMPAIGN.  341 

had  one  flank  securely  posted  on  the  Emmettsburg  road,  so 
that  he  was  really  between  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  and 
"Washington  ;  and  by  marching  towards  Frederick  could 
undoubtedly  have  manosuvred  Meade  out  of  the  Gettysburg 
position.  This  operation  General  Longstreet,  who  foreboded 
the  worst  from  an  attack  on  the  army  in  position,  and  was 
anxious  to  hold  General  Lee  to  his  promise,  begged  in  vain  to 
be  allowed  to  execute.* 

What  really  compelled  Lee,  contrary  to  his  original  intent 
and  promise,  to  give  battle,  was  the  animus  and  inspiration  of 
the  invasion ;  for,  to  the  end,  such  were  the  "  exsufflicate  and 
blown  surmises"  of  the  army,  and  such  was  the  contempt  of  its 
opponent  engendered  by  Fredericksburg  and  Chancellorsville, 
that  there  was  not  in  his  ranks  a  barefoot  soldier  in  tattered 
gray  but  believed  Lee  would  lead  him  and  the  Confederate 
army  into  Baltimore  and  Washington,  if  not  into  Philadelphia 
and  New  York.f  To  have  withdrawn,  therefore,  without  a 
battle,  though  materially  easy,  was  morally  impossible;  for 
to  have  recrossed  the  Potomac  without  a  blow,  and  abandoned 
the  invasion  on  which  such  towering  hopes  had  been  built, 
would  have  been  a  shock  beyond  endurance  to  his  army  and 
the  South.  Such  were  the  causes  that,  under  providential 
ordainment,  resulted  in  the  mighty  shock  of  arms  that  hurled 
the  invading  force  from  the  soil  of  the  loyal  States,  and  dealt 
the  army  of  Lee  a  blow  from  which  it  never  afterwards  recov 
ered.  To  the  events  of  this  action  I  now  return. 

By  morning  of  the  2d  of  July  the  entire  Union  army,  saving 
the  corps  of  Sedgwick,  had  reached  Gettysburg;  and  the 
whole  Southern  force,  with  the  exception  of  Pickett's  division 
of  Longstreet' s  corps,  had  come  up. 

*  The  officer  named  is  my  authority  for  this  statement. 

•j-  Colonel  Freemantle,  of  the  British  service,  who  was  with  the  Confederate 
anr<y  during  the  battle  of  Gettysburg,  thus  testifies  to  this  feeling  :  "  The  staff- 
officers  (on  the  night  of  the  1st)  spoke  of  the  battle  as  a  certainty ;  and  the 
universal  feeling  in  the  army  was  one  of  profound  contempt  for  an  enemy 
whom  they  have  beaten  so  constantly,  and  under  so  many  disadvantages." — 
Three  Months  in  the  Confederate  States,  p.  256. 


342  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

Meade,  following  the  natural  line  of  defence,  disposed  his 
forces  as  follows  :  The  Eleventh  Corps  (Howard)  retained  its 
position  on  Cemetery  Hill,  where  it  was  supported  by  Robin 
son's  and  Doubleday's  divisions  of  the  First  Corps  (Newton) 
on  its  right  was  placed  Wadsworth's  division  of  the  same 
corps,  which  together  with  the  Twelfth  (Slocum)  held  the 
right  of  the  whole  army,  on  Gulps'  Hill ;  the  Second  (Han 
cock)  and  Third  (Sickles)  corps  occupied  the  crest  of  Ceme 
tery  Ridge — the  former  connecting  with  the  left  of  the 
Eleventh,  and  the  latter  (which  formed  the  left  of  the  line) 
connecting  with  the  left  of  the  Second.  The  Fifth  Corps 
(Sykes)  was  held  in  reserve  on  the  right. 

Lee  placed  his  troops  along  the  Seminary  Ridge,  separated 
from  the  Cemetery  Ridge  by  an  interval  of  about  a  mile,  and 
inclosing  it  with  a  wider  curve.  Longstreet,  with  the  divisions 
of  Hood  and  McLaws,  held  the  right,  facing  Round  Top  and 
a  good  part  of  Cemetery  Ridge,  on  which  Sickles  and  Han 
cock  were  placed.  Hill's  three  divisions  continued  the  line 
from  the  left  of  Longstreet  round  the  Seminary  Ridge,  and 
fronted,  therefore,  the  remainder  of  Cemetery  Ridge.  Ewell, 
with  his  three  divisions,  held  from  the  Seminary  through  the 
town ;  and  sweeping  round  the  base  of  Cemetery  Hill,  termi 
nated  the  left  of  the  hostile  line  in  front  of  Gulps'  Hill,  occu 
pied  by  Slocum's  corps,  which  formed  the  Union  right.  The 
Confederate  line  was  about  five  miles  in  stretch,  and  was  in 
great  part  well  concealed  by  a  fringe  of  woods.  Both  sides 
placed  in  position  a  powerful  artillery  force. 


TIL 

GETTYSBURG— THE   SECOND  DAY. 

When  morning  revealed  to  Lee  the  position  of  the  \  nion 
army  drawn  up  on  that  ridge  of  rocks,  he  must  have  keenly 
realized  all  the  perils  of  the  attack ;  for  upon  a  like  position 
held  by  him  at  Fredericksburg  he  had  seen  the  army  under 


**•-£> 


'•/L 


-  oil       MAP  OF  THE  BATTLE  or 


showing  fJo&'M 

JU  LY   2°    1863 

Prepared  W  Col.W.H.  Payrle. 

for-  "Campaigns  of  the  Army  of  the  Potanun 


f±.  Position   ocrtipietl  success  ively  by 

Genl*  Harriet,  Caldirell  ,Ayers  fr  Craw  ford. 


tfniati    Lines. 


THE  GETTYSBURG  CAMPAIGN.  343 

Burnside  dash  itself  to  pieces,  in  high  but  impotent  valor. 
But  the  excited  condition  of  his  army,  in  which  he  still 
shared,  would  not  allow  him  to  pause.  He  therefore  pro 
ceeded  with  his  dispositions  for  attack  ;  yet  it  was  four 
o'clock  in  the  afternoon  before  these  were  completed.  The 
Union  troops,  meanwhile,  made  good  use  of  the  time,  and 
improvised  for  themselves  cover  behind  breastworks  and  stone 
walls.  Early  in  the  morning,  Ewell's  deployment  of  his  left 
around  the  base  of  Gulps'  Hill  attracted  attention,  and  raised 
the  belief  that  the  enemy  would  attack  that  point.  General 
Meade  therefore  proposed  to  assume  the  initiative  there, 
allowing  General  Slocum  to  attack  with  his  own  and  two 
additional  corps  ;  but  that  officer  having  reported  the  ground 
very  unfavorable,  the  purpose  was  given  up.*  About  two 
o'clock  the  Sixth  Corps,  under  General  Sedgwick,  arrived, 
having  made  a  march  of  thirty-five  miles  in  twenty  hours. 
On  the  arrival  of  Sedgwick,  General  Meade  directed  Sykes' 
corps  (Fifth),  that  had  been  in  reserve  on  the  right,  to  move 
over  and  be  in  reserve  on  the  left. 

The  result  of  the  Confederate  reconnoissances  was  to  fix 
upon  the  ground  opposite  Longstreet — that  is,  the  left  and 
left  centre,  held  by  Sickles'  corps — as  the  most  practicable 
point  of  attack.  That  portion  of  the  Union  front  was  placed 
in  a  very  anomalous  position  ;  and  this  fact,  which  presently 
became  the  pivotal  fact  of  the  Confederate  attack,  was  the 
result  of  a  train  of  events  that  befell  in  this  wise. 

In  the  original  ordainment  of  the  line  of  battle,  Sickles' 
corps  (Third)  had  been  instructed  to  take  position  on  the  left 
of  Hancock,  on  the  same  general  line,  which  would  draw  it 
along  the  prolongation  of  Cemetery  Eidge  towards  the  Bound 
Top.  Now,  the  ridge  is,  at  this  point,  not  very  well  defined, 

*  The  attack  was  designed  to  be  made  by  Slocum's  own  corps  and  the  Fifth 
Corps,  together  with  the  Sixth,  as  soon  as  it  should  arrive.  But  at  ten,  orders 
were  sent  to  attack  without  the  Sixth  Corps ;  and  it  was  then  that  General 
Slocum  reported  adversely  to  it.  General  Warren,  chief-engineer,  who  at  the 
time  went  to  examine  the  position,  also  reported  an  attack  from  the  right  unad- 
visable. — Report  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  second  series,  vol.  i.,  p.  438. 


344  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

for  the  ground  in  front  falls  off  into  a  considerable  hollow. 
But  at  the  distance  of  some  four  or  five  hundred  yards  in 
advance,  it  rises  into  that  intermediate  crest  along  which  runs 
the  Emmettsburg  road.  General  Sickles,  thinking  it  desirable 
to  occupy  this  advanced  position — which  he  conceived  would, 
if  held  by  the  enemy,  make  his  own  ground  untenable — 
assumed  the  responsibility  of  pushing  his  front  forward  to 
that  point. 

The  motive  that  prompted  General  Sickles  to  this  course 
was  laudable  enough,  yet  the  step  itself  was  faulty :  for  though 
to  a  superficial  examination  the  aspect  of  this  advanced 
position  seems  advantageous,  it  is  not  really  so ;  and  pro 
longed  to  the  left,  it  is  seen  to  be  positively  disadvantageous. 
It  affords  no  resting-place  for  the  left  flank,  which  can  be 
protected  only  by  refusing  that  wing  and  throwing  it  back 
through  low  ground,  towards  Bound  Top  ;  but  this,  in  turn, 
presents  the  danger  of  exposing  a  salient  in  a  position  which, 
if  carried,  would  give  the  enemy  the  key-point  to  the  whole 
advanced  line.* 

*  The  point  where  two  lines  meet  in  an  angle  must  always  be  weak  for  de- 
i'ence.  This  truth  is  recognized  as  one  of  the  leading  principles  of  the  science 
of  fortification,  where  the  lines  which  meet  in  an  angle  are  represented  by 
ramparts  or  parapets,  because  there  must  always  be  a  certain  space,  more  or 
less  great  in  proportion  to  the  greater  or  smaller  acuteness  of  the  angle,  which 
is  undefended  by  the  direct  fire  of  the  lines.  The  same  applies  to  lines  formed 
by  troops,  whose  fire  and  general  resistance  can  only  be  effective  when  they 
act  perpendicular,  or  nearly  so,  to  the  direction  of  the  lines.  There  is  another 
mathematical  truth  which  applies  to  the  case  of  troops,  and  which  is  thus 
stated  by  Colonel  MacDougall :  "  Where  two  lines  representing  mechanical 
forces  meet  in  a  point,  the  single  line  or  force  which  is  capable  of  counteracting 
them,  called  their  equivalent,  is  always  less  than  the  sum  of  the  two  lines ; 
and  the  direction  of  this  equivalent  is  that  of  the  diagonal  produced  of  the 
parallelogram  supposed  to  be  formed  on  these  two  lines,  ty  acting  in  a  con 
trary  sense."  (MacDougall :  Modern  Warfare  and  Modern  Artillery,  p.  145) 
There  is  yet  another  serious  evil  attaching  to  an  angle  presented  by  a  line  on 
a  field  of  battle — the  enemy  may  place  guns  so  as  to  enfilade  one  or  both  of  the 
faces.  When,  therefore,  circumstances  render  such  a  formation  unavoidable, 
the  angle  should  be  covered  by  ground  inaccessible  to  the  enemy  by  nature  01 
rendered  so  by  art.  But  neither  was  this  position  taken  up  by  General  Sicklea 
unavoidable,  nor  was  it  strengthened  by  artificial  defences. 


THE  GETTYSBURG  CAMPAIGN.  345 

General  Sickles'  disposition  of  his  troops  had  precisely  this 
character,  and  was  as  follows  :  his  right  division,  under  Gen 
eral  Humphreys,  was  thrown  forward  several  hundred  yards 
in  advance  of  Hancock's  left,  and  disposed  along  the  Em- 
msttsburg  road.  On  Humphreys'  left,  the  prolongation  of 
the  same  line  was  continued  to  the  left  by  Graham's  brigade 
of  Birney's  division,  as  far  as  the  "  Peach  Orchard,"  where, 
leaving  the  ridge,  the  remainder  of  Birney's  division,  made  up 
of  the  brigades  of  De  Trobriand  and  Ward,  was  refused,  and 
stretched  obliquely  back  through  a  low  ground  of  woods,  a 
wheat-field  and  woods,  towards  Bound  Top,  in  front  of 
which,  in  a  rocky  ravine,  the  left  flank  rested.  Tliis  brought 
the  salient  at  the  peach  orchard,  which  was  therefore  the 
key-point  of  Sickles'  rather  weak  line.  On  this  obtruding 
member,  Lee  determined  to  make  his  attack  ;  for,  as  he  states, 
"  it  appeared  that  if  the  position  held  by  it  could  be  carried, 
its  possession  would  give  facilities  for  assailing  and  carrying 
the  more  elevated  ground  and  crest  beyond." 

This  eccentricity  in  the  placing  of  Sickles'  corps  did  not 
become  known  to  General  Meade  until  about  four  o'clock, 
when  he  arrived  personally  on  that  part  of  the  field;  and 
though  he  then  saw  the  danger  to  which  that  corps  exposed 
itself,  it  was  thought  to  be  too  late  to  correct  the  error  ;  for 
just  at  tha*t  moment,  Longstreet,  under  cover  of  a  powerful 
artillery  fire,  opened  his  attack,  and  all  that  remained  for 
General  Meade  was  to  support  Sickles  as  far  as  could  be  done 
in  the  emergency.  Longstreet  first  advanced  his  right  divi 
sion  under  Hood,  so  that  the  attack  fell  upon  that  part  of 
Sickles'  corps  which  stretched  back  from  the  peach  orchard 
to  the  Bound  Tops — that  is,  upon  the  brigades  of  De  Tro 
briand  and  Ward;  and  while  sharply  assailing  this  front, 
Hood  at  the  same  time  thrust  his  right  unperceived  between 
the  extreme  left  of  Sickles  and  Bound  Top.  The  extraordi 
nary  danger  to  which  this  menace  exposed  not  merely  the 
force  of  Sickles,  but  the  whole  army,  will  be  obvious  when 
it  is  remembered  that  the  possession  of  this  point  would  have 
taken  the  entire  line  in  reverse.  This  result  seemed  at  this 


346  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

moment  imminent,  for  Little  Round  Top  was  quite  unoccupied. 
Had  Hood  known  its  nakedness,  mid,  massing  his  whole  divi 
sion  on  the  force  that  had  outflanked  Sickles'  left,  pushed 
boldly  for  its  rocky  summit,  he  would  have  grasped  in  his 
hand  the  key  of  the  battle-ground,  and  Gettysburg  might 
have  been  one  of  those  fields  that  decide  the  issues  of  wars. 

Fortunately,  at  the  time  Hood  made  his  attack,  General 
Warren,  chief-engineer,  happened  to  reach  Little  Round 
Top.  The  summit  of  this  hill  had  been  used  as  a  signal 
station,  and  at  the  moment  of  his  arrival,  the  signal-officers 
suddenly  seeing  that  the  enemy  had  penetrated  between 
Round  Top  and  the  left  of  Sickles'  line  and  was  approach 
ing  their  position,  were  folding  up  their  flags  to  leave  ; 
but  Warren,  commanding  them  to  continue  waving  them, 
so  as  to  make  at  least  a  show  on  the  hill,  hastened  to  seek 
some  force  wherewith  to  occupy  this  important  point.  It 
happened  at  this  pregnant  moment  that  the  head  of  Sykes' 
column,  which  had  been  ordered  over  to  the  left,  reached  this 
vicinity,  and  the  leading  division  of  this  corps,  under  General 
Barnes,  was  then  passing  out  to  re-enforce  Sickles.  General 
Warren  assumed  the  responsibility  of  detaching  from  this 
force  the  brigade  of  Vincent,  and  this  he  hurried  up  to  hold 
the  position,  while  Hazlitt's  battery  was  by  enormous  labor 
dragged  and  lifted  by  hand  up  the  rocky  brow  of  the  hill 
and  planted  on  its  summit.  As  these  events  followed  in  quick 
succession,  it  resulted  that  while  that  part  of  Hood's  force 
that  had  penetrated  to  the  left  of  the  line  was  approaching 
the  front  slope  of  the  Little  Round  Top,  which  in  a  few  mo 
ments  would  have  been  seized  by  it,  other  claimants  were 
hurrying  up  its  rear.  Vincent's  men,  thrown  forward  at 
the  pas  de  course,  and  without  time  to  load,  reached  the  crest 
just  as  Hood's  Texans,  advancing  in  column  and  without 
skirmishers,  were  running  to  gain  it. 

Little  Round  Top — the  prize  so  eagerly  coveted  by  both, 
combatants — is  a  bold  and  rocky  spur  of  the  lofty  and 
peaked  hill  Round  Top.  It  is  impossible  to  conceive  a 
scene  of  greater  wildness  and  desolation  than  is  presented  by 


THE  GETTYSBURG   CAMPAIGN.  347 

its  bare  and  mottled  figure,  up-piled  with  granite  ledges  and 
masses  of  rock,  and  strewn  with  mighty  boulders,  that  might 
be  the  debris  of  some  antique  combat  of  the  Titans. 

Here  there  ensued  one  of  those  mortal  struggles  rare  in 
war,  when  the  hostile  forces,  clenching  in  close  contest,  illus 
trate  whatever  there  is  of  savage  and  terrible  in  battle.  Yin- 
cent's  brigade,  composed  of  the  Sixteenth  Michigan  (Lieu 
tenant-Colonel  Welsh),  the  Forty-fourth  New  York  (Colonel 
Rice),  the  Eighty-third  Pennsylvania  (Captain  Woodward), 
and  the  Twentieth  Maine  (Colonel  Chamberlain),  coming 
quickly  into  position,  engaged  Hood's  troops  in  a  hand-to- 
hand  conflict,  in  which  bayonets  were  crossed  and  muskets 
clubbed ;  and  officers,  seizing  the  rifles  dropped  from  dead 
hands,  joined  in  the  fray.  After  half  an  hour  of  this  des 
perate  work,  the  position  was  secured.  Meantime,  Weed's 
brigade  of  Ayres'  division  of  the  Fifth  Corps'55'  took  post  on 
Yincent's  right  on  Little  Bound  Top.  Hood's  men,  how 
ever,  clung  fast  to  the  rocky  glen  at  the  base  of  the  hill,  and 
working  their  way  up  the  ravine  between  the  Bound  Tops, 
succeeded  in  turning  the  left  flank.  The  ammunition  of  Yin- 
cent's  troops  was  already  exhausted.  It  therefore  became 
necessary  to  use  the  steel,  and  the  enemy  was  driven  from 
this  point  by  a  charge  with  the  bayonet  by  Colonel  Chamber 
lain's  Maine  Regiment.  Yet  this  rocky  bulwark  was  not 
secured  without  a  heavy  sacrifice.  Colonel  Yiiicent,  who 
had  so  heroically  met  the  first  shock,  laid  down  his  life  in 
defence  of  the  position  ;  O'Rourke  and  the  much-beloved 
General  Weed  were  killed  ;  Hazlitt,  who  commanded  the  bat 
tery,  also  fell  at  his  perilous  post  ;t  and  among  the  ledges  of 
rocks  lay  many  hundred  dead  soldiers  in  blue.J 

*  The  One  Hundred  and  Fortieth  New  York,  of  this  brigade,  had  gone  up 
simultaneously  with  Hazlitt's  battery,  and  participated  in  the  engagement. 

f  Hazlitt  was  bending  over  the  prostrate  form  of  his  commander,  General 
Weed,  and  receiving  his  last  words  and  sighs,  when  a  bullet  threw  him  prone 
and  inanimate  on  the  body  of  his  comrade  in  glory  and  in  death. 

|  Towards  dark,  after  Chamberlain's  charge,  Fisher's  brigade  of  the  Penn 
sylvania  Reserves  re-enforced  Vincent's  troops  ;  and  later  at  night  Chamberlain's 
regiment,  supported  by  two  of  Fisher's  regiments,  occupied  Round  Top  proper 


348  CAMPAIGNS   OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

It  lias  been  seen  that,  at  the  same  time  Hood  thrust  his 
right  through  the  interval  between  Sickles'  left  flank  and 
Bound  Top,  and  entered  upon  the  contest  for  the  possession 
of  that  point,  he  also  assailed  the  portion  of  the  Third  Corps 
line  held  by  Birney's  division.  In  this  attack  he  was 
joined  by  Longstreet's  other  division  under  General  McLaws, 
so  that  this  effort  was  directed  against  the  entire  left  and 
centre  of  the  Third  Corps,  from  its  left  flank  near  Kound  Top, 
forward  to  the  salient  in  the  peach  orchard  on  the  Emmetts- 
burg  road.  But  it  happened  that  Longstreet's  line  as  formed 
did  not  cover  the  entire  front  of  Sickles'  corps  (for  Hood's 
point  of  attack  was  quite  to  the  Confederate  right,  and  Long- 
street  had  only  McLaws'  division  in  addition),  and  it  failed  to 
cover  it  by  about  the  front  held  by  the  right  division  under 
General  Humphreys.  Where  Longstreet's  line  terminated, 
however,  the  prolongation  towards  the  Union  right  was  con 
tinued  by  Hill's  corps,  so  that  Humphreys  had  part  of  that 
corps  in  his  front.  But  Hill's  duty  was,  while  Longstreet 
attacked,  to  make  demonstrations  and  only  assault  in  case  of 
a  good  opportunity.  Thus  it  came  about,  that,  when  Long- 
street,  after  the  development  of  Hood's  attack,  advanced 
McLaws'  division  on  the  left  of  Hood,  the  brunt  of  the  as 
sault  fell  upon  Sickles'  centre  and  left  under  Birney ;  Hum 
phreys'  division  being  for  the  time  unassailed. 

The  onset  of  Hood  and  McLaws  upon  Birney's  front  was 
made  with  great  vigor,  compelling  General  Sickles  immediately 
to  call  for  re-enforcements ;  and  it  was  in  response  to  this  re 
quest  that  General  Barnes'  division  of  the  Fifth  Corps  had  been 
thrown  out  in  support  at  the  time  General  Warren  detached 
from  this  division  the  brigade  of  Vincent  to  hold  Little  Bound 
Top.  Its  other  two  brigades,  under  Colonels  Tilton  and 
Sweitzer,  hastened  to  the  support  of  Birney's  hard-pressed 
troops  on  the  advanced  line  ;  and  General  .Humphreys,  who 
held  the  right  of  the  Third  Corps,  but  had  not  yet  been 
attacked,  sent  one  of  his  own  brigades  under  Colonel  Burling 
to  still  further  help. 

The  heaviest  pressure  of  the  hostile  attack  fell  upon  that 


THE  GETTYSBURG   CAMPAIGN  349 

exposed  portion  of  the  line  where  it  made  an  angle  at  the 
peach  orchard,  and  this  point  of  Sickles'  line  was  held  by 
eight  regiments  belonging  to  Birney's  and  Humphrey's  divi 
sions.  The  assault  was  made  by  McLaws'  left,  supported  by 
Anderson's  division  ;  ard  though  it  was  disputed  by  the 
Union  regiments  with  very  great  stubbornness,  the  position 
was  at  length  carried,  and  the  key-point  remained  in  the 
enemy's  hands. 

Now  certainly,  if  not  before,  was  seen  the  faultiness  of  the 
advanced  line  ;  for  the  enemy  having  burst  through  the  cen 
tre,  was  free  to  penetrate  the  interval  and  assail  in  detail 
the  disrupted  forces  right  and  left.  To  meet  this  menace, 
that  portion  of  the  line  which  was  to  the  right  of  the  peach 
orchard — that  is,  Humphreys'  division  and  Graham's  bri 
gade — swung  back  its  exposed  left,  thus  making  a  change  of 
front  to  face  southward  instead  of  westward,  and  the  batteries 
on  the  forward  crest  under  Major  McGilvray  were  retired  firing. 
That  portion  of  the  line  which  was  to  the  left  of  the  peach 
orchard — namely,  the  brigades  of  Tilton  and  Sweitzer,  that 
had  been  sent  out  to  re-enforce  Birney — being  now  not  only 
assailed  in  front  but  having  its  right  flank  exposed,  fell  back  ; 
and  this  also  involved  Birney's  front. 

It  is  rare  that  a  field  of  battle  displays,  in  a  more  striking 
manner  than  was  here  presented,  the  influence  of  key-points 
in  determining  tactical  results.  The  possession  of  the  peach 
orchard  enabled  the  enemy  to  meet  and  repulse  a  succession 
of  attacks,  and  the  history  of  the  action  on  the  left  presents 
an  extraordinary  series  of  efforts  to  maintain  ground  now 
become  untenable — one  re-enforcement  after  another  being 
thrown  forward  only  to  be  driven  back  in  a  whirling  vortex 
of  advancing  and  retiring  lines. 

The  original  front  of  Birney  had  already  gone  out  and  dis 
appeared,  and  Barnes'  two  brigades  sent  forward  in  support 
had  been  repulsed.  Hereupon  Caldwell's  division  was  de 
tached  from  Hancock's  front  and  ordered  in  to  check  the  hos 
tile  advance.  The  disputed  ground  had  come  to  be  an  inter 
mediate  position  of  woods  and  wheat-field  between  Sickles'  lost 


350  CAMPAIGNS  OF   THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

front  and  the  Bound  Tops,  in  the  rear  now  securely  held. 
C  aid  well  advanced  with  his  left  skirting  Little  Round  Top, 
and  pushing  forward  into  the  wheat-field  engaged  the  enemy 
i  with  the  brigades  of  Cross  and  Kelly.  This  line  was  much 
cut  up,  and  Colonel  E.  E.  Cross,  of  the  Fifth  New  Hamp 
shire  (commanding  the  First  brigade),  whose  intrepid  bear 
ing  had  so  often  been  exhibited  on  the  field  of  battle,  was 
killed.  To  relieve  these  troops,  General  Caldwell  then  ad 
vanced  his  second  line,  made  up  of  the  brigades  of  Brooke 
and  Zook.  The  latter  was  mortally  wounded  while  carrying 
his  troops  into  action.  Brooke  led  his  command  forward  with 
much  gallantry,  and  after  an  exceedingly  stubborn  fight,  drove 
the  enemy  from  under  cover  of  the  woods,  and  from  a  position 
of  great  natural  strength  along  the  rocky  bottom  of  a  creek  at 
its  margin.*  But  this  success,  notwithstanding  that  Sweitzer's 
brigade  was  again  advanced  to  assist  the  attack,  was  tempo 
rary.  Hood  had  already  carried  the  whole  of  the  position 
originally  held  by  the  left  of  the  Third  Corps ;  and  to  hold 
him  in  check  at  that  point,  General  Ayres,  with  two  brigades 
of  the  Regulars  of  the  Fifth  Corps,  moved  forward.  Caldwell 
experienced  the  same  fate  as  those  that  had  gone  before ;  for 
the  Confederates,  penetrating  the  wide  interval  made  by  the 
disruption  of  Sickles'  centre  at  the  peach  orchard,  enveloped 
his  right,  and  penetrated  almost  to  his  rear.  This  quickly 
forced  Caldwell  back,  after  the  frightful  sacrifice  of  one-half 
his  division.  Then  the  enemy,  breaking  out  through  the 
woods  on  the  right,  hurled  Sweitzer  back ;  and  the  division  of 
Regulars,  under  General  Ayres,  being  struck  on  its  right  and 
rear,  fought  its  way  with  great  gallantry  and  heavy  loss 
through  the  enemy  to  its  original  line  of  battle.  I  shall  leave 
now  the  recital  of  the  manner  in  which  he  was  finally 
checked,  and  take  up  the  thread  of  events  on  the  right  of  the 
Third  Corps,  where  Humphreys  yet  clung  with  one  of  his 
flanks  to  his  advanced  position. 

It  has  been  seen  that  when  Sickles'  line  was  cut  in  twain  by 

*  Colonel  Brooke  was  -wounded  in  this  action. 


THE    GETTYSBURG   CAMPAIGN.  351 

the  carrying  of  the  peach  orchard,  Humphreys,  joined  by  the 
brigade  of  Graham,  swung  back  his  left  so  as  to  make  a 
change  of  front,  and  with  his  right  still  held  on  to  the  crest  on 
the  Emmettsburg  road.  For  a  considerable  time,  while  the 
contest  raged  to  his  left,  he  was  not  assailed,  and  the  enemy 
only  made  demonstrations  of  attack;  but  when  finally  the 
whole  left  and  the  troops  that  had  moved  to  its  support  were 
thrown  back,  the  hostile  force  poured  through  the  interval 
and  advanced  to  strike  Humphreys,  whose  left  was  greatly 
exposed,  and  whose  right  was  thrown  much  out  of  position. 
To  support  that  flank,  General  Hancock  sent  forward  two 
regiments  from  Gibbon's  division  (the  Fifteenth  Massachu 
setts,  under  Colonel  Ward,  and  the  Eighty-second  New  York, 
under  Colonel  Huston),  and  to  cover  the  gap  on  the  left,  he 
detached  Willard's  brigade  from  Hays'  division  ;*  but  at  this 
moment  Hill,  converting  his  demonstrations  into  a  real  attack, 
pressed  upon  Humphreys,  who  was  forced  to  fall  back.  In 
the  midst  of  this  action  General  Sickles  was  severely  wounded, 
losing  a  leg.  General  Hancock  hereupon  took  direction  of 
the  Third  Corps  (now  under  General  Birney)  ir  addition  to  his 
own. 

The  attack  on  Humphreys  was  so  sudden  and  severe,  that 
two  additional  regiments  (the  Nineteenth  Massachusetts, 
under  Colonel  Devereux,  and  the  Forty-second  New  York, 
under  Colonel  Mallon),  which  Hancock  had  sent  out  to  his 
assistance,  finding  that  Humphreys  was  retiring,  could  only 
get  quickly  into  line  of  battle,  deliver  a  few  volleys  at  the 
advancing  enemy,  and  then  retire  with  a  considerable  loss. 
The  enemy  pushed  them  so  closely  that  a  number  of  the  Con 
federates,  eagerly  pressing  forward,  fell  prisoners  into  the 
hands  of  those  they  were  pursuing.  Humphreys,  in  retiring 
his  men,  which  he  refrained  from  doing  until  not  only  pressed 
upon  by  the  enemy,  but  until  ordered  back,  felt  the  import 
ance  of  yielding  stubbornly  and  slowly  ;  for  under  the  circum 
stances,  he  judged  that  if  a  rapid  backward  movement  were 

*  Colonel  Willard  waa  killed  in  this  action. 


352  CAMPAIGNS  OF   THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

made,  it  would  be  difficult  to  rally  tlie  men  upon  the  new  line. 
Yet  this  imposed  obstinacy  cost  the  terrible  sacrifice  of  half 
his  small  division.  What  of  its  remains  was  collected  on  the 
original  line  was  the  debris  of  many  regiments — hardly  more 
than  an  ordinary  battalion,  though  with  many  colors.*  Three 
guns  of  one  of  its  batteries  had  been  left  on  the  field,  owing 
to  its  heavy  losses  in  horses  and  cannoniers.  And  now  the 
enemy  began  to  surge  against  the  base  of  the  crest,  and  it  be 
came  urgently  necessary  to  form  a  bulwark  of  men  to  resist 
his  oncoming.  This  was  not  an  easy  task,  for  the  action,  as 
it  rolled  on,  had  fully  involved  Sykes'  corps  on  the  left,  and  a 
large  part  of  the  Second  Corps  had  been  thrown  in  to  aid  the 
Third  at  different  points,  and  was  shockingly  cut  up. 

With  all  that  could  be  done  the  front  was  still  only  patched, 
and  wherever  the  head  of  a  column  could  be  thrust  through, 
the  enemy  was  quick  to  do  so.  Thus  Hancock,  in  riding 
along  the  line,  suddenly  met  a  force  of  the  enemy,  which  hav 
ing,  unobserved,  approached  very  close  to  the  line,  under 
cover  of  a  fringe  of  undergrowth,  was  about  to  pass  through 
an  unprotected  interval.  Opportunely,  the  First  Minnesota  Ke- 
giment  came  up  at  this  moment,  and,  making  an  exceedingly 
spirited  charge,  drove  it  back  in  disorder,  capturing  its  colors. 
The  line  being,  however,  still  incomplete,  Stannard's  brigade 
was  brought  up,  and  General  Meade  led  forward  in  person  a 
part  of  the  Twelfth  Corps,  consisting  of  two  regiments  of 
Lockwood's  Maryland  brigade,  which  were  placed  further  to 
the  left.  This  was  enough,  for  the  enemy's  efforts  were  now 
little  more  than  the  frantic  sallies  of  an  exhausted  wrestler. 
A  terrible  price  had  been  exacted  for  the  success  he  had  won  : 
General  Barksdale,  the  impetuous  leader  of  the  boldest  at 
tack,  was  mortally  hurt,  and  lay  within  the  Union  lines,  and 
many  other  Confederate  officers  were  killed  and  wounded. 
When,  therefore,  Hancock  ordered  a  counter-charge,  the  en 
emy  easily  gave  way.  This  was  made  by  the  portions  of  the 
different  corps  that  had  come  up  to  the  assistance  ;  and  Hum- 


*  Hancock:  Report  of  Gettysburg. 


THE  GETTYSBURG  CAMPAIGN.  353 

phreys'  little  band  joined  in,  and  had  the  satisfaction  to  re 
take  and  bring  back  its  lost  guns.  A  new  line  was  then 
formed  by  Doubleday's  and  Bobinson's  divisions  of  the  First 
Corps,  and  by  troops  from  the  Twelfth  Corps,  brought  up  by 
General  Williams.* 

Thus,  at  dusk,  ended  the  action  on  the  left  centre,  and  at 
the  same  time  the  complicated  action  on  the  left,  whose  ebb 
and  flow  I  have  already  described,  was  brought  to  a  close. 
It  has  been  seen  how  line  after  line  was  swept  back,  and  how 
the  enemy,  following  on  the  heels  of  the  troops  of  Ayres  last 
engaged,  debouched  from  the  woods  in  front  of  Little  Hound 
Top.  Thus  far,  the  success  of  Longstreet  had  indeed  been 
considerable ;  but  it  had  no  decisive  character,  and  until  this 
crest  and  spur  should  be  carried,  he  could  claim  no  substantial 
victory ;  for  the  position  wrested  from  Sickles  was  one  intrin 
sically  false,  and  though  the  successive  attacks  of  Barnes  and 
Caldwell  and  Ayres  had  been  repulsed,  yet  the  advantage  was 
gained  at  a  heavy  cost  to  the  Confederates.  When,  therefore, 
debouching  from  the  woods,  they  suddenly  saw  across  a  nar 
row  swale  the  beetling  sides  of  Little  Bound  Top  crowned 
with  troops  and  artillery,  and  the  figure  of  a  battle  array  de 
fined  on  the  bold  crest  to  the  right,t  their  line  was  visibly 
shaken.  At  this  moment  six  regiments  of  the  division  of 
Pennsylvania  Beserves,  moving  down  the  ridge,  rapidly  ad 
vanced  under  the  personal  leadership  of  General  Crawford. 
This  sally  was  enough  to  determine  the  action;  for  seeing 
attack  to  be  hopeless,  and  in  turn  assailed  themselves,  the 
Confederates,  after  a  sharp  but  brief  contest  for  the  reten 
tion  of  a  stone  wall  occupied  by  them,  hastily  recoiled  to  the 
woods  beyond  the  wheat-field,  the  opposite  margins  of  which 
were  that  night  held  by  the  combatants. 

*  It  had  been  intended  that  Geary's  division  (with  the  exception  of  Greene's 
brigade)  should  also  re-enforce  the  left  ;  but  this  division  missed  its  way.  Gen 
eral  Williams  was  temporarily  in  command  of  the  Twelfth  Corps,  Slocum  hav 
ing  charge  of  the  whole  right  wing. 

]  Bartlett's  and  Wheaton's  brigades,  of  the  Sixth  Corps,  had  just  taken 
position  on  this  crest. 

23 


354  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

Such  was  the  main  current  of  the  action  as  it  fell  on  the 
left  and  left  centre  of  the  army,  and  it  was  fought  by  Long- 
street's  corps  and  a  part  of  Anderson's  division  of  Hill's 
corps.  Now  the  plan  of  battle  contemplated  that,  while 
Longstreet  attacked,  Ewell  should  make  vigorous  demonstra 
tions  against  the  forces  on  Cemetery  and  Gulp's  hills,  to  pre 
vent  re-enforcements  being  drawn  from  that  flank  to  increase 
the  opposition  to  be  encountered  in  the  real  assault  against 
the  Union  left.  For  some  reason,  however,  Swell's  demon 
strations  were  much  delayed,  and  it  was  sunset  before  he 
got  to  work.  Then,  opening  up  with  a  fire  of  artillery  from 
a  knoll  in  front  of  Cemetery  Hill,  he  followed  it  by  a  powerful 
infantry  attack  with  the  divisions  of  Early  and  Johnson — the 
former  on  Cemetery  Hill,  the  latter  on  Gulp's  Hill.  As  Early's 
-columns  defiled  from  the  town,  they  came  under  the  fire  of 
.Stevens'  battery  at  eight  hundred  yards ;  but,  wheeling  into 
line,  they  pushed  up  the  hill,  and  as  their  front  became  un 
masked,  all  the  guns  that  could  be  brought  to  bear  upon  them 
(some  twenty  in  number),  were  opened  upon  them,  first  with 
shrapnel,  then  with  canister,  and  with  excellent  effect,  for  their 
left  and  centre  were  beaten  back.  But  the  right,  working  its 
way  up  under  cover  of  the  houses  and  undulating  ground, 
pushed  completely  through  Wiedrich's  battery  into  Eicketts' 
battery.  The  cannoniers  of  both  batteries  stood  well  to  their 
guns,  and  when  no  longer  able  to  hold  them,  fought  with 
handspikes,  rammers,  and  even  stones.*  Howard's  troops 
were  considerably  shaken  by  the  assault ;  but  the  firmness  of 
the  artillery  and  the  opportune  arrival  of  Carroll's  brigade  of 
the  Second  Corps,  voluntarily  sent  by  General  Hancock  on 
hearing  the  firing,  repulsed  the  attack  and  saved  the  day.f 

But  E well's  efforts  did  not  end  here  ;  for  at  the  same  time 
this  attack  was  made,  he  threw  his  left  division,  under  Gen 
eral  Johnson,  up  the  ravine  formed  by  Eock  Creek,  and 

*  Hunt :  Report  of  Artillery  at  Gettysburg. 

f  "  Ewell  had  directed  Rodes'  division  to  attack  in  concert  with  Early,  cov 
ering  his  right.  When  the  time  came  to  attack,  Rodes  not  having  Ms  troops 
in  position,  was  unprepared  to  co-operate  with  Early." — Lee's  Report,  MS. 


THE  GETTYSBURG  CAMPAIGN.  355 

Btruck  the  extreme  right  of  the  Union  position  on  Gulp's  Hill. 
If  Swell's  delay  had  thwarted  the  original  intention  of  pre- 
yenting  re-enforcements  being  sent  from  the  right  to  buffet 
!Longstreet's  attack,  it  at  least  gave  him  the  opportunity  to 
make  his  demonstration,  when  at  length  made,  really  effective  ; 
for  such  heavy  detachments  had  been  taken  from  the  Twelfth 
Corps  to  re-enforce  the  left  during  the  operations  of  the  after 
noon,  that  there  remained  of  this  corps  but  a  single  brigade, 
under  General  Greene,  drawn  out  in  a  thin  line,  with  the  divi 
sion  of  Wadsworth  on  its  left.  The  brunt  of  the  attack  fell 
upon  Greene,  who,  re-enforced  by  parts  of  Wadsworth's 
troops,  maintained  his  own  position  with  great  firmness,  but 
Swell's  left  penetrated  without  opposition  the  vacated  breast 
works  on  the  furthest  right,  and  this  foothold  within  tho 
Union  lines  he  held  during  the  night. 

Thus  closed  the  second  day's  action,  and  the  result  was 
such  that  the  Confederate  commander,  believing  he  would 
be  able  ultimately  to  carry  the  position,  resolved  to  renew 
attack  on  the  morrow.  It  must  be  admitted  that  the  events 
of  the  day  seemed  to  justify  this  belief.  Longstreet  had 
carried  the  whole  front  on  which  the  Third  Corps  had 
been  drawn ;  Swell's  left  was  thrust  within  the  breastworks 
on  the  right,  in  a  position  which,  if  held  by  him,  would  enable 
him  to  take  Meade's  entire  line  in  reverse,  and  the  Union  loss 
in  the  two  days'  combat  had  already  reached  the  frightful 
aggregate  of  upwards  of  twenty  thousand  men.  But  Lee's 
inference,  though  specious,  was  unwarranted.  The  position 
carried  from  Sickles  at  such  costly  price  to  the  assailants 
was  no  part  of  the  real  line  as  drawn  on  the  crest  of  hills 
south  of  Gettysburg.  This,  intact  throughout,  remained  yet 
to  be  assailed ;  and  such  was  the  confidence  felt  by  the  corps- 
commanders  in  their  ability  to  maintain  this  position,  that 
notwithstanding  the  partial  reverses  of  the  day,  and  the 
heavy  loss  sustained,  when  they  came  together  that  night 
there  was  a  unanimous  determination  to  fight  it  out  at  Get 
tysburg — a  sentiment  which  was  quite  in  accord  with  General 
Meade's  own  conviction. 


356  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

VIII. 
GETTYSBURG— THE  THIRD  DAY. 

Lee's  plan  of  attack  of  the  previous  day  had  been  directed 
against  both  flanks  of  the  Union  position,  but,  as  I  have  shown, 
though  the  whole  of  the  advanced  line  on  the  left  had  been 
carried,  this  only  brought  Longstreet  abreast  a  more  formida 
ble  front  drawn  on  the  original  line.  Ewell,  however,  still 
maintained  his  foothold  within  the  breastworks  on  Gulp's 
Hill;  and  this  lodgment  inside  of  the  works  on  the  right 
shaped  the  determination  of  the  first  plan  of  attack  for  the 
third  day.  "General  Ewell,"  says  Lee,  "had  carried  some 
of  the  strong  positions  which  he  assailed,  and  the  result  was 
such  as  to  lead  to  the  belief  that  he  would  ultimately  be  able 
to  dislodge  the  enemy."* 

With  this  view,  Johnson's  force,  hugging  closely  Gulps' 
Hill,  was  considerably  strengthened ;  but  before  preparations 
could  be  made  for  an  attack,  Meade  assumed  the  offensive 
and  drove  back  the  intrusive  force.  During  the  night  a 
powerful  artillery  was  accumulated  against  the  point  entered 
by  the  enemy,  and  at  four  o'clock  opened  a  heavy  fire.  Mean 
while,  the  troops  of  the  Twelfth  Corps  returned  from  the 
left,  and  the  divisions  of  Williams  and  Geary,  aided  by 
Shaler's  brigade  of  the  Sixth  Corps,  entered  upon  a  severe 
struggle  to  regain  the  lost  portion  of  the  line.  After  four 
hours'  close  contest,  it  was  carried  by  a  charge  of  Geary's 
division,  the  original  line  on  Gulp's  Hill  was  re-established 
and  the  right  flank  made  secure.  Being  thus  thwarted  in  his 
plan  of  attack  on  the  right — a  plan  which,  besides,  would 
have  been  difficult  of  execution,  owing  to  the  wide  separation 
of  the  Confederate  wings — General  Lee  altered  his  determina 
tion  and  resolved  to  assault  the  centre  of  the  Union  position. 
In  this  he  seems  to  have  aimed  to  imitate  Wagram. 

*  Lee    Report  of  Gettysburg. 


THE  GETTYSBURG   CAMPAIGN.  357 

That  some  weighty  design  was  in  preparation  by  the  enemy 
was  throughout  the  morning  evident ;  for  after  the  struggle 
had  ceased  on  the  right  there  was  for  some  hours  a  deep 
silence.  During  all  this  time  the  Confederates  were  placing 
in  position  heavy  masses  of  artillery.  Lee,  less  sanguine 
than  the  day  before,  knew  well  that  his  only  hope  lay  in  his 
ability,  first  of  all,  to  sweep  resistance  from  the  slopes  before 
the  assaulting  columns  moved  forward.  By  noon  a  hundred 
and  forty -five  guns  were  in  position  along  the  ridge  occupied 
by  Longstreet  and  Hill.  At  one  o'clock  the  ominous  silence 
was  broken  by  a  terrific  outburst  from  this  massive  concen 
tration  of  the  enginery  of  war.  Ample  means  for  a  reply  in 
kind  were  at  hand ;  for  General  Hunt,  the  chief  of  artillery, 
had  crowned  the  ridge  along  the  left  and  left  centre,  on  which 
it  was  manifest  the  attack  was  to  fall,  with  eighty  guns — a 
number  not  as  great  as  that  of  the  enemy,  but  it  was  all 
that  could  be  made  effective  in  the  more  restricted  space 
occupied  by  the  army.*  Withholding  the  fire  until  the  first 
hostile  outburst  had  spent  itself,  General  Hunt  then  ordered 
the  batteries  to  open  ;  and  thus  from  ridge  to  ridge  was  kept 
up  for  near  two  hours  a  Titanic  combat  of  artillery  that  caused 
the  solid  fabric  of  the  hills  to  labor  and  shake,  and  filled  the 
air  with  fire  and  smoke  and  the  mad  clamor  of  two  hundred 
guns.  During  this  outburst  the  troops  crouched  behind  such 
slight  cover  as  they  could  find ;  but  the  musket  was  tightly 
grasped,  for  each  man  knew  well  what  was  to  follow — knew 
that  this  storm  was  but  the  prelude  to  a  less  noisy,  yet  more 
deadly  shock  of  infantry.  When,  therefore,  after  the  duel  had 

*  In  tlie  cemetery  were  placed  Dilger's,  Bancroft's,  Eakin's,  Wheeler's, 
Hill's,  and  Taft's  batteries,  under  Major  Osborne.  On  the  left  of  the  cemetery 
the  batteries  of  the  Second  Corps,  under  Captain  Hazard — namely,  those  of 
Woodruff,  Arnold,  Cushing,  Brown,  and  Rorty.  Next  on  the  left  was 
Thomas's  battery,  and  on  his  left  Major  McGilvray's  command,  consisting  of 
Thompson's,  Phillips',  Hart's,  Sterling's,  Ranks',  Dow's,  and  Ames'  of  the  re 
serve  artillery,  to  which  was  added  Cooper's  battery  of  the  First  Corps.  On 
the  extreme  left,  Gibbs'  and  Rittenhouse's  (late  Hazlitt's)  batteries.  As  batter 
ies  expended  their  ammunition,  they  were  replaced  by  batteries  of  the  artillery 
reserve,  sent  forward  by  its  efficient  chief,  Colone"  R.  O.  Tyler. 


358  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

continued  for  near  two  hours,  the  chief  of  artillery,  finding 
his  ammunition  running  low,*  and  that  it  was  unsafe  to  bring 
up  loads  of  it  from  the  rear  (for  many  caissons  and  limbers 
had  been  exploded),  directed  that  the  firing  should  be  gradu 
ally  stopped :  the  enemy  also  slackened  fire,  and  immediately 
the  Confederate  columns  of  attack  were  seen  forming  on  the 
edge  of  the  woods  that  cover  the  Seminary  Eidge. 

As  Pickett's  division  of  Longstreet's  corps  had  reached  the 
ground  during  the  morning,  and  as  Longstreet  wished  to  use 
the  divisions  of  Hood  and  McLaws  in  covering  his  right,  it 
was  appointed  to  lead  the  van.f  Pickett  formed  his  divi 
sion  in  double  line  of  battle,  with  Kemper's  and  Garnett's 
brigades  in  front  and  Armistead's  brigade  supporting  ;  while 
on  the  right  of  Pickett  was  one  brigade  of  Hill's  corps,  un 
der  General  Wilcox,  formed  in  column  by  battalions  ;  and  on 
his  left,  Heth's  division  (also  of  Hill's  corps),  under  General 
Pettigrew.  The  attacking  force  numbered  about  fifteen  thou 
sand  men,  and  it  advanced  over  the  intervening  space  of  near 
a  mile  in  such  compact  and  imposing  order,  that,  whether 
friend  or  foe,  none  who  saw  it  could  refrain  from  admiration 
of  its  magnificent  array.  The  hostile  line,  as  it  advanced, 
covered  a  front  of  not  more  than  two  of  the  reduced  and 
incomplete  divisions  of  the  Second  Corps,  numbering,  it  may 
be,  some  six  thousand  men.  While  crossing  the  plain,  it 
received  a  severe  fire  of  artillery,  which,  however,  did  not 
delay  for  a  moment  its  determined  advance;  so  that  the 
column  pressing  on,  came  within  musketry  range — the  troops 
evincing  a  striking  disposition  to  withhold  their  fire  until  it 
could  be  delivered  with  deadly  effect.  The  first  opposition  it 
received  was  from  two  regiments  of  Stannard's  Vermont 


*  Report  of  Artillery  Operations. 

f  The  absence  of  Pickett's  division  the  day  before  made  General  Long. 
street  very  loth  to  make  the  attack,  but  Lee,  thinking  the  Union  force  was 
not  all  up,  would  not  wait.  Longstreet  urged  in  reply  that  this  advantage  (or 
supposed  advantage,  for  the  Union  force  was  all  up)  was  countervailed  by  the 
fact  that  he  was  not  all  up  either :  but  the  Confederate  commander  was  not 
minded  to  delay.  My  authority  is  again  General  Longstreet. 


THE  GETTYSBURG  CAMPAIGN.  359 

brigade  of  the  First  Corps,  which  had  been  posted  in  a  small 
grove  to  the  left  of  the  Second  Corps  in  front  of  and  at  a  con 
siderable  angle  with  the  main  line.  These  regiments  opened 
upon  the  right  flank  of  the  enemy's  advancing  lines,  which 
received  also  an  oblique  fire  from  eight  batteries  under  Major 
McGilvray.  This  caused  the  Confederate  troops  on  that  flank 
to  double  in  a  little  towards  their  left,  but  it  did  not  stay 
their  onward  progress.  As,  during  the  passage  of  the  enemy 
across  the  intervening  plain,  the  rifled  guns  had  fired  away 
all  their  canister,  they  were  withdrawn  or  left  on  the  ground 
inactive,  to  await  the  issue  of  the  impending  shock  between 
the  two  masses  of  infantry — a  shock  momentarily  expected, 
for  the  assailants  approached  steadily,  while  the  Union  force 
held  itself  braced  to  receive  the  impact.  When  at  length  the 
hostile  lines  had  approached  to  between  two  and  three  hundred 
yards,  the  divisions  of  Hays  and  Gibbon  of  the  Second  Corps 
opened  a  destructive  fire,  and  repeated  it  in  rapid  succession. 

This  sally  had  the  effect  to  instantly  reveal  the  unequal 
metal  of  the  assaulting  mass,  and  proved  what  of  it  was  iron 
and  what  clay.  It  happened  that  the  division  on  the  left  of 
Pickett,  under  command  of  General  Pettigrew,  was,  in  con 
siderable  part,  made  up  of  North  Carolina  troops  compara 
tively  green.  To  animate  them,  they  had  been  told  that  they 
would  meet  only  the  Pennsylvania  militia.  But  when,  ap 
proaching  the  slope,  they  received  the  feu  d'enfer  from  Hays' 
line,  there  ran  through  their  ranks  a  cry,  the  effect  of  which  was 
like  to  that  which  thrilled  a  Greek  army  when  it  was  said  that 
the  god  Pan  was  among  them — "  The  Army  of  the  Potomac !" 

Thus  suddenly  undeceived  in  regard  to  their  opponents, 
Pettigrew's  troops  broke  in  disorder,  leaving  two  thousand 
prisoners  and  fifteen  colors  in  the  hands  of  Hays'  division. 
Now,  as  Wilcox's  brigade  had  not  advanced,  Pickett's  divi 
sion  remained  alone  a  solid  lance-head  of  Virginia  troops, 
tempered  in  the  fire  of  battle.  Solitary, this  division,  buffet 
ing  the  fierce  volleys  that  met  it,  rushed  up  the  crest  of 
Cemetery  Bidge,  and  such  was  the  momentum  of  its  assault 
that  it  fairly  thrust  itself  within  Hancock's  line. 


360  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  AEMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

It  happened  that  the  full  strength  of  this  attack  fell  upon 
Webb's  brigade  of  three  regiments.  This  brigade  had  been 
disposed  in  two  lines :  two  of  its  regiments,  the  Sixty -ninth 
and  Seventy-first  Pennsylvania,  posted  behind  a  low  stone  wall 
and  slight  breastwork  hastily  constructed  by  them,  while  the 
remaining  regiment  (the  Seventy-second  Pennsylvania)  lay 
behind  the  crest  some  sixty  paces  to  the  rear,  and  so  placed 
as  to  fire  over  the  heads  of  those  in  front.  "When  the  swift 
advancing  and  yelling  array  of  Pickett's  force  had,  notwith 
standing  the  volleys  it  met,  approached  close  up  to  the  stone 
wall,  many  of  those  behind  it  seeing  their  fire  to  be  now 
vain,  abandoned  the  position ;  and  the  Confederates,  detect 
ing  this  wavering,  rushed  over  the  breastworks,  General 
Armistead  leading,  and  crowned  the  stone  wall  with  their 
standards.  The  moment  was  certainly  as  critical  as  can  well 
be  conceived  ;  but  happily,  the  regiments  that  had  been  hold 
ing  the  front  line  did  not,  on  falling  back,  do  so  in  panic  :  so 
that  by  the  personal  bravery  of  General  Webb  and  his  offi 
cers,  they  were  immediately  rallied  and  reformed  on  the 
remainder  of  the  brigade,  which  held  the  second  line  behind 
the  crest,  and  Hancock,  who  had  the  day  before  turned  the 
fortunes  of  the  battle  in  a  similar  emergency,  again  displayed 
those  qualities  of  cool  appreciation  and  quick  action  that  had 
proved  him  one  of  the  foremost  commanders  on  the  actual 
field  of  battle,  and  instantly  drew  together  troops  to  make  a 
bulwark  against  any  further  advance  of  the  now  exultant 
enemy. 

As  the  hostile  front  of  attack  was  quite  narrow,  it  left  Han 
cock's  left  wing  unassailed.  From  there  he  drew  over  the 
brigades  of  Hall  and  Harrow  ;*  and  Colonel  Devereux,  com 
manding  the  Nineteenth  Massachusetts  Eegiment,  anxious  to 
be  in  the  right  place,  applied  for  permission  to  move  his 
regiment  to  the  front — a  request  gladly  granted  by  Hancock, 

*  One  Hundred  and  Fifty-first  Pennsylvania  and  Twentieth  New  York 
State  Militia,  both  under  Gates  of  Doubleday's  division,  First  Corps,  partici 
pated. 


THE  GETTYSBURG  CAMPAIGN.  361 

wlio  also  gave  Mallon's  Forty-second  New  York  Regiment 
the  same  direction;  while  Colonel  Stannard  moved  two  re 
giments  of  his  Vermont  brigade  to  strike  the  enemy  on  the 
right  flank.  These  movements  were  quickly  executed,  but 
not  without  confusion,  owing  to  many  men  leaving  their  ranks 
to  fire  at  the  enemy  from  the  breastworks.  When  the  new 
line  was  formed,  it  was  found  that  the  situation  was  very 
peculiar  ;  for  the  men  of  all  brigades,  while  individually  firm, 
had  in  some  measure  lost  their  regimental  organization — a 
confusion  that  arose  from  the  honorable  ambition  of  indi 
vidual  commanders  to  promptly  cover  the  point  penetrated  by 
the  enemy.  The  essential  thing  was  secured,  however — the 
breach  was  covered,  and  in  such  force  that,  in  regular  forma 
tion,  the  line  would  have  stood  four  ranks  deep. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  the  brigade  of  Stannard  held 
an  advanced  po:at  on  Hancock's  left.  As  the  assaulting 
column  passed  his  right  to  strike  "Webb,  he  moved  to  the 
right,  changed  front  forward,  and  opened  a  very  savage  fire 
on  the  enemy's  flank.  At  the  same  time,  the  colors  of  the 
different  regiments  were  advanced  in  defiance  of  the  long  line 
of  battle-flags  presented  by  the  Confederates,  and  the  men 
pressing  firmly  after  them  engaged  in  a  brief  and  determined 
combat  and  utterly  overthrew  the  foe.  "Whatsoever  valor 
could  do  to  wrest  victory  from  the  jaws  of  hell,  that  it  must 
be  conceded  the  troops  of  Pickett  had  done  ;  but  now,  seeing 
themselves  in  a  desperate  strait,  they  flung  themselves  on  the 
ground  to  escape  the  hot  fire  and  threw  up  their  hands  in 
token  of  surrender,  while  the  remnant  sought  safety  in  flight. 
Twenty-five  hundred  prisoners  and  twelve  battle-flags  were 
taken  at  this  point,  which  brought  the  aggregate  of  Han 
cock's  captures  up  to  four  thousand  five  hundred  prisoners 
and  twenty-seven  standards.  The  Confederate  loss  in  killed 
and  wounded  was  exceedingly  severe.  Of  the  three  brigade 
commanders  of  Pickett's  division,  Garnett  was  killed,  Armi- 
stead  fell  fatally  wounded  within  the  Union  lines,  and  Kemper 
was  borne  off  severely  hurt.  In  addition,  it  left  behind  four 
teen  of  its  field-officers,  and  only  a  single  one  of  that  rank 


362  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

escaped  unhurt,  while  of  its  rank  and  file  three-fourths  were 
dead  or  captives.  Pettigrew's  division,  also,  though  it  had 
faltered  earlier,  was  much  cut  up  and  lost  many  officers,  besides 
heavily  in  killed,  wounded,  and  prisoners.  But  this  illustrious 
victory  was  not  purchased  without  severe  price  paid;  and 
this  was  sadly  attested  in  the  thousands  of  dead  and  wounded 
that  lay  on  the  plain.  The  loss  in  officers  was  again  especially 
heavy ;  and  among  the  wounded  were  Generals  Gibbon  and 
Hancock ;  but  the  latter  did  not  leave  the  field  till  he  learned 
the  tidings  of  the  discomfiture  of  the  enemy. 

After  the  repulse  of  Pickett's  assault,  Wilcox's  command, 
that  had  been  on  the  right  but  failed  to  move  forward,  ad 
vanced  by  itself  to  the  attack,  and  came  to  within  a  few  hun 
dred  yards  of  Hancock's  line ;  but  in  passing  over  the  plain 
it  met  severe  artillery  fire,  and  Stannard  detached  a  force* 
which  took  it  in  flank  and  rear,  capturing  several  hundred 
prisoners :  the  rest  fled.f  This  ended  the  combat,  though 
towards  dusk  General  Crawford  advanced  across  the  wheat- 
field  into  the  woods  and  took  several  hundred  prisoners 
and  a  large  number  of  arms.  During  the  action,  the  cavalry 
had  been  operating  on  the  flanks,  Kilpatrick's  division  on  the 
left,  and  Gregg's  division  on  the  right.  Both  divisions  dis 
played  much  gallantry  and  suffered  heavy  loss.t 

When  the  shattered  columns  of  attack  returned  to  their 


*  The  Sixteenth  Vermont,  supported  by  a  detachment  of  the  Fourteenth 
Vermont. 

f  It  had  not  "been  designed  that  Wilcox  should  attack,  but  simply  cover,  the 
right  flank  of  Pickett's  assaulting  column.  But  he  did  not  move  forward  with 
suflicient  promptness  to  effect  the  former  purpose,  and  when  Pickett  had  been 
repulsed,  he  made  a  foolish  and  isolated  attack.  Thus,  in  the  first  instance,  he 
did  not  move  forward  enough,  and  in  the  second  he  moved  too  far. 

J  The  scope  of  this  work  does  not  permit  the  recital  of  the  details  of  the  nu 
merous  cavalry  affairs;  but  I  cannot  forbear  to  mention  the  very  spirited 
attack  on  Hood's  right  by  the  brigades  of  Farnesworth  and  Merritt,  operating 
on  the  left  flank  of  the  army.  Farnesworth,  with  the  First  Vermont  and  First 
Virginia  Cavalry,  cleared  a  fence  in  his  front,  sabred  the  enemy  behind  it,  and 
then  rushed  on  the  second  line  and  up  to  the  muzzles  of  the  guns,  where  most 
of  them  fell,  and  their  gallant  leader  at  their  head. 


THE  GETTYSBURG  CAMPAIGN.  363 

lines  on  Seminary  Eidge,  it  was  clear  to  Lee  that  the  attempt 
to  break  through  the  Union  position  was  hopeless.  Tho 
troops  went  back  much  disrupted,  and  it  was  only  by  the  en 
ergetic,  personal  exertions  of  Longstreet  and  of  Lee  that  they 
were  rallied  and  re-formed.  It  is  said  that  a  counter-attack 
by  the  Union  forces  was  much  feared  at  this  moment ;  and  it 
is  possible  that  had  General  Meade  been  aware  of  the  extent 
of  the  damage  he  had  inflicted  on  his  opponent,  and  the  ex 
treme  disorder  of  the  moment,  as  also  that  the  Confederate 
ammunition  had  run  very  low,  an  immediate  advance  by  the 
left  might  have  converted  the  repulse  into  a  rout.  But  it 
must  be  borne  in  mind  that  he  did  not  then  know  these  things, 
and  all  he  did  know  favored  a  cautious  policy.  For  his  own 
loss  was  terrible,  the  different  corps  were  much  intermingled, 
and  to  have  quitted  his  defences  would  have  exposed  him  to 
a  repulse  similar  to  that  the  enemy  had  just  received ;  and  as 
— with  the  exception  of  a  few  brigades  of  Sedgwick's  corps — 
there  were  no  reserves,  attack  must  have  been  made  by 
already  exhausted  troops.* 

With  Lee  there  now  remained  only  the  alternative  of  re- 

*  So  far  as  I  am  aware,  the  only  important  witness  on  the  Confederate  side 
in  favor  of  attack  at  this  time,  is  Colonel  Fremantle  of  the  British  service. 
Referring  to  the  situation  after  Pickett's  repulse,  he  says  :  "  It  is  difficult  to 
exaggerate  the  critical  state  of  affairs  as  they  appeared  about  this  time.  If 
the  enemy,  or  their  general,  had  shown  any  enterprise,  there  is  no  saying  what 
might  have  happened.  General  Lee  and  his  officers  were  evidently  fully  im 
pressed  with  a  sense  of  the  situation."  But  the  sequel  seems  to  belie  this ;  for 
he  immediately  remarks  :  "  Yet  there  was  much  less  noise,  fuss,  or  confusion 
of  orders  than  at  an  ordinary  field-day ;  the  men  as  they  were  rallied  in  the 
woods,  were  brought  up  in  detachments,  and  lay  down  quietly  and  coolly  in 
the  positions  assigned  them." — Three  Months  in  the  Confederate  States,  pp. 
269-270.  A  very  different  view  of  the  probable  success  of  an  assault  at  this 
time  is  given  by  Captain  Ross,  of  the  Austrian  service,  who  also  witnessed  tha 
battle  from  the  Confederate  side.  "  The  enemy,"  says  he,  "  made  no  attempt 
to  follow  up  their  advantage,  and  it  is  well  for  them  they  did  not.  I  see  that 
a  General  Butterfield,  in  evidence  given  before  some  Federal  committee,  blames 
General  Meade  for  not  attacking  Lee's  right  after  the  repulse,  imagining  that 
enormous  captures  of  guns  and  other  great  successes  would  have  been  the  re 
sult.  It  was,  however,  well  for  the  Federals  that  General  Meade  did  not  do  so 


364  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

treat ;  and  bitter  as  this  alternative  was — seeing  that  it  in* 
volved  the  abandonment  of  the  scheme  of  invasion  and  all 
the  high  hopes  built  thereon — it  was  imperative,  for  the  posi 
tion  he  had  to  assail  was  one  against  which  he  might  dash 
his  army  to  pieces,  but  against  which  he  could  now  hope  for 
no  success.  Yet  he  did  not  begin  an  immediate  retreat,  but 
waited  the  whole  of  the  following  day,  during  which  he  was 
withdrawing  his  trains  and  disposing  his  army  for  a  retro 
grade  movement.  And  it  is  the  most  striking  proof  that  could 
be  given  of  the  confidence  Lee  still  had  in  his  troops,  that 
during  that  whole  4th  of  July  he  was  in  a  mood  to  invite 
rather  than  dread  an  attack.  Retiring  his  left  from  around 
the  base  of  Gulp's  Hill  and  from  the  town  of  Gettysburg, 
which  was  reoccupied  by  Howard's  troops  during  the  fore 
noon,  a  strong  line  of  works  was  thrown  up  from  the  Semi 
nary  northwestward,  and  covering  the  Mummasburg  and 
Chambersburg  roads,  while  another  line  was  formed  on  the 
right  flank,  perpendicular  with  their  general  front,  and  ex 
tending  back  to  Marsh  Creek.  Here,  while  employed  in  the 
work  of  sending  off  their  wounded,  burying  their  dead,  etc., 
the  Confederates  stood  at  bay,  hopeless  of  venturing  another 
attack,  yet  quite  willing  to  be  attacked. 

But  this  was  not  in  the  line  of  General  Meade's  intent,  for 
having  gained  a  victory,  and  being  certain  of  the  necessity 
that  was  upon  his  antagonist  of  making  a  retreat,  he  was  in 
no  mood  to  jeopard  an  assured  success  by  any  rash  adven- 


for  lie  would  have  found  McLaws  and  Hood's  divisions  there  perfectly  ready 
and  willing  to  give  him  a  much  hotter  reception  than  he  would  have  liked." 
—Cities  and  Camps  of  the  Confederate  States,  p.  65.  On  the  Union  side,  many 
of  the  generals  present  have  testified  before  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of 
the  War,  in  favor  of  attack.  See  Report,  second  series,  vol.  i.,  passim. 

But  since  the  above  text  was  written,  I  have  become  convinced  from  testimony 
more  weighty  than  any  given  above — to  wit,  the  testimony  of  General  Long- 
street  himself— that  attack  would  have  resulted  disastrously.  "  I  had,"  said 
that  officer  to  the  writer,  "  Hood  and  McLaws,  who  had  not  been  engaged  ;  I 
had  a  heavy  force  of  artillery  ;  I  should  have  liked  nothing  better  than  to  have 
been  attacked,  and  have  no  doubt  I  should  have  given  those  who  tried  as  bad  a 
reception  as  Pickett  received." 


THE  GETTYSBURG  CAMPAIGN.  365 

ture.  Accordingly,  nothing  was  done  save  to  make  some 
demonstrations  of  a  rather  feeble  character,  and  the  day  was 
passed  in  attentions  to  the  wounded  and  burying  the  dead, 
while  holding  the  army  in  hand  for  pursuit.  That  night  Lee 
began  to  retire  by  the  Chambersburg  and  Fairfield  roads, 
which  leading  westward  from  Gettysburg,  pass  through  the 
South  Mountain  range  into  the  Cumberland  Valley  at  a  dis 
tance  of  seven  miles  from  each  other.  As  a  severe  storm 
had  come  on  during  the  afternoon  and  continued  during  the 
night,  the  roads  were  rendered  very  bad  ;  so  that  the  retreat 
was  made  painfully  and  slowly,  and  the  rear  of  the  column 
did  not  leave  its  position  near  Gettysburg  until  after  day 
light  of  the  5th.  General  Meade,  as  soon  as  he  was  satisfied 
that  the  enemy  had  actually  withdrawn,  took  measures  to  fol 
low  up  the  retreat. 

"When  it  became  possible  to  take  account  of  the  losses  of 
this  great  battle,  it  was  found  that  on  the  Union  side  they 
included  two  thousand  eight  hundred  and  thirty-four  killed, 
thirteen  thousand  seven  hundred  and  thirty-three  wounded, 
and  six  thousand  six  hundred  and  forty -three  missing,  mak 
ing  an  aggregate  of  twenty-three  thousand  one  hundred  and 
ninety.*  On  the  side  of  the  Confederates,  they  were  sup 
posed  to  be  near  thirty  thousand,  whereof  nearly  fourteen 
thousand  were  prisoners.f 

*  Official  Records  of  the  War  Department. 

f  This  is  simply  an  approximate  estimate,  as  no  report  of  the  Confederate 
casualties  was  ever  made  public.  "  It  is  not,"  says  General  Lee,  "  in  my 
power  to  give  a  correct  statement  of  our  casualties,  which  were  severe."  Lee : 
Report  of  Gettysburg.  The  number  of  prisoners  captured  by  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  as  by  official  returns,  was  thirteen  thousand  six  hundred  and  twenty 
one.  (Meade :  Report  of  Gettysburg).  1  believe  that  the  above  estimate  of 
thirty  thousand  for  Lee's  total  loss  will  not  prove  to  be  in  excess  of  the  truth. 
Lee's  infantry  present  for  duty  on  the  31st  May  was  68,352  ;  and  on  July 
31st  it  was  41,135— the  difference  being  27,217. 


366          CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF   THE  POTOMAC. 


IX. 

THE   CONFEDERATE   RETREAT. 

The  retreat  of  Lee,  which  became  definitively  known  on 
the  morning  of  Sunday,  July  5,  brought  with  it  the  important 
question  of  pursuit. 

Now,  there  were  two  lines  by  which  the  Confederates  might 
be  followed  up  :  the  one  was  a  direct  pursuit  by  the  same 
routes  over  which  they  had  retreated,  pressing  them  down  the 
Cumberland  Valley ;  the  other,  a  flank  march  by  the  east  side 
of  the  South  Mountains,  defiling  by  the  Boonsboro'  passes, 
with  the  view  to  head  off  the  enemy  or  take  him  in  flank. 
The  former  had  the  recommendation  of  being  the  shorter  line 
— the  distance  to  the  Potomac  (at  Williamsport)  being  in  this 
case  about  forty  miles  ;  and  by  the  latter  line,  nearly  eighty. 
The  only  disadvantage  attending  it  arose  from  the  fact  that 
the  enemy  might  hold  the  debouches  of  the  mountains  with  a 
rear-guard,  while  making  good  his  escape  with  his  main  body 
and  trains.  General  Meade  appears  to  have  been  in  some 
doubt  as  to  the  proper  method  of  action  ;  but  on  the  morning 
of  the  5th,  he  sent  a  column  in  direct  pursuit.  He  ordered 
Sedgwick's  Sixth  Corps  (then  the  freshest  in  the  army)  to  fol 
low  up  the  enemy  on  the  Fairfield  road,  while  he  dispatched 
a  cavalry  force  to  press  the  retreating  Confederates  on  the 
Chambersburg  road.  Sedgwick  that  evening  overtook  the 
rear  of  the  Confederate  column  at  a  distance  of  ten  miles, 
where  the  Fairfield  road  breaks  through  a  pass  in  the  South 
Mountain  range  This  position  was  found  to  be  very  de 
fensible  ;  but  there  was  no  occasion  to  attack  it,  for  another 
course  had,  meanwhile,  been  determined  on,  and  Sedgwick 
was  recalled. 

Instead  of  pursuing  the  enemy  by  the  direct  route  over 
which  he  had  retreated,  General  Meade  judged  it  better  to 


THE  GETTYSBURG  CAMPAIGN.  367 

make  a  flank  march  by  Middletown  and  the  lower  passes  of 
the  South  Mountain.  To  this  end,  General  French,  who  with 
seven  thousand  men  had  since  the  evacuation  of  Harper's 
Ferry  been  occupying  Frederick,  was  directed  to  seize  these 
passes  in  advance  and  repossess  himself  of  Harper's  Ferry. 
Both  these  duties  were  fulfilled  by  General  French,  who  also 
sent  out  a  cavalry  force  that  penetrated  as  far  as  Williamsport, 
and  destroyed  there  a  Confederate  ponton-bridge  across  the 
Potomac.  Then  the  army  was  put  in  motion  by  the  east  side 
of  the  South  Mountains.  On  July  6th  a  large  part  of  the 
army  moved  from  Gettysburg  towards  Emmettsburg,  and  the 
remainder  the  following  day.  July  7th,  the  headquarters  were 
at  Frederick.  The  8th,  they  were  at  Middletown,  and  nearly 
al]  the  army  was  concentrated  in  the  neighborhood  of  that 
place  and  South  Mountain.  The  9th,  headquarters  were  at 
South  Mountain  House,  and  the  advance  of  the  army  at 
Boonsboro'  and  Kohrersville.  The  10th,  headquarters  were 
moved  to '  Antietam  Creek :  the  left  of  the  line  crossed  the 
creek,  and  the  right  of  the  line  moved  up  near  Funkstown. 
The  llth,  the  engineers  put  a  new  bridge  over  the  Antietam 
Creek ;  the  left  of  the  line  advanced  to  Fairplay  and  Jones' 
cross-roads,  while  the  right  remained  nearly  stationary.  The 
13th,  Meade  had  his  forces  in  front  of  the  position  taken  up 
by  Lee  to  cover  the  passage  of  the  Potomac. 

The  above  data  will  suffice  to  show  that  the  pursuit  was 
conducted  with  an  excessive  circumspection;  and  Lee,  hav 
ing  reached  the  river  six  days  before,  had  had  time  to  select 
and  fortify  a  strong  position.  Indeed,  the  Confederate  army 
might  have  effected  an  unmolested  escape  into  Virginia,  had 
it  not  been  for  the  fact  that  the  great  rains  had  so  swollen 
the  Potomac  as  to  make  it  impassable  by  the  ford  at  Wil 
liamsport,*  and  that  the  ponton-bridge  at  Falling  Waters  had 
been  destroyed  by  General  French.  This  perilous  circum- 


*  "  The  Potomac  was  found  to  be  so  much  swollen  by  the  rains  that  had 
fallen  almost  incessantly  since  our  entrance  into  Maryland,  as  to  be  unfordable." 
-  -Lee :  Report  of  Campaign  in  Pennsylvania. 


368  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

stance  compelled  Lee  to  take  up  a  defensive  position  where 
he  might  stand  at  bay,  while  his  communications  were  being 
re-established. 

As  the  event  proved,  it  would  probably  have  been  a  better 
course  to  have  pushed  the  pursuit  by  the  direct  line,  as  ap 
pears  to  have  been  at  first  intended  when  Sedgwick,  on  the 
5th,  was  thrown  forward  on  the  Fairfield  road.  The  obstruc 
tions  which  Lee  could  have  placed  in  the  defiles  of  the  South 
Mountains  cannot  be  considered-  as  presenting  any  serious 
difficulty;  for  General  Smith  with  a  division  of  militia  had 
moved  forward  from  the  Susquehanna,  on  the  3d,  into  the 
Cumberland  Valley,  and  on  the  5th  he  seized  and  held  a  pass 
in  the  South  Mountains,  a  few  miles  above  that  through 
which  the  Confederate  force  passed.  By  this  the  whole  army 
might  readily  have  defiled  through  the  South  Mountains  to  fall 
on  Lee's  flank  and  rear.*  If  nothing  had  been  accomplished 
by  this  means,  the  retreat  of  Lee  would  still  have  been  fol 
lowed  so  closely,  that  coming  to  the  Potomac,  and  having  an 
impassable  river  in  his  rear,  his  situation  would  have  been 
one  of  the  very  gravest  peril. 

It  cannot  be  said  that  General  Meade  was  not  alive  to  the 
importance  of  striking  Lee  a  blow  before  he  should  be  able 
to  make  good  his  retreat.  But  he  was  tardy  in  realizing  the 
severity  of  the  damage  he  had  inflicted  on  his  opponent,  and 
the  distance  the  army  was  compelled  to  march  by  the  line 
adopted  (double  that  by  the  Cumberland  Valley),  together 
with  the  slowness  of  the  march  (in  part  necessitated  by  the 
bad  condition  of  the  roads  owing  to  the  severe  storm),  re 
sulted  in  Lee's  being  able  to  take  up  a  position  on  the 
Potomac ;  and  having  reached  this  point  three  days  before 


*  "  On  Saturday  (5th),  I  held  the  most  northern  pass,  through  which,  by 
rapid  marching,  Meade  might  have  cut  off  the  enemy's  rear-guard  in  the  other 
passes,  if  they  had  tried  to  hold  them.  Moreover,  on  July  the  6th  (the  day 
Meade  moved),  I  held  the  broad  turnpike  pass  to  Chambersburg,  through 
which  he  might  have  marched  his  entire  army  in  two  days,  if  all  the  other 
had  been  held."— Private  letter  from  General  W.  F.  Smith. 


A  CAMPAIGN   OF  MANOEUVRES.  385 

pursued  by-roads  between  the  columns  of  Warren  and  Hill, 
came  up,  and  this  brought  the  entire  force  of  Lee  in  front  of 
the  Second  Corps.  Nevertheless,  before  Lee  could  make  dis 
positions  for  attack,  night  came  on,  and,  under  its  friendly 
cover,  Warren  retired,  and  next  morning  joined  the  main  body 
of  the  army  massed  at  Centreville.* 

Meade  was  now  strongly  posted  on  the  heights  of  Centre- 
ville,  and  if  compelled  to  fall  back  from  there,  would  do  so 
into  the  fortifications  of  Washington.  As  no  additional  turn 
ing  movement  could  be  of  any  avail,  Lee  pushed  his  advance 
no  further.  His  intention  had  been  to  gain  Meade's  rear,  and 
as  this  was  now  completely  foiled,  he  was  not  minded  to  essay 
assault  on  the  army  in  position.  Resolving,  however,  not  to 
have  made  an  utterly  useless  campaign,  he  threw  forward  a 
thin  line  as  far  as  Bull  Eun,  and  thus  masking  his  design,  he 
proceeded  to  destroy  the  Orange  and  Alexandria  Eailroad 
from  that  point  southward  to  Warrenton  Junction.  Having 
effectually  accomplished  that  object,t  he,  on  the  18th,  began  a 
retrograde  movement. 

Meade  commenced  pursuit  on  the  following  day,:):  but  with 
out  overtaking  Lee ;  and  in  this  movement  there  occurred  no 
rencounter  of  a  more  serious  character  than  the  wonted  inde 
cisive  cavalry  combats.  Stuart,  with  his  two  divisions  of 
horse,  covered  the  retrograde  movement,  and  during  the  en 
tire  march  was  constantly  engaged  in  skirmishes  with  the 
Union  cavalry.  One  of  these  affairs  was  of  some  import 
ance.  While  on  the  advance  towards  Warrenton,  on  the 
19th,  Kilpatrick's  division  skirmished  warmly  with  Hamp- 

*  General  Lee  states  that  Hill's  attack  was  made  by  two  brigades,  and  ex 
tenuates  the  result  by  stating  that  the  assault  was  "  against  greatly  superior 
numbers."  But  Hill's  own  Report  shows  that  he  had  two  divisions  on  the  field. 
Warren  met  their  attack  with  little  over  three  thousand  men. 

f  Lee's  Report. 

\  This  delay  in  following  up  was  owing  to  the  fact  that  since  the  army  had 
crossed  to  the  north  side,  that  stream  had  become  much  swollen  by  heavy 
rains  ;  and  previous  to  that,  not  anticipating  that  the  ponton-bridges  would  be 
needed,  they  had  been  sent  with  the  other  trains  some  eight  or  ten  miles  to  the 
rear. 

25 


386  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OP  THE  POTOMAC. 

ton's  division  up  to  Bucldand  Mills,  at  the  crossing  of  Broad 
Run,  on  the  south  bank  of  which  Hampton  took  post,  under 
the  personal  direction  of  Stuart,  who  here  planned  a  skilful 
manoeuvre  to  defeat  his  opponent.  Kilpatrick  having  forced 
the  crossing  by  turning  the  flank  of  Hampton,  Stuart  fell 
back  slowly  towards  Warrenton  with  the  view  of  permitting 
Fitz  Lee's  cavalry  division  to  come  up  from  Auburn  and 
attack  the  Union  cavalry  in  flank  and  rear.  This  plan  was 
carried  out  with  some  success.  Fitz  Lee  arriving  just  below 
Bucldand  surprised  Kilpatrick's  force  on  the  flank,  and  Stuart, 
hearing  Fitz  Lee's  guns,  pressed  vigorously  in  front  with 
Hampton's  division.  A  stubborn  resistance  was  offered,  but 
a  charge  au  fond  finally  forced  Kilpatrick's  command  to  give 
way,  and  he  retreated  in  some  confusion.*  Lee  retired  be 
hind  the  Eappahannock. 

The  Army  of  the  Potomac  being  pushed  forward  as  far  as 
Warrenton,  General  Meade  was  compelled  to  halt  there  to 
await  the  repairing  of  the  Orange  and  Alexandria  Eailroad. 
This  work,  undertaken  with  much  energy,  was  accomplished 
early  in  November ;  and  on  the  7th,  the  whole  army  continued 
the  advance  towards  the  Eappahannock  in  two  columns.  Gen 
eral  French  had  command  of  the  left  wing,  composed  of  the 
First,  Second,  and  Third  corps,  and  General  Sedgwick  had 
command  of  the  right  wing,  composed  of  the  Fifth  and  Sixth 
corps.  The  left  column  was  directed  to  cross  the  Eappahan 
nock  at  Kelly's  Ford,  and  the  right  column  at  Eappahannock 
Station.  Lee  held  position  south  of  the  Eappahannock,  in 
the  vicinity  of  Culpepper,  with  outposts  at  Kelly's  Ford  on  the 
south  bank,  and  at  Eappahannock  Station  on  the  north  bank. 
The  Third  Corps  under  Birney  had  the  advance  on  Kelly's 
Ford,  and  on  reaching  that  point,  Birney  crossed  over  a  divi 
sion  by  wading,  without  waiting  for  the  laying  of  the  ponton- 
bridges,  and  advancing  an  attacking  party,  composed  of  Ber- 

*  Stuart  says,  "  great  confusion."  "  I  pursued  them  from  three  miles  of 
Warrenton  to  Buckland,  the  horses  at  full  speed  the  whole  distance,  the  enemy 
retreating  in  great  confusion."— Stuart's  Report.  But  the  reports  of  Custer  and 
Kilpatrick  are  naturally  not  so  frank  as  to  avow  this. 


A  CAMPAIGN  OP  MANOEUVRES.  387 

dan's  Sharp-shooters,  the  Fortieth  New  York,  the  First  and 
Twentieth  Indiana,  the  Third  and  Fifth  Michigan,  and  the 
One  Hundred  and  Tenth  Pennsylvania  regiments,  carried  the 
rifle-pits  and  captured  five  hundred  prisoners.  The  enemy 
was  prevented  from  strengthening  the  force  in  the  works 
by  the  fire  of  batteries  on  the  heights  on  the  north  side, 
which  swept  the  plain  on  the  southern  bank.  Birney's  loss 
was  trivial. 

While  the  left  column  was  thus  passing  at  Kelly's  Ford, 
the  right  wing  was  forcing  a  crossing  against  more  formida 
ble  obstacles.  The  Confederates  occupied  a  series  of  works 
on  the  north  bank  of  the  river  at  Eappahannock  Station, 
which  had  been  built  some  time  before  by  the  Union  troops, 
and  consisted  of  a  fort,  two  redoubts,  and  several  lines  of 
rifle-trenches.  These  works  were  held  by  two  thousand  men 
belonging  to  Early's  division  of  Swell's  corps.  Commanding 
positions  to  the  rear  of  the  fort  having  been  gained,  heavy 
batteries  were  planted  thereon,  and  a  fierce  cannonade  opened 
between  the  opposing  forces.  Just  before  dark,  a  storming 
party  was  formed  of  Russell's  and  Upton's  brigades  of  the 
Sixth  Corps,  and  the  works  were  carried  by  a  very  brilliant 
coup  de  main.  Over  fifteen  hundred  prisoners,  four  guns,  and 
eight  standards  were  here  taken.  Sedgwick's  loss  was  about 
three  hundred  in  killed  and  wounded. 

This  brilliant  opening  of  the  campaign  should  have  insured 
a  decisive  operation  ;  and  it  is  probable  that,  if  a  rapid  ad 
vance  had  been  made  either  towards  Culpepper  or  to  the 
south  of  it  by  Stevensburg,  the  Confederate  army,  which  lay 
in  winter-quarters  in  echelon  from  Kelly's  Ford  to  the  west  of 
Culpepper,  might  have  been  cut  in  two.  But  the  army  having 
crossed  on  the  night  of  the  7th  and  morning  of  the  8th, 
the  whole  of  that  day  was  wasted  in  useless  and  uncertain 
movements,*  and  Lee,  not  courting  battle,  availed  himself  of 
the  opportunity  that  night  to  withdraw  again  across  the 


*  On  this  point,  see  Birney's  testimony :  Report  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War. 
second  series,  vol.  i.,  p.  372 ;  Warren's  testimony  :  Ibid.,  p.  385, 


388  CAMPAIGNS  OF   THE  ARMY  OF  THE   POTOMAC. 

Eapidan.  Meade  then  advanced  and  took  up  position  be- 
tween  the  Happahannock  and  the  Rapidan,  which  was  nearly 
the  same  ground  he  held  before  his  retreat. 

This  campaign  may  be  regarded  from  two  points  of  view, 
and  from  each  is  susceptible  of  a  different  critique.  Consid 
ered  as  a  movement  to  meet  Lee's  advance,  it  was  perfectly 
successful,  and  its  conduct  highly  creditable.  Lee's  line  of 
manoeuvre  was,  it  is  true,  exterior  to  that  of  Meade,  and  as  it 
was  necessary  for  him  to  pursue  circuitous  routes  in  order  to 
effect  his  turning  movements,  this  imposed  on  the  former  con 
siderably  greater  marching.  Yet  he  had  a  clear  object  in  view, 
whereas  his  antagonist  was  necessarily  delayed  by  ignorance 
of  his  opponent's  real  design.  The  very  success  of  Lee's  plan 
depended  on  being  pushed  impetuously.  Nevertheless,  he  de 
layed  at  Madison  Courthouse,  which  thwarted  the  success  of 
his  first  flank  movement ;  and  he  delayed  again  at  Warrenton, 
which  baulked  that  of  his  second.  But  even  in  view  of  these 
halts,  which  General  Lee  partly  explains  on  the  ground  that 
they  were  necessary  in  order  to  supply  the  troops,  the  opera 
tions  of  the  14th  were  not  conducted  with  much  vigor.  Ewell 
allowed  himself  to  be  detained  by  the  rear-guard,  at  Auburn, 
from  early  in  the  morning  till  noon ;  and  from  Greenwich  he 
took  a  blind  track  across  the  fields,  which  he  found  very  diffi 
cult,  and  which  gave  him  much  delay,  thus  preventing  his 
junction  with  Hill  at  Bristoe  until  too  late.  Nor  was  Hill's 
march  made  with  much  more  expedition ;  for  notwithstanding 
that  his  route  to  Bristoe  was  but  four  miles  longer  than  that 
of  Warren,  and  that  the  latter  was  delayed  for  several  hours 
by  his  rencounter  with  Ewell  at  Auburn,  he  reached  the  de 
cisive  point  as  soon  as  Hill.  Warren's  conduct  throughout 
these  operations  was  excellent,  and  a  model  of  the  execution 
of  the  duties  of  a  rear- guard. 

But  if,  on  the  other  hand,  we  look  upon  General  Meade's 
line  of  duty  as  calling  essentially  for  offensive  action,  his 
course  in  this  retrograde  movement  is  open  to  another  order 
of  criticism. 


A  CAMPAIGN  OF  MANOEUVRES.  389 

It  is  due  to  observe  that  General  Meade  not  only  did  not 
wish  to  avoid  battle,  but  he  was  really  anxious  to  precipitate 
decisive  action,  provided,  always,  he  could  fight  on  advanta 
geous  terms.  Yet  he  appears  to  have  overpassed  several 
excellent  openings  for  a  bold  initiative.  It  would  have  been 
interesting  to  see  the  result  of  a  determination  that,  overleap 
ing  a  too  pedantic  view  of  the  nature  and  uses  of  lines  of 
communication,  would  have  tried  the  experiment  of  holding 
the  army  in  a  favorable  position  and  allowed  Lee  to  continue 
his  turning  movements.  There  is  little  doubt  that  if  Meade 
had  held  fast  either  at  Culpepper  or  at  Warrenton,  Lee 
would  not  have  ventured  beyond  those  points,  for  his  oppo 
nent  would  then  have  been  on  his  communications,  to  whose 
endangered  safety  he  would  have  presently  been  recalled. 
Lee's  conduct  throughout  shows  how  diffident  he  was  in  re 
gard  to  this  point — feeling  his  way,  and  afraid  to  move  until 
he  had  first  started  Meade,  which  was  the  very  way  of  defeat 
ing  the  object  he  had  in  view,  if  he  really  wished  to  interpose 
between  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  and  Washington — a  pur 
pose  which,  under  the  circumstances,  was  only  to  be  accom 
plished  by  the  utmost  audacity  of  movement. 

There  is  another  opportunity  of  which  General  Meade 
might  have  availed  himself,  and  which  I  shall  point  out. 
When,  on  the  12th,  the  Second,  Fifth,  and  Sixth  corps  had 
been  sent  back  across  the  Eappahannock  under  a  false  lead, 
these  corps  were  in  position,  by  a  move  to  the  right,  to  fall 
upon  the  rear  of  Lee's  column  in  crossing  at  Sulphur  Springs. 
This  would  have  been  a  bold  move,  and  would  have  been  as 
effective  as  a  retrograde  movement  in  relieving  French  on  the 
north  bank  of  the  Eappahannock.  But  it  would  have  been 
somewhat  hazardous;  for  Lee  might  have  disputed,  with  a 
part  of  his  force,  the  passage  of  the  ^Bstham  fork  of  the 
Eappahannock,  and  moved  with  the  rest  to  overwhelm  the 
Third  Corps  at  Freeman's  Ford.  It  is  quite  likely  that  Gen 
eral  Meade,  who  was  exceedingly  anxious  to  bring  on  a  bat 
tle,  would  have  made  some  of  the  moves  indicated,  had  ha 
received  prompter  intelligence  of  his  opponent's  movements. 


390  CAMPAIGNS  OP  THE  ARMY  OF  THE   POTOMAC. 

But  he  was  excessively  ill-informed  by  his  cavalry,  and  in 
each  case  learned  the  enemy's  position  only  when  it  had 
already  become  too  late  to  act  upon  it. 

The  line  of  manoeuvre  adopted  by  General  Lee  in  this 
campaign  was  the  same  as  that  used  by  him  in  the  previous 
summer  against  Pope's  army.  But  the  result  was  very  dif 
ferent  :  and  this  arose  from  two  causes.  Lee  had  now  neither 
a  lieutenant  capable  of  making  such  a  flank  march  as  that 
of  Jackson  on  Manassas,  nor  such  an  opponent  as  Pope  ;  for, 
if  Meade's  action  was  not  brilliant,  he  at  least  did  not  lose  his 
head.  As  a  whole,  the  campaign  added  no  laurels  to  either 
army ;  yet  it  was  none  the  less  attended  with  much  toil  and 
suffering — sleepless  nights  and  severe  marches  and  manifold 
trying  exposures.  But  this  is  a  part  of  the  history  of  the 
army,  of  which  those  who  did  not  bear  the  heat  and  burden 
of  the  day  can  never  know  much. 


III. 
MINE   RUN. 

Judging  from  the  experience  of  such  military  operations  as 
had  been  attempted  during  previous  years  at  the  season  now 
reached,  it  might  have  been  inferred  that  the  army  could  do 
nothing  better  than  go  into  winter-quarters  and  await  the 
coming  spring  before  entering  upon  a  new  campaign.  But 
General  Meade  felt  that  the  condition  of  the  public  mind 
would  hardly  brook  delay ;  and  being  himself  very  eager  for 
action,  he  anxiously  watched  a  favorable  opportunity  to 
deliver  battle.  Such  an  opportunity  he  thought  he  saw 
towards  the  end  of  November ;  and  he  then  planned  an  opera 
tion  known  as  the  "Mine  Run  move" — an  operation  which 
deserved  better  success  than  it  met. 

It  was  ascertained  that  Lee,  while  resting  the  right  of  his 


A  CAMPAIGN  OF  MANOEUVRES.  391 

array  on  the  Bapidan  near  Morton's  Ford,  had  left  the  lower 
fords  of  the  river  at  Ely's,  Culpepper  Mine,  Germanna  and 
Jacobs'  mills  uncovered,  and  depended  for  the  defence  of 
that  flank  upon  a  line  of  intrenchments  which  he  had  con 
structed  perpendicular  to  the  river  and  extending  along  the 
left  bank  of  a  small  tributary  of  the  Bapidan  named  Mine 
Bun,  which  flows  almost  at  right  angles  with  the  former 
stream,  and  empties  into  it  at  Morton's  Ford.  Belying  for 
the  security  of  his  right  upon  that  line,  Lee  had  placed  his 
force  in  cantonments  covering  a  wide  extent  of  country  ;  so 
that  while  Swell's  corps  held  position  from  Morton's  Ford  to 
Orange  Courthouse,  Hill's  corps  was  distributed  from  south 
of  that  point  along  the  railroad  to  near  Chaiiottesville,  with 
an  interval  of  several  miles  between  the  two  corps. 

This  wide  separation  of  his  opponent's  forces  gave  Meade 
the  hope  that,  by  crossing  the  Bapidan  at  the  lower  fords, 
turning  the  Confederate  right,  and  advancing  quickly  towards 
Orange  Courthouse  by  the  plank  and  turnpike  roads  that 
connect  that  place  with  Fredericksburg,  he  might  be  able  to 
interpose  between  the  two  hostile  bodies  under  Ewell  and 
Hill,  and  destroy  them  in  detail. 

This  plan,  different  from  the  kind  of  operations  ordinarily 
attempted  in  Yirginia,  was  well  suited  to  the  circumstances. 
It  was  based  upon  a  precise  mathematical  calculation  of  the 
elements  of  time  and  space,  of  the  kind  for  which  Napoleon 
was  so  famous,  and  depended  absolutely  for  its  success  on  a 
rigorous  execution  of  all  the  foreordained  movements  in  the 
foreordained  time  and  way.  Thus  planning,  Meade  attempted 
the  bold  coup  d'essaye  of  cutting  entirely  loose  from  his 
base  of  supplies,  and,  providing  his  troops  with  ten  days' 
rations,  he  left  his  trains  on  the  north  side  of  the  Bapidan, 
relying  on  the  meditated  success  to  open  up  new  lines  of 
communication. 

The  movement  was  begun  at  dawn  of  the  26th  of  November, 
and  the  order  of  march  was  as  follows.  The  Fifth  Corps,  fol 
lowed  by  the  First  Corps,  was  to  cross  the  Bapidan  at 
Culpepper  Mine  Ford  and  proceed  to  Parker's  Store,  on  the 


392  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

plankroad  to  Orange  Courthouse.  The  Second  Corps  was  to 
cross  at  Germanna  Ford,  and  proceed  out  on  the  turnpike 
(which  runs  parallel  with  the  plankroad)  to  Robertson's 
Tavern.  To  this  point  also  the  Third  Corps,  crossing  at 
Jacobs'  Mill  Ford,  and  followed  by  the  Sixth  Corps,  was  to 
march  by  other  routes,  and  there  make  a  junction  with  the 
Second  Corps.  With  the  left  thus  at  Parker's  Store  and  the 
right  at  Robertson's  Tavern,  the  army  would  be  in  close  com 
munication  on  parallel  roads,  and  by  advancing  westward  to 
wards  Orange  Courthouse  would  turn  the  line  of  the  Mine 
Run  defences,  which  it  was  known  did  not  extend  as  far  south 
as  to  cross  the  turnpike  and  plankroads.  As  the  distance  of 
the  several  corps  from  their  encampments  to  the  assigned 
points  of  concentration  was  under  twenty  miles,  General 
Meade  reasonably  assumed  that  marching  early  on  the  26th, 
each  corps-commander  would  be  able  to  make  the  march 
inside  of  thirty-four  hours,  or,  at  most,  by  noon  of  the 
27th.  It  remains  to  relate  how  this  well-devised  and  meri 
torious  plan  was  baulked  by  circumstances  that,  though 
seemingly  trivial  to  those  uninstructed  in  war,  are  yet  the 
very  elements  that  in  a  large  degree  assure  success  or  entail 
failure. 

The  first  of  these  delays  was  occasioned  by  the  tardiness  of 
movement  of  the  Third  Corps  under  General  French,  which 
having  a  greater  distance  to  march  than  the  other  corps,  yet 
did  not  reach  its  assigned  point  for  the  crossing  of  the 
Rapidan  until  three  hours  after  the  other  corps  had  arrived. 
This  caused  a  delay  to  the  whole  army  of  the  time  named ;  for, 
not  knowing  what  he  should  encounter  on  the  other  side, 
General  Meade  was  unwilling  to  allow  the  other  corps  to 
cross  until  the  Third  was  up.  A  second  obstacle  was  the 
result  of  an  unpardonable  blunder  on  the  part  of  the  engi 
neers  in  underestimating  the  width  of  the  Rapidan,  so  that 
the  ponton-bridges  it  was  designed  to  throw  across  that 
stream  were  too  short,  and  trestle-work  and  temporary  means 
had  to  be  provided  to  increase  their  length.  In  addition, 
another  cause  of  delay  resulted  from  the  very  precipitous 


A  CAMPAIGN  OF  MANCEUVEES. 


banks  of  the  Rapidan,  which  rendered  the  passage  of  the  ar 
tillery  and  trains  tedious  and  difficult.  The  effect  of  these 
several  circumstances  was  that  the  army,  instead  of  making 
the  passage  of  the  river  early  in  the  day,  was  not  across 
until  the  following  morning.  Twenty-four  hours  had  passed, 
and  only  half  the  distance  was  made. 

Early  on  the  morning  of  the  27th,  the  corps  were  again  in 
motion,  and,  under  imperative  orders  from  General  Meade, 


SKETCH  OP  MINE  RUN. 


they  pushed  forward  with  greater  rapidity.  The  Second  Corps, 
under  General  Warren,  reached  its  designated  point  at  Robert- 
son's  Tavern,  about  one  o'clock,  and  meeting  a  force  of  the 
enemy,  immediately  began  to  develop  its  strength  and  position 
by  a  brisk  skirmish  fire.  It  will  be  remembered  that,  accord 
ing  to  the  plan,  this  corps  was  here  to  have  been  joined  by  the 
Third  Corps,  and  it  was  not  allowed  to  make  a  serious  attack 


394  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE   POTOMAC. 

until  General  French  should  arrive.  But  that  officer  had 
fallen  into  a  series  of  luckless  mishaps,  by  which  it  happened 
that  soon  after  crossing  the  Eapidaii  at  Jacobs'  Mill,  he  took 
the  wrong  road  to  reach  Eobertson's  Tavern,  falling  upon  a 
route  too  much  to  the  right,  which  brought  it  against  John 
son's  division  of  Swell's  corps.  With  this  force  it  had  a  brisk 
brush,  and  by  the  time  it  could  extricate  itself,  get  on  the 
right  road,  and  open  communications  with  Robertson's  Tavern, 
it  was  night. 

Meanwhile,  the  intention  was  fully  disclosed,  and  Lee,  as 
may  be  supposed,  was  not  inactive.  Hill's  corps,  which  had 
been  scattered  far  south  of  Orange  Courthouse,  was  called 
up;  Ewell  was  withdrawn  from  his  advanced  position  on 
which  he  had  checked  French  and  confronted  Warren,  and 
the  whole  Confederate  force  concentrated  on  the  line  of  Mine 
Eun,  to  bar  progress  beyond  that  point. 

Had  the  original  intention  of  march  been  carried  out,  this 
line  would  not  have  opposed  a  barrier  to  Meade's  advance ; 
for  though  Mine  Eun  crosses  the  two  roads  on  which  the 
army  was  to  advance  towards  Orange  Courthouse,  yet  its 
defences  did  not  stretch  as  far  southward  as  these  two  roads 
— the  right  being,  in  fact,  at  Bartlett's  Mills,  on  Mine  Eun, 
and  thence  up  to  the  Eapidan.  But,  by  the  disclosure  of 
Meade's  purpose,  Lee  was  able  to  extend  his  line  so  as  to 
cover  these  roads,  and  the  nature  of  the  ground  and  the  im 
provised  works  that  might  be  thrown  up  in  the  course  of  four- 
and-twenty  hours,  would  render  the  position  a  very  powerfu.1 
one. 

The  Confederate  line  was  drawn  along  a  prominent  ridge 
or  series  of  heights,  extending  north  and  south  for  six  or  eight 
miles.  This  series  of  hills  formed  all  the  angles  of  a  complete 
fortification,  and  comprised  the  essential  elements  of  a  fort 
ress.  The  centre  of  the  line  presented  four  or  five  well- 
defined  facings  of  unequal  length,  occupying  a  space  of  more 
than  three  thousand  yards,  with  such  angles  of  defence  that 
the  fire  of  the  enemy  was  able  to  enfilade  every  avenue  of 
approach/while  his  right  and  left  flanks  were  not  less  strongly 


A  CAMPAIGN   OF  MANOEUVRES.  395 

protected.  Stretching  immediately  iu  the  rear  and  on  the 
Hanks  of  this  position  was  a  dense  forest  of  heavy  timber, 
while  some  twelve  hundred  yards  in  front  was  Mine  Hun — 
a  stream  of  no  great  width,  but  difficult  for  infantry  to 
cross  from  the  marshy  ground  and  dense  undergrowth  of 
stunted  timber  with  which  it  was  frequently  flanked  on  either 
side,  as  well  as  from  the  abrupt  nature  of  its  banks.  In  addi 
tion  to  these  natural  defences,  the  enemy  quickly  felled  in 
front  of  a  large  extent  of  his  position  a  thick  growth  of  pine 
as  an  abatis,  and  hastily  constructed  trenches  and  breast 
works  for  infantry.  The  position  was,  in  fact,  exceedingly 
formidable. 

This  is  what  the  army  presently  found  out,  when,  being  at 
length  concentrated,  it  pushed  forward  on  the  f oh1  owing  morn 
ing,  the  28th — the  enemy  having  during  the  night  abandoned 
his  advanced  position — and  after  a  short  march  of  two  or 
three  miles  found  itself  brought  up  against  the  line  of  Mine 
Eun.  Upon  reaching  this  point  the  troops  were  immediately 
put  into  position,  and  reconnoissances  were  made  with  the 
view  of  ascertaining  a  point  of  attack.*  At  the  same  time 
that  these  reconnoissances  were  made,  General  Warren,  with 
the  Second  Corps,  strengthened  by  a  division  of  the  Sixth 
Corps,  was  sent  to  move  upon  the  enemy's  right ;  find  out 
how  far  south  his  line  extended,  and,  if  possible,  outflank  and 
turn  him.  In  these  tentative  efforts  passed  the  28th  of  No 
vember. 

Next  day,  "Warren,  having  moved  southward  to  the  Cathar- 
pin  Road,  completed  his  observation  of  the  Confederate  right, 
and  announced  the  conditions  as  favorable  for  an  attack 
from  that  point.  At  the  same  time,  Sedgwick,  having  care 
fully  examined  the  Confederate  left,  reported  that  there  was  a 
point  there  which  he  thought  weak  and  assailable.  General 

*  "  In  order  to  secure  an  efficient  and  active  reconnoissance,  orders  were 
given  to  every  corps-commander  to  prepare  himself  to  attack  the  enemy  in  his 
immediate  front,  and  to  examine  critically,  and  to  ascertain,  as  early  as  he 
possibly  could,  where  would  be  the  best  place  to  attack  the  enemy." — Meade's 
evidence :  Report  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  p.  345. 


396  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

Meade  accordingly  resolved  to  make  attack  on  both  wings, 
and  for  the  purpose  of  strengthening  the  force  with  which 
Warren  was  to  operate  on  the  left,  he  detached  from  the 
corps  of  French  two  divisions  which  were  sent  to  the  former, 
which  made  Warren's  force  some  twenty-six  thousand  men. 
Sedgwick,  with  his  Sixth  Corps,  supported  by  the  Fifth, 
would  operate  on  the  right.  French,  with  the  remaining 
division  of  his  command  and  two  divisions  of  the  First  Corps, 
under  Newton,  would  hold  an  interval  of  four  miles  between 
the  right  and  left ;  and  as  this  centre  would  be  weak,  it  was 
assigned  a  role,  of  simple  observation.  Dispositions  in  accord 
ance  with  this  plan  were  not  completed  until  late  on  Sunday, 
the  29th ;  so  it  was  resolved  to  make  the  attack  next  morn 
ing,  and  it  was  appointed  that  after  a  heavy  artillery  fire, 
Warren,  on  the  left,  should  open  the  attack  at  eight  o'clock, 
and  that  an  hour  after  he  was  engaged,  Sedgwick  should 
assault  on  the  right.* 

Early  on  Monday  morning  the  army  was  under  arms,  impa 
tiently  awaiting  the  signal-gun.  At  last,  the  sound  of  Sedg- 
wick's  cannon  came  roiling  along  the  line,  when  the  entire 
artillery  of  the  right  and  centre  opened  upon  the  works  of  the 
enemy.  But  not  an  echo  from  Warren  on  the  left !  The 
explanation  of  this  silence  soon  came  in  intelligence  brought 
by  an  aid-de-camp.  A  close  observation  of  the  enemy's 
position  by  dawn  revealed  a  very  different  state  of  facts  than 
was  presented  the  previous  evening,  t  The  presence  of  War 
ren's  troops  had  attracted  Lee's  attention  to  his  right,  and 
during  the  night  he  had  powerfully  strengthened  that  flank 
by  artillery  in  position  and  by  infantry  behind  breastworks 
and  abatis.  Looking  at  the  position  with  the  critical  eye  of 
an  engineer,  but  not  without  those  lofty  inspirations  of  cour- 

*  This  disposition  was  based  on  the  hope  that  as  Warren's  attack  was  to 
be  the  main  one,  his  opening  first  would  cause  the  Confederates  to  weaken 
their  left,  opposed  to  Sedgwick,  and  thus  afford-  him  a  favorable  opportunity. 

f  It  happened  frequently  during  the  war  that  dispositions  were  made  dur 
ing  the  day  for  attack  the  following  morning.  Attacks  thus  planned  in  ad 
vance  generally  failed,  as  might  be  expected. 


A  CAMPAIGN  OF  MANOEUVRES.  397 

age  that  o'erleap  the  cold  dictates  of  mathematical  calcula 
tion,  Warren  saw  that  the  task  was  hopeless  ;  and  so  seeing, 
he  resolved  to  sacrifice  himself  rather  than  his  command.  He 
assumed  the  responsibility  of  suspending  the  attack. 

His  verdict  was  that  of  his  soldiers — a  verdict  pronounced 
not  in  spoken  words,  but  in  a  circumstance  more  potent  than 
words,  and  full  of  a  touching  pathos. 

The  time  has  not  been  seen  when  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
shrank  from  any  call  of  duty ;  but  an  unparalleled  experi 
ence  in  war,  joined  to  a  great  intelligence  in  the  rank  and  file. 
had  taught  these  men  what,  by  heroic  courage,  might  be  done, 
and  what  was  beyond  the  bounds  of  human  possibility.  Eec- 
ognizing  that  the  task  now  before  them  was  of  the  character 
of  a  forlorn  hope,  knowing  well  that  no  man  could  here  count 
on  escaping  death,  the  soldiers,  without  sign  of  shrinking  from 
the  sacrifice,  were  seen  quietly  pinning  011  the  breast  of  their 
blouses  of  blue,  slips  of  paper  on  which  each  had  written  his 
name  ! 

That  this  judgment  of  General  Warren  and  of  his  troops 
was  correct,  General  Meade  became  himself  convinced  on 
riding  over  to  the  left  and  viewing  the  position.  It  was,  in  fact, 
even  more  formidable  than  the  line  of  the  Kapiclan,  which  it 
had  been  considered  impracticable  to  assail  by  a  front  attack. 
The  only  possible  opportunity  of  now  continuing  the  enter 
prise  was  by  moving  still  further  to  the  left,  and  by  manoeu 
vring  on  Lee's  right,  endeavor  to  force  him  out  of  his  intrenched 
line.  But,  under  the  circumstances,  with  the  uncertainties  of 
a  Virginia  December,  this  was  hardly  to  be  seriously  con 
sidered.  The  entire  plan  had  been  conditioned  on  a  quick 
operation  that  would  uncover  direct  communications  with  the 
Eapidan.  The  trains,  therefore,  had  been  left  on  the  north 
bank,  and  the  troops  furnished  with  a  limited  number  of 
rations,  now  nearly  exhausted.  In  this  state  of  facts,  griev 
ous  and  galling  though  it  was  to  permit  the  campaign  to 
come  to  such  abortive  issue,  General  Meade  felt  there  was 
no  alternative.  He,  therefore,  during  the  following  night, 


398  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ABMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

withdrew  the  army  across  the  Rapidan,  and  it  resumed  its  old 
camps.*    Lee  did  not  follow  up  in  the  least. 


IV. 
THE  ARMY  IN  WINTEE  QUARTERS. 

The  movement  on  Mine  Eun  terminated  for  the  season  grand 
military  operations  in  Virginia,  and  the  army  established  itself 
in  winter  cantonments  for  the  next  three  months.  During 
this  period  the  dignity  of  dulness  was  disturbed  only  by  one 
or  two  cavalry  expeditions,  planned  with  the  ambitious  aim 
of  capturing  Richmond  by  a  sudden  dash.  The  first  of  these 
schemes,  which  had  the  merit  of  boldness  in  conception  if 
not  in  execution,  was  devised  by  General  Butler,  then  com 
manding  the  Department  of  Virginia  and  North  Carolina. 
Believing  that  Richmond  had  been  stripped  of  its  garrison  for 
the  purpose  of  strengthening  the  Confederate  force  operating 
in  North  Carolina  under  General  Pickett,  General  Butler 
formed  the  design  of  swooping  down  on  the  Confederate  cap 
ital  with  a  cavalry  raid  by  way  of  New  Kent  Courthouse  on 
the  Peninsula.  As  a  "  diversion"  in  favor  of  this  enterprise, 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  to  make  a  demonstration  across 
the  Rapidan.  The  raiding  column,  under  command  of  Briga 
dier-General  "Wistar,  left  New  Kent  Courthouse  on  the  5th  of 
February,  and  reached  the  Chickahominy  at  Bottom's  Bridge 

*  It  would  have  been  a  move  well  adapted  to'the  circumstances  had  General 
Meade,  on  seeing  his  plan  of  operations  frustrated,  advanced  on  Fredericksburg 
instead  of  falling  back  to  his  old  line  across  the  Rapidan.  This  would  have  had 
the  character  of  an  offensive  movement,  and  would  have  saved  the  morale  of 
the  army  and  the  confidence  of  the  country,  both  of  which  were  rudely  shaken 
by  these  frequent  fruitless  operations.  But  here  General  Meade  was  met  by 
previous  prescriptions  from  General  Halleck,  not  to  make  any  change  of  base. 
This  absurd  piece  of  pedantry  prevented  what  would  have  been  an  excellent 
measure.  From  General  Meade  I  learn  that  he  would  assuredly  have  made 
this  move,  had  he  been  free  to  do  so. 


A  CAMPAIGN  OF  MANOEUVRES.  399 

on  the  following  day.  The  7th,  in  obedience  to  orders  from 
"Washington,  General  Sedgwick,  temporarily  commanding  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  in  the  absence  of  General  Meade, 
threw  Kilpatrick's  cavalry  division  across  the  Eapidan  at 
Ely's  Ford,  and  Merritt's  division  at  Barnett's  Ford,  while,  at 
a  point  between,  two  divisions  of  the  Second  Corps  made  the 
passage  at  Germanna  Ford  by  wading.  The  Confederates 
held  their  positions,  and  considerable  skirmishing  took  place 
during  the  day.  The  troops  remained  on  the  south  bank 
until  the  time  fixed  for  the  termination  of  General  Butler's 
movement,  when  they  were  withdrawn.  The  raiding  scheme 
resulted  in  nothing.  General  Wistar  found  Bottom's  Bridge 
blockaded,  and  after  reconnoitring  the  position,  he  returned. 
He  does  not  appear  to  have  lost  any  thing ;  but  the  troops  of 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  that  had  the  luck  to  be  engaged  in 
the  "  diversion,"  suffered  a  sacrifice  of  two  hundred  and  fifty 
men. 

A  few  weeks  later  a  bold  expedition  was  fitted  out  with  the 
view  of  releasing  the  large  body  of  Union  prisoners  held  at 
Richmond,  the  accounts  of  whose  ill-treatment  had  excited 
profound  sympathy  throughout  the  North.  This  enterprise 
was  under  command  of  General  Kilpatrick,  with  some  thre'e 
or  four  thousand  cavalry,  seconded  by  Colonel  Dahlgren,  a 
young  officer  of  extraordinary  dash  and  daring.  It  set  out 
on  the  28th  of  February,  after  SedgWick's  corps  and  Custer's 
cavalry  had  made  a  demonstration  on  Lee's  -left.  Crossing 
the  Rapidan  at  Ely's  Ford,  beyond  the  Confederate  right 
flank,  the  force  marched  thence  to  Spottsylvania  Courthouse. 
Here  Colonel  Dahlgren,  with  five  hundred  picked  men,  as 
suming  the  most  daring  part  of  the  expedition,  diverged  from 
the  main  body  and  pushed  forward  by  way  of  Frederickshall 
towards  the  James  River.  The  column  under  General  Kil 
patrick  at  the  same  time  moved  rapidly  southward,  and  on 
the  following  night,  the  29th,  struck  the  Yirginia  Central 
Railroad  at  Beaver  Dam  Station,  whence  parties  were  sent 
out  to  damage  the  road.  While  engaged  in  this  work,  a 
train  of  troops  arrived  from  the  direction  of  Richmond ;  1m  t 


400  CAMPAIGNS  OF    THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

after  some  skirmishing  these  retired.  Another  party  was 
dispatched  to  destroy  the  bridge  of  the  Frederieksburg  ard 
Richmond  Railroad  across  the  South  Anna — a  purpose  that 
was  foiled  by  the  presence  of  a  small  observing  force.  The 
main  column  then  advanced  with  insignificant  opposition,  and 
on  the  forenoon  of  the  following  day,  March  1st,  reined  up 
before  the  fortifications  of  Richmond.  The  swoop  had  been 
so  sudden  that  the  troopers  passed  unopposed  within  the 
outer  line  of  redoubts ;  but  the  Confederates  having,  mean 
while,  brought  up  some  forces,  Kilpatrick  found  himself 
arrested  before  the  second  line  by  opposition  he  could  not 
break  through.  In  the  mean  time.  Colonel  Dahlgren,  with 
his  isolated  party,  had  moved  southward  from  Frederickshall, 
after  destroying  the  depot,  till  he  struck  the  James  River, 
where  he  did  considerable  damage  to  the  canal,  etc.  A 
native  of  the  country  had  undertaken  to  lead  the  party  to  a 
ford  not  far  from  Richmond,  but  through  ignorance  or  treachery 
he  missed  his  way,  and  conducted  the  column  to  near  Gooch- 
land  Courthouse,  a  full  day's  march  from  the  intended  point. 
The  guide  was  hanged  on  the  nearest  tree,  and  Dahlgren 
moved  down  the  course  of  the  river  towards  Richmond,  in 
front  of  which  he  arrived  late  on  March  1st.  But  in  the 
interim,  General  Kilpatrick,  having  been  estopped  in  front  of 
the  fortifications,  and  hearing  nothing  of  Dahlgren's  column, 
became  fearful  as  to  his  safety,  and  decided  to  fall  back  down 
the  Peninsula,  which  he  did  in  face  of  considerable  opposi 
tion. 

Dahlgren  was  thus  completely  isolated  from  the  main  body, 
while  the  country  around  him,  now  thoroughly  aroused,  was 
alive  with  parties  of  armed  citizens  and  militia.  During  the 
night  of  the  3d,  while  on  the  retreat,  Colonel  Dahlgren,  with 
a  hundred  horsemen,  became  separated  from  the  rest  of  his 
command,  and  falling  into  an  ambush,  he  was  killed,  with 
some  of  his  men,  the  rest  surrendering.  The  other  portion 
succeeded  in  making  a  junction  with  Kilpatrick's  column, 
which  returned  to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  by  way  of  Fort* 
ress  Monroe. 


A  CAMPAIGN  OF  MANCEUYRES.  401 

These  outlying  operations,  which  were  indeed  of  a  rather 
Quixotic  character,  very  slightly  affected  the  main  current  of 
the  war,  whose  issue,  it  was  clearly  seen,  must  await  new  and 
weightier  trials  of  strength  by  the  two  great  armies.  As  all 
the  grounds  of  inference  led  to  the  belief  that  the  spring  cam 
paign  must  be  decisive  of  the  war,  both  armies,  as  by  consent, 
settled  down  in  winter  cantonments,  to  recuperate  from  the 
wear  and  tear  of  the  trying  season  of  1863,  and  renew  their 
strength  for  the  impending  shock  of  arms.  Lee  held  the 
south  bank  of  the  Eapidan,  his  forces  being  distributed  from 
the  river  along  the  railroad  to  Orange  Courthouse  and  Gor- 
donsville.  The  Army  of  the  Potomac  established  itself  along 
the  Orange  and  Alexandria  Kailroad  from  the  Kapidan  back 
to  the  Eappahannock.  The  ranks  of  both  armies  were  re 
plenished  by  conscripts,  and  drills,  inspections,  and  reviews 
were  energetically  pushed  forward  within  the  opposing  camps. 
Thus  the  months  of  winter  glided  by,  till  vernal  grasses  and 
flowers  came  to  festoon  the  graves  on  battle-fields  over  which 
the  contending  hosts  had  wrestled  for  three  years. 

Then,  upstarting,  the  armies  faced  each  other  along  the 
lines  of  the  Eapidan. 


402  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 


XI. 

GRANT'S  OVERLAND  CAMPAIGN. 

MAY-JUNE,  1864. 


I. 
COMBINATIONS  OF  THE  SPRING  CAMPAIGN. 

IF  one  should  seek  to  discover  the  cause  of  the  indecisive 
character  of  the  Yirginia  campaigns,  and  why  it  was  that  for 
three  years  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  after  each  advance 
towards  Kichmond,  was  doomed  to  see  itself  driven  back  in 
discomfiture,  it  might  be  thought  that  a  sufficient  explanation 
was  furnished  in  the  consideration  of  the  inherent  difficulty 
of  the  task,  arising  from  the  near  equality  of  its  adversary  in 
material  strength,  and  the  advantage  the  Confederates  en 
joyed  in  fighting  defensively  on  such  a  theatre  as  Virginia. 
But  to  these  weighty  reasons  must  be  added  another,  of  a 
larger  scope,  and  having  relation  to  the  general  conduct  of 
the  war.  Justice  to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  demands  that 
this  should  here  be  stated,  especially  as  the  campaign  on 
which  I  am  about  to  enter  will,  happily,  show  the  army  under 
new  auspices  as  regards  this  particular. 

In  Yirginia,  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  had  not  only  to  combat 
the  main  army  of  the  South,  but  an  army  that,  by  means  of  the 
interior  lines  held  by  the  Confederates,  might  be  continually 
strengthened  from  the  forces  in  the  western  zone,  unless  these 
should  be  under  such  constant  pressure  as  to  prevent  their 


GRANT'S  OVERLAND  CAMPAIGN.  403 

diminution.  To  the  Confederates,  "Virginia  bore  the  character 
of  a  fortress  thrust  forward  on  the  flank  of  the  theatre  of  war  „ 
and  such  was  their  estimate  of  its  importance,  that  they  were 
always  ready  to  make  almost  any  sacrifice  elsewhere  to  insure 
its  tenure. 

In  this  they  were  greatly  favored  by  the  false  and  waste 
ful  military  policy  of  the  North,  between  whose  two  great 
armies  in  the  East  and  the  West  there  had  hitherto  been  such 
lack  of  combination  of  effort,  that  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
and  the  Army  of  the  West  had  commonly  found  themselves 
in  their  extremest  crises  at  the  moment  when  the  other,  re 
duced  to  inaction,  left  the  Confederates  free  to  concentre 
rapidly  on  the  vital  point.  Since  the  time  when,  for  a  brief 
period,  McClellan  had  exercised  the  functions  of  general-in- 
chief — a  period  during  which  he  had  opportunity  to  outline,  but 
not  to  execute,  a  comprehensive  system  of  operations — an  in 
credible  incoherence  prevailed  in  the  general  conduct  of  the 
war.  For  three  years  there  was  presented  the  lamentable 
spectacle  of  three  or  four  independent  armies,  acting  on 
various  lines  of  operations,  and  working  noir  only  with  no 
unity  of  purpose,  but  frequently  at  cross-purposes ;  while  in 
the  military  councils  at  Washington  there  ruled  alternately 
an  uninstructed  enthusiasm  and  a  purblind  pedantry. 

At  the  period  already  reached  in  this  narrative,  the  con 
viction  had  become  general  throughout  the  North  that  this 
crude  experimentalism  was  seriously  jeoparding  all  hope  of 
a  successful  issue  of  the  war.  This  prompted  the  nomination 
of  Major-General  Grant  to  the  grade  of  lieutenant-general— 
in  which  rank  he  was  confirmed  by  the  Senate  on  the  2d 
March ;  and  on  the  10th,  a  special  order  of  President  Lincoln 
assigned  him  to  the  command  of  all  the  "  armies  of  the  United 
States." 

The  elevation  of  General  Grant  to  the  lieutenant-general 
ship  gave  perfect  satisfaction  throughout  the  North — a  senti 
ment  arising  not  more  from  the  conviction  that  it  put  the 
conduct  of  the  war  on  a  sound  footing,  than  from  the  high 
estimate  held  by  the  public  of  General  Grant's  military  tal- 


404  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

ent.  The  country  had  long  ago  awaked  from  its  early  dream 
of  a  coming  "Napoleon,"  and  there  was  no  danger  of  its 
cherishing  any  such  delusion  respecting  General  Grant ;  but 
it  saw  in  him  a  steadfast,  pertinacious  commander,  one  who 
faithfully  represented  the  practical,  patient,  persevering  ge 
nius  of  the  North.  As  it  was  his  happy  fortune  to  reach  the 
high  office  of  general-in-chief  at  a  time  when  the  Administra 
tion  and  the  people,  instructed  somewhat  in  war  and  war's 
needs,  were  prepared  to  give  him  an  intelligent  support,  he 
was  at  once  able,  with  all  the  resources  of  the  country  at  his 
call,  with  a  million  men  in  the  field,  and  a  generous  and 
patriotic  people  at  his  back,  to  enter  upon  a  comprehensive 
system  of  combined  operations.  Moreover,  the  instrument 
with  which  he  had  to  work  was  one  highly  tempered  and 
brought  to  a  fine  and  hard  edge.  The  troops  had  become,  by 
the  experience  of  service,  thoroughly  inured  to  war.  They 
could  march,  manoeuvre,  and  fight.  The  armies,  in  fact,  were 
real  armies,  and  were,  therefore,  prepared  to  execute  opera 
tions  that  at  an  earlier  period  would  have  been  utterly  im 
practicable. 

The  lieutenant-general  was  committed  by  the  whole  bent 
of  his  nature  to  vigorous  action ;  and,  upon  taking  into  his 
hand  the  baton,  he  resolved  upon  a  gigantic  aggressive  system 
that  should  embrace  simultaneous  blows  throughout  the  whole 
continental  theatre  of  war.  His  theory  of  action  looked  to 
the  employment  of  the  maximum  of  force  against  the  armies 
of  the  Confederates,  to  such  a  direction  of  this  power  as 
would  engage  the  entire  force  of  the  enemy  at  one  and  the 
same  time,  and  to  delivering  a  series  of  heavy  and  uninter 
rupted  blows  in  the  style  of  what  the  Duke  of  Wellington 
used  to  call  "  hard  pounding,"  and  of  what  General  Grant  has 
designated  as  "  continuous  hammering." 

The  armed  force  of  the  Confederacy  was  at  this  time  mainly 
included  in  the  two  great  armies  of  Johnston  and  Lee — the  for 
mer  occupying  an  intrenched  position  at  Dalton,  Georgia,  the 
latter  ensconced  within  the  lines  of  the  Eapidan.  These  bodies 
were  still  almost  as  powerful  in  numbers  as  any  the  South 


GRANT'S  OVERLAND  CAMPAIGN.  405 

had  ever  had  in  the  field.  Their  intrinsic  weakness  lay  in  the 
fact  that  those  reservoirs  of  strength  from  which  armies  must 
constantly  draw  to  repair  the  never-ceasing  waste  of  war  were 
well-nigh  exhausted ;  that  the  sustaining  power  of  the  Con 
federacy, — the  moral  energy  of  the  people — had  so  declined, 
that  what  remained  of  arms-bearing  population  in  the  South 
evaded  rather  than  courted  service  in  the  field.  Still,  the 
existing  armies  presented  a  formidable  and  unabashed  front, 
and  by  skilful  conduct  they  might  yet  hope  to  do  much. 

The  immediate  command  of  all  the  armies  west  of  the  Alle- 
ghany  mountains,  and  east  of  the  Mississippi  Eiver,  was  com 
mitted  to  Major-General  "W.  T.  Sherman,  who  was  intrusted 
with  the  duty  of  acting  against  Johnston's  force  by  a  cam 
paign  having  as  its  objective  point  Atlanta,  the  great  railroad 
centre  of  the  middle  zone.  The  lieutenant-general  then  es 
tablished  his  headquarters  with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
from  where  he  designed  to  exercise  general  supervision  of  the 
movements  of  all  the  armies. 

This  act  was  of  itself  a  recognition  of  that  primacy  of  inter 
est  and  importance  which  belonged  to  that  army,  but  which 
appeared,  for  a  time,  to  have  passed  from  it  to  its  more  for 
tunate  rival  in  the  western  theatre  of  operations.  General 
Grant  saw  that  the  task  assigned  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
was  no  less  momentous  now  than  ever ;  for  it  still  confronted, 
in  Virginia,  the  foremost  army  of  the  Confederacy,  under  the 
Confederacy's  foremost  military  leader.  After  three  years  of 
colossal  combat,  that  army,  the  head  and  front  of  all  the  hos 
tile  offending,  still  continued  to  cover  Eichmond — a  point 
which  had  been  the  first  objective  of  the  army's  efforts,  and 
which,  though  originally  of  no  marked  military  importance, 
had  come  to  acquire  the  kind  of  value  that  attaches  to  a 
national  capital.  Bearing  on  its  bayonets  the  fate  of  the 
Confederacy,  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  stood  erect  and 
defiant,  defending  Eichmond — threatening  Washington.  No 
man  but  knew  that  so  long  as  it  held  the  field,  the  Confederacy 
had  lease  of  life. 

It  was  the  destruction  of  this  force  that  General  Grant  now 


406  CAMPAIGNS   OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

undertook  to  accomplish,  by  the  double  agency  of  direct 
attack,  and  by  engaging  all  the  remaining  forces  of  the  ene 
my  available  for  its  re-enforcement.  Having  provided  for  the 
latter  in  instructions  to  his  lieutenants,  he  fixed  his  headquar 
ters  at  Culpepper  Courthouse  during  the  last  days  of  March, 
and  sat  down  to  study  the  difficult  chess-board  of  Virginia. 
His  opponent  was  that  same  veteran  player  who  had  check 
mated  so  many  antagonists — Kobert  E.  Lee. 

Thus  were  brought  face  to  face  those  Two  whom,  by  com 
mon  consent,  the  North  and  the  South  regarded  as  its  own 
and  its  antagonist's  ablest  military  leader.  It  was  natural 
that  a  surpassing  interest  should  attach  to  the  portentous 
game  of  war  to  which  these  rivals  prepared  to  address  them 
selves.  From  the  moment  the  nature  of  the  coming  cam 
paign  disclosed  itself,  the  sounding  notes  of  preparation  and 
the  energetic  concentration  of  force  in  Virginia,  made  it  mani 
fest  that  it  was  no  ordinary  passage  at  arms  in  which  the 
contending  hosts  were  to  meet ;  but  a  remorseless  life  and 
death  struggle.  Grant  was  fully  resolved,  by  rapid  and  re 
morseless  blows,  to  crush  that  army  which,  spite  of  the  many 
shocks  it  had  received  in  past  years,  seemed  yet  invulnerable. 
But  Lee  knew  well  the  matchless  temper  of  the  instrument  he 
wielded,  and  though  he  saw  the  superior  heft  of  his  antago 
nist's  arm,  and  read  that  in  his  eye  which  showed  the  com 
bat  must  be  mortal,  he  did  not  lose  heart  of  hope  that  by 
a  stubborn  defensive  and  quick  returns  of  offence  he  might 
still  hold  his  own. 

In  entering  upon  the  problem  of  framing  a  plan  of  cam 
paign  against  Eichmond  and  the  covering  force,  there  was 
one  question  that  could  not  fail  to  present  itself  to  General 
Grant,  and  it  is  one  of  a  higher  order  than  any  mere  point  of 
grand  tactics.  It  has  relation  to  the  choice  of  a  line  of  opera 
tion  against  Eichmond  as  between  that  of  the  "overland 
route"  and  a  transfer  of  the  army  to  the  Peninsula,  or  the 
south  side  of  the  James  Eiver. 

The  former  of  these  methods  had  been  repeatedly  essayed 
during  the  past  three  years — by  Burnside  and  Hooker  on  the 


GRANT'S  OVERLAND  CAMPAIGN.  407 

Fredericksburg  route;  by  Pope  and  Meade  by  tho  Orange 
and  Alexandria  Railroad.  Uniform  ill-success  had  attended 
each  attempted  advance,  and  the  many  repulses  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  had  met  on  that  line  had  marked  it  with  a  bloody 
condemnation.*  The  distance  to  Richmond  by  this  route, 
from  any  front  held  along  the  Rappahannock  or  Rapidan,  is 
between  sixty  and  seventy  miles.  This  necessarily  involves 
communications  excessively  long  and  difficult  to  maintain  for 
an  army  dependent  for  its  supplies  on  its  wagons,  while  the 
march  must  be  made  in  a  region  full  of  the  finest  defensive 
positions.  Whether  the  movement  be  made  by  the  Freder 
icksburg  or  by  the  Orange  and  Alexandria  Railroad — the  only 
two  lines  of  manoeuvres  available  in  the  overland  route — 
peculiar  difficulties  beset  it  on  each.  But  assuming  these  to 
be  severally  overpassed,  the  successful  execution  of  the 
long  march  only  results  in  bringing  the  army  abreast  the 
fortifications  of  Richmond,  within  which  the  defending  force, 
with  its  communications  south  and  west  all  open  and  intact, 
might  stand  an  indefinite  siege.  In  other  words,  the  aggres 
sive  army  is  brought  to  a  dead-lock ;  and  if  it  be  attempted  to 
undo  this  by  shifting  to  the  south  side  of  the  James  River, 
with  the  view  of  operating  against  Richmond's  communica 
tions,  the  transfer  is  made  at  the  expense  of  the  one  advan 
tage  of  the  overland  route  (namely,  that  it  covers  the  national 
capital),  and  the  same  line  of  operations  is  taken  up,  after 
enormous  cost,  that  might  have  been  assumed  at  first,  with 
out  any  sacrifice  whatever.  If  the  army,  therefore,  is  strong 
enough,  and  so  placed  by  the  presence  of  such  a  garrison  and 
covering  force  for  the  defence  of  Washington  as  to  leave  that 
city  out  of  the  question,  there  would  seem  to  be  every  advan 
tage  in  taking  up,  at  the  start,  a  line  of  operations  that  obvi 
ates  the  peculiar  difficulties  of  the  overland  route. 

*  I  speak  here  of  the  opinion  of  the  army  ;  for  what  is  called  public  opin 
ion  was  much  divided.  The  fact,  however,  that  the  views  of  those  at  home 
were  mainly  influenced  by  extrinsic  and  political  considerations  (the  supporters 
of  McClellan  condemning  and  his  opponents  favoring  the  overland  route), 
makes  public  opinion  hardly  worth  discussion. 


408  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

Now,  it  is  an  interesting  fact  that,  at  tlie  time  the  problem 
of  the  Virginia  campaign  first  came  before  the  mind  of  Gen 
eral  Grant  in  a  definitive  shape  (which  was  shortly  before  he 
came  East,  and  while  he  was  still  a  major-general),  he  was  so 
strongly  impressed  with  the  weight  of  the  considerations  ad 
verse  to  the  adoption  of  the  overland  route,  that  he  com 
mitted  himself  to  a  very  decided  expression  of  opinion  against 
it,  and,  in  an  official  communication  addressed  to  Washington, 
urged  a  coast  movement  south  of  the  James  Biver.  General 
Grant  argued  that,  as  there  was  at  hand  a  sufficiency  of  troops 
to  form  two  armies  equal  each  in  strength  to  the  single  force 
of  Lee,  "Washington,  that  vexatious  element,  should  be  elimi 
nated  from  the  problem,  by  assigning  to  it  a  defending  army 
capable  of  making  it  quite  secure ;  and  that  the  other  army, 
formed  into  a  powerful  column  of  active  operations,  should  be 
transferred  to  a  point  on  the  seaboard,  there  to  act  against 
the  communications  of  Richmond. 

Without  seeking  to  draw  any  inference  favorable  to  this 
plan  from  the  experience  of  the  other  plan  of  campaign 
actually  adopted  by  the  lieutenant-general,  there  are  sufficient 
reasons  to  authorize  the  assertion  that  it  was  of  the  two  much 
the  preferable  method.  In  a  country  so  favorable  to  defen 
sive  warfare  as  is  Virginia,  the  true  theory  of  action  for  the 
party  upon  whom  is  placed  the  burden  of  the  offensive,  is, 
while  acting  on  the  aggressive  strategically,  to  seek  to  secure 
the  advantage  of  a  tactical  defensive — that  is,  to  so  threaten 
the  vital  lines  of  the  enemy  as  to  compel  him  to  fight  for 
their  tenure  or  recovery.  As  regards  Richmond,  an  opera 
tion  from  the  coast  by  the  James  or  south  of  it,  is  the 
only  method  in  which  an  army  can  be  speedily,  effectively, 
and  without  loss,  applied  in  the  realization  of  this  principle. 
This  fact  is  sufficient  to  determine  its  immense  advantage 
over  the  overland  movement. 

By  what  inspiration  of  his  own,  or  by  what  influence  oi 
others,  it  was  that  General  Grant  renounced  a  plan  of  cam 
paign  thus  recommended  by  soundest  military  reasoning,  and 
which,  while  he  was  yet  at  the  West,  he  had  himself  strongly 


GRANT'S  OVERLAND  CAMPAIGN.  409 

urged,  it  needs  not  here  to  inquire.  But  when  he  established 
himself  in  Virginia,  and  prepared  to  begin  operations,  he 
changed  his  views  and  addpted  a  kind  of  mixed  plan  of  cam 
paign,  by  which  it  was  proposed  to  act  with  the  main  column 
on  the  overland  route  from  the  Eapidan  to  the  James,  but,  at 
the  same  time,  secure,  by  an  independent  force,  some  of  the 
recognized  advantages  of  a  flank  menace  on  the  communica 
tions  of  Richmond.  The  latter  operation  was  intrusted  to 
General  B.  F.  Butler,  who,  with  an  army  of  about  thirty 
thousand  men,  was  to  ascend  the  James  River  from  Fortress 
Monroe  ;  establish  himself  in  an  intrenched  position  near  City 
Point,  whence  he  was  to  operate  against  Richmond,  or  its 
communications,  or  invest  that  city  from  the  south  side,  or  be 
in  position  to  effect  a  junction  with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
coming  down  from  the  north.  Butler's  force  consisted  of  two 
corps,  respectively  under  Generals  Gillmore  and  W.  F.  Smith. 
In  addition  to  this  co-operative  column,  General  Grant  organ 
ized  an  auxiliary  force  to  threaten  the  westward  communica 
tions  of  Richmond.  General  Sigel,  who  held  a  considerable 
army  for  the  protection  of  West  Virginia  and  the  frontiers 
of  Maryland  and  Pennsylvania,  was  instructed  to  form  his 
forces  into  two  columns — the  one,  of  ten  thousand  strong, 
under  General  Crook,  to  move  for  the  Kanawha  and  operate 
against  the  Virginia  and  East  Tennessee  Railroad ;  the  other, 
seven  thousand  strong,  under  Sigel  in  person,  to  advance  as 
far  as  possible  up  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  with  the  view  to 
compel  Lee  to  make  detachments  from  his  main  force  to  meet 
this  menace  against  his  westward  lines  of  supply. 

This  was  one  of  those  combinations  that  are  more  specious 
in  theory  than  successful  in  practice ;  for  such  outlying  col 
umns,  moving  against  an  enemy  holding  interior  lines,  are 
very  liable  to  be  beaten  in  detail,  or,  at  least,  to  have  their 
efforts  neutralized,  and  made  of  no  avail.* 

*  The  combination  of  action  of  these  three  columns  formed  a  concentric 
operation  which  may  be  either  good  or  most  pernicious  according  to  circum 
stances.  Touching  this  point,  General  Grant  makes  an  absolute  statement  of 
principle  which  can  only  be  true  under  certain  circumstances.  "  Generally 


410  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

It  is  probable,  however,  that  General  Grant's  main  reliance 
was  upon  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  which,  powerful  in  num 
bers,  and  in  a  high  state  of  efficiency,  discipline,  and  morak, 
had  never  been  better  fitted  to  take  the  field.  At  the  time 
General  Grant  came  to  Virginia,  it  was  reorganized  into  three 
corps — the  Second,  under  Major-General  Winfield  Scott  Han 
cock,  the  Fifth,  under  Major-General  Gouverneur  K.  "Warren, 
and  the  Sixth,  under  Major-General  John  Sedgwick.*  The 

speaking,"  says  he,  "  concentration  can  be  practically  effected  by  armies  mov 
ing  to  the  interior  of  the  enemy's  country  from  the  territory  they  have  to 
guard." — Instructions  to  General  Butler:  Report  of  Operations,  page  four. 
Now  while  this  principle  is  true  under  certain  conditions,  it  is  very  wide  of  the 
mark  as  above  formulated.  Concentric  operations  are  good  in  two  cases : 
lv  When  they  tend  to  concentrate  a  scattered  army  upon  a  point  where  it  will 
be  sure  to  arrive  before  the  enemy ;  2.  When  they  direct  to  the  same  end  the 
efforts  of  columns  which  are  in  no  danger  of  being  beaten  separately  by  a 
stronger  enemy.  Jomini  justly  observes:  "Une  ligne  d'operations  double, 
centre  les  parties  d'une  armee  ennemie  plus  rapprochees,  sera  toujours  funeste, 
a  forces  egales,  si  1'ennemi  profite  des  avantages  de  sa  position,  et  manoeuvre 
avec  rapidite  dans  rinterieur  de  la  sienne." — Jomini :  Histoire  des  Guerres  de 
Frederic  II.,  vol.  i.,  p.  293. 

Now  the  point  of  concentration  of  the  three  columns,  respectively  under 
Meade,  Butler,  and  Sigel,  was  Richmond ;  and  from  the  interior  lines  held  by 
the  Confederates,  the  latter  could  unite  much  more  rapidly  on  this  point  than 
could  the  Union  forces.  In  this  regard,  therefore,  this  combination  lacked  the 
first  condition  under  which  a  concentric  operation  is  judicious;  and,  as  there 
was  danger  that  the  outlying  forces  might  be  overwhelmed  by  superior  num 
bers,  it  violated  also  the  second  condition. 

*  In  the  reorganization  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  the  Second,  Fifth,  and 
Sixth  corps  were  consolidated  into  two  divisions.  The  first  and  second  divi 
sions  of  the  Third  Corps  were  transferred  to  the  Second  Corps,  preserving  their 
badges  and  distinctive  marks.  The  third  division  of  the  Third  Corps  was 
transferred  permanently  to  the  Sixth  Corps.  The  three  divisions  forming  the 
old  First  Corps,  consolidated  into  two  divisions,  were  transferred  to  the  Fifth 
Corps,  preserving  their  badges  and  distinctive  marks.  The  reorganized  army 
ihen  stood  as  follows : 

FIFTH  COUPS. 

First  Division,  Brigadier-General  Charles  Griffin. 
First  Brigade,  Brigadier-General  James  Barnes. 
Second  Brigade,  Brigadier-General  J.  J.  Bartlett. 
Third  Brigade,  Brigadier-General  R.  B.  Ayres 


GRANTS  OVERLAND  CAMPAIGN.  411 

command  of  the  army  remained  under  General  Meade,  who 
had  proved  himself  to  be  an  excellent  tactician. 

The  three  corps-commanders  were  men  of  a  high  order  of 
ability,  though  of  very  diverse  types  of  character.    Hancock 

Second  Division,  Brigadier-General  J.  C.  Robinson. 
First  Brigade,  Colonel  Leonard. 
Second  Brigade,  Brigadier-General  Henry  Baxter. 
Third  Brigade,  Colonel  Dennison. 

Third  Division,  Brigadier-General  S.  W.  Crawford. 
First  Brigade,  Colonel  W.  McCandless. 
Second  Brigade,  Colonel  J.  W.  Fisher. 

Fourth  Division,  Brigadier-General  J.  S.  Wadsworth. 

First  Brigade,  Brigadier-General  L.  Cutler. 

Second  Brigade,  Brigadier-General  J.  C.  Rice. 

Third  Brigade,  Colonel  Roy  Stone. 

Inspector-General  and  Chief  of  Staff  Lieut.-Colonel  H.  C.  Bankhead. 
Chief  of  Artillery,  Colonel  C.  S.  Wainwright. 

SECOND  CORPS. 

First  Division,  Brigadier-General  F.  C.  Barlow 
First  Brigade,  Colonel  N.  A.  Miles. 
Second  Brigade,  Colonel  T.  A.  Smythe. 
Third  Brigade,  Colonel  R.  Frank. 
Fourth  Brigade,  Colonel  J.  R.  Brooke. 

Second  Division,  Brigadier-General  John  Gibbon. 
First  Brigade,  Brigadier-General  A.  S.  Webb. 
Second  Brigade,  Brigadier-General  J.  P.  Owens. 
Third  Brigade,  Colonel  S.  S.  Carroll. 

Third  Division,  Major-Genera]  D  5.  Birney. 

First  Brigade,  Brigadier-General  J.  H.  Ward. 

Second  Brigade,  Brigadier-General  A.  Hays. 
Fourth  Division,  Brigadier-General  J.  B.  Carr. 

First  Brigade,  Brigadier-General  G.  Mott. 

Second  Brigade,  Colonel  W.  R.  Brewster. 

Inspector-General  and  Chief  of  Staff,  Lieutenant-Colonel  C.  H.  Morgan 
Chief  of  Artillery,  Colonel  J.  C.  Tidball. 

SIXTH  CORPS. 

First  Division,  Brigadier-General  H.  G.  Wright. 
First  Brigade,  Brigadier-General  A.  T.  A.  Torbert. 
Second  Brigade,  Colonel  E.  Upton. 


412  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

may  be  characterized  as  the  ideal  of  a  soldier :  gifted  with  a 
magnetic  presence  and  a  superb  personal  gallantry,  he  was 
one  of  those  lordly  leaders  who,  npon  the  actual  field  of  battle, 
rule  the  hearts  of  troops  with  a  potent  and  irresistible  mastery. 
Warren,  young  in  the  command  of  a  corps,  owed  his  promotion 
to  the  signal  proofs  of  ability  he  had  given,  first  as  a  briga 
dier,  then  as  chief-engineer  of  the  army,  and  latterly  as  the 
temporary  commander  of  the  Second  Corps.  Of  a  subtle,  an 
alytic  intellect,  endowed  with  an  eminent  talent  for  details, 
the  clearest  military  coup  d'ceil,  and  a  fiery  concentrated  en 
ergy,  he  promised  to  take  the  first  rank  as  a  commander. 
Sedgwick,  long  the  honored  chief  of  the  Sixth  Corps,  was  the 
exemplar  of  steadfast  soldierly  obedience  to  duty :  singularly 
gentle  and  child-like  in  character,  he  was  scarcely  more  be 
loved  in  his  own  command  than  throughout  the  army. 

A  fit  leader  for  the  cavalry  corps  had  long  been  wanting. 
This  desideratum  was  fully  filled  by  the  appointment  of 
Major-General  P.  H.  Sheridan.  Although  his  experience  had 
been  confined  to  that  of  a  divisional  general  of  infantry  in 
the  "West,  enough  was  known  of  his  character  to  justify  the 
nomination,  and  his  first  campaign  left  no  doubt  of  his  pre 
eminent  fitness  for  the  command. 

The  staff  organization  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  re 
mained  unchanged.  Brigadier-General  H.  J.  Hunt  continued 
to  be  the  efficient  chief  of  artillery ;  Major  James  C.  Duane 
was  chief-engineer,  and  Brigadier-General  Eufus  Ingalls, 

Third  Brigade,  Colonel  H.  Burnham. 

Fourth  Brigade,  Brigadier-General  A.  Shaler. 
Second  Division,  Brigadier-General  G.  W.  Getty. 

First  Brigade,  Brigadier-General  F.  Wheaton. 

Second  Brigade,  Colonel  L.  A.  Grant. 

Third  Brigade,  Brigadier-General  T.  H.  Neill. 

Fourth  Brigade,  Brigadier-General  A.  L.  Eustis. 
Third  Division,  Brigadier-General  H.  Prince. 

First  Brigade,  Brigadier-General  W.  H.  Morris. 

Second  Brigade,  Brigadier-General  D.  A.  Russell. 

Inspector-General  and  Chief  of  Staff,  Lieutenant-Colonel  M  T.  McMahon 
Chief  of  Artillery,  Colonel  C.  H.  Tompkins. 


GRANT'S  OVERLAND  CAMPAIGN.  413 

facile  princeps  of  quartermasters,  remained  at  the  Lead  of  that 
great  department  of  administrative  service  so  long  under  his 
charge. 

This  much  for  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  It  should  be 
added,  that  about  the  time  it  began  active  operations,  it 
was  re-enforced  by  the  Ninth  Corps  under  General  Burn- 
side,  who,  however,  commanded  it  independently  of  Gen 
eral  Meade.  This  corps  had  lately  returned  from  its  cam 
paign  in  East  Tennessee,  and  rendezvoused  at  Annapolis, 
where  it  had  recruited  its  ranks  and  received  the  addition  of 
a  division  of  colored  troops.  All  doubt  as  to  its  destination 
was  dispelled  at  the  end  of  April,  when  it  was  called  to 
Washington,  and  thence  marched  to  the  Kapidan  to  make  a 
junction  with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  The  united  strength 
of  the  four  corps  gave  Grant  a  movable  column  of  about 
one  hundred  and  forty  thousand  men  of  all  arms.  The  rolls 
of  Lee's  army  showed  a  force,  present  for  duty,  of  fifty-two 
thousand  six  hundred  and  twenty-six  men — foot,  horse,  and 
artillery. 

The  3d  of  May  the  order  went  forth  that  the  army  should 
that  night  launch  forth  on  its  great  adventure.  The  campaign 
thus  initiated — a  campaign  unsurpassed  by  any  on  record,  in 
the  elements  that  make  war  grand,  terrible,  and  bloody — will 
form  the  subject-matter  of  the  succeeding  chapters. 


II. 
THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS. 

The  defensive  line  for  many  months  occupied  by  the  Con 
federates  along  the  bluffs  that  skirt  the  south  bank  of  the 
Eapidan  was  so  strong  by  nature  and  art  that  a  direct  attack 
was  out  of  the  question.  Lee  as  little  feared  as  Grant  de 
signed  such  an  attack,  and  both  the  defensive  preparations 
of  the  former,  and  the  offensive  preparations  of  the  latter, 
contemplated  a  turning  movement  upon  the  right  or  the  left 


414  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE   ARMY  OP  THE  POTOMAC. 

flank  of  the  Confederate  line.  It  only  remained  to  choose 
the  direction  to  be  given  the  advance — whether  by  the  right 
or  the  left. 

The  views  of  General  Grant  strongly  favored  an  operation 
against  Lee's  left,  crossing  the  Eapidan  above  that  flank. 
This  plan  was  recommended  by  the  consideration  that  an  ad 
vance  by  this  line  would  cover  the  communications  with 
Washington  against  any  contingency  of  a  counter-move 
northward  by  Lee,  and  force  him  directly  back  towards  Rich 
mond.  It  was,  however,  attended  with  the  serious  difficulty 
that  the  duration  of  the  campaign  would  be  limited  by  the 
amount  of  rations  that  could  be  carried  with  the  army,  since 
it  would  be  impracticable  to  keep  up  a  line  of  supplies  in  an 
advance  by  that  route.  This  objection  was  of  sufficient  weight 
to  determine  the  adoption  of  the  other  alternative,  which  was 
to  cross  the  Eapidan  by  the  lower  fords  and  turn  Lee's  right. 

Quitting  the  camps  in  which  it  had  lain  during  the  winter, 
the  army  moved  at  midnight  of  the  3d  of  May.  The  advance 
to  the  Eapidan  was  made  in  two  columns  :  the  right  column, 
made  up  of  the  corps  of  Warren  and  Sedgwick,  to  cross,  at 
Germanna  Ford ;  the  left  column,  consisting  of  Hancock's 
corps,  at  Ely's  Ford,  six  miles  below. 

Warren's  corps,  forming  the  advance  of  the  right  column, 
marched  from  the  vicinity  of  Culpepper,  and,  preceded  by 
Wilson's  cavalry  division,  reached  Germanna  Ford  at  six 
o'clock  of  the  morning  of  Thursday,  the  4th ;  and  as  soon  as 
the  bridge  was  laid,  began  the  passage,  which  was  completed 
by  one  o'clock.  During  the  afternoon,  Sedgwick's  corps  fol 
lowed  across,  and  encamped  for  the  night  near  the  river.  War 
ren,  advancing  some  miles  southward  from  the  Eapidan,  biv 
ouacked  at  Old  Wilderness  Tavern  at  the  point  of  intersec 
tion  of  the  plankroad  from  the  Germanna  Ford  with  the 
turnpike  from  Orange  Courthouse  to  Fredericksburg.  On  the 
latter  road,  Wilson's  division  of  cavalry  was,  in  the  afternoon, 
thrown  out  towards  Eobertson's  Tavern  to  watch  the  direc 
tions  whence  any  hostile  menace  might  be  expected.  The 
left  column,  consisting  of  Hancock's  corps,  moved  from  its 


•    .-  /••                   // > &\~ •••'••j,<*  <•-.'/.-  ^ 

M^M^?^^  i 

M^^pi^^i  ^ 

^^^i^Ss^J  ^ 


i5^m4*S 


GRANT'S  OVERLAND  CAMPAIGN.  415 

encampment  near  Stevensburg,  and  advanced  to  Ely's  Ford,* 
preceded  by  Gregg's  division  of  cavalry.  When  the  corps 
reached  the  Kapidan  the  cavalry  was  well  across,  and  had  the 
canvas  ponton-bridge  nearly  laid.  This  work  being  soon 
completed,  the  infantry  made  the  passage  and  pushed  forward 
to  Chancellorsville,  which  place  it  reached  at  nine  in  the 
morning  of  the  4th,  the  cavalry  being  thrown  out  towards 
Fredericksburg  and  Todd's  Tavern.  At  Chancellorsville, 
Hancock's  troops  rested  for  the  remainder  of  the  day,  await 
ing  the  passage  of  the  heavier  column  on  the  right.  The 
troops  bivouacked  for  the  night  on  Hooker's  old  battle 
ground. 

Thus  the  morning  of  Thursday,  the  5th  of  May,  found  a 
hundred  thousand  men  across  the  Eapidan.  The  barrier  that 
had  so  long  divided  the  opposing  armies  was  passed,  and 
with  the  mingled  emotions  which  grand  and  novel  enterprises 
stir  in  men's  breasts,  the  troops  looked  out,  hopefully,  yet 
conscious  that  a  terrible  struggle  was  before  them,  into  a 
region  yet  untrodden  by  the  hostile  armies,  but  soon  to  be 
come  historic  by  a  fierce  grapple  of  armed  hosts  and  bloody 
battles  in  many  tangled  woods. 

Lee  had  offered  no  opposition  to  the  passage  of  the 
Eapidan.  His  right  was  turned.  Was  this  to  be  considered 
a  great  success  ?  The  answer  will  depend  on  the  line  of 
action  marked  out  for  himself  by  General  Lee. 

In  the  defence  of  rivers,  military  art  presents  several  dis 
tinct  lines  of  conduct.  1.  The  general  on  the  defensive  may 
permit  the  crossing  of  a  part  of  the  assailing  force,  and  then, 
by  destroying  the  means  of  passage,  seek  to  overwhelm  the 
isolated  fraction.t  2.  He  may  oppose  directly  the  passage  of 
the  hostile  army,  or,  by  occupying  advantageous  positions, 


*  General  Grant,  in  his  official  report  (p.  6),  inadvertently  states  that  the 
Second  Corps  crossed  at  United  States  Ford ;  but  Ely's  Ford  was  the  point  o., 


f  The  conduct  of  the  Archduke  Charles  at  Essling,  is  a  good  example  ol 
this.    See  Vial :  Cours  d'Art  et  d'Histoire  Militaires,  vol.  ii.,  p.  92. 


416  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE   ARMY   OF  THE   POTOMAC. 

prevent  it  from  deploying.*  3.  He  may  allow  the  enemy  to 
make  the  passage  entirely  unobstructed,  but  fall  upon  him 
after  crossing.  In  this  case  he  simply  observes  the  line  of 
the  river,  and  holds  his  masses  distributed  at  convenient 
points  within  supporting  distance. 

This  last  method  was  that  adopted  by  General  Lee  ;  and, 
as  the  line  to  be  defended  was  long,  and  it  was  uncertain 
whether  Grant  would  essay  a  turning  movement  on  his  left  to 
wards  Gordonsville,  or  on  his  right  by  the  lower  fords,  he  had 
along  the  river  merely  a  force  in  observation,  while  his  main 
masses  were  positioned  in  echelon  from  the  Rapidan  near 
Somerville  Ford  to  Gordonsville — Longstreet's  corps  being 
posted  near  the  latter  place,  Hill's  in  the  vicinity  of  Orange 
Courthouse,  and  Swell's  thence  up  to  and  along  the  Eapidan, 
the  right  of  the  Confederate  line  resting  near  Raccoon  Ford. 
It  is  obvious,  therefore,  that  though  the  successful  passage  of 
the  Eapidan  by  the  army  with  its  enormous  train  of  four 
thousand  wagons  was  a  matter  of  congratulation,  it  was  no 
proof  that  a  severe  struggle  was  not  imminent.! 

*  A  striking  illustration  of  this  mode  of  action  is  presented  in  the  conduct 
of  Vendome  in  disputing  the  passage  of  the  Adda  by  Prince  Eugene  in  1805. 
It  is  thus  described  by  Dufour  :  "  Eugene  had  gained  a  march  upon  Vendome 
and  was  attempting  to  throw  a  bridge  across  the  Adda  at  a  very  favorable  spot 
Vendome  came  up  as  soon  as  he  could,  and  arrived  before  the  bridge  was  com 
pleted.  He  tried  to  arrest  the  work  of  the  pontoniers,  but  in  vain.  The 
ground  was  so  well  swept  by  the  artillery  of  Eugene  that  he  could  not  get  near 
enough  to  injure  the  workmen.  Still,  the  passage  of  the  river  must  be  pre 
vented.  Vendome  put  his  army  to  work  upon  a  trench  and  parapet,  surround 
ing  the  ground  occupied  by  the  imperialists  after  crossing.  They  were  finished 
nearly  as  soon  as  the  bridges.  Eugene  deemed  the  passage  of  the  river  im 
practicable  and  ordered  a  retreat." — Dufour :  Strategy  and  Tactics,  p.  252. 

f  Lieutenant-General  Grant,  touching  this  point,  uses  language  which 
shows  that  he  regarded  the  passage  of  the  Rapidan  as  a  very  important 
achievement.  "  This,"  says  he,  "  I  regarded  as  a  great  success,  and  it  removed 
from  my  mind  the  most  serious  apprehensions  I  had  entertained,  that  of  cross 
ing  the  river  in  the  face  of  an  active,  large,  well-appointed,  and  ably-com 
manded  army,  and  how  so  large  a  train  was  to  be  carried  through  a  hostile 
country  and  protected." — Grant :  Report  of  Operations  of  1864-5,  p.  6.  But 
the  trouble  in  regard  to  the  trains  really  began  when  the  army  reached  the 
Wilderness,  being  there  shut  up  in  the  restricted  triangle  between  the  Rapidan 
and  Rappahannock. 


GRANT'S  OVERLAND  CAMPAIGN.  417 

The  line  of  march  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  after 
crossing  the  Rapidan,  led  through  that  region  known  as  the 
Wilderness,  which  extends  a  considerable  distance  southward 
from  the  river,  and  westward  as  far  as  Mine  Hun.  It  was 
along  its  gloomy  margin  that  the  bloody  battle  of  Chancel- 
lorsville  had  been  fought  a  twelvemonth  before.  Now  General 
Grant  did  not  expect  to  be  brought  to  quarters  in  this  diffi 
cult  country,  and  the  direction  given  the  columns  when  the 
march  was  resumed  on  the  morning  of  Thursday,  May  5th, 
was  such  as  would  have  carried  them  quite  beyond  the 
bounds  of  the  Wilderness  region.*  He  counted  that  the 
Confederate  right  being  turned  by  the  successful  passage  of 
theKapidan,  he  would  be  able  to  mask  his  march  through  the 
Wilderness,  and  then  by  a  rapid  advance  towards  Gordons- 
ville,  plant  himself  between  the  Confederate  army  and  Rich 
mond. 

To  foil  his  adversary's  design  was  Lee's  first  aim.  The 
plan  he  formed  to  effect  this  is  one  of  the  boldest  and  most 


*  The  following  extract  from  the  order  of  inarch  for  May  5th  will  show  the 
line  of  advance  contemplated  by  General  Grant,  and  the  points  the  corps  were 
that  day  to  reach,  had  not  the  movement  been  interrupted  by  Lee  : 

"  HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 
May  4,  1864—6  P.  M. 

"  The  following  movements  are  ordered  for  the  5th  May,  1864  :  1st.  Major- 
General  Sheridan,  commanding  cavalry  corps,  will  move  with  Gregg's  and  Tor- 
bert's  divisions  against  the  enemy's  cavalry  in  the  direction  of  Hamilton'? 
crossing.  General  Wilson,  with  the  third  cavalry  division,  will  move  at 
five  A.  M.  to  Craig's  Meeting-house  on  the  Catharpin  road.  He  will  keep  out 
parties  on  the  Orange  Courthouse  pike  and  plankroad,  the  Catharpin  road, 
Pamunkey  road  (road  to  Orange  Springs),  and  in  the  direction  of  Troy  man's 
Store  and  Andrews'  Store  or  Good  Hope  Church.  3d.  Major-General  Hancock, 
commanding  Second  Corps,  will  move  at  five  A.  M.  to  Shady  Grove  Church  and 
extend  his  right  towards  the  Fifth  Corps  at  Parker's  Store.  3d.  Major-General 
Warren,  commanding  Fifth  Corps,  will  move  at  five  A.  M.  to  Parker's  Store  on 
the  Orange  Courthouse  plankroad,  and  extend  his  right  towards  the  Sixth 
Corps  at  Old  Wilderness  Tavern.  4th.  Major-General  Sedgwick,  commanding 
Sixth  Corps,  will  move  to  Old  Wilderness  Tavern  on  the  Orange  Courthouse 
pike  as  soon  as  the  road  is  clear.  *  *  * 

"  By  command  of  MAJOB-GEITERAL  MEADJB." 
27 


418  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

skilful  conceptions  of  that  officer.  Instead  of  falling  back, 
on  finding  his  flank  turned,  he  took  a  strategic  offensive, 
directed  a  rapid  concentration  of  his  forces  to  meet  Grant, 
and  aimed  to  shut  Grant  up  in  the  Wilderness. 

From  Orange  Courthouse,  which  was  the  centre  of  Lee's 
position,  two  parallel  roads  (the  Orange  and  Fredericksburg 
plankroad  and  turnpike)  run  eastward  and  strike  Grant's  line 
of  march  at  right  angles.  By  directing  his  forces  rapidly 
forward  on  these  routes,  Lee  would  fall  upon  the  army  on  the 
march  and  compel  battle  in  the  Wilderness,  where  he  hoped 
to  lure  his  antagonist  into  tangled  labyrinths  of  confusion  and 
disaster.  This  region,  well  known  to  him,  was  to  his  antago 
nist  pure  terra  incognita.  In  its  thick  chaperal,  through  which 
no  artillery  could  play,  Grant's  masses  would  lose  their  force 
of  impact,  while  the  Confederate  marksmen,  with  an  almost 
Indian  skill  in  woodcraft,  could  lie  unseen  in  their  gray  array 
amid  those  dun  woods  and  deal  death  to  the  assailants. 
Being  apprised,  therefore,  on  the  morning  of  the  4th,  that  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  had  begun  the  passage  of  the  Eapidan, 
he  promptly  directed  his  forces  forward  to  meet  it  by  the 
routes  I  have  indicated.  The  mean  distance  of  the  corps  from 
their  camps  to  where  they  would  strike  the  army  was  about 
twenty  miles.  Swell's  corps  was  thrown  forward  on  the  old 
turnpike,  and  Hill's  on  the  plankroad.  Thus,  while  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  was,  throughout  the  4th,  defiling  to  the  south 
bank  of  the  Rapidan,  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  making 
a  rapid  change  of  front,  hurried  forward  to  meet  its  rival 
with  a  front  of  opposition  before  it  should  have  time,  by  a 
march  beyond  the  Wilderness,  to  lay  hold  of  the  Confederate 
communications  with  Richmond.*  That  night  the  van  of  the 


*  "  The  enemy  crossed  the  Rapidan  at  Ely's  and  Germanna  fords.  Two 
corps  of  this  army  moved  to  oppose  him — Swell's  by  the  old  turnpike,  and 
Hill's  by  the  plankroad.  They  arrived  this  morning  (May  5th),  in  close  prox- 
tmity  to  the  enemy's  line  of  march." — Lee  :  Dispatch  of  May  5,  1864.  Long- 
etreet's  corps,  which  formed  the  extreme  left  of  the  Confederate  line,  was 
further  off  than  the  others,  being  near  Gordonsville ;  but  it  also  was  or 
dered  up 


GRANT'S  OVERLAND  CAMPAIGN.  419 

hostile  armies  bivouacked,  unsuspecting,  very  close  to  each 
other — Warren's  corps  at  Wilderness  Tavern,  situate  at  the 
junction  of  the  Germanna  Ford  plank  with  the  Orange  and 
Fredericksburg  turnpike  ;  Ewell's  corps  on  the  latter  road, 
within  three  miles  of  Warren's  position. 

Early  next  morning — the  morning  of  the  5th  of  May — the 
Union  columns  set  out  to  resume  the  onward  march — the  left 
column,  under  Hancock;  being  directed  from  Chancellorsville 
on  Shady  Grove  Church,  and  the  right  column,  led  by  War 
ren's  corps,  from  Wilderness  Tavern  to  Parker's  Store,  on  the 
Orange  and  Fredericksburg  plankroad.  Warren's  command 
was  next  to  the  enemy,  and  as  the  opening  of  the  battle  of  the 
Wilderness  took  shape  from  Warren's  movements,  it  will  be 
necessary  to  describe  these  in  detail. 

The  proximity  of  the  Confederates,  the  position  of  whose 
advance  has  been  indicated  above,  was  not  at  all  known.* 
But  to  guard  against  any  approach  by  the  Orange  turnpike, 
Warren  threw  out  the  division  of  Griffin  on  that  road  to  guard 
against  any  irruption  of  the  enemy  into  the  route  upon  which 
Sedgwick's  corps,  which  followed  the  Fifth,  was  yet  to  move 
from  Germanna  Ford ;  while  he  set  the  van  of  his  column, 
composed  of  the  division  of  Crawford,  in  motion  by  a  wood 
road  to  gain  Parker's  Store. 

Now  Ewell  also  continued  his  eastward  march  early  that 
morning  on  the  turnpike,  so  that  presently  the  skirmishers  of 
Griffin's  division,  which  had  been  thrown  forward  on  that 
road,  were  driven  in.  Moreover,  no  sooner  had  Crawford's 
force  neared  Parker's  Store  than  the  troopers  in  his  front, 
which  had  already  occupied  that  point  early  in  the  morning, 
were  met  running  back ;  and  on  sending  forward  a  reconnoi 
tring  force,  it  was  found  that  a  column  of  the  enemy  was  press- 


11  This  ignorance  of  the  enemy's  position  was  partly  due  to  the  fact  that 
Wilson's  division  of  cavalry,  which  had,  on  the  afternoon  of  the  4th,  moved 
out  on  the  turnpike  nearly  to  Robertson's  Tavern,  was  withdrawn  that  evening, 
and  proceeded  on  a  scout  to  Parker's  store  on  the  plankroad.  Therefore  no 
feelers  were  out  on  the  route  by  which  Ewell  was  advancing. 


420  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

ing  forward  on  the  plankroad  also.*  It  will  be  sufficiently 
clear  what  this  force  was  when  it  is  remembered  that  Lee  had 
dispatched  Hill's  corps  on  this  road,  and  the  enemy  encoun 
tered  by  Griffin  was  the  van  of  E well's  column,  which,  as 
already  seen,  had  bivouacked  the  night  before  within  three 
miles  of  Wilderness  Tavern.  These  developments,  of  course, 
necessitated  a  cessation  in  the  prescribed  movement  of  Gen 
eral  Warren,  who  found  himself  called!  upon  to  meet  an  imme 
diate  and  pressing  emergency. 

Such  was  the  situation  of  affairs  when,  on  the  morning  of 
Thursday,  May  5th,  Generals  Grant  and  Meade  reached  Old 
Wilderness  Tavern.  Neither  of  these  commanders,  however, 
believed  that  aught  but  a  small  force  was  in  front  of  Warren 
to  mask  the  Confederate  retreat,  as  it  was  not  deemed  possi 
ble  that  Lee,  after  his  defensive  line  had  been  turned,  could 
have  acted  with  such  boldness  as  to  launch  forward  his  army 
in  an  offensive  sally.  It  was,  therefore,  at  once  resolved  to 
brush  away  or  capture  this  force ;  but  as  this  determination 
was  formed  under  a  very  erroneous  apprehension  of  the  actual 
situation,  the  means  employed  were  inadequate  to  the  task.f 

The  main  development  of  opposition  having  come  from 
the  force  that  showed  itself  against  Griffin  on  the  turnpike, 
an  attack  was  ordered  at  that  point — Wadsworth's  division 

*  "  Led  the  advance  of  the  Fifth  Corps  at  five  A.  M.,  with  orders  to  proceed 
to  Parker's  Store.  Received  the  following  instruction  from  General  Warren : 
'  Throw  out  a  skirmish  line  well  to  your  left  and  rear  facing  the  plankroad,  so 
that  the  enemy  cannot  get  on  your  flank  or  rear  without  your  knowing  it. 
General  Getty  is  now  moving  up  the  plankroad  towards  your  left.  If  you 
hear  firing  in  that  direction  it  will  be  his.'  Took  the  wood  road  from  the 
Lacy  House,  and  pushed  on  till  reaching  the  open  space  about  one  mile  from 
Parker's  Store.  The  cavalry  had  become  engaged  with  the  enemy,  who 
pressed  them  so  hard  that  they  sent  back  for  support.  I  deployed  the  Buck- 
tails  at  once  to  the  front,  and  they  advanced  just  in  time  to  resist  an  attack  of 
infantry  that  had  just  arrived.  Took  up  position,  and  at  twenty  minutes  past 
eight  A.  M.  received  an  order  from  General  Warren,  stating  that  the  movement 
had  been  suspended  and  that  Griffin  and  Wadsworth  would  attack  on  the 
turnpike."— Crawford :  Notes  on  the  Battle  of  the  Wilderness. 

f  As  direct  testimony  to  this  state  of  feeling  on  the  part  of  the  commanding 
general,  I  extract  from  my  note-book  the  following  memorandum  made  on  the 


GRANT'S  OVERLAND  CAMPAIGN.  421 

(also  of  Warren's  corps)  being  disposed  in  line  on  the  left  of 
Griffin,  and  the  division  of  Robinson  in  support.  Crawford's 
movement  towards  Parker's  Store,  which  had  already  been 
arrested  by  the  enemy,  was  now  formally  suspended.  One  of 
its  brigades  (that  of  McCandless)  was  sent  to  act  on  the  left  of 
Wadsworth's  command,  and  the  remainder  of  the  division 
was  afterwards  withdrawn — the  enemy  following  up  and  firing 
into  the  rear  of  the  column. 

With  this  force  an  impetuous  attack  was  at  noon  made  on 
the  enemy  on  the  turnpike.  The  brunt  of  this  assault  fell  to 
the  lot  of  Griffin's  division,  of  which  Ayres'  brigade  was 
formed  on  the  right,  and  Bartlett's  the  left  of  the  Orange 
turnpike.  These  succeeded  in  carrying  every  thing  in  their 
front ;  and  with  dispositions  better  suited  to  the  circum 
stances,  Swell's  corps  (only  the  van  of  which  had  yet  reached 
the  ground)  should  have  been  crushed.*  But  as  the  attack 

spot :  "  May  5th ;  rode  with  Grant,  Meade,  and  the  staff  to  Old  Wilderness 
Tavern ;  found  Warren's  corps  in  position  there,  and  Sedgwick  coming  up. 
At  eight  o'clock,  while  on  the  way,  a  message  came  that  the  enemy  were  ad 
vancing  on  us  by  the  turnpike.  Griffin's  division  out  on  that  road.  At  nine 
A.  M.,  General  Meade  said  to  Warren,  Sedgwick,  and  others  standing  by: 
'  They  \tlie  enemy]  have  left  a  division  to  fool  us  here,  while  they  concentrate 
and  prepare  a  position  towards  the  North  Anna  ;  and  what  I  want  is  to  pre 
vent  those  fellows  from  getting  lack  to  Mine  Run.'  " 

*  From  officers  of  Swell's  corps  engaged  in  this  action,  I  learn  the  follow 
ing  particulars. 

When  the  first  onset  was  made  by  the  Fifth  Corps,  Johnson's  division 
alone  held  the  position.  Jones'  brigade,  formed  across  the  turnpike,  was 
swept  back  by  the  force  of  the  assault,  and  his  troops  fell  back  much  broken. 
It  was,  however,  immediately  replaced  by  Stewart's  brigade,  and  almost  simul 
taneously  with  the  first  signs  of  weakness  in  Johnson's  line,  Rodes'  division 
arrived,  took  position  on  its  right,  and,  by  a  firm  counter-attack,  drove  th6 
Union  troops  back.  It  is  very  clear  from  the  confession  of  the  disorder  result 
ing  from  the  first  attack  of  the  Union  force  that,  had  adequate  preparations 
been  made,  Ewell's  corps  might  have  been  overwhelmed.  I  may  remark  that 
General  Warren  urged  a  just  view  of  the  situation— setting  forth  that  if,  as 
was  believed  at  headquarters,  there  was  but  a  rear-guard  in  his  front,  the 
attack  could  but  little  affect  the  great  campaign  on  which  the  army  was  enter 
ing  ;  but  if  the  Confederates  were  present  in  force,  time  should  be  allowed  to 
form  a  really  weighty  attack.  But  immediate  action,  with  such  means  as  were 
at  hand,  had  been  determined  upon. 


422  CAMPAIGNS  OP  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC 

was  ordered  under  the  impression  that  only  a  rear-guard  of 
the  enemy  was  present,  the  dispositions  made  were  very  far 
from  being  adapted  to  the  actual  situation. 

Recovering  from  its  momentary  repulse,  the  van  of  Ewell's 
force  re-formeci  on  a  wooded  acclivity  a  short  distance  in  the 
rear,  and  there  being  joined  by  the  remainder  of  the  corps, 
the  Confederates  were  soon  in  position  not  only  to  withstand 
the  shock  of  Warren's  onset,  but  to  assume  the  offensive.  It- 
had  been  designed  that  the  right  of  Warren's  line  should  be 
sustained  by  the  left  of  the  Sixth  Corps,  the  division  of  Wright 
forming  the  connection ;  but,  owing  to  the  thickness  of  the 
woods,  that  officer  was  unable  to  get  up  to  Warren's  support 
in  time,  and  this  left  the  right  of  the  latter  exposed.  Against 
this  naked  flank  the  Confederates  made  a  vigorous  attack 
upon  Ayres'  brigade  of  Eegulars,  and  this  giving  way,  Bart- 
lett's  brigade  also  was  beaten  back.*  Two  guns  that  had 
been  advanced  on  the  turnpike  to  take  advantage  of  the  first 
success,  their  horses  being  killed,  were  left  between  the  lines, 
and  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy,  t  On  the  left  of  Griffin, 
Wadsworth's  division  advanced  simultaneous  with  it  to  the 
attack;  but  there  was  no  connection  between  the  two,  and 
the  troops  of  the  latter  in  their  passage  through  the  de^3e 
thicket,  having  taken  a  somewhat  false  direction,  unwittingly 
exposed  their  left  flank  to  a  destructive  fire  from  the  enemy, 
which  threw  them  back  in  some  confusion.^  The  brigade  of 

*  "  Moved  at  noon  with  Ayres'  Regulars  on  the  right.  Attacked  the  enemy 
on  my  front  and  drove  him.  The  Regulars  gave  way,  which  exposed  our 
right  flank,  and  rendered  retreat  necessary  by  the  brigade.  This  could  not  be 
effected  across  the  ground  by  which  we  advanced,  and  I  brought  out  the  com- 
mand  by  a  detour  through  the  woods  to  the  left,  in  rear  of  the  enemy." — Bart- 
.ett :  Notes  on  the  Battle  of  the  Wilderness. 

f  Meade :  Report  of  the  Battle  of  the  Wilderness. 

$  The  cause  of  Wadsworth's  repulse  affords  a  curious  illustration  of  the 
difficulties  that  beset  the  movement  of  troops  in  such  a  region  as  the  Wilder 
ness.  General  Warren  gave  Wads  worth  bis  direction  by  a  point  of  the  com 
pass,  there  being  no  other  guide  in  such  a  thicket.  His  course  was  to  be  due 
west  from  the  Lacy  House,  which  would  have  brought  him  to  the  left  of  Griffin 
and  on  a  prolongation  of  his  line.  But  Wadsworth  started  facing  northwest 


GRANT'S  OVERLAND  CAMPAIGN.  423 

Crawford's  division  (that  of  McCandless),  which  was  to  the 
left  of  Wadsworth,  occupied  an  isolated  position,  and  being 
nearly  surrounded,  it  was  easily  driven  from  the  field,  with 
the  loss  of  almost  two  whole  regiments.  Thus  all  the  ground 
gained  was  given  up,  but  the  Confederates  did  not  follow,  and 
"Warren  assumed  a  new  line  somewhat  in  rear,  but  still  in 
front  of  Old  Wilderness  Tavern  and  across  the  Orange  turnpike. 
Such  were  the  initial  operations  of  the  battle  of  the  Wilder 
ness.  The  opening  was  not  auspicious.  It  gave  Warren's 
corps  a  very  severe  shock,  entailing  upon  it  a  loss  of  above 
three  thousand  men.  The  result  left  no  doubt  respecting  the 
presence  of  the  enemy  in  force,  and  early  in  the  day,  when 
the  serious  opposition  encountered  by  the  Fifth  Corps  made 
this  manifest,  General  Grant,  suspending  the  previously  or 
dained  marches  of  the  corps,  made  dispositions  to  accept  Lee's 
gage  of  battle.  The  Sixth  Corps  being  directly  in  rear  of  the 
Fifth,  was  ready  to  take  post  on  Warren's  right.  But  Han 
cock's  column,  which  was  moving  considerably  to  the  left,  and 
had  that  morning  marched  southward  from  Chancellor sville, 
was  quite  out  of  position  for  a  battle  in  the  Wilderness.  In 
structions  were  therefore  sent  recalling  it  to  unite  with  the 
main  body  by  a  movement  up  the  Brock  road  to  its  intersec 
tion  with  the  Orange  plankroad.  This  order  was  received  by 
Hancock  at  eleven  o'clock,  and  the  countermarch  immediately 
begun.  He  was  then  distant  about  ten  miles.* 

instead  of  going  due  west.  Now  Ewell's  line  was  at  right  angles  with  tho 
turnpike,  so  that  by  the  time  Wadsworth's  line  of  battle  passed  the  Higerson 
House  [see  map]  it  had  come  almost  to  face  the  turnpike  directly,  and  the  first 
fire  of  the  enemy  came  square  upon  its  flank.  The  thick  woods  prevented  any 
change  on  the  spot,  and  by  running  back,  the  men  did  about  the  best  thing 
they  could. 

*  "  At  five  A.  M.  on  the  5th  May,  the  Second  Corps  moved  towards  its  designat 
ed  position  at  Shady  Grove  Church,  taking  the  road  by  the  Furnace  and  Todd's 
Tavern.  My  advance  was  about  two  miles  beyond  Todd's  Tavern,  when,  at  nine 
A.  M.,  I  received  a  dispatch  from  the  major-general  commanding  the  Army  oi 
the  Potomac  to  halt  at  the  tavern,  as  the  enemy  had  been  discovered  in  some 
force  on  the  Wilderness  pike.  Two  hours  later  I  was  directed  to  move  my 
command  up  on  the  Brock  road  to  its  intersection  with  tho  Orange  plankroad." 
—Hancock :  Report  of  The  Battle  of  the  Wilderness. 


424  CAMPAIGNS  OF   THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

It  will  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  Confederate  corps  of  Hill 
was  hurrying  forward  on  the  Orange  plankroad,  and  that  the 
van  of  Warren's  force  which  had  gone  out  towards  Parker's 
Store  in  the  morning  had  seen  this  column  filing  rapidly  down 
that  road.  Four  miles  east  of  Parker's  Store  the  plankroad 
is  intersected  by  the  Brock  road,  which  runs  southward  to 
Spottsylvania  Courthouse,  and  on  which  Hancock  was  moving 
up  to  join  the  main  body  of  the  army.  It  is  obvious,  there 
fore,  that  this  junction  of  road  was  a  strategic  point  of  the 
first  importance,  and  if  Hill  should  be  able  to  seize  it,  he 
would  interpose  effectually  between  the  two  Union  columns. 
Discerning  this  danger,  General  Meade,  early  in  the  day, 
directed  a  division  of  the  Sixth  Corps,  under  General  Getty,  to 
hold  stoutly  this  position  until  Hancock's  junction  could  be 
effected.  While  the  latter  was  still  far  off,  Getty  had  begun 
to  feel  the  presence  of  the  enemy,  and  hour  by  hour  it  grew 
more  heavy  upon  him.  But  he  held  his  post  immovably,  and 
towards  three  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  the  welcome  cheer  of 
Hancock's  approaching  troops  was  heard.  Then  the  position 
was  secure,  and  the  Second  Corps,  hurrying  forward  as  rap 
idly  as  the  narrow  defiles  of  the  forest  would  permit,  was  dis 
posed  in  double  line  of  battle  along  and  in  front  of  the  Brock 
road,  facing  Hill's  line  drawn  up  across  the  Orange  plank 
road.'*  To  make  the  tenure  of  the  position  certain,  in  case 
the  enemy  should  assault,  as  seemed  likely,  substantial  lines 
of  breastworks  were  immediately  constructed  by  Hancock's 
troops  ;  but  before  these  were  entirely  completed  he  received 
orders  to  advance  upon  Hill  and  drive  him  back  on  the  plank 
road  beyond  Parker's  Store. 


*  Birney's  division,  which  led  the  van  of  Hancock's  corps,  first  joined  Getty, 
and  was  posted  on  the  right  soon  after  the  divisions  of  Gibbon,  Mott,  and  Bar 
low  came  up,  and  were  placed  on  the  left ;  Barlow's  division  (with  the  exception 
of  Frank's  brigade,  which  was  stationed  at  the  junction  of  the  Brock  road  with 
the  road  to  the  Catharpin  furnace)  formed  the  left  of  the  line,  and  was  thrown 
forward  on  some  high,  cleared  ground  in  front  of  the  Brock  road,  where,  as  the 
only  available  place  in  the  dense,  environing  forest,  Hancock  massed  his  ar 
tillery. 


GRANT'S  OVERLAND  CAMPAIGN  425 

The  situation  of  the  opposing  forces  was  now  peculiar 
enough.  Warren  had  engaged  Ewell  on  the  turnpike  with 
such  result  as  has  already  been  seen,  and  Hancock  now  pre 
pared  to  attack  Hill  on  the  plankroad ;  but  there  was  no  con 
nection  whatever  either  between  the  two  Federal  or  the  two 
Confederate  columns.  Each  combat,  in  fact,  had  the  charac 
ter  of  an  action  in  a  defile,  and  had  very  slight  bearing  the 
one  on  the  other. 

A  little  past  four  o'clock,  the  attack  on  Hill  was  opened  by 
Getty's  command.  His  troops  encountered  the  enemy  in  a 
line  of  battle,  not  intrenched,  about  three  hundred  paces  in 
front  of  the  Brock  road,  and  immediately  became  hotly  en 
gaged.  But  as  it  was  soon  manifest  that  the  Confederates 
were  present  in  heavy  force,  Hancock  advanced  his  own  corps. 
The  fight  at  once  grew  very  fierce,  the  opposing  forces  being 
exceedingly  close  and  the  musketry  continuous  and  deadly 
along  the  whole  line.  Hancock  attacked  with  the  utmost  vigor 
in  what  Lee  justly  calls  "  repeated  and  desperate  assaults  ;"* 
but  the  Confederates,  seeking  what  cover  the  ground  afforded, 

*  "  The  enemy  subsequently  concentrated  against  General  Hill,  who,  with  his 
own  and  Wilcox's  divisions,  successfully  resisted  the  repeated  and  desperate  as 
saults." — Lee :  Dispatch,  May  5. 

From  General  Hancock's  official  report  I  extract  the  following  details  of  this 
action : 

"  At  a  quarter  past  four  P.  M.  General  Getty  moved  forward  on  the  right  and  left 
of  the  Orange  plankroad,  having  received  direct  orders  from  General  Meade  to 
commence  the  attack  without  waiting  for  me.  Finding  that  General  Getty  had 
met  the  enemy  in  great  force,  I  ordered  General  Birney  to  advance  his  com 
mand  (his  own  and  Mott's  divisions)  to  support  the  movement  of  Getty  at  once. 
Although  the  formation  I  had  directed  to  be  made  before  carrying  out  my  in 
structions  to  advance  was  not  yet  completed,  General  Birney  immediately 
moved  forward  on  General  Getty's  right  and  left — one  section  of  Ricketts'  bat 
tery,  Company  F,  First  Pennsylvania  Artillery,  moving  down  the  plankroad  jusi 
in  rear  of  the  infantry.  The  fight  became  very  fierce  at  once,  the  lines  of  bat 
tle  were  exceedingly  close,  the  musketry  continuous  and  deadly  along  the  entire 
line.  Half-past  four  P.  M.,  Carroll's  brigade  of  Gibbon's  division  advanced  to  the 
support  of  Getty's  right,  on  the  right  of  the  plank  road  ;  and  a  few  minutes 
later,  Owen's  brigade  of  Gibbon's  division  was  also  ordered  into  action  in  sup 
port  of  General  Getty  on  the  right  and  left  of  the  Orange  plankroad.  During 
this  contest,  the  Irish  Brigade,  commanded  by  Colonel  Smythe  of  the  Second  Del- 


126  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

and  hidden  by  the  forest,  met  the  advancing  lines  with  such 
well-delivered  and  murderous  volleys  that  Hancock  was  every 
time  checked.  Mott's  division  gave  way,  and  Brigadier-Gen 
eral  Alexander  Hays,  in  going  to  repair  the  break  in  the  line, 
was  shot  dead  while  gallantly  leading  his  command  in  the 
thickest  of  the  fight.* 

The  heavy  firing  borne  to  the  ears  of  Generals  Grant  and 
Meade  at  the  Old  Wilderness  Tavern,  attested  the  severity  of 
the  work  that  was  going  on  at  this  important  junction  of 
roads.  It  was  judged  that  the  pressure  on  Hancock  might  be 
relieved  by  sending  a  force  from  Warren's  corps  to  strike 
southward  through  the  forest  and  fall  upon  the  flank  and  rear 
of  Hill.  Wadsworth's  division  and  the  brigade  of  Baxter 
were  accordingly  dispatched  late  in  the  afternoon  to  execute 
this  movement.  But  great  difficulty  was  experienced  by  these 
troops  in  making  their  way  through  the  thicket,  and  it  was 
dark  by  the  time  Wadsworth  got  his  force  in  position  to  ap 
ply  it  in  the  manner  directed.  His  troops  lay  on  their  arms 
during  the  night  where  darkness  found  them,  which  was  in 
contact  with  the  skirmishers  on  Hill's  left  flank — a  situation 
in  which  Wadsworth  might  attack  with  much  advantage  the 
following  morning. f 

aware  Volunteers,  and  Colonel  Brooke,  Fourth  Brigade,  both  of  Barlow's  divi 
sion,  Second  Corps,  attacked  the  enemy  vigorously  on  his  right  and  drove  his 
line  for  some  distance.  The  Irish  Brigade  was  heavily  engaged,  and  although 
four-fifths  of  its  numbers  were  recruits,  it  behaved  with  great  steadiness  and 
gallantry,  losing  largely  in  killed  and  wounded.  The  section  of  Ricketts'  bat 
tery  which  moved  down  the  plankroad  when  Birney  and  Getty  attacked,  suf 
fered  severely  in  men  and  horses.  It  was  captured  at  one  time  during  the 
fight,  but  was  retaken  by  detachments  from  the  Fourteenth  Indiana  and 
Eighth  Ohio  Volunteers  of  Carroll's  brigade.  It  was  then  withdrawn,  and  re 
placed  by  a  section  of  Dow's  Sixth  Maine  battery." 

*  Meade :  Report  of  the  Rapidan  Campaign. 

f  The  column  under  command  of  General  Wadsworth  moved  about  four  o'clock. 
After  entering  the  woods  southeast  of  the  Lacy  House,  line  of  battle  was  formed. 
After  proceeding  half  a  mile  the  skirmish  line  of  the  enemy  was  driven  in  and 
steadily  pushed  until  it  was  too  dark  to  see,  when  the  troops  halted  in  line  oi 
battle  for  the  night.  The  line  had  gradually  swung  round  so  as  to  be  facing 
more  nearly  south,  between  Widow  Tap's  [see  map]  and  the  Brock  road — the 
left  being  perhaps  half  a  mile  from  the  Brock  road. 


GRANT'S  OVERLAND  CAMPAIGN.  427 

Hancock  continued  his  unavailing  efforts  to  drive  Hill  till 
eight  o'clock,  when  night  shutting  down  on  the  darkling  woods 
ended  the  struggle.  The  combatants  lay  on  their  arms,  mutu 
ally  exhausted  after  the  fierce  wrestle  ;  and  many  corpses  lay 
in  the  tangled  brakes  and  bushes,  evidences  of  the  bloody 
work  done  that  day. 

The  action  of  the  5th  of  May  was  not  so  much  a  battle  as 
the  fierce  grapple  of  two  mighty  wrestlers  suddenly  meeting. 
But  it  had  determined  that  there  should  be  a  battle,  and  it 
had  drawn  the  relative  positions  of  the  combatants.  The 
moving  Union  columns,  almost  surprised  in  flagrante  delicto, 
had  succeeded  in  making  a  junction  ;  and  if  it  had  been  Lee's 
purpose  to  interpose  between  them,  he  was  foiled  in  this.  The 
antagonist  armies  and  their  commanders  were  in  the  highest 
mettle,  both  were  filled  with  aggressive  ardor,  and  the  proof 
of  this  was  that  each  determined  to  attack  on  the  morrow. 
Yet  each  felt  that  in  the  encounter  there  would  be  need  of  all 
his  strength,  and  whatever  corps  of  each  had  not  yet  come  up 
were  urgently  ordered  forward.  On  the  Union  side  all  had 
already  arrived,  saving  the  Ninth  Corps  under  General  Burn- 
side,  who  had  been  instructed  to  hold  position  on  the  Orange 
and  Alexandria  Railroad  for  twenty-four  hours  after  the  army 
had  crossed  the  Rapidan.  This  corps  was  at  once  summoned 
to  the  front,  and  early  on  the  morning  of  the  6th,  after  a  rapid 
and  arduous  march,  it  reached  the  field  and  took  position  in 
the  interval  between  "Warren's  corps  on  the  turnpike  and  Han 
cock's  on  the  plankroad.  The  Union  line  of  battle,  as  formed 
by  dawn  of  the  6th,  was  therefore  in  the  order  of  Sedgwick  on 
the  right  next  Warren,  and  Burnside  and  Hancock  on  the 
left.  It  ran  north  and  south,  faced  westward,  and  was  in 
extent  about  five  miles. 

On  the  side  of  the  Confederates,  Longstreet's  corps,  which 
at  the  opening  of  the  campaign  had  to  march  up  from  Gor- 
donsville  (distant  forty  miles),  had  not  been  up  to  participate 
in  the  action  of  the  5th  ;  but  that  night  it  bivouacked  not  far 
off,  and  its  presence  early  in  the  impending  battle  was 


-128  CAMPAIGNS   OF  THE  AKMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

assured.  Lee  maintained  the  same  ground  he  had  held  the 
day  before — Ewell  on  the  left  across  the  turnpike,  and  Hill 
on  the  right  across  the  plankroad  ;  but  whereas,  on  that  day, 
owing  to  the  suddenness  with  which  they  were  precipitated 
into  action,  there  had  been  no  connection  between  them,  they 
now  extended  to  meet  each  other  and  form  a  continuous 
front.  It  was  appointed  that  Longstreet  on  his  arrival  should 
come  upon  the  right  flank  of  Hill's  corps. 

The  field  where  the  first  rencounter  of  the  armies  had 
taken  place,  and  where  it  was  now  decreed  the  battle  should 
be  fought,  was  that  region  known  as  "  The  Wilderness."  I 
have  already  touched  on  some  of  the  characteristic  features 
of  this  region  in  the  recital  of  the  action  of  the  5th  ;  but  it  is 
necessary  that  these  should  be  fully  realized  in  order  to  gain 
a  just  appreciation  of  this  singular  and  terrible  combat.  It 
is  impossible  to  conceive  a  field  worse  adapted  to  the  move 
ments  of  a  grand  army.  The  whole  face  of  the  country  is 
thickly  wooded,  with  only  an  occasional  opening,  and  inter 
sected  by  a  few  narrow  wood-roads.  But  the  woods  of  the 
Wilderness  have  not  the  ordinary  features  of  a  forest.  The 
region  rests  on  a  belt  of  mineral  rocks,  and,  for  above  a  hun 
dred  years,  extensive  mining  has  here  been  carried  on.*  To 

*  The  mines  of  this  region  were  first  worked  in  the  early  part  of  the  last 
eentury  by  Alexander  Spottswood,  then  governor  of  Virginia.  Colonel  Byrd, 
:n  his  "  Progress  of  the  Mines,"  published  in  1732,  gives  many  interesting  de 
tails  of  this  region,  from  which  it  appears  that  Germanna,  now  known  only  as 
a  ford,  was  once  a  place  of  some  celebrity.  "This  famous  town  [Germanna] 
consists  of  Colonel  Spottswood's  enchanted  castle  on  one  side  of  the  street  and 
a  baker's  dozen  of  ruinous  tenements  on  the  other,  where  so  many  German 
families  had  dwelt  some  years  ago ;  but  are  now  removed  ten  miles  higher,  in 
the  fork  of  the  Rappahannock,  to  land  of  their  own.  In  the  evening  the 
noble  colonel  came  home  from  his  mines.  I  let  him  understand  that  besides 
the  pleasure  of  paying  him  a  visit,  I  came  to  be  instructed  by  so  great  a  master 
in  the  mystery  of  making  iron,  wherein  he  had  led  the  way,  and  was  the 
Tubal  Cain  of  Virginia.  He  corrected  me  a  little  there,  by  assuring  me  that  he 
was  not  only  the  first  in  this  country,  but  the  first  in  North  America,  who  had 
erected  a  regular  furnace."  Another  writer,  of  a  still  earlier  period,  thus 
speaks :  "  Beyond  Colonel  Spottswood's  furnace,  above  the  Falls  of  Rappahan 
nock  River,  within  view  of  the  vast  mountains,  he  has  founded  a  town  called 


GRANT'S  OVERLAND  CAMPAIGN  429 

feed  the  mines  the  timber  of  the  country  for  many  miles 
around  had  been  cut  down,  and  in  its  place  there  had  arisen 
a  dense  undergrowth  of  low-limbed  and  scraggy  pines,  stiff 
and  bristling  chinkapins,  scrub-oaks,  and  hazel.  It  is  a 
region  of  gloom  and  the  shadow  of  death.  Manoeuvring  here 
was  necessarily  out  of  the  question,  and  only  Indian  tactics 
told.  The  troops  could  only  receive  direction  by  a  point  of 
the  compass  ;  for  not  only  were  the  lines  of  battle  entirely 
hidden  from  the  sight  of  the  commander,  but  no  officer  could 
see  ten  files  on  each  side  of  him.  Artillery  was  wholly  ruled 
out  of  use ;  the  massive  concentration  of  three  hundred  guns 
stood  silent,  and  only  an  occasional  piece  or  section  could 
be  brought  into  play  in  the  road-sides.  Cavalry  was  stili 
more  useless.  But  in  that  horrid  thicket  there  lurked  two 
hundred  thousand  men,  and  through  it  lurid  fires  played ;  and, 
though  no  array  of  battle  could  be  seen,  there  came  out  of  its 
depths  the  crackle  and  roll  of  musketry  like  the  noisy  boiling 
of  some  hell-caldron  that  told  the  dread  story  of  death.  Such 
was  the  field  of  the  battle  of  the  Wilderness ;  and  General 
Grant  appointed  that  at  five  o'clock  of  the  morning  the  fight 
should  be  renewed.  Combinations  or  grand  tactics  there 
were  none ;  the  order  of  battle  was  simple,  and  was  to  all  the 
corps — Attack  along  the  whole  line. 

It  is  a  striking  proof  of  the  aggressive  determination  ani 
mating  both  commanders,  that  Lee,  also,  that  morning  had 
resolved  upon  assuming  the  offensive.  His  plan  was  to 
deliver  an  overwhelming  blow  on  the  left  of  the  Union  army 
— a  point  well  chosen,  since  this  was  Grant's  strategic  flank, 
the  carrying  of  which  would  force  him  back  against  the 
Eapidan.  It  was,  however,  impossible  to  strike  this  blow  ef 
fectively  until  Longstreet's  corps,  which  had  not  yet  arrived, 

Germanna,  from  some  Germans  sent  over  by  Queen  Anne.  Beyond  this  is 
seated  the  colony  of  Germans  of  Palatines,  with  allowance  of  good  quantity  of 
rich  land,  who  thrive  very  well  and  live  happily,  and  entertain  generously." 
Hugh  Jones :  "  Present  Condition  of  Virginia,"  1724.  The  latter  syllable  of 
the  name  Spottswood,  latinized  forms  with  the  former  part  the  name  of  th* 
county  of  Spottsylvania, 


430  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

should  come  up.  To  distract  attention,  therefore,  Lee  re 
solved  to  make  a  threatening  demonstration  against  the 
Union  right.  Thus  it  came  about,  that  fifteen  minutes  before 
the  time  appointed  by  Grant  for  the  general  attack,  a  sudden 
outburst  of  musketry  from  the  direction  of  Sedgwick  an 
nounced  that  Lee  was  beforehand  with  him  in  offensive  pur 
poses. 

The  attack  was  made  upon  Seymour's  brigade  on  the  ex 
treme  right,  involved  the  whole  of  Hicketts'  division,  and  then 
Wright's.  But,  as  has  been  seen,  it  had  no  serious  character, 
and  was  not  pushed  with  much  vigor ;  so  that  Sedgwick  not 
only  yielded  no  ground,  but  was  able  to  push  his  front  for 
ward  a  few  hundred  yards.  At  the  same  time,  Warren  and 
Hancock  joined  in  the  general  attack.  But  as  the  left  was 
the  point  at  which,  as  by  common  consent,  the  fiercest  dis 
pute  took  place,  I  shall  first  of  all  set  forth  the  sequence  of 
events  on  that  flank. 

When,  at  five  o'clock,  Hancock  opened  his  attack  by  an 
advance  of  his  two  right  divisions  under  Birney,  together 
with  Getty's  command,*  and  pushed  forward  on  the  right  and 
left  of  the  Orange  plankroad,  the  onset  was  made  with  such 
vigor,  and  Lee  was  yet  so  weak  on  that  flank,  owing  to  the 
non-arrival  of  Longstreet,t  that,  for  a  time,  it  seemed  as 
though  a  great  victory  would  then  be  snatched.  At  the  same 
time  that  Hancock  opened  a  direct  attack.  Wads  worth's  divi 
sion^  which  had  the  evening  before  secured  a  position  to  assail 
Hill's  flank,  took  up  the  action,  and  fought  its  way  across  that 
part  of  the  Second  Corps  posted  on  the  right  of  the  plank- 

*  The  brigades  of  Owen  and  Carroll  of  Gibbon's  division  supported. 

f  It  would  appear,  also,  that  even  Hill's  corps  was  not  all  up  ;  for  Anderson's 
division  had  been  left  behind  to  guard  certain  fords  of  the  Rapidan,  and  did 
not  arrive  for  some  hours. 

\  "  During  the  night  I  sent  instructions  to  General  Wadsworth  to  form  his 
line  northeast  and  southwest,  and  go  straight  through.  Precisely  at  the  hour 
the  fighting  began.  Wadsworth  fought  his  way  entirely  across  the  Second 
Oorps  front  to  the  south  side  of  the  plankroad,  and  wheeling  round  com- 
mpnced  driving  the  enemy  up  the  plankroad." — Warren :  Notes  on  the  Battle 
of  the  Wilderness. 


GRANT'S  OVERLAND  CAMPAIGN.  431 

road.  The  combined  attack  overpowered  the  Confederates, 
and  after  an  hour's  severe  contest,  the  whole  hostile  front  was 
carried,  and  Hill's  divisions  under  Wilcox  and  Heth  were 
driven  for  a  mile  and  a  half  through  the  woods  under  heavy 
loss  and  back  on  the  trains  and  artillery  and  the  Confederate 
headquarters.*  But  here,  whether  the  significance  of  the  suc 
cess  was  not  understood,  or  because  further  advance  was 
rendered  impossible,  owing  to  the  disintegration  of  Hancock's 
line  in  advancing  so  far  through  the  thickets,  a  halt  was  cried, 
and  a  readjustment  of  the  line  made.  This  pause,  as  will 
presently  appear,  forfeited  all  the  gain ;  for,  at  the  height  of 
Hill's  confused  retreat,  Anderson's  division,  soon  followed  by 
the  head  of  Longstreet's  column,  came  on  the  ground.  When, 
therefore,  about  nine  o'clock,  after  an  interval  of  two  hours, 
taken  up  in  the  rehabilitation  of  the  line,  Hancock,  who  had 
been  re-enforced  by  Stevenson's  division  of  the  Ninth  Corps, 
in  addition  to  Wadsworth's  division,  resumed  the  advance,  he 
met  a  bitter  opposition,  and  though  furious  fighting  took 
place,  he  gained  no  more  headway.f 

That  it  was  Longstreet  that  thus  met  him,  General  Han 
cock  did  not,  at  this  time,  know.  Indeed,  Longstreet's  attack 
had  been  anticipated  in  a  very  different  direction ;  and  the 
manner  in  which  this  expectation  influenced  Hancock's  dispo 
sitions  is  a  striking  illustration  of  the  kind  of  agencies  that 
effect  the  issue  of  battles.  It  was  known  during  the  night  that 
Longstreet's  corps,  which '  had  not  been  in  the  previous  day's 
action,  was  marching  up  from  the  direction  of  Orange  Court 
house,  to  reach  the  field  by  a  route  that  would  strike  Han 
cock's  left  flank  and  rear.  That  officer  was  cautioned  officially 


*  I  use  here  no  stronger  language  than  that  employed  by  General  Long- 
street,  in  a  description  he  gave  the  writer  of  the  situation  of  affairs  at  the  mo 
ment  of  his  arrival. 

f  The  advance  was  made  by  Birney's  and  Mott's  divisions,  and  Webb's,  Car 
roll's,  and  Owen's  brigades  of  Gibbon's  division,  all  of  the  Second  Corps,  together 
with  Stevenson's  division  of  the  Ninth  and  Wadsworth's  of  the  Fifth.  Hancock 
had  been  so  strengthened  that  now  he  had  with  him  nearly  one-half  the 
•inny. 


432  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE   POTOMAC'. 

to  beware  of  this.*  It  was  with  the  view  to  provide  against 
this  menace  that,  in  attacking  in  the  morning,  Hancock  ad 
vanced  only  his  right  divisions,  and  allowed  his  left,  under 
Gibbon,  to  remain  on  the  original  line  on  the  Brock  road ;  sc 
that,  in  throwing  forward  his  right,  he  pivoted  on  his  left,  and, 
with  that  flank,  clung  to  the  road  on  which  it  was  expected 
Long-street  would  come  up.  Now,  at  the  time  Hancock  began 
his  attack,  Longstreet  was  really  making  the  movement  indi 
cated  ;  but  the  assault  was  executed  with  such  energy,  and  so 
completely  disrupted  Hill,  that  Lee  found  it  necessary  to  re 
call  Longstreet  from  his  flank  march,  and  bring  him  forward 
to  meet  the  more  pressing  necessity  in  front.  Hancock,  how 
ever,  unaware  of  this,  still  looked  nervously  to  his  left ;  and 
though,  after  the  successful  advance  of  his  right,  he  directed 
General  Gibbon  to  advance  with  Barlow's  division,  and  press 
the  enemy's  right,  the  approach  of  Longs treet's  corps  on  the 
flank  gave  such  constant  apprehension,  that  Gibbon  advanced 
only  one  brigade  (that  of  Colonel  Frank),  which,  after  an  ob 
stinate  resistance,  succeeded  in  forming  connection  with  the 
left  of  the  advanced  line.t  This  apprehension  was,  through 
out  the  forenoon,  constantly  revived  and  strengthened  by 
various  incidents  that  befell.  Thus,  about  eight  o'clock,  an 
outburst  of  fight  was  heard  considerably  to  the  left,  where 
Sheridan,  with  a  division  of  horse,  had  engaged  the  enemy ; 
but,  instead  of  his  encountering  Longstreet,  as  Hancock  sup 
posed,  it  turned  out  to  be  Stuart's  cavalry  he  had  met. 
Some  time  after  this,  there  came  in  a  report  that  inHiitry 
was  moving  up  on  the  Brock  road  from  the  direction  of 
Todd's  Tavern,  about  two  miles  from  Hancock's  left ;  and  as 


*  Hancock :  Report  of  the  Battle  of  the  Wilderness. 

f  "  I  do  not  know  why  my  order  to  attack  with  Barlow's  division  was  not 
more  fully  carried  out ;  but  it  was  probably  owing  to  the  apprehended  ap 
proach  of  Longstreet's  corps  on  my  left  about  that  time.  But  had  my  left 
advanced,  as  directed  by  me  in  several  orders,  I  believe  the  overthrow  of  the 
enemy  would  have  been  assured.  At  all  events,  an  attack  on  the  enemy's 
right  by  the  troops  of  Barlow's  division  would  have  prevented  the  turning  of 
the  left  of  Mott's  division,  which  occurred  later  in  the  day." — Hancock's  Report. 


GRANT'S  OVERLAND  CAMPAIGN.  433 

he  knew  he  had  no  infantry  in  that  quarter,  he  again  supposed 
it  to  be  Longstreet,  and  took  measures  to  meet  him.*  But 
the  reported  column  of  infantry  proved  to  be  a  body  of  sev 
eral  hundred  Union  convalescents,  who  had  come  to  the  front 
by  way  of  Chancellor sville,  and  were  now  following  the  route 
of  the  Second  Corps  around  by  Todd's  Tavern.  Thus  it  was 
that  the  suspicion,  continually  reawakened,  that  Longstreet 
was  moving  to  turn  Hancock's  left  flank,  resulted  in  para 
lyzing  a  large  number  of  his  best  troops — troops  that  would 
otherwise  have  gone  into  action  at  the  time  when  the  disrup 
tion  of  Hill's  force  opened  a  rare  opportunity  for  a  decisive 
blow. 

The  contest  that  signalized  Longstreet's  arrival  on  Han 
cock's  front,  and  restored  the  integrity  of  the  shattered  Con 
federate  right,  now  died  away ;  and  for  some  hours,  up  to 
nearly  noon,  there  was  a  lull.  During  this  time,  Longstreet's 
troops  continued  to  arrive ;  and  when,  at  length,  his  line  had 
acquired  breadth  and  weight  by  the  incoming  force,  it  was 
advanced,  and  Hancock's  troops,  which  had  first  halted,  now 
began  to  feel  a  heavy  pressure.  The  attack  first  fell  on  the 
left  of  the  advanced  line,  held  by  the  brigade  of  Frank.  This 
force  Longstreet's  troops  fairly  overran ;  and,  brushing  it 
away,  they  struck  the  left  of  Mott's  division,  which  was,  in 
turn,  swept  back  in  confusion ;  and  though  Hancock  endeav 
ored,  by  swinging  back  his  left,  and  forming  line  along  the 
plankroad,  to  secure  the  advanced  position  still  held  by  his 
right,  it  was  found  impossible  to  do  so,  and  he  had  to  content 
himself  with  rallying  and  re-forming  the  troops  on  the  original 
line,  along  the  Brock  road,  from  which  they  had  advanced  in 
the  morning.  "Wadsworth,  on  the  right  of  Hancock,  opposed 
the  most  heroic  efforts  to  the  onset  of  the  enemy ;  but  after 
several  ineffectual  charges,  his  troops  broke  into  the  retreat ; 
and  while  striving  to  rally  them,  that  patriotic  and  high- 

*  Brooke's  brigade,  of  Barlow's  division,  was  sent  out  on  the  Brock  road  to 
the  extreme  left,  where  a  strong  breastwork  was  constructed  across  the  road, 
and  Leasure's  brigade,  of  the  Ninth  Corps,  and  Eustis'  brigade,  of  the  Sixth 
Corps,  were  held  ready  to  support. 


434:  CAMPAIGNS  OF    THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

souled  gentleman  and  brave  soldier  received  a  bullet  in  his 
head,  and  died  within  the  enemy's  lines  the  following  day. 

But  in  the  very  fury  and  tempest  of  the  Confederate  onset 
the  advance  was  of  a  sudden  stayed  by  a  cause  at  the  moment 
unknown.  This  afterwards  proved  to  have  been  the  fall  of 
the  head  of  this  attack. 

Longstreet  had  made  his  dispositions  for  a  decisive  blow ; 
for  while  advancing  one  force  in  front,  he  sent  another  to 
move  round  Hancock's  left  and  lay  hold  of  the  Brock  road. 
At  the  time  the  Union  troops  were  giving  ground,  and  the 
Confederates  were  pushing  on,  that  officer,  with  his  staff,  rode 
forward  in  front  of  his  column  ;  when  suddenly  confronting  a 
portion  of  his  own  flanking  force,  the  cavalcade  was  mistaken 
for  a  party  of  Union  horsemen,  and  received  a  volley  under 
which  Longstreet  fell,  severely  wounded.*  General  Lee  then 
took  formal  charge  of  that  part  of  the  field ;  but  it  was  four 
hours — that  is,  about  four  o'clock  of  the  afternoon — before 
he  could  get  things  in  hand  to  carry  out  the  intent  of  his 
lieutenant.  Before  detailing  the  sequel  of  events  at  the  left, 
it  will,  however,  be  proper  to  glance  rapidly  at  what  had 
meanwhile  taken  place  on  the  centre  and  right  of  the  field. 

The  opening  of  the  combat  on  the  right,  under  Sedgwick, 
has  been  already  seen  ;  and  the  history  of  what  subsequently 
passed  here  can  only  be  told  in  the  heavy  losses  sustained  by 
ithe  Sixth  Corps,  in  unavailing  attempts  to  carry  intrenched 
positions.  On  Sedgwick's  left  was  Warren's  corps,  placed  to 
the  right  and  left  of  the  Orange  turnpike ;  but  as  Hancock's 
needs  had  compelled  the  detachment  to  his  assistance  of  two 
divisions  of  the  Fifth  Corps,  the  remaining  two  divisions 
(Griffin's  and  Crawford's)  held  a  simply  defensive  attitude. 

*  General  Longstreet  stated  to  the  writer  that  he  saw  they  were  his  own 
men,  but  in  vain  shouted  to  them  to  cease  firing.  He  also  expressed,  with  great 
emphasis,  his  opinion  of  the  decisive  blow  he  would  have  inflicted  had  he  not 
been  wounded.  "  I  thought,"  said  he,  "  that  we  had  another  Bull  Run  on  you, 
for  I  had  made  my  dispositions  to  seize  the  Brock  road."  But  on  my  pointing 
out  that  Hancock's  left  had  not  advanced,  but  remained  on  the  original  line 
covering  that  road,  he  admitted  that  that  altered  the  complexion  of  affairs. 


GRANT'S  OVERLAND  COMPAIGN.  435 

Severe  skirmishing  took  place  throughout  the  day ;  but  the 
enemy  in  front  was  found  to  be  well  intrenched,  and  no  im 
pression  was  made  on  his  position. 

In  the  action  of  the  previous  day,  there  had  existed  a  con 
siderable  interval  between  "Warren's  corps  on  the  turnpike 
and  Hancock's  corps  on  the  plankroad.  It  was  designed  that 
Burnside's  command  should  advance  through  this  opening ; 
and  the  point  on  which  his  attack  was  directed  gave  high 
hopes  of  a  successful  issue.  Advancing  through  the  woods  in 
the  morning,  the  enemy  was  encountered  on  a  wooded  crest 
near  the  plankroad.  An  attack  on  this  position  was  not 
thought  advisable,  and  the  corps  was  moved  further  to  the 
left.  It  was  not  till  afternoon,  and  subsequent  to  Hancock's 
repulse,  that  it  became  engaged  with  the  enemy.  No  decisive 
result  followed,  and  towards  evening  Burnside  fell  back  and 
intrenched.  * 

The  long  lull  that  had  followed  the  successful  attack  of 
Longstreet  upon  Hancock  gave  the  latter  time  to  thoroughly 
re-establish  his  position,  now  strengthened  by  fresh  troops 
sent  to  him  by  General  Meade.  His  immediate  front  was 
cleared  by  a  well-executed  movement  made  by  a  brigade 
under  Colonel  Leasure,  across  its  whole  extent  from  left  to 
right,t  and  he  was  prepared  to  meet  the  enemy,  who,  how- 

*  Leasure's  brigade  belonged  to  the  Ninth  Corps,  and  held  position  towards 
the  left  of  Hancock's  line,  under  the  immediate  command  of  General  Gibbon. 
Under  orders  from  Hancock,  Colonel  Leasure  formed  his  command  at  right 
angles  with  Hancock's  front :  his  right,  at  about  one  hundred  paces  from  the 
breastworks,  swept  across  the  whole  front  of  Mott's  and  Birney's  divisions, 
and  crossed  the  Orange  plankroad  to  the  right  of  Hancock's  line,  encountering 
in  his  progress  what  he  supposed  to  be  a  brigade  of  the  enemy,  which  fell  back 
in  disorder  without  engaging  him. 

f  "  The  head  of  the  column  passed  the  Lacy  House  at  daybreak.  Nothing 
was  encountered  until  reaching  the  field  this  side  of  Wilderness  Run;  here 
the  flankers  on  the  right  became  engaged  with  the  enemy's  skirmishers.  As 
soon  as  the  head  of  the  column  emerged  into  the  field,  a  rebel  battery  at 
Tuning's  opened  on  them.  Some  fifty  shots  were  fired,  but  no  one  was  hun. 
The  column  halted :  a  strong  skirmish  line  advanced  across  the  run,  up  the 
slope  covered  with  thick  pines  ;  and  as  soon  as  they  showed  themselves  in  the 
edge  of  Tuning's  field,  they  received  a  musketry  fire  and  fell  back.  Per- 


436  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE   ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

ever,  made  no  demonstration  until  four  o'clock  in  the  after 
noon.  At  that  hour,  Lee,  having  gotten  well  in  hand  the 
troops  of  Longstreet  and  Hill,  made  an  impetuous  assault 
upon  Hancock's  intrenched  position,  pressing  up  to  within  less 
than  a  hundred  yards  of  his  front  line.  Here  the  Confeder 
ates  halted,  and  continued  a  long  and  uninterrupted  fire  of 
musketry,  which,  however,  had  little  effect  on  the  troops  be 
hind  their  substantial  breastwork  of  logs,  whence  they  deliv 
ered  a  sharp  fusillade ;  and  the  repulse  of  the  Confederate  attack 
would  have  been  easy,  but  for  an  accident  here  occurring.  In 
front  of  the  left  of  the  line  a  fire  had,  during  the  afternoon, 
sprung  up  in  the  woods,  and  at  the  time  of  the  attack  this  had 
communicated  to  the  log  breastworks  on  that  part  of  the  line. 
At  this  critical  moment  they  became  a  mass  of  flame,  which 
it  was  found  impossible  to  subdue,  and  which  extended  for 
many  hundred  yards  to  the  right  and  left.  The  intense  heat 
and  the  smoke,  which  was  driven  by  the  wind  directly  in  the 
faces  of  the  men,  prevented  them,  or  portions  of  the  yet  unin 
jured  line,  from  firing  over  the  parapet.  The  enemy,  taking 
advantage  of  this,  swept  forward  ;  a  considerable  body  of  the 
troops  in  the  first  line  gave  way,  and  retreated  in  great  disor- 

haps  one  division  of  the  Ninth  Corps  was  deployed  in  line  of  battle  on  the 
left  of  the  road  in  the  hollow.  A  long  consultation  now  ensued  between  Gen 
erals  Burnside  and  Park,  and  Colonel  Comstock.  No  one  liked  the  idea  of 
taking  the  hill  by  assault.  *  *  *  The  idea  was  entertained  that 
General  Crawford  was  to  advance  and  join  on  the  right  of  the  Ninth  Corps ; 
but  I  explained  that  if  Crawford  advanced  at  all,  he  would  close  on  the  right  of 
Griffin,  and  advance  up  the  pike  away  from  the  Ninth  Corps.  More  than  an 
hour  was  lost  doing  nothing,  while  the  firing  over  by  Wadsworth  grew  very 
heavy.  They  finally  concluded  to  abandon  this  route,  and  move  further  to  the 
left,  aiming  at  a  point  half-way  between  Tuning's  and  Tap's.  The  corps  be 
came  engaged  there  about  noon,  with  no  decisive  result,  and  fell  back  towards 
evening  and  intrenched." — Notes  of  a  Staff  Officer. 

Regarding  the  anticipated  effect  of  Burnside's  movements,  General  Hancock 
uses  the  following  language : 

"  I  am  not  aware  what  movements  were  made  by  General  Burnside  near 
Parker's  Store,  on  the  morning  of  the  6th  ;  but  I  experienced  no  relief  from  the 
attack  I  was  informed  he  would  make  across  my  front — a  movement  long  and 
anxiously  waited  for." 


GRANT'S  OVERLAND  CAMPAIGN.  437 

der  towards  Chancellorsville,  and  the  enemy,  pressing  into  the 
breastworks,  crowned  it  with  their  standards.  Yet  the  victory- 
was  short-lived ;  it  was  only  the  more  adventurous  that  had 
penetrated  the  breastworks  (inside  of  which,  indeed,  a  few 
were  killed),  and  these  were  quickly  driven  out  by  a  forward 
rush  of  Carroll's  brigade.  Lee  then  abandoned  the  attack,  in 
which  he  had  suffered  a  considerable  loss. 

This  closed  the  main  action  of  the  day ;  but  just  before 
dark,  Ewell  moved  a  considerable  force  around  the  right  flank 
of  the  wing  held  by  Ricketts'  division  of  the  Sixth  Corps,  and, 
in  conjunction  with  a  demonstration  in  front,  succeeded  in 
forcing  this  division  back  in  considerable  confusion,  making 
prisoners  of  Brigadier-Generals  Seymour  and  Shaler,  and  a 
considerable  number  of  men.  The  attack  produced  a  good 
deal  of  alarm  ;  but  the  break  was  soon  repaired,  and  darkness 
prevented  the  Confederates  following  up  the  success  of  this 
sally. 

When  the  dawn  of  the  third  day  (Saturday,  May  7th)  came 
to  light  up  the  dark  hollows  of  the  Wilderness,  neither  army 
showed  any  disposition  to  take  the  offensive.  The  terrible 
conflict  of  the  past  two  days  had  left  both  combatants  bleed 
ing  and  exhausted,  and  the  events  of  the  7th  were  confined  to 
a  severe  but  indecisive  combat  between  the  opposing  cavalry 
at  Todd's  Tavern. 

The  heavy  losses  Lee  had  suffered  in  the  battle,  in  which 
he  had  acted  on  the  aggressive  quite  as  much  as  his  antago 
nist,  admonished  a  more  cautious  conduct ;  and  though  he  was 
willing  to  be  assailed,  he  dared  not  venture  further  attack. 
When,  therefore,  the  skirmish  line  was  thrown  forward  on  the 
morning  of  the  7th,  the  Confederates  were  found  standing  at 
bay  behind  their  intrenchments.* 

*  General  Grant  appears  to  have  drawn  an  inference  from  Lee's  remaining 
behind  his  intrenchments  on  the  morning  of  the  7th,  which  facts  do  not  justify. 
"  From  this,"  says  he,  "  it  was  evident  to  my  mind  that  the  two  days'  fighting 
had  satisfied  him  of  his  inability  to  further  maintain  the  contest  in  the  open 
field,  notwithstanding  his  advantage  of  position." — Report  of  Operations,  p.  6 


438  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE   POTOMAC. 

But  the  like  reasons  made  Grant  equally  little  minded  to 
renew  the  assault.  Yet  the  situation  was  such,  that  it  was 
necessary  either  to  go  forward  or  to  go  backward. 

Had  General  Grant  chosen  to  adopt  the  latter  course,  he 
would  not  have  been  without  precedents.  But  this  step  was 
not  only  unbefitting  his  position — it  was  altogether  con 
trary  to  his  bent  of  mind.  There  is  much  in  that  com 
mander's  temper  that  recalls  that  old  marshal  whom  his 
soldiers  named  "  Marshal  Forwarts  ;"  and  as  Blucher,  in  the 
great  campaign  in  France,  that  ended  in  the  capitulation  of 
Napoleon,  would  hear  of  nothing  but  marching  straight  on 
Paris,  so  Grant,  his  eyes  fixed  immovably  on  Richmond  as  the 
goal  of  all  his  efforts,  the  prize  he  resolved  to  seize,  through 
whatever  seas  of  blood  he  might  have  to  wade,  pronounced 
the  magisterial  word,  "  Forward !"  When  darkness  came, 
the  columns  began  their  march  for  Spottsylvania. 

The  battle  of  the  Wilderness  is  scarcely  to  be  judged  as  an 
ordinary  battle.  It  will  happen  in  the  course  as  in  the  begin 
ning  of  every  war,  that  there  occur  actions  in  which  ulterior 
purposes,  and  the  combinations  of  a  military  programme 
play  very  little  part ;  but  which  are  simply  trials  of  strength. 
The  battle  of  the  Wilderness  was  such  a  mortal  combat — a 
combat  in  which  the  adversaries  aimed  each,  respectively,  at  a 
result  that  should  be  decisive  :  Lee  to  crush  the  campaign  in 
its  inception,  by  driving  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  across  the 
Eapidan  ;  Grant  to  destroy  Lee. 

Out  of  this  fierce  determination  came  a  close  and  deadly 
grapple  of  the  two  armies — a  battle  terrible  and  indescribable 


It  is  not  entirely  clear  what  the  lieutenant-general  means  by  "  maintaining 
the  contest  in  the  open  field."  During  the  two  days'  battle,  both  armies  pivoted 
on  intrenchments  covering  their  entire  front.  From  these,  one  side  or  the 
other  sallied  forth  to  attack  his  adversary,  who  endeavored  to  receive  the  at 
tack  from  behind  his  breastworks.  Lee  attacked  Grant's  force  behind  in 
trenched  lines,  quite  as  much  as  Grant  attacked  Lee's  force  behind  intrenched 
lines.  The  real  conclusion  at  which  loth  commanders  had  arrived  was,  thai 
farther  assault  on  these  lines  was  hopeless. 


GllANT'S  OVERLAND  CAMPAIGN.  439 

in  those  gloomy  woods.  There  is  something  horrible,  yet  fas 
cinating,  in  the  mystery  shrouding  this  strangest  of  battles 
ever  fought — a  battle  which  no  man  could  see,  and  whose 
progress  could  only  be  followed  by  the  ear,  as  the  sharp  and 
crackling  volleys  of  musketry,  and  the  alternate  Union  cheer 
and  Confederate  yell  told  how  the  fight  surged  and  swelled. 
The  battle  continued  two  days  ;  yet  such  was  the  mettle  of 
each  combatant  that  it  decided  nothing.  It  was  in  every 
respect  a  drawn  battle  ;  and  its  only  result  appeared  in  the 
tens  of  thousands  of  dead  and  wounded  in  blue  and  gray  that 
lay  in  the  thick  woods.  The  Union  loss  exceeded  fifteen 
thousand,  and  the  Southern  loss  was  about  eight  thousand.* 

That  this  result  was  a  grievous  disappointment  to  General 
Grant  will  be  readily  understood,  if  account  be  taken  of  the 
expectation  with  which  he  set  out  upon  the  campaign.  Gen 
eral  Grant  at  this  time  shared  an  opinion  commonly  enter 
tained  in  that  part  of  the  country  where  his  own  successes 
had  been  won — the  opinion  that  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
had  never  been  fought  to  the  uttermost.  This  belief  was,  per 
haps,  natural  under  the  circumstances ;  for  there  was  much 
that,  to  one  at  a  distance,  where  the  peculiar  nature  of  the 
task  given  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  to  do  was  little  under 
stood,  might  inspire  this  belief.  Nevertheless  it  was  fallacious. 

Sharing  this  view,  General  Grant  hoped  at  one  blow  to 
finish  the  troublesome,  and  seemingly  invulnerable,  adver 
sary.  And  to  achieve  this  end,  he  made  little  account  of 
those  arts  that  accomplish  results  by  the  direction  and  combi- 


*  This  estimate  of  loss  is  inferential  respecting  both  sides.  The  tabular 
statement  of  casualties  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  embodied  in  the  report  of 
General  Meade,  gives  an  aggregate  of  twenty-nine  thousand  four  hundred  and 
ten  killed,  wounded,  and  missing,  for  the  whole  period  between  the  5th  and 
12th  of  May.  But  as  the  losses  in  the  actions  subsequent  to  the  Wilderness, 
and  previous  to  the  12th  of  May  (which  was  the  date  of  the  main  battle  at 
Spottsylvania  Courthouse),  were  probably  not  much  over  ten  thousand,  the 
aggregate  of  casualties  in  the  Wilderness  might  perhaps  be  safely  carried 
up  to  nearer  twenty  thousand.  In  estimating  Lee's  losses  at  eight  thousand, 
I  proceed  on  the  basis  of  the  aggregate  of  Confederate  casualties  during  the  en 
tire  campaign. 


440  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  AKMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

nation  of  forces;  for  at  this  period  lie  avowedly  despised 
manoeuvring.*  His  reliance  was  exclusively  on  the  applica 
tion  of  brute  masses,  in  rapid  and  remorseless  blows,  or,  as 
he  has  himself  phrased  it,  in  "  hammering  continuously."  It 
soon  appeared,  however,  that  the  hammer  would  itself  break 
on  the  anvil ;  and,  taught  a  lesson  by  this,  he  was  thereafter 
more  disposed  to  accept  whatever  aid  the  resources  of  strategy 
afford.  Great  results,  indeed,  are  seldom  won  save  by  the 
employment  of  both  agencies.  A  well-considered  offensive  is 
never  incompatible  with  so  manoeuvring  as  to  secure  advan 
tageous  conditions  to  strike  ;  and  the  commander  who  at 
tempts  to  renounce  these  is  seldom  long  in  having  a  costly 
proof  of  his  error. 

Disappointed  though  he  was  in  the  result  of  the  battle, 
General  Grant  was,  nevertheless,  not  dismayed  nor  cast  down ; 
but,  seizing  the  masses  of  his  force,  he  launched  them  forward 
to  new  trials  of  fortune. 


III. 
THE  LINES  OF  SPOTTSYLYANIA. 

The  determination  of  General  Grant  to  move  southward 
from  the  Wilderness  was  formed  early  on  Saturday,  the  7th. 
His  purpose  was,  to  plant  himself  between  Lee's  army  and 
Richmond,  by  a  movement  upon  Spottsylvania  Courthouse, 

*  I  trust  the  reader  will  understand  tliat  I  do  not  make  this  statement  at 
random.  It  is  founded  on  the  testimony  of  the  highest  authority,  and  I  may 
mention  an  incident  that  corroborates  this  statement.  Shortly  before  the 
opening  of  the  Rapidan  campaign,  General  Meade,  in  conversation  with  the 
lieutenant-general,  was  telling  him  that  he  proposed  to  manoeuvre  thus  and 
so ;  whereupon  General  Grant  stopped  him  at  the  word  "  mano3uvre,"  and  said, 
"Oh!  I  never  manoeuvre."  This  characteristic  utterance,  which  the  suavity  of 
biographers  might  readily  pass  over  in  silence,  cannot  be  omitted  here ; 
for  it  is  the  proof  of  a  frame  of  mind  that  essentially  influenced  the  com 
plexion  of  the  campaign.  The  battle  of  the  Wilderness  can  hardly  be  un 
derstood,  save  as  the  act  of  a  commander  who  "never  manoauvred,"  It  was  re 
marked  that  he  was  not  so  unwilling  to  avail  himself  thereafter  of  this  resource. 


GRANT'S  OVERLAND  CAMPAIGN. 

fifteen  miles  southeast  of  the  battle-field  of  the  Wilderness. 
The  march  of  the  infantry  was  not  to  be  begun  until  after 
nightfall ;  but  it  was  necessary  to  make  earlier  disposition  of 
the  immense  trains  ;  and  for  this  purpose,  they  were  with 
drawn  from  the  battle-field  in  the  middle  of  the  afternoon, 
and  sent  to  Chaneellorsville,  there  to  park  for  the  night. 
This  movement  of  the  trains  apprised  the  enemy  of  Grant's 
withdrawal,  but  not  of  his  objective ;  and  it  was  by  a  mere 
accident  that  a  Confederate  corps  marched  towards  Spottsyl- 
vania  that  night.* 

The  direct  route  to  Spottsylvania  Courthouse  is  by  the 
Brock  road,  via  Todd's  Tavern.  On  this  road,  the  Fifth 
Corps,  under  General  Warren,  was  to  take  the  advance,  and, 
by  a  rapid  march,  seize  Spottsylvania  Courthouse.  Han 
cock's  corps  was  to  follow  on  the  same  line,  while  the  corps 
of  Sedgwick  and  Burnside  were  to  move  on  an  exterior  route, 
by  way  of  Chancellorsville.t  The  route  of  march  of  Lee,  in 

*  The  accident  befell  in  this  wise.  Lee  seeing  that  Grant  was  moving  off 
somewhere,  but  not  knowing  whether  towards  Fredericksburg  or  Spottsylva 
nia,  instructed  Anderson,  now  commanding  Longstreet's  corps,  to  draw  out  his 
corps  from  the  breastworks  and  camp  it  in  readiness  to  move  to  Spottsylvania 
in  the  morning.  Anderson  not  being  able  to  find  a  good  place  to  bivouac  (the 
woods  being  on  fire),  began  the  march  that  night,  about  ten  o'clock. 

f  The  following  order  of  march  will  assist  those  who  desire  to  study  the 
logistics  of  this  movement : 

HEADQUARTEB3   ARMY   OF   THE   POTOMAC,    May  7,  3  P.  M. 

The  following  movements  are  ordered  for  to-day  and  to-night : 

1st.  The  trains  of  the  Sixth  Corps  authorized  to  accompany  the  troops  will 
be  moved,  at  four  o'clock  P.  M.,  to  Chaneellorsville,  and  park  on  the  left  of  the 
road,  and  held  ready  to  follow  the  Sixth  Corps  during  the  night  march. 

3d.  The  trains  of  the  Fifth  Corps  authorized  to  accompany  the  troops  will 
be  moved,  at  five  o'clock  P.  M.,  to  Chancellorsville,  following  the  trains  of  the 
Sixth  Corps,  and  parking  with  them,  and  held  ready  to  follow  those  trains  in 
the  movement  to-night. 

3d.  The  trains  of  the  Second  Corps  authorized  to  accompany  the  troops  will 
be  moved,  at  six  o'clock  P.  M.,  to  Chancellorsville,  and  park  on  the  right  of  the 
road,  and  held  ready  to  move  at  the  same  hour  with  the  other  trains,  by  way  of 
Furnace's,  to  Todd's  Tavern,  keeping  clear  of  the  Brock  road,  which  will  bo 
•used  by  the  troops. 

4th.  Corps-commanders  will  send  escorts  with  these  trains. 

6th.  The  Reserve  Artillery  will  move  at  seven  o'clock,  by  way  of  Chancel- 


442  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

order  to  foil  his  antagonist's  design  of  planting  himself  be 
tween  the  Confederate  army  and  Richmond,  was  by  the  road 
from  Parker's  Store  to  Spottsylvania  Courthouse,  which  runs 
parallel  with  the  Brock  road,  and  a  few  miles  west  thereof. 
The  distance  in  each  case  is  about  equal.* 

The  vital  interest  of  this  turning  movement  centred  in  the 

lorsville,  Aldrich's,  and  Piney  Branch  Church,  to  the  intersection  of  the  road 
from  Piney  Branch  Church  to  Spottsylvania  Courthouse,  and  the  road  from 
Alsop's  to  Block  House,  and  park  to  the  rear  of  the  last-named  road,  so  as  to 
give  room  for  the  Sixth  Corps. 

6th.  At  half-past  eight  P.  M.,  Major-Gen eral  Warren,  commanding  Fifth 
Corps,  will  move  to  Spottsylvania  Courthouse,  by  way  of  Brock  road  and 
Todd's  Tavern. 

7th.  At  eight  and  a  half  o'clock  P.  M.,  Major-General  Sedgwick,  command 
ing  Sixth  Corps,  will  move,  by  the  pike  and  plankroad,  to  Chancellors ville, 
when  he  will  be  joined  by  the  authorized  trains  of  his  own  corps  and  those  of 
the  Fifth  Corps ;  thence,  by  way  of  Aldrich's  and  Piney  Branch  Church,  to 
Spottsylvania  Courthouse,  and  the  road  from  Alsop's  to  Block  House.  The 
trains  of  Fifth  Corps  will  then  join  the  corps  at  Spottsylvania  Courthouse. 

8th.  Major-General  Hancock,  commanding  Second  Corps,  will  move  to 
Todd's  Tavern,  by  the  Brock  road,  following  Fifth  Corps  closely. 

9th.  Headquarters  during  the  movement  will  be  along  the  route  of  the  Fifth 
and  Second  corps,  and  at  the  close  of  the  movement,  near  the  Sixth. 

10th.  The  pickets  of  the  Fifth  and  Sixth  corps  will  be  withdrawn  at  one 
o'clock  A.  M.,  and  those  of  the  Second  at  two  A.  M.,  and  will  follow  the  routes  of 
their  respective  corps. 

llth.  The  cavalry  now  under  the  command  of  Colonel  Hammond  will  be 
left  by  General  Sedgwick  at  the  Old  Wilderness  Tavern,  and  upon  being  in 
formed  by  General  Hancock  of  the  withdrawal  of  this  corps  and  pickets,  will 
follow  that  corps. 

12th.  Corps-commanders  will  see  that  the  movements  are  made  with  punc 
tuality  and  promptitude. 

13th.  Major-General  Sheridan,  commanding  cavalry  corps,  will  have  a  suf 
ficient  force,  on  the  approaches  from  the  right,  to  keep  the  corps-commanders  ad 
vised  in  time  of  the  appearance  of  the  enemy. 

14th.  It  is  understood  that  General  Burnside's  command  will  follow  the 
Sixth  Corps. 

By  command  of  MAJOR-GENERAL  MEADB. 

*  General  Grant  (Report,  p.  7)  states,  that  "the  enemy  having  become  ap 
prised  of  our  movement,  and  having  the  shorter  line,  was  enabled  to  reach  there 
first."  But  if  there  be  any  difference  in  the  distance  of  the  routes  travelled  by 
the  rival  armies,  that  of  Lee  was  rather  the  longer. 


PLANoFTHE  BATTLE 

AND      LINES 


fcuferom      ^I-'*.  -  ^xt.  / 

<-      :  Mfc*     %*» 
^|g%^-  ^ 
*;&*%*$*%& 

,&>:••*  ••«->-*•».•,:•**• 

/•*:>M'*  >*>-'*••*«* " 


GRANT'S  OVERLAND  CAMPAIGN.  443 

march  of  "Warren  to  seize  Spottsylvania  Courthouse.  But 
though  that  officer  threw  the  utmost  ardor  into  the  execution 
of  this  purpose,  it  was,  by  causes  now  to  be  mentioned,  first 
retarded  and  finally  foiled. 

The  advance  of  "Warren's  corps  was  begun  at  nine  p.  M.  of 
the  7th.  Beaching  Todd's  Tavern,  he  was  delayed  for  an 
hour  and  a  half  by  the  cavalry  escort  of  General  Meade  block 
ing  the  way.  On  advancing  two  miles  beyond  that  point,  at 
about  three  A.  M.  of  the  8th,  he  was  again  detained  by  the 
cavalry  division  of  General  Merritt,  which  had  the  day  before, 
and  up  to  a  late  hour  of  the  night,  been  engaged  in  fighting 
and  driving  the  cavalry  of  Stuart,  who  had  been  sent  by  Lee 
to  hold  the  Brock  road,  and  who  still  barred  further  ad 
vance.*  Merritt,  after  two  or  three  hours  of  ineffectual  effort, 
gave  way  to  Warren,  who  advanced  to  clear  his  own  path.  It 
was  by  this  time  broad  daylight.  A  couple  of  brigades  of  the 
advance  division,  under  Kobinson,  were  deployed  in  line  of 
battle,  while  the  remainder  of  the  corps  followed  in  column. 
Numerous  barricades  obstructed  the  road,  and  considerable 
loss  occurred  in  removing  these,  several  pioneers  being  killed 
and  wounded  while  chopping.  Finally,  at  eight  A.  M.  of  the 
8th,  the  column  emerged  from  the  woods  into  a  clearing, 
two  miles  north  of  Spottsylvania  Courthouse. f  Beyond  this 
are  woods  again,  and  then  the  ground  rises  into  the  Spottsyl 
vania  Ridge. 

Forming  in  line,  Eobinson's  division  advanced  over  the 
plain.  Thus  far,  only  Stuart's  dismounted  troopers  had  been 
encountered,  and  no  other  opposition  was  anticipated ;  but 
when  half-way  across  the  field,  and  on  the  point  of  rising  the 

*  '<  At  nine  P.  M.,  the  army  began  to  move  towards  Spottsylvania  Court 
house,  the  Fifth  Corps  having  the  advance  on  the  Brock  road.  We  were  de 
layed  about  an  hour  and  a  half  by  the  cavalry  escort  of  General  Meade,  and  on 
reaching  a  point  two  miles  beyond  Todd's  Tavern,  were  retarded  about  three 
hours  by  Merntt/s  cavalry  endeavoring  to  clear  the  way  for  iis.  They  gave  it 
up  about  six  A.  M.  (May  8th),  and  got  out  of  our  way." — Warren :  Notes  on  the 
Rapidan  Campaign. 

t  This  clearing  will  be  noted  on  the  accompanying  map  as  that  marked 
"Alsop's." 


444  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

crest,  the  troops  were  met  by  a  savage  musketry  fire  from  in 
fantry.  Owing  to  their  severe  experiences  in  the  Wilderness, 
and  the  night  march,  without  rest,  the  men  were  in  an  ex 
cited  and  almost  frightened  condition,  and  the  tendency  to 
stampede  was  so  great,  that  General  Warren  had  been  com 
pelled  to  go  in  front  of  the  leading  brigade.  When,  there 
fore,  they  received  a  fire  in  front  from  the  redoubtable  foe 
they  had  left  in  the  Wilderness,  the  line  wavered  and  fell 
back  in  some  confusion.  General  Robinson  was,  at  the  same 
time,  severely  wounded,  which  left  the  troops  without  their 
commander  at  a  critical  moment,  and  they  were  with  some 
difficulty  rallied  and  re-formed  in  the  woods  back  of  the  open 
plain.  Griffin's  division,  which  advanced  on  the  right  of  Rob 
inson,  soon  afterwards  received  the  same  fire,  with  a  like  re 
sult.*  During  this  episode,  Crawford's  division  had  come  up. 
It  succeeded  in  driving  the  Confederates  out  of  the  woods  on 
Griffin's  left  ;f  and  Wadsworth's  division  (under  General  Cut- 

*  It  will  be  observed  on  the  map  that  the  road  forks  at  Alsop's.  Robinson 
took  to  the  left,  and  Griffin  to  the  right ;  the  latter,  forming  Bartlett's  brigade 
in  line  of  battle  in  a  ravine  below  Alsop's,  advanced,  with  Ayres'  and  Sweitzer's 
brigades  on  the  road.  Of  Bartlett's  brigade,  the  Eighty-third  Pennsylvania 
and  Forty-fourth  New  York  formed  the  first  line,  and  the  First  Michigan  and 
Eighteenth  Massachusetts  the  second.  "  The  Eighty-third  Pennsylvania  fought 
hand  to  hand  with  the  Confederates,  and  pulled  prisoners  out  of  the  works,  and 
brought  them  to  the  rear  ;  but  the  enemy,  seeing  no  supports  coming  up,  got  a 
flank  fire  on  my  right,  from  the  fact  of  Robinson's  division  not  pushing  up  in 
line.  The  enemy  attacking  at  the  same  time  in  front  caused  me  to  abandon 
my  position,  and  fall  back  of  the  second  line,  which  was  then  formed,  with 
Colonel  Sweitzer's  brigade  on  the  left,  and  General  Ayres'  on  the  right." — Bart 
lett :  Notes  on  the  Rapidan  Campaign. 

"  It  so  happened  that  Ayres'  men  in  the  road  had  good  cover,  the  road  be 
ing1  sunken  about  three  feet  below  the  level.  They  held  their  ground,  thus 
affording  a  rallying  point  for  Bartlett's  men ;  and  in  a  short  time  the  line  was 
re-established,  through  the  personal  exertions  of  Generals  Griffin,  Ayres,  and 
Bartlett.  They  advanced  a  little  way  further,  and  held  the  line  our  corps  oc- 
supied  while  north  of  Spottsylvania." — Notes  of  a  Staff-Officer. 

f  Crawford  double-quicked  into  the  woods,  and  drove  the  enemy  entirely 
back,  the  Confederates  leaving  their  dead  and  wounded  on  the  field.  "  The 
enemy  encountered  at  this  point  was  Barksdale's  Mississippi  brigade;  and 
prisoners  taken  gaid  they  had  travelled  all  night  to  hurry  in  there,  and  that  the 
divisions  of  McLaws  and  Anderson  were  right  behind." — Crawford :  Notes  on 
the  Rapidan  Campaign. 


GRANT'S   OVERLAND  CAMPAIGN.  445 

ler)  also  arriving,  drove  them  out  of  the  woods  on  his  right.  A 
line  for  the  whole  corps  was  then  taken  up,  very  close  to  the 
enemy,  and  the  troops  fell  to  intrenching  of  their  own  accord. 
The  force  encountered  before  Spottsylvania  Courthouse  was 
the  head  of  Longstreet's  column,  which,  having  left  the  Wil 
derness  battle-field  almost  simultaneously  with  Warren's  setting 
out,  had  hurried  forward  towards  the  threatened  point,  and, 
being  favored  by  the  delays  that  had  befallen  Warren,  reached 
it  in  time  to  bar  further  progress.  It  is  probable  that  a  vig 
orous  attack  by  an  adequate  force,  any  time  during  that  day, 
would  have  carried  the  position ;  for  the  Confederate  army 
was  but  in  process  of  arrival,  and  the  defences,  being  such  as 
were  improvised  on  the  spot,  were  not  formidable.  But  there 
were  various  causes  that  prevented  this.  The  task  was  too 
much  for  the  Fifth  Corps  alone  ;  and  when,  in  the  afternoon, 
Sedgwick  came  up  with  the  Sixth  Corps,  and  took  command 
of  the  field,  there  was  much  delay  in  determining  the  disposi 
tions  for  attack.  Moreover,  Hancock's  corps,  which  followed 
Warren's  route  from  the  Wilderness,  and  was  designed  to  be 
within  supporting  distance,  was,  owing  to  the  occupation  of 
the  road  by  other  troops,  halted  in  the  morning,  midway  of 
the  march,  at  Todd's  Tavern ;  and,  later,  events  so  shaped 
themselves,  that  Hancock  was  detained  all  day  at  Todd's 
Tavern  by  General  Meade,  to  meet  an  anticipated  attempt  of 
Lee  to  fall  upon  the  rear  of  the  Union  column.* 

*  At  Todd's  Tavern,  the  Brock  road  is  intersected  by  a  road  (the  Catharpin 
road)  that  connects  the  routes  on  which  the  rival  armies  were  moving  ;  and  as 
hostile  parties  made  their  appearance  close  to  the  Union  line  of  march,  this 
caused  General  Meade  to  retain  Hancock's  division  all  day  at  Todd's  Tavern, 
though  one  division  (that  of  Gibbon)  was  in  the  afternoon  sent  forward  towards 
Spottsylvania  Courthouse.  To  observe  the  Catharpin  road  against  any  hostile 
approach,  Miles'  brigade  of  Hancock's  corps,  with  a  brigade  of  Gregg's  cavalry 
and  a  battery  of  artillery,  moved  out  in  the  afternoon,  and  took  up  a  position 
within  a  mile  of  Corbyn's  Bridge.  This  Miles  held,  meeting  only  an  artillery 
fire,  till  he  was  recalled,  late  in  the  afternoon.  While  retiring,  he  was  assailed 
by  Mahone's  division  of  Hill's  corps  ;  but  Miles,  with  much  skill,  repulsed  tlus 
attack.  It  would  probably  have  sufficed  to  retain  only  a  small  masking  force, 
such  as  that  of  Miles.  In  this  case  Hancock  would  have  been  able  to  push  on 
to  the  critical  front.  His  retention  at  Todd's  Tavern  was  very  unfortunate,  and 


446  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

To  return  to  the  front  of  operations.  Sedgwick  having  joined 
Warren  with  a  part  of  his  corps,  resolved,  late  in  the  after 
noon,  to  assault  the  position  with  such  force  as  was  available. 
But  much  time  was  lost,  and  it  was  evening  before  any  thing 
was  done.  A  partial  attack  was  then  made  by  a  New  Jersey 
brigade,*  but  it  resulted  in  nothing.  An  advance  was,  how 
ever,  made  soon  afterwards  by  Crawford's  division,  with  better 
fortune.  It  happened  that  a  body  of  troops  belonging  to 
Swell's  corps  was  marching  in  by  the  flank,  and  coining  un 
expectedly  upon  Crawford's  force,  it  was  driven  back  for  a 
mile  in  confusion,  losing  a  hundred  prisoners  and  a  flag. 
Had  the  attack  been  made  in  stronger  force,  as  was  first  in 
tended,  the  best  results  might  have  been  expected. t 

The  operations  of  the  day  left  the  Confederates  in  posses 
sion  of  Spottsylvania  Courthouse.  Lee,  in  fact,  had  succeeded 
in  planting  his  army  across  Grant's  line  of  march  ;  and  having 
drawn  upon  the  Spottsylvania  Eidge  a  bulwark  of  defence,  he 
was  able,  for  twelve  days,  to  hold  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
in  check,  and  exact  another  heavy  dole  of  blood. 

The  army  was  all  brought  into  position  on  a  line  in  front  of 
Spottsylvania  on  the  following  day,  Monday,  the  9th,  and  the 
cavalry  under  Sheridan  was  dispatched  on  a  grand  raid  to  cut 
Lee's  railroad  communications.  Sedgwick's  corps  took  post 
on  the  left  of  Warren,  and  Burnside's  on  the  left  of  Sedg 
wick,  forming  the  left  of  the  army.  Hancock  came  up  from 
Todd's  Tavern,  and,  moving  to  the  right,  took  position  on 
high  ground  overlooking  the  valley  of  the  Kiver  Po,  which, 
circling  southward  of  Spottsylvania  Courthouse,  heads  north 
ward  to  the  west  of  that  place.  Hancock  formed  the  right  of 

must  be  accounted  rattier  timid  generalship ;  for  the  army,  having  been  cut 
loose  from  the  Wilderness,  should  have  been  pushed  to  Spottsylvania  with  the 
utmost  vigor.  The  situation  was  such  as  to  present  quite  as  much  danger  to 
the  head  of  the  column  as  to  its  rear  ;  and  had  Warren  gained  Spottsylvania 
Courthouse,  his  position,  with  nothing  within  supporting  distance,  would  have 
been  very  critical. 

*  This  brigade  belonged  to  Neill's  division  of  the  Sixth  Corps. 

f  Notes  of  a  Staff-Officer. 


GRANT'S  OVERLAND  CAMPAIGN.  447 

the  army.  Aside  from  the  movements  to  take  up  position,  the 
day  was  passed  in  quiet.  The  Confederate  sharp-shooters 
were,  however,  very  active,  and  early  in  the  day  their  deadly 
aim  brought  down  an  illustrious  victim  in  the  person  of  Gen 
eral  Sedgwickj  the  beloved  chief  of  the  Sixth  Corps,  who  was 
shot  while  standing  in  the  breastworks  along  his  line,  and 
almost  instantly  expired.  The  loss  of  this  lion-hearted  sol 
dier  caused  the  profoundest  grief  among  his  comrades,  and 
throughout  the  army,  which  felt  it  could  better  have  afforded 
to  sacrifice  the  best  division.  General  Wright  succeeded  to 
the  command. 

During  the  afternoon  a  Confederate  wagon-train  was  ob 
served  filing  along  the  road  leading  into  Spottsylvania  oppo 
site  Hancock's  position.  That  officer  was  directed  to  make  a 
movement  across  the  Po,  partly  with  the  hope  of  capturing 
some  of  the  train.  Accordingly,  towards  evening  of  the  9th, 
the  Second  Corps  forced  a  crossing  of  the  stream,  the  south 
bank  of  which  was  observed  by  but  a  small  force.  The  pas 
sage  was  effected  with  entire  success,  in  face  of  many  diffi 
culties  of  ground ;  but  night  came  on  before  the  movement 
could  be  brought  to  a  head.  Next  morning,  the  10th,  Han 
cock  pushed  forward  the  development  of  his  operation,  and, 
at  the  same  time,  bridged  the  stream  at  the  points  at  which 
his  force  had  crossed.  The  Confederate  train  had  all  been 
safely  retired  within  Spottsylvania  Courthouse  ;  so  that  the 
continuance  of  the  enterprise  was  without  any  very  well- 
defined  object.  The  Po,  at  Hancock's  point  of  passage, 
runs  nearly  eastward;  but  near  Spottsylvania  Courthouse 
it  turns  sharply  southward.  It  therefore  once  more  crossed 
his  line  of  advance  ;*  and  it  was  observed  that  the  enemy 
was  in  force  behind  intrenchments  on  its  eastern  bank, 
covering  the  approaches  to  Spottsylvania  Courthouse.  The 
Po  is  here  crossed  by  a  wooden  bridge  two  miles  west  of  the 
courthouse.  But  the  passage  was  not  practicable,  as  all 


*  Hancock,  after  crossing  the  Po,  struck  what  is  called  the  Block  House 
road,  which  crosses  the  Po  on  a  covered  bridge  two  miles  west  of  Spottsylvania. 


4.48  CAMPAIGNS  OP  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

access  was  commanded  by  the  enemy.  Hancock,  however, 
succeeded  in  throwing  Brooke's  brigade  across  the  stream 
some  distance  above,  and  was  proceeding  to  develop  the  ene 
my's  strength,  when  suddenly  the  movement  was  suspended 
by  General  Meade.  "While  Hancock's  movement  was  in  prog 
ress  that  morning,  it  had  been  determined  to  make  an  attack 
on  the  enemy  on  "Warren's  front  and  on  that  of  the  Sixth  Corps, 
and  General  Hancock  was  ordered  to  withdraw  two  divisions 
from  the  south  side  of  the  Po,  to  assist  the  proposed  assault. 

In  obedience  to  this  order,  the  divisions  of  Gibbon  and 
Birney  were  retired,  the  rear  of  the  latter  being  assailed  in 
the  act.  There  then  remained  only  the  division  of  Barlow, 
and  as  the  enemy  at  this  moment  showed  a  disposition  to 
attack,  Hancock  was  instructed  to  withdraw  this  also. 

The  order  was  given  just  as  Barlow's  skirmishers  were 
being  driven  in,  at  two  p.  M.  The  operation  immediately 
became  one  of  great  delicacy ;  for  after,  by  skilful  disposi 
tions,  two  brigades  of  the  division  had  been  withdrawn  from 
the  front,  the  enemy,  encouraged  by  what  he  deemed  a  forced 
retreat,  made  a  very  vigorous  assault  on  the  two  remaining 
brigades,  under  Colonels  Brooke  and  Brown.  He,  however, 
met  so  deadly  and  determined  a  fire  from  these  fine  brigades 
that  he  was  repulsed  with  heavy  loss.  During  the  heat  of  the 
contest  the  woods  in  the  rear  of  the  troops,  and  between  them 
and  the  river,  took  fire ;  and  in  the  midst  of  these  appalling 
perils,  with  a  fierce  foe  in  its  front,  and  a  burning  forest  in  its 
rear,  the  force,  after  checking  the  advance  of  the  enemy  by 
several  stubborn  stands,  was  retired  across  the  Po.  This  was 
not  accomplished  without  heavy  loss,  and  many  of  the  wound 
ed  perished  in  the  flames.*  The  remarkable  coolness  and 
steadiness  of  the  men  alone  saved  them  from  a  great  disaster. 
One  gun,  the  first  ever  lost  by  the  Second  Corps,  had  to  be 
abandoned  in  consequence  of  being  sunk  in  a  marsh. 
Miles'  brigade  crossed  last,  taking  up  the  ponton-bridge  and 
destroying  the  other. 

*  Hancock  :  Report  of  Spottsylvania. 


GRANT'S  OVERLAND  CAMPAIGN.  449 

This  affair,  though  illustrating  the  steady  valor  of  the 
troops,  was  an  unfortunate  one  in  every  respect.  It  was 
undertaken  without  any  very  well-defined  military  object,  and 
abandoned  under  circumstances  unfavorable  to  the  spirit  of 
the  troops,  and  highly  encouraging  to  the  enemy.* 

The  point  against  which  the  attack  (to  assist  in  which  the 
Second  Corps  had  been  retired  across  the  Po)  was  designed 
to  be  made,  was  a  hill  held  by  the  enemy  in  front  of  Warren's 
line.f  This  was,  perhaps,  the  most  formidable  point  along  the 
enemy's  whole  front.  Its  densely  wooded  crest  was  crowned 
by  earthworks,  while  the  approach,  which  was  swept  by  artil 
lery  and  musketry  fire,  was  rendered  more  difficult  and  haz 
ardous  by  a  heavy  growth  of  low  cedars,  mostly  dead,  the 
long  bayonet-like  branches  of  which,  interlaced  and  pointing 
in  all  directions,  presented  an  almost  impassable  barrier  to  the 
advance  of  a  line  of  battle 4 

The  attack  of  this  position  had  already  been  essayed  during 
the  day  by  troops  both  of  the  Second  and  Fifth  corps,  and 
with  most  unpromising  results.§  When  Hancock's  divisions 
joined  the  Fifth,  an  assault  was  made  by  the  troops  of  both 
corps  at  five  o'clock;  but  it  met  a  very  bloody  repulse. 
The  men  struggled  bravely  against  an  impossible  task, 

*  This  action  was  regarded  by  the  Confederates  as  so  considerable  a  victory 
that  General  Heth  (commanding  a  division  of  Hill's  corps),  who  directed  it, 
issued  thereon  a  congratulatory  order,  which  was  indorsed  by  General  Lee. 
Upon  this  point  General  Hancock  remarks :  "  Had  not  Barlow's  fine  division, 
then  in  full  strength,  received  imperative  orders  to  withdraw,  Heth's  division 
would  have  had  no  cause  for  congratulation." — Report  of  the  Second  Epoch  of 
the  Rapid  an  Campaign. 

f  This  point,  known  as  Laurel  Hill,  will  be  noted  on  the  accompanying  map. 

%  Hancock  :  Report  of  Operations. 

§  Of  the  Second  Corps,  the  brigades  of  Webb  and  Carroll  of  Gibbon's  divi 
sion,  had  at  eleven  A.  M.  engaged  in  an  attack  of  this  position,  in  which  they 
suffered  severe  loss.  At  three  P.  M.  the  divisions  of  Crawford  and  Cutler  ol 
Warren's  corps  had  also  essayed  a  preliminary  assault  in  order  to  gain  room  to 
form  the  lines  of  battle  far  enough  forward  for  the  main  attack  appointed  for 
five  o'clock,  when  Hancock's  divisions  should  join  in.  But  they  also  failed  in 
thin  object  and  were  repulsed  with  heavy  sacrifice. 


450  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

and  even  entered  the  enemy's  breastworks  at  one  or  two 
points ;  but  they  soon  wavered  and  fell  back  in  confusion 
and  great  slaughter.  Notwithstanding  the  disastrous  upshot 
of  this  assault,  the  experience  of  which  had  taught  the  troops 
that  the  work  assigned  them  was  really  hopeless,*  a  second 
charge  was  ordered  an  hour  after  the  failure  of  the  first. 
The  repulse  of  this  was  even  more  complete  than  that  of  the 
former  effort ;  and  the  loss  in  the  two  attacks  was  between 
five  and  six  thousand,  while  it  is  doubtful  whether  the  enemy 
lost  as  many  hundreds.  Among  the  killed  was  Brigadier- 
General  Eice  of  the  Fifth  Corps,  distinguished  for  his  in 
trepid  bearing  on  many  fields. 

On  the  left  of  Warren  an  assault  by  part  of  the  Sixth 
Corps  met  with  more  success.  Upton's  brigade,  in  a  vigor 
ous  charge,  carried  the  enemy's  first  line  of  intrenchments, 
capturing  nine  hundred  prisoners  and  several  guns.  But 
as  this  operation  was  unsupported  the  advantage  could 
not  be  maintained,  and  after  nightfall  Upton  withdrew,  leav 
ing  the  captured  guns  behind,  t 

In  these  operations  before  the  lines  of  Spottsylvania,  Gen 
eral  Grant  had  carried  out  with  much  fidelity,  but  very  indif 
ferent  success,  his  own  principle  of  hammering  continuously. 
Better  results,  however,  at  length  rewarded  his  persevering 
efforts  under  sounder  combinations. 

Thus  far  the  attacks  had  been  mainly  directed  against  Lee's 
left.  It  was  now  resolved  to  make  a  sudden  sally  against 

*  This  conclusion  the  men  had  really  formed,  and  this  was  precisely  one  of 
those  cases  in  which  the  troops,  thus  viewing  the  task  given  them  to  do,  showed 
a  nervous  wavering  and  a  behavior  very  unlike  that  which  was  common  with 
them.  "  Ward's  brigade,"  says  General  Hancock,  "  retired  in  disorder,  until 
rallied  by  my  own  staff  and  that  of  General  Birney."  "  Birney's  men,"  writes  a 
staff-officer,  "  in  fact  became  scared  and  ran  back  a  quarter  of  a  mile  behind 
some  old  breastworks."  It  is  only  those  who  know  little  of  the  motives  which 
influence  troops  that  would  mistake  such  conduct  for  pusillanimity. 

f  General  Meade  attributes  the  failure  of  this  operation  to  the  fact  that  Up 
ton  was  not  supported,  as  had  been  designed  he  should  be,  by  Mott's  division 
of  the  Second  Corps  on  his  left. — Report  of  the  Rapidan  Campaign. 


GRANT'S  OVERLAND  CAMPAIGN.          451 

his  right  centre,  where  it  was  thought  a  favorable  point  of 
attack  presented  itself.  Hancock's  corps  was  selected  for 
this  operation,  which  was  to  be  supported  by  the  rest  of 
the  army.  The  llth  was  passed  in  preparation  for  this, 
and,  after  dark,  the  Second  Corps  was  moved  over  from 
the  right  to  near  the  point  decided  on  for  the  assault.  The 
night  was  dark  and  stormy,  and  Hancock's  troops  quietly 
and  promptly  took  position  within  twelve  hundred  yards 
of  the  position  they  were  to  storm — a  position  of  which 
little  or  nothing  was  known.*  The  direction  of  advance 
was  determined  by  the  compass.  Hancock  disposed  his 
troops  as  follows  :  Barlow's  division  in  two  lines  of  masses — 
Brooke's  and  Miles'  brigades  in  the  first  line,  Brown's  and 
Smythe's  brigades  in  the  second  line,  each  regiment  forming 
double  column  on  the  centre  ;  Birney  formed  in  two  de 
ployed  lines  on  Barlow's  right;  Mott's  division  supported 
Birney,  and  Gibbon's  division  was  held  in  reserve. 

At  half-past  four  o'clock  of  Thursday  morning,  May  the  12th, 
as  soon  as  the  faint  dawn  struggling  through  a  fog  gave 
sufficient  light  to  see  the  direction  of  advance,  Hancock 
moved  forward.  Barlow's  division,  formed  on  cleared 
ground  extending  up  to  the  enemy's  lines,  advanced  at  quick 
time  for  several  hundred  yards — his  heavy  column  without 
firing  a  shot  marching  over  the  Confederate  pickets.  When 
half-way  towards  the  hostile  line,  the  men  broke  forth  into  a 
ringing  cheer,  and  spontaneously  taking  the  double-quick, 
rolled  like  a  resistless  wave  into  the  enemy's  works,  tearing 
away  with  their  hands  what  abatis  there  was  in  front  of  the 

*  The  point  to  which  Hancock's  corps  moved  during  the  night  of  the  llth 
and  where  it  formed  for  the  assault,  will  be  noted  on  the  accompanying  map  as 
the  "  Brown  house."  From  this  point  to  the  enemy's  lines,  some  twelve  or  fif 
teen  hundred  yards,  the  ground  ascends  sharply  and  was  thickly  wooded,  with 
the  exception  of  a  clearing  about  four  hundred  yards  in  width,  extending  up  to 
the  Confederate  works  in  front  of  the  "  Landrum  house"  [see  map],  curving  to 
the  right  as  it  approaches  the  enemy's  position.  The  direction  of  advance  was 
ascertained  only  by  a  line,  determined  by  compass,  from  Brown's  house  to  a 
large  white  house  known  to  be  inside  the  enemy's  lines  ["McCool's  house"  - 
gee  map].  Such  was  warfare  in  Virginia ! 


452  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

intrenchments,  and  spite  of  a  desperate  but  brief  defence  car 
ried  the  line  at  all  points.  Birnej's  division  on  Barlow's 
right,  moving  through  the  woods,  went  over  the  works  almost 
simultaneously  with  Barlow's  men.  Inside  the  intrenchnients 
there  ensued  a  savage  hand-to-hand  combat  with  the  bayonet 
and  clubbed  muskets  ;  but  it  was  of  short  duration,  and  re 
sulted  in  the  capture  of  near  four  thousand  prisoners,  com 
prising  almost  the  whole  of  Johnson's  division  of  Swell's 
corps  (including  General  Johnson),  twenty  pieces  of  artillery, 
and  thirty  colors.  The  remainder  of  the  force  fled  to  the  rear 
in  great  confusion.* 

It  happened  that  the  storming  column  struck  the  line  of 
works  at  the  point  where  it  formed  a  salient ;  so  that,  having 
burst  open  this  angle,  Hancock  had  driven  in  a  wedge  be 
tween  the  right  and  centre  of  the  enemy,  and  was  in  position 
to  rift  asunder  the  formidable  structure  in  which  the  Confed 
erate  army  lay  ensconced.  But  though  the  tactical  disposi 
tions  to  carry  the  works  were  admirable,  little  provision  had 
been  made  looking  to  that  critical  moment  that  comes  after 
an  assault,  when  the  victory  must  either  be  assured  by  a  deci 
sive  blow  or  risk  a  lapse  of  all  the  gain.  Flushed  with  their 
success,  the  troops  that  had  made  the  assault  could  not  be 
restrained  after  the  capture  of  the  intrenchments,  but  pushed 
the  flying  enemy  through  the  forest  towards  Spottsylvania 
Courthouse.  Now  at  the  distance  of  half  a  mile  they  came 
up  against  a  fresh  line  of  breastworks ;  but  it  was  without 
order  or  ensemble,  and  the  momentum  of  the  assault  had  been 
so  broken  that  on  arriving  in  front  of  the  new  line  the  troops 
halted. f  Here  the  Confederates  quickly  rallied  on  their  re- 

*  Hancock :  Report  of  the  Second  Epoch  of  the  Campaign  of  1864. 

f  The  precise  nature  of  this  second  line  is  somewhat  difficult  to  determine. 
It  is  certain  that  a  second  line  had  been  laid  out  but  not  completed.  John 
son's  artillery  had  been  taken  back  to  this  line  the  day  before  ;  but,  becoming 
apprehensive  of  attack,  that  officer  before  daylight  ordered  it  to  return.  It  had 
just  got  back,  but  only  two  pieces  were  unlimbered  when  Hancock's  attack  was 
made.  But  what  really  stopped  Hancock's  column  was  that  no  adequate  prep 
aration  had  been  made  to  follow  up  the  success,  and  because  the  fire  and  enthu 
siasm  of  the  troops  were  not  sustained  ;  for  when  this  feeling  is  kept  up  great 
results  can  be  plucked  even  without  orderly  tactical  dispositions. 


GRANT'S  OVERLAND  CAMPAIGN.  453 

aerves,  and  assuming  the  offensive,  threw  back  their  pursuers 
on  the  captured  line  ;  but  Hancock's  men,  forming  on  the 
right  and  left  of  the  angle  of  works,  resisted  the  attempt  to 
dislodge  them  from  the  position  won.  Yet  its  tenure  de 
manded  all  the,  force  that  could  be  brought  up,  for  the  Con 
federates,  re-enforced  by  heavy  masses,  began  an  impetuous 
assault  to  retake  the  lost  line  :  so  that  it  was  opportune  that 
at  this  moment  the  Sixth  Corps  reached  the  ground  and  re 
lieved  the  Second  Corps  from  the  salient  to  the  right.* 
Hancock  then  formed  on  the  left  of  the  angle. 

The  weight  of  the  pressure  brought  to  bear  by  Lee  for  the 
recapture  of  the  lost  line  led  to  the  inference  that  the  concen 
tration  against  the  Second  and  the  Sixth  corps  must  be  at  the 
expense  of  a  reduction  of  force  in  front  of  the  rest  of  the  army 
— that  is,  against  Burnside  on  the  left,  and  against  Warren  on 
the  right — and  at  eight  o'clock  these  officers  were  ordered  to 
make  a  general  attack,  both  to  take  advantage  of  the  sup 
posed  diminution  of  the  force  in  their  front,  and  to  relieve 
Hancock  and  W right.  The  assault  was  made  as  directed,  but 
produced  no  impression,  though  it  resulted  in  very  heavy  loss 
of  life.  Seeing,  at  length,  that  nothing  could  be  hoped  from 
this,  two  of  "Warren's  divisions  (those  of  Cutler  and  Griffin) 
were  detached  and  sent  to  aid  the  Second  and  Sixth  corps, 
where  the  angle  of  works  continued  to  be  the  prize  hotly  con 
tended  for.  Lee  seemed  to  be  determined  to  retake,  at  any 
cost,  the  line  wrested  from  him,  and  throughout  the  day 
made  not  less  than  five  heavy  assaults,  each  of  which  was  in 
succession  repulsed  by  the  troops  of  the  different  corps  now 
concentrated  at  the  point  assailed. 

Of  all  the  struggles  of  the  war  this  was  perhaps  the  fiercest 
and  most  deadly.  Frequently,  throughout  the  conflict,  so 
close  was  the  contest  that  the  rival  standards  were  planted  on 
opposite  sides  of  the  breastworks.  The  enemy's  most  savage 
Bailies  were  directed  to  retake  the  famous  salient  which  was 

*  The  Sixth  Corps  came  up  at  six  A.  M. ;  its  arrival  was  timely,  and  the  sei- 
vice  it  performed  during  the  day  was  of  the  first  importance. 


454  CAMPAIGNS  OF   THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

now  become  an  angle  of  death,  and  presented  a  spectacle 
ghastly  and  terrible.  On  the  Confederate  side  of  the  works 
lay  many  corpses  of  those  who  had  been  bayoneted  by  Han 
cock's  men  when  they  first  leaped  the  intrenchments.  To 
these  were  constantly  added  the  bravest  of  those  who,  in  the 
assaults  to  recapture  the  position,  fell  at  the  margin  of  the 
works,  till  the  ground  was  literally  covered  with  piles  of  dead, 
and  the  woods  in  front  of  the  salient  were  one  hideous  Gol 
gotha.* 

At  midnight,  after  twenty  hours  of  combat,  Lee  drew  back 
his  bleeding  lines,  and  reformed  them  on  his  interior  position. 
The  loss  on  the  Union  side  this  day  was  above  eight  thousand,! 
and  on  the  Confederate  side  it  must  also  have  been  great. 
But  Hancock's  success  had  an  excellent  moral  effect  on  the 
army,  and  was  worth  all  it  cost. 

Thus  the  lines  of  Spottsylvania  remained  still  intact,  and 
General  Grant,  who  might  easily  have  turned  the  position  and 
manoeuvred  his  antagonist  out  of  it,  seemed  bent  on  carrying 
it  by  direct  attack.  Accordingly,  during  the  succeeding 
week,  various  movements  of  corps  were  made  from  flank  to 
flank,  in  the  endeavor  to  find  a  spot  where  the  lines  could  be 
broken.J  These  attempts  were  skilfully  met  at  every  point, 


*  I  am  aware  that  the  language  above  used  may  resemble  exaggeration  ; 
but  I  speak  of  that  which  I  personally  saw.  In  the  vicious  phraseology  com 
monly  employed  by  those  who  undertake  to  describe  military  operations,  and 
especially  by  those  who  never  witnessed  a  battle-field,  "  piles  of  dead"  figure 
much  more  frequently  than  they  exist  in  the  reality.  The  phrase  is  here  no 
figure  of  speech,  as  can  be  attested  by  thousands  who  witnessed  the  ghastly 
scene.  It  may  be  stated  that  the  musketry  fire  has  had  the  effect  to  kill  the 
whole  forest  within  its  range,  and  there  is  at  Washington  the  trunk  of  a  tree 
eighteen  inches  in  diameter,  which  was  actually  cut  in  two  by  the  bullets. 

f  The  precise  loss  in  this  battle  is  unknown  ;  but  from  the  12th  to  the  21st 
May  it  was  by  official  returns  ten  thousand  three  hundred  and  eighty-one. 
The  casualties  subsequent  to  the  action  of  the  12th  were,  however,  in  all  like 
lihood  not  above  ten  thousand. 

^  No  mere  general  statement  can  give  any  idea  of  the  enormous  amount 
«f  labor,  suffering,  and  privation  that  befell  the  troops  in  these  continual  shift- 


GRANT'S  OVERLAND  CAMPAIGN.  455 

— the  Confederates  extending  their  line  to  correspond  with 
the  shiftings  of  the  army ;  so  that  wherever  attack  was  es 
sayed,  the  enemy  bristled  out  in  breastworks,  and  every 
partial  assault  made  was  repulsed.  Day  by  day  Grant  con- 
ings  of  the  corps  from  point  to  point  of  the  long  line.  I  shall  in  this  note  in  • 
dicate  some  details  of  the  action  from  day  to  day. 

MAY  13TH. — The  battle  of  the  12th  having  ended  in  Lee's  retirement  to  an 
inner  and  shorter  line,  it  was  resolved  to  attempt  to  turn  his  right  flank. 
With  this  view,  the  Fifth  Corps,  during  the  night  of  the  13th,  was  ordered  to 
march  from  its  position  on  the  extreme  right,  take  post  on  the  extreme  left,  to 
the  left  of  Burnside's  corps,  and  assault  in  conjunction  with  that  corps  at  four 
A.  M.  on  the  14th.  The  march  was  begun  at  ten  P.  M.  The  wet  weather  had, 
however,  badly  broken  up  the  roads  ;  and  the  night  being  one  of  Egyptian  dark 
ness,  the  move  was  made  with  immense  difficulty.  The  route  of  march  was 
past  the  Landrum  House  [see  map]  to  the  Ny  River,  which  had  to  be  waded. 
Across  the  Ny  the  route  followed  no  road,  but  traversed  the  fields  and  a  piece 
of  woods  where  a  track  had  been  cut.  Here,  midway  of  the  journey,  a  dense 
fog  arose  and  covered  the  ground,  so  that  not  even  the  numerous  fires  that  had 
been  built  to  guide  the  column  could  be  seen.  The  men,  exhausted  with 
wading  through  the  mud  knee  deep  and  in  the  darkness,  fell  asleep  all  along 
the  way.  In  addition  to  this,  the  locality  where  the  troops  were  to  take  posi 
tion  was  quite  unknown  ;  and  at  broad  daylight,  when  the  head  of  the  column 
got  to  the  left  of  Burnside's  corps  near  the  Fredericksburg  turnpike  [see  map], 
the  only  troops  on  hand  with  which  to  execute  the  meditated  assault  were 
twelve  hundred  fagged-out  men  of  Griffin's  division.  It  was  seven  o'clock  be 
fore  General  Cutler  got  thirteen  hundred  of  his  men  together. 

MAY  14TH. — Skirmishing  commenced  at  six  A.  M.  Off  to  the  southeast  of 
the  Beverly  House  was  a  high  hill — the  Jet  House  [see  map],  which  completely 
commanded  Warren's  position.  It  appeared,  however,  to  be  occupied  only  by 
a  few  of  the  enemy's  cavalry ;  so  a  small  force  of  Regulars  under  Lieutenant 
Oolonel  Otis  was  sent  to  take  it.  The  troopers  retired,  and  Otis  commenced  to 
intrench  around  the  house ;  and  while  doing  so,  Upton's  brigade  of  the  Sixth 
Corps — that  corps  having  followed  the  route  of  the  Fifth — relieved  him.  Be 
fore  Upton  was  fairly  established,  a  large  force  of  the  enemy's  infantry  moved 
against  him,  coming  from  the  Courthouse.  They  made  him  clear  out  pell-mell, 
and  were  near  catching  General  Meade,  who  had  come  upon  the  ground.  The 
remainder  of  the  Sixth  Corps  now  came  up  and  massed  around  the  Anderson 
House  [see  map].  In  the  afternoon  this  important  position  was  retaken,  or  re- 
occupied  (it  being  doubtful  whether  the  enemy  had  not  abandoned  it),  by 
Ayres'  brigade,  Fifth  Corps,  in  conjunction  with  troops  of  NeilTs  division, 
Sixth  Corps. 

MAY  15TH  AND  16TH. — The  withdrawal  of  the  Fifth  and  Sixth  corps  from 
the  right  of  the  Second  to  make  this  movement  on  the  left,  caused  the  Second 


456  CAMPAIGNS   OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

tinned  to  throw  out  towards  the  left,  in  the  hope  of  overlap 
ping  and  breaking  in  the  Confederate  right  flank :  so  that 
from  occupying,  as  the  army  did  on  its  arrival,  a  line  extend 
ing  four  or  five  miles  to  the  northwest  of  Spottsylvania  Court- 
Corps  to  be  the  right  of  the  whole  line.  But  on  the  15th  an  additional  refusal 
of  that  flank  was  made — Hancock  being  directed  to  transfer  the  divisions  of 
Barlow  and  Gibbon  to  the  Fredericksburg  road.  Meanwhile,  Birney's  division 
remained  covering  the  right  of  Burnside's  corps,  and  was  the  right  of  the 
army. 

For  the  other  corps,  the  day  passed  in  getting  things  in  order,  collecting 
stragglers,  cutting  roads,  and  constant  skirmishing.  At  this  time  also  a 
new  base  was  opened  at  Aquia  Creek,  whither  the  sick  and  wounded  were 
sent,  and  whence  supplies  and  forage,  much  needed  by  the  army,  were  drawn. 

MAY  17TH. — Hancock  received  orders  to  move  his  command  back  to  the 
works  he  had  captured  on  the  12th,  and  attack  the  enemy  at  daylight  on  the 
18th  in  the  intrenchments  he  then  held  in  front  of  that  position.  The  Sixth 
Corps  was  directed  to  form  on  Hancock's  right  and  assail  the  enemy's  line  at 
the  same  hour.  The  Ninth  Corps  was  also  to  participate.  The  movement 
commenced  at  dark  of  the  17th.  The  withdrawal  of  these  corps  left  Warren 
holding  almost  the  entire  front  of  the  army.  The  night  march  was  a  very 
arduous  one. 

MAY  18TH.— Before  daylight  of  the  18th  the  troops  were  in  position  for  an 
assault.  It  had  been  the  intention  to  catch  the  enemy  napping  ;  but  he  had  at 
least  one  eye  open,  and  was  covered  by  acres  of  impenetrable  slashings. 

At  four  A.  M.  the  divisions  of  Gibbon  and  Barlow  moved  forward  to  the  as 
sault  in  lines  of  brigades.  The  artillery  was  posted  in  the  first  line  of  works, 
firing  during  the  action  over  the  troops  in  front.  Birney's  division  and  Tyler's 
division  of  foot-artillerists,  which  had  recently  joined  the  army,  were  in 
reserve.  The  Confederates  held  a  strong  line  of  intrenchments  about  half  a 
mile  in  front  of,  and  parallel  to,  the  works  Hancock  had  stormed  on  the  12th 
Their  position  was  concealed  by  the  forest,  and  protected  by  the  heaviest  kind 
of  abatis.  As  the  troops  moved  forward,  they  encountered  a  severe  fire  01 
musketry  and  artillery,  which  completely  swept  the  approaches,  making  great 
havoc  in  their  ranks.  They  pressed  forward,  however,  until  they  arrived  at 
the  edge  of  the  abatis,  which,  with  the  heavy  fire,  arrested  their  progress. 
Many  gallant  attempts  were  made  to  penetrate  the  enemy's  line,  but  without 
•success.  The  Corcoran  Legion  of  Gibbon's  division  was  particularly  marked 
on  this  occasion,  and  its  losses  were  very  heavy.  At  ten  A.  M.,  finding  attack 
to  be  hopeless,  operations  were  suspended  by  General  Meade.  During  the 
morning,  the  batteries  were  opened  along  the  entire  line,  the  enemy  scarcely 
replying.  The  only  apparent  effect  was  to  drive  them  under  cover  of  their 
breastworks.  Immense  waste  of  ammunition — result  nil. 

MAY  19TH. — During  the  night  of  the  18th,  Barlow'g,  Birney's,  and  Gib- 


GRANT'S  OVERLAND  CAMPAIGN.  457 

house  it  had  at  the  end  of  ten  days  assumed  a  position  almost 
due  east  of  that  place,  the  left  resting  at  a  distance  of  four 
miles  at  Massaponax  Church. 

After  twelve  days  of  effort,  the  carrying  of  the  position 
was  seen  to  be  hopeless ;  and  General  Grant,  abandoning 
the  attempt,  resolved  by  a  turning  operation  to  disengage  Lee 
from  a  position  seen  to  be  unassailable.  Preparations  for 
this  movement  were  begun  on  the  afternoon  of  the  19th  ;  but 
the  enemy  observing  these,  retarded  its  execution  by  a  bold 
demonstration  against  the  Union  right.  It  happened  that 
this  flank  was  held  by  a  division  of  foot  artillerists,  under 
General  Tyler,  posted  in  an  important  position,  covering  the 
road  from  Spottsylvania  to  Fredericksburg,  which  was  the 
army's  main  line  of  communication  with  its  base  at  the  latter 
point.  Ewell  crossed  the  Ny  Eiver  above  the  right  flank, 
and  moving  down,  seized  the  Fredericksburg  road  and  laid 
hands  on  an  ammunition  train  coming  up.  Tyler  promptly 
met  this  attack  and  succeeded  in  driving  the  enemy  from  the 
road  and  into  the  woods  beyond.  The  foot  artillerists  had 
not  before  been  in  battle,  but  it  was  found  that  once  under 
fire,  they  displayed  an  audacity  surpassing  even  the  old 
troops.  In  these  murderous  wood-fights,  the  veterans  had 
learned  to  employ  all  the  Indian  devices  that  afford  shelter  to 
the  person  ;  but  these  green  battalions,  unused  to  this  kind  of 
craft,  pushed  boldly  on,  firing  furiously.  Their  loss  was  heavy, 
but  the  honor  of  the  enemy's  repulse  belongs  to  them. 
Shortly  afterwards,  troops  of  the  Second  and  Fifth  corps 

bon's  divisions  of  the  Second  Corps  moved  to  the  vicinity  of  Anderson's  Mills 
on  the  Ny  [see  map].  Tyler's  division  remained  at  the  Fredericksburg  road 
near  the  Harris  House  [see  map].  The  assigned  position  was  taken  up  by 
Hancock  on  the  morning  of  the  19th,  when  he  received  orders  to  be  ready  to 
move  at  dark  in  the  direction  of  Bowling  Green.  Preparations  for  this  were 
under  way,  when,  in  the  afternoon,  Ewell  attacked  Tyler  in  the  manner  and 
with  the  results  described  in  the  text  above.  At  the  same  time  the  Second 
Corps  moved,  the  Ninth  Corps  also  marched  to  the  left  and  took  post  on  the 
left  of  the  Sixth  Corps.  In  aid  of  Ewell's  attack,  Hill  made  a  demonstra 
tion  on  the  Fifth  Corps,  but  without  effect. 

MAY  20TH. — The  turning  movement  and  southward  march  begin. 


458  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

coming  to  their  assistance,  pursued  the  fugitives  up  through 
the  valley  of  the  Po,  and  made  prisoners  of  several  hundred 
Confederates  that  had  scattered  through  the  woods.  This 
attack  somewhat  disconcerted  the  contemplated  movement, 
and  delayed  it  till  the  following  night,  May  20th,  when  the 
army,  moving  by  the  left,  once  more  took  up  its  march  to 
wards  Richmond. 

Before  the  lines  of  Spottsylvania  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
had  for  twelve  days  and  nights  engaged  in  a  fierce  wrestle,  in 
which  it  had  done  all  that  valor  may  do  to  carry  a  position 
by  nature  and  art  impregnable. 

In  this  contest,  unparalleled  in  its  continuous  fury,  and 
swelling  to  the  proportions  of  a  campaign,  language  is  inade 
quate  to  convey  an  impression  of  the  labors,  fatigues,  and 
sufferings  of  the  troops,  who  fought  by  day  only  to  march  by 
night,  from  point  to  point  of  the  long  line,  and  renew  the 
tight  on  the  morrow.  Above  forty  thousand  men  had  already 
fallen  in  the  bloody  encounters  of  the  Wilderness  and  Spott 
sylvania,*  and  the  exhausted  army  began  to  lose  its  spirit.  It 
was  with  joy,  therefore,  that  it  at  length  turned  its  back  upon 
the  lines  of  Spottsylvania. 

Before  proceeding  to  follow  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  in  its 
southward  march  from  Spottsylvania  Courthouse,  it  will  be 
proper  to  glance  briefly  at  the  operations  of  the  cavalry  under 
Sheridan  during  its  raid  on  Lee's  communications.  This  col 
umn,  consisting  of  portions  of  the  three  divisions  of  Merritt, 
Wilson,  and  Gregg,t  cut  loose  from  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 

*  By  the  official  returns,  the  casualties  from  the  5th  to  the  l?th  of  May 
were  twenty-nine  thousand  four  hundred  and  ten  ;  and  from  the  12th  to  the 
21st  of  May  (at  which  time  the  army  moved  from  Spottsylvania),  they  were 
ten  thousand  three  hundred  and  eighty-one — making  an  aggregate  of  thirty- 
nine  thousand  seven  hundred  and  ninety-one. — Meade  :  Report  of  the  Rapidan 
Campaign.  But  to  this  must  be  added  the  casualties  of  Burnside's  corps,  not 
then  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  Of  these  I  have  no  returns. 

f  The  dismounted  men  and  those  with  worn  and  jaded  animals  were  or 
dered  to  remain  and  guard  the  trains.  These  constituted  nearly  one-half  of 
the  corps. 


GRANT'S  OVERLAND  CAMPAIGN.  459 

on  the  9th  of  May,  with  orders  to  engage  the  enemy's  cavalry, 
and  after  destroying  the  Fredericksburg  and  Central  rail 
roads,  to  threaten  Richmond  and  eventually  communicate  with 
and  draw  supplies  from  Butler's  force  on  the  James  River.* 

To  mask  the  march  the  first  move  was  towards  Fredericks- 
burg,  near  which,  turning  southward  to  the  right,  the  column 
thrust  itself  inside  the  enemy's  lines.  The  clouds  of  tell-tale 
dust,  miles  in  length,  soon  informed  Stuart,  however,  of  its 
presence,  and  he  dispatched  a  force  in  pursuit.  But  the  rear 
being  skilfully  covered,  the  blows  directed  thereat  did  not 
retard  Sheridan's  progress.  Reaching  the  crossing  of  the 
North  Anna  on  the  following  day,  he  captured  Beaver  Dam 
Station  on  the  Central  Railroad,  destroying  ten  miles  of  the 
track,  two  locomotives,  three  trains  of  cars,  and  a  million  and 
a  half  of  rations.  Here  also  he  recaptured  four  hundred  Union 
prisoners  on  their  way  to  captivity  in  Richmond.  At  this 
point  he  was  attacked  by  the  enemy  in  flank  and  rear,  but 
his  loss  was  inconsiderable,  and  this  affair  did  not  serve  to 
impede  his  progress.  The  South  Anna  was  crossed  at  Ground- 
squirrel  Bridge  ;  Ashland  Station  was  captured  at  daylight  of 
the  llth,  and  the  depot,  six  miles  of  the  road,  a  train,  and  a 
large  quantity  of  stores  were  destroyed.  After  this,  Sheridan 
resumed  the  march  towards  Richmond. 

To  meet  this  advance,  Stuart  had  succeeded  by  a  detour  in 
interposing  himself  between  the  assailants  and  the  Confeder 
ate  capital,  and  had  massed  all  his  available  cavalry  at  Yel- 
len  Tavern,  a  few  miles  north  of  Richmond.  Here  Sheridan 
immediately  attacked  him  on  the  llth,  and  after  an  obstinate 
contest  gained  possession  of  the  turnpike,  driving  the  Confed 
erate  force  back  towards  Ashland  and  across  the  North  Fork 
of  the  Chickahominy.  In  this  passage  at  arms  between  the 
two  ablest  cavalry  leaders  of  the  rival  armies,  General  J.  E. 
B.  Stuart,  whose  dashing  exploits  fill  a  brilliant  page  in  the 
history  of  the  war,  was  killed. 

Pursuing  his  advantage  gained  at  Yellow  Tavern,  Sheridan 

*  Meade :  Report  of  the  Rapidan  Campaign. 


460  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

made  a  bold  dasli  upon  the  outer  defences  of  Richmond. 
The  first  line,  feebly  defended,  was  carried — Ouster's  brigade 
capturing  a  section  of  artillery  and  a  hundred  prisoners. 
The  second  line,  however,  was  too  strong  to  be  assailed,  being 
thoroughly  commanded  by  redoubts  and  bastioned  works,  and 
as  the  garrison  rallied  for  the  defence  Sheridan  retired  towards 
the  Chickahominy.  Crossing  at  Meadow  Bridge  he  drove  the 
enemy  from  his  front,  and  repulsed  an  attack  on  his  rear 
by  Confederate  infantry  from  the  city.  After  destroying  the 
railroad-bridge  over  the  Chickahominy,  Sheridan  moved  to 
Haxall's  Landing,  which  he  reached  on  the  14th  of  May 
Here  he  remained  three  days  to  refit,  when  he  returned  by 
way  of  Baltimore  Store,  White  House,  and  Hanover  Court 
house,  rejoining  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  the  25th  of  May, 
on  the  Pamunkey. 


IV. 


CO-OPERATIVE    MOVEMENTS    ON    THE    JAMES    AND    IN 
THE   SHENANDOAH  VALLEY. 

Thus  far  in  the  campaign,  the  course  of  this  narrative  has 
followed  the  main  action  as  waged  between  the  two  mighty 
adversaries  in  tide-water  Virginia.  It  is  now  necessary  to 
interrupt  for  a  time  this  recital,  and  trace  the  development  of 
the  movements  co-operative  under  Butler  and  Sigel,  on  the 
banks  of  the  James  River  and  in  the  Valley  of  the  Shenan- 
doah.  This  I  shall  only  do  so  far  as  may  be  necessary  to  set 
forth  their  relations  with  the  general  system  of  operations. 

The  force  under  General  Butler  was  assembled  at  Yorktown 
and  at  Gloucester  Point,  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  York 
River,  during  the  month  of  April.  It  was  composed  of  the 
Eighteenth  Corps,  under  General  W.  F.  Smith,  and  the  Tenth 


GRANT'S  OVERLAND  CAMPAIGN.  461 

Corps,*  which  General  Q.  A.  Gillmore  fcad  lately  brought  from 
the  coast  of  South  Carolina.  General  Butler  had  in  addition 
a  division  of  horse,  under  General  Kautz ;  this  division  was, 
at  this  time,  at  Norfolk  and  Portsmouth.  The  strength  of 
the  army  was  somewhat  above  thirty  thousand  of  all  arms. 

At  Yorktown,  Butler  was  in  position  to  move  by  land  up  the 
Peninsula  in  the  direction  of  Eichmond ;  to  use  the  line  of 
the  York  River  for  an  advance  similar  to  that  of  McClellan, 
in  186*2,  or  to  take  up  the  line  of  the  James  and  threaten  the 
Confederate  capital  from  the  south  side.  The  last  was  the 
move  actually  intended,  but  the  real  destination  of  this  column 
was  kept  secret ;  and  feints  of  striking  in  both  the  other 
directions  were  made.  The  1st  of  May,  Butler  dispatched  a 
detachment  of  his  force  (Henry's  brigade  of  Turner's  divi 
sion)  by  water  to  West  Point,  at  the  head  of  the  York,  and  at 
the  same  time  he  sent  a  force  of  eighteen  hundred  cavalry  to 
move,  by  way  of  West  Point,  across  the  Peninsula,  attract 
the  attention  of  the  enemy  towards  Eichmond,  and  then  make 
a  junction  with  his  main  body  when  it  should  have  reached 
its  destination.  Kautz,  with  his  mounted  division,  was  in 
structed  to  move  northward  from  Suffolk  to  the  south  side. 

During  the  night  of  May  4th,  the  same  day  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  crossed  the  Eapidan,  the  entire  command  of 
Butler  embarked  on  transports,  dropped  down  the  York, 
passed  Fortress  Monroe,  and,  entering  the  James,  ascended 
that  river,  convoyed  by  a  fleet  of  gunboats.  The  following 
afternoon  a  landing  was  effected  on  the  south  side  of  the 
James — one  detachment  at  City  Point,  another  at  Fort  Pow- 
hatan,  a  few  miles  below ;  but  the  main  body  a  mile  or  two 
above  City  Point,  at  Bermuda  Hundred,  a  neck  of  land  formed 
by  the  sinuous  course  of  the  James  and  Appomattox.  The 
point  of  debarkation  was  between  Petersburg  and  Eichmond 
— ten  miles  north  of  the  former  and  twenty  miles  south  of 

*  The  Tenth  Corps  was  composed  of  three  divisions  under  Brigadier-Gen 
erals  Terry,  Ames,  and  Turner ;  the  Eighteenth  Corps,  of  two  divisions  of 
white  troops,  under  Brigadier-Generals  Brooks  and  Weitzel,  and  a  division  of 
colored  troops,  under  Brigadier-General  Hinks. 


462  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  AKMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

the  latter  place.  The  landing  was  a  complete  surprise,  and 
was  made  without  molestation.  Indeed,  the  Confederate 
force  about  Petersburg  and  Richmond  was  at  this  time  very 
trivial. 

General  Butler's  instructions  from  General  Grant  pre 
scribed  Richmond  as  his  objective  point ;  but  his  operations 
were  to  be  contingent  upon  the  results  achie\red  by  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac.  The  programme  drawn  up  by  the  lieutenant- 
general  for  Butler's  governance  is  indeed  vague,  and  in  some 
respects  contradictory,  and  it  is  difficult  to  tell  precisely  what 
was  expected  of  that  officer.  He  was  commanded  first  of  all 
to  intrench  at  City  Point,  which  would  indicate  rather  a 
defensive  than  an  offensive  purpose.  Further  instructions 
ordered  him  to  move  against  Richmond  by  the  south  bank 
of  the  James,  capturing  it  if  possible,  and  if  not,  investing  it 
on  the  south  side  so  as  to  have  his  left  resting  on  the  James 
above  Richmond.  It  is,  however,  clearly  set  forth  in  papers 
not  embodied  by  General  Grant  in  his  official  report,  that  But 
ler's  action  was  to  hinge  on  General  Grant's  own  success ;  that 
he  expected,  after  decisive  action,  either  to  defeat  Lee  or  drive 
him  into  the  intrenchments  at  Richmond ;  that  he  would  then 
approach  the  Confederate  capital  from  the  direction  of  the 
north  and  west,  and,  swinging  across  the  James,  make  a  junc 
tion  with  Butler,  whose  signal  for  action  was  to  be  Grant's 
guns  thundering  on  the  north  side.  But,  as  Grant's  guns 
were  never  heard  thundering  on  the  north  side,  it  is  a 
matter  of  less  surprise  that  Butler  also  was  foiled  in  his 
part.  Moreover,  I  shall  attempt  to  show  that  there  was, 
in  any  event,  very  little  likelihood  that  the  James  River 
column  would  meet  what  seem  to  have  been  General  Grant's 
expectations. 

An  advance  against  Richmond  by  the  south  bank  of  the 
James  placed  that  great  river  between  the  city  and  the  assail 
ants,  and  the  defence  of  the  points  of  passage  could  readily  be 
maintained  by  the  local  garrison  until  strengthened  to  with 
stand  attack.  It  is,  however,  unnecessary  to  discuss  this  prob 
lem  in  detail,  as  it  is  hardly  possible  that  General  Grant  ever 


GRANT'S  OVERLAND  CAMPAIGN.  463 

really  expected  General  Butler  to  capture  Richmond.  Equally 
remote  was  the  possibility  of  investing  it  from  the  south  bank  of 
the  James,  where  the  ground  is  a  low,  open  plain.  But  there 
is  another  circumstance  that  greatly  complicates  any  operation 
on  that  line,  whether  directed  against  Richmond  immediately,  or 
with  a  view  to  invest  it  from  the  south  side,  or  with  the  object 
of  holding  a  debouche  for  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  above 
that  city.  This  is  the  dangerous  exposure  of  its  rear  and 
communications  which  the  operating  column  must  make.  It 
is  hardly  to  be  supposed  that,  in  framing  a  plan  of  opera 
tions  for  the  James  River  column,  there  could  be  failure  to 
note  the  certainty  of  the  approach  of  adverse  masses  from 
the  south  ;  for  the  withdrawal  of  Gillmore's  force  from  South 
Carolina  left  Beauregard  free  to  hurry  forward  with  a  con 
siderable  army  to  Richmond,  the  danger  to  which  was  appa 
rent  the  moment  Butler  landed  on  the  south  side  of  the 
James  River.  It  is  marvellous  how  it  could  have  been  ex 
pected  that  in  this  event  Butler's  army  could  have  maintained 
a  position  above  Richmond  when  not  only  its  rear  must  have 
been  so  greatly  exposed,  but  its  line  of  communications,  with 
its  depot  at  Bermuda  Hundred,  must  have  been  quite  uncov 
ered  to  the  enemy. 

In  the  actual  situation  the  only  effective  service  that  But 
ler's  force  could  render  towards  the  execution  of  the  general 
plan  was  to  secure  a  lodgment  on  the  south  side  of  the  James 
River,  below  Richmond,  in  case  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
should  need  to  be  transferred  thither.  This  purpose  might 
best  of  all  have  been  attained  by  another  operation,  which, 
while  serving  this  end,  would  have  had  the  most  important 
bearings  on  the  general  object  of  the  campaign.  This  is  to 
have  immediately  seized  Petersburg,  which,  as  the  strategic 
key  to  Richmond,  would  probably  have  been  decisive  of  the 
fall  of  that  city.  Had  Petersburg  been  taken  at  this  time,  it 
is  probable  that  Lee,  abandoning  as  vain  the  attempt  to 
defend  the  Confederate  capital,  would  have  fallen  off  on  the 
Lynchburg  or  Danville  line.  But  even  had  Lee  attempted, 
by  throwing  himself  upon  Butler,  to  recover  Petersburg,  the 


464  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

James  Biver  column  was  sufficiently  powerful  to  have  main 
tained  alone  the  defence  of  the  line  of  the  Appomattos 
against  any  force  the  Confederates  could  spare  to  bring 
against  it.  It  will  now  be  seen  how  speedy  was  the  punish 
ment  that  befell  dispositions  originally  faulty. 

The  debarkation  of  the  force  was  completed  by  the  6th. 
As  the  instructions  of  General  Grant  were  first  of  all  to 
intrench,  the  construction  of  a  defensive  front  across  the  nar 
row  neck  of  Bermuda  Hundred  was  immediately  begun. 
This  line  was  drawn  within  three  miles  of  the  Richmond  and 
Petersburg  Railroad,  the  destruction  of  which  engaged  But 
ler's  first  attention.  The  same  day  a  brigade  moved  out  to 
this  road,  which  it  struck  near  Walthal  Junction.  A  small 
force  of  the  enemy  was  encountered,  and  after  a  brisk  skir 
mish  the  brigade  returned. 

Thus  far  there  had  been  no  indication  of  any  considerable 
body  of  the  enemy  in  the  vicinity,  but  that  night  the  van  of 
Beauregard's  army,  drawn  from  Charleston,  Savannah,  and 
Florida,  reached  Petersburg.  When,  therefore,  on  the  morn 
ing  of  the  7th,  a  column  of  five  brigades  moved  out  to  destroy 
the  Petersburg  and  Richmond  Railroad,  the  enemy  was  found 
in  a  position  covering  that  road,  from  Walthal  Junction  north 
to  Chester  station.  Brooks  attacked  and  drove  this  force 
from  its  vantage  ground;  but  rallying,  it  pushed  back  his 
right,  and  finally  both  parties  withdrew. 

On  the  morning  of  the  9th,  another  advance  was  made  to 
the  railroad.  Here  a  force  was  left  facing  in  the  direction  of 
Richmond,  while  the  remainder  turned  southward,  towards 
Petersburg.  The  enemy  was  soon  met  and  driven,  skirmish 
ing,  to  Swift  Creek  (three  miles  from  Petersburg),  on  the 
right  bank  of  which  he  occupied  a  strong  line  of  earthworks. 
Having  meanwhile  effectually  destroyed  the  railroad,  Butler 
designed  next  day  crossing  Swift  Creek  and  crowding  the 
enemy  into  Petersburg  ;  but  that  night  he  received  from 
Washington  such  accounts  of  Lee's  being  "  in  full  retreat  to 
Richmond,"  that  he  resolved  to  turn  northward,  in  order  to 
aid  in  the  investment  of  the  Confederate  capital. 


GRANT'S  OVERLAND  CAMPAIGN.  4.65 

Two  days  afterwards  a  general  advance  was  made  in  the 
direction  of  Kichmond.  Whatever  force  of  the  enemy  was 
encountered  was  pressed  back  until  dark,  when  the  Confed 
erates  took  position  on  the  left  bank  of  Proctor's  Creek. 
Next  morning  (13th)  the  enemy  withdrew  from  the  creek  to 
an  intrenched  line  in  the  rear.  This  line,  if  adequately  held, 
would  have  been  difficult  to  carry  by  assault;  but  General 
Gillmore  succeeded  in  turning  it,  and  held  its  extreme  right. 
The  possession  of  this  line,  however,  only  revealed  the  enemy 
holding  an  interior  line  of  works,  with  a  bastion  salient  on  an 
eminence  completely  commanding  the  position  gained.  The 
flanks  fell  back  on  the  Confederates'  left  to  the  James  River 
and  Drury's  Bluff,  and  on  their  right  extended  in  a  north 
westerly  direction  beyond  any  point  visible.  The  prong  or 
arm  of  the  works  which  General  Gillmore  had  turned  ran 
into  this  second  line  at  the  bastion  salient  before  mentioned. 
Butler's  force  was  much  strung  out,  and  an  assault  ordered 
for  the  next  morning  had  to  be  abandoned  for  the  want  of 
available  troops  to  form  a  column.  It  was  then  determined 
to  attack  on  the  morning  of  the  16th. 

The  night  of  the  15th  every  thing  was  still.  A  thin 
film  of  clouds  slightly  obscured  the  sky,  but  it  was  not  so 
heavy  as  to  interfere  seriously  with  the  moonlight,  and  the 
heavens  gave  no  token  of  what  was  presently  to  be  seen. 
Before  dawn  a  dense  fog,  arising  from  the  margin  of  the 
James,  overspread  the  whole  face  of  the  country  with  so 
opaque  a  pall  that  a  horseman  was  not  visible  at  a  distance  of 
ten  yards.  In  the  thick  of  this,  and  before  dawn,  the  sleeping 
camp  was  suddenly  aroused  by  a  savage  outburst  of  musketry 
and  artillery  fire  along  the  whole  line.  Beauregard  had  taken 
advantage  of  the  fog,  and  had  begun  the  execution  of  a  plan 
of  offensive  action  which,  under  the  circumstances,  threatened 
fatal  results  to  the  Union  force.  Butler's  force  was  disposed 
along  a  front  excessively  extended,  and  though  General  Smith 
endeavored  to  reach  as  far  as  possible  by  drawing  out  his 
corps  in  one  thin  line,  there  was  still  a  full  mile  and  a  half  of 
open,  undulating  country  between  his  right  flank  and  the 

30 


466  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

James.  This  great  stretch  was  observed  by  nothing  more  than 
one  hundred  and  fifty  colored  cavalry.  Beauregard's  dis 
positions  to  attack  were  well  suited  to  the  circumstances,  and 
contemplated  a  simultaneous  onset  in  front  with  a  thrusting 
forward  of  the  flanking  column,  to  gain  the  rear  of  the  Union 
line  by  the  unguarded  interval  on  its  right  flank.  To  make 
his  stroke  still  more  sure,  the  Confederate  commander,  while 
moving  up  with  his  main  force  from  Petersburg  to  Butler's 
front,  had  left  one  of  his  divisions,  under  General  Whiting,  in 
position  at  a  point  on  the  Petersburg  and  Richmond  Rail 
road,  a  considerable  distance  to  the  rear  of  the  left  of  But 
ler's  force.  To  this  division  was  assigned  the  duty  of 
moving  directly  forward  simultaneously  with  the  attack  in 
front,  and  laying  hold  of  the  Union  line  of  retreat.  Nothing 
could  be  more  complete  than  the  plan,  but  its  execution 
was  very  far  from  filling  the  measure  of  Beauregard's  expec 
tations. 

The  right  of  Smith's  line,  where  the  shock  of  the  turning 
column  was  first  felt,  was  held  by  Heckman's  brigade.  This 
was  quite  overwhelmed  by  the  suddenness  of  the  blow,  and 
as  the  enemy  was  then  entirely  in  rear  of  the  right  flank,  a 
great  disaster  seemed  imminent.  It  happened  fortunately, 
however,  that  the  night  before  General  Butler  had  assigned 
three  regiments  of  Ames'  division  of  Gillmore's  corps  to 
General  Smith  as  a  reserve  to  his  line.  One  of  these  regi 
ments,  the  One  Hundred  and  Twelfth  New  York,  happily 
arrived  at  this  critical  juncture,  and,  being  joined  by  the 
Ninth  Maine  Regiment,  the  two  met  the  Confederates  at  a 
point  where  the  transverse  road  on  which  they  were  moving 
forward  crosses  the  road  running  back  to  Bermuda  Hundred. 
This  latter  road  the  enemy  were  aiming  to  seize,  when  the 
purpose  was  foiled  by  the  stubborn  resistance  of  the  two 
regiments  above  named.  It  is  probable  that  the  resistance 
here  encountered  gave  the  Confederate  commander  the  im 
pression  that  he  had  been  mistaken  in  his  notion  of  the 
Union  dispositions,  and  caused  him  to  believe  that  the  Union 
•right,  instead  of  resting  where  it  really  did,  was  thrown  back 


GRANT'S  OVERLAND  CAMPAIGN.  467 

en  echelon.  Thus  disconcerted  and  confused  in  the  thick  fog, 
the  Confederate  turning  column  withdrew. 

While  this  flanking  operation  was  in  execution,  Beauregard 
assailed  energetically  the  front  of  Smith's  line,  held  by  the 
divisions  of  Brooks  and  Weitzel.  But  so  far  from  gaining 
any  success  here,  he  met  a  severe  repulse.  This  was  in  a  large 
measure  due  to  a  novel  and  ingenious  device  of  General  Smith, 
who  had  caused  his  men  a  day  or  two  before  to  wind  a  large 
amount  of  telegraph  wire  (here  found)  around  the  stumps  of 
trees,  and  thus  cover  their  front.  When,  therefore,  the  Con 
federates  ran  forward  to  the  assault,  not  perceiving  the  wire 
in  the  fog,  they  were  tripped  violently  and  shot  as  snared 
game  by  the  Union  marksmen. 

Finding  that  the  Union  force  was  inexpugnable  by  a  front 
attack,  Beauregard  set  on  foot  a  repetition  of  his  turning 
move  in  heavier  force  against  the  right  flank,  this  time  made 
further  to  the  right.  The  position  was  really  untenable  by 
the  force  at  General  Smith's  disposal  against  a  serious  effort 
in  that  direction,  for  the  Confederates  had  but  to  swing  their 
left  well  round  in  order  to  attain  a  lateral  road  leading  directly 
back  to  Bermuda  Hundred.  Accordingly,  on  learning  this 
new  turning  movement — which  threatened  the  trains,  the 
communications,  and  even  the  depot  on  the  James,  which  had 
been  left  but  feebly  defended — General  Smith  ordered  a  retire 
ment  of  his  line  to  a  position  in  the  rear,  where  he  could 
better  cover  what  was  of  value  behind  him. 

While  these  things  were  passing  on  Smith's  front,  Gill- 
more's  corps  on  the  left  had  been  less  engaged.  His  right, 
indeed,  felt  the  shock  of  the  same  attacks  that  were  made 
upon  Smith,  but  his  left  was  entirely  unassailed.  This 
was  due  to  the  inexplicable  inaction  of  General  Whiting, 
whose  position  threatened  directly  the  main  line  of  re 
treat  by  the  turnpike.  Beauregard's  instructions  to  him  to 
attack  were  entirely  disobeyed,  and  he  made  no  motion  what 
ever.  In  this  condition  of  affairs  it  would  have  been  fortu 
nate  had  Gillmore's  left  been  swung  forward,  for  this  move 
ment  would  not  only  have  relieved  the  pressure  on  Smith, 


468  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

but  would  hare  taken  Beauregard's  line  in  reverse.  When 
Smith's  corps  was  withdrawn,  General  Gillmore  conformed 
to  the  movement.  The  whole  force  was  then  by  General  Butler 
withdrawn  within  the  lines  at  Bermuda  Hundred.  The  Con 
federate  loss  in  this  action  was  about  three  thousand,  and  the 
Union  loss  nearly  four  thousand.  Beauregard  followed  up 
leisurely,  and  threw  up  a  defensive  line  confronting  Butler's 
intrenchments. 

It  was  certainly  very  unfortunate  that  Butler  allowed  him 
self  to  be  thrown  back  into  the  cul-de-sac  of  Bermuda  Hun 
dred,  where,  if  he  was  secure  against  attack,  he  was  also 
powerless  for  offensive  operations  against  Richmond — being, 
as  he  himself  said  at  the  time,  bottled  up  and  hermetically 
sealed.  It  was  still  open  to  him,  however,  to  pass  to  the 
south  bank  of  the  Appomattox  and  seize  Petersburg — the 
most  important  stroke  he  could  possibly  have  executed.  This 
soon  became  apparent  to  Butler,  and  he  had  made  all  his 
preparations  to  move  on  that  place,  when  he  was  ordered  by 
General  Grant  to  detach  the  major  part  of  his  force  to  the 
assistance  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  which  was  then 
approaching  the  Chickahominy. 

The  expeditionary  force  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley  and 
West  Virginia  was  divided  into  two  columns — one  under 
Crook,  consisting  of  a  force  of  infantry  and  a  division  of 
cavalry  under  General  Averill,  to  move  by  the  Kanawha  to 
operate  against  the  East  Tennessee  and  Virginia  Railroad ; 
the  other,  under  Sigel,  to  advance  as  far  as  possible  up  the 
Virginia  Valley.  Both  movements  began  the  1st  of  May. 

Sigel  moved  up  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  met  the  enemy  at 
Newmarket  on  the  15th,  and,  after  a  severe  engagement,  was 
defeated,  with  considerable  loss,  and  retired  behind  Cedar 
Creek.  Sigel  was  then  superseded  by  General  Hunter,  who 
immediately  took  up  the  offensive  under  instructions  from 
General  Grant  to  move  on  Staunton  and  destroy  the  railroad 
thence  towards  Charlotteville.  If  he  could  reach  the  latter 
place,  and  thence  move  on  Lynchburg,  he  was  to  do  so. 


GRANT'S  OVERLAND  CAMPAIGN.  469 

Hunter  encountered  the  Confederates  the  5th  of  June,  at 
Piedmont,  and,  after  an  action  of  several  hours,  defeated 
them,  capturing  fifteen  hundred  prisoners  and  three  pieces  of 
artillery.  This  result  is  attributable  to  the  fact  that  Lee  had 
ventured  on  detaching  Breckinridge's  division  from  the  force 
in  the  valley  to  join  the  army  confronting  Grant.  The  8th  of 
the  same  month,  Hunter  formed  a  junction  with  Crook  and 
Averill  at  Staunton,  from  which  place  he  moved  towards 
Lynchburg,  by  way  of  Lexington.  Arriving  before  Lynch- 
burg,  it  was  found  to  be  well  defended;  and,  as  Hunter 
learned  that  re-enforcements  to  the  Confederates  were  arriving 
by  railroad  from  Lee's  army,  while  his  own  supplies  of  ammu 
nition  were  nearly  exhausted,  he  determined  to  return.  But 
this  he  judged  too  perilous  by  the  route  over  which  he  had 
advanced,  seeing  that  the  enemy,  by  means  of  the  Virginia 
Central  Kailroad,  might  rapidly  throw  forces  in  his  rear. 
He  thought  it  better,  therefore,  to  retire  by  the  line  of  the 
Kanawha.  His  supplies  had  nearly  given  out ;  but  it 
was  confidently  expected  that  great  store  would  be  found 
at  Meadow  Bridge,  five  or  six  marches  from  Lynchburg, 
where  a  half-million  rations  had  been  left  a  few  days  before 
by  Crook  and  Averill,  under  guard. of  two  Ohio  regiments 
of  hundred  days'  men.  These  troops,  however,  were  stam 
peded  by  a  contemptible  handful  of  guerrillas,  and,  after 
burning  about  half  the  stores,  carried  off  the  remainder. 
The  return  of  Hunter's  column  by  way  of  the  Alpine  and 
almost  impracticable  region  of  West  Virginia  was  attended 
with  great  privations ;  but  he  succeeded  in  bringing  it 
through.  The  eccentric  line  of  retreat  taken  up  put  him  for 
several  weeks  out  of  all  relation  with  military  operations,  and 
entirely  uncovered  the  frontier  of  the  loyal  States.  Aside 
from  great  material  damage  inflicted  on  the  enemy  by  the 
destruction  of  foundries,  factories,  and  mills,  Hunter's  opera 
tions  had  no  sensible  influence  on  the  campaign  in  Virginia. 

Both  co-operative  columns  being  thus  disposed  of,  it  is  now 
time  to  return  to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 


470          CyjMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 


V. 

FROM  SPOTTSYLVANIA  TO   THE  CHICKAHOMINY. 

The  experience  of  the  twelve  days  before  Spottsylvania 
brought  the  conviction  to  every  man  in  the  army  that  the 
position,  as  defended,  was,  in  truth,  impregnable.  Of  this 
even  General  Grant,  anxious  as  he  was  to  give  Lee  a  crushing 
blow,  was  at  length  convinced.  Then,  as  in  the  Wilderness, 
he  began  a  movement  to  turn  the  position  by  a  flank  march. 
This  is  an  operation  usually  accounted  very  hazardous  in  the 
presence  of  a  vigilant  enemy.  Nevertheless,  it  was  conducted 
with  great  precision  and  skill  and  complete  success.  First  of 
all,  Hancock's  corps,  taken  from  the  right  of  the  army,  moved 
on  the  night  of  the  20th  May,  behind  the  cover  of  the  remain 
ing  corps,  eastward  to  Massaponax  Church.  Thence,  heading 
southward,  and  preceded  by  Torbett's  cavalry  division,  Han 
cock,  on  the  following  day,  pushed  his  advance  to  Milford 
Station,  on  the  Fredericksburg  and  Richmond  Railroad, 
seventeen  miles  south  of  his  point  of  starting.  The  cavalry 
in  advance,  with  much  address,  dislodged  a  hostile  force  hold 
ing  the  bridge  across  the  Mattapony  near  this  point,*  and 
Hancock  threw  his  left  over  that  stream  at  Bowling  Green.  In 
this  position  it  bivouacked  on  the  night  of  the  21st,  and  here 
also  the  Second  Corps  remained  till  the  morning  of  the  23d, 
while  other  movements  about  to  be  described  were  under  way. 

This  turning  movement,  jealously  guarded  as  it  was,  did 
not  pass  unobserved  by  the  wary  enemy.  Now,  it  is  well 

*  It  happened  that  a  Confederate  brigade,  under  Kemper,  on  its  way  from 
Richmond  to  Spottsylvania  to  re-enforce  Lee,  had  reached  this  point  and  taken 
up  a  position  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Mattapony — a  position  exceedingly 
strong  against  an  attempt  to  cross  that  stream  in  force.  The  cavalry  showed 
much  skill  and  pluck  in  dislodging  the  enemy  from  this  position,  and  captured 
rixty-six  prisoners.  But  more  important  still,  it  secured  the  bridge. 


GRANT'S  OVERLAND  CAMPAIGN.  471 

known  that  a  flank  march  in  presence  of  the  hostile  army 
affords  unusual  opportunity  of  striking  a  blow,  and  a  vigorous 
commander  will  not  willingly  let  slip  such  an  occasion  of 
taking  the  offensive,  either  by  falling  upon  that  portion 
already  on  the  march,  or  by  attacking  the  portion  that  re 
mains  behind.  It  can  hardly  be  supposed  that  it  was  any 
thing  but  Lee's  weakness  that  prevented  his  adopting  this 
course ;  for,  although  made  aware  of  Grant's  initiative,  he, 
instead  of  acting  on  the  aggressive,  adopted  the  course  of 
falling  back  on  parallel  roads  nearer  to  Kichmond,  with  the 
intention,  however,  of  again  interposing  his  army  across 
Grant's  line  of  march.  Accordingly,  at  midnight  on  the  20£h, 
the  same  night  on  which  Hancock  set  out,  Longstreet's  corps 
was  headed  southward,  and  another  grand  race  between  the 
two  armies,  similar  to  that  from  the  Wilderness  to  Spottsyl- 
vania,  was  begun.  But  as  Lee's  front  at  Spottsylvania  gave 
him  command  of  the  best  and  direct  route  leading  southward 
(namely,  the  telegraph  road,  with  the  roads  converging  on 
and  radiating  therefrom),  and  as  it  was  necessary  for  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  on  its  delicate  flank  march,  to  take 
circuitous  routes  well  eastward,  it  was,  from  the  start,  proba 
ble  that  Lee  would  gain  on  his  adversary. 

Hancock  had  begun  the  movement  on  the  night  of  the  20th. 
On  the  morning  of  the  21st  Warren's  corps  followed.  Lee 
met  this  by  sending  Ewell's  corps  after  Longstreet's.  There 
then  remained  within  the  lines  of  Spottsylvania,  Burnside's 
and  Wright's  corps  on  the  Union  side,  and  Hill's  corps  on  the 
Confederate  side.  Burnside  left  that  afternoon.  Wright, 
with  the  Sixth  Corps,  prepared  to  follow.  Hill  then  fancying 
it  to  be  a  good  opportunity  to  assume  the  offensive,  made  a 
sally  on  Wright's  front,  and  opened  an  attack,  which,  however, 
was  easily  repulsed.*  During  the  night  the  Sixth  Corps  with- 

*  Hill  committed  an  error  in  making  the  attack  in  front ;  for  had  he  crossed 
the  Ny  above,  he  would  have  struck  the  right  flank  of  the  Sixth  Corps,  uncov 
ered  by  the  withdrawal  of  Warren,  and  would  have  had  a  very  effective  enfila 
ding  fire.  As  it  was,  he  succeeded  in  breaking  Wright's  line  at  one  place ;  but 
a  heavy  artillery  fire  checked  his  advance. 


472  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

drew;  Hill  did  the  same,  and  the  works  of  Spottsylvania, 
ceasing  to  be  the  objects  either  of  attack  or  defence,  remained 
as  parts  of  the  series  of  parallels  that  along  the  whole  route 
of  the  contending  armies,  from  the  Bapidan  to  the  James, 
stand  monuments  of  the  most  desperate  campaign  in  his 
tory. 

The  two  armies  once  fairly  on  the  march,  their  operations 
belong  to  the  domain  of  strategy,  which  deals  with  the  move 
ments  of  armies  out  of  sight  of  each  other.  Neither  in 
deed,  seems  to  have  sought  to  deal  the  other  a  blow  while 
on  the  march,  and  both  headed,  as  for  a  common  goal,  to 
wards  the  North  Anna.  Two  marches  brought  the  rival 
forces  once  more  close  to  each  other. 

The  region  between  Spottsylvania  and  the  North  Anna, 
through  which  the  advance  conducted,  is  fair  and  fertile — 
the  face  of  the  country,  beautifully  undulating,  is  nowhere 
bold,  and  the  river-bottoms  have  many  large  and  fine  planta 
tions,  which  were  at  this  time  under  cultivation.  It  was  in 
deed  virgin  ground  over  which  the  army  advanced,  showing 
none  of  those  desolating  traces  of  war  that  marked  all  Vir 
ginia  north  of  the  Eapidan.  Here  were  fields  with  sprouting 
wheat  and  growing  corn  and  luxuriant  clover ;  lowing  herds 
and  the  perfume  of  blossoms,  and  the  song  of  summer  birds  ; 
homesteads  of  the  Virginia  planter  (every  thing  on  a  large 
and  generous  scale),  and  great  ancestral  elms,  dating  back  to 
the  time  before  our  forefathers  learned  to  be  rebels.  Coming 
as  the  army  so  lately  did  from  where  the  tread  of  hostile 
feet  for  three  years  had  made  the  country  bare  and  barren 
as  a  threshing-floor,  the  region  through  which  it  now  passed 
seemed  a  very  Araby  the  Blest. 

The  advances  of  the  21st  and  22d  brought  the  different 
corps,  which  had  moved  on  parallel  roads  at  supporting  dis 
tance,  within  a  few  miles  of  the  North  Anna  Eiver.  Ee- 
suming  the  march  on  the  morning  of  Monday,  May  23d,  the 
army  in  a  few  hours  reached  the  northern  bank  of  that 
stream.  But  it  was  only  to  descry  its  old  enemy  planted  on 


GRANT'S  OVERLAND  CAMPAIGN.  473 

the  opposite  side  i*  The  problem  then  passed  from  the  domain 
of  strategy  into  the  tactical  question  of  forcing  the  passage  of 
the  river — an  operation  always  delicate  and  difficult  when  vig 
orously  resisted.  And  that  it  would  be  vigorously  resisted 
there  was  every  promise ;  for  if  Lee  purposed  making  a  stand 
between  the  North  and  South  Anna,  he  would  naturally  seek 
to  gain  all  the  time  possible  in  order  to  establish  himself  well 
in  his  new  position.  Moreover,  the  North  Anna  covers  the 
Virginia  Central  Railroad  (here  but  from  one  to  three  miles 
south  of  the  river),  by  which  re-enforcements  were  coming  to 
him  from  the  Yalley  of  the  Shenandoah. 

The  lines  on  which  the  army  had  pushed  its  advance 
brought  the  columns  to  the  North  Anna,  near  the  point  at 
which  the  Fredericksburg  and  Richmond  Railroad  crosses 
that  stream.  The  left  column  under  Hancock,  indeed,  struck 
it  at  the  railroad,  and  at  a  point  one  mile  above  where  the 
telegraph  road  from  Fredericksburg  to  Richmond  crosses  the 
North  Anna  on  a  wooden  bridge  :  the  right  column,  under 
Warren,  four  miles  higher  up,  at  Jericho  Ford.  By  a  con 
trary  fortune,  Warren  was  able  to  effect  the  passage  without 
any  resistance,  but  was  savagely  assailed  on  the  other  side  ; 
while  Hancock  had  to  fight  on  the  north  bank  for  a  crossing. 

When  Warren's  column  reached  the  North  Anna  at  Jericho 
Ford,  the  Confederate  commander,  absorbed  in  guarding  the 
points  of  passage  opposite  his  right,  either  unwittingly  neg 
lected,  or  did  not  heed  the  crossing  above ;  so  that  on  War 
ren's  arrival  at  Jericho  Ford,  no  enemy  was  observed  on  the 
southern  bank — a  circumstance  of  which  advantage  was  at 
once  taken.  The  river  has  here  very  precipitous  banks  and  a 
rocky  bed  ;  and  Jericho  Ford  is  a  ford  in  name  rather  than  in 
reality.  Nevertheless,  the  head  of  Warren's  column,  the 
brigade  of  Bartlett,  accoutred  as  it  was,  plunged  into  the 
stream  breast  deep,  waded  across,  and,  forming  line  of  battle 
on  the  opposite  side,  covered  the  building  of  a  ponton-bridge. 

*  "  The  enemy  was  seen  in  large  force  marching  in  column  on  the  opposite 
bank,  evidently  en  route  from  Spottsylvania." — Hancock's  Report. 


CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

This  being  quickly  done,  the  whole  of  the  corps  crossed  early 
in  the  afternoon.  Line  of  battle  was  formed  with  Cutler's 
division  on  the  right,  Griffin's  division  in  the  centre,  and 
Crawford's  division  on  the  left.  Then  pushing  out  several  hun 
dred  yards,  the  corps  took  position  on  the  hither  side  of  a 
piece  of  woods  that  lies  between  the  river  and  the  Virginia 
Central  Kailroad,  distant  a  mile  and  a  half.  Nothing  more 
than  a  heavy  skirmish  line  was  at  first  met,  the  only  Confeder 
ate  force  at  the  moment  present  being  a  single  brigade  of 
Wilcox's  divison  of  Hill's  corps,  under  command  of  Colonel 
Brown.  But  this  was  soon  re-enforced  by  the  three  other  bri 
gades  of  the  division,*  and  by  Heth's  division.  Warren's  line 
was  just  about  to  begin  intrenching  itself  in  the  position 
taken  up,  when,  a  little  past  five  o'clock,  Griffin,  holding  the 
centre,  was  furiously  assailed  by  the  force  above  mentioned , 
which  suddenly  developed  double  lines  of  battle.  Griffin 
effectually  repulsed  the  attack,  and  with  such  loss  to  the 
assailants,  that  the  Confederate  commander,  while  continuing 
to  hold  three  brigades  on  Griffin's  front,  detached  the  brigade 
under  Brown  to  make  an  assault  in  flank.f  Marching  in 
column  up  the  railroad  for  some  distance,  that  brigade 
wheeled  by  right  into  line  of  battle,  and  fell  upon  Cutler's 
division,  which  was  just  getting  into  position  on  the  right  of 
Griffin.  Cutler's  left  giving  way,  the  whole  division  was 
thrown  into  much  confusion.  This  uncovered  Griffin's  right ; 
but  the  danger  was  avoided  by  refusing  that  flank  somewhat, 
and  at  the  same  time  Bartlett's  brigade  hurried  forward  and 
re-established  the  line.  In  the  execution  of  this  manoeuvre, 
there  occurred  one  of  those  odd  rencounters  which  occasion 
ally  happen  in  the  complicated  action  of  battle.  One  oi 
Bartlett's  regiments  (the  Eighty-third  Pennsylvania,  under 
Lieutenant-Colonel  McCoy),  in  marching  up  by  the  flank,  ran 
plump  against  Brown's  column,  which  was  moving  to  follow 

*  The  brigades  of  Scales,  Gordon,  and  Thomas. 

f  The  manner  of  execution  of  this  movement  I  had  on  the  spot  froir 
Colonel  Brown  himself,  who,  as  will  be  seen,  was  in  a  few  minutes  taker 
prisoner. 


GRANT'S  OVERLAND  CAMPAIGN.  475 

up  its  first  advantage  against  the  right.  It  was  one  of  those 
critical  situations  which  a  moment  will  decide — the  decision, 
in  fact,  depending  on  gaining  the  advantage  of  the  first  vol 
ley.  "With  quick  self-possession,  McCoy  wheeled  his  forward 
companies  into  line,  and  secured  the  first  fire.  One  of 
McCoy's  men  seized  the  Confederate  commander  by  the 
collar  and  dragged  him  in,  and  the  Eighty-third  poured  into 
the  flank  and  rear  of  the  hostile  brigade  a  volley  which  sent 
it  back  in  disorder  through  the  woods.  The  repulse  of  the 
enemy  at  all  points  on  Warren's  front  was  now  complete,  and 
nearly  a  thousand  prisoners  were  taken.  Warren's  entire 
loss  was  not  above  three  hundred  and  fifty  in  killed  and 
wounded. 

I  pass  now  from  Warren  on  the  right  to  Hancock  on  the 
left,  where  that  officer  had  to  carry  the  passage  of  the  river 
against  considerable  opposition.  Hancock's  point  of  pas 
sage,  as  already  seen,  was  the  Chesterfield  or  County  Bridge, 
a  mile  above  the  railroad  crossing  of  the  North  Anna.  Here 
the  Confederates  had  constructed  a  tete-de-pont  on  a  tongue 
of  land  formed  by  Long  Creek  and  the  North  Anna.  Cover 
ing  the  bridge  on  the  north  side  was  an  extended  redan,  with 
a  wet  ditch  in  front,  the  gorge  being  commanded  by  rifle- 
trenches  in  the  rear.  On  the  southern  bank,  which  dominates 
the  northern,  was  a  similar  work.*  The  tongue  of  land  to  be 
overpassed  in  carrying  the  bridge-head  was  a  bare  and 
barren  plain  several  hundred  yards  in  width,  ascending 
sharply  towards  the  enemy's  position,  which,  as  it  turned  out, 
was  held  by  a  part  of  McLaws'  division  of  Longstreet's 
corps.  Birney's  division  of  Hancock's  corps  was  assigned 
the  duty  of  carrying  the  work  and  bridge.  To  cover  the  storm 
ing  party,  Colonel  Tidball,  chief  of  artillery  of  the  corps, 
placed  in  position  three  sections,  which  replied  with  effect  to 
the  enemy's  fire.  An  hour  before  sundown,  the  assault  was 
made  by  the  brigades  of  Pierce  and  Egan,  that,  under  a 


*  These  works  were  built  the  year  previous,  about  the  time  of  the  battle 
Chancellorsville. 


476  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

heavy  fire,  swept  across  the  open  plain  at  double-quick.  As 
the  menacing  line  approached  close  to  the  work,  the  garri 
son  fled  precipitately,  and  the  men,  making  a  foothold  in  the 
parapet  with  their  bayonets,  clambered  over  it  and  planted 
their  colors  on  the  redan.  Thirty  men  of  the  defending  force, 
unable  to  escape,  were  captured  in  the  ditch.  The  affair  was 
exceedingly  spirited,  and  cost  less  than  a  hundred  and  fifty 
men.  The  enemy  made  several  attempts  to  burn  the  bridge 
during  the  night,  but  these  were  frustrated  by  the  vigilance 
and  good  conduct  of  the  troops. 

On  the  following  morning  it  was  found  that  the  Confeder 
ates  had  abandoned  their  advanced  works  on  the  southern 
bank  of  the  river.  Hancock's  corps  then  crossed  by  the 
bridge.  At  the  same  time  the  Sixth  Corps  made  the  passage 
on  the  right  at  the  same  point  at  which  Warren's  corps  had 
defiled  the  previous  evening. 

It  will  have  been  noted  that  the  point  at  which  the  left 
column  under  Hancock  crossed  the  North  Anna,  is  separated 
from  the  point  at  which  the  right  column  under  Warren  had 
made  the  passage  by  an  interval  of  four  miles.  From 
this  circumstance  there  resulted  a  very  peculiar  formation  of 
the  Confederate  line ;  and  from  this  a  train  of  events  that 
baulked  the  attempt  to  push  the  advance  across  the  South 
Anna,  and  finally  compelled  General  Grant  to  abandon  the 
attempt,  recross  the  North  Anna,  and  take  up  a  wholly  differ 
ent  line  of  march.  I  shall  endeavor  to  make  this  intelligible. 

While  Lee,  after  the  passage  of  Hancock  on  the  left,  threw 
his  right  wing  back  from  the  North  Anna,  and  on  the  passage 
of  Warren  on  the  right  threw  back  his  left  wing,  he  con 
tinued  to  cling  with  his  centre  to  the  river ;  so  that,  as  I  have 
said,  his  army  took  up  a  very  remarkable  line  in  the  form  of 
an  obtuse-angled  triangle,  with  the  vertex  thrust  out  on  the 
North  Anna,  his  right  flank  refused  on  the  Hanover  marshes, 
and  his  left  flank  thrown  back  and  resting  on  Little  River. 
Hancock's  corps  was  abreast  one  face  of  this  triangle  ;  War 
ren's  and  Wright's  corps  were  abreast  the  other  face.  Now, 
when  Burnside  attempted  to  throw  his  command  across  the 


GRANT'S  OVERLAND  CAMPAIGN.  477 

North  Anna  at  a  transit  intermediate  between  the  points 
of  passage  of  Hancock  and  Warren,  his  advance  division, 
under  General  Crittenden,  suffered  very  severely  in  the  opera 
tion.  Moreover,  when  Warren  attempted  to  extend  his  line  by 
sending  down  Crawford's  division  from  the  right  to  connect 
with  Crittenden,  this  force  also  was  assailed,  and  with  consid 
erable  difficulty  made  its  way  back.  Then  the  Confederates 
interposing,  cut  off  connection  between  Hancock's  and  War 
ren's  corps,  and  therefore  between  the  two  wings  of  the  army. 
The  game  of  war  seldom  presents  a  more  effectual  check 
mate  than  was  here  given  by  Lee  ;  for  after  Grant  had  made 
the  brilliantly  successful  passage  of  the  North  Anna,  the 
Confederate  commander,  thrusting  his  centre  between  the  two 
wings  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  put  his  antagonist  at 
enormous  disadvantage,  and  compelled  him,  for  the  re- 
enforcement  of  one  or  the  other  wing,  to  make  a  double  pas 
sage  of  the  river.  The  more  the  position  of  Lee  was 
examined,  the  more  unpromising  attack  was  seen  'to  be  ;  and 
after  passing  the  two  following  days  in  reconnoissances,  and 
in  destroying  some  miles  of  the  Virginia  Central  Kailroad, 
General  Grant  determined  to  withdraw  across  the  North 
Anna  and  take  up  a  new  line  of  advance.* 

The  withdrawal  from  the  North  Anna  was  begun  at  dark  of 
the  26th  of  May,  when  the  Second,  Fifth,  and  Sixth  corps  re 
tired  by  different  bridges  to  the  north  bank.  It  was  designed 
to  make  the  movement  secretly,  and  this  purpose  was  suc 
cessfully  accomplished.  Not  a  picket  shot  was  fired,  and  no 
sound  broke  on  the  midnight  air  save  the  low  rumble  of  the 
artillery  and  wagons,  and  the  tread  of  armed  men  as  they 
moved  across  the  bridges.  It  was  near  daylight  before  the 
rear  of  the  long  columns  had  filed  across.  The  army  then 
headed  eastward  and  southward  to  cross  the  Pamunkey. 

*  General  Grant's  statement  of  the  situation  is  vague,  and  is  in  the  following 
words :  "  Finding  the  enemy's  position  on  the  North  Anna  stronger  than  either 
of  his  previous  ones,  I  withdrew  on  the  night  of  the  26th  to  the  north  bank  of 
the  North  Anna."  Report,  p.  9. 


478  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

The  Sixth  Corps  led  the  van,  followed  by  the  Fifth  and  Ninth 
corps.  The  Second  Corps  held  position  till  the  morning  of 
the  27th,  when  it  covered  the  rear. 

From  the  North  Anna  the  line  of  march  of  the  army  made 
a  wide  circuit  eastward  and  then  southward  to  pass  the 
Pamunkey.  This  river  is  formed  by  the  confluence  of  the 
North  and  South  Anna ;  and  the  Pamunkey  in  turn  uniting 
with  the  Mattapony,  forms  the  York  Kiver,  emptying  into 
Chesapeake  Bay.  Thus  the  successful  passage  of  the  Pa 
munkey  would  not  only  dislodge  Lee  from  the  lines  of  the 
North  and  South  Anna,  but  would  bring  the  army  in  com 
munication  with  a  new  and  excellent  water-base.  While  the 
army  was  at  Spottsylvania  Courthouse  it  had  used  Fredericks- 
burg  as  a  depot ;  when  it  moved  to  the  North  Anna,  the  base 
was  shifted  to  Port  Koyal  on  the  Rappahannock.  Cutting 
loose  from  this,  it  had  "White  House  as  a  depot. 

The  Sixth  Corps,  preceded  by  two  divisions  of  cavalry  under 
Sheridan,  had  the  advance  on  the  night  of  the  26th ;  and  on 
the  morning  of  the  27th,  after  a  beautifully  executed  march 
of  twenty-two  miles,  the  head  of  the  column  struck  the  Pa 
munkey  at  Hanovertown.  Nothing  was  present  but  a  small 
mounted  force  in  observation  :  this  was  readily  dispersed  or 
captured.  The  Sixth  Corps  thereupon  made  the  passage, 
uncovered  the  fords,  and  took  position  to  await  the  arrival 
of  the  remaining  corps  of  the  army.  These  continued  their 
march  during  the  day,  and  on  the  morning  of  the  28th  the 
Fifth  and  Ninth  corps  had  joined  the  van  on  the  south  side 
of  the  Pamunkey.  The  Second  Corps  bringing  up  the  rear, 
retired  from  the  North  Anna  on  the  morning  of  the  27th,  and 
on  the  same  afternoon  made  the  passage  at  a  ford  four  miles 
above  Hanovertown.  The  whole  army  was  thus  across  the 
Pamunkey ;  and  the  routes  to  White  House,  at  the  head  of 
York  River,  being  opened  up,  the  army  was  put  in  commu 
nication  with  the  ample  supplies  floated  by  the  waters  of 
Chesapeake  Bay. 

Grant's  new  turning  movement  was  met  by  a  corresponding 
retrograde  movement  on  the  part  of  Lee,  and  as  he  fell  back 


GRANT'S  OVERLAND  CAMPAIGN.  479 

on  a  direct  line  less  than  half  the  distance  of  the  great  detour 
made  by  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  it  was  not  remarkable 
that,  on  crossing  the  Pamunkey,  the  Confederate  force  was 
again  encountered,  ready  to  accept  the  gage  of  battle.  Lee 
assumed  a  position  in  advance  of  the  Chickahominy,  cov 
ering  the  Virginia  Central  and  Fredericksburg  and  Rich 
mond  railroads.  His  line  of  battle,  as  thus  formed,  faced 
northeastward.  This  front  of  opposition  compelled  disposi 
tions  to  dislodge  the  Confederate  force  before  essaying  the 
passage  of  the  Chickahominy.  The  cavalry  was  immediately 
pushed  out  on  the  Hanover  road,  and  at  a  point  known  as 
Hawes'  Shop,  the  brigades  of  Davies,  Gregg,  and  Custer  be 
came  warmly  engaged,  on  the  afternoon  of  the  28th,  with  the 
Confederate  cavalry  under  Fitz  Hugh  Lee  and  Hampton. 
The  troopers,  as  usual,  dismounted,  and  for  several  hours 
fought  with  great  obstinacy,  and  unusually  large  loss — Sheri 
dan  losing  upwards  of  four  hundred,  and  the  Confederates 
nearly  double  that  number.  The  combat  ended,  however,  in 
Sheridan's  retaining  possession  of  this  important  junction  of 
roads,  which  enabled  the  entire  line  of  the  army  to  be  thrown 
forward  in  advance  of  Hawes'  Shop.  The  Confederates  re 
tired  behind  the  Tolopotomy. 

The  region  in  which  the  army  was  now  operating  revived 
many  reminiscences  in  the  minds  of  those  who  had  made  the 
Peninsular  Campaign  under  McClellan ;  for  it  was  at  Hawes' 
Shop  that  the  extreme  right  of  the  army  then  rested,  and  here 
that  Stuart,  in  moving  from  Hanover  Courthouse  to  make  his 
famous  raid,  first  struck  McClellan's  outposts.  Games'  Mill 
and  Mechanicsville  were  within  an  hour's  ride ;  Fair  Oaks 
could  be  reached  in  a  two  hours'  trot ;  Richmond  was  ten 
miles  off,  and  to  those  within  that  city  the  morning  air  daily 
wafted  the  booming  of  hostile  guns. 

Meantime,  where  Lee  had  taken  up  his  real  vantage  ground 
was  uncertain,  and,  with  the  view  of  developing  his  position, 
strong  reconnoissances  by  all  the  corps  were  next  day  thrown 
forward :  the  Sixth  Corps  was  directed  on  Hanover  Courthouse ; 
the  Second  Corps  on  the  road  from  Hawes'  Shop  towards 


482  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

all  that  could  be  spared  into  a  movable  column  and  forward 
it  to  make  a  junction  with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  Ac 
cordingly,  on  the  29th  of  May,  a  force  of  sixteen  thousand 
men,  under  General  W.  F.  Smith,  made  up  of  four  divisions 
taken  from  the  Tenth  and  Eighteenth  corps,  was  embarked 
on  transports  in  the  James  Eiver,  and  after  passing  down  the 
James,  and  ascending  the  York  and  Pamunkey,  debarked  at 
White  House  on  the  following  day.  Here  General  Smith 
received  orders  from  the  headquarters  of  General  Grant  to 
move  his  command  to  New  Castle,  on  the  south  side  of  the 
Pamunkey.*  It  will  be  observed  that  a  movement  on  that 
point  must  throw  Smith  completely  out  of  position  in  relation 
to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  then  fronting  the  Chickahominy 
— a  fact  that  was  sufficiently  evident  to  that  officer  on  his 
arrival  there,  on  the  night  of  the  31st,  after  a  long  and  fa 
tiguing  march.  It  was  not,  however,  till  the  following  morn 
ing  that  he  learned  from  an  officer  of  General  Grant's  staff 
that  his  orders  had  been  wrongly  worded — that  instead  of  New 
Castle  it  was  New  Cold  Harbor  he  was  designed  to  reach,  and 
that  in  consequence  he  had  made  an  unnecessary  march  of  ten 
or  fifteen  miles.  Upon  this,  General  Smith  countermarched 
his  column,  and  on  the  afternoon  of  that  day  (June  1st) 
reached  Cold  Harbor,  where  the  Sixth  Corps,  detached,  as 
already  seen,  from  the  right  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  had 
just  arrived.  At  Cold  Harbor  General  Smith  was  met  with 
orders  from  General  Meade,  to  take  position  on  the  right  of 
the  Sixth  Corps  and  co-operate  with  it  in  an  immediate 
attack.f 

Now,  as  soon  as  the  Sixth  Corps  was  withdrawn  from  the 
right  of  the  army,  Lee,  detecting  the  procedure,  and  sus- 

*  General  Smith's  Report :  Order  from  General  Grant,  dated  Hanovertown 
May  28th. 

f  The  precise  terms  of  the  order  to  General  Smith  were  quite  peculiar ;  for 
he  was  commanded  to  "  hold  the  road  from  Cold  Harbor  to  Bethesda  Church" 
(Warren's  position),  and  "  co-operate  with  the  Sixth  Corps  in  an  attack."  As 
General  Smith's  force  was  insufficient  even  to  fill  this  space  of  several  miles, 
he  abandoned  the  attempt  to  comply  with  the  first  part  of  his  instructions 
and  resolved  to  execute  the  second — that  is,  attack. 


GRANT'S  OVERLAND  CAMPAIGN.  483 

pecting  its  object,  met  this  manoeuvre  by  withdrawing  Long- 
street's  corps  from  his  own  left,  and  directing  it  towards 
Cold  Harbor,  to  cover  there  any  attempt  to  force  the  passage 
of  the  Chickahominy  :  so  that  when  Wright  and  Smith  ar 
rived,  it  was  no  longer  the  slight  force  encountered  by  Sheri 
dan  that  they  were  to  meet.  The  enemy  was  descried  in 
force  holding  position  behind  Cold  Harbor  in  a  thick  wood, 
to  reach  which  it  was  necessary  to  traverse  an  open  field 
several  hundred  yards  in  width.  Dispositions  being  com 
pleted  towards  four  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  the  assault  was 
made  very  spiritedly,  the  troops  advancing  over  the  open 
space  under  a  very  severe  fire.  Both  the  left  of  Smith's  line 
and  the  right  of  the  Sixth  Corps  succeeded  in  carrying  the 
first  line  of  rifle-trenches,  capturing  between  them  six  hun 
dred  prisoners.  It  was,  however,  found  quite  impracticable 
to  carry  the  second  line,  and  the  troops  rested  on  their  arms 
for  the  night,  after  dispositions  to  secure  what  had  been 
gained.  The  casualties  in  this  action  were  severe,  being  up 
wards  of  two  thousand  men  in  the  two  corps. 

Great  as  was  the  loss  in  this  action  it  secured  the  posses 
sion  of  Cold  Harbor,  which  it  was  indispensable  to  hold ;  for 
General  Grant  had  determined  there  to  force  the  passage  of 
the  Chickahominy,  and  compel  Lee  to  retire  within  the  in- 
trenchments  of  Richmond.  Hancock's  corps,  which,  since 
the  withdrawal  of  the  Sixth  Corps  from  the  line  of  the  Tolo- 
potomy,  formed  the  right  of  the  army,  was  ordered  that  night 
from  its  position,  and  directed  on  Cold  Harbor,  to  take  posi 
tion  on  the  left  of  the  Sixth  Corps.  Warren's  corps  continued 
near  Bethesda  Church,  and  though  holding  a  line  exces 
sively  long  (nearly  four  miles  in  extent),  there  was  still  an 
interval  between  his  left  and  Smith's  right.  To  close  this 
gap,  Warren  was  directed  by  General  Meade  to  extend  his 
left,  while  Burnside's  command  was  to  retire  altogether  from 
its  place  on  the  right  of  the  line,  and  mass  on  the  right  and 
rear  of  Warren.  When  Burnside,  during  the  afternoon  of 
the  2d,  was  in  the  act  of  executing  this  movement,  the  ene 
my,  detecting  it,  followed  up  with  a  line  of  battle,  drove  Burn- 


484  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF   THE  POTOMAC. 

side's  skirmish  line  through  a  swamp,  capturing  many,  and 
then  penetrating  between  Warren's  line  of  battle  and  his  skir 
mish  line,  cut  off  and  took  prisoners  about  four  hundred  men. 
This  sudden  attack  of  course  put  an  end  to  Warren's  contem 
plated  extension  to  the  left,  and  compelled  him  to  act  on  the 
defensive  at  once,  to  avert  any  positive  disaster.  The  enemy's 
sally  was,  however,  not  made  with  much  vigor,  and  was 
readily  repulsed  by  Bartlett's  brigade.  Dispositions  were 
then  made  by  the  Fifth  and  Ninth  corps  for  the  battle  which 
was  determined  on  for  the  morrow. 

Cold  Harbor,  where  Generals  Grant  and  Meade  established 
their  headquarters  for  the  impending  passage  at  arms,  is  no 
harbor,  as  the  name  might  imply,  for  it  is  quite  inland  ;*  nor 
is  it  even  a  centre  of  population,  nor  so  much  as  a  collection  of 
farm-houses,  but  a  mere  locality,  having  all  its  importance 
from  the  convergence  of  roads  there.  Behind  it  runs  the 
Chickahominy,  and  the  map  will  reveal  that  we  are  here  again 
on  classic  ground ;  for  it  was  here  that  the  battle  of  Games' 
Mill,  the  first  of  the  series  of  actions  in  McClellan's  retrograde 
movement  across  the  Peninsula,  was  fought.  As  the  lines 
were  now  drawn,  however,  there  was  this  difference,  that  the 
relative  situations  of  the  combatants  were  quite  reversed — Lee 
holding  McClellan's  position  and  Grant  Lee's. 

Lee  disposed  his  force  on  the  hither  side  of  the  Chicka 
hominy,  in  an  excellent  position  for  defence,  having  the  front 
of  approach  obstructed  by  thickets  and  cut  up  by  marshes. 
The  Union  force  was  drawn  up  in  the  order  already  given — 
Hancock's  corps  on  the  left ;  then  the  Sixth  Corps ;  then 
Smith's  command ;  then  Warren  and  Burnside  on  the  right. 
The  left  rested  across  the  Dispatch  Station  road,  the  right  on 
Tolopotomy  Creek.  Sheridan  with  two  divisions  of  horse 


*  Many  interpretations  of  Cold  or  Coal  Harbor  have  been  given.  It  has 
been  suggested  that  the  proper  form  is  "  Cool  Arbor" — a  designation  which  its 
shady  coverts  might  justify.  But  it  would  appear  that  "  Cold  Harbor"  is  a 
common  name  for  many  places  along  the  travelled  roads  in  England,  and 
means  simply,  "  shelter  without  fire." 


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GRANT'S  OVERLAND  CAMPAIGN.  485 

held  the  lower  crossings  of  the  Chickahominy  and  covered 
the  roads  to  White  House.  The  other  cavalry  division  under 
Wilson  took  post  on  the  right  flank.  The  manner  of  attack 
ordered  was  of  the  kind  already  so  often  made  in  the  course 
of  this  campaign — a  general  assault  along  the  whole  front  of 
six  miles,  to  be  made  at  half-past  four  in  the  morning. 

Next  morning,  with  the  first  gray  light  of  dawn  struggling 
through  the  clouds,  the  preparations  began  :  from  behind  the 
rude  parapets  there  was  an  upstarting,  a  springing  to  arms, 
the  muffled  commands  of  officers  forming  the  line.  The 
attack  was  ordered  at  half-past  four,  and  it  may  have  been 
five  minutes  after  that,  or  it  may  have  been  ten  minutes,  but  it 
certainly  was  not  later  than  forty-five  minutes  past  four,  when 
the  whole  line  was  in  motion,  and  the  dark  hollows  between 
the  armies  were  lit  up  with  the  fires  of  death. 

It  took  hardly  more  than  ten  minutes  of  the  figment  men 
call  time  to  decide  the  battle.  There  was  along  the  whole  line 
a  rush — the  spectacle  of  impregnable  works — a  bloody  loss 
— then  a  sullen  falling  back,  and  the  action  was  decided. 
Conceive  of  this  in  the  large,  and  we  shall  then  be  able  to 
descend  to  some  of  the  points  of  action  as  they  individualize 
themselves  along  the  line. 

Hancock  held  the  left  of  the  whole  army.  His  attack  was 
made  by  the  division  of  Barlow  on  the  left  and  Gibbon  on 
the  right,  with  Birney  supporting.  Barlow,  formed  in  two 
lines,  advanced,  and  found  the  enemy  strongly  posted  in  a 
sunken  road  in  front  of  his  works.  From  this,  after  a  severe 
struggle,  the  enemy  was  dislodged  and  followed  into  his  works, 
where  several  hundred  prisoners,  a  color,  and  three  guns  were 
taken.  The  guns  were  immediately  turned  upon  the  enemy, 
forcing  him  to  retreat  in  confusion  from  that  part  of  the  line. 
But  this  partial  success  was  speedily  turned  into  a  reverse ; 
for  not  only  did  Barlow's  second  line  fail  to  come  up  to  the 
prompt  support  of  the  first,*  but  the  enemy,  speedily  re- 
enforced,  forced  Barlow's  troops  out  of  the  captured  works. 

*  Hancock  :  Report  of  Cold  Harbor. 


486  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

They  fell  back,  but  not  to  their  original  position  :  to  a  posi 
tion  far  in  advance  of  that  from  which  they  had  moved  for 
ward,  and  but  from  thirty  to  seventy-five  yards  from  the 
enemy,  where,  taking  advantage  of  the  ground,  they  covered 
themselves  in  an  astonishingly  short  time. 

Gibbon's  advance  was  simultaneous  with  Barlow's  ;  but  in 
moving  forward,  he  came  upon  one  of  the  swamps  of  the 
Chickahominy,  which  widened  as  the  line  neared  the  enemy's 
intrenchments.  This  separated  his  command  ;  but  the  troops, 
at  a  fearful  sacrifice,  advanced  close  up  to  the  works.  Some 
for  a  moment  entered  them.  Colonel  McMahon,  with  a  part 
of  his  regiment,  separated  by  the  swamp  from  the  rest  of  his 
brigade,  reached  the  parapet,  planted  on  it  his  colors,  but 
fell  covered  with  many  wounds,  and  expired  in  the  enemy's 
hands,  losing  his  colors  with  honor.  The  gallant  Colonels 
Porter,  Morris,  McKeen,  and  Haskell  were  killed,  and  General 
Tyler  was  wounded.  Yet  Gibbon's  troops,  too,  clung  tena 
ciously  to  the  ground  gained ;  and  some  remained  so  close  to 
the  hostile  works,  that  the  men  could  only  be  reached  by  cov 
ered  ways.  In  less  than  an  hour  Hancock's  loss  was  above 
three  thousand. 

The  story  of  the  advance  of  the  Sixth  Corps  on  the  right  of 
Hancock,  and  that  of  Smith  on  the  right  of  the  Sixth,  is  of  a 
like  tenor.  Every  assault  was  immediately  repulsed  most  dis 
astrously  ;  and  to  retain  possession  of  an  advanced  position, 
more  or  less  close  to  the  enemy's  line,  was  the  utmost  that 
could  be  done. 

To  the  right  the  Fifth  Corps  was  strung  out  in  a  line  so 
thin  and  extended,  that  beyond  holding  its  own,  it  was  hope 
less  for  that  corps  to  attempt  to  do  more.  The  Ninth  Corps 
made  no  attack  at  the  hour  ordered ;  but  General  Burnside 
got  two  of  his  divisions  round  in  position  to  assail  the  enemy's 
left  flank,  and  by  noon  had  one  brigade  posted  across  the 
eastern  end  of  the  Shady  Grove  road.  This  force  warmly 
engaged  the  enemy.  The  batteries  of  the  corps  worked  suf 
ficiently  far  round  to  the  right  to  make  the  Confederate  posi 
tion  at  that  point  very  difficult  to  hold ;  and  by  afternoor 


GRANT'S  OVERLAND  CAMPAIGN.  187 

General  Burnside  was  prepared  to  assail  the  enemy's  left. 
Long  before  that  time,  however,  the  action  had  been  sus 
pended. 

The  action  was  decided,  as  I  have  said,  in  an  incredibly 
brief  time  in  the  morning's  assault.  But,  rapidly  as  the 
result  was  reached,  it  was  decisive ;  for  the  consciousness  of 
every  man  pronounced  further  assault  hopeless.  The  troops 
went  forward  as  far  as  the  example  of  their  officers  could 
carry  them  :*  nor  was  it  possible  to  urge  them  beyond ;  for 
there  they  knew  lay  only  death,  without  even  the  chance  of 
victory.  The  completeness  with  which  this  judgment  had 
been  reached  by  the  whole  army  was  strikingly  illustrated  by 
an  incident  that  occurred  during  the  forenoon.  Some  hours 
after  the  failure  of  the  first  assault,  General  Meade  sent  in 
structions  to  each  corps- commander  to  renew  the  attack  with 
out  reference  to  the  troops  on  his  right  or  left.  The  order 
was  issued  through  these  officers  to  their  subordinate  com 
manders,  and  from  them  descended  through  the  wonted  chan 
nels  ;  but  no  man  stirred,  and  the  immobile  lines  pronounced 
a  verdict,  silent,  yet  emphatic,  against  further  slaughter.  The 
loss  on  the  Union  side  in  this  sanguinary  action  was  over 
thirteen  thousand,  while  on  the  part  of  the  Confederates,  it  is 
doubtful  whether  it  reached  that  many  hundreds. 

In  criticism  of  the  action  of  Cold  Harbor  it  must  be  said, 
that  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  battles  can  be  won  on  the  princi 
ple  here  adopted.  If  to  be  superior  to  your  adversary  at  the 
actual  point  of  contact  be  a  cardinal  maxim  of  war,  it  is  not 
easy  to  discover  on  what  ground  success  can  be  hoped  from 
such  general  assaults  along  a  line  of  many  miles,  and  conse 
quently  everywhere  weak,  made  by  corps-commanders  inde 
pendently  of  each  other,  and  directed  against  positions  which 
have  not  been  reconnoitred,  over  most  unequal  conditions  of 

*  This  phrase,  "  as  far  as  the  example  of  their  officers  could  carry  them,"  I 
take  from  the  Report  of  General  Hancock.  It  is  true  of  the  whole  army,  and 
to  those  who  witnessed  that  terrible  slaughter,  will  have  an  almost  pathetic 
significance. 


488  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

terrain,  and  at  a  uniform  and  precise  moment  fixed  for  all  by 
the  watch.  If  this  rude  and  primitive  array  sufficed,  one 
might  forget  all  that  experience  has  taught  and  genius  de 
vised  of  the  means  by  which  success  is  snatched  on  the 
field  of  battle — one  might  forget  that  there  are  key-points 
on  every  field — that  it  is  the  aim  of  the  commander  to  de 
termine  this  point  on  his  actual  front,  and  then  by  massing 
heavily  against  it,  by  concentrating  his  force  into  a  focus  of 
fiery  energy,  instead  of  dissipating  it  in  indefinite  space,  to 
seize  such  master-ground  as  may  give  the  opening  for  a  deci 
sive  blow. 

The  bloody  experiment  at  Cold  Harbor,  far  from  disprov 
ing  this  principle  of  action,  signally  confirmed  it ;  for  while 
the  assault  along  the  whole  line  everywhere  failed,  there 
was  at  least  one  tactical  point  on  the  field  which,  had  dis 
positions  suited  to  the  occasion  been  made,  might  have 
been  seized,  and  a  path  to  success  opened.  This  point  was 
a  bald  height  opposite  the  Union  left,  named  Watt's  Hill, 
dominating  the  whole  ground,  and  covering  the  angle  of 
the  dispatch  road.  Along  this  ridge,  on  which  Lee's  right 
rested,  the  Confederate  line  formed  a  salient,  and  in  front  of 
it  was  the  sunken  road  from  which  Hancock's  left  division 
dislodged  the  enemy,  and  then,  by  an  impetuous  rush,  carried, 
and  for  a  moment  held  the  works  beyond.  But  so  little  con 
sideration  had  been  given  in  advance  to  the  dispositions  of 
attack,  that  it  was  not  till  after  its  blood-bought  victory  had 
been  snatched  from  that  slender  force,  that  the  supreme  im 
portance  of  this  position  was  appreciated.  By  this  time 
the  position  had  been  re-enforced  by  the  enemy,  and  the 
opportune  moment  was  of  course  lost ;  but  had  -a  heavy 
force  at  first  been  massed  against  that  point,  it  might  not 
only  have  been  held,  but  the  entire  hostile  line  would  then 
have  been  taken  in  reverse. 

After  the  failure  of  the  first  assault,  renewal  of  the  attack 
was  seen  to  be  so  void  of  all  show  of  success,  that  at  half-past 
one  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  offensive  operations  were  for- 
rnally  suspended,  and  the  corps-commanders  were  ordered  to 


GRANT'S  OVERLAND  CAMPAIGN. 


intrench  their  advanced  positions.  Next  day  siege  operations 
were  begun,  with  a  view  to  carry  the  defences  of  the  Chicka- 
hominy  by  regular  approaches.  But  this  work  also,  at  the 
end  of  a  few  days,  ceased,  and  General  Grant  determined  to 
change  his  line  of  operations  to  the  south  side  of  the  James 
River.  The  circumstances  under  which  this  determination 
was  made,  and  the  manner  in  which  it  was  carried  into  execu 
tion,  will  be  detailed  in  the  succeeding  campaign. 


VII. 
OBSERVATIONS  ON  THE  OVERLAND  CAMPAIGN. 

The  course  of  this  narrative  has  already  set  forth  the  series 
of  operations,  remarkable  in  the  history  of  warfare,  by  which, 
in  one  pregnant  month,  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  fought  its 
way  to  the  Chickahominy. 

The  campaign  indeed  resembled  less  ordinary  campaigns 
than  a  kind  of  running  siege.  From  the  Rapidan  to  the 
Chickahominy  the  face  of  the  country  was  covered  with  the 
intrenched  lines,  within  which  these  "points  of  mighty  op- 
posites,"  the  Armies  of  the  Potomac  and  of  Northern  Vir 
ginia,  had  waged  a  succession  of  deadly  conflicts.  At  every 
advance,  Lee  was  able  to  meet  his  adversary  with  a  front  of 
opposition,  and  within  his  improvised  strongholds  exact  a 
heavy  price  in  blood.  And  although  the  illustrious  valor  o* 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac  more  than  once  plucked  victor} 
from  the  jaws  of  hell,  and  bayoneted  an  unyielding  enemy  in 
the  very  enceinte  of  his  citadel,  the  Union  commander  was 
never  able  to  crush  his  opponent,  who,  thrown  again  and 
again  in  the  mighty  wrestle,  each  time  rose  quickly  to  his 
feet.  Foiled  in  the  effort  to  force  a  direct  issue,  Genera] 
Grant,  at  the  end  of  each  combat,  initiated  a  movement  to 
turn  the  hostile  front ;  and  these  flanking  operations  were 
executed  with  much  address — throwing  the  Confederates  sue- 


490  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE   ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

cessively  out  of  the  positions  at  the  Wilderness,  before  Spott- 
sylvania,  on  the  North  Anna,  and  along  the  Pamunkey. 
Thus,  by  battles  and  marches,  the  army,  in  thirty  days  and 
thirty  nights,  reached  the  Chickahominy. 

Now,  it  will  be  observed  that  each  of  these  turning  move 
ments,  up  to  the  Chickahominy,  brought  the  army  nearer  at 
each  leap  to  the  objective  of  all  its  efforts,  Eichmond.  But, 
once  before  the  Chickahominy,  the  series  of  flanking  opera 
tions  was  exhausted;  for  any  additional  move  by  the  left 
would  throw  the  army  not  towards,  but  away  from  Eichmond. 
If,  therefore,  it  was  designed  to  push  the  advance  by  the  line 
on  which  the  army  was  now  acting,  and  on  which  General 
Grant  had  declared  he  would  "fight  it  out,  if  it  took  all 
summer,"  *  it  was  absolutely  necessary  to  force  the  passage 
of  the  Chickahominy.  The  result  of  the  battle  of  Cold 
Harbor,  fought  on  the  3d  of  May,  was  to  show  that  this  line 
could  not  be  carried  by  a  coup  de  main. 

But  as  the  alternative  was  either  to  force  a  crossing  of  this 
stream  or  abandon  that  line  of  operations  altogether,  General 
Grant's  first  impulse  after  the  disastrous  upshot  of  the  action 
at  Cold  Harbor,  was  to  order  the  initiation  of  siege  opera 
tions,  with  the  view  to  carry  the  position  by  regular  ap 
proaches.  It  was  not  long,  however,  before  the  unpromising 
aspect  of  the  result  that  would  follow  even  a  successful  issue 
on  the  Chickahominy  gave  pause  to  this  purpose,  and  finally 
led  to  the  adoption  of  an  altogether  new  line  of  manoeuvre. 

In  the  discussion  of  the  "  overland  route,"  with  which  the 
recital  of  this  campaign  opened,  I  have  shown  that  any  ad 
vance  on  that  line  ends  in  the  siege  of  the  uninvested  fortifi 
cations  of  Eichmond,  within  which  the  defending  army,  with 
all  its  lines  of  communication  open,  might  remain  indefinitely. 
It  was  no  doubt  from  the  perception  of  the  altogether  inde 
cisive  nature  of  this  result  that  General  Grant,  after  ten  days 
passed  along  the  Chickahominy,  resolved  to  execute  another 

*  "  I  propose  to  fight  it  out  on  this  line,  if  it  takes  all  summer."— Dispatch 
of  May  11,  1864. 


GRANT'S  OVERLAND  CAMPAIGN 


491 


flank  movement,  which  should  throw  the  army  to  the  south 
side  of  the  James  River.  Now,  as  this  change  of  base  ended 
the  operations  on  the  "  overland  route,"  it  would  seem  also  to 
challenge  a  judgment  on  the  merits  of  that  enterprise,  con 
sidered  as  a  whole. 

It  has  been  seen  that  General  Grant  himself  originally 
preferred  to  the  overland  march  an  operation  against  the 
communications  of  Richmond  by  a  transfer  of  the  army  to  a 
point  on  the  coast.  The  results  thus  far  accomplished  on  the 
former  line  would  appear  to  justify  his  primal  choice. 

As  the  overland  campaign  was  unsuccessful  either  in  the 
destruction  of  Lee's  army  01  the  capture  of  Richmond,  and 
as  that  line  of  operations  was  at  length  abandoned,  the  gross 
result  would  seem  to  be  confined  to  whatever  loss,  material 
and  moral,  had  been  caused  the  opposing  army.  But  it  is  not 
possible  to  measure  aright  this  loss,  unless  it  be  considered 
in  its  relations  with  the  cost  at  which  it  was  purchased. 

In  this  regard,  it  must  be  considered,  the  balance  was  very 
much  in  favor  of  the  enemy.  Grant's  loss  in  the  series  of 
actions  from  the  "Wilderness  to  the  Chickahominy  reached 
the  enormous  aggregate  of  sixty  thousand  men  put  liors  du 
combat* — a  number  greater  than  the  entire  strength  of  Lee's 

*  I  append  a  tabular  statement  of  casualties  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  in 
the  battles  of  the  Wilderness,  Spottsylvania,  North  Anna,  and  Cold  Harbor. 


Killed. 

Wounded. 

Missing. 

Aggre 

Battles. 

Dates. 

Officers 

Enlisted 

Officers 

Enlisted 

Officers 

Enlisted 

gate. 

men. 

men. 

men. 

Wilderness.  . 

May    5  to  12. 

269 

3,019 

1,017 

18,261 

177 

6,667 

29,410 

Spottsvlvania 

Mav  12  to  21. 

114 

2,032 

259 

7,697 

31 

248 

10,881 

North  Anna  . 

May  21  to  31. 

12 

138 

67 

1,063 

3 

324 

1,607 

Cold  Harbor  . 

June  1  to  10. 

144 

1,561 

421 

8,621 

51 

2,855 

13,153 

539 

6,750 

1,764 

35,642 

262 

9,594 

54,551  ( 

But  to  this  must  be  added  the  casualties  of  the  Ninth  Corps,  which,  up  to 
the  battle  of  Cold  Harbor,  was  independent  of  Meade's  command.  Counting 
these  at  five  thousand,  or  less  than  one-half  the  average  of  the  other  corps,  we 
obtain  an  aggregate  of  above  sixty  thousand  men.  It  will  be  observed  that 
the  loss  in  officers  was  especially  severe,  reaching  in  all  three  thousand. 
These  were  generally  the  flower  of  the  officers  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
t.he  bravest  of  the  brave  men  whose  loss  to  the  army  was  irreparable. 


492  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

army  at  the  opening  of  the  campaign.  He  had  inflicted  on 
Lee  a  loss  of  twenty  thousand— the  ratio  being  one  to  three.* 
The  Confederates,  elated  at  the  skilful  manner  in  which  they 
had  constantly  been  thrust  between  Eichmond  and  the  Union 
army,  and  conscious  of  the  terrible  price  in  blood  they  had 
exacted  from  the  latter,  were  in  high  spirit,  and  the  morale 
of  Lee's  army  was  never  better  than  after  the  battle  of  Cold 
Harbor.f 

It  is  not  often  in  war  that  a  belligerent  is  in  condition  to 
afford  a  sacrifice  thus  disproportionate  ;  nor  can  results  thus 
achieved  be  accounted  the  proof  and  procedure  of  a  high 
order  of  generalship.  I  shall  endeavor  to  show  this  by  a 
recurrence  to  those  simple  principles  to  which  great  military 
questions  may  almost  always  be  reduced. 


*  In  stating  the  casualties  of  the  Confederate  army  at  twenty  thousand,  I 
place  the  aggregate  somewhat  higher  than  that  obtained  from  the  Confederate 
sources  of  information  to  which  I  have  had  access.  General  Lee's  adjutant-gen 
eral,  in  conversation  with  the  writer,  gave  eighteen  thousand  as  his  impression  of 
the  loss.  This  number  corresponds  remarkably  with  that  derived  from  a  com 
parison  of  the  force  with  which  Lee  opened  the  campaign  and  that  present  after 
the  battle  of  Cold  Harbor.  The  former  was  fifty-two  thousand  six  hundred  and 
twenty-six,  and  on  May  31  it  was  forty-four  thousand  two  hundred  and  forty- 
seven,  the  difference  being  somewhat  above  eight  thousand.  But  meanwhile 
Lee  had  received  accessions  to  his  strength — seven  thousand  men  under 
Pickett,  from  Petersburg,  and  two  thousand  under  Breckenridge,  from  the 
Valley.  This  would  make  his  loss,  up  to  Cold  Harbor,  seventeen  thousand  ; 
and  adding  one  thousand  for  the  casualties  of  that  battle  (an  over-estimate), 
we  obtain  an  aggregate  of  eighteen  thousand. 

f  I  have  until  lately  taken  a  different  view  of  the  condition  of  Lee's  army 
at  this  time,  inferring  that  the  severe  strain  to  which  it  had  been  constantly 
subjected,  must  have  shaken  its  morale.  In  first  writing  touching  this  part  of  the 
campaign,  I  used  the  following  language :  "  There  was  one  result  of  a  purely 
moral  order  that  sprang  from  this  campaign  that  had,  without  doubt,  a  con 
siderable  influence  on  its  issue.  The  very  relentlessness  with  which  General 
Grant  dealt  his  blows,  and  sacrificed  lives  to  deal  these  blows,  assumed  at 
length  to  the  enemy  the  aspect  of  a  remorseless  fate ;  taught  him  that  there 
was  a  hand  at  his  throat  that  never  would  unloose  its  grasp,  and  shook  him  in 
advance  with  anticipated  doom."  In  holding  a  different  opinion  of  the  con 
dition  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  at  this  time,  I  ground  the  statement 
on  the  unanimous  and  emphatic  testimony  of  officers  of  that  army 


GRANT'S  OVERLAND  CAMPAIGN.  493 

Having  determined  to  advance  upon  Kichmond  by  an  over 
land  march,  it  depended  on  General  Grant's  own  will  to  give 
his  operations  what  character  he  pleased.  This,  at  least,  was 
true  after  the  battle  of  the  Wilderness,  which  was  an  inevita 
ble  action,  determined  less  by  strategic  or  tactical  considera 
tions  than  by  the  moral  condition  of  the  opposing  armies  and 
their  commanders. 

Whatever  was  done  after  that  should  have  been  done  to 
accomplish  the  ultimate  result  aimed  at.  This,  however,  was 
of  a  double  nature — to  destroy  Lee's  army,  and  to  capture 
"Richmond,  covered  by  that  army.  The  latter  could  only  be 
effected  by  a  carefully  considered  combination  and  direction 
of  force.  When  the  hostile  army  had  succeeded  in  ensconcing 
itself  within  such  intrenched  lines  as  those  of  Spottsylvania, 
the  North  Anna,  and  the  Chickahominy,  the  chances  of  deal 
ing  an  effective  blow  were  meagre  indeed ;  while  assaults, 
under  such  circumstances,  were  attended  with  a  sacrifice  of 
life  enormous  on  the  part  of  the  assailants,  and  slight  on  the 
part  of  the  defenders.  The  only  possible  result  to  be  gained 
by  such  attacks  was,  therefore,  the  forcing  of  the  enemy  from 
his  position. 

But  this  might  have  been  done  without  loss  by  a  simple 
turning  movement,  and  the  principles  of  war  admonish  the 
use  of  this  means  in  preference  to  an  attack  in  front,  in  every 
case  where,  by  this  means,  a  position  may  be  carried.*  More 
over,  this  was  the  means  by  which,  eventually,  after  a  heavy 
waste  of  life,  the  enemy  was  dislodged  from  these  lines.  It 
results  that  such  assaults  were  vain  ;  and  the  campaign  on  the 

*  This  principle  in  military  art  is  too  well  established  to  require  that  it 
should  be  fortified  by  authority  ;  but  Napoleon,  in  a  criticism  on  the  conduct 
of  Turenne  in  the  campaign  of  1655,  sets  forth  the  action  of  that  general  in  a 
statement  of  principles  so  different  from  those  followed  by  General  Grant,  that 
I  cannot  avoid  citing  it  here.  "  Turenne,"  says  he,  "  constantly  observed  the 
two  maxims:  1st,  Never  attack  a  position  in  front,  when  you  can  obtain  it  by 
turning  it ;  2d,  Avoid  doing  what  the  enemy  wishes,  and  that  simply  because 
he  does  wish  it.  Shun  the  field  of  battle  which  he  has  reconnoitred  and  stud 
ied,  and  more  particularly  that  in  which  he  has  fortified  and  intrenched  him- 
belf." — Montholon  and  Gourgaud :  Memoirs  of  Napoleon,  vol.  iii.,  p.  95. 


CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

overland  route  must  be  accounted  a  failure  in  this  regard  : 
that  so  far  from  accomplishing  the  result  aimed  at — to  wit,  the 
capture  of  Kichmond  and  the  destruction  of  Lee's  force — the 
army  began  to  work  efficiently  towards  that  end  only  when 
it  left  this  line  of  operations,  and  took  up  a  new  one  south  of 
the  James  Kiver. 

General  Grant  has  summed  up  his  theory  of  action  in  a 
single  phrase — to  "hammer  continuously;"  and  his  conduct 
in  this  campaign  ranks  him  with  that  class  of  generals  who 
have  been  named  Thor-strikers.  But  the  mind  of  a  great 
commander  never  moved  on  that  principle  alone,  though  the 
greatest  have  at  times  shown  a  fondness  for  the  employment 
of  brute  masses  in  direct  attacks,  as  was  the  case  with  Napo 
leon  in  1812,  in  a  partial  eclipse  of  his  genius.*  The  result  of 
such  assaults  as  that  of  Spottsylvania  Courthouse  and  at  Cold 
Harbor,  in  the  latter  of  which  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  lost 
at  least  twenty  men  to  Lee's  one,  presents  the  reductio  ad  ab- 
surdum  of  the  theory  of  "  hammering."  And  besides,  General 
Grant's  best  successes  were  accomplished  only  when,  departing 
from  his  own  principle,  he  manoeuvred  as  well  as  attacked. 

It  may  indeed  be  said  that,  as  the  resources  of  the  Con 
federacy  were  well-nigh  exhausted,  while  those  of  the  North 
were  still  ample,  a  continuance  of  even  such  unequal  exchange 
of  life  as  was  made  in  this  campaign  would  finally  result  in 
the  destruction  of  the  enemy.  But  this  assertion  omits  the 
important  consideration  that  war  is  sustained  quite  as  much 
by  the  moral  energy  of  a  people  as  by  its  material  resources, 
and  that  the  former  must  be  active  to  bring  out  and  make 
available  the  latter.  It  has  not  unfrequently  occurred  that, 
with  abundant  resources,  a  nation  has  failed  in  war  by  the 
sapping  of  the  animating  principle  in  the  minds  of  its  citizens. 
For  armies  are  things  visible  and  formal,  circumscribed  by 

*  "  In  1812,  a  decided  taste  for  direct  attacks  began  to  manifest  itself  in  him 
•—a  taste  for  the  pleasure  of  employing  force,  and  a  kind  of  disdain  for  the  con 
currence  of  art  and  skilful  combinations.  He  conquered  at  the  Moskwa,  but 
with  immense  losses  and  unimportant  results." — Marmont :  Spirit  of  Military 
Institutions,  p.  186. 


GRANT'S  OVERLAND  CAMPAIGN.  495 

time  and  space ;  but  the  soul  of  war  is  a  power  unseen, 
bound  up  with  the  interests,  convictions,  passions  of  men. 
Now,  so  gloomy  was  the  military  outlook  after  the  action  on 
the  Chickahominy,  and  to  such  a  degree  by  consequence  had 
the  moral  spring  of  the  public  mind  become  relaxed,  that 
there  was  at  this  time  great  danger  of  a  collapse  of  the  war. 
The  history  of  this  conflict  truthfully  written  will  show  this.* 
Had  not  success  elsewhere  come  to  brighten  the  horizon,  it 
would  have  been  difficult  to  have  raised  new  forces  to  recruit 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  which,  shaken  in  its  structure,  its 
valor  quenched  in  blood,  and  thousands  of  its  ablest  officers 
killed  and  wounded,  was  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  no  more. 

It  would  be  interesting  to  institute  a  detailed  comparison 
between  the  overland  campaign  towards  Richmond  and  the 
campaign  of  Sherman  towards  Atlanta.  These  operations 
were  parallel ;  but  the  conduct  of  the  commanders  was  very 
different.  General  Sherman,  rarely  assaulting,  treated  each 
position  taken  up  by  Johnston  as  a  fortress  ;  and  by  intrench 
ing  in  front  of  his  opponent's  works,  he  was  able  both  to  cover 
his  own  lines  and  gradually  accumulate  on  a  flank  a  force  so 
menacing  to  his  antagonist's  communications  as  to  compel  him 
to  abandon  each  successive  stronghold.  Thus,  by  repeated 
leaps  in  advance,  and  with  comparatively  little  loss,  he  reached 
his  goal,  Atlanta,  f 

General  Grant  also  effected  turning  movements  of  the  same 
kind ;  but  these  were  rarely  undertaken  until  after  a  frightful 
sacrifice  of  life  in  the  attempt  to  force  a  direct  issue.  What 
ever  adverse  criticism  history  may  make  on  this  campaign  will 
probably  turn  mainly  on  the  question  of  the  utility  of  these 


*  The  archives  of  the  State  Department,  when  one  day  made  public,  will 
show  how  deeply  the  Government  was  affected  by  the  want  of  military  success. 
and  to  what  resolutions  the  Executive  had  in  consequence  come. 

f  General  Johnston,  whose  very  words,  in  conversation  with  the  writer,  ara 
employed  above,  added  a  significant  statement.  He  said  he  believed,  at  the 
beginning  of  the  campaign,  that  he  could  beat  Sherman :  and,  said  he,  "  / 
know  I  should  have  beaten  him,  had  he  made  such  assaults  on  me  tis  General 
Grant  did  on  Lee.'* 


496  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

attacks,  and  on  the  tactical  execiition  of  the  operations,  which 
was  often  much  inferior  to  the  conception.  The  flank  marches 
were  conducted  with  great  skill,  and  the  movements  of  the  col* 
umns,  with  a  constantly  shifting  base,  present  a  study  highly 
interesting  and  instructive  to  those  who  concern  themselves 
with  the  larger  questions  of  war. 


THE  SIEGE  OF  PETERSBURG.  497 


xn. 

THE  SIEGE  OF  PETERSBURG. 

JUNE,  1864-MAECH,  1865. 


I. 

THE  CHANGE  OF  BASE. 

THE  determination  of  General  Grant  to  transfer  the  army, 
by  a  flank  march,  to  the  south  side  of  the  James  River,  in 
volved  considerations  of  a  wholly  different  order  from  those 
concerned  in  the  repeated  turning  movements  which  he  had 
made  to  dislodge  Lee  from  the  intrenched  positions  held  by 
him.  These  were  simply  manoeuvres  of  grand  tactics,  delicate 
indeed  in  their  nature,  but  they  did  not  carry  the  army  away 
from  its  line  of  operations,  nor  from  the  defensive  line  as  re 
gards  Washington,  which  it  all  the  time  covered.  The  reso 
lution  to  cross  the  James  necessitated  the  total  abandonment 
of  that  system  of  action  which  aimed,  while  operating  against 
the  enemy  offensively,  to  directly  defend  the  national  capital. 

Now,  although  in  the  defence  of  places,  it  is  frequently  more 
efficacious  to  assume  a  line  of  operation  that  seems  to  aban 
don  the  point  to  be  guarded  and  deliver  it  up  to  the  enemy, 
than  to  place  one's  self  directly  in  front  of  it,  it  must  be 
borne  in  mind  that  General  Grant  was  acting  under  an  Ad 
ministration  that  was  not  only  incapable  of  appreciating 
such  considerations,  which  indeed  belong  to  the  higher  part 
of  war,  but  an  Administration  that  was,  from  political  mo 
tives,  strongly  opposed  to  a  removal  of  the  army  from  the 

83 


498  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

overland  line  of  advance  against  Kichmond.  Moreover,  the 
operation  was  in  itself  one  of  great  delicacy,  a  change  of 
base  being  pronounced  by  the  foremost  master  of  war  "  the 
ablest  manoeuvre  taught  by  military  art."  • 

General  Grant  manifested  as  much  moral  firmness  in 
adopting  a  line  of  action  which,  adverse  though  it  was  to  the 
wishes  of  his  Government,  he  felt  to  be  prescribed  by  the 
highest  military  considerations,  as  he  showed  ability  in 
executing  this  difficult  operation.  The  measure  itself  was  not 
only  entirely  conformable  to  the  true  principles  of  war,  but 
its  execution  reflects  high  credit  on  the  commander,  and 
merits  the  closest  study. 

Immediately  after  the  battle  of  Cold  Harbor,  the  Ninth 
Corps,  then  holding  the  extreme  right  of  the  line,  had  been 
withdrawn  from  its  position  and  posted  between  the  Fifth 
Corps,  which  then  became  the  right  of  the  line,  and  the 
Eighteenth.  On  the  6th,  the  Fifth  Corps  was  retired  and 
massed  in  rear  of  the  centre.  The  Ninth  Corps  then  became 
again  the  right  of  the  line.  On  the  7th,  the  Second  Corps, 
then  forming  the  left  of  the  line,  being  stretched  to  the 
Chickahominy,  the  Fifth  was  transferred  to  that  flank  to 
extend  it  as  far  as  Dispatch  Station  on  the  York  Biver  Bail- 
road.  At  this  date,  two  divisions  of  cavalry  under  Sheridan 
were  sent  to  destroy  more  effectually  the  Central  Eailroad. 

By  the  gradual  refusal  of  the  right  flank  and  development 
of  the  left,  the  army  was  placed  within  an  easy  march  of  the 
lower  crossings  of  the  Chickahominy — "Warren's  corps  being 
but  ten  miles  from  Long  Bridge.  On  the  night  of  the  12th  of 
June  the  movement  to  the  James  was  begun. 

Warren,  preceded  by  Wilson's  cavalry  division,  took  the 
lead,  seized  the  crossing  of  the  Chickahominy  at  Long 
Bridge,  and  made  dispositions  to  mask  the  movement  of  the 
army.  Hancock's  corps  then  followed  the  Fifth,  and  marched 
to  Wilcox's  Landing  on  the  left  bank  of  the  James.  The  corps 
of  Wright  and  Burnside,  by  an  exterior  route,  crossed  at 

*  Napoleon :  Memoirs,  vol.  iii,  p.  203. 


THE  SIEGE  OF  PETERSBURGK  499 

Jones'  Bridge  and  marched  to  diaries  City,  on  the  James. 
Smith's  command  marched  to  White  House,  where  it  took 
transports  and  returned  to  Bermuda  Hundred  by  water.  The 
trains  made  the  passage  of  the  Chickahominy  by  a  bridge  at 
Coles'  Ferry. 

The  march  of  fifty-five  miles  across  the  Peninsula  was 
made  in  two  days,  and  with  perfect  success.  It  was  covered 
from  the  enemy's  observation  by  a  skilful  feint  made  by 
"Warren,  who  threatened  direct  advance  on  Kichmond  by  the 
route  of  White  Oak  Swamp.  After  crossing  the  Chicka 
hominy  at  Long  Bridge,  Warren  threw  Crawford's  division 
forward  on  the  New  Market  road,  while  Wilson's  cavalry  divi 
sion,  taking  the  advance,  drove  the  enemy's  mounted  force 
across  White  Oak  Swamp.  Warren  lay  in  this  vicinity 
during  the  day,  covering  all  the  routes  by  which  the  enemy 
might  come  down  from  Eichmond  to  observe  or  disturb  the 
movement ;  and  under  cover  of  his  array,  the  whole  army 
marched  towards  the  James. 

Lee,  of  course,  discovered  the  withdrawal  on  the  morning 
of  the  13th.  He,  however,  made  no  attempt  to  follow  up,  but 
retired  towards  Eichmond.  During  the  afternoon,  a  body  of 
infantry  came  down  the  New  Market  road ;  but  finding  War 
ren's  force  in  line  of  battle,  it  made  no  attack,  contenting  it 
self  with  intrenching  in  plain  sight.  It  is  probable  that  this 
menace  by  Warren  deceived  Lee  as  to  Grant's  actual  purpose, 
and  caused  him  to  anticipate  a  direct  advance  on  Eichmond 
by  the  river  routes.  But,  meantime,  the  army  had  reached 
the  James  below  Harrison's  Landing,  and  was  prepared  to 
pass  to  the  south  side.  Here  a  considerable  delay  was 
caused  by  the  non-arrival  of  the  ponton-bridges  ;  *  but  means 
of  transport  being  at  hand,  Hancock's  corps  was  ferried 


*  It  turned  out  that  the  ponton-bridge  for  the  wagon-train  over  the 
Chickahominy  at  Coles'  Ferry  was  too  short  by  half  its  length ;  so  that  the 
army  ponton-train  was  sent  to  piece  it  out.  By  this  means  a  day  was  lost ;  and 
rather  than  run  the  very  remote  risk  of  losing  a  wagon-train,  the  commander 
ran  the  very  positive  risk  of  losing  Petersburg. 


500  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

across  at  "Wilcox's  Landing,  and  landed  on  the  south  bank 
at  Windmill  Point.  During  the  night  of  the  14th,  the  pon 
ton-bridge  was  laid  across  the  James  at  Douthard's,  a 
short  distance  below  Hancock's  point  of  passage.*  By  noon 
of  the  16th  the  whole  army  was  on  the  south  side  of  the 
James. 

While  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  thus  making  the  over 
land  march  across  the  Peninsula,  General  Smith's  command 
had  returned  to  Bermuda  Hundred,  whence  it  proceeded  upon 
an  operation  that  had  an  important  bearing  on  the  campaign. 

Upon  debarking  at  Bermuda  Hundred  during  the  night  of 
the  14th,  Smith's  column  was  by  General  Butler  put  in  mo 
tion  to  seize  Petersburg,  an  abortive  attempt  to  capture  which 
had  been  made  a  few  days  before  by  a  part  of  his  force.f  The 
possession  of  this  place  as  a  point  d'appui  for  the  ulterior  oper 
ations  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  of  prime  importance. 
Being  joined  by  the  cavalry  division  of  Kautz  and  the  divi 
sion  of  colored  troops  under  Hinks,  Smith's  force,  during  the 
night  of  the  14th,  passed  to  the  south  side  of  the  Appomattox 
on  a  ponton-bridge,  and  pushed  forward,  on  the  morning  of 
the  15th,  towards  Petersburg,  distant  seven  miles.  The  ad 
vance  was  made  in  three  columns — Kautz,  with  the  cavalry, 


*  This  bridge  was  a  notable  achievement  in  ponton  engineering,  being  over 
two  thousand  feet  in  length,  and  the  channel  boats  anchored  in  thirteen  fath 
oms  of  water.  It  was  begun  daring  the  forenoon  of  the  14th  and  was  com 
pleted  by  midnight.  The  site  for  the  bridge  was  selected  and  the  approaches 
prepared  by  Brigadier-General  Weitzel,  chief-engineer  Department  of  Virginia 
and  North  Carolina ;  and  the  bridge  was  laid  under  direction  of  Brigadier- 
General  Benham. 

f  This  attempt  was  made  on  the  10th  of  May,  two  days  before  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  began  its  change  of  base.  The  expedition  was  made  by  an 
infantry  force  under  General  Gillmore,  and  a  cavalry  force  under  General 
Kautz.  The  cavalry  carried  the  works  on  the  south  side,  and  penetrated  well 
in  towards  the  town,  but  was  forced  to  retire.  General  Gillmore,  finding  the 
works  which  he  approached  very  strong,  and  deeming  an  assault  impracticable, 
returned  to  Bermuda  Hundred  without  attempting  one. — Grant:  Report  of 
Operations,  p.  10. 


THE  SIEGE  OF  PETERSBURG.  501 

to  threaten  the  line  of  fortifications  near  the  Norfolk  and 
Petersburg  Railroad,  and  at  the  same  time  protect  the  left 
flank  of  the  infantry ;  Hinks'  division,  in  rear  of  Kautz,  tc 
take  position  across  the  Jordan's  Point  road,  as  near  as  possi 
ble  to  the  enemy's  works ;  Brooks'  division  to  follow  Hinks, 
and  take  position  on  his  right ;  Martindale's  division,  on  the 
extreme  right,  to  proceed,  by  the  river-road,  and  strike  the 
City  Point  Railroad.* 

After  an  advance  of  two  miles,  the  cavalry  struck  a  line  of 
rifle-trenches,  near  the  City  Point  Railroad,  defended  by  in 
fantry  and  armed  with  a  light  battery.  "Upon  this,  Kautz 
was  withdrawn  to  the  left,  and  the  colored  division  thrown 
forward  to  carry  the  line — a  duty  that  was  executed  in  a 
spirited  manner,  and  one  gun  captured.  This  unexpected 
affair  delayed  the  column  until  about  nine  A.  M.  No  fur 
ther  obstacle  was  encountered,  and  after  a  march  of  a  couple 
of  miles,  the  force  brought  up  in  front  of  the  fortifications 
enveloping  Petersburg  from  the  south.  It  was  noon  before 
all  the  troops  could  be  brought  up.f 

On  reconnoitring  the  position,  it  was  found  to  be  defended 

*  Smith :  Report  of  Operations  against  Petersburg. 

f  It  may  be  observed  that  this  statement  of  the  time  of  the  arrival  of  the  col 
umn  before  the  fortifications  of  Petersburg  is  at  variance  with  the  statement  of 
General  Grant,  who  asserts  that  General  Smith  "  confronted  the  enemy's  pickets 
near  Petersburg  before  daylight." — Report,  p.  12.  The  statement  above  made 
is  based  on  the  official  reports  of  General  Smith  and  his  division  commanders. 
Without  inquiring  too  curiously  in  regard  to  this  matter,  it  is  enough  to  say, 
that  the  assertion  of  the  lieutenant-general  is  not  in  conformity  with  a  series 
of  established  facts  in  regard  to  the  sequence  of  events  on  the  morning  of  the 
15th.  Thus,  it  was  some  time  after  daylight  before  the  column  began  to  move 
from  its  point  of  passage  of  the  Appomattox  at  Broadway.  It  was  then 
brought  to  a  halt  by  the  line  of  rifle-pits  already  mentioned,  and  it  was  after 
nine  o'clock  before  it  got  under  way  again.  It  is  probably  this  line  of  rifle-pits 
that  the  lieutenant-general  means  when  he  speaks  of  "  confronting  the  enemy 
near  Petersburg."  Moreover,  this  affair  caused  a  further  delay ;  for  the  carrying 
of  these  trenches  had  thrown  General  Hinks  out  of  his  assigned  position  on  the 
left,  and  as  he  knew  the  country  better  than  any  one  present,  it  was  necessary 
to  halt  the  column  until  he  could  move  by  the  flank  to  his  place.  The  head 
of  the  column  arrived  before  the  Petersburg  fortifications  between  ten  and 
eleven,  but  it  was  three  before  the  force  was  up  and  deployed  in  position. 


502  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

by  a  strong  line  of  redans,  and  connected,  though  incom 
pletely,  by  very  formidable  rifle-pits  ;  while  the  approach  was 
over  a  broad  low  valley  perfectly  swept  by  the  artillery  of  the 
works,  and  cut  up  by  ditches  and  ravines.  In  the  centre  the 
line  formed  a  salient,  covered  by  a  powerful  profiled  work, 
heavily  flanked  by  earthworks  and  rifle-trenches  en  echelon. 

General  Smith  had  been  informed  that  the  fortifications 
were  such  that  "cavalry  could  ride  over  them" — a  repre 
sentation  that  did  not  turn  out  to  be  justified  by  experience  ; 
for  Kautz,  who,  with  his  mounted  division,  essayed  to  work 
his  way  round  on  the  left,  found  himself  completely  estopped 
by  a  heavy  fire,  and  in  front  the  approaches  were  discovered 
to  be  so  covered  by  the  play  of  artillery  from  the  works,  that 
from  every  point  on  which  Smith  attempted  to  place  batteries 
to  silence  the  enemy's  fire  the  guns  were  speedily  driven  off.* 
It  could  not  be  detected  that  any  heavy  force  of  infantry  was 
manning  the  fortification ;  but  it  was  not  judged  probable 
that  so  considerable  an  artillery  force  would  be  there  without 
support. 

After  surveying  the  ground  and  making  his  dispositions, 
which  consumed  all  the  afternoon,  General  Smith,  thinking  that 
the  assault  of  the  works  by  a  column  would,  from  the  fire  of 
the  enemy's  guns,  cost  too  great  a  sacrifice,  determined  to  try 
a  heavy  line  of  skirmishers.  Accordingly,  towards  seven 
p.  M.,t  a  cloud  of  tirailleurs  was  advanced  from  the  divisions 


*  "  Wherever  I  went  on  the  line,  I  found  a  heavy  cross-fire  of  artillery  from 
the  enemy.  The  few  artillery  positions  I  could  find  I  tried  to  get  our  guns  to 
open  from  ;  but  they  were  always  driven  in  by  the  superior  fire  of  artillery 
from  earthworks." — Smith :  Report  of  Operations  before  Petersburg. 

f  The  determination  to  attack  in  the  manner  above  described  was  formed 
by  General  Smith  at  five  P.  M.,  but  a  delay  of  above  an  hour  occurred  here,  owing 
to  the  fact  that  "  the  chief  of  artillery  had,  upon  his  own  responsibility,  taken 
his  guns  to  the  rear,  and  unhitched  the  horses  to  water."— Smith :  Report  of 
Operations  before  Petersburg.  Now,  as  an  interval  of  five  or  six  hours  had 
passed  between  the  time  of  Smith's  arrival  and  his  resolution  to  assault,  it 
may  be  a  point  of  inquiry  what  he  was  doing  during  this  time.  General  Grant 
makes  this  delay  the  ground  of  implied  censure.  "  For  some  reason  that  I 
have  never  been  able  to  satisfactorily  understand,"  says  he,  "  General  Smith 


THE  SIEGE  OF  PETERSBURG.  503 

of  Hinks,  on  the  left,  Brooks  in  the  centre,  and  Martindale  on 
the  right  (the  rest  of  whose  command  awaited  in  line  of  battle 
to  follow  up  any  success),  and,  under  a  sharp  infantry  tire, 
carried  the  line.  Brooks  captured  the  works  on  the  salient, 
with  several  hundred  prisoners  and  four  guns,  which,  double- 
shotted  with  canister,  had  been  kept  in  waiting  for  the  ex 
pected  column  of  assault.  Hinks  on  the  left,  and  Martindale 
on  the  right,  followed  up  the  success,  the  colored  troops 
carrying  four  of  the  redoubts  with  their  artillery. 

Thus  auspiciously  Opened  the  operations  on  the  south  side 
of  the  James ;  the  lines  of  Petersburg — defended,  as  it  proved, 
by  an  inconsiderable  force,  and  by  local  militia  made  up  of 
boys  and  old  men  of  the  town — were  carried.  But  as  it  was 
almost  dark  when  the  operations  I  have  described  closed,  the 
troops  rested  on  their  arms  in  the  works  gained,  without  the 
possession  either  of  Petersburg  or  the  line  of  the  Appomattox 
— an  event  whence  sprang  a  long  Iliad  of  woes. 

During  the  day  on  which  these  events  in  front  of  Peters 
burg  were  occurring,  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  still  continued 
the  laborious  process  of  filing  across  the  James,  and  at  the 
same  time  Lee  was  passing  his  army  to  the  south  side  above, 
near  Drury's  Bluff.  By  the  morning  of  the  15th,  however,  the 
same  morning  on  which  Smith  moved  towards  Petersburg, 
Hancock's  corps  had  been  all  ferried  to  the  south  side  of  the 
James,  and  it  would  have  been  a  simple  matter  to  have  directed 
that  corps  on  Petersburg,  to  unite  with  Smith's  command. 
Had  this  been  done,  Petersburg  and  the  line  of  the  Appomattox 

did  not  get  ready  to  assault  the  enemy's  main  line  until  near  sundown."  Now, 
although  this  censure  partially  rests  on  the  ground  that  General  Smith  reached 
the  position  "before  daylight" — an  assertion  traversed  by  the  fact  that  he  did 
not  arrive  until  noon — there  may  still  remain  a  residue  of  blame.  General 
Smith  might  possibly  have  assaulted  several  hours  before  he  actually  did,  had 
he  chosen  to  take  the  risk  of  attacking  without  reconnoissance.  It  is  likely 
snough  that  Sheridan,  had  he  been  present,  instead  of  Smith,  would  hava 
done  so.  But  this  involves  no  foundation  for  a  charge  of  dereliction  of  duty- 
it  is  only  a  question  of  choice  between  two  different  methods  of  action — the 
method  which,  taking  great  risks,  may  either  lose  greatly  or  greatly  gain,  and 
that  which  works  by  methodical  procedure. 


504  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

would  have  been  in  possession  of  the  Union  force  before  night. 
The  circumstance  by  which  it  failed  to  be  done  forms  one  of 
the  most  curious  episodes  in  the  conduct  of  this  campaign. 

It  would  seem  as  though  General  Grant  expected  that  Pe 
tersburg  would  fall  an  easy  prey  to  Butler's  force ;  for  he  left 
both  General  Meade  and  General  Hancock  wholly  unaware 
of  his  design  to  secure  the  capture  of  that  place.  Hancock 
was  directed  to  remain  at  the  point  at  which  he  had  crossed 
till  rations,  which  General  Butler  was  to  send,  should  be 
received  and  issued,  and  then  to  march  in  the  direction  of 
Petersburg,  and  "  take  up  a  position  where  the  City  Point  Hail- 
road  crosses  Harrison's  Creek"  After  waiting  till  about  ten 
o'clock  in  the  forenoon,  and  finding  that  the  expected  rations 
did  not  arrive,  he  ordered  the  forward  march  of  his  column 
towards  his  assigned  position  on  Harrison's  Creek — a  position 
which  was  marked  on  a  map  furnished  him  from  headquar 
ters,  and  on  which  it  was  located  at  about  four  miles  from 
Petersburg,  and  between  that  place  and  City  Point.  As  it 
proved,  however,  the  map  was  utterly  incorrect,  and  Harri 
son's  Creek,  instead  of  being  at  the  locality  indicated  on  the 
map,  was  miles  away,  and  actually  inside  the  enemy's  lines. 

At  length,  at  half-past  five  in  the  afternoon,  while  pushing 
forward  to  reach  this  mythical  objective,  Hancock  received  a 
dispatch  from  General  Grant,  directing  him  to  use  all  haste  in 
getting  up  to  the  assistance  of  General  Smith,  who,  as  the 
paper  stated,  had  attacked  Petersburg*  and  carried  the  outer 
works  in  front  of  that  place. 

*As  the  circumstances  attending  the  non-capture  of  Petersburg  are  likely 
to  give  rise  to  much  discussion,  I  shall  here  set  forth  with  more  particularity 
of  detail  such  facts  as  concern  the  march  of  Hancock's  column.  The  waiting 
fbr  rations,  which  caused  a  delay  of  several  hours  during  the  morning  of  the 
15th,  cannot  be  regarded  as  having  any  important  bearing  on  the  question, 
seeing  that  General  Hancock  would  not  have  waited  had  he  known  that  Peters 
burg  was  to  have  been  attacked.  The  column  was  put  in  motion  at  half-past 
ten  A.  M.,  and  the  distance  from  Windmill  Point,  whence  Hancock's  corps 
started,  is  about  twenty  miles.  Birney's  division  had  the  advance  on  the  Prince 
George  Courthouse  road,  while  Barlow's  division  moved  by  the  Old  Court 
house  road.  The  leading  division  was  conducted  on  the  former  road  by  the 


THE  SIEGE  OF  PETERSBURG.  505 

This  order,  which  was  the  first  intimation  General  Hancock 
had  received  that  Petersburg  was  to  be  attacked  that  day,  or 
that  General  Smith  was  operating  against  it,*  met  him  when 
he  was  some  miles  distant  from  Petersburg.  He  immediately 
hastened  forward  his  command,  but  was  unable  to  join  Gen 
eral  Smith  till  after  the  attack  had  been  made ;  and,  although 

chief  of  staff  to  General  Hancock,  who  was  furnished  with  a  map  on  which  the 
position  to  be  reached  behind  Harrison's  Creek  was  marked.  But  the  map 
proved  to  be  utterly  worthless — the  only  roads  laid  down  on  it  being  widely 
out  of  the  way.  The  staff-officer,  however,  bestirred  himself  to  obtain  infor 
mation  of  the  country  from  negro  guides,  and  this  being  communicated  to 
General  Hancock,  he  judged  that  the  speediest  way  to  get  to  the  position  hb 
was  directed  to  occupy  would  be  to  turn  the  head  of  the  column  from  the  Prince 
George  Courthouse  road  towards  Old  Courthouse,  then  by  a  cross-road  get 
behind  Harrison's  Creek.  Accordingly,  Birney's  and  Gibbon's  divisions  were 
turned  to  the  right,  leaving  the  Prince  George  Courthouse  road  within  six  miles 
of  Petersburg  before  three  P.  M.  At  half-past  five  P.  M.,  as  the  column  neared 
Old  Courthouse,  the  dispatch  from  General  Grant,  directing  the  march  to  join 
Smith,  was  received.  Fortunately,  this  came  to  hand  just  as  the  head  of  Bir 
ney's  division  was  passing  a  country  road  leading  directly  towards  Petersburg, 
and  the  column  (Birney's  and  Gibbon's  troops)  was  turned  in  that  direction, 
arriving  at  Smith's  position  as  the  assault  was  over.  No  time  had  been  lost  on 
the  march  during  the  day,  and  the  circumstance  of  Hancock's  non-arrival  at 
an  earlier  hour  is  due  exclusively  to  the  fact  that  he  was  not  directed  on  Peters 
burg,  and  had  no  intimation,  until  between  five  and  six  P.  M.,  that  it  was  to  be 
attacked.  Had  he  been  so  informed,  he  could  readily  have  joined  Smith  early 
in  the  afternoon,  by  marching  directly  towards  Petersburg.  The  best  hours  of 
the  day  were  spent  in  marching  by  an  incorrect  map,  in  search  of  a  designated 
position  which,  as  it  was  not  in  existence  as  described,  could  naturally  not  be 
found.  With  these  facts,  which  are  of  official  authenticity,  it  will  not  be 
difficult  to  judge  who  is  responsible  for  the  non-capture  of  Petersburg.  As 
Lieutenant-General  Grant  states  that  he  "threw  forward  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  by  divisions,  as  rapidly  as  could  be  done"  (Report,  p.  12),  and  as  the 
manner  in  which  he  threw  it  forward  is  sufficiently  manifest  in  the  fact 
-hat  neither  General  Meade  nor  General  Hancock  knew  that  Petersburg  was 
to  be  attacked  even,  I  leave  the  reconciliation  of  this  discrepancy  to  those  better 
equipped  for  the  task. 

*  "  I  desire  to  say  here  that  the  messages  from  Lieutenant-General  Grant, 
and  from  General  Smith,  which  I  received  between  five  and  six  P.  M.  on  the 
15th,  were  the  first  and  only  intimation  I  had  that  Petersburg  was  to  be 
attacked  that  day.  Up  to  that  hour  I  had  not  been  notified  from  any  source  that 
I  was  expected  to  assist  General  Smith  in  assaulting  that  city." — Hancock 
Seport  of  the  Fifth  Epoch  of  the  Campaign  of  1864. 


506  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

he  then  proffered  his  troops  to  General  Smith,  that  officer  had 
determined  to  suspend  operations  for  the  night,  judging  it 
wiser  to  hold  securely  what  had  been  won,  than,  bj  attempt 
ing  to  reach  the  bridges,  to  risk  the  loss  of  all  the  gain.* 

Whether  General  Smith,  in  thus  acting,  did  ill  or  well,  may 
be  a  question ;  but  there  can  be  no  question  as  to  who  is 
really  responsible  for  the  failure  to  take  Petersburg.  This  is 
no  other  than  the  lieutenant-general  himself. t  Yet,  as  the 
event  proved,  it  was  fortunate  it  was  not  taken.  The  resolu 
tion  on  the  part  of  the  Confederates  to  try  out  the  issue  of  the 
war  there,  gave  the  Union  army  an  excellent  line  of  operations 
on  an  easy  base  ;  whereas,  had  Petersburg  fallen,  Lee  would 
have  retired  from  Eichmond  to  the  interior,  thus  greatly  com 
plicating  matters. 

During  the  night  of  the  15th,  the  van  of  Lee's  army  reached 
the  town,  and  men  of  a  very  different  mettle  from  the  crude 
soldiers  to  whom  its  defence  had  been  intrusted  silently 
deployed  in  line  of  battle.  In  the  morning  it  was  found 
that  a  new  line  of  works  had  been  thrown  up  around  the 
town,  defended  by  a  large  force  already  present,  which  was 
constantly  re-enforced  by  the  rapidly  arriving  Confederate 
corps.  It  was  soon  manifest  that  the  "  Cockade  City,"  which 
the  day  before  was  the  open  prize  of  the  first  captor,  would 
demand  for  its  possession  a  battle  or  a  siege.  As  the  event 

*  It  will  probably  always  remain  one  of  those  questions  respecting  which 
men's  opinions  will  differ,  whether  General  Smith  did  well  or  ill  in  not  pushing 
into  Petersburg,  and  seizing  the  bridges  of  the  Appomattox.  His  conduct  was 
shaped  by  considerations  thus  stated  in  his  official  report:  "We  had  thua 
broken  through  the  strong  line  of  rebel  works,  but  heavy  darkness  was  upon 
us,  and  I  had  heard  some  hours  before  that  Lee's  army  was  rapidly  crossing  at 
Drury's  Bluff.  I  deemed  it  wiser  to  hold  what  we  had,  than,  by  attempting  to 
reach  the  bridges,  to  lose  what  we  had  gained  and  have  the  troops  meet  with  a 
disaster.  I  knew,  also,  that  some  portion  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  wan 
wming  to  aid  us,  and  therefore  the  troops  were  placed  so  as  to  occupy  the  com- 
manding  positions  and  wait  for  daylight." — Smith :  Report  of  Operations  before 
Petersburg. 

f  There  is  on  file  in  the  archives  of  the  army  a  paper  bearing  this  indorse 
ment,  by  General  Meade :  "Had  General  Hancock  or  myself  known  t/iat  Peters 
burg  was  to  be  attacked,  Petersburg  would  have  fallen." 


THE  SIEGE  OF  PETERSBURG.  507 

proved,  Grant  was  compelled  to  sit  down  before  it  in  formal 
beleaguerment,  and  it  was  not  till  after  the  lapse  of  near  a 
twelvemonth  that,  in  the  last  act  of  the  eventful  drama  of  the 
war,  Petersburg  fell. 


II. 
THE  ARMY  BEFORE  PETERSBURG. 

In  its  strategic  relations  to  Richmond,  Petersburg  may  be 
defined  as  a  fortress  thrust  forward  on  the  flank  of  the 
Confederate  capital.  The  great  lines  of  supply  for  an  army 
covering  Richmond — the  Lynchburg  Railroad,  James  River  Ca 
nal,  and  Danville  Railroad — run  into  that  city  from  a  westerly 
and  southwesterly  direction.  But  Petersburg,  securely  held, 
easily  holds  off  at  arin's-length  any  force  threatening  the  com 
munications  of  the  Confederate  capital.  It  is  distant  twenty- 
two  miles  south  from  Richmond,  with  which  city  it  is  con 
nected  by  the  Petersburg  and  Richmond  Railroad,  while  by 
means  of  the  Lynchburg  Railroad  it  taps  the  great  Danville 
line,  and  from  the  south  it  receives  the  Weldon  and  the  Nor 
folk  railroads.  In  case  it  should  lose  the  two  latter,  as  would 
be  likely  if  assailed  by  a  force  following  the  line  of  operations 
of  the  Union  army,  there  remained  the  two  former,  which 
from  their  situation  are  almost  unassailable. 

Invested  with  this  value,  Petersburg  could  not  fail  to  be  a 
possession  coveted  with  equal  eagerness  by  each  combatant. 
This  was  indeed  the  case :  Grant  had  designed  to  seize  it 
before  the  Confederate  army  could  join  the  meagre  local  force 
left  for  its  defence ;  and  Lee,  as  soon  as  the  transfer  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  to  the  south  side  of  the  James  had 
plainly  declared  his  rival's  purpose,  drew  his  columns  also  to 
the  south  bank  and  hurried  them  forward  to  Petersburg, 
where  they  began  to  arrive  during  the  hours  of  darkness  that 
followed  the  assault  on  the  evening  of  the  15th  of  June. 


508          CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

How  nearly  Petersburg  then  fell  a  prize  to  Smith's  coup  de 
main  has  already  been  seen.  But  night  sufficed  to  throw  into 
the  city  a  Confederate  force  so  considerable  as  to  insure  that 
its  capture  would  cost  a  severe  struggle. 

The  morning  of  the  16th  found  on  the  Union  side  present 
before  Petersburg  no  more  than  the  two  corps  of  Smith  and 
Hancock:  the  remaining  corps  were  distant  several  hours' 
march.  The  centre  of  the  line  of  redans  enveloping  the  city 
from  the  south  had  been  penetrated  the  night  before,  and 
the  positions  then  gained  were  securely  held  by  the  Union 
force.  But  the  Confederates  clung  tenaciously  to  a  hastily 
improvised  line  close  in  the  rear  of  the  lost  point ;  and  this 
on  its  left  flank  ran  into  portions  of  the  original  system  of 
earthworks  that  remained  still  in  the  enemy's  hands. 

But  although  by  the  morning  of  the  16th  Lee  had  succeed 
ed  in  throwing  into  Petersburg  a  considerable  body  of  troops, 
it  was  outnumbered  by  the  Union  force  present,  while  the 
latter  was  also  in  position  to  be  re-enforced  more  rapidly 
than  the  Confederates.  The  situation,  therefore,  was  not 
even  yet  of  a  nature  to  forbid  the  hope  of  securing  Peters 
burg,  or  at  least  securing  all  the  commanding  ground  before 
the  heavy  Confederate  re-enforcements  should  arrive.  Gen 
eral  Hancock,  to  whom,  in  the  absence  of  Generals  Grant  or 
Meade,  the  command  of  the  field  fell,  was  fully  alive  to  the 
importance  of  so  doing,  and  he  had  the  night  before  instructed 
his  division  officers,  Generals  Birney  and  Gibbon,  that  all 
such  ground  between  their  positions  and  the  Appomattox 
should  be  attacked  and  taken  at  or  before  daylight.*  These 
instructions  were  not  promptly  complied  with,  nor  indeed  did 
the  efforts  of  these  officers  possess  any  serious  character. 
This  forfeited  the  one  opportunity  that  remained  ;  and  when, 
later  in  the  morning,  reconnoissances  were  pushed  forward,  it 
was  found  the  enemy  had  secured  the  commanding  positions 
and  greatly  strengthened  his  line  at  all  important  points. t 

*  Hancock :  Report  of  the  Fifth  Epoch  of  the  Campaign  of  1864. 
f  Among  these  dominating  points  was  the  high  ground  at  the  position 
which  will  be  found  marked  on  the  accompanying  map  as  the  "  Avery  House." 


OPERATIONS 
RICHMOND  >»°  PETERSBURG 


THE  SIEGE  OF  PETERSBURG.  509 

Meantime,  Hancock  was  admonished  bj  General  Meade  to 
refrain  from  attack  until  the  remaining  corps  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  should  have  arrived.  Of  these,  the  Ninth 
reached  the  front  at  noon,  and  the  Fifth  at  dusk.  An  assault 
was  ordered  to  be  made  about  four  p.  M.  by  Hancock  and 
Burnside — Smith  on  the  right  to  demonstrate  merely.  At  the 
appointed  time  the  assault  was  made  by  Hancock,  supported 
by  two  brigades  of  the  Ninth  on  his  left.  The  advance 
was  spirited  and  forcible,  and  resulted,  after  a  close  strug 
gle  in  which  the  troops  suffered  heavily,  in  driving  the  en 
emy  back  some  distance  along  the  whole  line.*  The  severe 
fighting  ceased  at  dark,  though  during  the  night  the  Confed 
erates  made  several  ineffectual  sallies  to  regain  the  lost 
ground.  The  same  day  an  advance  was  made  by  Butler's 
force  from  Bermuda  Hundred  for  the  purpose  of  destroying 
the  Petersburg  and  Richmond  Eailroad ;  but  after  reaching 
this  point  it  was  compelled  to  withdraw,  in  consequence  of  the 
pressure  of  a  heavy  Confederate  column  advancing  towards 
Petersburg  from  the  direction  of  Bichmond.t 

Here  there  were  a  large  redoubt  and  rifle-trenches  that  had  been  empty  early 
in  the  morning ;  but  these  the  delay  permitted  the  Confederates  soon  to  oc 
cupy.  It  should  be  mentioned,  however,  that  when  an  advance  was  at  length 
made  in  the  morning,  Egan's  brigade  of  Birney's  division  attacked  and  carried 
in  a  very  spirited  manner  a  small  redoubt  occupied  by  the  enemy  opposite 
Birney's  left. 

*  The  enemy  succeeded  in  holding  this  temporary  line  until  the  completion 
of  the  line  on  "  Cemetery  Hill."  When  Hancock  advanced  the  next  day,  the 
Confederates  retired  over  "  Hare's  Hill." 

f  The  urgency  for  troops  at  Petersburg  had  caused  the  withdrawal  of  the 
main  Confederate  force  from  Butler's  front  at  Bermuda  Hundred.  Butler  then 
threw  forward  Terry's  command,  which  advancing  found  that  the  Richmond 
and  Petersburg  Railroad  had  been  left  quite  uncovered.  It  appears  that  Gen 
eral  Lee's  orders  were  that  the  troops  in  front  of  Butler  should  not  be  with 
drawn  till  Longstreet's  column,  en  route  towards  Petersburg,  should  arrive  to 
relieve  it.  But  instead  of  waiting  the  arrival  of  Longstreet,  they  withdrew  on 
the  morning  of  the  16th.  One  part  of  Terry's  force  accordingly  proceeded  to 
destroy  the  track,  while  the  other  was  moved  up  the  turnpike  in  the  direction 
of  Richmond.  The  latter,  however,  had  not  advanced  far  when  it  encountered 
the  head  of  a  hostile  column  hastening  down  from  Richmond  towards  Peters 
burg,  whereupon  Terry  withdrew  to  Bermuda  Hundred. 


510          CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF   THE  POTOMAC. 

The  attack  was  renewed  by  Hancock  and  Burnside  on  the 
morning  of  the  17th.  The  former  succeeded  in  taking  some 
important  ground  on  his  front.*  The  attack  of  the  latter  was 
directed  against  a  part  of  the  enemy's  original  line  of  works 
that  had  not  yet  been  carried,  and  resulted  in  the  capture  of 
a  redoubt,  four  guns,  and  several  hundred  prisoners. t  In  the 
afternoon  the  Ninth  Corps  made  another  attack,  in  which  Bar 
low's  division  of  the  Second  Corps  participated,  losing  heavily 
in  killed,  wounded,  and  prisoners.^  After  heavy  fighting,  and 
the  failure  of  two  attacks,  Burnside  succeeded  in  getting 
across  a  part  of  the  enemy's  line ;  but  his  left  was  pressed 
very  hard  and  continually  ground  away,  so  that  finally  his 
line  was  at  right  angles  across  the  enemy's.  Crawford's  divi 
sion  of  Warren's  corps  was  then  put  in  on  the  left  in  support. 
It  was  already  near  dusk,  and  Crawford's  troops  became  be 
wildered  in  the  ravines,  but  advanced  nevertheless,  and  his 
right  went  into  the  enemy's  lines,  capturing  a  number  of  pris 
oners  and  the  flag  of  an  Alabama  regiment.  The  enemy  had 
during  the  day  made  several  sorties  and  sallies  to  regain  the 
positions  taken,  and  after  dark  leaped  the  breastwork  Burn- 
side  had  captured  and  drove  him  out.  The  loss  during  the 
day  was  heavy — numbering  about  four  thousand  men.  These 
attacks  had,  however,  established  an  integral  line  for  the 
army.§ 

This  result  being  accomplished,  a  general  assault  of  the 
enemy's  position  was  ordered  for  the  morning  of  the  18th. 
When,  however,  the  skirmishers  moved  forward,  it  was  found 
that  the  enemy  had  abandoned  the  temporary  line  held  by 
him,  giving  up  what  works  remained  of  the  original  system  of 
intrenchments,  and  had  taken  up  a  new  and  systematic  line, 

*  This  was  the  hill  on  which  the  Hare  House  stood,  and  on  which  Fort 
Steadman  was  afterwards  erected. 

f  Meade :  Report  of  the  Campaign  of  1864. 

\  Hancock :  Report  of  the  Fifth  Epoch  of  the  Campaign  of  1864. 

§  In  the  evening  Smith's  corps  was  relieved  by  troops  of  the  Sixth  Corps, 
and  crossed  the  Appomattox  to  rejoin  Butler's  force  at  Bermuda  Hundred. 
Martindale's  division  of  his  command,  however,  could  not  be  withdrawn  to 
advantage,  and  so  continued  to  hold  the  extreme  right 


THE  SIEGE  OF  PETERSBURG.  511 

drawn  on  commanding  ground  closer  around  Petersburg.* 
This  required  new  dispositions,  and  the  general  assault  was 
deferred  till  three  o'clock  in  the  afternoon.  When  made,  it 
was  a  complete  repulse  at  every  point,  and  was  attended  with 
another  mournful  loss  of  life.f 

The  constant  inspiration  of  these  attacks  had  been  the 
belief  that  Petersburg  could  be  carried  before  Lee  succeeded 
in  yet  bringing  up  the  whole  of  his  troops.  The  result  con 
vinced  General  Grant  that  this  hope  was  now  vain,  and  that 
further  attack  was  equally  so.  The  troops  were  therefore 
ordered  to  begin  intrenching  a  systematic  line.  A  few  days' 
labor  brought  this  into  such  condition  that  the  front  could  be 
held  by  a  part  of  the  army,  allowing  the  rest  to  be  cut  loose  for 
manoeuvres  to  the  left.  Accordingly,  on  the  21st,  the  Second 
and  Sixth  corps  were  dispatched  on  that  flank  to  effect  a 
closer  envelopment  of  Petersburg  on  the  South  side.  The 
Second  Corps,  having  the  lead,  proceeded  westward  to  the 
Jerusalem  plankroad,  which  runs  southward  from  Petersburg, 
nearly  midway  between  the  Norfolk  and  the  Weldon  railroads. 
After  some  skirmishing  it  established  itself  in  a  position  on 
the  west  side  of  that  road,  connecting  with  Griffin's  division 
of  the  Fifth  Corps,  which  held  post  on  the  east  side.  During 
the  night,  the  Sixth  Corps  coming  up,  extended  to  the  left 
and  rear  of  the  Second  Corps,  and  the  cavalry  divisions  of 
Wilson  and  Kautz  were  sent  to  cut  the  Weldon  and  South- 
side  railroads. 

It  had  been  designed  to  extend  the  left  of  the  infantry  by 
means  of  the  Sixth  Corps  to  the  Weldon  Eailroad ;  but  as  the 

*  "  On  advancing,  it  was  found  that  the  enemy  during  the  night  had  re 
tired  to  a  line  about  a  mile  nearer  the  city — the  one  he  now  occupies." — Meade . 
Report  of  the  Campaign  of  1864.  (Made  November,  1864). 

f  "About  noon  an  unsuccessful  assault  was  made  by  Gibbon's  division, 
Second  Corps.  Martindale's  advance  was  successful  in  occupying  the  enemy's 
skirmish  line  and  making  some  prisoners.  General  Birney,  temporarily  com 
manding  the  Second  Corps,  then  organized  a  formidable  column,  and  about  six 
p.  M.  made  an  attack,  but  without  success.  Later  in  the  day,  attacks  were 
made  by  the  Fifth  and  Ninth  corps,  with  no  better  results." — Meade :  Report 
of  the  Campaign  of  1864. 


512          CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE   ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

indication  of  this  purpose  instantly  developed  very  menacing 
demonstrations  on  the  part  of  the  enemy,  the  movement  to  the 
railroad  was  suspended,  and  General  Birney,  who  at  this  time 
commanded  the  Second  Corps,  during  a  temporary  disability 
of  General  Hancock,*  was  ordered  to  swing  forward  the  left  of 
the  Second  Corps,  so  as  to  envelop  the  right  flank  of  the  ene 
my's  works.  This  movement,  made  by  the  divisions  of  Mott 
and  Barlow  (pivoting  on  the  right  division  under  Gibbon,  which 
was  already  in  close  contact  with  the  enemy),  was  executed 
without  reference  to  the  Sixth  Corps,  and,  of  course,  carried 
the  Second  away  from  that  corps,  leaving,  as  the  former  ad 
vanced,  a  wide  and  widening  gap  between  the  two.  The  opera 
tion  had  nearly  been  completed,  Mott's  division  had  secured 
its  position  on  the  left  of  Gibbon,  and  was  intrenching  itself, 
and  Barlow's  division  was  coming  into  place  on  the  left  of 
Mott,  when  a  force  of  the  enemy,  composed  of  part  of  Hill's 
corps,  advancing  in  column  by  brigades,  penetrated  the  inter 
val  between  the  left  of  the  Second  and  the  right  of  the  Sixth 
corps.  The  shock  was  soon  felt  on  the  flanks  of  both  these 
corps,  but  especially  on  the  left  of  the  Second.  Barlow's  divi 
sion,  rolled  up  like  a  scroll,  recoiled  in  disorder,  losing  several 
hundred  prisoners.  Mott,  on  his  right,  fell  back,  but  not 
without  a  like  loss  ;  and  the  enemy,  still  pressing  diagonally 
across  the  front  of  the  corps,  struck  Gibbon's  now  exposed  left 
flank  and  rear,  swept  off  and  captured  several  entire  regiments 
and  a  battery,  and  carried  Gibbon's  intrenchments — the  rest 
of  the  original  line  of  the  Second  Corps  remaining  intact. 

The  shattered  corps  was  reformed  on  its  original  line,  when 
the  enemy  made  a  brisk  attack  on  Miles'  brigade,  but  was 
easily  repulsed.  The  Confederates,  however,  held  the  in 
trenchments  taken  from  Gibbon  until  they  had  removed  the 
captured  guns,  only  a  feeble  effort  being  made  to  retake  them. 
They  then  withdrew  as  suddenly  as  they  had  made  their 
swoop,  carrying  with  them  twenty-five  hundred  prisoners,  and 
many  standards.  The  disaster  was  due  no  less  to  the  lack  of 
spirit  displayed  by  the  troops  than  to  the  unwise  order  for 

*  Caused  by  the  outbreaking  of  a  wound  received  at  Gettysburg. 


THE  SIEGE  OF  PETERSBURG.  513 

the  advance  of  the  two  corps.  The  Sixth  Corps  also  lost  sev 
eral  hundred  prisoners.  Thus  this  operation,  which  had  been 
designed  against  the  enemy's  communications  by  the  Weldon 
Railroad,  resulted  simply  in  a  considerable  extension  of  the 
line  of  the  army  to  the  left.  The  additional  ground  occupied 
gave  no  advantages  whatever,  and  the  operation  could  not 
be  considered  a  gain  in  any  respect. 

The  co-operative  cavalry  expedition  under  Generals  Wilson 
and  Kautz  met  with  more  success.  Striking  the  Weldon 
Railroad  at  Reams'  Station,  the  force  destroyed  the  depot 
and  several  miles  of  the  track.  The  columns  then  proceeded 
to  the  Southside  Railroad — Wilson's  division  reaching  it 
about  fifteen  miles  from  Petersburg  and  destroying  it  thence 
to  Nottoway  Station,  where  he  met  General  W.  H.  F.  Lee's 
division  of  cavalry,  and,  after  a  sharp  conflict,  defeated  him. 
Kautz  reached  Burkesville,  the  junction  of  the  Southside  and 
Danville  railroads,  on  the  afternoon  of  the  23d.  At  this 
point  he  damaged  the  track  considerably,  and  then  moved  to 
Meherrin  Station,  where  he  formed  a  junction  with  Wilson's 
column  on  the  24th.  The  two  then  destroyed  the  road  as  far 
as  Roanoke  Bridge,  a  distance  of  twenty -five  miles.  Further 
progress,  however,  was  impeded  by  the  enemy,  who  was  found 
in  force  and  could  not  be  dislodged.  In  returning,  Wilson 
met,  on  the  evening  of  the  28th,  the  enemy's  cavalry,  massed 
at  the  Weldon  Railroad  crossing  of  Stoney  Creek,  where  he 
had  a  severe  engagement.  He  then  made  a  detour  by  his 
left,  and  endeavored  to  reach  Reams'  Station,  presuming  it  to 
be  in  possession  of  the  Union  force  ;  but  he  here  encountered 
not  only  the  Confederate  cavalry  but  a  hostile  infantry. 
Being  largely  outnumbered,  he  was  overwhelmed  and  forced 
to  retire,  with  the  loss  of  his  trains  and  artillery  and  a  con 
siderable  number  of  prisoners.*  He  succeeded  in  crossing 
the  Nottoway,  however,  and  escaped  within  the  Union  lines 

*  "  In  the  various  conflicts  with  the  enemy's  cavalry,  in  their  late  expedition 
against  the  railroads,  besides  their  killed  and  wounded  left  on  the  field,  one 
thousand  prisoners,  thirteen  pieces  of  artillery,  and  thirty  wagons  and  ambu 
lances  were  taken." — Lee :  Dispatch  of  July  1st. 


514.  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  AEMT  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

by  their  left  and  rear  with  the  remnant  of  his  shattered 
force.  The  first  intimation  General  Meade  had  of  Wilson's 
situation,  was  in  intelligence  brought  by  one  of  his  aids,  who 
cut  his  way  through  from  Beams'  Station.  The  Sixth  Corps 
was  immediately  sent  thither,  and  Sheridan  ordered  up  with 
the  cavalry ;  but  before  they  could  reach  that  point  the  affair 
was  over  and  the  enemy  had  withdrawn. 

Such  raids  on  the  communications  of  the  enemy  had 
frequently  been  made  by  both  armies,  and  generally  with  im 
punity  ;  but  the  disastrous  upshot  of  this  expedition  showed 
that  such  detached  columns  operating  far  from  the  main  body 
must  always  be  in  a  perilous  situation,  if  there  be  vigilance 
and  vigor  on  the  part  of  the  antagonist.  The  present  raid  had 
inflicted  considerable  damage  to  the  Confederate  communica 
tions  ;  but  it  was  soon  repaired,  and  it  is  doubtful  whether 
the  temporary  advantage  gained  over  the  enemy  more  than 
balanced  the  losses  in  men  and  material  suffered  by  the  expe 
ditionary  force. 

Two  weeks  of  exhausting  effort  thus  passed ;  but  the  lines 
of  Petersburg  had  withstood  all  the  shocks  they  had  received. 
There  now  remained  no  hope  of  carrying  the  city  by  assault. 
Indeed,  the  Union  army,  terribly  shaken  as  well  in  spirit  as 
in  material  substance,  by  the  repeated  attacks  on  intrenched 
positions  it  had  been  called  on  to  make,  was  in  a  very  unfit 
moral  condition  to  undertake  any  new  enterprise  of  that 
character. 

In  these  preliminary  operations  against  Petersburg,  which 
may  be  brought  together  under  the  definition  of  the  "  period  of 
assaults,"  though  no  large  action  had  taken  place,  the  rolls  of 
the  army  showed  a  loss  of  fifteen  thousand  men.  Lee  had, 
with  much  address,  taken  advantage  of  every  opportunity 
afforded  him  to  thrust  his  rapier  through  the  somewhat  loose- 
jointed  harness  of  his  antagonist.  Though  he  had  struck  no 
vital  blow,  he  had  yet  drawn  blood,  inflicted  many  smarts, 
and  gained  time  to  draw  around  Petersburg  a  system  of  de 
fences  that  bade  defiance  to  assault. 


THE  SIEGE  OF  PETERSBURG.  515 


III. 

.  THE  LINES   OF  PETERSBURG. 

It  required  no  clearer  demonstration  than  that  already 
given  in  the  unpromising  results  of  the  several  assaults  made 
against  the  Confederate  lines,  to  show  that  the  difficult  prob 
lem  of  the  capture  of  Petersburg  had  passed  beyond  that 
stage  at  which  success  might  be  hoped  from  expedients,  par 
tial  efforts,  and  coups  de  main.  The  task  was  one  of  the  first 
magnitude,  in  which  an  auspicious  issue  was  only  to  be  ex 
pected  from  systematic  operations  and  a  well-considered  com 
bination  of  effort.  This  will  be  manifest  from  a  brief  descrip 
tion  of  the  relative  situation  of  the  opposing  armies. 

Growing  in  strength  day  by  day,  the  Confederate  line  of 
defence  had,  by  the  beginning  of  July,  become  so  formidable 
that  assault  was  pronounced  impracticable  by  the  chiefs  of 
artillery  and  of  engineers.*  This  line  consisted  of  a  chain  of 
redans,  connected  by  infantry  parapets  of  a  powerful  profile, 
while  the  approaches  were  completely  obstructed  by  abatis, 
stakes,  and  entanglements.  Beginning  at  the  south  bank  of 
the  Appomattox,  it  enveloped  Petersburg  on  the  east  and 
south,  stretching  westward  beyond  the  furthest  reach  of  the 
left  flank  of  the  Union  army.  A  continuation  of  the  same 
system  to  the  north  side  of  the  Appomattox  protected  the 
city  and  the  Petersburg  and  Eichmond  railroad  against  attack 
from  the  direction  of  the  front  held  by  Butler's  force  at 
Bermuda  Hundred.  The  defence  of  Eichmond  was  provided 
for  by  its  own  chain  of  fortifications. 

The  attitude  assumed  by  Grant  before  Petersburg  was 
somewhat  peculiar.  As  the  Union  lines  were  drawn,  the  de 
fending  force  was  not  under  siege,  investment,  or  blockade ; 

*  Report  of  an  Examination  of  the  Enemy's  Lines,  July  6th,  by  Genera! 
Hunt,  chief  of  artillery,  and  Major  Duane,  chief-engineer. 


516  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

for  its  lines  of  communication  were  all  open.  Petersburg,  in 
fact,  was  in  the  same  situation  as  Sebastopol,  when  belea 
guered  by  the  Allies  in  the  so-called  siege — a  term  not  ap 
plicable  to  the  kind  of  operation  practised  in  both  these  cases. 
This  is  of  a  character  novel  and  modern,  and  may  be  better 
described  as  a  partial  investment,  or  an  attitude  of  watching. 
There  were,  however,  several  manoeuvres  and  operations  open 
to  the  Union  commander. 

1.  The  first  of  these  was  a  move  resulting  from  that  pecu 
liar  strategic  relation  of   the  contending  armies  by  which, 
while  Eichmond  was    the  ultimate  objective  of  attack  and 
point  of  defence,  the  actual  struggle  was  waged  before  Peters 
burg,  on  the  south  side  of  the  James,  and  twenty-two  miles 
distant  from  the  Confederate    capital,  situate  on  the  north 
side  of  that  river.     A  lodgment  for  the  Union  force  on  the 
north  side  of  the  James  had  early  been  secured  by  General 
Butler  at  Deep  Bottom,  only  ten  miles  south  of  Kichmond. 
Here  a  force  under  Foster  held  an  intrenched  camp,  and  com 
munication  with  Bermuda  Hundred  was  established  by  means 
of  a  ponton-bridge.     Thus  it  was  always  practicable  for  Gen 
eral  Grant,  by  a  movement  to  the  north  bank  of  the  James, 
to  threaten  Eichmond  by  its  direct  approaches.     These  were, 
however,    "  observed"   by    General    Lee,   who,  by    ponton- 
bridges   across   the  James,  near  Drury's  Bluff,  a  few  miles 
below  Eichmond,  preserved  his  interior  lines,  and  held  the 
means  of  rapidly  re-enforcing  either  wing.     Yet,  since  General 
Grant  could  at  any  time  take  the  initiative,  it  was  always  in 
his  power  to  outrun  any  immediate  action  of  his  opponent. 

2.  The  next  course  open  to  the  Union  commander  was  to 
operate  against  the  railroad  lines  that  fed  Lee's  army  at 
Petersburg.     These  lead  into  that  city  from  the  south  and 
west.      They  could  be   acted   against,  either  by  a   gradual 
extension  of  the  left  flank,  or  by  cutting  loose  a  column  of 
active   operations  powerful    enough  to  meet   any  force  the 
enemy  might  bring  to  meet  the  menace.     The  Weldon  Eail- 
road  was  within  the  scope  of  the  former  course,  and,  as  will 
presently  appear,  it  was  soon  afterwards   seized   and  held, 


THE   SIEGE  OF  PETERSBURG.  517 

and  the  left  flank  of  the  army  extended  to  insure  its  tenure. 
The  main  lines  of  supply  by  the  Southside  and  the  Danville 
roads  were,  however,  well  covered  by  Lee's  army.  The  dis 
tance  from  the  position  of  the  army  before  Petersburg  to  the 
nearest  point  at  which  the  Southside  Railroad  could  be 
struck  is  from  ten  to  fifteen  miles,  and  to  Burkesville — which, 
as  the  junction  of  the  Southside  and  the  Danville  roads,  is  the 
strategic  key  to  all  the  Confederate  communications  of  Peters 
burg  and  Richmond — the  distance  is  near  forty  miles.  These, 
therefore,  could  not  be  reached  by  any  extension  of  the  Union 
intrenched  line  to  the  left,  without  dangerously  weakening  the 
front  covering  Grant's  depot  at  City  Point ;  but  they  could 
be  operated  against  by  a  column  able  to  cut  itself  loose  from 
its  base. 

3.  In  the  relative  situations  of  the  opposing  armies,  the  line 
to  be  guarded  by  Lee  was  between  thirty  and  forty  miles, 
running  from  southwest  of  Petersburg  to  northeast  of  Rich 
mond.  There  was,  accordingly,  open  to  General  Grant  a 
a  great  variety  of  tactical  combinations,  compelling,  on  the 
part  of  the  Confederates,  continued  motion  to  the  greatest 
distances  from  flank  to  flank,  and  visiting  concentration  on 
one  flank  by  a  sudden  blow  on  the  other.  There  also  re- 
remained  the  contingency  of  a  good  opening  for  direct  as 
sault,  in  case  the  Confederates  should  reduce  the  force  within 
their  lines  of  defence  to  meet  these  manoeuvres. 

In  order  to  hold  the  actual  front  with  a  fractional  force, 
and  relieve  as  large  a  part  of  the  army  as  possible  for  a  col 
umn  of  active  operations,  the  construction  of  a  powerful  line 
of  redoubts  was  pushed  forward,  and  a  series  of  heavy  bat 
teries  was  placed  in  position  to  cover  an  assault,  in  case  a 
suitable  opening  therefor  should  present  itself.  By  the  close 
of  July,  a  system  of  earthworks  covering  the  front  then  held 
by  the  army  had  been  constructed  and  armed.  Grant  was 
then  in  position  either  to  undertake  direct  assault  or  operate 
on  the  flanks  of  the  Confederate  line. 


518  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 


IV. 

THE    MINE    FIASCO. 

As  soon  as  the  system  of  works  had  been  completed,  it  was 
determined  to  make  an  assault  on  the  enemy's  position  on 
Burnside's  front,  and  it  was  resolved  to  work  into  the  plan  the 
explosion  of  a  mine  which  that  officer  had  prepared. 

This  enterprise  had  been  undertaken  some  weeks  previously 
by  Burnside  of  his  own  motion,  and  was  allowed  to  proceed 
rather  by  sufferance  than  sanction.  Having  at  first  excited 
only  ridicule,  the  mine,  now  that  it  was  finished,  began  to 
receive  more  serious  consideration,  and  it  was  resolved  to 
bring  it  into  play  in  the  proposed  plan  of  assault.  Burnside 
occupied  a  position  very  close  to  and  within  a  hundred  and 
fifty  yards  of  the  enemy 's~line,*  which  happened  there  to  form 
an  angle,  that  was  covered  by  a  fort.  It  was  under  this  fort 
that  the  mine  had  been  run.  The  location  of  the  mine  did 
not  promise  well,  the  fort  to  be  destroyed  being  in  a  re-entrant 
of  the  enemy's  line,  and  therefore  exposed  to  an  enfilading 
and  reverse  fire  right  and  left.t  Still,  it  was  seen  that  if  the 
crest  of  the  ridge  behind  the  fort,  and  distant  from  it  by  only 
four  hundred  yards,  could  be  carried,  it  would  secure  the 
most  important  results,  carrying  with  it  Petersburg,  and 
probably  a  large  part  of  the  enemy's  artillery  and  infantry.^ 

About  the  time  fixed  for  the  assault,  which  was  the  morning 
of  the  30th  of  July,  there  happened  a  conjuncture  of  events 
that  promised  a  happy  bearing  on  the  result.  Four  days  before 

*  This  was  the  position  secured  by  Griffin's  division,  of  Warren's  corps,  in 
the  attack  of  the  18th  of  June. 

f  For  proof  of  the  disadvantageous  location  of  the  mine,  see  Meade's  Re 
port ;  Meade's  testimony  before  the  Court  of  Inquiry.— Report  of  the  Conduct 
of  the  War,  p.  125.  Testimony  of  the  chief-engineer.— Ibid. 

JMeade'B  testimony.— Ibid.,  p.  126. 


THE  SIEGE  OF  PETERSBURG.  519 

— that  is,  on  the  26th  of  July — an  expeditionary  force  under 
General  Hancock,  consisting  of  the  Second  Corps  with  two 
divisions  of  Sheridan's  cavalry,  had  been  sent  to  operate  to 
wards  Kichmond  by  the  north  side  of  the  James.  Hancock 
crossed  at  Deep  Bottom  on  the  night  of  the  26th,  with  in 
structions  to  proceed  rapidly  to  Chapin's  Bluff,  where  Lee 
had  established  ponton-bridges,  that  were  his  means  of  com 
munication  between  the  two  parts  of  his  army.  Hancock  was 
to  prevent  Confederate  re-enforcements  from  being  sent  to 
the  north  side  of  the  James,  while  Sheridan  with  his  cavalry 
was  to  proceed  to  the  Virginia  Central  Kailroad,  to  operate 
towards  Bichinond,  the  works  of  which  being  thinly  held 
were  supposed  to  be  open  to  a  surprise.*  As  will  presently 
appear,  however,  there  were  circumstances  that  thwarted  the 
execution  of  this  part  of  the  plan. 

Foster's  lodgment  at  Deep  Bottom  had  caused  Lee  to  send 
a  body  of  troops  to  observe  him.  This  force  held  position 
on  his  immediate  front,  and  had  already  made  one  or  two 
unsuccessful  sallies  to  dislodge  him.  Hancock  determined, 
next  morning,  to  disengage  this  force  by  a  turning  movement 
by  the  right,  while  Foster  threatened  it  in  front.  The  oper 
ation  was  successfully  accomplished,  and  the  skirmish  line 
of  Miles'  brigade,  of  Barlow's  division,  f  by  a  well-executed 
manoeuvre,  captured  four  guns.  The  enemy  held  this  front 
weakly ;  and,  when  thus  assailed,  retired  a  short  distance  to 
another  line  of  works,  behind  Bailey's  Creek,  where  he  effect 
ually  barred  Hancock's  approach  to  Chapin's  Bluff.  This 
position  seemed  so  formidable  that  Hancock  preferred  to 
flank  it.  The  cavalry,  meanwhile,  moved  to  the  right,  and,  by 
one  or  two  spirited  charges,  gained  possession  of  some  high, 
open  ground,  which  it  was  hoped  might  enable  it  to  get  in 
the  rear  of  the  enemy's  line.  Night  came  on,  however,  before 
any  thing  was  accomplished,  and  the  movement  being  now 

*  Hancock :  Report  of  the  Expedition  to  Deep  Bottom. 

f  The  skirmish  line  was  composed  of  the  One  Hundred  and  Eighty-third 
Pennsylvania,  Twenty-eighth  Massachusetts,  and  Twenty-sixth  Michigan,  un 
der  Colonel  J.  C.  Lynch. 


520  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

fully  disclosed,  Lee  drew  to  this  point  a  very  heavy  force  from 
Petersburg.  In  the  morning  he  assumed  the  offensive,  drove 
back  Sheridan  from  his  advance  on  the  New  Market  and  Long 
Bridge  roads,  and,  though  that  officer  was  able,  by  dismount 
ing  his  troopers,  to  check  and  finally  drive  off  his  assailants,  it 
became  obvious  that  his  proposed  expedition  was  baulked. 

During  the  28th  and  following  day,  Hancock  held  a  simply 
defensive  attitude,  Lee  meanwhile  concentrating  so  heavily 
against  him  that  he  finally  had  drawn  to  the  north  bank  of 
the  James  five  of  the  eight  divisions  of  the  Confederate  army. 
Of  this  circumstance  General  Grant  determined  to  take  advan 
tage  ;  for,  though  the  direct  purpose  of  the  move  had  failed, 
it  had  yet  caused  Lee  so  materially  to  weaken  his  force  in 
front  of  Petersburg  as  to  afford  an  excellent  opportunity  for 
the  assault,  which  it  was  designed  to  make  on  Burnside's 
front.  Hancock's  move,  therefore,  assumed  the  character  of 
a  feint ;  and  the  expeditionary  force  was  ordered  that  night 
to  withdraw  secretly  from  its  position  on  the  north  side  of  the 
James,  and  return  to  the  lines  of  Petersburg,  to  participate  in 
the  attack  of  the  following  morning. 

It  will  have  appeared,  from  the  outline  already  given  of  the 
proposed  assault,  that  it  was  an  operation  essentially  of  the 
nature  of  a  coup  de  main.  It  involved  the  explosion  of  the 
mine,  through  the  breach  formed  by  which  an  assaulting 
column  would  then  push  forward  to  sweep  the  hostile  line 
right  and  left,  and  crown  the  crest  of  the  ridge.  Thus  the 
whole  momentum  of  the  action  and  the  entire  promise  of  the 
result  centred  in  the  corps  to  which  the  duty  of  assault  was 
assigned. 

In  this  state  of  facts,  it  would  seem  to  be  the  dictate  of 
prudence,  and  certainly  has  been  the  invariable  practice  of 
the  great  commanders,  to  select  for  the  storming  column  the 
elite  of  the  army — a  rule  that  does  not  seem  to  have  been 
followed  in  this  case.  It  happened  that  the  Ninth  Army 
Corps,  under  General  Burnside,  held  the  front  from  which  the 
assault  was  to  be  made.  With  no  purpose  of  undertaking  the 


THE  SIEGE  OF  PETERSBURG.  521 

ungracious  task  of  comparison,  but  with  the  simple  desire  of 
stating  a  matter  of  fact  essential  to  the  correct  appreciation 
of  the  action  and  its  result,  it  is  due  to  say  that  that  corps 
could  not  be  considered  the  elite  corps  of  the  army.  The  old 
Ninth,  than  which  there  never  was  better,  had  been  reduced 
by  long  and  varied  service  to  a  mere  nucleus,  with  which  had 
been  agglomerated  (not fused)  a  mass  of  new,  heterogeneous, 
and  inferior  material.  The  first  division  was  largely  made 
up  of  foot-  artillerists  and  dismounted  cavalry,  and  the  fourth 
division  was  composed  exclusively  of  Blacks.  To  such  an 
extent  had  the  morale  of  the  Ninth  Corps  become  impaired, 
that  its  inspecting  officer  a  short  time  before  the  assault  de 
clared  the  three  White  divisions  to  be  in  so  bad  a  condition 
that  the  division  of  Blacks  was  to  be  preferred  for  the  duty. 

If,  in  view  of  this  circumstance,  it  be  asked  why  another 
selection  was  not  made,  an  answer  does  not  readily  present 
itself.  There  is,  however,  in  Carnot's  work,  De  la  Defence 
des  Places  Fortes,  a  remarkable  passage  that  closely  touches 
this  matter.  "  The  reasons  why  our  assaults  occasionally  fail," 
says  he,  "  are,  in  my  opinion,  various.  In  the  first  place,  it  is 
a  rule  that  the  troops  immediately  on  duty,  or  near  the  spot, 
generally  storm  or  do  whatever  service  may  be  required. 
These  troops  may  be  most  unfit  for  it,  and  by  this  mode 
the  good  old  custom  is  done  away  of  employing  grena 
diers  or  chosen  men  for  occasions  of  difficulty.  There  are  no 
troops  in  the  world  that  can  be  taken  indiscriminately  for 
brilliant  services, ,  and  undoubtedly  none  more  so  than  for 
storming  works.  Besides,  the  officer  to  whom  the  command 
falls  may  be  very  unfit  for  the  particular  service." 

But,  what  is  even  more  extraordinary  than  the  selection 
itself,  is  the  mode  in  which  the  selection  was  made.  General 
Grant  refused  to  permit  the  black  division  to  be  chosen  for 
the  assaulting  column,  and  it  remained  to  appoint  one  of 
the  three  divisions  of  white  troops.  General  Burnside  then 
resolved  to  determine  the  choice  by  casting  lots — or,  as 
General  Grant  has  expressed  it,  by  "  pulling  straws  or  tossing 
coppers."  The  lot  fell  to  the  first  division,  under  command  of 


522  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

Brigadier-General  Ledlie.  With  such  a  mode  of  determining 
such  a  question,  need  it  be  wondered  that  an  elfish  fate  turned 
up  of  all  the  divisions  the  poorest — a  division  fitted  neither  in 
respect  of  its  composition  nor  its  commander  for  the  glorious 
but  exacting  duty  assigned  it. 

The  hour  for  the  explosion  of  the  mine  was  fixed  at  half- 
past  four  in  the  morning  of  the  30th.  At  that  hour  the  match 
was  applied,  but,  owing  to  the  defective  fuse  employed,  the 
mine  failed  to  explode.  After  waiting  some  time,  a  commis 
sioned  and  a  non-commissioned  officer*  volunteered  for  the 
perilous  duty  of  entering  the  mine  and  ascertaining  the  cause 
of  the  failure.  The  fuse  being  relighted,  the  mine  exploded 
at  forty-two  minutes  past  four  in  the  morning.  A  solid  mass 
of  earth,  through  which  the  exploding  powder  blazed  like 
lightning  playing  in  a  bank  of  clouds,  arose  slowly  some  two 
hundred  feet  into  the  air,  and,  hanging  visibly  for  a  few 
seconds,  it  subsided,  and  a  heavy  qloud  of  black  smoke  floated 
off.  The  explosion  of  the  mine  was  the  signal  for  a  simul 
taneous  outburst  of  artillery  fire  from  the  various  batteries. 
This  had  the  effect  of  soon  silencing  the  enemy's  guns.f  The 
leading  division  under  Ledlie  then  advanced  to  the  charge. 
The  place  d'armes  was,  however,  very  restricted  :  no  proper  de 
bouches  had  been  prepared  for  the  assaulting  column,{  and  the 
advance  was  made  slowly  and  stragglingly. 


*  Lieutenant  Jacob  Douty  and  Sergeant  Henry  Rees,  of  the  Forty-eighth 
Pennsylvania  Kegiinent. 

f  "  On  the  morning  of  the  30th,  as  soon  as  the  mine  exploded,  our  fire 
opened  along  the  whole  line.  The  firing  was  from  each  piece  slow,  deliberate, 
and  careful,  partaking  of  the  nature  of  target  practice,  and  was  very  effective. 
The  enemy's  guns  in  iront  of  the  Fifth  Corps  were  soon  silenced,  and  his  fire 
in  front  of  the  Ninth  Corps  confined  to  a  battery  on  the  hill  behind  the  mine, 
and  to  one  gun  from  another  work  south  of  the  mine,  which  could  not  be 
effectually  reached."— Hunt :  Report  of  Artillery  Operations. 

f  On  this  point  Lieutenant-General  Grant  says :  "  I  am  satisfied  that  he 
[General  Burnside]  did  not  make  the  debouchement  that  he  was  ordered  to 
make.  1  know  that  as  well  as  I  know  any  thing  that  1  cannot  exactly  sweai 
to." — Report  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  second  series,  vol.  i.,  p.  110.  General 
Meade  says :  "  There  was  a  high  parapet  in  front  of  our  lines,  an  abatu  and 


THE  SIEGE  OF  PETERSBURG.  523 

On  reaching  the  site  of  the  fort,  it  was  found  to  have  been 
converted  by  the  explosion  into  a  huge  crater  one  hundred 
and  fifty  feet  long,  sixty  feet  wide,  and  from  twenty-five  to 
thirty  deep.  Here  the  assaulting  column  sought  shelter, 
though  there  was  nothing  to  prevent  its  rushing  forward  and 
crowning  the  crest ;  for  the  enemy,  paralyzed  by  the  explo 
sion,  remained  inactive  for  above  half  an  hour.  Portions  of 
the  other  two  divisions,  under  Generals  Potter  and  "Wilcox, 
then  advanced,  but  they  also  huddled  into  the  crater,  or  sought 
cover  behind  the  breastworks,  which  had  been  vacated  by 
the  enemy  for  two  or  three  hundred  yards  to  the  right  and 
left  of  the  mine.  Here  the  troops  of  the  several  divisions  be 
coming  mixed  up :  a  scene  of  disorder  and  confusion  com 
menced,  which  seems  to  have  continued  to  the  end  of  the 
operations.* 

In  the  mean  time  the  enemy,  rallying  from  the  confusion  in 
cident  to  the  explosion,  began  forming  his  infantry  in  a  ravine 
to  the  right,  and  planting  his  artillery  both  on  the  right  and 
left  of  the  crater.  Seeing  this,  one  of  the  division  command 
ers,  General  Potter,  made  a  praiseworthy  effort  to  extricate 
himself  from  the  disgraceful  coil,  and  charged  towards  the 
crest ;  but,  owing  to  want  of  support,  he  was  compelled  to  fall 
back.  It  was  now  seven  A.  M.,  more  than  two  hours  after  Led- 
lie  occupied  the  crater,  yet  he  made  no  advance  himself,  and 
obstructed  the  efforts  of  other  officers.  In  this  state  of  facts, 
the  more  troops  that  were  thrown  in,  the  worse  was  the  con 
fusion  ;  yet  General  Burnside  threw  forward  the  black  divi 
sion  to  essay  an  assault.  Passing  beyond  the  crater,  the 
colored  troops  made  an  advance  towards  the  crest,  when,  en 
countering  a  fire  of  artillery  and  infantry,  they  retired  in  great 
disorder  through  the  troops  in  the  crater,  and  back  to  the 

other  obstacles  to  keep  the  enemy  from  us.     Those  obstacles  should  have  been 
removed  to  enable  our  troops  to  move  out  promptly.    There  was  but  a  small 
opening  made,  by  which  the  Ninth  Corps,  fifteen  thousand  men,  moved  out  by 
the  flank." — Ibid.,  p.  35.    See  also  the  testimony  of  Major  Duane,  Ibid.,  p.  99 
Warren,  Ibid.,  p.  83. 

*  Meade :  Report  of  the  Battle  of  Petersburg 


524  CAMPAIGN  OP  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

original  lines.*  After  the  repulse  of  the  colored  division,  all 
semblance  of  offensive  efforts  ceased ;  Blacks  and  Whites  tum 
bled  pell-mell  into  the  hollow  of  the  exploded  earthworks- 
a  slaughter-pen  in  which  shells  and  bombs,  rained  from  the 
enemy's  lines,  did  fearful  havoc.f  Failing  to  advance,  it  soon 
•proved  almost  equally  difficult  to  retreat,  though  parties  of 
tens  and  twenties,  crawling  out,  ran  back  as  best  they  could. 
The  enemy  then  made  a  saUy  towards  the  crater,  but  was 
repulsed.  A  second  assault,  however,  shook  the  disjointed 
structure  of  the  hapless  mass,  which,  without  head  or  direc 
tion,  obeyed  the  instinct  of  sauve  qui  pent.  Above  four  thou 
sand  were  killed  or  captured.  Thus  ended  what  General 
Grant  justly  called  "  this  miserable  affair,"  in  which,  if  success 
promised  results  of  the  first  importance,  it  would  be  difficult 
to  say  that  the  preparations  were  of  a  character  to  insure 
success.:): 


*  "  A  part  of  the  colored  division  was  deflected  to  tlie  right,  and  charged  and 
captured  a  portion  of  the  enemy's  line,  with  a  stand  of  colors  and  some  pris 
oners." — Burnside :  Report  of  the  Battle  of  Petersburg. 

f  The  most  destructive  fire  came  from  a  gun  in  a  work  south  of  the  mine, 
which  was  covered  from  the  Union  batteries  by  a  fringe  of  trees  on  their  front, 
that  the  chief  of  artillery  had  required  should  be  felled.  "  This  work  having 
been  delayed  by  the  Ninth  Corps  until  the  night  of  the  29th,  it  was  then  ob 
jected  to  by  General  Burnside  that  the  noise  of  chopping  would  alarm  the 
enemy." — Hunt :  Report  of  Siege  Operations. 

$  The  report  of  the  Congressional  Investigating  Committee  finds  that  the 
failure  of  the  assault  was  due  to  the  following  causes :  1.  The  fact  that  the 
charge  was  led  by  white.,  instead  of  black  troops.  This  is  stated  by  the  com 
mittee  to  be  "  the  first  and  great  cause  of  disaster."  2.  The  fact  that  General 
Meade  directed  that  the  assaulting  column  should  push  at  once  for  the  crest  of 
Cemetery  Hill,  instead  of  first  clearing  the  enemy's  lines  to  the  right  and  left 
of  the  mine.  This  is  a  ridiculous  charge ;  for  the  order  to  crown  the  crest 
involved,  in  its  execution,  the  clearing  of  the  enemy's  lines  right  and  left,  as 
much  as  an  order  to  General  Burnside  to  pass  through  a  door  would  presup 
pose  his  opening  the  door. 

A  very  different  verdict  was,  however,  pronounced  by  a  military  court  of  in 
quiry  instituted  soon  after  the  failure.  This  court  was  composed  of  Generals 
Hancock,  Ayres,  and  Miles,  and  its  finding  is  as  follows : 

"  The  causes  of  failure  are — 

"  1.  The  injudicious  formation  of  the  troops  in  going  forward,  the  movement 


THE  SIEGE  OP  PETERSBURG.  525 


IV. 

LEE'S  DIVERSION. 

In  the  threatening  attitude  maintained  by  Grant,  there  was 
one  move  open  to  Lee  that  promised,  for  a  time  at  least,  to 
relieve  the  pressure  on  his  beleaguered  lines.  This  was  to 
make  a  diversion  in  favor  of  his  own  army  by  such  a  menace 
against  Washington  as  would  compel  Grant  to  part  with  so 
much  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  that  offensive  operations 
against  Petersburg  must  cease.  This  measure  was  now 
adopted  by  Lee. 

The  execution  of  this  project  was  facilitated  not  only  by  the 
fact  that  the  position  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  south  of  the 

being  mainly  by  flank,  instead  of  extended  front.  General  Meade's  order  indi 
cated  that  columns  of  assault  should  be  employed  to  take  Cemetery  Hill,  and 
the  proper  passages  should  be  prepared  for  those  columns.  It  is  the  opinion  of 
the  court,  that  there  were  no  proper  columns  of  assault.  The  troops  should 
have  been  formed  in  the  open  ground  in  front  of  the  point  of  attack,  parallel  to 
the  line  of  the  enemy's  works.  The  evidence  shows  that  one  or  more  columns 
might  have  passed  over  at  and  to  the  left  of  the  crater,  without  any  previous 
preparation  of  the  ground. 

"  2.  The  halting  of  the  troops  in  the  crater,  instead  of  going  forward  to  the 
crest,  when  there  was  no  fire  of  any  consequence  from  the  enemy. 

"  3.  No  proper  employment  of  engineer  officers  and  working  parties,  and  of 
materials  and  tools  for  their  use,  in  the  Ninth  Corps. 

"  4.  That  some  parts  of  the  assaulting  columns  were  not  properly  led. 

"  5.  The  want  of  a  competent  common  head  at  the  scene  of  the  assault,  to 
direct  affairs  as  occurrences  should  demand. 

"  Had  not  failure  ensued  from  the  above  causes,  and  the  crest  been  gained,  the 
success  might  have  been  jeoparded  by  the  failure  to  have  prepared  in  season 
proper  and  adequate  debouches  through  the  Ninth  Corps  lines  for  troops,  and 
especially  for  field  artillery,  as  ordered  by  Major-General  Meade." — Report  on 
the  Conduct  of  the  War,  second  series,  vol.  i.,  p.  215. 

Neither  of  these  verdicts,  however,  reaches  the  root  of  the  evil.  If  the 
reader  will  study  carefully  the  passage  I  have  quoted  from  Carnot,  in  its  appli 
cation  to  the  character  of  the  troops  that  made  the  assault,  he  will  have  the 
r^al  cause  of  the  failure.  All  the  rest  followed  from  that  primal  evil. 


526  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC! 

James  completely  uncovered  Washington  ;  but  the  direct  line 
of  march  by  the  Shenandoah  Valley  had  been  left  open  to  the 
advance  of  a  hostile  force  by  General  Hunter,  who,  after  his 
defeat  before  Lynchburg,  had  taken  up  an  eccentric  line  of 
retreat  by  way  of  Western  Virginia.  The  effect  of  this  was 
completely  to  uncover  the  frontier  of  the  loyal  States. 

The  force  detached  by  Lee  for  this  expedition  consisted  of 
a  body  of  twelve  thousand  men  under  General  Early.  Fol 
lowing  the  beaten  track  of  invasion,  Early  marched  rapidly 
down  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  arriving  before  Martinsburg  the 
3d  of  July.  Sigel,  who  held  post  there  with  a  small  force, 
at  once  retreated  across  the  Potomac  at  Shepherdstown. 
General  Weber,  in  command  at  Harper's  Ferry,  evacuated  the 
town  and  retired  to  Maryland  Heights.  Hunter,  who  had 
made  a  toilsome  march  through  the  Alpine  region  of  Western 
Virginia,  experienced  great  delays  in  transporting  his  troops 
to  Harper's  Ferry,  owing  to  the  lowness  of  the  river  and  the 
breaking  of  the  railroad  in  several  places.  He  was  therefore 
not  in  position  to  check  the  irruption  of  the  enemy  into  Mary 
land,  and  the  Confederates,  the  way  being  thus  open,  passed 
the  Potomac,  and  marching  by  way  of  Hagerstown,  on  the 
7th,  reached  Frederick — a  central  point  whence  they  might 
threaten  both  Baltimore  and  Washington. 

The  only  force  at  hand  with  which  to  dispute  Early 's  ad 
vance  was  a  body  of  a  few  thousand  foot  artillerists,  hundred 
days'  men  and  invalids  under  General  Wallace,  then  in  com 
mand  at  Baltimore.  But  on  learning  the  irruption  of  the 
enemy  across  the  Potomac,  General  Grant  detached  the  Sixth 
Corps  from  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  and  forwarded  it  by 
transports  to  Washington.  It  happened,  too,  at  this  juncture, 
that  the  Nineteenth  Corps  under  General  Emory,  which  had 
been  ordered  from  New  Orleans  after  the  failure  of  the  Eed 
River  expedition,  had  just  arrived  in  Hampton  Eoads.  With 
out  debarking  it  was  sent  to  follow  the  Sixth.  The  advance 
division  of  the  Sixth  Corps  under  General  Eicketts  having 
arrived,  General  Wallace,  with  that  added  to  his  own  hetero 
geneous  force,  moved  forward  to  meet  Early,  and  took  posi- 


THE  SIEGE  OF  PETERSBURG.  527 

tion  on  the  Monocacy.  Here  he  received  battle  on  the  8th, 
and  though  he  was  discomfited,  the  stand  he  made  gained 
time  that  was  of  infinite  value.  Wallace  fell  back  on  Balti 
more,  and  the  route  to  Washington  being  clear,  Early  at  once 
pushed  forward  in  that  direction — sending  towards  Baltimore 
a  cavalry  force  that  destroyed  a  long  stretch  of  the  Northern 
Central  Kailroad  and  burnt  the  viaduct  of  the  Baltimore  and 
Ohio  Kailroad,  thus  effectually  cutting  off  communication  with 
the  North  and  securing  the  Confederate  rear. 

Advancing  by  the  great  highway  from  Frederick  to  George 
town,  his  column  on  the  9th  reached  Eockville,  fourteen 
miles  from  the  Federal  capital.  Bivouacking  here,  it  next 
day  resumed  the  march,  and  on  the  morning  of  the  llth, 
Early's  van  reined  up  before  the  fortifications  covering  the 
northern  approaches  to  Washington.  By  afternoon  the  Con 
federate  infantry  had  come  up,  and  showed  a  strong  line  in 
front  of  Fort  Stevens.  Early  had  then  an  opportunity  to 
dash  into  the  city,  the  works  being  very  slightly  defended. 
The  hope  at  headquarters  that  the  capital  could  be  saved  from 
capture  was  very  slender.  But  his  conduct  was  feeble,  and 
during  the  day  the  Sixth  Corps  arrived,  and  was  soon  followed 
by  the  Nineteenth. 

After  this,  no  one  of  sound  nerves  had  any  fears  for  the 
safety  of  Washington.  The  Confederates  still  held  their  posi 
tion  during  the  12th,  and  that  afternoon  warm  skirmishing 
took  place,  though  without  vigor  on  the  part  of  the  enemy. 
A  brigade  of  the  Sixth  Corps  made  a  sally  from  the  lines  and 
fell  upon  and  drove  the  enemy  for  a  mile,  suffering  a  loss  of 
near  three  hundred  in  killed  and  wounded,  but  inflicting 
heavier  damage  on  the  enemy.  That  night  Early  withdrew 
his  force  and  retired  across  the  Potomac  at  Edward's  Ferry, 
taking  with  him  much  booty,  but  little  glory.  Next  day 
General  Wright  began  pursuit,  but  did  not  overtake  the  ene 
my  till  he  reached  the  Shenandoah  Valley.  After  a  smart 
skirmish  at  Snicker's  Ferry,  Early  beat  a  retreat  southward. 
The  Sixth  Corps  was  then  drawn  back  to  Washington,  but  as 
shortly  afterwards  the  Confederates  showed  signs  of  repeat- 


528  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF   THE   POTOMAC. 

ing  the  invasion,  it  was,  with  the  Nineteenth  Corps,  returned 
to  the  Shenandoah  Valley.  Here  General  Sheridan  soon 
afterwards  took  command,  and  opened  a  brilliant  campaign, 
to  the  details  of  which  I  shall  shortly  return. 

In  this  enterprise,  General  Lee  founded  his  expectations 
less  on  what  might  be  accomplished  directly  by  the  expe 
ditionary  force,  than  on  the  effect  he  supposed  this  menace  to 
Washington  would  have  on  the  army  beleaguering  Petersburg. 
He  reasoned  that  as  General  Grant  was  a  man  who  believed 
in  overwhelming  numbers,  he  would  find  himself,  after  the  de 
tachment  of  a  sufficient  force  to  meet  the  column  of  invasion, 
so  reduced  in  strength  that  he  would  remove  his  remaining 
corps  altogether  from  Petersburg.*  The  siege  would  thus  be 
raised  and  Richmond  relieved. 

But  Lee's  reasoning  was  falsified  by  the  fact.  The  oppor 
tune  arrival  of  the  Nineteenth  Corps  from  New  Orleans  en 
abled  Grant  to  provide  a  sufficient  force  to  meet  Early  by  the 
detachment  of  a  single  corps,  the  loss  of  which  had  no  sensi 
ble  influence  on  operations  against  Petersburg.  There  is 
little  doubt  that  at  an  earlier  period  of  the  war  the  result 
would  have  been  very  different  and  would  have  fully  met  Lee's 
expectations.  As  it  was,  it  required  all  General  Grant's 
moral  firmness  to  withstand  the  severe  pressure  brought  upon 
him  by  the  Administration  to  remove  his  army  from  the 
James  Eiver  to  the  front  of  Washington.  The  persistency 
which  has  been  often  pointed  out  as  that  commander's  dis 
tinguishing  trait  was  never  so  happily  illustrated. 

*  I  derive  this  statement  of  General  Lee's  views  from  Colonel  Marshall,  of 
the  staff  of  the  Confederate  commander. 


THE  SIEGE  OF  PETERSBURG.  529 


VI. 

SUMMER  AND   AUTUMN   OPERATIONS  AGAINST 
PETERSBURG   AND   RICHMOND. 

Having  already  set  forth  the  bounds  within  which  manoeu 
vres  were  practicable  for  the  army  before  Petersburg,  it  re 
mains  to  describe  a  series  of  operations  within  these  limits, 
executed  during  the  remaining  months  of  summer  and  autumn. 
They  present  a  remarkable  illustration  of  the  vigor  and  skill 
that  marked  both  the  attack  and  defence  of  that  city.  The 
recital  will  bring  this  narrative  up  to  the  close  of  the  cam 
paign  of  1864. 

THE  MOVEMENT  TO  DEEP  BOTTOM. — The  first  of  these  oper 
ations  was  a  repetition  of  the  manoeuvre  to  the  north  bank  of 
the  James  Eiver.  The  expedition  was  again  under  the  com 
mand  of  General  Hancock,  to  whom  were  given,  in  addition 
to  his  own  corps,  the  Tenth  Corps  (now  under  General  Bir- 
ney)  and  the  cavalry  division  of  General  Gregg.  The  move 
ment  was  begun  on  the  12th  of  August.  As  it  was  not  possi 
ble  long  to  conceal  its  real  character,  it  was  resolved  to  throw 
the  enemy  off  the  scent  by  the  embarkation  of  the  expe 
ditionary  force  on  transports  at  City  Point,  and  the  promulga 
tion  of  the  idea  that  it  was  about  to  start  for  Washington. 
During  the  night  of  the  12th,  the  fleet  steamed  up  stream,  and 
the  troops  were  next  morning  landed  at  Deep  Bottom,  where 
General  Foster  continued  to  hold  an  intrenched  camp.* 
Much  difficulty  was  experienced  in  the  debarkation,  which 

*  The  artillery  had  been  previously  sent  across  the  Appomattox,  by  way  of 
Point  of  Rocks,  and  parked  under  concealment  within  General  Butler's  lines. 
It  was  then  taken  to  the  north  side  of  the  James  when  the  infantry  had 
debarked, 

84 


530  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE   ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

was  not  completed  until  nine  o'clock  of  the  morning  of  the 
13th — a  tardiness  not  auspicious  of  a  successful  result.* 

Hancock  moved  out  by  the  New  Market  and  Malvern  Hill 
roads,  encountering  little  opposition  until  reaching  Bailey's 
Creek,  the  point  at  which  his  previous  advance  had  been 
arrested.  Here  Mott's  division  fronted  the  enemy's  intrenched 
line,  while  Barlow,  with  two  divisions,  numbering  nearly  ten 
thousand  men,  was  sent  to  assault  on  the  right,  with  instruc 
tions  that,  when  the  position  was  carried,  he  should  move  to 
his  left  and  uncover  Mott's  front,  when  the  whole  line  would 
advance.  The  duty  assigned  to  Barlow  was  of  the  nature  of 
a  detached  operation,  but  he  unfortunately  tried  to  keep  up 
his  connection  with  Mott's  right,  which  strung  his  force  out 
in  a  thin  line,  and  left  him  nothing  wherewith  to  form  a 
storming  column.  Late  in  the  day  he  made,  with  a  single 
brigade,  an  attack  that  was  rather  feebly  executed,  t  so  that 
night  found  the  Confederates  still  in  possession  of  the  in 
trenched  line.  On  General  Birney's  front,  on  the  other  side 
of  Bailey's  Creek,  some  success  was  gained  for  the  enemy, 
having  weakened  that  part  of  the  line  to  oppose  Barlow, 
General  Birney  was  able,  with  slight  loss,  to  break  through  a 
portion  of  the  hostile  front,  and  captured  four  guns. 

Whatever  prospect  of  success  originally  attended  this  opera 
tion  had  been  based  on  the  fact  that  the  Confederates  were 
weak  on  the  north  side  of  the  James — the  whole  force  being- 
believed  to  be  not  above  eight  thousand  men.J  But  the  design 

*  It  was  supposed  that  Hancock's  troops  could  be  readily  landed  by  running 
the  boats  along  shore,  and  throwing  out  gang-planks.  But  it  was  found  that 
the  boats  could  not  be  run  near  enough  to  the  shore  to  effect  this  purpose,  ana 
the  difficulty  was  materially  increased  by  the  outrunning  tide.  Moreover, 
many  of  the  transports  were  ill-adapted  to  this  use.  Throughout  all  these 
operations  great  inconvenience  arose  from  the  lack  of  a  few  light-draught  river 
steamers. 

f  The  inadequate  character  of  Barlow's  attacks  General  Hancock  attributes 
to  "  the  large  number  of  new  men  in  his  command,  and  the  small  number  of 
experienced  officers." — Report  of  Operations  at  Deep  Bottom. 

\  "An  estimate  of  General  Butler's  was  furnished  me.  putting  the  enemy's 
strength  north  of  the  James  at  eight  thousand  five  hundred  men."— Hancock  : 
Report  of  Operations  at  Deep  Bottom. 


THE  SIEGE  OF  PETERSBURG.  531 

being  now  fully  disclosed,  Lee  rapidly  re- enforced  to  meet 
this  menace,  and  success  was  already  very  problematical. 
New  dispositions  were,  however,  made  on  the  14th.  On  the 
following  day  General  Birney  was  directed  to  find  the  enemy's 
left  flank  and  turn  it,  Gregg's  cavalry  covering  the  movement 
on  the  right ;  but  he  did  not  conduct  his  operations  sufficiently 
to  the  left,  and  nothing  was  accomplished  that  day.  On  the 
morning  of  the  16th,  Birney*  made  a  direct  attack,  with  the 
division  of  Terry,  and  succeeded  in  carrying  the  line,  cap 
turing  three  colors  and  two  or  three  hundred  prisoners ;  but 
the  enemy  soon  rallied  and  recovered  the  position. 

In  connection  with  Birney's  operation,  Gregg's  mounted 
division,  and  an  infantry  brigade  under  General  Miles, 
were  sent  to  operate  on  the  Charles  City  road.  Gregg's 
advance  was  spirited,  and  he  succeeded  in  driving  the 
enemy  before  him  for  a  considerable  distance — the  Confeder 
ate  General  Chambliss  being  killed  in  the  skirmish.  Fresh 
forces  during  the  afternoon  assailed  Gregg,  however,  who 
retired,  fighting,  to  Deep  Creek,  across  which  he  was  after 
wards  driven.  In  Birney's  front  the  enemy  showed  so 
strong  a  force  that  a  renewal  of  the  attack  was  deemed 
impracticable. 

During  the  night  of  the  16th  a  fleet  of  steamers  was  sent 
from  City  Point  to  Deep  Bottom,  returning  at  four  A.  M.  on 
the  following  morning — the  object  being  to  convey  the  impres 
sion  to  the  enemy  that  the  expeditionary  force  was  withdraw 
ing,  and  induce  him  to  come  out  of  his  works  and  attack. 
This  ruse  was  not  successful. 

*  During  the  night  the  greater  part  of  General  Birney's  command  was 
massed  in  rear  of  the  position  occupied  by  General  Barlow.  The  line  from  the 
New  Market  and  Malvern  Hill  road,  at  a  point  designated  on  the  map  as  the 
"  Potteries,"  to  the  extreme  right,  was  held  by  a  thin  skirmish  line  only.  One 
of  General  Mott's  best  brigades,  under  Colonel  Craig  (One  Hundred  and  Fifth 
Pennsylvania  Volunteers),  was  sent  to  General  Birney.  The  remainder  of 
Mott's  division  was  massed  in  rear  of  his  picket-line,  except  a  small  force  left 
at  the  "  Potteries."  Gibbon's  division  (temporarily  under  Colonel  Smythe) 
was  also  massed  in  rear  of  the  skirmish  line,  and  Barlow's  division  was  con 
centrated  near  the  fork  of  the  Darby  and  Long  Bridge  roads. 


532  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

The  four  succeeding  days  passed  in  unimportant  recon- 
noissances,  though  on  the  afternoon  of  the  18th  the  Confed 
erates  made  a  sally  against  a  part  of  Birney's  line.  After  a 
fight  of  thirty  minutes  they  were  repulsed,  with  considerable 
loss.  General  Miles,  with  two  brigades,  participated,  attack 
ing  the  enemy  on  his  left  flank.  At  dark  of  the  20th,  Han 
cock  returned,  by  way  of  Bermuda  Hundred,  to  his  old  camp 
before  Petersburg.  The  Union  loss  in  this  operation  exceeded 
fifteen  hundred  men.*  Much  had  been  expected  from  it,  but 
the  results  were  trivial. 

To  THE  WELDON  EAILEOAD. — If  the  movement  to  the  north 
side  of  the  James  had  failed  to  accomplish  the  object  con 
templated,  it  had  at  least  compelled  Lee  to  detach  a  consid 
erable  force  from  the  lines  of  Petersburg.  Advantage  was, 
accordingly,  taken  of  this  fact  to  strike  out  on  the  left  flank, 
which  now  rested  within  three  miles  of  the  Weldon  Kailroad. 
This,  as  one  of  the  chief  lines  of  communication  for  the 
Confederate  army,  presented  a  tempting  prize. 

This  operation  was  intrusted  to  General  Warren,  who 
began  its  execution  on  the  morning  of  the  18th,  while  Han 
cock  remained  yet  on  the  north  side  of  the  James.  No  more 
than  slight  opposition  was  encountered  on  the  march,  and 
early  in  the  forenoon,  Warren  established  himself  on  the  rail 
road.  Leaving  Griffin's  division  to  guard  the  point  seized, 
and  observe  the  avenues  of  approach  from  the  south  and 
west,  the  advance  was  continued  northward  along  the  rail 
road.  After  proceeding  a  mile  towards  Petersburg,  the  enemy 
was  found  in  line  of  battle,  showing  a  firm  disposition  to 
contest  further  progress.t  In  the  afternoon,  when  Warren 
attempted  to  renew  his  advance,  with  Crawford's  division  on 
the  right,  and  Ayres'  on  the  left,  the  Confederates  took  the 
offensive  against  the  latter. 

The   attack   of  the  enemy  came  from  the  left,  from  the 

*  Hancock's  loss  in  his  own  corps  was  nine  hundred  and  fifteen.  In  the 
Tenth  Corps  and  cavalry  it  is  unknown. 

f  Warren  :  Report  of  Operations  on  the  Weldon  Railroad. 


THE   SIEGE  OF  PETERSBURG.  533 

Vaughan  road,  the  location  of  which  at  that  point  was  un 
known  to  the  Union  officers.  It  first  fell  upon  the  Maryland 
brigade,  which  was  marching  by  the  flank  to  cover  Ayres' 
left.  The  result  was  that  in  a  few  minutes  this  brigade  gave 
way,  thus  compelling  Ayres'  left  to  fall  back,  and  stopping  the 
advance  on  the  right.  About  two  hundred  of  the  Marylanders 
were  taken  prisoners :  the  remainder  retired  under  cover  of 
the  Fifteenth  New  York  Heavy  Artillery,  which,  standing 
firmly,  poured  rapid  volleys  into  the  enemy,  driving  him 
speedily  back.  This  action  cost  a  loss  of  a  thousand  men, 
killed,  wounded,  and  prisoners.  But  it  still  left  Warren  in 
possession  of  the  prize — the  Weldon  Hailroad.  Here  he  im 
mediately  began  intrenching  a  position. 

The  possession  of  this  line  was  not  to  Lee  a  matter  of  vital 
importance,  but  still  of  very  great  importance.*  He,  there 
fore,  determined  at  all  hazards  to  dislodge  the  intruding 
force. 

The  body  of  Confederates  met  by  Warren  had  not  ex 
ceeded  a  division ;  but  Lee  immediately  strengthened  it  by 
powerful  re-enforcements,  and  on  the  following  afternoon 
(the  19th),  made  a  sudden  irruption  on  the  right  flank  of  the 
Union  position.  General  Warren  had  directed  Brigadier- 
General  Bragg  to  establish,  by  means  of  his  brigade,  a  con 
nection  of  skirmishers  on  the  shortest  line  between  the  right 
of  his  corps  and  the  left  of  the  army  then  resting  across  the 
Jerusalem  plankroad.  This  order  General  Bragg  did  not 
execute,  but  took  up  another  line  a  mile  or  more  to  the  rear.t 
On  learning  this  error,  General  Warren  instructed  the  brig- 

*  General  Lee,  from  the  time  of  first  reaching  Petersburg,  never  expected  to 
be  able  long  to  hold  the  Weldon  Railroad  ;  and  four  days  after  his  arrival,  he 
sent  a  warning  to  the  Richmond  authorities  to  prepare  to  supply  his  army  by 
the  Danville  line  alone.  The  reply  was,  that  they  hoped  he  would  do  all  he 
could  to  hold  the  Weldon  road.  To  this  he  answered,  that  of  course  he  would 
do  all  he  could  to  hold  it,  but  that  he  had  little  faith  in  his  ability  to  do  so. 
The  failure  of  the  Confederate  authorities  to  make  any  provisions  in  accordance 
with  his  admonition  was  probably  the  cause  of  the  desperate  assaults  he  nvwfa 
to  dislodge  Warren. 

f  Warren  :  Report  of  Operations  on  the  Weldon  Railroad. 


534  CAMPAIGNS  OF    THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

adier  to  correct  it ;  but  before  this  could  be  done,  the  enemy 
broke  through  this  picket-line  with  heavy  fire  in  column  of 
fours,  left  in  front.  "Warren's  flank  was  now  turned,  and  the 
Confederates,  in  rear  of  Crawford's  line,  swept  rapidly  down 
to  "Warren's  left.  Great  confusion  was  produced  by  the  men 
on  the  front  line  hastily  retiring  and  masking  the  fire  of  those 
on  the  second  line  ;  so  that  the  whole  of  Crawford's  division 
was  compeUed  to  fall  back,  as  was  also  the  right  of  Ayres'. 
Twenty-five  hundred  prisoners  fell  into  the  hands  of  the 
enemy,  and  among  them  General  J.  Hays,  one  of  "Warren's 
brigade  commanders.  The  troops,  however,  still  clung  to 
their  vantage-ground  on  the  railroad. 

In  the  midst  of  the  action,  the  commands  of  "Wilcox  and 
White  of  the  Ninth  Corps  (about  two  thousand  in  all),  oppor 
tunely  came  up  ;  whereupon,  Warren,  his  own  lines  being  re 
formed,  pushed  forward  and  regained  the  ground  lost.  The 
enemy,  in  great  confusion,  rapidly  fell  back  to  his  intrench- 
ments,  after  a  success  which,  though  brilliant  in  itself,  totally 
failed  to  accomplish  the  designed  object. 

Being  satisfied  that  the  position  which  he  held  was  one  that 
the  enemy  would  make  renewed  efforts  to  regain,  Warren 
made  dispositions  of  his  lines  favorable  for  artillery  de 
fence,  and  then  awaited  attack.  He  was  not  mistaken 
in  this  anticipation ;  for,  on  the  morning  of  the  21st,  the 
Confederates  opened  with  some  thirty  pieces  of  artillery, 
crossing  their  fire  at  right  angles  over  Warren's  position. 
After  an  hour's  practice  of  this  nature  they  advanced  to 
attack  in  front,  and  at  the  same  time  endeavored,  with  a  turn 
ing  force,  to  reach  the  left  flank.  The  attack  in  front  was, 
however,  easily  repulsed,  and  Warren  having  previously  dis 
posed  his  left  flank  en  echelon,  the  turning  force  suddenly  met 
a  severe  fire,  under  which  it  fell  back  in  great  disorder — five 
hundred  being  taken  prisoners.*  The  day's  work  was  a  clear 

*  This  turning  movement  was  made  by  a  South  Carolina  brigade  undei 
General  Hay  good,  and  the  incidents  of  the  attack  are  thus  given  by  General 
Warren :  "  General  Haygood's  brigade  struck  a  part  of  our  line  where  the 
troops  were  in  echelon ;  they  found  themselves  almost  surrounded,  and  every 


THE  SIEGE   OF  PETERSBURG.  535 

victory,  achieved  with  trivial  loss.*  Warren  soon  rendered 
his  position  unassailable,  and  Lee  was  compelled  to  see  this 
important  line  of  supplies  cut  off.  The  loss  sustained  by 
Warren  in  these ,  actions  for  the  possession  of  the  Weldon 
Railroad,  reached  an  aggregate  of  four  thousand  four  hundred 
and  fifty-five  killed,  wounded,  and  missing.t 

THE  ACTION  AT  BEAMS'  STATION. — It  will  be  remembered 
that  at  the  time  Warren  moved  out,  Hancock  was  operating 
on  the  north  bank  of  the  James  River.  Having,  meanwhile, 
returned  to  the  lines  before  Petersburg  on  the  morning  of  the 
21st,  after  a  very  fatiguing  march,  he  was  ordered  to  the  left, 
'in  rear  of  the  position  held  by  Warren.  This  was  accom 
plished  the  same  afternoon,  and  the  troops  passed  the  next 
two  days  in  destroying  the  Weldon  Railroad,  moving  south 
ward  and  tearing  up  the  track  as  far  as  Reams'  Station.  The 
cavalry  meanwhile  operated  on  the  left  towards  Dinwiddie 
Courthouse.  From  Reams'  Station,  the  troops  proceeded,  on 
the  24th,  to  continue  the  work  of  destruction  for  three  miles 
further  southward,  after  which  they  were  withdrawn  to  the 
intrenchments.  As  Hancock's  instructions  were  to  break  up 
the  railroad  as  far  as  Rowanty  Creek,  eight  miles  south  of 
Reams',  he  once  more  dispatched  part  of  his  corps,  on  the 
25th,  to  perform  this  duty.  The  division  to  which  this  work 
was  this  day  assigned  (that  of  Gibbon),  had,  however,  hardly 
left  its  intrenchments  when  the  cavalry,  which  was  thrown 
out  in  the  -direction  of  any  hostile  approach,  reported  the 
enemy  advancing.  As  the  Confederates  showed  a  strong 

one,  thinking  they  had  surrendered,  ceased  firing.  Troops  immediately  ad 
vanced  to  bring  them  in,  when  their  officers  commenced  firing,  and  Captain 
Daly,  provost-marshal  of  the  Fourth  Division,  was  shot  by  General  Haygood. 
In  the  mixed  condition  of  our  men  and  the  enemy,  our  line  could  not  fire,  and 
many  of  the  enemy  escaped." — Warren :  Report  of  Operations  on  the  Weldon 
Railroad. 

*  The  actual  loss  was  three  hundred  and  two ;  the  enemy's  must  have  been 
thrice  or  four  times  that  number,  for  Warren's  men  buried  two  hundred  and 
eleven  of  the  Confederate  dead. 

f  Warren :  Report  of  Operations  on  the  Weldon  Railroad. 


536  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

force  of  cavalry  and  infantry,  Hancock  withdrew  Gibbon's 
division  within  the  intrenchments  at  Beams'  Station,  placing 
it  on  the  left  of  the  First  Division,  at  this  time  under  the  com 
mand  of  General  Miles.  These  two  small  divisions  numbered 
but  six  thousand  men. 

The  first  Confederate  attack  was  made  at  two  P.  M.  in  heavy 
force,  and  fell  upon  Miles'  division  on  the  right.  This  was 
speedily  repulsed.  A  second  and  more  vigorous  assault  fol 
lowed  at  a  brief  interval  and  was  likewise  repulsed,  some  of 
the  enemy  falling  within  a  few  yards  of  the  intrenchments.  It 
should  be  here  observed  that  the  line  of  breastworks  at 
Beams'  Station  had  been  constructed  by  another  corps  some 
time  before,  and  was  very  faultily  located — a  fact  that  made 
the  defence  difficult,  and  materially  contributed  to  the  disaster 
that  now  befell  Hancock. 

The  repulse  of  the  enemy  in  the  previous  charges  had  been 
so  severe,  and  attended  with  so  heavy  a  loss,  that  there  was 
hesitation  in  renewing  the  assault.  General  A.  P.  Hill,  who 
commanded  the  Confederate  corps  on  the  ground,  was,  how 
ever,  resolved  to  carry  the  position,  and  he  ordered  the  divi 
sion  of  Heth  to  do  so  at  all  hazards.  To  cover  this  attack 
the  Confederates  concentrated  a  powerful  artillery  fire  on  the 
position,  and,  from  the  faulty  location  of  the  breastwork,  it 
took  Hancock's  line  in  reverse,  considerably  demoralizing  his 
troops.  The  bombardment  was  promptly  followed  by  the 
advance  of  a  storming  column,  which,  by  an  impetuous 
rush,  succeeded  in  breaking  through  Miles'  line.  Most  of  the 
command  gave  way  in  confusion,  and  it  was  found  impossible 
to  repair  the  break,  for  the  only  reserve  present  was  a  brigade 
of  Gibbon's  division  under  Colonel  Bugg,  and  this  could 
neither  be  made  to  go  forward  nor  to  fire.*  The  Confederates 
then  sprang  upon  the  artillery,  and  the  batteries  of  McKnight, 
Perrin,  and  Sleeper  had  to  be  surrendered,  after  being  bril 
liantly  served. 

On  the  occurrence  of  this  disaster,  General  Hancock  ordered 

*  Hancock :  Report  of  Reams'  Station. 


THE  SIEGE  OF  PETERSBURG.  537 

forward  the  division  of  Gibbon  to  retake  the  position  and 
guns.  The  order  was  responded  to  very  feebly  by  the  troops, 
who  fell  back  to  their  breastwork  after  receiving  a  slight  fire. 
By  the  loss  of  this  part  of  the  line,  the  remainder  of  Gibbon's 
division  was  exposed  to  an  attack  in  flank  and  rear :  so  that 
the  troops  were  compelled  to  occupy  the  reverse  side  of  the 
line  of  intrenchments.  The  outlook  was  certainly  very  criti 
cal,  and  but  for  the  obstinate  bravery  of  Miles'  division,  and 
the  fine  behavior  of  that  ofiicer  himself,  it  had  been  very  ill 
for  the  Union  force.  Miles,  however,  succeeded  in  rallying  a 
portion  of  the  Sixty-first  New  York,  and  forming  it  at  right 
angles  to  the  breastwork,  arrested  the  progress  of  the  Con 
federates,  retook  McKnight's  guns,  and  recovered  a  consider 
able  part  of  the  lost  line.  The  behavior  of  most  of  the  other 
troops  was  despicable. 

The  enemy's  dismounted  cavalry  now  made  an  attack 
against  the  left.  Though  not  executed  with  much  vigor,  it 
was  resisted  with  still  less  by  Gibbon's  division,  which  was 
driven  from  its  breastworks.  The  Confederates,  elated  at 
their  easy  success,  pressed  on  with  loud  cheers,  when  they 
were  met  by  a  heavy  flank  fire  from  the  dismounted  Union 
cavalry,  that,  occupying  the  extreme  left,  behaved  in  a  man 
ner  that  contrasted  more  than  favorably  with  the  conduct  of 
most  of  the  infantry.  This  summarily  checked  their  advance. 
When,  however,  the  troopers  found  themselves  a  second  time 
assailed,  and  now  by  infantry,  they  were  unable  to  maintain 
their  position,  and  were,  therefore,  retired  to  a  new  line  in 
the  rear,  where  the  troops  had  been  rallied. 

It  is  wonderful,  and  indeed  incomprehensible,  that  the  com 
manding  general,  informed  as  he  was  of  Hancock's  situation, 
should  not  have  taken  prompt  measures  for  his  relief.  The 
distance  from  Beams'  Station  to  Warren's  position  was  but 
four  miles  by  a  broad,  open  road,  with  a  telegraph  line  be 
tween  the  two.  Yet  the  re-enforcements  forwarded  to  Han 
cock — to  wit,  Mott's  division  of  his  own  corps  and  Wilcox's 
division  of  the  Ninth  corps — were  ordered  to  take  up  theii 
march  by  the  plankroad,  the  distance  by  which  was  above 


538  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OP  THE  POTOMAC. 

double  that  of  the  direct  and  open  route  along  the  railroad. 
Several  circumstances  occurred  to  add  additional  delay  to  the 
arrival  of  these  troops ;  but  it  is  certain  that  in  any  event  they 
would  not  have  reached  Hancock  in  time  to  be  of  service.* 

Thus  affairs  stood  when  night  fell,  and  Hancock  then  with 
drew  from  Beams'  Station.  It  afterwards  proved  that  the 
Confederates  abandoned  the  field  about  the  same  hour. 
Hancock's  loss  in  this  action  was  twenty-four  hundred  killed, 
wounded,  and  missing,  out  of  his  small  command  of  eight 
thousand  infantry  and  cavalry.  Of  this  number,  seventeen 
hundred  were  prisoners.  The  loss  on  the  part  of  the  Con 
federates  is  known  to  have  been  also  very  severe ;  but  the 
precise  number  is  unknown.t 

*  The  circumstances  above  referred  to  as  causing  delay  are  thus  detailed  by 
Hancock :  As  soon  as  I  knew  that  Wilcox's  division  had  been  ordered  down 
the  plankroad,  I  dispatched  a  staff-officer  to  conduct  it  up.  About  5  o'clock  a 
staff-officer  from  General  Mott  reported  the  arrival  of  seventeen  hundred  men 
of  Mott's  division  at  the  forks  of  the  road  where  the  Reams'  Station  road  leaves 
the  plankroad.  These  troops  would  have  been  immediately  ordered  up  ;  but 
the  staff-officer  stated  that  before  he  could  possibly  get  back  with  the  order 
Wilcox's  division  would  have  passed,  so  that  nothing  would  be  gained.  Orders, 
therefore,  were  given  to  Colonel  McAllister,  commanding  the  force  of  Mott's 
division,  to  hold  well  down  the  plankroad,  in  anticipation  of  any  attempt  of  the 
enemy's  cavalry  to  pass  to  our  rear.  An  order  was  also  sent  to  him  to  arrest 
all  stragglers  and  form  them  into  regiments.  This  order,  it  appears,  was  handed 
by  the  orderly  bearing  it  to  General  Wilcox,  who,  not  observing  the  address  to 
Colonel  McAllister,  opened  the  order,  and  thinking  it  addressed  to  him,  de 
ployed  a  part  of  his  division  to  arrest  and  form  the  stragglers  from  tlie  battle 
field.  How  much  delay  was  caused  by  this  error  is  not  known  ;  but  it  is  known 
that  the  division,  in  any  event,  would  not  have  arrived  in  time  to  be  of  service." 
— Report  of  Reams'  Station. 

f  Authority  for  some  of  the  statements  in  the  above  account  of  the  action 
at  Reams'  Station,  is  derived  from  a  letter  from  General  Hancock  to  the  writer, 
detailing  the  substance  of  a  conversation  had  by  that  officer  with  the  Confed 
erate  General  Heth,  who  commanded  a  division  in  the  battle.  I  extract  the 
following :  "  Heth  would  not  say  positively  how  many  troops  they  had  at 
Reams'  Station,  but  acknowledges  to  a  very  heavy  force  of  infantry  and  caval 
ry.  He  was  surprised  at  learning  the  smallness  of  our  force.  After  they  had 
been  repulsed  in  the  third  charge  upon  our  works,  General  Hill  sent  for  Heth 
and  told  him  that  he  must  carry  the  position,  which  they  certainly  did  very 
handsomely  by  a  fourth  assault.  He  admits  their  losses  to  have  been  very 
severe  in  killed  and  wounded." 


THE  SIEGE  OF  PETERSBURG. 


MOVEMENT  BY  THE  LEFT. — The  hold  gained  by  Warren  on 
the  Weldon  Railroad  was  permanently  retained,  and  a  line  of 
redoubts  formed  connecting  his  position  with  the  old  left  of 
the  army,  on  the  Jerusalem  plankroad.  No  further  move 
ment  of  consequence,  beyond  reconnoissances,  was  made  till 
the  end  of  September,  when  General  Grant,  being  resolved 
to  push  operations  on  Butler's  front,  north  of  the  James 
Eiver,  directed  a  demonstration  to  be  made  on  the  left,  with 
the  view  of  preventing  the  transfer  of  re-enforcements  to  the 
troops  opposed  to  Butler.*  For  this  purpose  General  War 
ren,  with  two  divisions  of  the  Fifth  Corps,  and  General  Parke, 
with  two  divisions  of  the  Ninth,  moved  from  the  left  towards 
Poplar  Spring  Church  and  Peeble's  Farm.  Gregg's  division 
of  cavalry,  at  the  same  time,  moved  further  to  the  left  and 
rear.  One  of  Warren's  divisions,  under  General  Griffin, 
found  the  Confederates  intrenched  on  Peeble's  Farm,  and  at 
tacking,  carried  a  redoubt  and  a  line  of  rifle-pits,  taking  one 
gun  and  about  a  hundred  prisoners.  At  the  same  time  his 
other  division,  under  General  Ayres,  carried  a  small  work  on 
the  Squirrel  Level  road.  In  the  afternoon,  Parke,  moving  on 
Warren's  left,  towards  the  Boydton  road,  was  fiercely  assailed, 
and  forced  back  in  disorder.  Griffin's  division,  however, 
came  to  his  support,  and  the  enemy  was  then  checked  and 
repulsed. 

Early  next  morning,  Gregg  met  the  enemy's  cavalry  and 
forced  it  back.  At  the  same  time  Mott's  division  of  Han 
cock's  corps  was  withdrawn  from  the  lines  and  sent  to 
re-enforce  Parke ;  but  it  did  not  reach  the  ground  in  time  to 
be  of  service.  During  the  afternoon  Gregg  was  heavily 
attacked  on  the  Duncan  road,  where  he  was  guarding  the  left 
and  rear ;  but  repulsed  the  enemy,  with  considerable  loss. 

The  2d  of  October  the  whole  force  advanced,  but  found  the 
enemy  had  withdrawn  to  his  main  intrenchments.  A  position 
was  then  taken  up,  and  the  necessary  works  laid  out  to  extend 
the  Federal  intrenched  line  to  the  position  gained,  t  The  loss 
in  this  action  was  above  twenty-five  hundred. 

*  Meade :  Report  of  Campaign  of  1864.  f  Meade :  Report  of  Operations. 


540  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

During  these  occurrences  on  the  extreme  left,  General  But 
ler  had  been  operating  with  the  Army  of  the  James  against 
the  fortifications  of  Richmond.  Crossing,  on  the  night  of  the 
8th  of  September,  to  the  north  side  of  the  James  River,  with 
the  corps  of  Birney  and  Ord,  Butler  next  morning  advanced 
and  carried  the  very  strong  fortifications  and  intrenchments 
below  Chapin's  farm,  known  as  Fort  Harrison,  capturing  fif 
teen  pieces  of  artillery  and  the  New  Market  road,  with  the 
works  defending  it.*  This  success  was  followed  up  by  an  as 
sault  upon  Fort  Gilrner,  immediately  in  front  of  the  Chapin's 
farm  fortifications,  in  which  the  assailants  were  repulsed,  with 
a  loss  of  about  three  hundred  men.  The  position  being  one 
very  menacing  to  Richmond,  General  Butler  made  dispositions 
to  hold  it  permanently.  The  Confederates  endeavored,  in 
several  determined  assaults,  to  dislodge  him ;  but  he  was 
able  to  repulse  these  attacks,  and  make  the  enemy  pay  dearly 
therefor. 

TUENING  MOVEMENT  AGAINST  PETEESBUEG. — It  was  now  ap 
proaching  the  season  when,  practicable  roads  and  weather 
being  no  longer  to  be  counted  upon,  active  operations  on  a 
large  scale  must  necessarily  be  suspended.  Before  settling 
down  to  winter-quarters,  however,  General  Grant  deter 
mined  to  strike  one  vigorous  blow  for  the  capture  of  Peters 
burg.  The  plan  was  to  find  the  extreme  right  of  the  enemy's 
intrenched  line,  and  by  turning  it,  march  upon  and  lay  hold 
of  the  Southside  Railroad,  which  was  Lee's  principal  commu 
nication.  The  expeditionary  force  consisted  of  the  major 
part  of  the  three  corps  of  the  army,  leaving  behind  from  each 
only  a  sufficient  force  to  hold  the  lines  in  front  of  Petersburg. 

At  this  period  the  left  flank  of  the  Union  line  rested  at  a 
point  about  two  miles  west  of  the  Weldon  Railroad ;  three 
miles  west  of  this  point  one  strikes  the  Boydton  plankroad, 
which  runs  northeastward  into  Petersburg.  This  road,  since 
the  loss  of  the  Weldon  Railroad,  had  assumed  such  import- 

*  Grant :  Report  of  Operations. 


THE  SIEGE  OF  PETERSBURG.  54] 

ance  to  Lee  that  lie  had  prolonged  the  right  of  his  intrenched 
line,  covering  that  road  for  some  distance  below  the  point 
where  it  crosses  Hatcher's  Bun.  These  defences  protected, 
also,  the  Southside  Railroad,  which  at  this  point  runs  parallel 
with  the  Boydton  plankroad,  and  two  miles  distant  there 
from. 

In  the  assignment  of  duty  to  the  respective  corps,  the  Ninth 
Corps,  supported  by  that  of  Warren,  was  to  attack  vigorously 
the  extreme  right  of  the  enemy's  intrenched  line,  while  Han 
cock  should  cross  to  the  west  side  of  Hatcher's  Run,  by  a  swing 
ing  movement,  gain  the  Boydton  plankroad  and  advance  to 
seize  the  Southside  Railroad.  The  execution  of  this  plan  was 
begun  early  on  the  morning  of  the  27th.  Proceeding  westward 
two  or  three  miles,  the  Ninth  and  Fifth  corps,  at  nine  A.  M., 
struck  the  right  of  the  Confederate  intrenched  line,  which  was 
found  to  rest  on  the  east  bank  of  Hatcher's  Run.  The  Ninth 
Corps,  under  General  Parke,  was  on  the  right,  and  Warren's 
corps  on  the  left.  If  Parke  should  carry  the  position,  he  was 
to  follow  up  the  enemy  closely,  turning  towards  the  right. 
Warren  was  to  support  the  attack  in  case  of  success ;  but  if  the 
Ninth  Corps  should  fail  to  break  the  enemy's  line,  he  was  to 
cross  Hatcher's  Run  and  endeavor  to  turn  the  enemy's  right, 
by  recrossing  at  the  first  practicable  point  above  the  Boydton 
plankroad.  It  was  very  soon  found  impracticable  to  force  the 
enemy's  position  by  a  direct  attack,  and  Warren  then  set  on  foot 
the  turning  movement;  but  before  further  following  events 
here,  it  is  necessary  to  detail  the  operations  of  the  detached 
column  of  Hancock,  whose  part  in  the  plan  of  action  has  been 
above  indicated. 

Hancock  marched  by  the  Yaughan  road,  which  runs  west 
ward  a  considerable  distance  south  of  the  line  on  which 
Parke  and  Warren  were  acting.  Having  forced  the  crossing 
of  Hatcher's  Run,  disputed  by  a  small  body  of  the  enemy  on 
its  west  bank,  he  advanced  northwestward,  by  the  way  of 
Dabney's  Mill,  and  gained  the  Boydton  plankroad.  Thence 
he  was  to  proceed  to  the  crossing  at  White  Oak  bridge  two 
miles  above,  and  after  a  further  march  of  four  miles  strike  the 


542  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

Southside  Eailroad  in  rear  of  the  enemy's  extreme  right. 
Hancock's  left  was  covered  by  Gregg's  cavalry  division.  The 
crossing  of  Hatcher's  Bun  at  Burgess's  Mill  was  found  to  be 
observed  by  merely  a  small  force  of  the  enemy,  and  wishing 
to  mask  his  march,  he  was  proceeding  to  drive  it  across  the 
run,  when,  at  one  P.  M.,  he  received  orders  from  General  Meade 
to  halt  on  the  Boydton  plankroad — an  order  prompted  by  the 
want  of  success  attending  General  Parke's  direct  attack. 

It  has  been  seen  that,  on  the  failure  of  the  Ninth  Corps  to 
force  the  enemy's  line  in  its  front,  "Warren  set  on  foot  a  turn 
ing  movement.  That  officer  was  directed  to  send  one  of  his 
divisions  across  Hatcher's  Bun,  place  its  right  flank  on  the  run, 
and  then  move  up  its  course.  It  was  supposed  this  measure 
would  serve  the  double  purpose  of  supporting  Hancock's 
right  flank  and  turning  the  position  in  front  of  the  rest  of  War 
ren's  corps  and  of  the  Ninth  Corps.  When,  by  a  flank  attack, 
the  force  in  front  of  these  corps  should  be  forced  to  abandon 
its  position,  they  were  also  to  cross  to  the  west  side  ol 
Hatcher's  Bun.  The  division  assigned  by  Warren  to  this 
duty  was  Crawford's,  strengthened  by  one  brigade  of  Ayres'. 
Crawford  crossed  Hatcher's  Bun  at  Armstrong's  Mill,  about 
noon,  and  proceeded  up  the  stream  in  the  manner  indicated. 
It  will  now  be  understood  that  the  order  to  Hancock  to  halt 
on  the  Boydton  plankroad  was  prompted  by  the  desire  that 
Crawford  should  move  up  to  his  support,  and  open  the  way 
for  the  forces  to  the  same ;  for  Hancock's  position  at  Bur 
gess's  Mill,  on  the  Boydton  plankroad,  isolated  him  by  five  or 
six  miles  and  by  Hatcher's  Bun  from  Warren  and  Parke,  and 
raised  fears  as  to  his  safety.  Circumstances  now  to  be  de 
tailed,  however,  prevented  the  junction  of  these  forces,  and 
finally  ended  prematurely  an  expedition  from  which  the 
largest  results  had  been  hoped. 

Crawford's  march  up  the  west  bank  of  Hatcher's  Bun 
proved  to  be  one  of  great  difficulty,  the  country  being  densely 
wooded  and  nearly  impracticable.  Great  numbers  of  the 
men  became  lost — in  fact,  whole  regiments  losing  all  idea  of 
where  to  find  the  rest  of  the  division.  After  two  or  three 


THE  SIEGE  OF  PETERSBURG.  543 

hours  of  toilsome  effort,  he  had  advanced  so  far  tip  the  Eun 
as  to  be  directly  on  the  right  flank  of  the  intrenched  line 
opposed  to  the  rest  of  the  Fifth  Corps  and  Ninth  Corps. 
This  line  was,  however,  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  stream, 
and  before  crossing  to  assail  the  enemy,  General  Warren  or 
dered  cessation  of  operations,  until  he  should  consult  with 
General  Meade,  for  the  country  proved  to  be  entirely  different 
from  the  representations  of  the  imperfect  map.  From  the 
position  where  Crawford  lay  on  the  west  side  of  Hatcher's 
Eun,  to  that  held  by  Hancock  up  this  stream,  at  Burgess's 
Mill,  the  distance  was  not  above  a  mile ;  but,  owing  to  the 
difficult  nature  of  the  country,  it  was  long  before  these  re 
spective  forces  found  out  the  location  of  each  other,  and  in 
the  mean  time  affairs  culminated  by  an  attack  of  the  Confed 
erates  on  Hancock. 

Hancock,  on  being  instructed  to  halt  at  Burgess's  Mill,  was 
also  informed  that  Crawford's  division  was  feeling  its  way 
up  the  west  bank  of  the  Kun,  and  he  was  desired  to  assist 
in  making  the  connection  by  extending  his  right.  Accord 
ingly,  General  Egan  (then  commanding  Gibbon's  division  of 
Hancock's  corps),  deployed  two  of  his  brigades  to  the  right  of 
the  Boydton  plankroad,  and  subsequently  deployed  two  regi 
ments  as  far  as  they  would  reach  to  the  right.  It  was  at 
one  time  reported  that  the  connection  with  Crawford  was 
made ;  but  this  report  was  erroneous,  and  it  was  afterwards 
found  that  Crawford  was  full  three-fourths  of  a  mile  from 
Hancock's  right. 

"While  these  occurrences  were  passing,  Lee  had  resolved  to 
assume  the  offensive,  and  fall  upon  the  force  west  of  Hatcher's 
Kun,  which,  isolated  from  that  on  the  east  side,  presented  a 
favorable  opportunity  for  a  blow.  The  force  detached  to 
execute  this  stroke  consisted  of  the  greater  part  of  Hill's 
corps.  It  appears  that  it  was  Lee's  original  design  to  cross 
Hatcher's  Eun  above  Burgess's  Mill,  and  attack  Hancock's  left 
flank  ;  but  as  that  officer  had  carried  the  bridge  over  the  mill- 
dam  before  the  Confederates  were  ready  for  their  movement, 
and  as  Lee  feared  the  Union  force  would  cross  and  take  the 


544  CAMPAIGNS  OF    THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

heights  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  stream,  the  Confederate 
commander  determined  to  move  across  Hatcher's  Bun  at  once, 
and  assail  Hancock's  right.  Hill  accordingly  crossed,  and, 
as  it  happened,  his  point  of  passage  brought  him  directly  in 
the  interval  between  Hancock  and  Crawford.  But  of  this 
circumstance  he  was  not  at  all  aware,  owing  to  the  densely 
wooded  character  of  the  country.  The  Confederate  infantry 
passed  close  to  Crawford's  skirmishers,  and  followed  a  path 
through  the  woods  until  they  were  near  Hancock's  position, 
when  they  deployed,  and,  about  four  P.  M.,  suddenly  fell  upon 
Mott's  division  of  Hancock's  corps.  Most  of  the  troops  were 
disposed  so  as  to  meet  an  attack  from  quite  a  different  direc 
tion,  so  that  the  outbuist  of  the  enemy  was  on  their  rear, 
and  the  presence  of  the  Confederates  was  first  announced  by 
volleys  of  musketry.  Peirce's  brigade  of  Mott's  division  at 
this  point  gave  way,  one  section  of  artillery  was  captured,  and 
affairs  appeared  as  critical  as  can  well  be  conceived.  Han 
cock  immediately  ordered  Egan  to  change  front,  and  move  to 
resist  the  adverse  mass  ;  but  that  officer,  with  true  soldierly  in 
stinct,  had  already  done  that  of  his  own  motion,  and  was 
moving  rapidly  to  attack  the  force  in  his  rear.  It  is  probable 
that  the  Confederates  did  not  precisely  comprehend  the  situa 
tion,  for  on  emerging  into  the  open  space  around  the  Boyd- 
ton  plankroad,  they  pushed  rapidly  across  that  road,  and, 
facing  southward,  commenced  firing. 

Egan  swept  down  upon  the  flanks  of  the  enemy  with 
Smythe's  and  Willett's  brigades  of  his  own  division,  and  Mc 
Allister's  brigade  of  Mott's  division,  while  De  Trobriand's  bri 
gade  and  Kerwin's  brigade  of  dismounted  cavalry  formed  on 
the  west  side  of  the  road,  and  advanced  at  the  same  time. 
The  forward  rush  of  Egan's  men  was  irresistible,  and  the 
Confederates  were  driven  from  the  field  with  the  loss  of  two 
colors,  and  nearly  a  thousand  prisoners.  The  two  captured 
guns  were  retaken.  The  enemy  made  for  the  woods  in  con 
fusion,  and  retired  by  the  same  route  on  which  they  had 
advanced.  Several  hundred  of  them  strayed  into  Crawford's 
line,  and  were  taken.  An  advance  of  the  force  under  that 


THE   SIEGE  OF  PETERSBURG.  545 

officer  at  this  time,  must  have  been  decisive  of  the  action, 
driving  the  enemy  into  Hatcher's  Kun.*  No  such  advance 
was  ordered,  however,  as  it  was  thought  that  Ayres'  divi 
sion  could  reach  Hancock  more  readily  than  Crawford,  there 
being  no  known  road  between  these  two.  Darkness  was 
so  near  at  hand  when  Ayres  moved  that  he  halted  for  the 
night  at  Armstrong's  Mill,  and  consequently  did  not  reach 

Hancock.f 

_^ * 

*  "  The  Confederate  General  Heth  stated  that  he  was  greatly  alarmed  after 
he  had  crossed  the  run  to  attack  us,  lest  Crawford  should  advance  upon  his 
left  flank,  and  said  that  had  Crawford  made  such  an  advance,  his  (Heth's)  com 
mand  must  have  been  driven  into  the  stream,  and  dispersed  or  captured."— 
Private  letter  from  General  Hancock. 

f  As  the  above  narrative  recounts  a  series  of  rather  complicated  events,  I 
add  the  following  from  the  official  report  of  General  Warren :  "  I  ordered 
Crawford  to  halt  his  line  and  get  in  good  order,  and  press  the  enemy  with  his 
skirmishers,  while  I  went  to  consult  Avith  General  Meade,  who,  I  supposed, 
was  with  General  Hancock.  When  near  the  place  of  the  latter,  I  was  told 
by  Major  Riddle  that  General  Meade  had  returned  to  Armstrong's  Mill,  and  I 
proceeded  to  that  point  as  rapidly  as  possible.  Soon  after  reaching  him  we 
learned  that  the  enemy  had  come  in  between  Hancock  and  Crawford,  and 
attacked  the  former  with  great  violence.  The  commanding  general  immedi 
ately  directed  me  to  send  General  Crawford  to  his  support,  but  he  assenting  to 
my  suggestion  that  General  Ayres  could  more  readily  be  got  there,  I  directed 
General  Ayres  to  move  at  once.  Darkness  was  so  near  at  hand  that  he  was 
halted  at  Armstrong's  Mill.  The  attack  on  General  Hancock  must  have 
occurred  while  I  was  near  General  Crawford,  and  yet  in  the  woods  the  sound 
of  musketry  did  not  reach  us.  There  was  besides  no  road  known  to  us 
leading  directly  to  General  Hancock,  and  that  same  woods,  for  two  or  three 
miles,  was  certain  to  prevent  his  arriving  for  any  contemplated  emergency. 
What  would  have  added  still  greater  delay  to  communicating  with  General 
Crawford  supervened  by  the  rebels  getting  in  on  the  road  by  which  we  com 
municated  between  him  and  myself.  The  enemy  became  so  bewildered  in 
these  woods  that  upwards  of  two  hundred  of  them  strayed  into  General  Craw- 
ford's  line  and  wore  captured.  Some  of  these  men,  before  being  taken,  cap 
tured  three  of  our  ambulances  a  mile  in  the  rear  of  General  Crawford.  Six  01 
them  captured  Captain  Cope,  of  my  staff;  but  finding  themselves  in  our  lines, 
gave  up  to  him,  and  he  brought  them  in.  Major  Bingham,  of  General  Han 
cock's  staff,  on  his  way  to  General  Crawford,  was  captured  by  them,  but  made 
his  escape  ;  and  three  officers  of  my  staff,  in  attempting  to  avoid  the  road  thus 
infested  by  the  enemy,  became  lost  in  coming  from  General  Crawford's  to  me, 
and  had  to  stay  out  all  night  in  the  woods." — Warren  :  Report  of  Operations 
at  Hatcher's  Run. 


546  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

Almost  simultaneously  with  this  attack,  the  Confederate 
cavalry  (five  brigades  under  Hampton)  assailed  Hancock's 
left  and  rear,  held  by  Gregg's  mounted  division.  This  force 
was  so  heavily  pressed,  that  Hancock  was  obliged  to  send 
General  Gregg  all  of  his  force  that  he  had  used  in  meeting 
the  attack  in  front.  The  action  was  kept  up  here  till  some 
time  after  dark.  Gregg  was  able  to  maintain  his  ground,  and 
the  Confederates  gained  no  success. 

Hancock's  loss  in  this  encounter  was  fifteen  hundred  men, 
which  was  less  than  that  of  the  enemy.  The  action  was 
highly  creditable  to  his  skill  and  the  good  conduct  of  the 
troops.  Aside  from  the  praise  due  to  Hancock  for  the  man 
ner  in  which  he  had  met  this  sudden  attack  on  his  iso 
lated  position,  nothing  can  be  said  in  favor  of  the  expedition 
as  a  whole.  It  resulted  in  total  failure,  which  was  partly  the 
result  of  misfortune,  but  mainly  the  result  of  faults  in  the 
original  plan.  The  experience  of  this  operation  furnished  a 
fair  test  of  what  may  be  expected  from  the  like  dispositions. 

After  the  repulse  Hancock  had  given  the  force  that  assailed 
him,  he  was  reluctant  to  leave  the  field  that  night ;  but  as  his 
troops  had  nearly  exhausted  their  ammunition,  and  as  there 
was  little  prospect  that  a  fresh  supply  or  re-enforcements 
could  reach  him  in  time  for  an  attack  in  the  morning,  the 
withdrawal  was  begun  at  ten  p.  M.*  This  appears  to  have 

*  "  Between  six  and  seven  P.  M.  I  received  a  dispatch  from  General  Hum 
phreys,  stating  that  Ayres  division  of  the  Fifth  Corps  had  been  ordered  to  my 
support,  but  had  halted  at  Armstrong's  Mill,  which  was  as  far  as  it  could  be  able 
to  get.  The  dispatch  also  authorized  me  to  withdraw  that  night  if  1  thought 
proper  ;  but  stated  that  if  I  could  attack  successfully  in  the  morning,  with  the 
aid  of  Ayres'  and  Crawford's  divisions,  the  major-general  commanding  desired 
me  to  do  so.  Though  these  re-enforcements  were  offered  to  me,  the  question 
of  their  getting  to  me  in  time,  and  of  getting  ammunition  up  in  time  to  have 
my  own  command  effective  in  the  morning,  was  left  for  me  to  decide ;  and  I 
understood  that,  if  the  principal  part  of  the  fighting  in  the  morning  would  be 
thrown  upon  these  re-enforcements,  it  was  not  desired  that  they  should  be 
ordered  up.  They  would  at  least  have  been  called  upon  to  do  the  fighting 
until  my  own  command  could  have  replenished  their  ammunition,  which  I  was 
quite  certain  would  not  be  in  time  to  resist  attack  at  an  early  hour  in  the 
morning.  "Reluctant  as  I  was  to  leave  the  field,  and  by  so  doing  lose  some  of 


THE  SIEGE  OF  PETERSBURG.  547 

been  a  very  fortunate  decision,  for  during  the  flight,  the  Con 
federates  massed  at  the  position  where  the  fighting  ceased 
fifteen  thousand  infantry  and  Hampton's  cavalry,  with  which 
they  had  intended  to  assail  Hancock  at  daylight  of  the  28th.* 
Next  morning  the  whole  force  returned  to  the  lines  before 
Petersburg. 

NEW  MOVEMENT  TO  THE  LEFT. — From  this  time  forward  the 
operations  in  front  of  Petersburg  and  Richmond,  until  the 
spring  campaign  of  1865,  were  mainly  confined  to  the  de 
fence  and  extension  of  the  lines,  which  were  pushed  westward 
as  far  as  Hatcher's  Eun.  The  extension  of  the  lines  was  pre 
ceded  by  a  new  movement  to  the  left,  which  was  very  similar, 
in  its  general  aspects  to  that  above  recounted.  This  opera 
tion  had  the  same  object  as  the  October  movement,  which 
was  to  turn  the  enemy's  right  and  seize  the  Southside  Rail 
road.  It  was  undertaken  by  the  Fifth  Corps,  the  Second 
Corps,  now  under  General  Humphreys,!  and  Gregg's  division  of 
cavalry,  and  its  execution  was  begun  on  the  5th  of  February. 
For  several  days  preceding  that  date,  a  heavy  bombardment 
was  kept  up  from  all  the  batteries  before  Petersburg,  for  the 
purpose  of  engaging  the  enemy's  attention.  The  designated 
troops  then  moved  out — Gregg's  division  taking  the  advance 
by  the  Jerusalem  plankroad  to  Reams'  Station,  and  masking 
the  movements  of  the  infantry.  The  plan  of  operations  con 
templated  that  the  Second  Corps  should  move  directly  on  the 
right  of  the  Confederate  intrenched  line  at  Hatcher's  Run, 
while  the  Fifth  marched  around  its  right. 

the  fruits  of  my  victory,  I  felt  compelled  to  order  a  withdrawal  rather  than 
risk  a  disaster  by  awaiting  attack  in  the  morning  only  partially  prepared." 
— Hancock :  Report  of  Operations  on  the  Boydton  Plankroad. 

*  "  The  Confederate  General  Heth  stated  to  me  that  they  remained  all 
eight  in  the  position  they  held  when  the  fighting  ceased  on  the  evening  of  the 
37th,  and  during  the  night  massed  fifteen  thousand  infantry,  and  Hampton's 
cavalry,  with  which  they  intended  to  have  advanced  upon  us  at  daylight  of 
the  28th." — Private  Letter  from  General  Hancock. 

f  General  Hancock  had  some  time  before  been  ordered  North  to  raise  the 
aew  First  Corps,  and  he  never  returned  to  his  old  command. 


548  CAMPAIGNS   OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

From  Beams'  Station  the  cavalry  moved  westward,  carried 
the  crossing  of  Eowanty  Creek  after  a  brisk  skirmish,  and 
marched  rapidly  on  Dinwiddie  Courthouse.  The  Fifth  Corps 
also  passed  to  the  west  side  of  the  creek  and  moved  on  its  ap 
pointed  route.  Meantime  Humphreys,  with  the  Second  and 
Third  divisions  of  the  Second  Corps,  marched  down  the 
Yaughan  road  to  where  it  crosses  Hatcher's  Run.  The  Con 
federate  intrenchments  on  the  opposite  bank  were  not  strongly 
manned ;  the  stream  was,  however,  so  obstructed  that  the 
cavalry  were  driven  back  in  an  attempt  to  cross  it ;  but  De 
Trobriand's  brigade  easily  carried  the  passage  with  a  skirmish 
line.  Before  reaching  Hatcher's  Eun,  Humphrey's  second 
division  under  General  Smythe  was  turned  abruptly  to  the 
right  on  a  path  leading  northeasterly  towards  Armstrong's 
Mill.  Advancing  about  three-fourths  of  a  mile,  the  enemy 
was  found  intrenched  in  strong  force,  and  nothing  was  done 
save  to  form  connection  between  the  two  divisions  of  the 
Second  Corps.  In  the  afternoon  the  Confederates  made  a 
furious  assault  on  Smythe's  position,  endeavoring  to  turn  his 
right  flank.  This  attempt  was  frustrated  by  the  firmness  of 
his  troops,  aided  by  McAllister's  brigade  of  Mott's  division, 
which  held  the  extreme  right.  These  maintained  their  ground 
with  the  utmost  stubbornness  and  repulsed  repeated  attacks 
that  were  continued  till  dark. 

Next  day  the  Fifth  Corps,  which  had  moved  up  the  west 
bank  of  Hatcher's  Eun,  was  brought  into  connection  with  the 
Second  Corps ;  and  Gregg's  cavalry,  which  had,  meanwhile, 
returned  from  Dinwiddie,  took  position  to  cover  the  left  of 
the  infantry.  Warren  then  threw  forward  his  left,  under 
Crawford,  towards  the  Boydton  plankroad.  That  officer 
advanced  as  far  as  Dabney's,  whence  he  drove  a  force  of  Con 
federates  under  General  Pegram.  But  the  Confederates, 
having  meanwhile  found  out  where  the  exposed  flank  of  this 
turning  column  lay,  put  in  practice  the  usual  and  always  suc 
cessful  tactics.  A  considerable  force  was  sent  by  a  detour  by 
the  Yaughan  road  to  take  Crawford's  division  in  the  rear,  and 
cut  off  his  retreat ;  while  at  the  same  time  they  opened  an 


THE  SIEGE  OF  PETERSBURG.  549 

attack  in  front.  This  flanking  force  first  fell  upon  Gregg's 
cavalry,  which  was  driven  back  to  Hatcher's  Run.  Such  a 
movement  on  the  part  of  the  enemy  had  been  anticipated, 
and  to  strengthen  Crawford,  Ayres'  division  was  ordered  up 
to  his  support.  But,  while  moving  in  column,  that  division 
was  attacked  and  driven  back,  and  then  Crawford's  division 
was  repulsed  in  confusion  and  with  heavy  loss.  Wheaton's 
division  of  the  Sixth  Corps,  which  had  also  been  sent 
forward  to  re-enforce  the  left,  only  arrived  in  time  to  take 
part  in  the  general  discomfiture.  The  line  of  retreat  was 
towards  the  position  held  by  the  Second  Corps  on  Hatcher's 
Bun.  The  Confederates,  elated  with  their  easy  victory, 
followed  up  vigorously  and  dashed  out  into  an  open  space  in 
front  of  that  corps.  Here,  however,  they  were  met  by  a 
sharp  fire  from  Humphrey's  troops,  who  had  intrenched 
themselves,  and  the  enemy  ceasing  the  attack,  hastily  retired. 
The  Union  loss  in  these  operations  was  about  two  thousand, 
of  which  the  larger  part  fell  on  Crawford's  division.  The 
Confederate  loss  is  stated  to  have  been  near  a  thousand,  and 
included  General  John  Pegram,  who  was  killed. 

The  action  of  the  6th  put  an  end  to  the  contemplated 
advance  towards  the  Southside  Railroad,  and  the  only  result 
gained  was  to  prolong  the  left  of  the  Union  line  westward  to 
Hatcher's  Run. 

WARREN'S  OPERATIONS  ON  THE  WELDON  ROAD. — After  the 
action  of  February,  winter  operations  were  confined  to  expe 
ditions  for  the  purpose  of  crippling  the  Confederate  lines  of 
supply.  Of  these  operations,  the  most  important  and  exten 
sive  was  that  made  by  General  Warren  for  the  complete 
destruction  of  the  Weldon  Railroad.  This  road,  though  the 
Union  lines  were  long  ago  planted  across  it,  was  still  of  con 
siderable  service  to  the  Confederates,  who  were  able  to  use  it 
up  to  within  a  few  miles  of  the  Union  position,  and  from  the 
point  of  stoppage  supplies  were  hauled  by  wagon.  Warren's 
expedition  was  to  completely  break  up  this  line  for  a  distance 
of  twenty- five  miles  southward.  The  force  consisted  of  the 


550  CAMPAIGNS  OF  TIIE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

Fifth  Corpsr  Mott's  division  of  the  Second  Corps,  and  Gregg's 
mounted  division.  Setting  out  on  the  7th  of  December,  with 
four  days'  rations,  the  troops  moved  southward,  and  that 
night  reached  Nottoway.  The  railroad- bridge  over  this 
stream  was  destroyed  by  General  Gregg.  Next  day  the 
march  was  renewed  to  Jewett's  Station,  to  which  point  the 
railroad-track  was  torn  up  from  the  Nottoway.  The  work  of 
destruction  was  resumed  early  on  the  morning  of  the  9th,  by 
forming  line  of  battle  on  the  railroad,  each  division  destroying 
all  on  its  front,  and  then  moving  to  the  left  alternately.  A  force 
of  the  enemy  was  encountered,  but  was  driven  by  Gregg 
across  the  Meherrin  River.  At  Hicksford,  on  the  south  side 
of  this  stream,  the  Confederates  had  three  forts  or  batteries, 
armed  with  artillery,  and  connected  by  rifle-pits,  and  manned 
by  a  considerable  body ;  so  that  it  was  impracticable  to  force 
a  crossing  at  that  point.  As  the  attempt  to  turn  the  position 
would  occasion  at  least  two  days  longer  time  than  that  for 
which  the  expedition  was  provisioned,  General  Warren  re 
solved  to  return.  The  railroad  destruction  was  carried  over 
a  distance  of  eighteen  or  twenty  mile-s,  and  was  very  com 
plete.  The  return  was  made  with  the  same  success.  The 
entire  distance  travelled  was  about  a  hundred  miles  in  the 
six  days.  The  loss  was  trivial. 

Subsequent  occurrences  during  this  period  call  for  no  special 
mention.  The  army  settled  itself  in  winter-quarters  to  await 
the  season  for  the  opening  of  the  spring  campaign. 


VII. 
OBSERVATIONS   ON   THE   SIEGE   OF   PETERSBURG. 

Kegarded  as  a  whole,  the  operations  I  have  brought  to 
gether  under  the  designation  of  the  Siege  of  Petersburg,  form 
a  fruitful  study.  From  the  extent  of  time  they  cover,  the 
energy  with  which  they  were  prosecuted,  and  the  skilful  man- 


THE  SIEGE  OF   PETERSBURG.  551 

ner  in  which  they  were  met  by  the  defending  army,  they  are 
remarkable  in  the  history  of  modern  warfare. 

The  characteristic  of  these  operations  is  the  progressive 
development  of  the  intrenched  Union  line  to  the  left.  Start 
ing  from  the  position  directly  east  of  Petersburg  taken  up 
by  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  on  its  first  arrival  in  June,  the 
lines  of  contravallation  were  gradually  extended  south  and 
southwest  of  the  town,  till  at  last  they  stretched  from  the 
Appomattox  to  Hatcher's  Him,  a  distance  of  fifteen  miles. 

This  extension  was  less  designed  than  accidental.  It  grew 
out  of  a  series  of  manoeuvres  by  the  left,  of  which  manoeuvres 
the  original  purpose  was  in  each  case  to  turn  the  right  of  the 
Confederate  system  of  defences,  and  lay  hold  of  the  South- 
side  Eailroad.  Criticism  should,  therefore*,  first  be  directed 
to  these  operations  regarded  in  the  light  of  their  original 
intent,  rather  than  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  incidental 
result  arising  therefrom. 

In  their  most  general  relations,  these  operations  are  to 
be  looked  upon  as  a  swinging  movement  of  the  left  pivot 
ing  on  the  right.  The  intrenched  lines  before  Petersburg- 
were  strongly  held,  and  on  these  as  a  point  d'appui,  it  was 
attempted  to  throw  the  left  against  and  around  the  Confed 
erate  right.  But  these  manoeuvres  had  several  characteristics 
that  invariably  robbed  them  of  the  success  hoped  from  them  : 
the  pivotal  force  was  generally  stronger  than  the  body  to 
which  was  assigned  the  turning  movement,  and  by  reducing  the 
garrison  of  his  defences  to  the  minimum,  Lee  was  able  to  ac 
cumulate  on  the  menaced  point  a  force  sufficient  to  meet,  and 
almost  always  to  repulse,  the  body  threatening  his  communi 
cations.  Moreover,  these  movements  were  invariably  made 
in  extended  lines,  which  had  the  inevitable  result  to  expose  a 
flank.  This  system  the  enemy  soon  learnt  so  well,  that  his 
invariable  plan  was  to  attack  the  flank  as  soon  as  it  was  ex 
posed.  The  region  of  country  southwest  of  Petersburg  in 
which  these  operations  were  conducted  was  highly  favorable 
to  the  Confederates,  being  densely  wooded,  intersected  with 
swamps,  and  possessing  few  roads ;  and  they  had  a  great  ad- 


552  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE   ARMY  OF  THE   POTOMAC. 

vantage  in  their  minute  knowledge  of  the  topography  of  the 
country,  which  was  nearly  terra  incognita  to  the  Union  com 
mander.  The  success  of  the  Confederate  tactics  was  won 
derful  ;  each  movement,  saving  that  to  the  Weldon  Railroad, 
which  was  conducted  on  a  different  principle,  ending  in  a 
check,  generally  accompanied  by  one  or  more  thousand  pris 
oners.  The  aggregate  of  captures  made  by  the  enemy  in  these 
successive  swoops  is  astonishing.  But  notwithstanding  the 
many  costly  proofs  received  of  the  fatality  attending  these 
unlimited  extensions,  the  type  of  operation  was  adhered  to 
with  a  constancy  only  accountable  on  the  supposition  that  the 
Union  commander  was  enamored  of  it. 

These  turning  movements,  though  in  each  foiled  as  regards 
their  primal  object,  always  resulted  in  a  further  prolongation 
of  the  intrenched  line  to  the  left.  It  remains  to  ask,  was  this 
extension  of  front  a  real  gain  ?  The  answer  will  depend  on 
whether  it  was  a  front  of  offence  or  defence.  If  of  the  latter, 
it  cannot  be  considered  a  gain,  for  in  the  part  assigned  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  it  was  nothing  if  not  offensive.  But 
beyond  the  Weldon  Eailroad  the  extension  to  the  left  carried 
Grant  no  nearer  Lee's  line  of  communications,  the  Southside 
Eailroad — in  fact,  rather  away  from  it,  for  Lee,  by  thrusting 
his  right  southward  along  the  Boydton  plankroad,  caused  the 
Union  intrenched  line  to  run  in  the  contrary  direction  to  that 
of  the  Southside  Eailroad.  It  may  indeed  be  said  that  the 
prolongation  of  the  Union  line  caused  Lee  to  extend  also, 
which  was,  pari  passu,  to  weaken  himself.  But  it  is  doubtful 
whether  the  advantage  in  this  process  was  to  the  Union  side. 
Lee  always  took  the  risk  of  holding  his  works  with  a  force 
greatly  inferior  to  that  his  antagonist  was  willing  to  employ  : 
so  that,  proportionately,  Grant  could  cut  loose  no  heavier  a 
turning  column  than  with  much  shorter  lines. 

In  the  object  General  Grant  had  in  view,  which  was  the 
capture  of  Petersburg,  there  would  appear  to  be,  theoretically, 
two  modes  in  which  this  might  have  been  accomplished.  The 
first  is  by  a  system  of  regular  approaches  from  the  points 
most  favorable.  These  were  the  site  of  Fort  Sedgwick,  and 


THE  SIEGE  OF  PETERSBURG.  553 

the  position  held  by  Burnside  at  the  time  of  the  mine  affair. 
From  these  points  two  saps  might  have  been  ran,  and  in  the 
course  of  a  month,  with  well-led  storming  columns,  there  is 
every  likelihood  that  the  Confederate  line  might  have  been 
carried. 

The  second  method  is  more  bold.  It  is  to  have  aban 
doned  for  a  time  the  attempt  to  hold  the  long  intrenched  lines 
and  the  connections  with  the  depot  at  City  Point,  and  moved 
out  the  whole  army  against  Lee's  railroad  communications. 
This  would  have  compelled  him  to  leave  his  defences  and 
fight  a  battle  in  the  open  field,  or  to  have  evacuated  Peters 
burg  and  Kichmond.  The  immediate  recovery  of  his  railroad 
communications  would  have  been  an  absolute  necessity  to 
Lee,  for  so  bad  was  the  conduct  of  the  Confederate  commis 
sariat  and  transport  system  that  he  was  never  able  to  accu 
mulate  even  one  day's  supplies  ahead — a  fact  well  known  to 
the  Union  commander.  This  line  of  action  would  have  been 
a  realization  of  that  cardinal  principle  in  American  warfare 
which  teaches  that  it  should  be  the  aim  of  the  general  on  the 
offensive  to  so  threaten  the  enemy's  vital  lines  as  to  compel 
him  to  fight  for  their  recovery.  General  Grant's  great  pre 
ponderance  in  numbers  would  have  made  the  contingency  of 
his  being  beaten  in  such  a  fight  a  very  remote  one.  It  is  true 
that  this  plan  would  not  have  been  without  hazard,  and  would 
have  demanded  proportionate  skill  and  vigor  in  its  execution  ; 
but  if  successful,  it  would  have  been  decisive. 

The  proposed  operation  would  have  resembled  the  manoeu 
vre  by  which  General  Sherman  compelled  the  evacuation  of 
Atlanta.  That,  also,  was  not  without  danger,  though  it  is  to 
be  remembered  that  Sherman's  opponent  was  infinitely  infe 
rior  to  the  commander  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia. 


554  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE   POTOMAC. 


VIII. 
SHERIDAN'S   OPERATIONS   IN   THE   VALLEY. 

Before  proceeding  to  recount  the  history  of  the  final  cam 
paign  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  it  will  be  necessary  to 
describe  briefly  the  summer  and  •  autumn  operations  in  the 
Shenandoah  Valley,  as  they  have  an  important  bearing  on  the 
events  that  are  to  follow. 

In  the  relative  situations  of  the  contending  armies  in  Vir 
ginia,  the  operations  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley  had  always 
exercised  a  powerful  influence  on  the  main  current  of  action. 
From  the  peculiar  geographical  relations  of  that  Valley  in  a 
military  point  of  view,  it  was  always  open  to  a  detached  force 
to  make  incursions  across  the  frontier  of  the  loyal  States, 
whether  for  the  purpose  of  plunder  or  of  a  diversion  in  favor 
of  the  main  Confederate  army,  by  a  menace  against  Wash 
ington.  At  the  same  time,  the  line  of  the  Blue  Ridge  per 
fectly  covered  its  communications  with  Richmond  and  Lee's 
army.  From  this  circumstance,  the  Confederates  had  always 
3een  able,  with  astonishingly  small  bodies  of  cavalry  and  in 
fantry,  to  retain  a  powerful  Federal  force  for  the  protection 
of  the  frontier  of  Maryland  and  Pennsylvania.  In  several 
critical  situations  the  Shenandoah  column  had,  by  vigorous 
demonstrations,  paralyzed  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  by  call 
ing  away  therefrom  so  considerable  a  force  as  to  compel  a 
surcease  of  operations  on  the  main  line. 

Relying  on  the  oft-proved  effect  of  such  threats,  Lee,  as 
soon  as  he  found  himself  under  beleaguerment  at  Petersburg, 
nad  detached  the  column  of  Early  to  menace  the  Federal 
capital.  It  has  already  been  seen  that  the  result  did  not 
correspond  with  his  wishes  ;  for  Grant,  parting  only  with  a 
sufficiency  of  force  to  protect  Washington,  continued  to  hold 
Lee  with  an  unrelaxiug  grip. 


THE  SIEGE  OF  PETERSBURG.  555 

But  although  the  direct  object  of  the  Confederate  menace 
had  failed,  it  nevertheless  met  so  considerable  a  measure  of 
success  that  even  after  Early  had  retired  to  the  Valley  of  the 
Shenandoah,  he  was  there  able  to  take  up  so  threatening  an 
attitude  that  it  was  found  impossible  to  return  the  Sixth  and 
Nineteenth  corps  to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  No  sooner 
was  this  attempted,  than  Early  was  again  across  the  border — 
his  cavalry  penetrating  Pennsylvania  as  far  as  the  town  of 
Chanibersburg,  which  they  laid  in  ashes.  Upon  this,  the 
Sixth  Corps,  which  had  been  retired  to  Washington  en 
route  for  the  James,  was  returned  to  Harper's  Ferry,  to 
unite  with  the  Nineteenth  Corps  and  the  Federal  forces  of 
West  Virginia  in  an  effort  to  clear  the  Valley  of  the  Shenan 
doah. 

The  distribution  of  the  Union  force  in  the  region  of  North 
ern  and  West  Virginia,  and  along  the  frontier  of  the  loyal 
States,  was  at  this  time  as  little  conformable  to  military  prin 
ciples  as  it  had  been  in  the  worst  period  of  1862.  Washington 
and  Baltimore,  and  the  country  adjacent,  formed  the  Depart 
ment  of  Washington  ;  Eastern  and  Central  Pennsylvania  and 
Northern  Maryland,  the  Department  of  the  Susquehanna ; 
Northwestern  Virginia  and  Western  Pennsylvania,  the  Depart 
ment  of  West  Virginia  ;  and  the  region  of  the  Shenandoah,  and 
eastward  to  the  Bull  Run  Mountains,  the  Middle  Department. 
These  several  military  bailiwicks  were  under  control  of  inde 
pendent  military  commanders,  whose  petty  jealousies  and 
want  of  harmony  of  action  enabled  the  Confederates,  with  a 
force  ridiculously  inferior,  to  pluck  at  any  time  cheap  laurels. 
Happily  the  conduct  of  the  war  was  now  under  one  military 
head,  so  that  General  Grant  could  at  will  end  this  costly  and 
disgraceful  policy.  The  events  of  July  showed .  the  urgent 
need  of  unity  of  command  in  Northern  Virginia,  and  the  lieu 
tenant-general,  in  August,  consolidated  these  four  depart 
ments  into  one,  named  the  Middle  Military  Division,  under 
General  Hunter.  That  officer,  however,  before  entering  on 
the  proposed  campaign,  expressed  a  willingness  to  be  re 
lieved,  and  General  P.  H.  Sheridan,  who  had  been  transferred 


556  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY    OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

from  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  to  the  command  of  the  forces 
in  the  field  under  Hunter,  was  appointed  in  his  stead.  The 
selection  was  a  fortunate  one.  An  excellent  strategist,  of 
sound  military  views,  and  a  wary,  enterprising,  and  aggres 
sive  temper,  General  Sheridan  was  of  all  others  the  man 
best  fitted  for  the  peculiar  command  intrusted  to  him.  To 
the  column  of  active  operation  under  his  command,  consist 
ing  of  the  Sixth  and  Nineteenth  corps  and  the  infantry  and 
cavalry  of  West  Virginia,  under  Generals  Crook  and  Averill, 
were  added  two  divisions  of  cavalry  from  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  under  Torbert  and  Wilson.  This  gave  him  an 
effective  in  the  field  of  forty  thousand  men,  whereof  ten 
thousand  consisted  of  excellent  cavalry — an  arm  for  the  use 
of  which  the  Shenandoah  region  affords  a  fine  field. 

General  Sheridan  was  appointed  to  the  command  on  the  7th 
of  August,  and  his  operations  during  that  month  and  the  fore 
part  of  September  were  mainly  confined  to  manoeuvres  hav 
ing  for  their  object  to  prevent  the  Confederates  from  gaining 
the  rich  harvests  of  the  Shenandoah  Valley.  But  after  once 
or  twice  driving  Early  southward  to  Strasburg,  he  each  time 
returned  on  his  path  towards  Harper's  Ferry.  General  Grant 
had  hesitated  in  allowing  Sheridan  to  take  a  real  initiative, 
as  defeat  would  lay  open  to  the  enemy  the  States  of  Maryland 
and  Pennsylvania  before  another  army  could  be  interposed  to 
check  him.  Finding,  however,  while  on  a  personal  visit  to 
General  Sheridan,  in  the  month  of  September,  that  that  officer 
expressed  great  confidence  of  success,  he  authorized  him  to 
attack. 

At  this  time  the  Confederate  force  held  the  west  bank  of 
Opequan  Creek,  covering  Winchester;  and  the  Union  force 
lay  in  front  of  Berryville,  twenty  miles  south  of  Harper's 
Ferry.  The  situation  of  the  opposing  armies  was  peculiar : 
each  threatened  the  communications  of  the  other,  and  either 
could  bring  on  a  battle  at  any  time. 

It  would  appear  that  General  Early  had  designed  assuming 
the  offensive;  for,  leaving  one  division  of  infantry  and  Fitz 
Hugh  Lee's  cavalry  to  cover  Winchester,  he  had  thrown  the 


THE  SIEGE  OF  PETERSBURG.  557 

bulk  of  his  army  well  forward  by  his  left  to  Bunker  Hill,  twelve 
miles  north  of  Winchester.  From  this  point  he,  on  the  18th, 
advanced  a  reconnoitring  force  as  far  as  Martinsburg,  twelve 
miles  further  to  the  north.  Sheridan,  whose  position  at  Berry- 
rille  was  twelve  miles  east  of  Winchester,  being  well  content 
with  his  antagonist's  manoeuvre,  advanced  towards  Winches 
ter  early  on  the  morning  of  the  19th,  expecting  to  catch  his 
opponent  inflagrante  delict o. 

Wilson's  cavalry  division,  having  the  advance  on  the  Win 
chester  and  Berryville  turnpike,  at  dawn  carried  the  Confed 
erate  intrenched  skirmish  line  on  the  west  bank  of  the  Ope- 
quan.  This  stream  runs  northward  at  a  distance  of  four  miles 
east  of  Winchester.  The  way  being  thus  opened,  the  infantry 
column,  the  Sixth  Corps  in  the  van,  crossed  at  the  ford  and 
took  position  within  two  miles  of  Winchester.  The  direction 
of  Sheridan's  advance  brought  his  attack  full  upon  Early 's 
isolated  right,  which,  but  for  a  vexatious  delay,  might  readily 
have  been  overwhelmed,  while  the  main  Confederate  force 
was  still  ten  miles  off  at  Bunker  Hill.  This  delay,  which 
consumed  two  hours  in  the  march  of  the  Nineteenth  Corps, 
was  caused  by  the  obstruction  of  the  Winchester  and  Berry 
ville  turnpike  by  the  wagon-trains  of  the  Sixth  Corps  and 
of  Wilson's  cavalry  division.  This  delay,  which  was  much 
regretted  by  Gen.  Emory,  enabled  Early  to  hurry  his  force 
southward  from  Bunker  Hill  in  time  to  meet  the  attack. 
Sheridan  formed  his  line  of  battle  with  the  Sixth  Corps  on 
the  left,  covered  on  that  flank  by  Wilson's  cavalry  division, 
the  Nineteenth  Corps  in  the  centre,  and  the  Kanawha  in 
fantry  on  the  right.  The  latter  flank  was  covered  by  Merritt's 
division  of  cavalry.  Averill's  division  of  cavalry,  which  had 
pressed  down  on  the  retreating  Confederates  from  the  direc 
tion  of  Bunker  Hill,  succeeded  in  closing  in  on  the  Union 
right.  This,  therefore,  brought  two  powerful  divisions  of 
horse  on  the  right  of  the  Federal  line,  which  had  a  develop 
ment  of  about  four  miles,  enveloping  Winchester  from  the 
north  and  east.  Eaiiy's  left  rested  on  a  series  of  detached 
and  fortified  hills  to  the  northwest  of  the  town.  It  is  due  tc 


558          CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

state  that  there  was  a  great  disparity  in  the  numbers  engaged 
— Early's  force  consisting  of  eight  thousand  five  hundred  mus 
kets  and  three  thousand  sabres,*  while  Sheridan's  strength 
was  thrice  that  of  the  aggregate  Confederate  force. 

Sheridan's  preponderance  in  horse  enabled  him  to  extend 
far  beyond  and  overlap  the  Confederate  left,  and  when,  after 
several  hours  of  indecisive  fighting  between  the  infantry,  a 
general  advance  was,  at  four  P.  M.,  made  by  the  whole  line, 
the  cavalry,  by  an  impetuous  charge,  carried  the  fortified 
heights :  the  Confederates,  pressed  heavily  in  front  by  the 
infantry,  and  on  the  right  by  "Wilson's  cavalry,  broke  in  con 
fusion,  retiring  from  the  field  and  through  Winchester,  with 
the  Union  forces  in  pursuit.  Night,  however,  prevented  Sher 
idan  from  following  up  the  victory,  among  the  trophies  of 
which  were  two  thousand  five  hundred  prisoners,  five  pieces 
of  artillery,  and  nine  battle-flags.  Among  the  Confederate 
officers  killed  were  Generals  Kodes  and  Godwin.  The  Union 
loss  was  also  severe,  and  included  that  intrepid  soldier,  Gen 
eral  D.  A.  Kussell  (commanding  a  division  of  the  Sixth  Corps), 
who  was  killed. 

After  his  defeat  at  Winchester,  Early  did  not  pause  in  his 
southward  retreat  till  he  reached  Fisher's  Hill,  near  Stras- 
burg,  thirty  miles  south  of  Winchester.  This  is  a  very  defen 
sible  position,  commanding  the  debouclie  of  the  narrow  Stras- 
burg  valley  between  the  north  fork  of  the  Shenandoah  Eiver 
and  the  North  Mountain.  On  these  obstacles  Early  rested 

*  The  authority  for  this  statement  of  the  Confederate  force,  is  a  letter  written 
by  General  Early  from  Havana,  and  published  in  December,  1865.  In  this 
letter  that  officer  says :  "  At  the  battle  of  Winchester,  or  Opequan,  as  it  is 
called  by  General  Grant,  my  effective  strength  was  about  eight  thousand  five 
hundred  muskets,  three  battalions  of  artillery,  and  less  than  three  thousand 
cavalry." 

The  Confederate  cavalry  of  the  Valley,  consisting  of  two  divisions  under  Fitz 
Hugh  Lee  and  Lomax,  was  at  this  time  in  a  miserable  condition,  materially 
and  morally.  "  Our  horses,"  says  a  letter  from  a  Confederate  officer  of  this 
force,  "  had  been  fed  on  nothing  but  hay  for  some  time,  and  were  quite  weak  ; 
and  want  of  discipline  had  greatly  demoralized  the  men." 


THE  SIEGE  OF  PETERSBURG.  551) 

his  flank.  lu  front  of  this  position  Sheridan  arrived  on  the 
morning  of  the  22d,  and  formed  his  force  for  a  direct  attack, 
while  he  sent  Torbert  with  two  divisions  of  cavalry  by  the 
parallel  Luray  valley,  to  gain  New  Market,  twenty  miles  in 
Early's  rear.  After  much  manoeuvring,  and  several  ineffectual 
efforts  to  force  the  position,  an  attack  of  cavalry  was  made 
from  the  right.  Under  cover  of  this  mask  a  corps  of  infantry 
was  moved  to  that  flank,  and  by  an  impetuous  assault  carried 
the  Confederate  left  resting  on  the  North  Mountain.  A  gen 
eral  attack  in  front  then  disrupted  Early's  whole  line,  and  the 
Confederates,  retired  in  great  disorder,  leaving  behind  sixteen 
pieces  of  artillery  and  several  hundred  prisoners. 

The  success  at  Fisher's  Hill  was  greatly  influenced  by  the 
fact  that  at  the  time  the  attack  was  made,  Early  was  about 
retiring  from  the  position,  owing  to  his  fears  of  an  irruption 
on  his  line  of  communications  by  the  Union  cavalry  column 
moving  through  Luray  valley.  This  fear  was,  however,  ground 
less  ;  for  this  powerful  body  was  held  in  check  all  day  by  a 
much  inferior  force  of  Confederate  cavalry  at  Milford.* 

Early's  retreat  was  not  stayed  until  he  reached  the  lower 
passes  of  the  Blue  Ridge,  whither  he  retired  with  a  loss  of 
half  his  army.  Sheridan,  after  pushing  the  pursuit  as  far  as 
Staunton,  and  operating  destructively  against  the  Virginia 
Central  Railroad,  returned  and  took  position  behind  Cedar 
Creek  near  Strasburg.  Previously  to  abandoning  the  country 

*  The  defence  at  this  point  was  made  by  a  small  division  of  Confederate 
cavalry  under  General  Wickl^m,  and  an  officer  of  that  command  thus  writes 
concerning  the  affair  of  the  22d : 

"  At  Milford,  with  such  fortifications  as  we  could  throw  up,  we  fought  all 
day  Thursday  (the  22d).  At  one  time  Torbert  flanked  us  with  three  regiments. 
We  did  not  allow  this  to  stampede  us  like  the  army  at  Fisher's  Hill :  but  Col 
onel  Mumford,  withdrawing  several  squadrons  from  the  centre  under  a  galling 
fire,  went  over  to  the  right,  and  by  resorting  to  a  little  strategy,  repulsed  the 
flanking  column  and  restored  our  lines.  At  night  Torbert  retired,  declaring 
that  our  position  was  impregnable.  Some  idea  can  be  formed  of  the  value  of 
this  victory  when  it  is  known  that,  had  we  run  off,  it  would  have  let  Torbert 
into  Newmarket  twelve  hours  before  Early  could  have  gotten  back  there  with 
his  army.  This  must  have  resulted  in  the  annihilation  of  the  latter  beyond  :\ 
possibility  of  a  doubt." 


560  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

south  of  Strasburg,  it  was  laid  waste  by  the  destruction  of  all 
barns,  grain,  forage,  farming  implements,  and  mills.  The 
desolation  of  the  Palatinate  by  Turenne  was  not  more  com 
plete.* 

On  the  withdrawal  of  Sheridan,  Early,  after  a  brief  respite, 
and  being  re-enforced  by  Kershaw's  division  of  infantry  and 
six  hundred  cavalry  from  Lee's  army,  again  marched  north 
ward  down  the  Yalley,  and  once  more  ensconced  himself  at 
Fisher's  Hill.  Sheridan  continued  to  hold  position  on  the 
north  bank  of  Cedar  Creek.  Nothing  more  important  than 
cavalry  combats,  mostly  favorable  to  the  Federal  arms,  took 
place,  until  the  19th  of  October,  when  Early  assumed  a  bold 
offensive  that  was  near  giving  him  a  victory  as  complete  as 
the  defeat  he  had  suffered. 

*  General  Sheridan's  dispatch  reciting  the  destruction  of  the  Shenandoah 
Valley  is  in  the  following  words:  "  In  moving  back  to  this  point,  the  whole  coun 
try,  from  the  Blue  Ridge  to  the  North  Mountain,  has  been  made  entirely  unten 
able  for  a  rebel  army.  I  have  destroyed  over  two  thousand  barns  filled  with 
wheat  and  hay  and  farming  implements ;  over  seventy  mills  filled  with  flour  and 
wheat ;  have  driven  in  front  of  the  army  over  four  thousand  head  of  stock,  and 
have  killed  and  issued  to  the  troops  not  less  than  three  thousand  sheep.  This 
destruction  embrace's  the  Luray  valley  and  the  Little  Fort  valley,  as  well  as  the 
main  valley."  This  dread  bulletin  recites  acts  some  of  which  are  indefensible. 
The  destruction  of  the  crops,  provision,  and  forage  was  allowable ;  for  this 
deprived  the  enemy  of  immediate  subsistence,  and  operated  to  the  end  to  in 
duce  him  to  surrender.  But  the  burning  of  the  mills  and  farming  implements 
cannot  be  justified,  for  that  was  to  inflict  vengeance  upon  the  country  for 
many  years  to  come.  It  may  indeed  be  said  that  the  desolation  of  the  Shenan 
doah  Valley  was  a  special  measure  designed  togyover  the  frontier  of  the  loyal 
States  from  invasion  ;  but  this,  though  plausible,  is  not  a  sufficient  reason. 
I  have  cited  above  the  destruction  of  the  Palatinate,  and  the  case  is  quite  in 
point,  both  in  respect  to  the  act  itself  and  the  verdict  history  will  pronounce 
thereon.  "When,"  says  a  legal  writer  of  the  highest  authority,  "the  French 
armies  desolated  with  fire  and  sword  the  Palatinate  in  1674,  and  again  in 
1689,  there  was  a  general  outcry  throughout  Europe  against  such  a  mode  of 
carrying  on  war ;  and  when  the  French  minister  Louvois  alleged  that  the 
object  in  view  was  to  cover  the  French  frontier  against  the  invasion  of  the 
enemy,  the  advantage  which  France  derived  from  the  act  was  universally  held 
to  be  inadequate  to  the  suffering  inflicted,  and  the  act  itself  to  be  therefore 
unjustifiable."— Twiss  :  Law  of  Nations,  vol.  i.,  p.  125.  See  also  Vattel,  L.  iii., 
c.  9,  §  166. 


THE  SIEGE  OF  PETERSBURG.  561 

At  this  time  the  Union  force  was  stationed  as  follows  :  the 
infantry  line  ran  along  the  east  bank  of  Cedar  Creek  behind 
intrenchments  drawn  on  rising  and  rolling  ground — Crook's 
(Eighth)  corps  on  the  left ;  Emory's  (Nineteenth)  in  the  cen 
tre,  and  the  Sixth  Corps,  for  the  time  under  Eicketts,  on  the 
right.  The  latter  corps  was  posted  somewhat  in  rear  and  in 
reserve.  The  cavalry  divisions  of  Custer  and  Merritt  guarded 
the  right  flank ;  that  of  Averill  (at  this  time  under  Powell) 
guarded  the  left,  and  picketed  the  whole  line  of  the  North  Fork 
of  the  Shenandoah  from  Cedar  Creek  to  Front  Boyal.  The 
army  was,  at  this  time,  temporarily  under  the  command  of 
General  Wright — Sheridan  being  absent  at  Washington. 

The  position  held  by  the  Union  force  was  too  formidable  to 
invite  open  attack,  and  Early's  only  opportunity  was  to  make 
a  surprise.  This  that  officer  now  determined  on,  and  its  exe 
cution  was  begun  during  the  night  of  the  18-19th  October. 
Soon  after  midnight,  Early,  having  made  his  dispositions  at 
Fisher's  Hill,  moved  forward  in  demonstrations  against  the 
Union  right,  whence  the  sounds  of  musketry  announced  a 
right  on  the  picket-line.  But  this  was  merely  a  feint — the  real 
attack  was  to  fall  on  the  left.  One  column  was  marched 
southeasterly  from  Strasburg,  a  short  distance  along  the  Ma- 
nassas  Gap  Eailroad,  so  as  to  pass  beyond  the  furthest  de 
velopment  of  the  Union  left  flank,  while  another  massed 
silently  behind  the  picket-line  for  a  direct  attack.  The  flank 
ing  column  then  turned  northerly  on  a  path  that  crosses  the 
North  Fork  of  the  Shenandoah,  by  a  ford  about  a  mile  to  the 
east  of  the  junction  of  Cedar  Creek  with  that  stream.  Before 
dawn  it  was  across  the  ford,  and  being  favored  by  a  heavy 
fog,  had  attained,  unperceived,  the  rear  of  the  left  flank  of  the 
Union  force,  formed  by  Crook's  corps.  This  position  gained, 
the  Confederates  closed  in  upon  and  captured  the  Union 
pickets,  and  rushed  into  the  camp — the  troops  awaking 
only  to  find  themselves  prisoners.  To  rally  the  men  in  their 
bewilderment  was  impossible,  and  Crook's  corps,  being  thor 
oughly  broken  up,  fled  in  disorder,  leaving  many  guns  in  the 
hands  of  the  enemy. 

86 


562          CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

As  soon  as  this  flank  attack  was  dey eloped,  Early,  with  his 
other  column,  emerged  from  behind  the  hills  west  of  Cedai 
Creek,  and  crossing  that  stream,  struck  directly  the  troops  on 
the  right  of  Crook.  This  served  to  complete  the  disaster,  and 
the  whole  Union  left  and  centre  became  a  confused  mass, 
against  which  the  Confederates  directed  the  captured  artillery 
(eighteen  guns),  while  the  flanking  force  swept  forward  to  the 
main  turnpike. 

Such  was  the  scene  on  which  the  light  of  day  dawned. 
The  only  force  not  yet  involved  in  the  enemy's  onset  was  the 
Sixth  Corps,  which  by  its  position  was  somewhat  in  rear. 
With  this  General  Eicketts  quickly  executed  a  change  of  front, 
throwing  it  forward  at  right* angles  to  its  former  position, 
and  firmly  withstood  the  enemy's  shock.  Its  chief  service 
was,  however,  to  cover  the  general  retreat  which  Wright  now 
ordered,  as  the  only  practicable  means  of  reuniting  his  force. 
This  was  executed  with  such  order  as  might  be  under  the 
circumstances,  and  as  the  enemy  pressed  the  left  most  vigor 
ously,  wedging  in  as  though  in  the  endeavor  to  cut  off  the 
Union  force  from  its  line  of  retreat  to  Winchester,  the  cavalry 
divisions  of  Merritt  and  Custer  were  transferred  to  that  flank. 
At  length,  when  Middletown,  the  first  village  north  of  Stras- 
burg  and  about  five  miles  from  that  place,  was  reached,  line 
of  battle  was  formed  and  a  stand  made  to  dispute  the  further 
advance  of  the  enemy.  But  it  was  obvious  that  there  was 
still  too  little  cohesion  in  the  mass,  and  as  the  Confederates 
threatened  to  overlap  the  left  flank,  the  Union  line  again  fell 
back,  and  the  enemy  gained  Middletown.  Now,  however,  the 
pursuit  began  to  lose  its  vigor,  and,  at  the  first  good  position 
between  Middletown  and  Newtown,  Wright  was  able  to  rally 
and  reform  the  troops,  form  a  compact  line,  and  prepare  either 
to  resist  further  attack  or  himself  resume  the  offensive. 

It  was  at  this  time,  about  half-past  ten  A.  M.,  that  General 
Sheridan  arrived  upon  the  field  from  Winchester,  where  he  had 
slept  the  previous  night.  Hearing  the  distant  sounds  of  battle 
Tolling  up  from  the  south,  Sheridan  rode  post  to  the  front, 
where  arriving,  his  electric  manner  had  on  the  troops  a  very 


THE  SIEGE  OF  PETERSBURG.  563 

inspiriting  effect.*  General  Wright  had  already  brought  order 
out  of  confusion  and  made  dispositions  for  attack.  These  were 
left  unchanged  by  Sheridan,  except  that  Ouster's  cavalry 
division  was  transferred  to  its  place  on  the  right  flank.  A 
counter-charge  was  begun  at  three  o'clock  in  the  afternoon. 
Notwithstanding  the  success  of  the  morning,  or  rather  by  rea 
son  of  that  success  conjoined  with  bad  discipline,  the  Confed 
erates  were  at  this  time  in  a  very  unfit  moral  condition  to  resist 
attack,  for  a  large  part  of  Early's  force,  in  the  intoxication  of 
success,  had  abandoned  their  colors  and  taken  to  plundering 
the  abandoned  Federal  camps. t  The  refluent  wave  was  as 
resistless  as  the  Confederate  surge  had  been ;  the  enemy  was 
driven  out  of  Middletown  and  beyond,  and  pressed  upon  back 
to  Cedar  Creek.  The  retreat  soon  became  a  rout,  in  which  the 
Confederates  abandoned  much  material.  The  Union  infantry 
halted  within  their  old  camps ;  but  the  cavalry,  forcing  the 
passage  of  Cedar  Creek,  hung  on  the  flanks  and  rear  of  the 
enemy  and  followed  beyond  Strasburg  till  night  put  an  end  to 
the  pursuit.  Early  succeeded  in  halting  his  force  for  the 
night  at  Fisher's  Hill,  and  next  morning  continued  his  retreat 
southward.  In  the  pursuit  all  the  captured  guns  were 


*  The  dramatic  incidents  attending  the  arrival  of  Sheridan  have  perhaps 
caused  General  Wright  to  receive  less  credit  than  he  really  deserves.  The 
disaster  was  over  by  the  time  Sheridan  arrived  ;  a  compact  line  of  battle  was 
formed,  and  Wright  was  on  the  point  of  opening  the  offensive.  Wright  certainly 
had  not  the  style  of  doing  things  possessed  by  Sheridan,  but  no  one  who  knows 
the  steady  qualities  of  that  officer's  mind  can  doubt  that  he  would  have  himself 
retrieved  whatever  his  troops  had  lost  of  honor. 

f  General  Early,  in  an  address  made  to  his  army  subsequent  to  this  action, 
held  the  following  language :  "  Had  you  remained  steadfast  to  your  duty  and 
your  colors,  the  victory  would  have  been  one  of  the  most  brilliant  and  decisive 
of  the  war.  But  many  of  you,  including  some  commissioned  officers,  yielding 
to  a  disgraceful  propensity  for  plunder,  deserted  your  colors  to  appropriate  to 
yourselves  the  abandoned  property  of  the  enemy;  and  subsequently,  those 
who  had  previously  remained  at  their  posts,  seeing  their  ranks  thinned  by  the 
absence  of  the  plunderers,  when  the  enemy,  late  in  the  afternoon,  with  hia 
shattered  columns,  made  but  a  feeble  effort  to  retrieve  the  fortunes  of  the  day 
yielded  to  a  needless  panic,  and  fled  the  field  in  confusion,  thereby  converting 
a  splendid  victory  into  a  disaster." 


564  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

retaken  and  twenty-three  in  addition.  The  captures  included, 
besides,  near  fifteen  hundred  prisoners,  which  fully  made  up 
for  those  lost  by  the  Union  force  in  the  morning. 

With  this  defeat  of  Early,  all  operations  of  moment  in  the 
Valley  of  the  Shenandoah  forever  ended.  The  complete 
destruction  of  forage  in  this  region  rendered  it  impossible  for 
the  Confederates  to  sustain  there  any  considerable  body  oi 
cavalry.  The  prestige  won  by  Sheridan  enabled  General 
Grant  to  recall  the  Sixth  Corps  to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
and  to  take  away  two  of  Sheridan's  mounted  divisions.  Soon 
afterwards  most  of  Early's  infantry  returned  to  rejoin  the 
main  Confederate  force  at  Petersburg. 

In  this  stirring  campaign  of  two  months'  duration,  Sheri 
dan's  operations,  characterized  by  great  vigor,  were  crowned 
with  complete  success.  It  is  indeed  to  be  borne  in  mind  that 
the  credit  awarded  to  warlike  exploits  is  to  be  measured  by 
the  obstacles  overcome,  and  that  Sheridan  certainly  had  a 
very  great  preponderance  of  force.  Nevertheless,  the  clean 
ness  with  which  the  work  was  done,  the  energy  of  the  execu 
tion,  the  completeness  of  the  solution  of  a  long-time  vexatious 
problem,  are  all  very  admirable.  Sheridan's  operations  were 
characterized  not  so  much,  as  has  been  supposed,  by  any 
originality  of  method,  as  by  a  just  appreciation  of  the  proper 
manner  of  combining  the  two  arms  of  infantry  and  cavalry. 
He  constantly  used  his  powerful  body  of  horse,  which  under 
his  disciplined  hand  attained  a  high  degree  of  perfection,  as 
an  impenetrable  mask  behind  which  he  screened  the  execution 
of  manoeuvres  of  infantry  columns  hurled  with  a  weighty  mo 
mentum  on  one  of  the  enemy's  flanks. 


THE  FINAL  CAMPAIGN. 


XTTT. 

THE   FINAL    CAMPAIGN 

MARCH— APRIL  9,  1865. 


I. 

THE  CIRCLE  OF  THE  HUNT. 

THE  time  has  now  come  when  it  is  no  longer  possible  to 
consider  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  apart  from  that  colossal 
combination  of  force  that,  pressing  from  all  sides  on  the 
structure  of  the  Confederacy,  finally  bore  it  to  the  ground. 

That  this  army  cannot  rightly  be  viewed  independently  of 
the  co-operative  forces  throughout  the  general  theatre  of  war,  is 
made  apparent  by  the  single  fact  that  during  the  winter  months 
succeeding  the  close  of  the  campaign  of  1864,  so  far  from  its 
being  any  longer  a  desirable  object  to  capture  Petersburg  and 
Richmond,  Grant's  efforts  were  mainly  directed  to  restraining 
the  Confederates  from  voluntarily  giving  up  to  him  those 
strongholds  that,  having  been  for  four  years  the  prize  so  eagerly 
coveted,  were  now  the  possession  most  of  all  to  be  shunned. 
How  this  was  and  must  have  been  so,  will  become  manifest 
from  a  brief  glance  at  the  relations  which  the  gigantic  vigor 
of  Sherman  had  established  between  his  own  army  and  the 
opposing  forces  in  Virginia. 

The  communications  on  which  Lee's  army  depended,  not 
only  for  the  maintenance  of  its  interior  lines  with  the  remain 
ing  forces  of  the  Confederacy  in  the  Southwest,  but  for  its 
supplies  of  food  and  ammunition,  ran  through  the  Carolinas 


566  CAMPAIGNS  OF   THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

and  the  seaboard  States  and  radiated  over  the  great  produc 
tive  territory  of  the  central  zone. 

By  the  capture  of  Atlanta,  gained  in  the  midsummer  of 
1864,  Sherman  grasped  one  of  the  main  ganglia  of  the  South 
ern  railroad  system.  This  was  a  loss  terrible  indeed  to  the 
Confederates,  and  narrowing  the  sphere  of  their  activity  and 
their  means  of  intercommunication,  yet  not  so  deadly  but  that 
they  might  still,  by  the  judicious  use  of  such  force  as  they 
had,  oppose  a  menacing  front  and  greatly  prolong  the  war. 

But  whatever  opportunity  was  then  afforded  the  Confeder 
ates  of  thus  acting,  was  thrown  away,  with  that  species  of  mad 
ness  with  which  the  gods  are  said  to  inspire  those  whom  they 
would  destroy,  when  Hood,  at  this  time  in  command  of  the 
Confederate  army  of  the  West,  quitting  his  proper  defensive, 
was  directed  to  make  his  ill-judged  and  disastrous  aggressive 
movement  into  Tennessee.  What  would  have  been  a  thorn 
in  the  side  of  an  inferior  man,  was  to  Sherman  an  oppor 
tunity,  and  with  one  of  those  inspirations  such  as  are  possible 
only  to  military  minds  of  the  first  order,  he  determined  to 
offer  a  counter  to  Hood's  initiative  by  laying  hold  of  and 
advancing  along  those  interior  lines  voluntarily  abandoned  to 
him  by  his  antagonist.  Sherman's  march  assumes  the  aspect 
of  a  great  swinging  movement,  the  pivot  of  which  was  the 
army  before  Petersburg.  But  it  was  a  swinging  movement 
described  on  a  radius  of  half  a  continent — one  of  those  colossal 
enterprises  whereof  there  are  few  examples  in  military  his 
tory,  and  which  fill  up  the  measure  of  the  imagination  with 
the  shapes  of  all  that  is  vast  and  grandiose  in  war. 

From  Atlanta  Sherman  advanced,  destroying  the  Southern 
railroads,  foundries,  mills,  workshops,  and  warehouses,  to 
Savannah  on  the  sea.  That  city  was  reached  the  21st  of  De 
cember,  after  a  march  of  above  three  hundred  miles,  in  four- 
and-twenty  days.  It  was  now  open  to  General  Grant  to  unite 
Sherman's  army  with  the  army  before  Petersburg  either  by 
water  or  by  an  advance  of  Sherman  through  the  seaboard 
States.  The  latter  course  was  determined  on  as  the  more 
decisive  in  its  character,  and  its  execution  begun  on  the  1st 


THE  FINAL  CAMPAIGN.  56? 

of  February,  1865,  when  Sherman  crossed  the  Savannah  into 
South  Carolina. 

When  Hood's  crushing  defeat  by  Thomas  before  Nashville 
had  made  an  end  of  the  campaign  that  Mr.  Davis  had  pro 
jected  as  the  means  of  throwing  Sherman  back  out  of  Georgia 
in  a  "  Moscow  retreat,"  and  when  it  was  seen  that  Sherman, 
heading  his  columns  northward  towards  Virginia,  approached 
like  an  irresistible  fate,  sweeping  a  wide  swathe  of  desolation 
through  the  centre  of  the  South,  the  Richmond  authorities, 
awaking  to  a  sense  of  their  fatal  folly  and  goaded  by  the 
clamors  of  an  alarmed  and  frenzied  people,  sought  a  measure 
of  amelioration  for  the  shattered  fortunes  of  the  Confederacy 
by  the  reappointment  of  General  Johnston  to  the  command 
of  the  forces  opposing  Sherman. 

But  it  was  already  too  late.  Johnston  did  all  he  could ; 
and  all  he  did  was  judicious  :  but  he  could  only  stay  for  a 
time  a  result  seen  to  be  inevitable.  Withdrawing  the  garri 
sons  of  the  seaboard  cities,  and  uniting  thereto  the  corps 
lately  under  Beauregard  and  the  remnants  of  Hood's  army, 
which  with  much  address  he  succeeded  in  bringing  to  a  junc 
tion  with  the  troops  confronting  Sherman,  he  prepared  to 
oppose  such  a  resistance  as  was  possible  to  the  onward  march 
of  his  formidable  antagonist.  Johnston  had  on  paper  a  nu 
merous  army ;  but,  in  effect,  it  was  not,  all  told,  above  twenty 
thousand  strong  ;  while  the  troops  were  in  such  condition  of 
morale  as  may  be  imagined  of  men  who  had  already  been 
driven  through  two  States  into  the  forests  of  North  Carolina. 
In  this  state  of  facts  it  was  vain  for  Johnston  to  attempt  an 
aggressive  policy,  unless  indeed  he  should  find  an  opportunity 
of  striking  a  blow  at  a  detached  fragment.  But  his  antagonist 
carried  too  much  art  into  his  dispositions  of  his  columns  of 
march  to  present  such  an  opening,  and  the  one  stroke  at  Ben- 
tonville  (a  partial  and  unimportant  success),  was  all  the  offen 
sive  essayed  by  Johnston. 

The  Confederate  commander  was,  moreover,  in  a  trying 
dilemma  :  in  order  to  keep  open  the  Danville  line,  by  which  a 
junction  of  the  forces  of  Lee  and  Johnston  might  be  made,  it 


568  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

was  necessary  for  him  to  constantly  refuse  his  left  and  manoeu 
vre  by  his  right.  But  this  was  to  uncover  the  path  by  which 
Sherman  might  advance  to  unite  with  Grant.  As  this  result, 
however,  could  not  long  be  prevented,  Johnston  chose  the 
former  course  and  fell  back  in  the  direction  of  Raleigh,  which 
was  a  judicious  measure,  since  a  junction  of  the  two  Con 
federate  armies  was  now  the  governing  desideratum.  Press 
ing  forward  his  advance,  Sherman,  the  23d  of  March,  reached 
Goldsborough,  North  Carolina,  where  he  united  with  the 
Federal  columns  that  had  moved  out  from  Newbern  and  Wil 
mington.  His  course  to  Petersburg  was  then  clear — the  dis 
tance  a  hundred  and  fifty  miles  in  a  northerly  direction.  No 
immediate  start,  however,  was  made  from  Goldsborough,  as 
well  for  the  reason  that  his  army  had  to  be  refitted  as  that 
General  Grant  feared  if  Sherman  should  then  move  any  fur 
ther  on  his  way,  Lee  would  abandon  Petersburg  and  Rich 
mond.  This,  as  I  have  already  intimated,  was  the  thing  now 
least  desired,  for  the  conditions  were  not  such  as  to  permit  of 
an  effective  pursuit,  and  Grant,  like  Phocion,  desired  to  have 
an  army  fitted  for  a  long  race — a  race,  the  goal  of  which  was 
the  destruction  of  his  adversary. 

While  from  the  direction  of  the  south  Sherman  thus  drew 
from  the  mountains  to  the  sea  a  wall  of  bayonets  that  im 
prisoned  the  enemy  between  himself  and  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  Grant  directed  Sheridan  to  make  a  new  raid,  with  a 
view  to  severing  all  the  remaining  communications  of  the  Con 
federates — a  necessary  step  in  that  plan  of  encircling  and  en 
closing  Lee  which  the  lieutenant-general  had  devised  as  the 
preliminary  to  his  premeditated  blow. 

Moving  from  Winchester  the  27th  of  February,  Sheridan 
galloped  up  the  Valley  of  Virginia.  With  his  superb  column 
of  ten  thousand  sabres,  he  little  recked  of  any  enemy  he  was 
likely  to  encounter.  Early,  indeed,  still  hovered  about  the 
Valley  that  had  been  so  fatal  to  him ;  but  what  of  force  re 
mained  with  him  was  but  the  shreds  and  patches  of  an  army, 
numbering,  perhaps,  twenty-five  hundred  men.  Foiling  by  his 


THE  FINAL  CAMPAIGN.  569 

rapid  advance  an  attempt  to  destroy  the  bridge  .over  the  Mid 
dle  Fork  of  the  Shenandoah  at  Mount  Crawford,  Sheridan  en 
tered  Staunton  the  2d  of  March  and  then  moved  to  Waynes- 
boro,  where  Early  had  taken  position  to  dispute  the  debouche 
of  the  Blue  Eidge.  Charging  upon  this  scratch  of  an  army 
without  taking  the  trouble  of  making  a  reconnoissance  even, 
Sheridan  broke  it  in  pieces,  capturing  two-thirds  of  it,  with 
most  of  its  artillery  trains  and  colors.  Then,  defiling  by  the 
passes  of  the  Blue  Eidge,  he  struck  Charlottesville,  where  he 
remained  two  days,  destroying  the  railroad  towards  Eichmond 
and  Lynchburg,  including  the  two  large  bridges  over  the 
north  and  south  forks  of  the  Eivanna  Eiver.  He  had  now 
moved  so  far  away  that  it  was  necessary  for  him  to  await  the 
arrival  of  his  trains. 

Sheridan's  instructions  prescribed  that  he  should  gain 
Lynchburg  on  the  south  bank  of  the  James.  From  that  point 
he  was  to  effectually  break  up  those  main  branches  of  Lee's 
communications,  the  Lynchburg  Eailroad  and  James  Eiver 
Canal,  after  which  he  was  to  strike  southward  through  Yir- 
ginia  to  the  "Westward  of  Danville  and  join  Sherman.  But 
while  awaiting  at  Charlottesville  the  arrival  of  his  trains,  the 
James  Eiver  became  so  swollen  by  heavy  rains  as  to  be  im 
passable.  Nowise  disconcerted  by  this  untoward  fortune, 
but  with  an  admirable  fertility  of  resource,  he  determined 
to  abandon  the  purpose  of  capturing  Lynchburg,  and  in 
the  mean  time  to  operate  against  the  canal,  and  then,  if 
possible,  effect  a  crossing  of  the  James  between  Lynchburg 
and  Eichmond.  The  former  design  was  very  completely  car 
ried  out,  but  he  was  unable  to  pass  the  James,  as  the  Con 
federates  destroyed  all  the  bridges. 

Thus  cabined  and  confined,  there  was  for  Sheridan  but  one 
alternative,  either  to  go  back  whence  he  had  come,  or  strike 
a  base  at  White  House  and  thence  effect  a  junction  with 
the  army  before  Petersburg.  With  characteristic  daring 
he  adopted  the  latter  course,  and  this  resolve,  though  it 
baulked  Grant's  original  intent,  led  to  a  result  every  way 
better. 


570  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMf  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

After  completing  the  destruction  of  the  canal,  he  concen 
trated  his  whole  force  at  Columbia,  and  thence  rounding  the 
left  of  Lee's  army,  and  putting  the  Pamunkey  between  him 
and  the  Confederate  force,  Sheridan  proceeded  towards  the 
York,  breaking  up  en  route  all  the  railroad  tracks  and  bridges. 
The  19th  of  March  he  reached  White  House,  whither  an  in 
fantry  force  and  supplies  had  been  forwarded  to  him.  After 
resting  and  refitting  here,  Sheridan,  on  the  24th,  moved  across 
the  Peninsula  to  James  River,  and  passing  to  the  south  bank 
at  Jones'  Landing,  he,  two  days  afterwards,  joined  the  army 
before  Petersburg. 

The  circle  of  the  hunt  was  now  complete.  The  leashed 
dogs  of  war  lay  ready  for  the  spring,  whenever  the  meditative 
soldier  who  sat  silent  in  his  wooden  hut  at  City  Point  should 
sound  the  "  laissez  cdler" 

That  the  campaign  about  to  be  opened  could  have  but  one 
result — to  wit,  the  destruction  of  the  Confederate  armies — was 
not  now  doubtful ;  and  discerning  men  at  the  South  plainly 
read  the  omens  of  doom.  It  was  not  alone  that  an  over 
whelming  weight  of  physical  power,  represented  by  a  million 
men  in  arms,  threatened  to  overwhelm  the  insurgent  armies, 
or  that  the  great  extent  of  territory  overrun  by  the  Union 
forces  had  torn  asunder  the  fabric  of  the  Confederacy ;  but 
secret  causes  of  disturbance  in  the  moral  order  had  corrupted 
the  life-blood  of  the  revolt.  It  is  such  metaphysical  influ 
ences  that  govern  the  issues  of  war — influences  little  under 
stood  by  the  superficial  annalists  who  attempt  to  explain  by 
material  causes  the  secrets  of  an  art  so  vast,  subtle,  and  com 
plex  as  to  be  almost  beyond  the  reach  of  man's  mind — influ 
ences,  whose  sovereign  power  was  marked  by  the  greatest  of 
commanders  in  the  aphorism,  that  in  war  the  moral  is  to  the 
physical  as  three  to  one. 

When  in  a  revolution  the  time  arrives  that  the  people  sep 
arate  themselves  from  the  cause  of  their  leaders,  that  cause 
Bpeedily  falls  to  the  ground.  This  was  the  pass  to  which  the 
Confederate  States  had  come.  It  was  not  precisely  that  the 


THE  FINAL  CAMPAIGN. 

people  of  the  South  had  ceased  to  desire  the  triumph  of  seces 
sion  ;  but  they  had  ceased  any  longer  to  be  capable  of  those 
efforts  failing  which  success  is  out  of  the  question.  It  will  be 
for  the  philosophical  historian,  unravelling  the  intricate  web 
of  cause  and  effect,  to  trace  the  reasons  of  this  decline  in  the 
moral  energy  of  the  South  :  it  is  enough  here  to  mark  the  re 
sult  as  it  influenced  the  fortunes  of  the  armies  in  the  field. 

General  Grant,  during  the  winter  of  1864,  expressed  in  a 
strong  figure  the  belief  that  the  fighting  population  of  the 
Confederacy  was  exhausted.  "  They  have,"  said  he,  "  robbed 
the  cradle  and  the  grave."  But  this  statement  overshot  the 
reality.  The  South  did  not  so  much  lack  men  as  the  men 
lacked  interest  in  the  war.  The  conscription  then  became 
odious,  and  evasion  universal,  while  those  who  wished  to  es 
cape  military  service  readily  found  those  at  home  willing  to 
open  their  ranks,  let  them  slip  through,  and  close  up  behind 
them.  It  finally  came  about  that  men  enough  to  form  three 
armies  of  the  strength  of  Lee's  lay  perdu,  beyond  the  power 
of  recovery  of  the  Richmond  authorities.  To  this  must  be 
added  the  fact  that  a  prodigious  number  of  Confederate  troops 
— probably  as  many  as  were  in  the  ranks  of  both  Lee  and 
Johnston — were,  during  the  last  eighteen  months  of  the  war, 
kept  out  of  the  field  by  being  retained  as  prisoners  at  the 
North  under  a  fixed  determination  of  General  Grant  not  to 
exchange  them — a  measure  that  was  certainly  an  effectual 
agency  in  the  lieutenant-general's  avowed  plan  of  "  hammer 
ing  continuously  against  the  armed  force  of  the  enemy  and 
his  resources  until  by  mere  attrition,  if  by  no  other  way, 
there  should  be  nothing  left  to  him." 

While  the  conscription  system  had  thus  hopelessly  broken 
down,  the  collapse  of  the  Confederate  commissariat  was 
equally  complete.  And  here,  again,  it  was  not  that  the  South 
lacked  resources,  for  the  granaries  of  that  vast  and  fertile  ter 
ritory  bulged  with  great  store  of  corn ;  but  mal-administra- 
tion  rendered  these  riches  as  vain  as  if  the  South  had  been  a 
Sahara.  That  great  department  of  administrative  service 
charged  with  the  feeding  of  the  troops,  was  presided  over  by 


572  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

a  man  of  such  notorious  ignorance  and  incompetence,  that  au 
thentic  records  show  the  armies  in  the  field  to  have  been  half 
the  time  bordering  on  starvation.  The  daily  ration  for  the 
army  defending  Petersburg,  during  all  the  last  winter  of  the 
war,  was  a  pound  of  flour  and  a  quarter  of  a  pound  of  meat. 
But  even  this  so  frequently  failed  that  it  was  only  the  pro 
digious  vigor  of  Lee  that  enabled  the  troops  in  the  trenches 
to  receive  even  that  meagre  dole  of  food.* 

If  the  moral  spring  of  the  insurrection  had  become  thus  re 
laxed,  it  is  not  wonderful  that  the  armies  also  had  sunk  in 
energy.  The  glory  of  arms  at  length  ceased  to  support  men 
against  sufferings,  privations,  and  fatigues  that,  while  hard  to 
bear  in  themselves,  were  unmitigated  by  any  hope  of  a  suc 
cessful  issue.  The  consequence  of  this  was  soon  seen  in  such 
an  increase  of  desertion  that  the  two  main  armies  of  the  Con 
federacy  showed  four  men  on  their  rolls  to  one  in  the  ranks. 
At  the  opening  of  the  spring  campaign,  General  Lee  had,  on 

*  General  Johnston,  soon  after  the  close  of  the  war,  stated  to  me  that  he  re 
garded  these  two  causes — the  condition  of  the  Confederate  commissariat  and 
the  abuses  of  the  conscription  system— as  amply  adequate  to  account  for  the 
failure  of  the  South.  I  shall  here  record  a  few  of  his  pregnant  observations  on 
both  these  subjects.  "  In  regard  to  the  raising  of  troops,"  said  he,  "  that  was 
done  in  the  worst  possible  manner — namely,  by  conscription,  by  the  Confeder 
ate  government.  Instead  of  determining  the  number  of  troops  wanted,  and  ap 
portioning  to  each  State  its  proper  quota,  wholesale  impressments  were  made 
by  the  machinery  of  a  central  government.  Each  State  had  its  own  officers 
with  which  it  could  have  raised  the  troops  ;  and  being  of  the  localities,  they, 
of  course,  knew  every  man  and  boy  in  the  place,  and  avoidance  or  evasion 
would  have  been  difficult.  But  by  the  system  adopted,  this  perfect  agency  was 
not  called  into  play  at  all.  Finally,  it  resulted  that  it  required  as  many  men 
to  enforce  the  conscription  as  it  was  expected  to  raise  by  its  operation.  Then 
ensued  evasion :  those  who  wished  to  shrink  service,  or  aid  others  to  do  so, 
opened  their  ranks,  allowed  them  to  slip  through  and  close  up  behind.  Sup 
plies,  also,  instead  of  being  honestly  raised,  were  impressed  by  a  band  of  com 
missaries  and  quartermasters,  who  only  paid  one-half  the  market  value.  As 
might  have  been  expected,  this  was  enough  to  prevent  their  getting  any  thing. 
These  they  took  by  force,  and  did  it  with  the  greatest  injustice.  You  can  im 
agine  what  disorganization  of  labor  and  what  discontent  this  produced.  The 
mismanagement  of  the  Confederate  executive  in  these  two  regards  was  enough 
to  ruin  the  cause." 


THE  FINAL  CAMPAIGN.  573 

paper,  one  hundred  and  sixty  thousand  men,  but  in  reality 
less  than  fifty  thousand,  from  which,  if  there  be  deducted  the 
troops  on  detached  duty,  it  will  appear  that  he  had  forty 
thousand  men  with  which  to  defend  forty  miles  of  intrench- 
ments. 

These  were  the  forlorn  hope  of  the  rebellion.  Corralled 
between  the  two  great  Union  armies,  in  the  restricted  space 
between  the  James  and  the  Neuse  and  the  Alleghanies  and 
the  Atlantic,  it  was  manifest  that  the  end  was  near.  It  only 
remains  to  show  how  in  the  last  wrestle  these  men  comported 
themselves,  and  how  when  they  at  last  broke  down  under  a 
burden  too  heavy  to  bear,  the  fabric  of  the  revolt  which  they 
had  for  four  years  upheld  on  their  bayonets,  fell  with  a  crash 
that  resounded  through  the  world. 


IL 

LEE'S  INITIATIVE. 

The  glories  of  spring-tide  that  adorned  the  hills  and  vales 
of  beautiful  Virginia,  and  made  her  woods  vocal  with  the 
song  of  birds,  brought  no  vernal  promise  to  the  sad  army  of 
wearied  and  half-famished  men  that  lay  in  the  trenches  of 
Petersburg.  They  knew  that  the  sun  that  thawed  the  frost 
from  the  roads  did  but  make  paths  on  which  the  adversary, 
with  whom  they  could  no  longer  hope  to  cope,  would  move 
to  their  destruction.  There  was  one  consoling  reflection  to 
them,  however :  the  end  was  near.  And,  after  all  their  fatigues 
and  privations,  even  this  was  welcome.  Yet  it  was  an  army 
of  high  mettle  and  of  great  traditions,  and  it  could  not  do 
otherwise  than  prepare  to  go  down  with  honor. 

In  the  situation  in  which  Lee  found  himself  there  was  but 
one  course  open  to  him  whereby  he  might  hope  to  prolong 
the  contest.  This  was  to  abandon  the  effort  to  defend  Rich 
mond  and  retire  to  an  interior  line,  either  in  the  direction  of 


574          CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

Lyncliburg  or  Danville,  where  uniting  with  the  forces  of 
Johnston  he  might,  by  maintaining  a  defensive  system,  cause 
the  Union  army  to  undertake  a  long  and  costly  campaign. 
This  would  indeed  have  been  to  give  up  the  Confederate  capi 
tal,  but  with  a  re- enforcement  of  twenty  thousand  men  Lee 
could  have  shown  that  the  capital  was  at  his  headquarters. 

Now,  waiving  the  ethical  question  of  the  rightfulness  or 
wrongfulness  of  the  cause  whereof  Lee  was  the  military  head, 
it  was  manifestly  his  duty  as  a  soldier  to  maintain  the  struggle 
as  long  as  possible.  The  turns  of  fortune  in  war  are 
infinitely  various,  and  many  an  army  has  come  out  of  a 
seemingly  desperate  strait  triumphant.  A  Southern  writer 
has  indeed  averred  that  Lee  intended  to  surrender  before 
evacuating  Eichmond.  If  so,  he  was  guilty  of  the  murder  of 
every  one  of  his  soldiers  that  fell  after  that  intent  was  formed. 
But  it  is  not  by  the  standard  of  such  men's  pusillanimous 
instincts  that  the  soul  of  a  great  commander  is  to  be  judged. 
Lee,  beyond  a  doubt,  never  meant  to  surrender  until  he  was 
compelled  to  surrender. 

It  is  now  certain  that  at  this  time  the  Confederate  com 
mander  had  fully  resolved  to  adopt  the  course  of  evacuating 
Petersburg  and  Richmond  and  effecting  a  junction  with  the 
forces  of  Johnston  on  the  Danville  line.  Preparations  for  the 
intended  movement  were  begun  early  in  the  month  of  March : 
Johnston  was  to  refuse  his  left  if  Sherman  advanced ;  flat- 
boats  were  collected  for  bridging  the  affluents  of  the  Eoan- 
oke ;  rations  were  to  be  accumulated  at  Amelia  Courthouse, 
and  the  line  of  retreat  and  columns  of  march  were  arranged. 
Before  he  could  put  this  purpose  into  execution,  however,  it 
was  necessary  for  Lee  to  assume  the  offensive  against  Grant 
— not  so  much  in  obedience  to  the  rule  of  art  that  prescribes 
a  vigorous  stroke  of  offence  as  the  best  mask  for  a  withdrawal, 
but  for  a  special  reason  which  it  is  important  here  to  indicate 
because  it  has  not  hitherto  been  understood. 

In  the  plan  of  retreat  which  Lee  had  marked  out  for  his 
army  he  did  not  purpose  moving  by  the  north  bank  of  the 
Appomattox,  but  by  the  south  side,  which  is  much  the  shorter 


THE  FINAL  CAMPAIGN.  575 

line  to  Amelia  Courthouse,  which  was  the  point  of  concentra 
tion  of  his  columns  on  the  Danville  railroad.  The  direct  route 
to  that  place  is  by  what  is  known  as  the  Cox  road,  which 
leaves  Petersburg  above  the  Bojdton  plankroad  and  runs 
due  west,  following  the  line  of  the  Appomattox.  But  by  the 
gradual  extension  of  the  left  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
towards  the  Boydton  plankroad,  the  flank  of  the  Union  line 
approached  so  near  the  Cox  road  as  to  make  Lee's  withdrawal 
thereby  a  very  perilous  operation.  He  resolved,  therefore, 
to  strike  a  sudden  blow,  and  to  give  this  blow  such  a  direc 
tion  that  it  would  be  necessary  for  Grant  to  withdraw  his 
left,  which  would  completely  relieve  Lee's  proposed  line  of 
retreat.  This  object  he  supposed  would  be  best  realized  by 
striking  the  contrary  flank  from  that  on  which  he  wished 
the  effect  to  be  produced.  Accordingly,  he  planned  to  break 
through  the  right  of  the  Union  line  hard  by  where  that  flank 
rested  on  the  Appomattox  east  of  Petersburg.  Special  con 
siderations  of  a  topographical  character  indicated  Fort 
Steadrnan  as  the  most  advantageous  point  of  attack. 

The  project  of  assaulting  the  Union  front  at  all  was  bold. 
The  Army  of  the  Potomac  lay  ensconced  in  its  lines  of  coi»- 
travallation.  A  cordon  of  redoubts  of  a  powerful  profile  ani 
armed  with  the  heaviest  metal,  studded  this  line.  Infantry 
parapets,  amply  manned,  stretched  from  work  to  work.  Cov 
ering  the  fronts  of  approach  were  labyrinthine  acres  of 
abatis,  while  all  the  appliances  of  ditches,  entanglements,  and 
clievaux  de  frise  lent  their  aid  to  make  defence  sure  and  as 
sault  folly.  But  plans  in  war  are  sometimes  successful  on 
account  of  their  very  boldness ;  and  Lee's  purpose  was  to 
seize  Fort  Steadman  and  the  neighboring  works,  crown  the 
commanding  ground  in  rear  of  this  part  of  the  Federal  line 
and  lay  hold  of  the  military  railway  to  City  Point.  If  Grant 
turned  to  fight  him  in  this  position,  he  was  prepared  to  receive 
battle,  but  if  Grant  should  make  a  detour  towards  City  Point 
to  recover  his  communications,  the  Confederate  commander 
designed,  instead  of  awaiting  attack,  to  withdraw  immediately. 
fix  any  event,  Lee  counted  that  the  blow  struck  at  Grant's 


576  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OP  THE  POTOMAC. 

right  would  cause  the  retirement  of  his  left  flank,  where  was 
the  greater  accumulation  of  force,  and  that  thus  the  Cox  road 
would  be  rendered  entirely  free.  The  morning  of  the  25th  of 
March  was  appointed  for  the  attack.  It  was  to  be  made  by 
two  divisions  under  Gordon ;  but  to  render  it  as  forcible  as 
possible,  all  the  additional  troops  available  (about  twenty 
thousand  men)  were  disposed  ready  to  support  it. 

The  opposing  lines  were,  at  the  locality  of  Fort  Steadman, 
very  close — that  work  being  on  a  considerable  salient :  so  that 
the  interval  was  not  above  one  hundred  and  fifty  yards.  This 
part  of  the  line  was  garnished  by  troops  of  the  Ninth  Corps. 
In  the  gray  dawn  the  Confederate  column  of  attack,  having 
previously  formed,  moved  out  noiselessly  from  the  works. 
The  space  to  be  overpassed  being  not  great,  a  rush  of  a  few 
moments  brought  the  Confederates  to  the  Union  intrench- 
ments,  which  must  have  been  guarded  with  little  vigilance ; 
for  Fort  Steadman  was  surprised  and  taken  by  a  coup  de  main. 
Of  the  garrison  of  the  Fort,  which  was  the  Fourteenth  New 
York  foot-artillerists,  many  were  taken  prisoners  and  the  rest 
fled.  The  Third  brigade  of  the  First  division  of  the  Ninth 
Corps  met  a  similar  fate.  The  guns  of  the  captured  redoubt 
were  immediately  turned  by  the  Confederates  on  the  neigh 
boring  works,  and  in  consequence  batteries  Nine,  Ten,  and 
Eleven,  on  its  flanks,  were  abandoned  by  the  Union  troops  and 
occupied  by  the  enemy. 

Thus  far  the  triumph ;  but  it  was  destined  to  be  short 
lived.  To  rift  open  the  system  of  Union  works  it  was  neces 
sary  that  the  wedge  thus  entered  should  be  driven  home  ;  or, 
in  other  words,  it  was  needful  that  the  storming-party  should 
be  followed  up  and  sustained  by  a  powerful  column  to  pass 
beyond  and  seize  the  commanding  crest  in  rear  of  the  Federal 
line.  Till  this  was  done  nothing  was  gained ;  for  in  the  sys 
tem  of  fortification  on  which  the  Federal  line  was  constructed, 
a  partial  break  in  the  line  was  not  an  irretrievable  loss — each 
work  being  so  well  commanded  by  those  on  its  flanks  that  to 
make  any  one  point  tenable  by  an  enemy  every  thing  on  its 
right  and  left  must  be  cleared. 


THE  FINAL  CAMPAIGN.  577 

It  is  well  known  that  there  was  great  dereliction  of  duty  on 
the  part  of  the  supporting  columns  ;  for  Gordon's  attack  was 
left  almost  wholly  unsupported,  notwithstanding  that  Lee  had 
massed  in  the  vicinity  all  his  available  force.  Those  who  had 
gone  forward  then  made  a  feeble  attempt  against  Fort  Has- 
call,  the  work  next  on  the  left  of  Fort  Steadman.  They  could, 
however,  make  no  impression  on  this  ;  and  no  sooner  had 
they  rallied  on  Fort  Steadman  than  they  found  themselves 
not  only  subjected  to  a  terrible  artillery  fire,  but  in  turn  as 
sailed  by  the  troops  of  the  Ninth  Corps  brought  forward  to 
meet  the  emergency.  The  counter-assault  was  made  by 
Hartranft's  division  ;  and  it  now  needed  little  to  determine 
the  Confederates  to  retire.  Yet  to  withdraw  was  less  easy 
than  it  had  been  to  advance,  for  the  lines  of  retreat  were  so 
covered  by  the  cross-fire  of  artillery  directed  from  all  the  ad 
jacent  works  that  the  Confederates  found  themselves  corralled 
in  the  narrow  space  between  the  two  lin.es,  and  about  two 
thousand  preferred  to  give  themselves  up  as  prisoners  rather 
than  brave  the  deadly  perils  of  the  rain  of  fire. 

The  primal  stroke  had,  indeed,  been  brilliant,  but  not  being 
pushed  to  a  conclusion,  it  left  no  solid  advantage  to  the  ene 
my,  while  it  entailed  a  loss  that  could  be  ill  afforded  by  Lee. 
This  embraced  not  alone  the  captures  above  noted,  but  a 
heavy  sacrifice  in  killed  and  wounded — probably  not  less  than 
twenty-five  hundred,  which  was  the  aggregate  of  the  Union: 
casualties. 

Nor  was  this  affair  unaccompanied  by  some  positive  mili 
tary  advantages  to  the  Union  side.  Employing  that  manoeu 
vre  which  in  fencing  is  known  as  the  riposte  or  parry  and 
thrust,  General  Meade  threw  forward  the  whole  line  of  the 
Sixth  and  Second  corps,  which  were  to  the  left  of  the  Ninth, 
and  the  troops  succeeded  in  wresting  from  the  Confederates 
their  strongly-intrenched  picket-line,  which  gave  ground  that 
was  of  value  in  the  subsequent  assaults. 

Admirably  as  Lee's  plan  was  laid,  admirably  as  it  was 
adapted  to  effect  the  desired  end  of  relieving  the  pressure  upon 
his  right,  the  failure  of  the  execution  was  most  signal.  This 

3,7 


578  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

is  easy  to  account  for.  The  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  was 
no  longer  capable  of  the  efforts  required  in  carrying  out  such 
an  enterprise,  and  it  must  have  been  with  a  pang  that  Lee 
felt  that  arm  of  strength,  so  long  obedient  to  his  will,  fail  now 
to  follow  the  motions  of  his  spirit. 


Ill 

THE  ARMIES  UNLEASHED. 

Lee's  act  of  offence  neither  retarded  nor  precipitated  the 
catastrophe,  for  Grant  having  forefixed  the  29th  of  March 
as  the  day  on  which  he  would  open  the  campaign,  held  firmly 
to  his  intent,  pushing  forward  meanwhile  his  preparations  for 
the  grand  movement. 

To  exhibit  in  its  details  the  plan  of  operations  devised  by 
the  lieutenant-general,  I  give,  in  the  accompanying  note,  the 
text  of  the  order  then  drawn  up.*  It  wiU  be  noted  that  in  its 

*  "  CITY  POINT,  VA.,  March  24, 1865. 

"  GENERAL  : — On  the  29th  instant  the  armies  operating  against  Richmond 
will  be  moved  by  our  left  for  the  double  purpose  of  turning  the  enemy  out  of 
his  present  position  around  Petersburg,  and  to  insure  the  success  of  the  cavalry 
under  General  Sheridan,  which  will  start  at  the  same  time,  in  its  efforts  to 
reach  and  destroy  the  Southside  and  Danville  railroads.  Two  corps  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  will  be  moved  at  first  in  two  columns,  taking  the  two 
roads  crossing  Hatcher's  Run  nearest  where  the  present  line  held  by  us  strikes 
that  stream,  both  moving  towards  Dinwiddie  Courthouse. 

"  The  cavalry  under  General  Sheridan,  joined  by  the  division  now  under 
General  Davies,  will  move  at  the  same  time  by  the  Weldon  road  and  the 
Jerusalem  plankroad,  turning  west  from  the  latter  before  crossing  the  Notto- 
way,  and  west  with  the  whole  column  before  reaching  Stony  Creek.  General 
Sheridan  will  then  move  independently,  under  other  instructions  which  will 
be  given  him.  All  dismounted  cavalry  belonging  to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
and  the  dismounted  cavalry  from  the  Middle  Military  Division  not  required  for 
guarding  property  belonging  to  their  arm  of  service,  will  report  to  Brigadier- 
General  Benham,  to  be  added  to  the  defences  of  City  Point.  Major-General 
Parke  will  be  left  in  command  of  all  the  army  left  for  holding  the  lines  about 


_  _A-_       _J_ 


THE  FINAL  CAMPAIGN.  579 

distinguishing  features  this  plan  was  a  repetition  of  that 
which  had  so  often  been  essayed  by  Grant.  It  repeated  the 
prevailing  characteristic  of  a  left  turning  column  pivoting  on 

Petersburg  and  City  Point,  subject,  of  course,  to  orders  from  the  commander  of 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  The  Ninth  Army  Corps  will  be  left  intact  to  hold 
the  present  line  of  works,  so  long  as  the  whole  line  now  occupied  by  us  is  held. 
If,  however,  the  troops  to  the  left  of  the  Ninth  Corps  are  withdrawn,  then  the 
left  of  the  corps  may  be  thrown  back  so  as  to  occupy  the  position  held  by  the 
army  prior  to  the  capture  of  the  Weldon  road.  All  troops  to  the  left  of  the 
Ninth  Corps  will  be  held  in  readiness  to  move  at  the  shortest  notice  by  such 
route  as  may  be  designated  when  the  order  is  given. 

"  General  Ord  will  detach  three  divisions,  two  white  and  one  colored,  or  so 
much  of  them  as  he  can,  and  hold  his  present  lines,  and  march  for  the  present 
left  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  In  the  absence  of  further  orders,  or  until 
further  orders  are  given,  the  white  divisions  will  follow  the  left  column  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  the  colored  division  the  right  column.  During  the 
movement,  Major-General  Weitzel  will  be  left  in  command  of  all  the  forces  re 
maining  behind  from  the  Army  of  the  James. 

"  The  movement  of  troops  from  the  Army  of  the  James  will  commence  on 
the  night  of  the  21st  instant.  General  Ord  will  leave  behind  the  minimum 
number  of  cavalry  necessary  for  picket  duty,  in  the  absence  of  the  main  army. 
A  cavalry  expedition  from  General  Ord's  command  will  also  be  started  from 
Suffolk,  to  leave  there  on  Saturday,  the  1st  of  April,  under  Colonel  Sumner,  for 
the  purpose  of  cutting  the  railroad  about  Hicksford.  This,  if  accomplished, 
will  have  to  be  a  surprise,  and  therefore  from  three  to  five  hundred  men  will  be 
sufficient.  They  should,  however,  be  supported  by  all  the  infantry  that  can  be 
spared  from  Norfolk  and  Portsmouth,  as  far  out  as  to  where  the  cavalry  crosses 
the  Blackwater.  The  crossing  should  probably  be  at  Uniten.  Should  Colonel 
Sumner  succeed  in  reaching  the  Weldon  road,  he  will  be  instructed  to  do  all 
the  damage  possible  to  the  triangle  of  roads  between  Hicksford,  Weldon,  and 
Gaston.  The  railroad-bridge  at  Weldon  being  fitted  up  for  the  passage  of  car 
riages,  it  might  be  practicable  to  destroy  any  accumulation  of  supplies  the  ene 
my  may  have  collected  south  of  the  Roanoke.  All  the  troops  will  move  with 
four  days'  rations  in  haversacks,  and  eight  days'  in  wagons.  To  avoid  as  much 
hauling  as  possible,  and  to  give  the  Army  of  the  James  the  same  number  of 
days'  supply  with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  General  Ord  will  direct  his  com 
missary  and  quartermaster  to  have  sufficient  supplies  delivered  at  the  terminus 
of  the  road  to  fill  up  in  passing.  Sixty  rounds  of  ammunition  per  man  will  be 
taken  in  wagons,  and  as  much  grain  as  the  transportation  on  hand  will  carry, 
after  taking  the  specified  amount  of  other  supplies.  The  densely  wooded 
country  in  which  the  army  has  to  operate  making  the  use  of  much  artillery  im 
practicable,  the  amount  taken  with  the  army  will  be  reduced  to  six  or  eight 
guns  to  each  division,  at  the  option  of  the  army  commanders. 

"  All  necessary  preparations  for  carrying  these  directions  into  operation  may 


580  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

the  right,  directed  against  the  Confederate  right  flank,  and 
accompanied  by  a  cavalry  expedition  to  cut  the  Confederate 
railway  communications. 

But,  though  in  form  this  operation  closely  resembled  more 
than  one  previously  attempted  movement,  there  were  several 
provisions  of  the  execution  that  caused  it  to  differ  materi 
ally  from  these,  and  gave  it  a  much  surer  promise  of  success. 
Former  moves  had  commonly  embraced  two  efforts,  each 
necessarily  weak,  directed  the  one  against  the  Confederate 
left,  on  the  north  side  of  the  James;  the  other  against  the 

be  commenced  at  once.  The  reserves  of  the  Ninth  Corps  should  be  massed  as 
much  as  possible.  Whilst  I  would  not  now  order  an  unconditional  attack  on 
the  enemy's  line  by  them,  they  should  be  ready,  and  should  make  the  attack,  if 
the  enemy  weakens  his  line  in  their  front,  without  waiting  for  orders.  In  case 
they  carry  the  line,  then  the  Avhole  of  the  Nintli  Corps  could  follow  up,  so  as  to 
join  or  co-operate  with  the  balance  of  the  army.  To  prepare  for  this,  the  Ninth 
Corps  will  have  rations  issued  to  them,  same  as  the  balance  of  the  army.  Gen 
eral  Weitzel  will  keep  vigilant  watch  upon  his  front,  and  if  found  at  all  practi 
cable  to  break  through  at  any  point,  he  will  do  so.  A  success  north  of  the 
James  should  be  followed  up  with  great  promptness.  An  attack  will  not  be 
feasible  unless  it  is  found  that  the  enemy  has  detached  largely.  In  that  case  it 
may  be  regarded  as  evident  that  the  enefSy  are  relying  upon  their  local  re 
serves  principally  for  the  defence  of  Richmond.  Preparations  may  be  made  for 
abandoning  all  the  line  north  of  the  James,  except  inclosed  works — only  to  be 
abandoned,  however,  after  a  break  is  made  in  the  lines  of  the  enemy. 

"  By  these  instructions  a  large  part  of  the  armies  operating  against  Rich 
mond  is  left  behind.  The  enemy,  knowing  this,  may,  as  an  only  chance,  strip 
their  lines  to  the  merest  skeleton,  in  the  hope  of  advantage  not  being  taken  of 
it,  whilst  they  hurl  every  thing  against  the  moving  column,  and  return.  It 
cannot  be  impressed  too  strongly  upon  commanders  of  troops  left  in  the  trenches 
not  to  allow  this  to  occur  without  taking  advantage  of  it.  The  very  fact  of  the 
enemy  coming  out  to  attack,  if  he  does  so,  might  be  regarded  as  almost  con 
clusive  evidence  of  such  a  weakening  of  his  lines.  I  would  have  it  particularly 
enjoined  upon  corps-commanders  that,  in  case  of  an  attack  from  the  enemy, 
those  not  attacked  are  not  to  wait  for  orders  from  the  commanding  officer  of 
the  army  to  which  they  belong,  but  that  they  will  move  promptly,  and  notify 
the  commander  of  their  action.  I  would  also  enjoin  the  same  action  on  the 
part  of  division  commanders  when  other  parts  of  their  corps  are  engaged.  In 
like  manner,  I  would  urge  the  importance  of  following  up  a  repulse  of  the 
enemy. 

"  U.  S.  GRANT,  Lieutenant-General. 

*  MAJOR-GENERALS  MEADE,  ORD,  and  SHERIDAN." 


THE  FINAL  CAMPAIGN.  581 

Confederate  right,  southwest  of  Petersburg.  The  present 
operation  was  confined  to  one  powerful  effort,  directed  against 
Lee's  right  and  vulnerable  flank.  Former  moves  had  pre 
sented  the  anomaly  of  a  turning  column  pivoting  on  a  force 
stronger  than  itself.  The  present  operation  was  made  by  a 
turning  column  so  weighty  that  it  contingently  embraced  the 
whole  Army  of  the  Potomac,  with  the  exception  of  the  Ninth 
Corps,  which  alone  was  to  be  the  pivot  of  the  manoeuvre. 
Moreover,  to  this  column  was  to  be  added  not  only  the  import 
ant  accession  of  Sheridan's  cavalry,  but  nearly  the  whole  of  the 
Army  of  the  James,  three  divisions  of  which  were  to  be  trans 
ferred  to  the  lines  before  Petersburg,  leaving  in  the  works 
on  the  Richmond  side  of  the  river  only  a  minimum  force. 

Sheridan,  coming  in  from  his  expedition,  joined  the  army 
before  Petersburg  on  the  27th.  The  same  day,  General  Ord, 
at  this  time  commanding  the  Army  of  the  James,  moved  over 
from  the  Richmond  front  to  the  lines  before  Petersburg.  His 
active  force  embraced  two  divisions  of  the  Twenty-fourth 
Corps,  under  General  Gibbon ;  one  division  of  the  Twenty- 
fifth  Corps,  under  Brigadier-General  Birney,  and  a  small 
division  of  cavalry,  under  Brigadier-General  McKenzie. 
These  troops  took  position  along  the  left  of  the  intrenched 
lines  lately  held  by  the  Second  and  Fifth  corps,  which  being 
now  relieved  were  foot-loose  to  manoeuvre  by  the  left.  The 
movement  was  begun  on  the  morning  of  the  29th  of  March, 
as  had  been  appointed. 

In  order  to  attain  the  point  against  which  the  turning 
column  of  infantry  was  directed,  it  was  necessary  to  pass  to 
the  west  side  of  Hatcher's  Run.  Breaking  camp  early  on 
the  morning  of  the  29th,  the  corps  of  Warren  and  Hum 
phreys  moved  by  the  rear  and  left  (that  is,  to  the  southwest), 
so  as  to  make  the  movement  without  observation.  Hatcher's 
Run  was  passed  without  opposition  of  moment,  and  the  two 
corps,  facing  northward,  advanced  to  effect  the  initial  manoeu 
vre  of  the  campaign.* 

*  A  reliable  map  of  the  region  in  which  the  movements  to  be  described 


582  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF   THE  POTOMAC. 

It  is  now  proper  to  point  out  whither  this  advance  tended, 
and  the  developments  that  arose  therefrom. 

The  right  of  Lee's  intrenched  line,  running  southwestward 
from  Petersburg,  crossed  Hatcher's  Run  at  the  Boydton 
plankroad.  Thence  it  extended  for  a  considerable  distance 

took  place  will  be  found  opposite  page  578.  This  will  enable  the  reader  to  fol 
low  the  details  of  the  initial  operations  of  the  29th  of  March,  which  I  here  add. 

THE  FIFTH  CORPS. — Warren  moved  at  three  A.  M.,  and  turning  southwest- 
ward  crossed  Rowantry  Creek  at  a  point  a  short  distance  below  where  that  stream 
is  formed  by  the  junction  of  Hatcher's  and  Gravelly  runs.  A  few  shots  were 
fired  by  the  enemy's  videttes,  probably  as  an  alarm  signal,  but  no  opposition 
was  made  to  the  crossing.  While  a  bridge  for  the  vehicles  was  being  laid,  the 
troops  scrambled  across  on  fallen  trees  and  the  wreck  of  a  former  bridge. 
Warren's  route  then  led  westward  by  the  stage-road.  At  a  distance  of  four 
miles  from  Hatcher's  Run,  the  Quaker  road  runs  northward  from  the  stage-road 
to  the  Boydton  plankroad.  Warren  was  directed  to  move  up  this  road,  which, 
at  a  distance  of  two  miles,  crosses  Gravelly  Run.  This  stream  could  not  be 
readily  forded,  but  the  skirmish  line  succeeded  in  crossing,  and  drove  off  a 
small  force  of  the  Confederates.  A  bridge  was  then  laid  and  the  northward 
movement  continued. 

THE  SECOND  CORPS. — While  Warren  was  making  this  wide  detour,  Hum 
phreys'  corps  had  passed  Hatcher's  Run  by  the  Vaughan  road-crossing,  four 
miles  above  Warren's  point  of  passage.  Turning  northward  it  followed  the 
run  up-stream.  This  movement  placed  Humphreys'  corps  on  the  right  of 
Warren,  and  both  corps  pushed  northward — the  latter  moving  on  the  Quaker 
road,  the  former  through  the  woods  between  that  road  and  Hatcher's  Run, 
But  as  Humphreys'  advance  was  made  in  an  extended  line  through  very  diffi 
cult  woods,  the  connection  was  made  and  broken  continually.  The  enemy's 
skirmishers  were  driven  in,  but  no  main  line  was  encountered,  and  darkness 
stayed  further  advance. 

SHERIDAN'S  CAVALRY. — Sheridan  moved  by  way  of  Reams'  Station  and  Ma- 
lone's  crossing  on  Rowantry  Creek,  where  he  had  to  construct  a  bridge.  At 
this  point  the  cavalry  encountered  a  Confederate  cavalry  picket,  which  was 
driven  to  the  left  across  Stony  Creek,  capturing  a  few  prisoners,  from  whom 
and  from  scouts  it  was  learned  that  the  Confederate  cavalry  was  at  Stony 
Creek  Depot  on  the  Weldon  Railroad,  twelve  miles  to  Sheridan's  left  and  rear. 
Believing  that  by  pushing  on  to  Dinwiddie  Courthouse,  he  would  compel  the 
Confederate  cavalry  to  make  a  wide  detour  in  order  to  rejoin  Lee's  right,  he 
continued  the  march  from  Malone's,  where  Custer's  division  was  left  to  protect 
the  trains,  to  Dinwiddie  Courthouse,  distant  twelve  miles.  This  point  was 
reached  at  five  p.  M.,  after  encountering  only  a  small  picket  of  the  enemy.  At 
Dinwiddie,  Sheridan  bivouacked. 


THE  FINAL  CAMPAIGN.  583 

westward,  parallel  with  Hatcher's  Bun,  and  along  what  is 
known  as  the  White  Oak  road.  This  line  directly  covered 
Lee's  main  communication  by  the  Southside  Kailroad.  Foul 
miles  further  to  the  west  of  the  termination  of  this  intrenched 
front  a  detached  line,  running  also  along  the  White  Oak  road, 
covered  an  important  strategic  point  where  several  roads 
from  the  north  and  south,  converging  on  the  White  Oak  road, 
form  what  is  known  as  the  Five  Forks.  With  this,  however, 
we  have  no  immediate  concern,  as  the  advance  of  Warren 
and  Humphreys  led  not  against  this  isolated  position  of  the 
enemy,  but  against  the  right  flank  of  Lee's  continuous  line. 

The  distance  to  be  traversed  by  the  turning  column  was  not 
great,  but  progress  was  toilsome  and  through  a  difficult  coun 
try.  When  Warren,  on  the  left,  moving  by  the  Quaker  road, 
had  advanced  to  within  about  two  miles  of  the  Confederate 
position,  the  resistance,  which  as  thus  far  encountered  had 
been  easily  swept  away  by  the  skirmishers,  became  more 
spirited,  and  the  leading  division  under  Griffin  was  assailed 
by  a  line  of  battle.  A  warm  action  ensued,  the  brunt  of 
which  was  borne  by  Chamberlain's  brigade.  Griffin  was  able 
to  hold  his  own  and  repulse  the  Confederates,  who  left  in  his 
hands  a  hundred  prisoners  and  their  dead  and  wounded. 
The  Union  loss  was  about  three  hundred  and  seventy  in 
killed  and  wounded.  After  this,  Warren  pressed  on  until  he 
drew  the  fire  from  the  Confederate  intrenched  line  on  the 
White  Oak  road. 

Humphreys,  on  the  right  of  Warren,  continued  his  advance 
through  a  dense  forest  and  undergrowth.  He  had  neared, 
but  not  struck,  the  enemy's  mam  line  when  darkness  stayed 
his  further  progress. 

While  affairs  thus  passed  with  the  infantry,  the  column 
of  horse  under  Sheridan,  sweeping  a  more  adventurous  radius, 
was  manoeuvring  further  to  the  left.  That  evening,  after 
slight  opposition,  Sheridan  occupied  Dinwiddie  Courthouse, 
six  miles  southwest  of  where  the  troops  of  Warren  and  Hum 
phreys  lay  on  their  arms. 

Such  was  the  situation  of  affairs  on  the  night  of  the  29th. 


584  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OP  THE  POTOMAC. 

The  Union  line  was  unbroken  from  the  Appomattox  to  Din- 
widdie  Courthouse,  and  was  in  the  following  order :  Parke, 
Wright,  Ord,  Humphreys,  Warren,  Sheridan.  In  the  morn 
ing  Sheridan  was  to  cut  loose  from  the  army  and  start  on  a 
distant  expedition  against  the  Southside  and  Danville  rail 
roads.  But  the  lieutenant-general  now  altered  his  plan  with 
respect  to  the  cavalry.  "  I  now  feel,"  wrote  General  Grant 
to  Sheridan,  at  Dinwiddie,  on  the  night  of  the  29th,  "  I  now 
feel  like  ending  the  matter,  if  it  is  possible  to  do  so,  before 
going  back.  I  do  not  want  you,  therefore,  to  cut  loose  and 
go  after  the  enemy's  roads  at  present.  In  the  morning,  push 
around  the  enemy,  and  get  on  to  his  right  rear.  We  will  act 
all  together  as  one  army  here  until  it  is  seen  what  can  be  done 
with  the  enemy." 

If  from  some  lofty  tower  of  observation  one  could  that 
night  have  looked  down  into  the  adverse  lines,  there  would 
have  been  seen  within  the  Confederate  camp  a  strange  stir, 
and  amid  the  darkness  a  noiseless  activity,  and  the  outlines  of 
moving  masses  ;  but  the  explanation  would  not  have  been  far 
to  seek,  for  the  head  of  every  column  was  turned  ivestward. 

Sudden  as  had  been  Grant's  manoeuvre  that  day,  it  had  not 
escaped  his  antagonist's  quick  perception,  and,  knowing  well 
how  and  where  the  blow  would  fall,  Lee  was  already  hasten 
ing  to  interpose  such  a  buckler  of  defence  as  would  ward  off 
the  stroke  from  that  vital  part  against  which  it  was  plainly 
directed. 

The  situation  in  which  Lee  now  found  himself  was  almost 
tragic ;  and  if  even  to  the  gods  there  be  something  pleasing 
in  the  spectacle  of  a  brave  man  struggling  against  fate,  it  will 
not  be  unlawful,  while  according  to  the  conduct  of  the  Union 
commander  the  admiration  due  the  power  and  persistency  that 
marked  it,  to  feel  a  like  sentiment  for  the  unfailing  resource 
with  which  the  Confederate  commander,  hoping  against  hope, 
comported  himself  in  a  desperate  strait. 

It  was  essential  that  Lee  should  secure  the  defence  of  his 
right  in  so  solid  a  manner  that  the  powerful  column  which 


THE  FINAL  CAMPAIGN.  585 

Grant  had  thrust  out  by  the  left  should  not  prevail  against 
those  vital  lines  whereon  the  Confederates  depended  for  their 
daily  food.  It  was  at  the  same  time  indispensable  that  he 
should  maintain  the  long  intrenched  line  that  covered  Peters 
burg  and  Richmond,  for  his  antagonist  warily  watched  all  its 
extent,  if  so  be  there  might  offer  an  opening  to  break  through. 
From  his  left,  northeast  of  Richmond,  to  his  right,  southwest 
of  Petersburg,  there  were  thirty-five  miles  of  breastwork 
which  it  behooved  Lee  to  guard,  and  all  the  force  remaining 
to  him  was  thirty-seven  thousand  muskets,  and  a  small  body 
of  broken  down  horse !  But  one  resource  remained — the 
oft-tried  resource  of  stripping  his  intrenched  lines  to  the 
uttermost,  and  with  the  force  thus  gathered  rushing  to  the 
menaced  right  with  the  view  of  checking — if  possible,  of  beat 
ing  back — the  turning  column. 

At  this  time  two  divisions  of  Longstreet's  corps  guarded 
the  lines  of  Richmond,  and  Mahone's  division  of  Hill's  corps 
the  front  of  Bermuda  Hundred.  These  Lee  did  not  dare  to 
weaken,  for,  not  so  well  informed  as  usual,  he  was  not  mas 
ter  of  all  the  bearings  of  the  Union  commander's  opera 
tions.  Unaware  that  Grant  had  already  removed  three  of  the 
four  divisions  that  had  been  confronting  the  Richmond  force, 
Lee  retained  Longstreet  where  he  was,  but  instructed  his  lieu 
tenant  to  move  to  the  Petersburg  side  as  soon  as  he  should 
detect  any  weakening  of  the  adverse  lines.  (Not  till  four  days 
afterwards,  and  when  too  late,  did  Longstreet  detect  how 
feeble  was  the  force  opposed  to  him).  On  the  Petersburg  side 
were  the  divisions  of  Wilcox,  Pickett,  Bushrod  Johnson,  and 
the  remnant  of  Ewell's  corps,  now  under  Gordon.  Taking 
from  these  corps  all  he  dared — two  divisions  and  three  bri 
gades — he  assembled  a  force  of  about  fifteen  thousand,  and 
with  this  he  hurried  to  the  protection  of  his  menaced  right. 
He  left  behind  him  six  or  seven  thousand  men  in  the  Peters 
burg  intrenchments  ;  but  as  these  were  strung  out  to  garnish 
nine  miles  of  breastwork,  they  made  little  more  than  senti 
nels.  To  the  force  set  foot-free,  Lee  added  Fitz  Lee's  divi 
sion  of  cavalry,  and  during  the  night  moved  to  the  right  to 


586  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  AKMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

take  position  within  the  lines  in  front  of  which  the  two  Fed 
eral  corps  had  been  arrested  by  the  darkness. 

The  morning  of  Thursday,  the  30th,  saw  the  Union  force  in 
position,  ready  to  strike.  Lee  was  yet  poorly  prepared  to 
withstand  a  blow,  though  all  night  long  his  troops  had  been 
filing  to  the  right.  But  in  this  situation  fortune  intervened 
in  his  behalf ;  and  Grant,  who  "  felt  like  making  an  end  of 
it,"  found  himself  embargoed  by  adverse  weather  just  when 
all  was  ready  for  the  stroke.  During  the  night  of  the  29th  a 
heavy  storm  of  rain  fell,  and  this  continued  without  cessation 
during  the  30th,  so  that  the  roads  became  almost  impracticable 
for  wheels  or  hoofs,  the  swampy  country  in  which  the  army 
was  operating  was  flooded,  heavy  details  had  to  be  sent  to 
assist  the  trains,  which  were  nearly  immovable  in  the  mud, 
and  all  aggressive  action  had  to  be  suspended.  Yet  Lee's 
infantry  could  tramp  through  the  mire  when  wheeled  vehicles 
might  not  move,  and  the  day's  delay  permitted  the  Confederate 
commander  to  complete  his  dispositions. 

Nothing  was  done  on  the  Union  side  save  to  push  up  the 
corps  of  Humphreys  and  Warren  close  in  front  of  the  Con 
federate  line  on  the  White  Oak  road  and  Hatcher's  Run : 
Sheridan  indeed  dispatched  a  body  of  his  cavalry  towards 
Five  Forks,  but  the  Confederates  were  found  there  in  numbers 
too  strong  to  be  dislodged  by  the  force  sent  forward.  It 
therefore  returned  to  Dinwiddie.* 


*  The  following  extracts,  from  the  reports  of  Generals  Warren,  Humphreys, 
and  Sheridan,  present  the  details  of  whatever  was  done  by  the  Fifth  and  Sec 
ond  corps,  and  the  cavalry,  on  the  30th  of  March  : 

THE  FIFTH  CORPS. — "  It  commenced  raining  in  the  night,  and  continued  to 
do  so  heavily  all  day  on  the  30th.  During  this  day  General  Griffin's  line  was 
advanced,  with  heavy  skirmishing  up  the  Boydton  plankroad,  so  as  to  confine 
the  enemy,  near  Burgess's  Mill,  to  his  breastwork  along  the  White  Oak  road. 
A  reconnoissance  by  General  Ayres'  division  was  also  made  as  far  west  as  where 
the  enemy's  line  along  the  White  Oak  road  turned  northward  to  Hatcher's  Run, 
and  our  picket-line  established  near  the  White  Oak  Ridge.  Finding,  on  per 
sonal  examination,  that  though  we  could  see  the  road,  our  pickets  did  not  occu- 


THE  FINAL  CAMPAIGN.  587 

Friday,  the  31st,  saw  the  ground  still  so  unfavorable  to 
movement  that  active  operations  were  formally  pretermitted 
by  General  Grant.  But  while  the  Union  commander  thus  pro 
posed,  his  opponent  willed  otherwise.  It  now  remains  to  show 
how,  by  the  initiative  of  the  Confederate  commander,  action 
was  precipitated  :  how,  aggressive  to  the  last,  he  Bought  to 
repeat  the  bold  stroke  whereby  he  had  foiled  so  many  previous 

py  it,  I  directed  this  occupation  to  be  made  that  evening." — Warren :  Report 
of  Operations. 

THE  SECOND  CORPS. — "  At  six  A.  M.  on  the  30th  the  advance  was  resumed, 
Hays'  division  on  the  right  being  supported  by  Turner's  division  of  the  Twenty- 
fourth  Cdrps.  The  enemy  was  driven  inside  his  intrenchments  along  Hatcher's 
Run  and  the  White  Oak  road,  this  position  being  attained  at  about  half-past 
eight  or  nine  A.  M.  The  right  of  the  corps  (General  Hays'  right)  rested  on 
Hatcher's  Run,  near  the  Crow  House,  and  the  enemy's  redoubt  in  that  vicinity. 
Turner's  division  of  the  Twenty-fourth  Corps  took  post  along  Hatcher's  Run, 
connecting  with  the  old  intrenchments  which  were  occupied  by  the  Twenty- 
fourth  Corps.  The  left  of  the  corps  connected  with  the  Fifth  Corps  near  the 
Boydton  plankroad,  in  the  vicinity  of  Mrs.  Rainie's.  The  line  of  battle  was 
extended  in  front  of  the  enemy's  intrenchments,  and  was  pressed  as  closely  to 
them  as  practicable  without  assaulting.  The  left,  on  the  Boydton  plankroad, 
was  subsequently  advanced  in  conjunction  with  the  Fifth  Corps,  so  as  to  in 
clude  nearly  the  whole  of  the  Dabney  Mill  road." — Humphreys :  Report  of 
Operations. 

SHERIDAN'S  CAVALRY. — "Early  on  the  morning  of  the  30th  of  March,  I  di 
rected  General  Merritt  to  send  the  first  division,  Brigadier-General  Devin  com 
manding,  to  gain  possession  of  the  Five  Forks,  or  White  Oak  road,  and  directed 
General  Crook  to  send  General  Davies'  brigade  of  his  division  to  the  support  of 
General  Devin. 

"  Gregg's  brigade,  of  Crook's  division,  was  held  on  the  Boydton  plankroad, 
and  guarded  the  crossing  of  Stony  Creek,  forcing  the  enemy's  cavalry  that  was 
moving  from  Stony  Creek  depot  to  form  a  connection  with  the  right  of  their 
army,  to  make  a  wide  detour,  as  I  had  anticipated,  on  the  south  side  of  Stony 
Creek,  and  west  of  Chamberlain's  Bed — a  very  fatiguing  march,  in  the  bad 
condition  of  the  roads.  A  very  heavy  rain  fell  during  this  day,  aggravating 
the  swampy  nature  of  the  ground,  and  rendering  the  movement  of  troops  al 
most  impossible.  General  Merritt's  reconnoissance  developed  the  enemy  in 
strong  force  on  the  White  Oak  road,  in  the  vicinity  of  Five  Forks,  and  there 
was  some  heavy  skirmishing  throughout  the  day." — Sheridan :  Report  of  Op 
erations. 


588  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

turning  attempts.  But,  first  of  all,  it  is  needful  to  describe 
the  precise  position  of  Warren's  corps,  which  held  the  left  of 
the  Union  line,  and  certain  changes  in  its  disposition  that  had 
that  morning  taken  place.  Though  these  changes  had  not,  as 
has  been  supposed,  any  important  bearing  on  Lee's  action 
(which  had  been  predetermined),  they  are  nevertheless  neces 
sary  to  the  just  appreciation  of  what  followed. 

During  the  30th  Warren  had  held  position,  with  the  divisions 
of  Griffin  and  Crawford,  on  the  Boydton  plankroad,  only  the 
division  of  Ayres  being  thrown  forward  to  the  west  of  it.  But 
at  daylight  of  the  31st,  his  right  division  under  Griffin  was  re 
lieved  by  the  division  of  Miles  of  the  Second  Corps,  so  as  to 
permit  a  greater  development  to  the  left.  Warren  then  moved 
his  entire  corps  to  the  westward  of  the  Boydton  plankroad,  and 
pushed  it  forward  so  that  its  pressure  was  directly  upon  the 
extreme  right  of  the  Confederate  intrenched  line  on  the  White 
Oak  road.  The  position  of  his  corps  was  then  in  this  wise : 
Ayres'  division  thrown  forward  to  within  a  few  hundred  yards 
of  the  White  Oak  road;  Crawford's  division  in  rear  of  and 
somewhat  to  the  right  of  Ayres ;  Griffin'^  division  in  rear  of 
and  somewhat  to  the  right  of  Crawford.  In  case  of  any  hos 
tile  sally  on  the  part  of  Lee,  the  position  held  by  Warren  was 
one  of  great  delicacy ;  for  as  Sheridan  was  isolated  from  the 
infantry  by  several  miles,  Warren  formed  the  very  left  of  the 
Union  line,  and  had  to  protect  his  own  flank. 

Thus  placed,  Warren  made  a  disposition  of  his  troops  that 
was  perfectly  conformable  to  correct  principles,  and  one  that 
showed  a  much  juster  appreciation  of  the  method  of  action 
suited  to  such  a  situation  than  was  manifested  in  the  conven 
tional  system  in  vogue.  In  spite  of  the  many  costly  proofs 
already  received  of  the  futility  of  long,  thin,  and  consequently 
everywhere  weak  lines  of  battle,  upon  the  naked  flanks  of 
which  Lee  had  made  a  series  of  constantly  successful  swoops, 
each  new  turning  operation  saw  this  error  repeated.  Warren, 
however,  discerning  truly  what  had  always  been  Lee's  oppor 
tunity,  in  place  of  attempting  to  maintain  a  weakly  extended 
line  from  the  left  of  Humphreys'  corps,  disposed  his  troops 


THE  FINAL  CAMPAIGN.  589 


in  masses  en  echelon,  so  that  they  could  meet  attack  from  any 
direction,  and  readily  re-enforce  any  point  assailed.  To  make 
his  position  still  more  secure,  Warren  desired  to  throw  for 
ward  the  skirmishers  on  his  left  to  seize  the  White  Oak  road, 
beyond  the  termination  of  the  Confederate  intrenched  line. 
By  this  means  he  would  observe  closely  the  road  by  which 
Lee  would  move  in  any  operation  to  strike  Warren's  flank. 
He  therefore  ordered  Ayres  to  advance  a  brigade  from  his 
division  and  drive  off  the  enemy  from  that  road,  or  develop 
in  what  force  it  was  held.  On  communicating  this  order  to 
General  Meade,  Warren  was  directed,  if  he  found  by  his  re- 
connoissance  that  he  could  get  possession  of  the  White  Oak 
road,  to  do  so,  notwithstanding  previous  instructions  to  sus 
pend  operations  for  the  day.* 

*  "  I  beg  leave  to  call  attention  to  a  statement  in  the  report  of  General  Grant, 
which  must  have  been  made  from  erroneous  information.  '  On  the  morning  of 
the  31st,  General  Warren  reported  favorably  to  getting  possession  of  the  White 
Oak  road,  and  was  directed  to  do  so.  To  accomplish  this,  he  moved  with  one 
division,  instead  of  his  whole  corps/  Now,  strictly  speaking,  '  On  the  morning 
of  the  31st  General  Warren  did  not  report  favorably  to  getting  possession  of 
the  White  Oak  road,  and  was  not  directed  to  do  so.  Nor  'to  accomplish  this, 
did  he  move  with  one  division  instead  of  his  whole  corps.'  *  *  The  operation 
I  directed  was  to  secure  a  good  position  for  our  picket-line,  and  to  develop  with 
what  force  the  White  Oak  road,  in  General  Ayres'  vicinity,  was  held.  My  in 
structions  to  General  Ayres  were  to  advance  his  pickekline,  using  a  brigade  as 
support,  if  necessary.  I  informed  General  Meade  of  this,  and  he,  in  a  dispatch 
I  received  about  eleven  A.  M.,  directed  that,  '  should  you  determine  by  your 
reconnoissance  that  you  can  get  possession  of,  and  hold  the  White  Oak  road, 
you  are  to  do  so,  notwithstanding  the  orders  to  suspend  operations.' 

"  Thus  it  appears  that  I  did  not  move  with  a  division,  but  with  a  reconnoi 
tring  brigade,  which  reconnoissance  it  was  necessary  to  make  to  ascertain  where 
to  use  the  whole  corps  if  it  were  to  be  all  used.  The  order  to  take  possession 
of  the  road  was  contingent  upon  the  result  of  the  reconnoissance.  It  is  also 
evident  that  only  in  a  very  modified  sense  could  I  be  said  to  have  as  yet  re 
ported  favorably  to  getting  possession  of  the  road.  At  most,  I  had  but  ex 
pressed  my  willingness  to  try,  venturing  a  little  on  my  own  responsibility 
to  achieve  a  desired  end,  and  ready  to  make  every  hazard,  if  ordered. 

"  Simultaneous  with  this  advance  of  General  Ayres'  picket-line,  the  enemy 
attacked  us  in  heavy  force."  —  Warren  :  Report  of  Operations. 


590  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

Hardly,  however,  was  this  reconnoissance  begun  by  an  ad 
vance  of  the  brigade  of  "Winthrop,  at  half-past  ten  A.  M.,  than 
a  heavy  attack  fell  upon  Warren. 

It  was  Lee's  initiative.  Often  before  had  he  broken  up 
these  turning  movements  in  their  inception  by  falling  heavily 
on  the  exposed  flank  of  the  Union  force.  Once  more  he  es 
sayed  the  like  blow,  and,  to  give  it  all  the  weight  possible,  he 
threw  into  it  the  bulk  of  the  troops  he  had  collected  and  formed 
on  his  right. 

The  attack  upon  Warren  was  sudden,  and  burst  out  simul 
taneously  both  from  the  north  and  west.  It  was  indeed  near 
attaining  almost  the  wonted  success,  for  Ayres'  troops,  finding 
themselves  enveloped  in  the  thick  woods,  easily  gave  way, 
falling  back  on  Crawford,  whose  division,  disorganized  by  the 
fugitives,  broke  in  turn.  Happily  the  disposition  Warren  had 
made  of  his  force  rendered  this  disruption  far  from  irretriev 
able.  No  disaster  had  occurred,  for  the  troops  ran  rather  be 
cause  they  were  bewildered  by  a  sudden  flank  and  rear  attack 
in  a  dense  and  swampy  forest,  than  because  they  were  forcibly 
beaten  back.  When,  however,  they  emerged  into  the  clearer 
ground  in  the  rear,  where  Griffin's  division  held  post,  they 
were  soon  rallied.  The  good  effect  of  the  echelon  arrangement 
was  now  seen.  Griffin  maintained  his  ground  immovably. 
The  Confederate  onset  was  soon  checked,  and  Warren,  gather 
ing  together  his  forces,  prepared  to  make  a  counter-attack. 
To  assist  this,  General  Humphreys  promptly  advanced  Miles' 
division  on  the  right  of  Warren.  While  the  Fifth  Corps  at 
tacked  in  front,  Miles  assailed  the  Confederate  left  flank.  The 
operations  of  both  forces  were  spirited  and  forcible,  and  re 
sulted  in  repulsing  the  enemy  at  all  points,  and  driving  him 
back  to  his  old  line  on  the  White  Oak  road.  In  the  Fifth 
Corps,  Chamberlain's  brigade  was  especially  distinguished, 
capturing  nearly  the  whole  of  the  Fifty-sixth  Virginia  regi 
ment,  with  its  colors.  Miles  also  took  one  flag  and  many 
prisoners.  Humphreys,  with  his  remaining  two  divisions,  at 
tempted  also  to  carry  the  enemy's  works  covering  the  Boyd« 
ton  road  crossing  of  the  White  Oak  road  and  those  on  the 


THE  FINAL  CAMPAIGN.  591 

west  side  of  Hatcher's  Kun ;  but  these  efforts  met  no  sue 
cess.* 

To  Lee  paucity  of  numbers  made  economy  of  life  so  im 
perative  a  duty,  that,  though  he  was  pushed  by  his  temper  and 
the  necessities  of  his  situation  to  attempt  an  aggressive  policy, 
he  knew  well  that  he  could  only  hope  for  such  success  as  sud 
den  swoops  might  bring,  and  that  he  was  in  no  condition  to 
attempt  a  general  offensive.  Hence,  when  he  found  himself 
foiled  in  the  attack  against  the  left  of  the  infantry,  he  drew 
back  with  but  slight  effort  to  resist  the  countercharge  of 
Warren,  and  sought  some  other  favorable  opening  for  a  blow. 
Such  an  opening  was  presented  by  the  cavalry  of  Sheridan, 
who,  by  manoeuvres  now  to  be  described,  had  gained  a  position 
that  was  very  menacing  to  Lee's  right  flank. 

From  the  position  of  Sheridan  at  Dinwiddie  Courthouse 
the  distance  to  the  Five  Forks  was  about  eight  miles  due  north  ; 
and  from  Five  Forks  the  distance  to  Lee's  intrenched  line  con 
fronting  Warren  and  Humphreys  was  but  four  miles  east.  Hold 
ing  Five  Forks,  one  holds  the  strategic  key  that  opens  up  the 
whole  region  which  Lee  was  now  seeking  to  cover.  Sheridan, 
appreciating  the  immense  importance  of  this  point,  deter 
mined,  notwithstanding  the  obstruction  to  the  movements 
of  cavalry  caused  by  the  storm  that  had  overtaken  the  army, 
and  the  consequent  increase  of  operations,  to  secure  its 
possession.  Nowise  disconcerted  by  the  failure  of  the  attempt 
of  the  previous  day,  he,  on  the  morning  of  the  31st,  directed 

*  The  details  of  Humphreys'  operations  on  the  31st  are  as  follows :  Miles,  by 
his  advance,  succeeded  in  occupying  the  White  Oak  road ;  but  the  enemy's  in- 
trenchments  here  covered  a  strong  position  on  the  crest  of  a  long  slope,  with 
wide  slashings  in  front  and  abatis  covering  the  ditch,  with  artillery  at  short 
intervals.  De  Trobiand's  brigade  of  Mott's  division  was  put  into  position  to 
strengthen  Miles,  and  subsequently  McAllister's  brigade  was  extended  to  the 
left  to  perfect  the  connection.  During  the  day  General  Mott  made  an  attempt 
to  carry  the  redoubts  and  intrenchments  covering  the  Boydton  road  crossing, 
but  without  success.  General  Hays  likewise  attempted  to  carry  the  Crow 
House  redoubt,  but  was  prevented  by  the  heavy  slashing,  which  was  impass 
able  for  any  large  number  of  troops. 


502  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

Devin's  division  again  towards  Five  Forks.  Finding  that  this 
body  encountered  a  considerable  opposition,  he  re-enforced  it 
with  Davies'  brigade  of  Crook's  division,  while  Crook,  with  his 
other  two  brigades,  under  Smith  and  Gregg,  were  ordered  to 
the  left,  and  encountered  a  hostile  cavalry  force  at  Chamber 
lain's  Creek,  a  little  west  of  Dinwiddie.  With  his  two  brigades 
Crook  held  this  body  in  check,  and  Devin  and  Davies  moved 
upon  and  seized  Five  Forks,  which  at  the  moment  was  guarded 
by  but  a  small  force,  the  Confederate  cavalry  being  mainly  on 
the  west  side  of  Chamberlain's  Creek,  and  the  infantry  engaged 
with  Warren. 

But  the  tenure  of  Five  Forks  was  not  to  be  long.  Having 
been  foiled  in  the  assault  on  Warren,  Lee  detached  portions 
of  the  two  divisions  of  infantry  under  Pickett  and  Bushrod 
Johnson,  and  moved  them  by  the  White  Oak  road  westward  to 
Five  Forks.  These  falling  upon  the  Union  cavalry  there,  drove 
it  out  and.  back  in  confusion  on  Dinwiddie  Courthouse.  The 
Confederates  then  pushed  rapidly  forward  on  the  west  side  of 
Chamberlain's  Creek,  but  when  they  attempted  to  cross  this, 
in  order  to  strike  Dinwiddie  Courthouse,  they  were  foiled  by 
the  stout  resistance  of  Smith's  brigade.  They  then  effected  a 
crossing  higher  up  the  creek,  and  falling  upon  Davies'  brigade 
forced  it  back  against  the  left  flank  of  Devin's  division,  thus 
partially  isolating  all  this  force  from  Sheridan's  main  line  at 
Dinwiddie  Courthouse.  In  order  to  unite  it  on  this  line,  Sheri 
dan  directed  it  to  make  a  detour  by  the  Boydton  plankroad. 
The  execution  of  this  manoeuvre  appeared  to  the  Confederates 
a  forced  retreat  on  the  part  of  Devin,  and,  deceived  by  this, 
they  made  a  left  wheel,  and  were  proceeding  to  follow  him  up. 
This  tactical  change  caused  the  Confederates  to  present  the 
flank  and  rear  of  their  line  of  battle  to  Sheridan's  force  at 
Dinwiddie,  whereupon,  seizing  the  opportunity,  he  directed  a 
charge  to  be  made  with  the  brigades  of  Gregg  and  Gibbs. 
This  unlooked-for  sally  compelled  the  Confederates  to  face  by 
the  rear  rank  and  give  up  the  movement  against  Devin,  who 
was  thus  enabled  to  rejoin  the  main  body.  Against  this  the 
Confederates  now  advanced  with  all  the  force  of  cavalry  and 


THE  FINAL  CAMPAIGN.  593 

infantry  present.  In  numbers  the  assailants  were  not  superior 
to  the  Union  cavalry,  but  they  had  an  advantage  in  the  range 
of  the  fire-arms  of  their  infantry. 

Thus  placed,  Sheridan  displayed  yery  commendable  pluck. 
Having  dismounted  his  troopers,  he  disposed  them  behind  a 
slight  breastwork  previously  prepared,  and  here,  from  their 
carbines,  they  poured  so  biting  a  fire  into  the  ranks  of  the 
assailants  that  they  were  repulsed  in  the  attack,  and  darkness 
prevented  its  renewal.  The  conduct  of  the  men  was  certainly 
excellent ;  but  it  was  a  great  relief  when  night  intervened  to 
abridge  the  attack  of  the  Confederates,  for  the  cavalry  had 
been  sorely  handled  in  the  action. 

The  tidings  of  Sheridan's  situation  received  at  headquarters 
led  to  the  belief  that  he  could  not  maintain  himself  at  Dinwid- 
die  unless  re-enforced,  and  such  was  the  alarm  in  regard  to  the 
safety  of  his  force,  that  all  dispositions  became  subordinated  to 
the  forwarding  of  troops  to  his  succor.  For  this  purpose  War 
ren  was,  at  nine  p.  M.  of  the  31st,  ordered  to  send  a  division  to 
Dinwiddie  Courthouse  by  way  of  the  Boydton  plankroad ;  and 
two  hours  later,  the  concern  about  Sheridan  growing  mean 
while,  he  was  directed  to  move  with  his  two  other  divisions 
by  a  road  to  the  west,  with  the  idea  that  he  would  strike  the 
rear  of  the  Confederate  force  confronting  Sheridan.* 


*  Previously  to  this — to  wit,  about  five  P.  M.,  and  before  it  became  known 
that  Sheridan  was  being  pressed  by  the  enemy — Warren  had  been  directed  to 
send  a  small  force  down  the  White  Oak  road  to  communicate  with  General 
Sheridan.  Warren  accordingly  dispatched  Bartlett's  brigade,  which  moved 
across  the  country  in  a  southwesterly  direction,  towards  Sheridan's  firing. 
Bartlett  forced  his  way,  after  brisk  skirmishing,  to  Gravelly  Run,  across  which 
a  hostile  body  was  driven  ;  but  as  it  was  much  after  dark  before  he  completed 
his  dispositions,  no  further  advance  could  be  made  that  night.  When,  how 
ever,  an  hour  or  two  later,  intelligence  was  received  of  what  had  befallen 
Sheridan,  such  was  the  alarm  thereby  inspired  at  headquarters,  that  it  was 
even  determined  to  go  so  far  as  to  sacrifice  the  advanced  position  gained  by  the 
Fifth  and  Second  corps.  The  following  extract  will  show  that  General  Warren 
was  himself  the  first  to  suggest  that  he  should  be  allowed  to  move  with  his 
whole  corps,  and  attack  in  rear  the  force  confronting  Sheridan  : 

88 


594          CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

"Warren  promptly  dispatched  Ayres'  division,  as  the  one  that 
could  get  under  way  most  expeditiously ;  and  proceeded  to 
make  arrangements  to  move  with  the  other  two  divisions  as 
soon  as  practicable.  Had  the  roads  been  unobstructed,  the 
march  to  Dinwiddie  would  not  have  occupied  above  four  or 
five  hours.  When,  however,  the  project  was  formed  of  send 
ing  Warren  to  succor  Sheridan,  there  was  one  very  important 
fact  which  was  not  known  at  headquarters,  but  which  was  of 
a  nature  to  prevent  any  possibility  of  a  force  reaching  Sheri 
dan  that  night.  This  was  the  fact  that  the  bridge  over  Grav 
elly  Kun,  by  the  Boydton  plankroad,  was  destroyed.  It  was,  by 
consequence,  necessary  for  General  Ayres  to  halt  at  the  run 
until  an  infantry  bridge  was  built.  This  consumed  till  near 
two  A.  M.  of  April  1st,  when  Ayres  crossed  his  division  and  has 
tened  towards  Dinwiddie. 

When  the  condition  of  the  crossing  of  Gravelly  Run  became 
known  to  General  Meade,  that  commander,  believing  that 
Sheridan  "  could  not  maintain  himself  at  Dinwiddie  without 
De-enforcements,"  suggested  (in  a  dispatch  received  by  General 
Warren  at  one  A.  M.)  other  methods  by  which  the  desired  end 

"  At  8.40  P.  M.  I  received  by  telegraph  the  following,  marked  '  Confidential,' 
from  General  Webb,  chief  of  staff,  written  8.30  P.  M.  :  '  The  probability  is,  that 
we  will  have  to  contract  our  lines  to-night.  You  will  be  required  to  hold,  if 
possible,  the  Boydton  plankroad  and  to  Gravelly  Run.  Humphreys  and  Ord 
along  the  run.  Be  prepared  to  do  this  at  short  notice.' 

"  I  regretted  exceedingly  to  see  this  step  foreshadowed ;  for  I  feared  it  would 
have  the  morale  of  giving  a  failure  to  our  whole  movement,  as  similar  orders 
had  done  on  previous  occasions.  It  would,  besides,  relieve  the  enemy  in  front 
of  Sheridan  from  the  threatening  attitude  my  position  gave  me.  I  therefore 
sent  the  following  by  telegraph,  at  8.40  P.  M.,  to  General  Webb  :  '  The  line 
along  the  plankroad  is  very  strong.  One  division,  with  my  artillery,  I  think, 
can  hold  it,  if  we  are  not  threatened,  south  of  Gravelly  Run,  east  of  the  plank 
road.  General  Humphreys  and  my  batteries,  I  think,  could  hold  this  securely, 
and  let  me  move  down  and  attack  the  enemy  at  Dinwiddie  Courthouse  on  one 
side,  and  Sheridan  on  the  other.  On  account  of  Bartlett's  position,  they  (the 
enemy)  will  have  to  make  a  considerable  detour  to  re-enforce  their  troops  at 
that  point  from  the  north.  Unless  General  Sheridan  has  been  too  badly 
handled,  I  think  we  have  a  chance  for  an  open  field-fight  that  should  be  made 
.use  of/  "—Warren  :  Report  of  Operations  of  March  29,  30,  and  31. 


THE  FINAL  CAMPAIGN.  595 

might  be  accomplished.  They  did  not,  however,  meet  the 
real  state  of  facts.  He  suggested  that  Warren  should  send 
troops  both  by  the  Boydton  plankroad  and  by  the  Quaker 
road,  further  to  the  east,  even  if  he  should  give  up  the  medi 
tated  rear  attack.  But  the  distance  to  Dinwiddie  by  the 
Quaker  road  was  above  ten  miles,  and,  at  the  advanced  hour 
of  the  night  at  which  the  dispatch  was  received,  it  would  have 
been  impossible  for  the  troops  by  that  road  to  have  reached 
Dinwiddie  before  eight  A.  M.,  by  which  time  they  could  be  of 
no  use  in  holding  that  place.  In  this  case  the  most  direct 
route  for  the  rear  attack  would  be  down  the  plankroad,  by 
which  Ayres'  division  was  marching.  Solicitous  as  General 
Warren  was,  therefore,  of  arriving  for  Sheridan's  succor  at  the 
earliest  possible  moment,  he  justly  judged  that  the  desired  end 
could  be  best  attained  by  abiding  the  movements  already  be 
gun,  holding,  meantime,  the  two  divisions  of  Griffin  and  Craw 
ford  where  they  were,  until  he  should  hear  that  Ayres'  division 
had  reached  Dinwiddie. 

In  the  midst  of  this  general  anxiety  for  Sheridan,  that  offi 
cer  himself  had  ceased  to  feel  any  solicitude  touching  his  situ 
ation  ;  for  before  midnight  he  knew  that  the  enemy  had  with 
drawn  all  but  a  mask  of  force  from  his  front.  Lee,  in  fact, 
could  not  afford  to  retain  so  considerable  a  body  at  Dinwiddie, 
both  because  it  was  very  much  out  of  position  for  the  defence 
of  the  Confederate  line  on  the  White  Oak  road,  and  because 
the  force  thus  isolated  was  directly  menaced  by  Warren.  It 
was,  therefore,  retired  by  Lee  as  soon  as  he  could  communicate 
with  it,  which  was  about  ten  p.  M.  of  the  31st,  and  it  fell  back 
and  took  position  at  Five  Forks,  leaving  only  a  cavalry  picket, 
which  also  withdrew  as  soon  as  assailed  at  dawn.  It  was,  in 
fact,  seen  hastily  decamping  by  Ayres,  when,  at  daylight  of 
April  1st,  he  joined  the  cavalry.  Sheridan  followed  up  vig 
orously,  putting  his  whole  force  in  motion  northward  towards 
Five  Forks.  Meantime,  Warren  withdrew  his  two  other  divi 
sions,  which,  marching  directly  across  the  country,  joined  the 
cavalry  midway  between  Dinwiddie  Courthouse  and  Five  Forks 
at  seven  A.  M.,  April  1st. 


596  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  AEMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

Full  of  doubts  and  fears  as  the  night  had  been,  morning 
dispelled  these  noxious  vapors.  The  event  proved  a  happy 
illustration  of  "  All's  well  that  ends  well ;"  for,  thanks  to  the 
good  judgment  of  Warren  in  keeping  his  corps  together,  it 
was  now  in  position  where  it  could  best  be  applied  conjointly 
with  the  cavalry  in  a  renewed  effort  against  the  Confederate 
position  at  Five  Forks.  Towards  that  position  Sheridan  was 
resolved  to  move,  and  in  the  operations  that  followed,  "Warren, 
with  the  Fifth  Corps,  came  under  his  orders. 


IV. 

FIVE   FORKS  AND  PETERSBURG 

The  situation  of  the  opposing  forces  on  the  moining  of  the 
1st  of  April  was  somewhat  peculiar.  From  the  Appomattox 
to  Hatcher's  Eun  the  Confederate  line  was  so  meagerly  gar 
nished  with  troops  that  there  was  but  one  man  to  every  five 
yards  of  front.  Confronting  this  line  were  the  Union  corps  of 
Parke,  "Wright,  Ord,  and  Humphreys.  But  the  point  of  dis 
pute  was  nowhere  along  these  locked  lines  ;  and  as,  by  times, 
in  olden  battles,  the  whole  array  of  two  opposing  armies 
would  stand  still  while  one  knight  from  each  side  engaged  in 
single  combat,  so  it  seemed  to  be  now  tacitly  agreed  that  the 
gage  of  battle  was  for  the  possession  of  the  Five  Forks — an 
isolated  position  four  miles  to  the  west  of  the  Federal  left  and 
Confederate  right.  Hither  Sheridan  was  moving,  and  here, 
as  for  the  defence  of  a  point  of  vital  value,  Lee  had  accumu 
lated  all  the  force  he  could  spare. 

In  thus  massing  upon  his  right,  Lee  ran  a  great  risk ;  for 
the  Petersburg  defences  were  left  so  inadequately  defended, 
that  they  were  incapable  of  withstanding  a  serious  attack. 
But  necessity  left  no  alternative.  It  is  worthy  of  note  that 
there  was  no  imperative  need  of  delivering  battle  at  Five 
Forks,  for  Sheridan's  manoeuvres  by  the  left,  together  with  the 
pressure  of  the  Second  and  Fifth  corps,  had  had  so  fully 


THE  FINAL  CAMPAIGN.  597 

tfte  effect  of  drawing  the  Confederate  strength  to  a  head  at 
that  flank,  that  it  was  open  to  the  Union  force  to  break  di 
rectly  through  the  Petersburg  defences.  Indeed,  both  Wright 
and  Ord,  ascertaining  from  their  reconnoissances  the  compara 
tive  nakedness  of  the  Confederate  works,  reported  favorably 
to  assault  on  the  1st.  Bat  it  was  otherwise  determined.  There 
is,  however,  no  occasion  to  note,  otherwise  than  as  a  contin 
gency  of  the  situation,  that  the  battle  of  Five  Forks  need  not 
necessarily  have  been  fought  in  order  to  have  gained  the  cap 
ture  of  Petersburg.  That,  nevertheless,  it  was  fortunate  it  was 
fought,  will  not  be  doubtful  after  the  recital  of  the  events  of 
that  brilliant  action. 

Pressing  forward  his  cavalry,  Sheridan,  by  spirited  charges, 
drove  the  Confederates  from  two  temporary  lines,  until,  at  two 
p.  M.,  April  1st,  he  had  confined  them  within  their  works  at 
the  Five  Forks.  The  admirable  method  in  which  Sheridan 
combined  the  operations  of  cavalry  and  infantry — using  the 
former  as  an  impenetrable  mask  behind  which  he  manoeuvred 
with  the  latter — has  already  been  seen  in  the  history  of  the 
Valley  campaign.  This  combination  was  now  to  receive  a  new 
and  splendid  illustration. 

In  pressing  back  the  enemy  into  his  works  Sheridan  had  em 
ployed  only  his  powerful  body  of  horse,  leaving  the  Fifth  Corps 
behind,  at  the  point  where  it  had  joined  the  cavalry  in  the  morn 
ing.  Now,  however,  that  the  Confederates  were  confined  within 
the  defences  on  the  White  Oak  road,  where  they  were  closely 
enveloped  by  his  numerous  squadrons,  he  directed  General 
Warren  to  bring  forward  the  Fifth  Corps,  for  the  employment 
of  which  he  devised  a  beautiful  tactical  manoeuvre.  He  ordered 
General  Merritt,  while  holding  the  enemy  in  front  with  the  cav 
alry,  to  demonstrate  as  though  he  aimed  to  turn  the  Confeder 
ate  right,  and  he  directed  Warren  to  form  the  infantry  so  that 
its  full  pressure  would  fall  directly  on  the  enemy's  left  flank. 
At  the  same  time  he  sent  McKenzie's  division  of  cavalry,  which 
had  joined  him  that  day,  to  the  White  Oak  road  to  cover  the 
right  flank  from  anv  hostile  force  moving  westward  from  the  di- 


598  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

rection  of  Petersburg.  McKenzie  executed  his  orders  witli 
skill  and  vigor,  attacking  a  body  of  the  enemy  and  driving  it  to 
wards  Petersburg,  after  which  he  countermarched  and  rejoined 
Sheridan  in  time  to  participate  in  the  action. 

Warren  formed  his  corps  before  moving  forward.  He  dis 
posed  Ayres'  division  on  the  left  and  Crawford's  on  the  right, 
with  Griffin's  in  reserve  behind  the  right.  Each  of  the  two 
front  divisions  placed  two  brigades  in  front,  each  brigade  in 
two  lines  of  battle  ;  and  the  third  brigade  in  two  lines  of  bat 
tle  behind  the  centre  of  the  two  front  lines.  Griffin's  division 
was  posted  in  column  of  battalions  in  mass  behind  the  right. 
In  moving,  the  lines  were  instructed  to  keep  closed  to  the 
left,  and  to  preserve  their  direction  in  the  woods  by  keeping 
the  sun,  which  was  shining  brightly,  in  the  same  position  over 
their  left  shoulders.  The  movement  was  to  be  forward  to  the 
"White  Oak  road,  at  a  point  beyond  the  enemy's  left  flank, 
when  the  line  was  to  swing  round,  pivoting  on  the  left,  and 
having  formed  itself  perpendicular  to  the  White  Oak  road,  it 
was  then  to  advance  and  fall  upon  the  Confederate  left  flank. 

Warren's  dispositions  being  promptly  completed  by  four 
p.  M.,  he  immediately  then  advanced.  A  few  minutes  brought 
the  line  to  the  White  Oak  road,  distant  about  a  thousand 
yards,  when  it  changed  front  so  as  to  face  westward  instead 
of  northward.  The  Fifth  Corps  was  now  directly  on  the  left 
flank  and  rear  of  the  Confederates,  with  a  line  of  battle 
formed  perpendicular  to  their  position.  The  enemy  had, 
however,  refused  his  left  in  a  crotchet  about  a  hundred 
yards  in  length  turned  northward  at  right  angles  to  his 
main  line,  and  covered  by  a  strong  breastwork  screened 
behind  a  dense  undergrowth  of  pines.  Thence  northward 
to  Hatcher's  Run,  the  Confederates  pieced  out  the  line 
by  a  slim  picket.  Ayres'  division  being  the  pivot  on  which 
Crawford's  and  Griffin's  wheeled,  effected  its  change  of  front 
first,  and  encountered  the  enemy's  skirmishers  in  front  of 
the  position  at  the  crotchet.  That  division  covered  nearly 
the  whole  of  this  refused  line,  so  that  Crawford  and  Ayres 
outflanked  it  to  the  north.  Or  nearly  so  :  Crawford's  division, 


THE  FINAL  CAMPAIGN.  599 

indeed,  in  changing  front,  having  occasion  to  pass  over  some 
open  ground,  received  on  its  left  from  this  line  a  fire  which 
caused  the  division  to  oblique  to  the  right,  so  as  to  keep  the 
protection  of  the  woods  and  ridge  while  executing  the  ma 
noeuvre.  Now,  owing  to  this  circumstance — to  wit,  that  Craw 
ford's  division  on  the  right  of  Ayres,  having  to  manoeuvre  on 
a  more  extended  radius  and  being  also  thrown  more  to  the 
right  to  avoid  the  enemy's  fire,  was  not  able  to  change  front 
so  rapidly — it  came  about  that  Ayres'  right  was  for  a  time  "  in 
air  ;"  and  as  it  received  the  same  fire  that  Crawford's  left  had 
encountered,  the  troops  on  that  flank  became  very  unsteady, 
and  many  broke  to  the  rear.  This  difficulty,  however,  was  soon 
remedied.  Griffin's  division  was  drawn  in  towards  the  left  to 
close  up  this  interval,  and  Ayres'  division  assailing  the  enemy's 
intrenched  crotchet,  carried  it  by  an  impetuous  charge,  in 
which  above  a  thousand  prisoners  and  several  battle-flags 
were  taken.  Griffin  then  fell  upon  the  rear  of  the  enemy's 
left,  capturing  the  breastworks  and  fifteen  hundred  prisoners. 
At  the  same  time  Crawford,  who  was  moving  further  to  the 
right,  advanced  steadily  in  rear  of  the  enemy's  line,  driving 
back  the  skirmishers  all  the  way,  and  continually  turning  the 
left  of  any  force  opposing  Ayres  and  Griffin,  till  he  attained 
the  Ford  road,  which  runs  directly  northward  from  the  centre 
of  the  Confederate  rear,  and  thence  across  Hatcher's  Run.  The 
outlet  for  the  enemy's  escape  northward  being  thus  closed, 
Warren  directed  Crawford's  line  to  swing  round  to  face  south 
ward  and  advance  upon  the  reverse  side  of  the  enemy's  line. 

The  Confederates  were  now  completely  entrapped.  Held  as 
in  a  vice  by  the  cavalry  which  enveloped  their  whole  front  and 
right,  stung  them  with  a  biting  fire,  and  charged  at  the  signal 
of  the  musketry  of  the  infantry,  they  now  found  a  line  of  bat 
tle  sweeping  down  on  their  rear.  Thus  placed,  they  did  all 
that  men  may.  Forming  front  both  north  and  south,  they 
met  with  a  desperate  valor  this  double  onset.  But  it  was 
vain.  From  the  rear  Warren  swept  down  towards  the  White 
Oak  road,  Crawford  taking  four  guns  ;  and  simultaneously  the 
cavalry  from  the  front  charged  upon  this  road  with  resistless 


(;00  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

impetuosity.  The  whole  centre  was  now  carried,  as  the  left 
had  been  before,  and  the  Confederates,  pressed  front,  flank, 
and  rear,  mostly  threw  down  their  arms.  Having  gained  the 
White  Oak  road,  Warren  changed  front  again  to  the  right  and 
advanced  westward,  thus  constantly  taking  in  flank  and  rear 
whatever  hostile  force  still  continued  to  hold  the  right  of  the 
Confederate  line.  This  had  originally  been  about  three  miles 
in  extent,  but  above  two-thirds  of  it  were  now  carried.  Yet, 
vital  in  all  its  parts,  what  of  the  two  divisions  remained  still 
continued  the  combat  with  unyielding  mettle.  Parrying  the 
thrusts  of  the  cavalry  from  the  front,  this  poor  scratch  of  a  force 
threw  back  its  left  in  a  new  and  short  crotchet  so  as  to  meet  the 
advance  of  Warren,  who  continued  to  press  in  at  right  angles 
with  the  White  Oak  road.  When  the  infantry,  greatly  elated 
with  their  success,  but  somewhat  disorganized  by  marching 
and  fighting  so  long  in  the  woods,  arrived  before  this  new  line, 
they  halted  and  opened  an  untimely  fusillade,  though  there  had 
been  orders  not  to  halt.  The  officers,  indeed,  urged  their 
men  forward,  but  they  continued  to  fire  without  advancing. 
Seeing  this  hesitation,  Warren  dashed  forward,  calling  to  those 
near  him  to  follow.  Inspired  by  his  example,  the  color- 
bearers  and  officers  all  along  the  front  sprang  out,  and,  with 
out  more  firing,  the  men  charged  at  the  pas  de  course,  captur 
ing  all  that  remained  of  the  enemy.  The  history  of  the  war 
presents  no  equally  splendid  illustration  of  personal  magnet 
ism.  Warren  led  the  van  of  the  rushing  lines  ;  his  horse  was  fa 
tally  shot  within  a  few  feet  of  the  breastworks,  and  he  himself 
was  in  imminent  peril,  when  a  gallant  officer,  Colonel  Eichard- 
son  of  the  Seventh  Wisconsin,  sprang  between  him  and  the 
enemy,  receiving  a  severe  wound,  but  shielding  from  hurt  the 
person  of  his  loved  commander. 

A  charge  of  the  cavalry  completed  the  rout,  and  the  rem 
nants  of  the  divisions  of  Pickett  and  Johnson  fled  westward 
from  Five  Forks,  pursued  for  many  miles,  and  until  long  after 
dark,  by  the  mounted  divisions  of  Merritt  and  McKenzie.  The 
trophies  of  the  day  included  many  colors  and  guns  and  above 
five  thousand  prisoners,  of  which  number  three  thousand  two 


THE  FINAL  CAMPAIGN.  601 

hundred  and  forty-four  were  taken  by  the  Fifth  Corps.  Bril 
liant  as  the  victory  was,  it  was  won  without  great  sacrifice  of 
life,  the  losses  of  the  cavalry  being  but  a  few  hundred,  and 
those  of  the  infantry  six  hundred  and  thirty-four  killed  and 
wounded.* 

No  sooner  had  the  sound  of  musketry  died  away  at  the 
Five  Forks,  than  from  the  multitudinous  throats  of  all  the 
guns  that  studded  Grant's  lines  before  Petersburg  there 
opened  a  prodigious  clamor,  and  the  darkness  of  night  was 
illumined  by  the  lurid  light  of  hundreds  of  bursting  shells 
and  bombs.  It  was  a  paean  to  victory ;  but  still  more  a  pre 
lude  of  what  was  yet  to  come. 

The  action  at  Five  Forks  had  simplified,  not  solved  the 
problem.  Lee's  right,  wrenched  violently  from  his  centre 
— the  troops  captive  or  rushing  wildly  westward — would 
trouble  no  more.  But  the  Confederate  lines  encircling  Pe 
tersburg  from  the  Appomattox  to  Hatcher's  Hun,  were  still 
intact.  This  was  Lee's  centre  in  the  general  relations  of  all 
the  points  he  aimed  to  defend,  while  his  left  was  the  front  that 
covered  Kichmond  from  the  Union  force  threatening  assault 
on  the  north  side  of  the  James.  But  as,  strangely  enough, 
Longstreet,  who  commanded  on  the  Richmond  side,  had  not 
discovered  how  greatly  the  enemy  in  his  front  had  been  re 
duced,  still  retained  two  divisions  on  that  side  of  the  James, 
the  force  immediately  defending  Petersburg  was  reduced  to 
two  incomplete  divisions.  Upon  this  General  Grant,  on  learn 
ing  the  success  at  Five  Forks,  ordered  an  attack  to  be  made 
by  the  corps  of  Wright,  Parke,  and  Ord,  the  following  morn- 

*  After  the  close  of  the  action,  General  Sheridan,  for  some  reason  as  yet  un 
explained,  relieved  General  Warren  from  duty,  and  assigned  General  Griffin  to 
the  command  of  the  Fifth  Corps.  In  saying  that  this  act  is  "  as  yet  unex 
plained,"  it  will  hardly  be  interpreted  in  the  sense  that  I  am  unaware  of  the 
reasons  stated  by  General  Sheridan  in  his  official  report,  but  that  these  reasons 
are  wholly  inadequate  to  justify  that  officer's  conduct.  It  is  needless  here  to 
enter  into  the  discussion  of  this  painful  question  ;  for  General  Warren  has  ex 
hausted  it  in  a  brochure,  lately  published,  under  the  title  of  "  An  Account  of  the 
Fifth  Army  Corps  at  the  Battle  of  Five  Forks." 


602  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

ing.  Being  apprehensive,  however,  that  Lee  might  during 
the  night  withdraw  this  force  and  fall  upon  Sheridan  in  his 
isolated  position,  he  ordered  Miles'  division  of  Humphreys' 
corps  to  his  support,  and  commanded  all  the  guns  in  the 
Petersburg  lines  to  be  opened  in  a  general  bombardment. 
This,  beginning  at  nightfall  of  the  1st,  was  kept  up  till  four 
A.  M.  of  the  2d  April. 

At  earliest  dawn  of  Sunday,  the  2d,  the  assault  was  opened, 
from  the  Appomattox  to  Hatcher's  Eun,  by  the  troops  of 
Parke,  Wright,  and  Ord.  Parke  on  the  right,  with  the  Ninth 
Corps,  carried  the  outer  line  of  intrenchments  ;  but  the  posi 
tion  of  that  corps  confronted  that  portion  of  the  Confederate 
defences  longest  held  and  most  strongly  fortified,  and  after  the 
outer  line  had  been  penetrated,  the  Confederates  were  found 
holding  an  inner  cordon  of  works,  from  which  Parke  could  not 
force  them. 

Wright,  with  the  Sixth  Corps,  next  on  the  left  of  the  Ninth, 
assaulting  at  four  A.  M.,  carried  every  thing  before  him.  Hav 
ing  attained  the  Boydton  plankroad,  he  swept  to  the  left 
down  the  Confederate  intrenchments,  capturing  many  guns 
and  several  thousand  prisoners.  He  was  closely  followed  by 
two  divisions  of  Ord's  command,  and  continued  on  until  he 
met  the  other  division  of  Ord's  that  had  succeeded  in  forcing 
the  lines  near  Hatcher's  Kun,  when  the  united  forces  swung 
to  the  right  and  proceeded  by  the  Boydton  plankroad  towards 
Petersburg. 

When  these  successes  were  reported,  Humphreys,  holding 
the  Union  left  to  the  west  of  Hatcher's  Eun,  advanced  with 
two  divisions  of  the  Second  Corps  (the  divisions  of  Hays  and 
Mott)  and  stormed  and  carried  a  redoubt  in  his  front.  Seeing 
this  lost,  the  Confederates  abandoned  this  position,  and  Hum 
phreys  moved  up  the  Boydton  plankroad  and  connected  with 
the  left  of  the  Sixth  Corps.  The  other  of  Humphreys'  divi 
sions,  under  Miles,  pursued  whatever  debris  of  the  enemy 
remained  west  of  Hatcher's  Eun.  This  force  retreated  north 
ward  to  Sutherland  Station,  on  the  Southside  Eailroad,  where 
it  was  overtaken  by  Miles,  who  in  a  spirited  charge  dis- 


THE  FINAL  CAMPAIGN.  603 

lodged  and  defeated  it,  taking  two  guns  and  six  hundred 
prisoners. 

On  reaching  the  lines  immediately  around  Petersburg,  a 
part  of  Ord's  command,  under  General  Gibbon,  began  an  as 
sault  with  the  view  to  break  through  to  the  city.  The  attack 
was  directed  against  Forts  Gregg  and  Alexander,  two  strong, 
inclosed  works,  the  most  salient  and  commanding  south  of 
Petersburg.  The  former  of  these  redoubts  was  manned  by 
Harris's  Mississippi  Brigade,  numbering  two  hundred  and  fifty 
men ;  and  this  handful  of  skilled  marksmen  conducted  the 
defence  with  such  intrepidity,  that  Gibbon's  forces,  surging 
repeatedly  against  it,  were  each  time  thrown  back.  At  length, 
at  seven  A.  M.,  a  renewed  charge  carried  the  work ;  but  not 
till  its  two  hundred  and  fifty  defenders  had  been  reduced  to 
thirty ;  and  it  is  calculated  that  each  of  these  riflemen  struck 
down  at  least  two  assailants,  for  Gibbon's  loss  was  above  five 
hundred  men.  The  other  fort  found  no  such  defenders,  and 
readily  fell.  This  being  accomplished,  the  Union  line  of  in 
vestment  was  drawn  close  around  the  city. 

The  result  of  these  operations  was,  that  the  Confederates, 
having  lost  most  of  their  outer  system  of  defences,  were 
pressed  back  to  a  chain  of  works  immediately  around  Peters 
burg.  But  as  they  had  here  a  short  and  strong  line,  with 
their  left  resting  on  the  Appomattox  on  the  east  of  Petersburg 
and  their  right  on  the  same  river  on  the  west  side,  they  still 
protected  the  city,  and  the  Union  force,  weighty  as  it  was,  found 
it  impossible  to  dislodge  them.  Lee,  indeed,  was  even  able 
to  make,  in  the  old  style,  an  offensive  sally  or  two,  for  about 
ten  A.  M.  a  slight  re-enforcement  came  to  him.  Longstreet 
having  at  length  discovered  that  the  force  that  for  many  days 
had  confronted  him  on  the  north  side  of  the  James  was  little 
more  than  a  mask,  drew  therefrom  several  of  his  brigades, 
and  at  the  hour  named  reached  Petersburg,  accompanied  by 
Benning's  brigade  of  Field's  division.  This  increase  of  his 
force,  slight  though  it  was,  together  with  the  protracted  resist 
ance  offered  by  Fort  Gregg,  enabled  Lee  to  establish  what  of 
force  remained  to  him  in  such  wise  as  would  best  avail  for 


604  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

the  defence  of  the  city.  General  A.  P.  Hill  then  pushed  for 
ward  the  division  of  Heth  on  the  Confederate  left,  in  an  effort 
to  regain  some  commanding  ground  held  by  the  Ninth  Corps. 
The  attack  was  made  with  such  vigor  and  pressed  so  heavily 
on  that  corps,  that  it  was  with  difficulty  it  could  maintain  its 
ground,  and  the  garrison  of  the  defences  of  City  Point  had 
to  be  ordered  up  to  its  support.  This  may  be  accounted  the 
last  blow  struck  by  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  while  cov 
ering  Richmond ;  and  it  is  noteworthy  that  in  its  execution 
fell  General  A.  P.  Hill,  who  in  all  the  operations  that  from 
first  to  last  filled  up  the  four  years'  defence  of  the  Confederate 
capital,  had  borne  a  most  distinguished  part. 

In  thus  maintaining  a  stubborn  attitude  of  resistance  at  the 
threshold  of  Petersburg,  Lee  had  now  but  one  thought,  which 
was  to  hold  his  ground  until  the  oncoming  of  night  should 
enable  him  to  put  into  execution  the  ulterior  design  he  had 
formed.  This  design  was  communicated  to  the  Richmond 
authorities  in  a  message  sent  by  Lee  about  eleven  o'clock  of 
the  forenoon  of  that  same  Sunday.  It  was  received  by  Mr. 
Davis  while  worshipping  at  the  church  of  Saint  Paul's  ;  and 
those  who,  as  he  passed  out,  marked  his  countenance  (on  which 
it  seemed  the  burden  of  an  additional  score  of  years  had  in 
a  moment  fallen),  knew  that  message  could  bear  nothing  but 
tidings  of  direful  import. 

It  announced  Lee's  purpose  of  that  night  abandoning  Peters 
burg  and  Richmond. 


V. 

THE  RETREAT  AND  PURSUIT. 

It  may  well  be  supposed  that  the  purpose  of  the  hardy 
captain  who  designed  to  "  make  an  end  of  it  before  going 
back,"  was  not  relaxed,  but  rather  intensified  by  the  events 
of  the  past  two  days  ;  and  forecasting  what  must  be  the  next 


THE  FINAL  CAMPAIGN.  605 

move  of  his  antagonist,  Grant,  on  the  night  of  the  2d,  had 
already  begun  his  dispositions  to  checkmate  him. 

To  Lee  there  was  but  one  line  of  retreat  that  led  anywhere 
but  to  destruction.  This  was  up  the  Appomattox,  parallel  with 
the  Southside  Eailroad,  and  westward  to  the  Danville  line.  But 
the  Fifth  Union  Corps  was  already  at  Sutherland's  Station  on 
the  Southside  Eailroad,  ten  miles  west  of  Petersburg,  and 
Sheridan,  with  the  cavalry,  on  the  night  of  the  2d  bivouacked 
at  Ford's,  ten  miles  still  further  to  the  west.  These  moves 
compelled  Lee,  at  the  outset,  to  make  his  retreat  by  the  north 
bank  of  the  Appomattox,  and  threw  him  upon  the  exterior 
line. 

To  the  Union  force  set  free  for  pursuit,  in  case  that  should 
be  the  order,  was  added,  on  the  night  of  the  2d,  the  Second 
Corps  under  Humphreys,  to  whom  was  at  the  same  time  sent 
a  ponton-train.  The  Sixth  and  Ninth  corps  and  Ord's  com 
mand,  meantime,  held  their  close-drawn  lines  of  investment 
around  Petersburg,  while  from  the  north  side  of  the  James 
Weitzel  watched  Eichmond. 

But  not  all  the  wary  eyes  of  peering  pickets  served  to  dis 
cover  what  was  that  night  passing  in  the  Confederate  camp. 
When  the  long  twilight  of  that  May-day  Sunday  had  faded 
out  in  the  west,  and  deep  darkness  had  settled  down  over  the 
sleeping  Union  host,  a  silent  withdrawal  was  begun  from  the 
whole  Confederate  front.  The  Petersburg  force,  retiring 
noiselessly  through  the  town,  filed  over  to  the  north  bank  of 
the  Appomattox.  Thence  marching  northward  to  Chester 
field  Courthouse,  midway  between  Petersburg  and  Eichmond, 
it  was  joined  by  the  division  holding  the  front  of  Bermuda 
Hundred.  At  the  same  time  whatever  force  remained  on  the 
Eichmond  side  was  drawn  in,  and  moved  southward  to  Ches 
terfield  Courthouse,  when  the  whole  Confederate  army  headed 
westward.  The  evacuation  was  conducted  with  wonderful 
address;  and  the  march  being  pushed  vigorously  all  night, 
the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  now  reduced  to  twenty-five 
thousand  men,  had  by  dawn  put  sixteen  miles  between  it  and 
Petersburg. 


606  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

It  is  said  by  those  who  were  with  the  Confederate  com 
mander,  that  his  spirits  were  unusually  light  and  cheerful  on 
the  morning  of  the  3d.  "  I  have  got  my  army  safe  out  of  its 
breastworks,"  said  he,  "  and,  in  order  to  follow  me,  my  enemy 
must  abandon  his  lines,  and  can  derive  no  further  benefit  from 
his  railroads  or  the  James  River."  What  then  might  he  now 
reasonably  hope  for  ?  He  could  certainly  not  dream  of  the 
triumph  of  his  cause.  That  is  not  to  be  supposed.  But  he 
might  hope  so  to  conduct  affairs  as  to  obtain  advantageous 
terms  of  peace  for  the  Confederacy.  And  it  is  certain  that  he 
did  expect  to  effect  a  successful  retreat — to  escape  entirely 
from  the  toils  of  his  antagonist — to  unite  with  the  army  under 
Johnston,  and  then  so  to  act  as  to  elicit  good  overtures  not 
only  for  the  capitulation  of  his  army,  but  for  the  settlement 
of  a  basis  of  peace,  which,  the  Confederate  government  being 
fugitive,  he  took  it  upon  himself  to  negotiate  should  opportu 
nity  be  afforded.  How  this  hope  was  dashed  to  the  ground, 
as  well  by  unforeseen  misfortunes  that  befell  Lee  as  by 
the  prodigious  vigor  with  which  Grant  pushed  the  pursuit, 
will  appear  in  the  course  of  this  narrative.  It  is  now  neces 
sary  to  look  to  the  dispositions  and  movements  of  the  Union 
columns. 

When  in  the  gray  dawn  of  Monday,  April  3d,  the  skirmish 
ers  advanced  from  the  lines  before  Petersburg,  the  city  was 
found  to  be  evacuated.  At  the  same  time  the  Union  force  on 
the  lines  confronting  Richmond  from  the  north  side  of  the 
James  was  startled  by  a  clamorous  uproar,  and  the  sky  was 
seen  to  be  lit  up  with  a  lurid  glare.  Surmising  the  meaning 
of  this  direful  blazon,  General  Weitzel  threw  forward  a 
cavalry  party  that,  entering  the  city  without  let,  planted  its 
guidons  on  the  Capitol. 

Thus  Richmond  fell !  Marvellous  as  had  been  the  one  year's 
defence  of  the  Confederate  capital,  its  fall  was  not  less  strange. 
Occupied,  not  captured,  Richmond,  to  gain  which  such  heca 
tombs  of  lives  had  been  sacrificed,  was  at  length  given  up  by 
the  civil  authorities  to  a  body  of  forty  troopers  ! 


THE  FINAL  CAMPAIGN.  607 

The  explanation  of  the  portentous  sounds  and  sights  was 
soon  learned.  To  the  rear-guard,  under  Ewell,  had  been  left 
the  last  duty  of  blowing  up  the  iron-clad  vessels  in  the  James 
and  the  bridges  across  that  river;  and  it  was  the  noise  of 
the  explosions  that  first  announced  to  General  Weitzel  that 
Richmond  was  given  up.  But  the  Confederate  officials,  in 
addition  to  this  work  of  destruction  (which  cannot  be  con 
demned  on  the  score  that  it  was  not  warranted  by  the  rules 
of  war),  adopted  a  measure  shocking  to  every  sense  of 
humanity.  It  appears  that  the  warehouses  of  Richmond 
contained  great  store  of  government  tobacco,  and  the  cruel 
and  senseless  order  was  given  to  fire  these — as  though  it 
were  possible  with  impunity  to  play  with  the  devouring 
element!  The  flames,  spreading  to  the  neighboring  build 
ings,  soon  involved  a  wide  and  widening  area ;  and,  though 
the  Union  force,  on  its  entry,  labored  to  put  out  the  fire 
it  could  not  be  subdued  until  the  heart  of  the  city,  including 
all  the  business  section,  was  laid  in  ashes.  It  was  amid  such 
scenes  that  Richmond  fell,  with  the  smoke  of  the  torment  of 
the  Confederacy  ascending  to  heaven,  while  far  away  all  that 
remained  of  the  Confederate  army  hastened  beyond  the 
sunset. 

But  little  did  Grant  reck  of  Richmond ;  and  already,  since 
morning  revealed  the  flight  of  the  Confederates,  he  had  been 
pressing  to  the  uttermost  the  march  of  his  columns.  Pur 
sued  and  pursuers  fared  forth  by  parallel  lines — Lee  by  the 
north  side  of  the  Appomattox,  Grant  by  the  south  bank. 
Let  us  see  whither  led  all  this  mad  haste. 

The  Danville  Railroad,  Lee's  line  of  retreat,  runs  southwest 
from  Richmond,  and  is  intersected  by  the  Southside  or  Lynch- 
burg  Railroad,  which  runs  westward  from  Petersburg,  at 
Burkesville,  which  is  fifty-eight  miles  from  Richmond  by  the 
former  road,  and  fifty-two  miles  from  Petersburg  by  the  latter 
road.  Burkesville,  therefore,  was  to  Lee  a  strategic  point  of  the 
first  importance,  for  if  he  should  be  anticipated  in  its  posses 
sion,  he  would  be  forced  off  the  direct  Danville  line,  and 


608  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

could  only  recover  it,  if  at  all,  by  a  great  detour  to  the  west. 
This,  accordingly,  was  his  first  objective. 

The  march  of  the  Union  forces  was  conducted  by  two 
lines  :  the  troops  of  the  Army  of  the  James,  under  General 
Ord,  by  the  line  of  the  Southside  or  Lynchburg  Railroad, 
towards  Burkesville,  and  Sheridan,  with  the  cavalry  and  Fifth 
Corps,  followed  by  the  Second  and  Sixth  corps  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac,  by  routes  near  the  Appomattox,  to  strike  the 
Danville  Railroad  north  of  Burkesville. 

Lee's  march  led  by  the  north  bank  of  the  Appomattox  for 
thirty  miles  west,  when  it  was  necessary  to  cross  that  stream 
at  Goode's  bridge  in  order  to  strike  the  Danville  road  at 
Amelia  Courthouse,  thirty-eight  miles  west  of  Richmond  and 
Petersburg.  Pushing  the  advance  vigorously  during  the  3d, 
Lee  next  day  reached  Amelia  Courthouse.  Here  a  dire  and 
unlooked-for  anguish  befell  him. 

When  Lee  determined  to  abandon  Petersburg  and  Rich 
mond,  he  dispatched  orders  that  large  supplies  of  commis 
sary  and  quartermasters'  stores  should  be  sent  forward  from 
Danville  to  Amelia  Courthouse,  there  to  await  the  arrival  of 
his  columns.  When,  however,  on  Sunday  afternoon,  the 
loaded  train  of  cars  reached  Amelia  Courthouse,  the  officer 
in  charge  was  met  by  an  order  from  the  Richmond  authorities 
to  bring  on  the  train  to  Richmond,  it  being  the  design  to 
use  the  cars  in  the  transportation  of  the  personel  and  prop 
erty  of  the  Confederate  government.  Interpreting  this  order 
in  the  sense  that  the  train  and  its  contents  should  be  taken  to 
Richmond,  the  officer,  without  unloading  the  stores  at  Amelia 
Courthouse,  carried  on  cars,  freight  and  all ;  and  the  rations 
on  which  Lee  had  depended  for  the  subsistence  of  his  army 
were  consumed  in  the  general  conflagration  of  Richmond  ! 

Such  were  the  agonizing  tidings  that  met  the  Confederate 
commander  on  his  arrival  at  Amelia  Courthouse ;  and  one 
can  well  imagine  how,  from  that  moment,  all  his  hopes  were 
dashed  to  the  ground.  Lee  had  fairly  counted,  that  as  Grant 
had,  for  the  purpose  of  rapid  pursuit,  broken  up  his  force  into 


THE  FINAL  CAMPAIGN.  609 

several  bodies,  an  opportunity  would  present  itself  to  fall 
upon  these  fractions  in  detail,  should  his  retreat  become  seri- 
cusly  endangered.  But,  to  accomplish  this,  it  was  necessary 
that  he  should  have  his  whole  army,  now  not  much  above  twenty 
thousand  men,  well  in  hand.  This,  in  the  absence  of  rations, 
was  no  longer  possible;  for,  in  order  to  keep  life  in  what 
force  remained  to  him,  it  became  incumbent  on  him  to  break 
up  a  moiety  of  it  into  foraging  parties. 

At  Amelia  Courthouse,  where  Lee  had  arrived  the  morn 
ing  of  the  4th,  he  was  compelled  to  remain  during  the  whole 
of  that  and  the  following  day;  and  this  forced  delay  gave 
Sheridan,  who,  with  the  cavalry  and  the  Fifth  Corps,  was 
pushing  the  advance  impetuously  far  in  the  van  of  the  re 
mainder  of  the  army,  time  to  strike  in  upon  the  Confederate 
line  of  retreat.  This  he  did  the  afternoon  of  the  4th,  at 
Jetersville,  on  the  Danville  Kailroad,  seven  miles  southwest 
of  Amelia  Courthouse. 

Thus  headed  off  from  the  direct  line  of  retreat,  there  was 
for  Lee  but  one  alternative — to  fall  upon  Sheridan's  isolated 
force  in  the  attempt  to  overwhelm  it  and  recover  the  Dan 
ville  route,  or,  by  doubling  on  his  track,  take  up  an  eccen 
tric  and  exterior  line.  But,  in  reality,  the  first  course  was, 
under  the  circumstances,  out  of  the  question.  Sheridan,  in 
deed,  has  animadverted  upon  Lee's  want  of  activity  here. 
"  It  seems  to  me,"  says  he,  "  that  this  was  the  only  chance 
the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  had  to  save  itself,  which 
might  have  been  done  had  General  Lee  promptly  attacked 
and  driven  back  the  comparatively  small  force  opposed  to 
him,  and  pursued  his  march  to  Burkesville  Junction."  *  But 
it  is  not  clear  what  this  distinguished  officer  means  by  a 
"  comparatively  small  force."  Sheridan  had  with  him  at  Jet 
ersville  above  eighteen  thousand  excellent  cavalry  and  in 
fantry,  well  intrenched;  while  he  himself  reported  Lee's 
entire  strength  at  Amelia  Courthouse  as  twenty  thousand; 
and  it  has  been  seen  that  half  of  this  force  was  broken  up 

*  Sheridan :  Report  of  Operations. 
89 


610  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

into  foraging  parties.     In  fact,  to  attempt  escape  was  all  that 
now  remained  to  Lee. 

Late  in  the  afternoon  of  the  5th,  General  Meade,  with  the 
Second  and  Sixtn  corps  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  joined 
Sheridan  at  Jetersville,  where,  expecting  attack,  he  had  held 
his  force  intrenched  since  the  previous  day.  Lee  was  still  at 
Amelia  Courthouse.  Meanwhile,  Sheridan  had  been  operat 
ing  with  his  cavalry  well  to  his  left,  to  watch  if  Lee  should 
make  any  attempt  to  escape  by  that  flank.  On  the  morning 
of  the  5th,  Brigadier-General  Davies,  with  a  mounted  force, 
advanced  to  Paine's  Cross-roads,  where  he  struck  a  train  of 
a  hundred  and  eighty  wagons,  escorted  by  a  body  of  Confed 
erate  cavalry,  which  he  defeated,  destroying  the  wagons  and 
capturing  five  pieces  of  artillery  and  a  number  of  prisoners. 
Gregg's  and  Smith's  brigades  of  the  Second  Cavalry  Division 
were  sent  out  to  support  Davies,  and  some  heavy  fighting  en 
sued — the  Confederates  having  sent  a  considerable  force  of 
infantry  to  cut  off  the  latter ;  but  the  attempt  was  thwarted. 

The  night  of  the  5th,  Lee  moved  from  Amelia.  His  only 
hope  now  was  to  make  a  race  to  Farmville  (west  thirty-five 
miles),  there  cross  the  Appomattox  once  more,  and,  by  de 
stroying  the  bridges  after  him,  escape  into  the  mountains 
beyond  Lynchburg.  "When,  therefore,  on  the  morning  of  the 
6th,  the  whole  Army  of  the  Potomac,  which,  the  night  pre 
vious,  had  been  concentrated  at  Jetersville,  moved  northward 
towards  Amelia  to  give  battle  to  the  Confederates,  it  was 
found  that  Lee  had  slipped  past.  The  direction  of  the  corps 
was  then  changed :  the  Sixth  Corps  moved  from  the  right  to 
the  left ;  the  Second  Corps  was  ordered  to  move  by  Deatons- 
ville ;  and  the  Fifth  and  Sixth  corps  to  move  in  parallel  direc 
tions  on  the  right  and  left.  As  Lee  was  retreating  by  the 
Deatonsville  route,  this  disposition  of  the  pursuing  forces 
placed  one  column  in  his  rear  on  the  same  road  by  which  he 
was  moving,  a  second  column  by  a  parallel  route  to  the  south, 
and  a  third  column  by  a  parallel  route  to  the  north.  Mean 
while,  the  Army  of  the  James,  which  had  been  pushing  its 


THE  FINAL  CAMPAIGN.  611 

march  by  the  line  of  the  Lynchburg  Eailroad,  had  reached 
Burkesville ;  and  on  the  morning  of  the  6th  General  Ord  was 
directed  towards  Farmville.  In  order,  if  possible,  to  reach 
and  destroy  the  bridges  near  that  place,  Ord  sent  forward  a 
light  column,  consisting  of  two  regiments  of  infantry  and  a 
squadron  of  cavalry,  under  Brigadier  General  Theodore  Read. 
This  force  met  the  head  of  Lee's  column  near  Farmville,  and 
Bead  heroically  attacked  it  in  the  effort  to  detain  the  Confed 
erate  column  until  the  main  force  should  be  able  to  make  up 
with  it.  That  gallant  officer  sacrificed  his  life  in  the  execu 
tion  of  this  duty,  and  his  command  was  overwhelmed;  but 
the  attack  served  the  intended  purpose,  and  so  delayed  the 
movements  of  the  enemy,  that  Ord  had  time  to  arrive  with 
the  Army  of  the  James.  Upon  this,  the  Confederate  force 
immediately  intrenched  itself. 

Sheridan,  who  had  now  with  him  only  the  cavalry,  formed 
the  van  of  the  column  that  was  marching  on  the  southern 
parallel  route  ;  and  he  was  deploying  all  the  resources  of 
an  energy  that  seemed  to  grow  hotter  and  hotter  with  the 
chase,  to  head  off  the  hunted  prey.  Near  Deatonsville,  that 
same  6th,  he  struck  in  upon  the  Confederate  wagon-train 
escorted  by  a  formidable  force  of  infantry  and  cavalry.  To 
wrest  this  prize  from  its  guardians  Sheridan  made  admirable 
dispositions.  He  ordered  Crook's  division  to  attack  the 
train,  and  if  the  covering  force  proved  too  strong,  one  of  the 
divisions  would,  while  Crook  held  fast  to  and  pressed  the 
enemy,  pass  him  and  attack  a  point  further  on  ;  and  this  di 
vision  was  ordered  to  do  the  same,  and  so  on  alternately. 
This  method  of  action  would,  he  judged,  enable  him  finally 
to  strike  some  weak  point. 

This  result  was  obtained  just  south  of  Sailor's  Creek,  a  small 
tributary  of  the  Appomattox  that,  running  northward,  empties 
into  that  stream  a  few  miles  east  of  Farmville.  Custer's  divi 
sion  gained  the  road,  and  the  divisions  of  Crook  and  Devin 
coming  up  to  its  support,  four  hundred  wagons  were  destroyed, 
and  sixteen  pieces  of  artillery  and  many  prisoners  were  cap 
tured.  Ewell's  corps,  which  was  following  behind  the  train, 


612  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

was  thus  cut  off  from  its  line  of  retreat.  To  detain  this  force 
as  long  as  possible,  so  that  the  infantry  might  have  time  to 
come  up,  was  now  Sheridan's  desire,  and  with  this  view  he  or 
dered  a  mounted  charge,  which  was  executed  in  a  very  spirited 
manner  by  one  of  his  brigades  under  Colonel  Stagg. 

When  the  head  of  column  of  the  Sixth  Corps  came  in 
sight  the  Confederates  began  retiring,  whereupon  Seymour's 
division  was  directed  to  carry  the  road.  This  being  done, 
the  Confederates  fell  back  slowly,  skirmishing  and  turning 
with  such  sharp  and  sudden  sallies  of  resistance,  that  a 
halt  had  to  be  called  to  get  up  Wheaton's  division  of  the 
Sixth  Corps.  This  took  position  on  the  left  of  Seymour, 
whereupon  a  renewed  advance  was  made,  and  the  Confeder 
ates  were  driven  until  the  lines  of  the  Sixth  Corps  reached 
Sailor's  Creek.  Then  from  the  north  bank  could  be  descried 
the  cavalry  on  the  high  ground  above  the  creek  and  south  of 
it,  and  the  long  lines  of  smoke  from  the  burning  wagons  be 
yond.  But  even  while  thus  environed,  these  men  showed  they 
could  still  exact  a  price  before  yielding  ;  and  when  an  advance 
was  made  by  a  part  of  the  Sixth  Corps,  they  delivered  so 
deadly  a  fire -that  a  portion  of  that  veteran  line  bent  and 
broke  under  it.  But  the  numbers  were  too  unequal,  too  over 
whelming  ;  and  when  a  simultaneous  assault  was  made  by 
the  Sixth  Corps  in  front  and  the  cavalry  in  flank  and  rear, 
E well's  troops,  finding  themselves  surrounded,  threw  down 
their  arms  in  token  of  surrender.  The  captures  included  nearly 
all  that  remained  of  the  corps  of  that  officer,  with  Lieutenant- 
General  Ewell  himself  and  four  other  general  officers. 

The  decisive  character  of  this  result  was  largely  due  to  the 
energetic  movements  of  the  Second  Corps,  which,  moving  to 
the  right,  had  pressed  the  Confederates  closely  in  a  rear-guard 
fight  all  day  till  night,  when  it  had  attained  a  position 
near  the  mouth  of  Sailor's  Creek.  Here  the  Confederates 
were  so  crowded  upon,  that  a  large  train  was  captured  and 
many  hundreds  were  taken  prisoners.  The  trophies  of  the 
Second  Corps  included,  in  addition  several  pieces,  of  artillery 
and  thirteen  flags. 


THE  FINAL  CAMPAIGN.  613 

Lee,  meanwhile,  with  the  relics  of  his  army,  continued  the 
retreat  during  the  night,  and  passed  to  the  north  bank  of  the 
Appomattox  by  bridges  near  Farmville. 

Such  are  the  mere  bald  facts  that,  thus  far,  marked  the  re 
treat  and  pursuit.  But  it  would  need  other  colors  in  which 
truly  to  paint  that  terrible  race  for  life  ;  and  one  would  have 
to  seek  its  like  in  what  befell  upon  the  snowy  wastes  of  Mus 
covy  in  the  winter  of  1812. 

The  Confederates  began  the  retreat  with  but  one  ration, 
and  when  no  supplies  were  met  at  Amelia  Courthouse,  they 
were  reduced  to  such  scant  store  as  could  be  collected  from 
the  poor  and  almost  exhausted  region  through  which  they 
passed.  This  re'source,  moreover,  grew  more  and  more  pre 
carious,  for  the  area  of  the  foragers  was  so  restricted  by  the 
clouds  of  enterprising  Union  cavalry,  that  they  could  collect 
less  and  less.  Those  men  were  fortunate  who  had  in  their 
pockets  a  few  handfuls  of  corn  which  they  might  parch  by  the 
wayside  ;  but  many  had  naught  wherewithal  to  assuage  the 
pangs  of  hunger  save  the  buds  and  twigs  of  spring  that,  with 
its  exuberant  bourgeon,  seemed  to  mock  the  sere  and  deso 
late  winter  of  their  fortunes.  The  misery  of  the  famished 
troops  during  the  4th,  5th,  6th,  and  7th  of  April,  passes  all 
experience  of  military  anguish  since  the  retreat  from  the 
banks  of  the  Beresina.  "  Towards  evening  of  the  5th,"  says 
an  eye-witness,  "  and  all  day  long  upon  the  6th,  hundreds 
of  men  dropped  from  exhaustion,  and  thousands  let  fall  their 
muskets  from  inability  to  carry  them  any  further.  The  scenes 
of  the  5th,  6th,  7th,  and  8th  were  of  a  nature  which  can  be 
apprehended  in  its  vivid  reality  only  by  men  who  are  thor 
oughly  familiar  with  the  harrowing  details  of  war." 

While  the  sufferings  of  the  men  were  thus  severe,  those  of 
the  horses  and  mules  were  even  keener ;  for  of  forage  there 
was  none,  and  the  grass  had  not  yet  sprouted.  Of  course,  in 
this  condition  of  the  draught-animals  the  locomotion  of  the 
trains  and  artillery  could  be  but  slow.  Moreover,  the  long 
lines  of  wagons,  filling  miles  of  the  road,  frequently  cut  in 


61i  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

upon  the  route  of  the  infantry  columns,  delaying  them  foi 
half  a  day  at  a  time  :  so  that,  from  this  and  other  reasons,  the 
march  had  to  be  mainly  conducted  by  night,  which  added  the 
want  of  rest  to  the  sum  of  miseries  accumulating  fast  and 
faster  on  the  hapless  host  of  fugitives.  Dark  divisions,  sink 
ing  in  the  woods  for  a  few  hours'  repose,  would  hear  suddenly 
the  boom  of  hostile  guns  and  the  clatter  of  the  hoofs  of  the 
ubiquitous  cavalry,  and  they  had  to  up  and  hasten  off  as  fast 
as  their  wearied  limbs  would  carry  them.  Thus  pressed  upon 
on  all  sides,  driven  like  sheep  before  prowling  wolves,  with 
blazing  wagons  in  front  and  rear,  amid  hunger,  fatigue,  and 
sleeplessness,  continuing  day  after  day,  they  fared  towards  the 
setting  sun — 

"  Such  resting  found  the  soles  of  unblest  feet !" 


VI. 
CLOSING  SCENES. 

When,  on  the  night  of  the  6th,  the  Army  of  Northern  Vir 
ginia  had  put  the  Appomattox  between  it  and  its  pursuers,  a 
group  of  the  chief  officers  met  around  the  bivouac-fire  to  take 
counsel  together  touching  their  fortunes.  General  Lee  alone 
was  not  of  the  number. 

The  result  of  the  interchange  of  views  was  to  reduce  the 
possibilities  of  the  situation  to  three  lines  of  conduct.  1.  To 
disband,  allowing  the  troops  to  make  their  way  as  best  they 
might  to  some  fixed  rallying  point.  2.  To  abandon  the 
trains  and  cut  their  way  through  the  opposing  lines.  3.  To 
surrender. 

But  it  was  soon  seen  that,  in  reality,  two  of  these  courses 
were  excluded.  To  disband  would  be  to  give  up  all;  for 
there  was  little  likelihood  that  the  troops  could  ever  be 
rallied,  while  their  dispersion  over  the  country  would  neces 
sarily  entail  unnumbered  ills  upon  the  inhabitants.  To  cut 
their  way  through  was  more  easy  to  talk  about  than  to  do ; 


THE  FINAL  CAMPAIGN.  615 

and  even  if  they  succeeded  in  effecting  this  purpose,  the 
army,  without  a  train  or  artillery  or  materiel,  would  lose  all 
organization,  and  must  starve.  It  resulted  that  there  seemed 
to  be  no  alternative  but  surrender.  This  was  the  voice  of  the 
•council ;  and  General  Pendleton  was  appointed  to  communi 
cate  the  conclusion  to  General  Lee. 

But  the  Confederate  commander  did  not  think  such  extrem 
ity  was  yet  upon  him ;  or,  rather,  he  did  not  think  he  could 
with  honor  surrender  until  he  should  be  compelled  to  surren 
der;  and  this  had  not  yet  been.  Moreover,  all  deliberation 
was  cut  short  by  an  ominous  outburst  of  sound  which  told 
that  the  hunter  was  again  upon  the  track  of  the  hunted. 
"When  the  whole  of  the  Confederate  column  had  filed  across  the 
Appomattox,  near  Farmville,  which  was  not  till  towards  dawn 
of  the  7th,  the  bridges  were  fired  to  prevent  pursuit.  But  the 
Second  Corps,  under  Humphreys,  taking  up  an  early  pursuit, 
came  up  with  the  Confederates  at  High  Bridge,  six  miles  east 
of  Farmville.  The  rear-guard  was  overtaken  just  as  it  had  fired 
the  wagon-road  bridge,  and  as  the  second  span  of  the  railroad 
bridge  was  burning ;  but  Humphreys  succeeded  in  saving  the 
wagon-road  bridge — a  matter  of  great  importance,  as  the  Ap 
pomattox  was  unfordable.  A  considerable  force  of  the  Con 
federates  was  observed  drawn  up  in  a  strong  position  on  the 
heights  on  the  opposite  bank  to  dispute  the  passage,  while 
the  bridge  was  held  by  skirmishers.  These  were,  however, 
quickly  driven  off,  and  the  Second  Corps  crossed,  Barlow's 
division  leading.  Artillery  was  put  in  position  to  cover  an 
attack  ;  but  this  was  unnecessary,  for  the  Confederate  force 
retired.  A  redoubt,  forming  the  bridge-head  on  the  south 
bank,  was  blown  up  as  the  Union  troops  approached,  eight 
guns  being  abandoned  to  the  pursuers,  as  were  also  ten  others 
on  the  north  bank.  High  Bridge  was  saved  with  the  loss  of 
four  spans. 

Humphreys  then  took  up  the  pursuit,  with  the  division  of 
Miles  and  De  Trobriand,  on  the  Old  Stage  road  leading  to 
Appomattox  Courthouse,  while  Barlow's  division  was  directed 
on  Farmville,  distant  three  miles.  Barlow  found  this  place  in 


616  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

possession  of  a  considerable  force  of  the  enemy,  that  was 
burning  the  bridges  there,  and  covering  a  wagon-train  moving 
towards  Lynchburg ;  but  on  Barlow's  approach  it  abandoned 
the  place,  destroying  one  hundred  and  thirty  wagons,  and 
rejoined  the  main  body  of  Lee's  army.  < 

This  Humphreys  found  intrenched  in  a  strong  position  four 
or  five  miles  north  of  Farmville,  covering  the  stage  and  plank 
roads  to  Lynchburg.  It  proved  to  be  too  formidable  for  a 
front  attack — the  ground  being  open  and  sloping  up  gradu 
ally  to  a  crest  about  a  thousand  yards  distant,  which  was  cov 
ered  with  intrenchments  and  batteries.  An  attempt  was  then 
made  to  take  it  in  flank,  but  the  Confederate  flanks  were 
found  to  extend  both  on  the  right  and  left  beyond  the  line  of 
Humphreys'  divisions,  and  it  became  manifest  that  all  that  re 
mained  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Yirginia  was  present.  Bar 
low's  division  was  then  ordered  up.  Meanwhile  Humphreys, 
having  extended  his  right  the  length  of  one  division,  ordered 
Miles  to  make  an  attack  with  three  regiments ;  but  these  met  a 
complete  repulse,  suffering  the  loss  of  above  six  hundred 
in  killed  and  wounded.  It  was  too  late  to  renew  operations 
when  Barlow  arrived,  and  during  the  night  Lee  again  re 
treated. 

While  these  events  were  in  progress,  Sheridan  dispatched 
two  of  his  mounted  divisions  to  Prince  Edward  Courthouse, 
and  a  third,  that  of  Crook,  to  Farmville.  The  bridges  having 
been  burnt  at  this  point,  the  horsemen  crossed  with  great  dif 
ficulty  by  wading ;  though  the  Sixth  Corps,  which  was  moving 
on  the  same  line,  was  so  delayed  that  it  was  not  able  to  make 
the  passage  until  night.  Crook  struck  a  train  on  the  north 
side  of  Appomattox  ;  but  it  was  too  well  defended  by  infantry; 
and  after  a  sharp  skirmish  the  cavalry  was  driven  off,  General 
Gregg,  commanding  one  of  the  brigades,  being  captured. 

The  night  of  the  7th  General  Lee  received  the  following 
communication : 

APBIX,  7,  1865. 

GENKRAL  : — The  result  of  the  last  week  must  convince  you  of  the  hopeless 
ness  of  further  resistance  on  the  part  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  in  this 


THE  FINAL  CAMPAIGN.  617 

struggle.  I  feel  that  it  is  so,  and  regard  it  as  my  duty  to  shift  from  myself  the 
responsibility  of  any  further  effusion  of  blood,  by  asking  of  you  the  surrender 
of  that  portion  of  the  Confederate  States  army  known  as  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia. 

TJ.  S.  GRANT,  Lieutenant-General. 
GENERAL  K.  E.  LEE. 

It  was  at  Farmville  that  General  Grant  wrote  this  message, 
and  he  was  prompted  by  the  belief  that  "General  Lee's 
chances  of  escape  were  now  utterly  hopeless,"  Lee  indited 
his  reply  that  same  night,  but  before  General  Grant  received 
it,  the  Confederate  commander  had  again  put  a  long  night's 
march  between  his  army  and  its  pursuers.  It  was  in  these 
words : 

GENEBAL  : — I  have  received  your  note  of  this  date.  Though  not  entertain 
ing  the  opinion  you  express  on  the  hopelessness  of  further  resistance  on  the 
part  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  I  reciprocate  your  desire  to  avoid  use 
less  effusion  of  blood,  and,  therefore,  before  considering  your  proposition,  ask 
the  terms  you  will  offer  on  condition  of  its  surrender. 

ROBERT  E.  LEE,  General. 

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL  U.  S.  GRANT. 

To  this  General  Grant  immediately  replied  : 

APRIL  8,  1865. 

GENERAL  : — Your  note  of  last  evening,  in  reply  to  mine  of  the  same  date, 
asking  the  condition  on  which  I  will  accept  the  surrender  of  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia,  is  just  received.  In  reply,  I  would  say  that  peace  being 
my  great  desire,  there  is  but  one  condition  I  would  insist  upon,  namely  :  that 
the  men  and  officers  surrendered  shall  be  disqualified  for  taking  up  arms  again 
against  the  Government  of  the  United  States  until  properly  exchanged.  I  will 
meet  you,  or  will  designate  officers  to  meet  any  officers  you  might  name  for  the 
same  purpose,  at  any  point  agreeable  to  you,  for  the  purpose  of  arranging 
definitely  the  terms  upon  which  the  surrender  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Vir 
ginia  will  be  received. 

U.  S.  GRANT,  Lieutenant-General. 

GENERAL  E.  E.  LEE. 

Meanwhile,  Lee's  night  march  of  the  7th  having  again  left 
the  Union  forces  considerably  behind,  it  was  necessary  to 
renew  pursuit  on  the  morning  of  the  8th. 

The  Second  and  Sixth  corps  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomao 


618  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

moved  by  the  north  bank  of  the  Appomattox,  while  Sheridan 
advanced  by  the  south  bank,  and,  followed  by  Ord's  command 
,  and  the  Fifth  Corps,  struck  out  for  Appomattox  station  on 
the  Lynchburg  Kailroad.  Lee's  line  of  retreat  was  now  by 
the  narrow  neck  of  land  betwixt  the  Appomattox  and  the 
James.  If  its  outlet  towards  Lynchburg  was  closed,  all  was 
lost  for  Lee.  Sheridan  was  hastening  to  close  this  outlet. 

Desperate  as  the  situation  was,  Lee,  determined  to  put  the 
best  face  on  matters,  with  a  kind  of  grim  humor,  wrote,  but 
flying  as  he  wrote  : 

APEIL  8,  1865. 

GENERAL  : — I  received  at  a  late  hour  your  note  of  to-day.  In  mine  of  yes 
terday  I  did  not  intend  to  propose  the  surrender  of  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia,  but  to  ask  the  terms  of  your  proposition.  To  be  frank,  /  do  not 
think  the  emergency  has  arisen  to  call  for  the  surrender  of  this  army  ;  but,  as 
the  restoration  of  peace  should  be  the  sole  object  of  all,  I  desired  to  know 
whether  your  proposals  would  lead  to  that  end.  I  cannot,  therefore,  meet  you 
with  a  view  to  surrender  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  but  as  far  as  your 
proposal  may  effect  the  Confederate  States  forces  under  my  command,  and  tend 
to  the  restoration  of  peace,  I  should  be  pleased  to  meet  you  at  ten  A.  M., 
to-morrow,  on  the  old  stage  road  to  Richmond,  between  the  picket  lines  of  the 
two  armies. 

R.  E.  LEE,  General. 

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL  GBANT. 

This  note  Grant  received  about  midnight,  and  next  morning 
lie  replied  in  these  terms  : 

APRIL  9,  1865. 

GENERAL  : — Tour  note  of  yesterday  is  received.  I  have  no  authority  to  treat 
on  the  subject  of  peace :  the  meeting  proposed  for  ten  A.  M.  to-day  could  lead  to 
no  good.  I  will  state,  however,  general,  that  I  am  equally  anxious  for  peace 
with  yourself,  and  the  whole  North  entertains  the  same  feeling.  The  terms 
upon  which  peace  can  be  had  are  well  understood.  By  the  South  laying  down 
their  arms  they  will  hasten  that  most  desirable  event,  save  thousands  of  human 
lives,  and  hundreds  of  millions  of  property  not  yet  destroyed.  Seriously 
hoping  that  all  our  difficulties  may  be  settled  without  the  loss  of  another  life, 
I  subscribe  myself,  &c., 

U.  S.  GRANT,  LieutenantGeneral. 

GENERAL  E.  E.  LEE. 

But,  before  Lee  received  this,  the  time  for  parley  had 


THE  FINAL  CAMPAIGN.  619 

passed.  The  evening  of  the  8th,  after  a  march  of  above 
thirty  miles,  Sheridan  reached  Appomattox  station  on  the 
Lynchhurg  Railroad,  five  miles  south  of  Appomattox  Court 
house.  The  rear-guard  of  Lee's  army  had  just  arrived,  and' 
four  trains  of  cars,  loaded  with  supplies  for  the  starving 
Confederates,  were  approaching.  Sheridan,  by  throwing  a 
force  in  rear  of  the  trains,  captured  them,  and  then  assailing 
the  vanguard,  drove  it  back  to  Appomattox  Courthouse. 
Here  he  planted  his  force  directly  in  front  of  Lee  and  on  his 
line  of  retreat,  and  resolved  to  hold  fast  for  the  night,  knowing 
that  the  Army  of  the  James  would  join  him  in  the  morning, 
whilst  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  would  strike  the  rear  of  the 
Confederates. 

But  one  escape  now  remained  to  Lee,  which  was  to  cut  his 
way  through  Sheridan's  lines,  and  this  he  attempted  at  dawn. 
The  once  proud  array  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  now 
presented  this  sorry  spectacle.  A  thin  line  of  battle,  made  up 
of  Gordon's  troops  in  front ;  another  scant  line  composed  of 
the  wreck  of  Longstreet's  corps  in  rear — in  all  about  eight 
thousand  men.  Between  the  two  were  the  debris  of  the  wag 
on-train  and  the  gaunt  figures  of  some  thousands  of  unarmed 
stragglers,  too  weak  to  carry  their  muskets.  Lee  sent  orders 
to  Gordon  to  cut  his  way  through  at  all  hazards.  This  was 
immediately  begun  with  wonderful  impetuosity,  and  the  cav 
alry,  that  had  dismounted  to  resist  the  attack,  found  itself 
forced  back.  At  this  juncture  Sheridan  personally  arrived 
from  Appomattox  Station,  whither  he  had  been  to  hasten  the 
march  of  the  Army  of  the  James.  That  officer  immediately 
directed  his  troopers  to  fall  back  gradually,  resisting  the 
enemy,  so  as  to  give  the  infantry  time  to  come  up  and  form 
its  lines.  This  was  soon  effected ;  and  the  moment  the  Con 
federates  caught  sight  of  the  advancing  bayonets,  they  ceased 
their  pressure  and  began  to  give  ground.  Then  Sheridan, 
sounding  the  order  to  mount,  dashed  with  his  cavalry  and 
placed  it  on  the  enemy's  left  flank.  He  was  just  about  to 
charge  on  the  trains  and  confused  mass,  when  one  bearing  a 
white  flag  emerged  from  the  Confederate  lines  with  a  letter 


620  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

from  General  Lee,  requesting  a  suspension  of  hostilities  look 
ing  to  a  surrender,  and  an  interview  with  General  Grant. 
This  meeting  was  had  at  a  dwelling  in  Appomattox  Court 
house,  where  the  rival  chieftains,  sitting  together  at  a  deal 
table,  reduced  to  form  the  act  that  put  out  of  existence  the 
Army  of  Northern  Yirginia.  The  agreement  was  embodied 
in  the  two  following  papers  : 

APPOMATTOX  COURTHOUSE,  VA., 
April  9,  1865. 

GENERAL  : — In  accordance  with  the  substance  of  my  letter  to  you  of  the  8th 
instant,  I  propose  to  receive  the  surrender  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia 
on  the  following  terms — to  wit :  Rolls  of  all  the  officers  and  men  to  be  made 
in  duplicate,  ono  copy  to  be  given  to  an  officer  to  be  designated  by  me,  the 
other  to  be  retained  by  such  officer  or  officers  as  you  may  designate.  The  offi 
cers  to  give  their  individual  paroles  not  to  take  up  arms  against  the  United 
States  until  properly  exchanged ;  and  each  company  or  regimental  commander 
to  sign  a  like  parole  for  the  men  of  their  commands.  The  arms,  artillery,  and 
public  property  to  be  packed  and  stacked,  and  turned  over  to  the  officers  ap 
pointed  by  me  to  receive  them.  This  will  not  embrace  the  side-arms  of  the 
officers,  nor  their  private  horses  or  baggage.  This  done,  each  officer  and  man 
will  be  allowed  to  return  to  his  home,  not  to  be  disturbed  by  United  States  au 
thority  so  long  as  they  observe  their  paroles  and  the  laws  in  force  where  they 
may  reside. 

U.  S.  GRANT,  Lieutenant-General. 

GENERAL  E.  E.  LEE. 

HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA, 
April  9,  1865. 

GENERAL  : — I  have  received  your  letter  of  this  date  containing  the  terms  of 
the  surrender  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  as  proposed  by  you.  As  they 
are  substantially  the  same  as  those  expressed  in  your  letter  of  the  8th  instant, 
they  are  accepted.  I  will  proceed  to  designate  the  proper  officers  to  carry  the 
stipulations  into  effect. 

B.  E.  LEE,  General. 
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL  U.  S.  GRANT. 

These  terms  were,  on  the  part  of  General  Grant,  liberal  and 
magnanimous ;  and  that  officer  displayed  throughout  the 
transaction  soldierly  delicacy. 

In  the  course  of  the  afternoon,  the  result  of  this  momentous 
interview  became  known  to  both  armies,  and  then  all  the  in- 


THE  FINAL  CAMPAIGN.  621 

tense,  yet  strangely  diverse  emotions  which  the  intelligence 
was  calculated  to  evoke,  broke  out  in  manifestations  that  pass 
all  words  of  description.  On  the  Union  side  there  was  joy 
unmixed  and  unrestrained — the  joy  of  men  that  had  gone 
through  great  tribulation,  the  joy  of  an  army  that,  often  un 
fortunate  and  ever  unappreciated,  saw  at  length  unparalleled 
labors  crowned  by  illustrious  success.  On  the  Confederate 
side  there  was  a  kind  of  joy,  too — such  sad  joy  as  men  feel 
when  a  long  agony  is  over.  Yet  there  could  not  fail  to  be 
deep  anguish  in  their  hearts  ;  and  this  burst  forth  when  Gen 
eral  Lee  rode  through  the  ranks.  "  Whole  lines  of  battle," 
says  an  eye-witness,  "  rushed  up  to  their  beloved  old  chief, 
and,  choking  with  emotion,  struggled  with  each  other  to  wring 
him  once  more  by  the  hand.  Men  who  had  fought  throughout 
the  war,  and  knew  what  the  agony  and  humiliation  of  that  mo 
ment  must  be  to  him,  strove  with  a  refinement  of  unselfishness 
and  tenderness  which  he  alone  could  fully  appreciate,  to 
lighten  his  burden  and  mitigate  his  pain.  "With  tears  pouring 
down  both  cheeks,  General  Lee  at  length  commanded  voice 
enough  to  say  :  '  Men,  we  have  fought  through  the  war  to 
gether.  I  have  done  the  best  that  I  could  for  you.'  Not  an 
eye  that  looked  on  that  scene  was  dry." 

As  the  armies  were  enemies  no  longer,  there  was  no  need  of 
martial  array  that  night,  nor  fear  of  surprise,  nor  call  to 
arms  ;  but  hostile  devisement  gave  place  to  mutual  helpfulness, 
and  the  victors  shared  their  rations  with  the  famished  van 
quished.  In  that  supreme  moment  these  men  knew  and  re 
spected  each  other.  If  the  one  army  drank  the  joy  of  victory, 
and  the  other  the  bitter  draught  of  defeat,  it  was  a  joy  moder 
ated  by  the  recollection  of  the  cost  at  which  it  had  been  pur 
chased,  and  a  defeat  mollified  by  the  consciousness  of  many 
triumphs.  If  the  victors  could  recall  a  Malvern  Hill,  an  Antie- 
tam,  a  Gettysburg,  a  Five  Forks,  the  vanquished  could  recall  a 
Manassas,  a  Fredericksburg,  a  Chancellorsville,  a  Cold  Har 
bor.  If  at  length  the  army  of  Northern  Virginia  fell  before 
the  massive  power  of  the  North,  yet  what  vitality  had  it 
shown !  How  terrible  had  been  the  struggle !  How  many 


622  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

hundreds  of  thousands  of  brave  men  had  fallen  before  that 
result  could  be  achieved !  And  this  is  the  glory  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac,  that  it  brought  to  the  ground  the  adversary 
which  had  ever  been  the  head  and  front  of  the  revolt,  and  that 
in  crushing  it,  it  quelled  the  rebellion.  For  so  decisive  upon 
the  issue  of  the  war  was  the  surrender  of  that  army,  that  the 
capitulation  of  all  the  other  Confederate  armies  followed  as  a 
corollary  therefrom,  and  the  structure  of  the  Confederacy, 
losing  its  key-stone,  fell  with  a  resounding  crash. 

Three  days  after  the  surrender,  the  Confederates  marched 
by  divisions  to  a  designated  spot  in  the  neighborhood  of 
Appomattox  Courthouse,  and  there  the  troops  stacked  their 
arms  and  deposited  their  accoutrements.  Less  than  eight 
thousand  presented  themselves  with  muskets  in  their  hands  ; 
but  the  capitulation  included,  in  addition,  about  eighteen  thou 
sand  unarmed.  Paroles  were  then  distributed  to  the  men,  and 
the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  passed  out  of  existence. 

The  Union  troops  then  retraced  their  steps  to  Eichmond, 
whence  they  were  soon  afterwards  transferred  to  Washington. 
Here  uniting  with  their  illustrious  sister-army  of  the  West, 
they  passed  in  review  before  the  President  and  his  cabinet, 
and  the  representatives  of  foreign  powers,  and  an  immense 
concourse  of  citizens,  who  with  great  rejoicings  welcomed 
home  the  men  whose  valor  had  won  the  peace  that  now 
reigned  over  all  the  land.  When  the  pageant  was  ended,  the 
troops  were  mustered  out  of  service,  and  the  men,  doffing 
the  Union  blue,  were  quietly  reabsorbed  into  the  body  of 
society. 

Thus  the  Army  of  the  Potomac — that  mighty  creation  of 
the  patriotism  of  a  free  people,  which  for  four  years  had 
waged  a  struggle  unparalleled  in  its  continuous  intensity — 
ceased  to  be,  closing  its  career  in  the  world  and  the  world's 
wars  by  the  happy  re-establishment  of  the  Union  for  which 
it  had  fought. 

What  it  belonged  to  me  to  say  of  this  army  is  now  com 
pleted.  It  is  worthy  of,  and  will  doubtless  find,  a  better  his 
torian.  Yet,  inadequate  as  is  the  performance,  I  am  con- 


THE  FINAL  CAMPAIGN.  623 

scions  of  having  wrought  with  a  laudable  aim — to  wit :  to 
speak  the  truth  with  candor,  and  to  challenge  for  that  army 
the  recognition  which  is  justly  its  due,  but  which  has  not 
yet  been  accorded  it — the  work  it  did  and  the  circum 
stances  under  which  it  was  done  being  both  little  under 
stood. 


APPENDIX. 


Page  58.  GENERALSHIP  AT  BULL  RUN. 

My  statement  in  regard  to  the  tactical  errors  at  Bull  Run,  in  regard  to 
McDowell's  attacking  in  fractions,  is  fully  borne  out  by  General  Johnston, 
who  also  adds  some  very  frank  avowals  of  error  on  his  own  part. 

"  The  [Confederate]  Army  of  the  Potomac,  exclusive  of  the  garrison  of  the 
intrenched  position  at  Manassas  Junction,  amounted  then  to  about  nineteen 
thousand  men  of  all  arms.  A  large  proportion  of  it  was  not  engaged  in  the 
battle.  This  was  a  great  fault  on  my  part.  When  Bee's  and  Jackson's  bri 
gades  were  ordered  to  the  vicinity  of  the  Stone  Bridge,  those  of  Holmes  and 
Early  should  have  been  moved  to  the  left  also,  and  placed  in  the  interval  on 
Bonham's  left,  if  not  then,  certainly  at  nine  o'clock,  when  a  Federal  column 
was  seen  turning  our  left ;  and  when  it  seemed  certain  that  General  Mc 
Dowell's  great  effort  was  to  be  made  there,  Bonham's,  Longstreet's,  Jones's, 
and  Ewell's  brigades,  leaving  a  few  regiments  and  their  cavalry  to  impose 
on  Miles's  division,  should  have  been  hurried  to  the  left  to  join  in  the  battle. 

'*  If  the  tactics  of  the  Federals  had  been  equal  to  their  strategy,  we  should 
have  been  beaten.  If,  instead  of  being  brought  into  action  in  detail,  their 
troops  had  been  formed  in  two  lines  with  a  proper  reserve,  and  had  assailed 
Bee  and  Jackson  in  that  order,  the  two  Southern  brigades  must  have  been 
swept  from  the  field  in  a  few  minutes,  or  enveloped.  General  McDowell 
would  have  made  such  a  formation,  probably,  had  he  not  greatly  under-esti 
mated  the  strength  of  his  enemy." — GEN,  J.  E.  JOHNSTON:  "Narrative," 
pages  56-57. 

Page  59.  QUESTION  OP  PURSUIT  AFTER  BULL  RUN. 

On  this  question  General  Johnston  and  Mr.  Davis  have  in  late  years  fought 
their  battles  over  again,  Mr.  Davis  stating  that  lie  was  in  favor  of  vigorous  pur 
suit,  and  General  Johnston  not  only  reiterating  his  statement  of  the  impossi 
bility  of  an  effectual  following  up  of  the  Federal  army,  but  asserting  that  Mr. 
Davis  "  gave  no  orders,  and  expressed  neither  wish  nor  opinion  on  the  subject^ 
that  ever  came  to  my  knowledge, " 

Regarding  the  following-up,  General  Johnston  writes :  "All  the  military  con 
ditions,  we  knew,  forbade  an  attempt  on  Washington.  The  Confederate  army 
was  more  disorganized  by  victory  than  that  of  the  United  States  by  defeat.. 


626  APPENDIX. 

.  .  .  .  Besides  this  condition  of  our  army  the  reasons  for  the  course  con 
demned  by  the  non-combatant  military  critics  were  : 

"The  unfitness  of  our  raw  troops  for  marching  or  assailing  intrenchments. 

"The  want  of  the  necessary  supplies  of  food  and  ammunition,  and  means 
of  transporting  them.  Until  near  August  10th,  we  never  had  rations  for  more 
than  two  days,  and  sometimes  none,  nor  half  enough  ammunition  for  a  battle, 

"The  fortifications  upon  which  skilful  engineers  had  been  engaged  since 
April,  manned  by  at  least  fifty  thousand  Federal  troops,  half  of  whom  had 
not  suffered  defeat. 

"  The  Potomac,  a  mile  wide,  bearing  United  States  vessels  of  war,  the  heavy 
guns  of  which  commanded  the  wooden  bridges  and  the  Southern  shore." — 
GEN.  J.  E.  JOHNSTON  :  "Narrative,"  pages  60-61. 

In  regard  to  Mr.  Davis's  opinion  of  the  propriety  of  pursuit,  General  John 
ston  quotes,  from  Alfriend's  "Life  of  Jefferson  Davis,"  these  statements: 
"Mr.  Davis  was  far  from  approving  the  inaction  which  followed  Manassas. 
He  confidently  expected  a  different  use  of  the  victory.  ,  .  .  Indeed,  be 
fore  leaving  Manassas,  President  Davis  favored  the  most  vigorous  pursuit 
practicable.  And  that  he  contemplated  immediate  activity  as  a  sequel  of 
Manassas  is  a  matter  of  indisputable  record." 

To  these  assertions  General  Johnston,  as  has  been  seen,  gives  a  flat  denial, 
adding  :  "  He  (Davis)  expressed  none  of  the  '  views T  and  opinions  ascribed  to 
him  in  the  biography,  and  gave  me  no  orders  for  movements  of  troops,  and 
discussed  no  matters  concerning  the  army,  except  such  as  related  to  adminis 
tration.  The  fact  that  he  gave  no  instructions  in  relation  to  the  employment 
of  the  army,  nor  orders  to  make  any  aggressive  movement,  nor  even  suggested 
such,  proves  conclusively  that  he  thought  none  expedient,  and  was  satisfied 
with  the  victory  as  it  was." — GEN.  J.  E.  JOHNSTON  :  "Narrative,"  page  64. 

It  is  now  time  to  introduce  Mr.  Jefferson  Davis  himself,  who  in  his  ' '  Rise 
and  Fall  of  the  Confederate  Government"  (Vol.  I.,  pp.  352-3),  says:  "At  a 
late  hour  of  the  night,  I  had  a  conference  with  Generals  Johnston  and  Beau- 
regard  ;  the  Adjutant-General  of  the  latter,  Colonel  Jordan,  was  present.  .  .  . 
When,  after  some  preliminary  conversation,  I  asked  whether  any  troops  had 
been  sent  in  pursuit  of  the  enemy,  I  was  answered  in  the  negative.  Upon 
further  inquiry  as  to  what  troops  were  in  the  best  position  for  pursuit,  and  had 
been  least  fatigued  during  the  day,  General  Bonham's  brigade  was  named.  .  .  . 
I  at  once  dictated  an  order  for  immediate  pursuit." 

In  corroboration  of  this,  Mr.  Davis  quotes  Adjutant-General  Jordan  as  fol 
lows  :  "  Mr.  Davis  with  much  animation  asserted  the  necessity  for  an  urgent 
pursuit  that  night  by  Bonham,"  a  statement  which,  however,  it  is  difficult  to 
reconcile  with  another  in  the  same  letter,  namely :  Mr.  Davis  did  not  ; '  dis 
play  the  least  disposition  to  interfere  by  opinion  or  authority  touching  what 
the  Confederate  forces  should  or  should  not  do." 

It  is  no  less  puzzling  to  understand  the  following  endorsement  by  General 
Beauregard  of  Adjutant -General  Jordan's  letter  from  which  the  above  extracts 
are  made  :  "  The  account  given  herewith  by  General  Jordan  of  what  occurred 
there  respecting  further  pursuit  that  night  agrees  with  my  own  recollection." 


APPENDIX.  627 

Pages  102-3.  GENERAL  JOHNSTON'S  THEORY  OP  DEFENDING  RICHMOND. 

General  Johnston  gives  emphatic  corroboration  of  the  statement  here  made 
that  he  did  not  believe  in  the  policy  of  making  a  stand  at  Yorktown  any 
longer  than  would  somewhat  delay  McClellan's  advance,  and  in  fact  did  not 
believe  in  the  attempt  to  hold  the  Peninsula  at  all.  He  says:  "I  was  con 
vinced  that  we  could  do  no  more  on  the  Peninsula  than  delay  General  Mc 
Clellan's  progress  toward  Richmond,  and  that,  if  he  found  our  intrenchments 
too  strong  to  be  carried  certainly  and  soon,  he  could  pass  around  them  by 
crossing  York  River.  It  seemed  to  me  the  more  probable,  however,  that  he 
would  open  York  River  to  his  vessels  by  demolishing  our  water-batteries,  and 
passing  us  by  water,  unless  tempted,  by  discovering  the  weakness  of  our  un 
finished  works  between  Yorktown  and  the  head  of  the  inundations,  to  force 
his  way  through  our  line  there."  General  Johnston  also  adds  an  interesting 
statement  of  his  views  as  to  the  proper  campaign  for  the  defence  of  Richmond. 

u  Instead  of  only  delaying  the  Federal  army  in  its  approach,  I  proposed  that 
it  should  be  encountered  in  front  of  Richmond,  by  one  quite  as  numerous, 
formed  by  uniting  there  all  the  available  forces  of  the  Confederacy  in  North 
Carolina,  South  Carolina,  and  Georgia,  with  those  at  Norfolk,  on  the  Penin 
sula,  and  then  near  Richmond,  including  Smith's  and  Longstreet's  divisions, 
which  had  arrived.  The  great  army  thus  formed,  surprising  that  of  the 
United  States  by  an  attack  when  it  was  expecting  to  besiege  Richmond  would 
be  almost  certain  to  win;  and  the  enemy,  defeated  a  hundred  miles  from 
Fort  Monroe,  their  place  of  refuge,  could  scarcely  escape  destruction.  Such  a 
victory  would  not  only  decide  the  campaign  but  the  war,  while  the  present 
plan  could  produce  no  decisive  result." — GEN.  JOHNSTON:  "Narrative," 
page  113. 

It  seems,  however,  that  in  stating  that  General  Lee  agreed  with  General 
Johnston  in  pronouncing  the  peninsula  untenable,  I  was  in  error.  The  latter 
officer  distinctly  states  that  in  a  council  of  war  held  early  in  April,  General  Lee 
opposed  the  plan  proposed.  "  He  thought,"  says  Johnston,  ' l  that  the  peninsula 
had  excellent  fields  of  battle  for  a  small  army  contending  with  a  great  one, 
and  that  we  should  for  that  reason  make  the  contest  with  McClellan's  army 
there.  .  .  .  The  President,  who  previously  had  expressed  no  opinion  on 
the  question,  announced  his  decision  in  favor  of  General  Lee's  opinion  " 
(p.  115). 

This  statement  of  General  Lee's  views  is  confirmed  by  Mr.  Davis  ("  Rise 
and  Fall  of  the  Confederate  Government,"  Vol.  II,,  page  87). 

General  Johnston  then  adds :  "  The  belief  that  events  on  the  peninsula 
would  soon  compel  the  Confederate  government  to  adopt  my  method  of  op 
posing  the  Federal  army,  reconciled  me  somewhat  to  the  necessity  of  obeying 
the  President's  order"  (p.  116), 

Farther  on  (page  142),  in  narrating  the  events  of  Fair  Oaks,  where  he  was 
wounded,  and  after  which.  General  Lee  took  command  of  the  Confederate 
army  in  Virginia,  General  Johnston  remarks  :  "  As  soon  as  I  had  lost  the  com 
mand  of  the  Army  of  Virginia  by  wounds  in  battle,  my  suggestion  was  adopted. 


628  APPENDIX. 

In  that  way  the  largest  Confederate  army  that  ever  fought  was  formed  in  the 
month  of  June,  by  strengthening  the  forces  near  Richmond  with  troops  from 
North  and  South  Carolina  and  Georgia." 

One  cannot  refuse  General  Johnston  this  little  chuckle  at  the  practical  vin 
dication  of  his  plan.  It  may  be  worth  noticing,  in  passing,  that  General  John 
ston  states  that  the  additions  to  Lee's  army  in  the  interim  between  his  taking 
command  and  the  operations  attending  the  change  of  base  (June  26th), 
amounted,  in  the  aggregate,  to  53,000  men.  But  other  Southern  writers,  in 
cluding  Major  Taylor,  Colonel  Marshall,  and  others,  have  each  done  his  share 
in  reducing  this  number,  till  under  the  arithmetical  manipulations  of  General 
Early  it  dwindles  to  23,000,  and  of  Mr.  Davis  to  16,916.  The  sixteen  in  this 
last  total  is  probably  an  excess.  But  enough  of  such  trifles. 

Page  117.  FRANKLIN'S  FLANK  MOVEMENT  via  WEST  POINT. 
In  the  passage  touching  this  matter  some  correction  is  required.  I  allow  the 
inference  to  be  drawn  that  when  Yorktown  was  evacuated,  Franklin  was  or 
dered  to  land  up  the  York  River  and  attack  Johnston's  army  in  flank.  It  ap 
pears,  however,  that  in  reality  he  was  ordered  to  land  where  he  did,  and  send 
back  the  transports  immediately  for  more  troops.  The  precise  object  of  Frank 
lin's  movement,  of  what  was  expected  from  it,  and  what  resulted  from  it,  will 
appear  from  the  following  extract  from  a  letter  from  General  Franklin  to  the 
present  writer  :  "  General  McClellan  did  not  order  me  to  move  into  the  interior 
from  West  Point.  On  the  contrary,  after  making  a  landing,  I  was  to  await  the 
arrival  of  Sedgwick's  and  Fitz  John  Porter's  divisions.  When  attacked,  the 
morning  after  my  landing  was  effected,  I  repulsed  the  attack,  and  was  joined 
the  same  day  by  Sedgwick,  and  the  day  after  by  Porter.  Therefore,  the  state 
ment  that  I  was  held  in  check  by  the  enemy  is  hardly  correct.  My  picket  line 
was  driven  in,  but,  by  repulsing  the  enemy,  was  re-established.  When  I  left 
Yorktown  for  West  Point  I  think  General  McClellan  anticipated  that  the 
enemy  would  make  a  heavier  stand  at  Williamsburg,  and  therefore  he  intended 
to  concentrate  a  large  turning  force  where  I  landed.  We  certainly  were  not 
repulsed  in  the  West  Point  fight,  and  that  we  were  held  in  check  by  the 
enemy  is  not  the  correct  way  to  put  it,  because  we  had  no  intention  to  go  for 
ward  until  joined  by  the  troops  I  have  named.  I  suppose  I  would  have  been 
ordered  to  advance  had  not  Johnston's  main  army  got  past  the  point  where  I 
could  have  struck  him  before  I  was  landed. " 

Page  118.   GENERAL  SUMNER  AT  WILLIAMSBURG. 

Since  the  date  of  original  publication  I  have  become  convinced  that  in  some 
respects  injustice  is  done  to  General  Sumner  in  the  account  of  the  action  at 
Williamsburg.  After  the  fall  of  Yorktown,  General  Sumner  received  an  order 
to  go  to  the  front  and  take  command,  without  other  instructions.  He  went  on 
with  Smith's  division,  arriving  at  Williamsburg  near  night.  He  found  that 
Stoneman  had  attacked  and  failed,  but  that  officer,  Stoneman,  insisted  that  it 
was  only  a  weak  line  of  rifle-pits,  and  that  he  had  no  doubt  the  enemy  had 
gone.  It  appeared  that  General  Heintzelman  came  up  in  the  night  with  an 


APPENDIX.  629 

order  identical  with  General  Simmer's  to  assume  command.  General  Sumner 
decided  to  get  the  troops  up  in  hand  to  attack  early  in  the  morning.  Keys  re 
ceived  positive  verbal  and  written  orders  to  have  Casey's  division  there  at 
dawn,  but  did  not  get  it  there  till  noon,  allowing  Kearney  to  pass  him  on  the 
road.  Hooker  came  up  and  attacked  without  orders  (from  Sumner  at  least), 
and  the  sound  of  his  firing  was  the  first  intimation  Sumner  had  of  Hooker's 
movements.  Smith  could  not  be  withdrawn,  but  the  first  troops  that  came 
up  (Kearney's)  were  sent  to  Hooker.  From  these  facts  it  would  appear  that 
General  Keys  was  to  blame. 

While  I  think  this  statement  due  to  the  memory  of  General  Sumner,  there 
does  not  appear  to  be  anything  to  contravene  my  general  verdict  "that  his 
conduct  of  affairs  at  Williamsburg  was  marked  by  great  confusion." 

General  J.  E.  Johnston  says :  "At  ten  o'clock,  when  the  action  had  lasted 
more  than  four  hours,  there  seemed  to  be  so  little  vigor  in  the  enemy's  con 
duct  that  I  became  convinced  that  it  was  a  mere  demonstration  intended  to 
delay  our  march — that  the  Federal  army  might  pass  us  by  water.  ...  As  the 
Federal  army,  except  Franklin's  division  had  marched  but  nine  miles  to  the 
field  the  day  before,  by  two  roads,  one  cannot  understand  why  four  or  even 
six  divisions,  if  necessary,  were  not  brought  into  action.  The  smallness  of  the 
force  engaged  on  this  occasion  greatly  strengthened  my  suspicion  that  the 
army  itself  was  moving  up  York  River  in  transports. " — GEN.  J.  E.  JOHNSTON  : 
"  Narrative,"  pages  120-124. 

It  was  at  Williamsburg  that  General  Hooker  won  the  sobriquet  "  Fighting 
Joe,"  but  he  did  so  in  the  foolhardy  and  unauthorized  attack  which  cost  many 
precious  lives. 

Pages  186,  187.  GENERAL,  FITZ  JOHN  PORTER  AND  GENERAL  POPE. 

To  the  Fitz  John  Porter  question,  as  stated  in  the  foot  note  to  page  186,  there 
has  been  a  long  sequel.  General  Porter  began  to  make  efforts  for  a  re-hearing 
soon  after  the  court-martial.  He  appealed  to  President  Lincoln  in  1863,  to 
President  Johnson  in  1867,  and  to  President  Grant  in  1869  and  1874.  "My 
appeals,"  says  General  Porter,  "  were  never  refused,  but  were  never  granted." 
Finally,  in  June,  1878,  a  board  was  ordered  to  convene  at  West  Point  for  the 
purpose  of  examining  into  the  case.  This  board  consisted  of  Generals  Scho- 
field,  Terry,  and  Getty.  After  a  "  very  thorough  examination  of  all  the  evi 
dence,"  it,  in  March,  1879,  made  a  report  from  which  I  make  the  following 
extracts : 

"  If  the  4.30  order  had  been  promptly  delivered,  a  very  grave  responsibility 
would  have  devolved  upon  General  Porter.  The  order  was  based  upon  condi 
tions  which  were  essentially  erroneous,  and  upon  expectations  which  could 
not  possibly  be  realized. 

"  It  required  an  attack  upon  the  enemy's  flank  or  rear,  which  could  not  be 
made,  and  that  the  attacking  force  keep  closed  on  Reynolds,  who  was  far  to 
the  right  and  beyond  reach.  Yet  it  would  have  been  too  late  to  correct  the 
error  and  have  the  order  modified.  That  order  appeared  to  be  part  of  a  gen 
eral  plan.  It  must  be  executed  promptly  or  not  at  all.  If  Porter  had  made 


630 

not  the  impossible  attack  which  was  ordered,  but  a  direct  attack  upon  the 
enemy's  right  wing,  would  he  have  been  blameless  for  the  fruitless  sacrifice  of 
his  troops  ?  We  believe  not.  It  is  a  well-established  military  maxim  that  a 
corps  commander  is  not  justifiable  in  making  an  apparently  hopeless  attack  in 
obedience  to  an  order  from  a  superior  who  is  not  on  tlie  spot,  and  wlio  is  evidently 
in  error  in  respect  to  tlie  essential  conditions  upon  which  the  order  is  based.  The 
duty  of  the  corps  commander  in  such  a  case  is  to  make  not  a  real  attack,  but  a 
strong  demonstration,  so  as  to  prevent  the  enemy  in  his  front  from  sending 
reinforcements  to  other  parts  of  his  line. 

"This  is  all  that  Porter  would  have  been  justifiable  in  doing,  even  if  he  had 
received  the  4.30  order  at  5  o'clock  ;  and  such  a  demonstration,  or  even  a  real 
attack  made  after  5  o'clock  by  Porter  alone,  could  have  had  no  beneficial  effect 
whatever  upon  the  general  result.  It  would  not  have  diminished  in  the  least 
the  resistance  offered  to  the  attacks  made  at  other  points  that  afternoon.  The 
display  of  troops  made  by  Porter  earlier  in  the  afternoon  had  all  the  desired 
and  all  possible  beneficial  effect.  It  caused  Longstreet's  reserve  division  to  be 
sent  to  his  extreme  right  in  front  of  Porter's  position.  There  that  division  re 
mained  until  about  6  o'clock — too  late  for  it  to  take  any  effective  part  in  the 
operations  at  other  points  of  the  line. 

"A powerful  and  well-sustained  attack  by  the  combined  forces  of  Porter's 
corps  and  King's  division  upon  the  enemy's  right  wing,  if  it  had  been  com 
menced  early  in  the  afternoon,  might  have  drawn  to  that  part  of  the  field  so 
large  a  part  of  Longstreet's  force  as  to  have  given  Pope  some  chance  of  success 
against  Jackson  ;  but  an  attack  by  Porter  alone  could  have  been  but  an  ineffec 
tive  blow,  destructive  only  to  the  force  that  made  it,  and,  followed  by  a  coun 
ter-attack,  disastrous  to  the  Union  army.  Such  an  attack,  under  such  circum 
stances,  would  have  been  not  only  a  great  blunder,  but,  on  tlie  part  of  an  intelli 
gent  officer,  it  would  have  been  a  great  crime. 

"What  General  Porter  actually  did  do,  although  his  situation  was  by  no 
means  free  from  embarrassment  and  anxiety  at  the  time,  now  seems  to  have 
been  only  the  simple,  necessary  action  which  an  intelligent  soldier  had  no 
choice  but  to  take.  It  is  not  possible  that  any  court-martial  could  have  con 
demned  such  conduct  if  it  had  been  correctly  understood.  On  the  contrary,  that 
conduct  was  obedient,  subordinate,  faithful,  and  judicious.  It  saved  the  Union 
army  from  disaster  on  the  29th  of  August.  .  .  .  Fortunately  that  order 
did  not  reach  Porter  until  about  sunset — too  late  for  any  attack  to  be  made. 
Any  attack  which  Porter  could  have  made  at  any  time  that  afternoon  must 
necessarily  have  been  fruitless  of  any  good  result.  Porters  faithfid,  subordi 
nate,  and  intelligent  conduct  that  afternoon  saved  the  Union  army  from  the  defeat 
whicfi  would  otherwise  have  resulted  that  day  from  the  enemy's  more  speedy  con 
centration.  The  only  seriously  critical  period  of  that  campaign,  viz.,  between 
11  A.M.  and  sunset  of  August  29th,  was  thus  safely  passed.  Porter  had  under 
stood  and  appreciated  the  military  situation,  and,  so  far  as  he  had  acted  upon 
his  own  judgment,  his  action  had  been  wise  and  judicious.  For  the  disaster 
of  the  succeeding  day  he  was  in  no  degree  responsible.  Whoever  else  may 
have  been  responsible,  it  did  not  flow  from  any  action  or  inaction  of  his.  .  .  . 


APPENDIX.  631 

"General  Porter  was,  in  effect,  condemned  for  not  having  taken  any  part 
in  his  own  battle.  Such  was  the  error  upon  which  General  Porter  was  pro 
nounced  guilty  of  the  most  shameful  crime  known  among  soldiers.  We  be 
lieve  not  one  among  att  the  gallant  soldiers  on  that  bloody  field  was  less  deserving 
of  such  condemnation  than  he.  .  Having  thus  given  the  reasons  for  our 

conclusions,  we  have  the  honor  to  report,  in  accordance  with  the  President's 
order,  that,  in  our  opinion,  justice  requires  at  his  hands  such  action  as  may 
be  necessary  to  annul  and  set  aside  the  findings  and  sentence  of  the  court- 
martial  in  the  case  of  Major-General  Fitz  John  Porter,  and  to  restore  him  to 
the  positions  of  which  that  sentence  deprived  him — such  restoration  to  take 
effect  from  the  date  of  his  dismissal  from  the  service." 

The  following  letter  from  General  Grant  to  President  Arthur  will  be  found 
interesting  in  this  connection : 

NEW  YORK,  December  22,  1881. 
THE  PRESIDENT,  Washington,  D.C. : 

Dear  Sir — At  the  request  of  General  Fitz  John  Porter  I  have  recently  re 
viewed  his  trial  and  the  testimony  furnished  before  the  Schofield  court  of  in 
quiry,  held  in  1879,  giving  to  the  subject  three  full  days  of  careful  reading  and 
consideration  and  much  thought  in  the  intervening  time.  The  reading  of 
the  whole  of  this  record  has  thoroughly  convinced  me  that,  for  these  nineteen 
years,  I  have  been  doing  a  gallant  and  efficient  soldier  a  very  great  injustice  in 
thought  and  sometimes  in  speech.  I  feel  it  incumbent  upon  me  now  to  do 
whatever  lies  in  my  power  to  remove  from  him  and  from  his  family  the  stain 
upon  his  good  name.  I  feel  this  the  more  incumbent  upon  me  than  I  should 
if  I  had  been  a  corps  commander  only,  or  occupying  any  other  command  in 
the  army  than  the  one  which  I  did  ;  but,  as  general,  I  had  it  possibly  in  my 
power  to  have  obtained  for  him  the  hearing  which  he  only  got  at  a  later  day  ; 
and,  as  President,  I  certainly  had  the  power  to  have  ordered  that  hearing.  In 
justification  for  my  injustice  to  General  Porter  I  can  only  state  that,  shortly 
after  the  war  closed,  his  defence  was  brought  to  my  attention,  but  I  read  it  in 
connection  with  a  sketch  of  the  field  where  his  offences  were  said  to  have  been 
committed,  which  I  now  see,  since  perfect  maps  have  been  made  by  the  engi 
neers'  department  of  the  whole  field,  were  totally  incorrect  as  showing  the 
position  of  the  two  armies.  I  have  read  it  in  connection  with  statements 
made  on  the  other  side  against  General  Porter,  and  I  am  afraid,  possibly,  with 
some  little  prejudice  in  the  case,  although  General  Porter  was  a  man  whom  I 
personally  knew  and  liked  before  ;  but  I  got  the  impression,  with  many  others, 
that  there  was  a  half-hearted  support  of  General  Pope  in  his  campaigns,  and 
that  General  Porter,  while  possibly  not  more  guilty  than  others,  happened  to 
be  placed  in  a  position  where  he  could  be  made  responsible  for  his  indiffer 
ence,  and  that  the  punishment  was  not  a  severe  one  for  such  an  offence.  I 
am  now  convinced  that  he  rendered  faithful,  efficient,  and  intelligent  service, 
and  the  fact  that  he  was  retained  in  command  of  a  corps  for  months  after  his 
offences  were  said  to  have  been  committed  is  in  his  favor.  What  I  would  ask, 
in  General  Porter's  behalf,  from  you  is  that,  if  you  can  possibly  give  the  time, 


632  APPENDIX. 

you  give  the  subject  the  same  study  and  thought  that  I  have  given  it,  and 
then  act  as  your  judgment  may  dictate.  But,  feeling  that  you  will  not  have 
the  time  for  such  an  investigation  (for  it  would  take  several  days'  time)  1 
would  ask  that  the  whole  matter  be  laid  before  the  attorney-general  for  his  ex 
amination  and  opinion.  Hoping  that  you  will  be  able  to  do  this  much  for  an 
officer  who  has  suffered  for  nineteen  years  a  punishment  that  never  should  be 
inflicted  upon  any  but  the  most  guilty,  I  a/n  very  truly  yours, 

U.  S.  GRANT. 

I  may  be  permitted  to  remark  that  when,  in  1866,  I  came  into  possession  of 
the  Confederate  official  reports,  and  felt  it  to  be  my  duty  to  cite  them  in  evi 
dence  (General  Porter  had  then  never  seen  these  Reports,  nor  had  I  ever  seen 
him),  I  was  most  unmercifully  berated  as  a  "copperhead"  and  friend  of 
traitors.  But,  "  the  whirligig  of  time  brings  in  his  revenges." 

Page  201.  LEE'S  LOST  ORDER. 
The  following  is  the  text  of  the  order  referred  to  : 

SPECIAL  ORDERS  No.  191. 

HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA, 
September  9,  1862. 

The  army  will  resume  its  march  to-morrow,  taking  the  Hagerstown  road. 
General  Jackson's  command  will  form  the  advance,  and  after  passing  Middle- 
town,  with  such  portion  as  he  may  select,  take  the  route  toward  Sharpsburg, 
cross  the  Potomac  at  the  most  convenient  point,  and  by  Friday  night  take 
possession  of  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad,  and  capture  such  of  the 
enemy  as  may  be  at  Martinsburg,  and  intercept  such  as  may  attempt  to  escape 
from  Harper's  Ferry. 

General  Longstreet's  command  will  pursue  the  same  road  as  far  as  Boons- 
boro,  where  it  will  halt  with  the  reserve,  supply,  and  baggage  trains  of  the 
army. 

General  McLaws,  with  his  own  division  and  that  of  General  R.  H.  Ander 
son,  will  follow  General  Longstreet ;  on  reaching  Middletown,  he  will  take  the 
route  to  Harper's  Ferry,  and  by  Friday  morning  possess  himself  of  the  Mary 
land  Heights,  and  endeavor  to  capture  the  enemy  at  Harper's  Ferry  and 
vicinity. 

General  Walker,  with  his  division,  after  accomplishing  the  object  in  which 
he  is  now  engaged,  will  cross  the  Potomac  at  Cheek's  Ford,  ascend  the  right 
tank  to  Lovettsville,  take  possession  of  Loudoun  Heights,  if  practicable,  by  Fri 
day  morning,  Key's  Ford  on  his  left  and  the  road  between  the  end  of  the 
mountain  and  the  Potomac  on  his  right.  He  will,  as  far  as  practicable,  co 
operate  with  General  McLaws  and  General  Jackson  in  intercepting  the  retreat 
of  the  enemy. 

General  D.  H.  Hill's  division  will  form  the  rear-guard  of  the  army,  pursuing 
the  road  taken  by  the  main  body.  The  reserve  artillery,  ordnance,  and  sup 
ply  trains,  etc. ,  will  precede  General  Hill. 


APPENDIX.  633 

General  Stuart  will  detach  a  squadron  of  cavalry  to  accompany  the  commands 
of  Generals  Longstreet,  Jackson,  and  McLaws,  and  with  the  main  body  of 
the  cavalry  will  cover  the  route  of  the  army  and  bring  up  all  stragglers  that 
may  have  been  left  behind. 

The  commands  of  Generals  Jackson,  McLaws,  and  Walker,  after  accom 
plishing  the  objects  for  which  they  have  been  detached,  will  join  the  main 
body  of  the  army  at  Boonsboro  or  Hagerstown. 

Each  regiment  on  the  march  will  habitually  carry  its  axes  in  the  regimental 
ordnance  wagons,  for  use  of  the  men  at  their  encampments,  to  procure  wood, 
etc. 

By  command  of  General  B.  L.  Lee. 

R.  H.  CHILTON, 

Assistant  Adjutant-General. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  D.  H.  HILL, 

Commanding  Division. 

It  seems  that  at  this  time  General  D.  H.  Hill's  division  had  not  been  attached 
to  nor  incorporated  with  either  of  the  two  wings  of  the  army  of  Northern  Vir 
ginia,  so  that  in  addition  to  the  copies  sent  to  corps  commanders,  one  copy  of 
this  order  was  sent  to  "General  D.  H.  Hill,  Commanding  Division,"  directly 
from  Lee's  headquarters.  General  Jackson  also  sent  Hill  a  copy,  regarding 
Hill  as  in  his  command.  It  was  one  of  these  copies  that  fell  into  McClellan's 
hands. 

Page  252.  HUMPHREYS'  CHARGE  ON  MARYE  HEIGHT. 

The  circumstances  of  Humphreys'  assault  deserve  fuller  mention  than  I 
have  made,  for  the  charge  was  marked  by  a  gallantry  unsurpassed  by  any 
thing  in  the  history  of  the  war.  General  Palfrey,  in  his  admirable  mono 
graph  on  Fredericksburg  (in  Scribner's  "Campaigns  of  the  Civil  War"  series) 
says  :  ' '  Some  of  the  very  best  fighting  that  was  done  at  Fredericksburg  was 
done  by  the  Third  Division  of  the  Fifth  Corps.  The  division  was  com 
manded  by  General  Humphreys,  who  was  probably  the  best  officer  in  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  that  day.  He  was  a  thoroughly  educated  soldier,  pos 
sessed  of  a  quick  eye  and  a  clear  head,  and  a  man  of  fiery  energy.  That  the 
fighting  his  division  did  was  so  good  was  due  to  him." 

I  venture  to  extract  from  a  private  letter  from  General  Humphreys  to  the 
present  writer,  dated  May  10,  1866,  the  following  particulars,  which  give  an 
even  more  vivid  picture  of  his  assault  than  is  found  in  his  official  report. 

"I  had  just  reached  the  edge  of  the  town  facing  Marye  Heights  with  my 
division,  when,  at  the  urgent  request  of  General  Couch,  I  was  authorized  or 
ordered  to  support  his  troops  in  front  of  the  stone  wall,  who,  he  said,  were 
nearly  out  of  ammunition,  and  would,  if  not  supported,  be  forced  back. 

"This  was  a  very  great  mistake.  Had  the  enemy  come  out  from  the  stone 
wall  we  should  have  carried  the  position.  I  moved  forward  at  once  with  my 
division  down  the  hill  and  across  the  ditch  or  canal,  formed  the  leading  bri 
gade  in  the  ravine  beyond  the  ditch  about  three  or  four  hundred  yards  from 
the  stone  wall,  and  advanced  in  line  of  battle  to  where  Couch's  men  were 


634  APPENDIX. 

lying  behind  a  small  fold  in  the  ground  about  one  hundred  and  fifty  yards  or 
less  from  the  stone  wall,  the  existence  of  which  I  knew  nothing  of  until  I  got 
there.  I  saw  at  once  that  there  was  nothing  to  be  done  but  to  try  the  bayonet, 
which  I  attempted  with  this  brigade,  but  could  not  carry  the  wall,  chiefly  be 
cause  my  troops  were  thrown  into  disorder  by  the  men  lying,  several  ranks 
deep,  behind  the  little  fold  in  the  ground  I  have  already  mentioned.  I  had 
ordered  my  other  brigade  to  form  in  the  same  ravine  as  it  came  up,  and  move 
up  to  me,  and  now  rode  back  toward  it.  It  was  at  this  time  that  I  found  the 
artillery  Hooker  had  put  on  the  edge  of  the  ravine,  just  in  the  very  ground 
my  troops  must  pass  over.  I  was  obliged  to  go  to  every  gun  myself  to  put  a 
stop  to  their  firing.1  I  then  led  forward  my  other  brigade,  which  was  thrown 
into  confusion  by  the  masses  of  men  lying  down  at  the  place  I  have  already 
mentioned,  the  little  fold  in  the  ground.  I  had  cautioned  my  troops  about 
these  men,  and  told  them  not  to  mind  them,  but  to  run  over  them.  But  the 
brigade  was  thrown  into  an  unwieldly  mass  in  going  over  or  through  them, 
and  the  officers  and  men  were  mixed  up  so  that  the  former  lost  all  control  of 
the  latter.  Notwithstanding  this  the  impetus  with  which  they  were  moving 
carried  them  close  up  to  the  wall,  the  right  being  actually  on  it,  and  the  left 
nearer  to  the  wall  than  any  other  troops  had  reached,  when  some  firing  began 
in  the  column  or  mass,  which  halted  and  turned  slowly  back.  One  minute 
more  and  we  should  have  been  over  the  wall,  which  I  am  confident  I  should 
have  carried  but  for  the  disorder  occasioned  by  the  troops  lying  down  whom  I 
was  sent  to  support.  If  they  had  been  withdrawn  before  I  moved  forward  a 
different  result  would  have  followed.  I  tried  to  get  them  up  to  make  them 
charge  with  me,  but  could  not  stir  them.  I  stopped  their  firing,  however. 
Every  officer  of  my  staff  but  one  was  dismounted,  and  his  horse  was  badly 
wounded.  Four  of  my  staff  were  wounded.  I  lost  two  horses.  So  near  was 
I  to  carrying  the  wall  and  heights  that  the  enemy  were  actually  moving 
their  guns  out  of  the  batteries,  and  near  our  right  they  were  beginning  to 
quit  the  wall.  It  was  getting  to  be  dark  when  the  charge  was  over.  It  was 
when  I  was  returning  to  lead  my  last  brigade  to  the  charge  that  I  received 
messages  for  the  first  time  from  General  Hooker  and  from  General  Butterfield, 

1  The  point  is  a  small  one,  but  it  would  seem  that  General  Humphreys  was  deceived  by  Gen 
eral  Hooker's  report  in  the  matter  of  the  placing  of  the  guns.  That  admirable  officer,  the  late 
Colonel  C.  H.  Morgan,  then  on  General  Couch's  staff,  wrote  me  before  his  death  :  "  Hooker  re 
ported  wrongly  about  those  two  batteries.  Couch  sent  me  down  to  examine  the  ground,  and 
afterward  I  put  them  in.  One  was  Hazard's,  the  other  Frank's  New  York." 

The  same  writer  adds  the  following  in  regard  to  General  Couch's  views  respecting  the  point 
of  attack  :  "  During  the  whole  day  Couch  had  been  anxious  to  make  an  effort  on  his  right,  seeing 
success  in  front  was  impracticable.  But  as  fast  as  he  made  preparations  for  this  his  troops  (How 
ard's)  were  called  to  the  support  of  French  and  Hancock.  When  Hooker  came  on  the  field  Gen- 
eral  Couch  went  to  him  and  told  him  that  he  thought  if  success  was  possible  it  would'  be  by  an 
attack  on  the  right  nearer  the  Taylor  House.  Hooker  treated  Couch  with  such  coldness,  not  to 
say  contempt,  that  his  sensitive  and  chivalric  nature  was  deeply  touched,  and  he  rode  away  in 
silence,  going  straight  to  the  front,  clear  up  to  the  little  brick  house,  and  farther  to  the  front,  I 
think,  than  any  horseman  got  that  day  and  returned  in  safety.  I  knew  his  peculiarities  well, 
and  believe  he  was  indifferent  to  a  courted  death,  being  stung  to  the  quick  by  Hooker's  apparent 
contempt  of  his  suggestions." 


APPENDIX.  635 

saying  that  General  Burnside  said  the  heights  must  be  taken  before  night.  I 
sent  them  word  I  had  tried  the  bayonet  with  one  brigade,  and  was  now  going 
to  try  it  with  the  other.  General  Hooker  and  General  Butterfield  had  re 
turned  from  General  Burnside  while  I  was  occupied  with  my  leading  brigade, 
and  the  former  mistook  the  charge  of  the  second  brigade  for  the  charge  of 
my  division,  hence  the  error  of  his  testimony.  I  went  over  the  ground  on 
my  march  to  Washington  in  May  of  last  year,  and  found  that  the  distances 
were  even  less  than  those  I  gave  in  my  official  report  of  the  part  taken  in  the 
battle  by  my  division.  The  first  brigade  that  charged  was  commanded  by 
Colonel  Allabach,  the  second  was  commanded  by  Brigadier-General  E.  B. 
Tyler." 

Page  273.  HOOKER'S  STRATEGY  AT  CHANCELLORSVILLE. 

From  a  statement  made  by  General  Lee  to  the  writer  at  Lexington,  Va.,  in 
1867,  it  appears  that  some  deduction  must  be  made  from  the  credit  given 
General  Hooker  for  the  "secrecy  "  of  the  manoeuvres  on  Chancellorsville.  "I 
see,"  said  General  Lee,  "that  you  give  General  Hooker  credit  for  the  secrecy 
of  his  operations  in  crossing  the  river,  and  say  I  '  was  surprised.'  In  most  cases 
this  talk  of  surprises  is  imaginative.  General  Stuart  was  a  very  vigilant  officer, 
and  kept  me  thoroughly  informed  of  every  movement  of  the  Federal  forces. 
But  I  could  not  act  until  Hooker  had  shown  his  hand,  for  I  did  not  know 
whether  his  manoeuvre  was  against  Fredericksburg  or  against  my  communica 
tions.  When,  however,  he  reached  Chancellorsville,  I  knew  exactly  the  char 
acter  of  the  operation,  and,  making  a  change  of  front,  I  went  there  and  met 
him." 

Page  355.  MEADE'S  ALLEGED  INTENTION  TO  RETREAT  AFTER  THE  COMBAT 
OF  JULY  2,  1863. 

1  'When  the  corps  commanders  came  together  that  night,  there  was  a 
unanimous  determination  to  fight  it  out  at  Gettysburg — a  sentiment  which 
was  quite  in  accord  with  General  Meade's  own  conviction." 

The  latter  part  of  this  statement  is  contradicted  by  Major-General  Abner 
Doubleday,  commanding  the  Third  Division  of  the  First  Corps  at  Gettysburg, 

in  a  volume  entitled  "  Chancellorsville  and  Gettysburg,"  1882. 

General  Doubleday  says : 

"  At  night  a  council  of  war  was  held,  in  which  it  was  unanimously  voted  to 
stay  and  fight  it  out.  Meade  was  displeased  with  the  result,  and,  although  he 
acquiesced  in  the  decision,  he  said  angrily,  '  Have  it  your  own  way,  gentle 
men,  but  Gettysburg  is  no  place  to  fight  a  battle  in.'  .  .  .  There  can  be  no 
question  that  at  the  council  referred  to  General  Meade  did  desire  to  retreat" 
(pages  184,  185).  . 

It  is  to  be  supposed  that  so  grave  a  charge  made  by  a  subordinate  against  his 
superior  officer,  and  couched  in  terms  so  emphatic  and  unqualified,  is  sustained 
by  an  array  of  testimony  incontestable  by  its  weight  and  volume. 


636  APPENDIX. 

General  Doubleday  does  not  produce  one  scintilla  of  testimony  in  support  of 
his  accusation,  which,  thus  unsupported,  assumes  a  very  grave  character  in  view 
of  the  following  emphatic  denial  by  that  high-minded  soldier,  General  Meade : 
"  I  utterly  deny,  under  the  full  solemnity  and  sanctity  of  my  oath,  and  in 
the  firm  conviction  that  the  day  will  come  when  the  secrets  of  all  men  shall 
be  made  known — I  utterly  deny  ever  having  intended  or  thought,  for  one 
instant,  to  withdraw  that  army,  unless  the  military  contingencies  which  the 
future  should  develop  during  the  course  of  the  day  might  render  it  a  matter 
of  necessity  that  the  army  should  be  withdrawn.  I  base  this  denial  not  only 
upon  my  own  assertion  and  my  own  veracity,  but  I  shall  also  show  to  the 
committee,  from  documentary  evidence,  the  despatches  and  orders  issued 
by  me  at  different  periods  during  that  day,  that  if  I  did  intend  any  such 
operation,  I  was  at  the  same  time  doing  things  totally  inconsistent  with  any 
such  intention."  (Report  of  Committee  on  Conduct  of  the  War,  pages  350  and 
436). 

General  Doubleday  was  not  present  at  the  council  of  corps  commanders  (not 
being  a  corps  commander),  and  from  no  corps  commander  who  was  present  was 
there  ever  testimony  of  aught  in  substantiation  of  General  Doubleday's  accusa 
tion.  It  is  accordingly  a  matter  of  some  curiosity  to  ascertain  on  whose  authority 
he  ventured  to  assert  that  General  Meade  wanted  to  retreat  after  the  battle  of 
July  2d.  Let  us  supply  this  omission  by  citing  the  witness,  who,  though  un- 
honored  by  mention  on  the  part  of  General  Doubleday,  furnishes  the  sole  tes 
timony  on  which  that  officer's  momentous  charge  is  based.  This  witness  is 
Major-General  Daniel  Butterfield,  who,  during  the  battle  of  Gettysburg,  served 
as  chief-of-staff  to  General  Meade.  Before  citing  this  officer's  statement,  how 
ever,  the  following  fact  should  be  borne  in  mind.  General  Butterfield  had 
served  as  chief-of-staff  to  General  Hooker.  When,  on  June  28th,  General 
Meade  assumed  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  he  chose  as  his  chief- 
of-staff  that  ideal  soldier,  General  A.  A.  Humphreys,  who,  however,  expressed 
a  wish  not  to  assume  the  position  till  after  the  coming  battle.  It  may  well  be 
that  General  Butterfield  was  apprised  of  the  fact  that  he  was  to  give  place  to 
General  Humphreys,  which,  in  point  of  fact,  he  did  a  few  days  after  the 
battle. 

In  his  testimony  before  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  General 
Butterfield  said  :  "  After  the  council  had  finished,  General  Meade  arose  from 
the  table  and  remarked  that  in  his  opinion  Gettysburg  was  no  place  to  fight  a 
battle  ;  but  it  was  settled  to  remain  there,  and  the  council  dispersed." 

This,  so  far  as  appears,  is  the  slender  foundation  on  which  General  Double- 
day  bases  the  assertion,  "  There  can  be  no  question  that  at  the  council  referred 
to  General  Meade  did  desire  to  retreat."  l 


1  It  will  be  observed  that  even  Butterfield's  statement  affords  no  ground  for  Doubleday's  dec 
laration  quoted  above,  eo  that  his  accusation  is  left  naked.  It  will  also  be  observed  by  the  curi 
ous  reader  that  Doubleday's  form  of  representing  what  Butterfield  reported  differs  significantly 
from  the  form  of  statement  actually  used  by  the  latter  officer.  We  are  told  by  Doubleday  that 
Meade  "  said  angrily,"  etc.,  and  Butterfield's  oratio  obliqua  is  converted  into  a  speech  with 
theatrical  accessories. 


APPENDIX.  637 

It  is  to  be  wished  that  General  Doubleday  had  made  this  charge  while  its 
subject  was  still  alive.1 

Pages  358-363.  PICKETT'S  CHARGE  AT  GETTYSBURG. 

In  connection  with  Pickett's  attack,  Colonel  Taylor,  in  his  "Four  Years 
with  General  Lee,"  makes  against  General  Longstreet  a  serious  charge,  the 
gravamen  of  which  is  that  General  Longstreet  was  instructed  by  General  Lee 
to  support  the  assault  of  Pickett  (strengthened  on  his  left  by  Heth's  division 
and  two  brigades  of  Fender's)  with  his  two  other  divisions,  those  of  Hood 
and  McLaws  (which  constituted  his  right  flank  on  and  near  the  Emmetsburg 
road),  and  that  he  failed  to  do  so. 

Colonel  Taylor  says  (pp.  103-109):  "General  Lee  then"  [about  1  P.M., 
July  3d]  "had  a  conference  with  General  Longstreet,  and  the  mode  of  attack 
and  the  troops  to  make  it  were  thoroughly  debated.  I  was  present,  and  un 
derstood  the  arrangement  to  be  that  General  Longstrtet  should  endeavor  to 
force  the  enemy's  lines  in  his  front.  That  front  was  held  by  the  divisions  of 
Hood  and  McLaws.  To  strengthen  him  for  the  undertaking,  it  was  decided 
to  reinforce  him  by  such  troops  as  could  be  drawn  from  the  centre.  .  .  . 
It  was  designed  originally  that  the  two  divisions  last  named,  reinforced  by 
Pickett,  should  make  the  attack ;  and  it  was  only  because  of  the  apprehen 
sions  of  General  Longstreet  that  his  corps  was  not  strong  enough  for  the  move 
ment  that  General  Hill  was  called  on  to  reinforce  him.  .  .  .  The  assault 
was  to  have  been  made  with  a  column  of  not  less  than  two  divisions,  and  the 
remaining  divisions  were  to  have  been  moved  forward  in  support  of  those  in 
advance.  This  was  the  result  of  the  conference  alluded  to  as  understood  by 
me.  .  .  .  At  a  given  signal  the  movement  began,  but  the  plan  agreed  on 
was  not  carried  out.  .  .  .  The  divisions  of  Hood  and  McLaws  (First 
Corps)  were  passive  spectators  of  the  movement.  .  .  .  Was  it  designed  to 
throw  these  few  brigades — originally,  at  the  most,  but  two  divisions — upon 
the  fortified  stronghold  of  the  enemy,  while,  full  half  a  mile  away,  seven- 
ninths  of  the  army  in  breathless  suspense,  in  ardent  admiration  and  fearful 
anxiety,  watched,  but  moved  not  ?  I  maintain  that  such  was  not  the  design 

1  We  do  not  know  whether  the  following  extract  from  General  Doubleday's  testimony  before 
the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War  will  suggest  any  animus  as  entering  into  his  estimate 
of  General  Meade's  conduct,  but  it  is  given  for  what  it  is  worth. 

"  Question.  Can  you  tell  why,  after  that  fight,  General  Howard  and  yourself  were  removed 
from  your  command  ? 

41  Answer.  I  was  removed  from  the  command  of  the  First  Corps.  General  Howard  was  not 
removed  from  command  of  his  corps,  but  was  directed  to  obey  General  Hancock,  who  was  his 
junior,  after  the  first  day  of  the  fight. 

"Question.  Why  was  that?  , 

"  Answer.  I  think  General  Meade  thought  a  couple  of  scapegoats  were  necessary ;  in  case  the 
next  day's  battle  turned  out  unfavorably,  he  wished  to  mark  his  disapprobation  of  the  first  day's 
fight.  General  Meade  is  in  the  habit  of  violating  the  organic  law  of  the  army  to  place  his  per 
sonal  friends  in  power.  There  has  always  been  a  great  deal  of  favoritism  in  the  Army  of  the  Po 
tomac.  No  man  who  is  an  anti-slavery  man  or  an  anti-McClellan  man  can  expect  decent  treat. 
ment  in  that  army  as  at  present  constituted."  (Page  311.) 


638  APPENDIX. 

t 

of  the  commanding  general.  Had  the  veteran  divisions  of  Hood  and  McLaws 
been  moved  forward,  as  was  planned,  in  support  of  those  of  Pickett  and  Petti- 
grew,  !  not  only  would  the  latter  division,  in  all  probability,  have  gained  the 
enemy's  works,  as  did  that  of  Pickett,  but  these  two  would  have  been  enabled, 
with  the  aid  of  Hood  and  McLaws,  to  resist  all  efforts  of  the  enemy  to  dis 
lodge  them." 

Under  date  of  January  29,  1877,  Colonel  Taylor  wrote  to  General  Long- 
street:  "  In  regard  to  the  third  day's  operations  at  Gettysburg,  according  to  my 
recollection,  General  Lee  had  a  conference  with  you  as  to  the  attack  to  be 
made  that  day,  when  it  was  determined  that  an  assault  should  be  made  on 
your  front,  by  your  corps,  reinforced  by  Heth's  division  and  two  brigades  of 
Pender's.  My  recollection  is  distinct  in  that  all  of  your  divisions  were  to  take 
part  in  the  assault,  and  I  never  did  understand  why  Hood  and  McLaws  were 
never  ordered  forward.  Colonel  Venable  agrees  with  me  entirely  in  this  par 
ticular." 

To  this  General  Longstreet  replied,  February  2,  1877:  "In  reply  to  your 
inquiry  for  a  statement  in  regard  to  the  supposed  orders  of  General  Lee  in 
reference  to  the  battle  of  the  third  day,  I  have  only  to  say  that  General  Lee 
gave  no  orders  for  placing  the  divisions  of  McLaws  and  Hood  in  the  column 
of  attack  that  day." 

In  a  subsequent  elaborate  review  of  "Lee  in  Pennsylvania,"  in  "Annals  of 
the  War,"  General  Longstreet  adds  : 

"I  may  mention  here  that  it  has  been  absurdly  said  that  General  Lee  or 
dered  me  to  put  Hood's  and  McLaws'  Divisions  in  support  of  Pickett's  assault. 
General  Lee  never  ordered  any  such  thing.2  After  our  troops  were  all  ar 
ranged  for  assault,  General  Lee  rode  with  me  twice  over  the  lines  to  see  that 
everything  was  arranged  according  to  his  wishes.  He  was  told  that  we  had 
been  more  particular  in  giving  the  orders  than  ever  before ;  that  the  com 
manders  had  been  sent  for,  and  the  point  of  attack  had  been  carefully  desig 
nated,  and  that  the  commanders  had  been  directed  to  communicate  to  their 
subordinates,  and  through  them  to  every  soldier  in  the  command,  the  work 
that  was  before  them,  so  that  they  should  nerve  themselves  for  the  attack,  and 
fully  understand  it.  After  leaving  me,  he  again  rode  over  the  field  once,  if 
not  twice,  so  that  there  was  really  no  room  for  misconstruction  or  misunder 
standing  of  his  wishes.  He  could  not  have  thought  of  giving  any  such  an 
order.  Hood  and  McLaws  were  confronted  by  a  largely  superior  force  of  the 
enemy  on  the  right  of  Pickett's  attack.  To  have  moved  them  to  Pickett's 
support  would  have  disengaged  treble  their  number  of  Federals,  who  would 


1  "  As  they  were  ordered  to  do  by  General  Lee,  for  I  heard  him  give  the  orders  when  arranging 
the  fight,  and  called  his  attention  to  it  long  afterward,  when  there  was  discussion  about  it.    He 
said,  « 1  know  it !  I  know  it ! '  "—Colonel  C.  S.  Venable. 

2  In  a  foot-note  General  Longstreet  writes:  "Colonel  Taylor  says  that  General  Lee,  in  his 
presence,  gave  me  orders  to  put  Hood's  and  McLaws'  Divisions  in  this  column  of  attack.     This 
I  deny,  and  do  not  suppose  he  will  claim  that  any  one  else  '  heard  the  order.' "    It  will  be  ob 
served  that  General  Longstreet  overlooks  the  important  corroborative  testimony  of  Colonel 
Venable,  also  a  member  of  General  Lee's  staff. 


APPENDIX.  639 

have  swooped  down  from  their  rocky  fastnesses  against  the  flank  of  our  at 
tacking  column,  and  swept  our  army  from  the  field.  A  reference  to  any  of 
the  maps  of  Gettysburg  will  show,  from  the  position  of  the  troops,  that  thi« 
would  have  been  the  inevitable  result.  General  Lee  and  myself  never  had 
any  deliberate  conversation  about  Gettysburg.  The  subject  was  never 
broached  by  either  of  us  to  the  other.  On  one  occasion  it  came  up  casually, 
and  he  said  to  me  (alluding  to  the  charge  of  Pickett  on  the  3d),  '  General, 
why  didn't  you  stop  all  that  thing  that  day?'  I  replied  that  I  could  not, 
under  the  circumstances,  assume  such  a  responsibility,  as  no  discretion  had 
been  left  me." 

Pages  363-4.  LEE'S  RESOLUTION  TO  RETREAT. 

The  following  interesting  revelation  of  General  Lee's  mood  of  mind  on  the 
night  of  the  third  day  of  the  battle  is  given  by  General  Imboden,  to  whom 
General  Lee  intrusted  the  duty  of  transporting  the  Confederate  wounded  from 
Gettysburg  back  to  Virginia. 

' '  When  night  closed  upon  the  grand  scene  our  army  was  repulsed.  Silence 
and  gloom  pervaded  our  camps.  We  knew  that  the  day  had  gone  against  us, 
but  the  extent  of  the  disaster  was  not  known  except  in  high  quarters.  .  .  . 
About  eleven  o'clock  a  horseman  approached  and  delivered  a  message  from 
General  Lee,  that  he  wished  to  see  me  immediately.  .  .  .  On  reaching  the 
place  indicated,  a  nickering,  solitary  candle,  visible  through  the  open  front  of 
a  common  tent,  showed  where  Generals  Lee  and  (A.  P.)  Hill  were  seated  on 
camp  stools,  with  a  county  map  spread  upon  their  knees,  and  engaged  in  a 
low  and  earnest  conversation.  They  ceased  speaking  as  I  approached,  and 
after  the  ordinary  salutations,  General  Lee  directed  me  to  go  to  his  head 
quarters  and  wait  for  him.  He  did  not  return  until  about  one  o'clock,  when 
he  came  riding  along  at  a  slow  walk  and  evidently  wrapped  in  profound 
thought.  There  was  not  even  a  sentinel  on  duty,  and  no  one  of  his  staff  was 
about.  .  .  .  The  moon  shone  full  upon  his  massive  features,  and  revealed  an 
expression  of  sadness  I  had  never  seen  upon  that  fine  countenance  before,  in 
any  of  the  vicissitudes  of  the  war  through  which  he  had  passed.  I  remarked, 
4  General,  this  has  been  a  hard  day  on  you.'  He  looked  up  and  replied 
mournfully,  '  Yes,  it  has  been  a  sad,  sad  day  for  us.  ...  We  must  return 
to  Virginia. » " 

Page  376.  THE  FLANK  MARCH  ON  CENTREVILLE. 

By  General  A.  A.  Humphreys,  who  was  chief  of  staff  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  from  July,  1863,  to  November,  1864,  I  am  favored  with  the  follow 
ing  valuable  notes  on  the  interesting  but  complicated  manoeuvres  between 
Generals  Lee  and  Meade  in  October,  1863. * 

"General  Meade  was  contemplating  a  movement  upon  Lee  by  our  right. 
He  and  myself  rode  to  Cedar  Mountain  on  Friday,  October  9th,  to  have  a 
better  look  at  the  country  in  the  direction  of  a  certain  pass.  We  noticed  the 


1  The  map  of  Pope's  campaign,  opposite  page  176,  shows  most  of  the  routes  and  positions. 


640  APPENDIX. 

smoke  of  many  camp  fires  about  Madison  Court  House.  We  knew  that  a 
movement  of  some  kind  was  intended  by  General  Lee,  for  a  signal  message  of 
the  enemy  to  General  Fitz  Hugh  Lee  had  been  read,  directing  him  to  draw 
three  days'  hard  bread.  '  Hard  bread '  with  Lee  meant  movement.  We 
took  it  to  be  a  cavalry  operation.  We  had  not  been  long  on  the  mountain 
when  information  came  from  the  Sixth  Corps  pickets  tending  to  show  that  at 
least  some  infantry  was  in  motion,  and  before  we  left  the  mountain  columns 
of  infantry  as  well  as  cavalry  were  across  the  upper  Rapidan.  Our  cavalry 
was  thrown  forward  to  ascertain  the  character  of  the  movement.  These, 
toward  Madison  Court  House,  were  supported  by  a  division  of  infantry,  but 
it  was  not  until  Saturday  evening,  the  10th,  that  the  true  character  of  the 
movement  disclosed  itself.  Lee  was,  in  our  judgment,  moving  to  Warrenton. 
A  large  part  of  Lee's  infantry  was  at  that  time  on  and  across  Hazel  River,  in 
the  vicinity  of  Turkey  Hole  Mountain.  At  that  time  the  First,  Fifth,  and 
Sixth  Corps  were  near  the  Rapidan,  the  Third  Corps  was  near  Culpepper  Court 
House,  and  the  Second  Corps  on  Mountain  Run  (or  Creek)  not  far  from  Stevens- 
burg.  Lee  was  as  near  to  Warrenton  as  we  were,  perhaps  nearer.  The  War 
renton  pike  and  the  railroad  formed  our  line  of  communication  with  Wash 
ington.  There  were  no  parallel  roads  from  the  vicinity  of  Culpepper  by 
which  the  army  could  be  moved  and  strike  Lee  in  flank  in  the  continuation 
of  his  movement  on  Warrenton.  There  was  but  one  road  leading  that  way, 
and  had  we  attempted  to  move  by  that  we  should  have  found  ourselves  in  the 
rear,  and  pretty  well  in  the  rear  of  Lee. 

' '  It  was  decided  at  once  to  move  to  Warrenton,  and  from  that  point  move 
forward  to  attack  Lee,  or  force  him  to  attack  us.  The  orders  were  issued  at 
once,  and  the  movement  began.  By  Sunday  afternoon  the  army  was  across 
the  Rappahannock  en  route  to  Warrenton.  Gregg  was  sent  up  the  Rappahan- 
nock  on  Sunday  toward  Jefferson  and  Amissville  across  the  roads  Lee  must 
take  to  Warrenton,  with  orders  to  send  the  earliest  intelligence  of  Lee  to  head 
quarters.  So  important  did  I  deem  it  that  Gregg  should  understand  that  it 
was  information  of  Lee's  movements  solely  that  he  was  after,  that  toward  sun 
set  I  sent  a  staff  officer  to  him  with  a  despatch  to  that  effect,  enjoining  upon 
him  the  importance  of  the  earliest  information  of  the  enemy.  The  staff  officer 
returned  in  the  night,  having  delivered  the  despatch. 

"Our  cavalry  under  General  Pleasonton  had  an  affair  with  the  enemy's  cav 
alry  near  Culpepper  Court  House  in  the  course  of  Sunday,  but  no  infantry 
appeared  there.  .  .  .  From  General  Pleasonton's  information  and  conver 
sation  General  Meade  derived  the  impression  that  Lee  had  been  probably  mov 
ing  on  Culpepper  Court  House  to  fight  us,  instead  of  on  Warrenton  to  get  on 
our  line  of  communication,  and  force  us  to  fight  him  on  ground  of  his  own 
choosing.  My  conviction  remained  the  same  as  it  had  been  the  night  before. 
In  this  state  of  uncertainty  the  movement  of  the  troops  to  Warrenton  the  next 
morning  was  suspended.  Twelve  o'clock  of  Monday  the  12th  passed,  and  not 
a  sound  of  shot  in  any  direction  had  been  heard  nor  one  word  from  Gregg  had 
been  received. 

"It  was  at  this  time,  between  twelve  and  one  o'clock  of  Monday,  October 


APPENDIX.  641 

12th,  that  General  Meade  finally  decided  to  send  the  Fifth,  Sixth,  and  Second 
Corps  back  toward  or  to  Culpepper  Court  House  in  search  of  the  enemy.  As 
they  advanced  toward  it  our  cavalry  had  some  skirmishing  with  that  of  the 
enemy,  and  some  cannon  shot  were  fired  by  them.  The  town  was  reached 
about  sunset,  but  Lee's  army  was  not  there.  Not  a  sound  of  any  kind  had 
been  heard  by  us  during  Monday  from  the  direction  of  Gregg,  nor  had  one 
word  of  information  been  received  from  him  or  any  one  else  concerning  Lee's 
army. 

"  Near  ten  o'clock  at  night  I  received  a  despatch  from  General  Gregg,  stating 
that  about  noon  he  had  encountered  Lee's  army  near  the  Rappahannock  mov 
ing  toward  Warrenton ;  that  after  a  severe  contest  he  had  been  driven  across 
the  Rappahannock,  and  was  then  at  FayetteVille  ;  that  Lee's  army  had  been 
crossing  the  river  for  several  hours.  Soon  aiter  this  the  pickets  of  the  Third 
Corps,  the  farthest  up  the  river,  began  to  be  driven  in  by  the  enemy,  who  was 
between  us  and  Warrenton,  and  within  a  few  miles  of  that  town.  General 
Gregg  stated  verbally  to  me,  at  a  subsequent  day,  that  he  had  sent  several  mes 
sages  to  headquarters.  None  were  received,  nor  was  any  explanation  made  as 
to  the  cause  of  failure  in  his  messengers  to  reach  us.  There  must  have  been 
a  heavy  cannonading  going  on  about  six  miles  from  us,  yet  we  did  not  hear  a 
sound.  Forty  guns,  according  to  Gregg,  were  at  one  time  at  work. 

"  The  army  was  at  once  got  in  motion,  and  by  Tuesday  evening  the  right  of 
the  Third  Corps  was  at  Greenwich,  the  Second  Corps  at  Auburn,  the  Fifth 
Corps  at  Catlett's,  the  Sixth  Corps  on  the  railroad  between  Catlett's  and  Bris- 
toe,  and  the  First  Corps  near  Bristoe. 

"To  determine  what  should  next  be  done  was  the  subject  of  long  examination 
and  discussion  by  General  Meade  and  myself.  The  area  between  Broad  Run, 
Cedar  Run,  the  Warrenton  Pike,  and  the  railroad,  was  almost  unknown  to  us. 
So  far  as  we  knew  the  ground  occupied  by  both  armies,  the  advantage  of 
ground  was  all  with  the  enemy.  WTe  could  not  fight  on  the  pike  and  railroad 
both,  without  subjecting  the  army  to  being  overpowered  on  one  or  the  other 
flank,  and  if  we  did  not  hold  these  two  roads  and  the  intermediate  ground,  we 
should  be  turned.  We  knew  of  no  roads  by  which  reserves  or  other  disposa 
ble  troops  could  be  transferred  rapidly  from  one  point  to  the  other.  It  was 
concluded  that  the  disadvantages  of  any  position  in  the  area  mentioned  were 
too  great  to  admit  of  its  being  adopted. 

"  The  next  position  was  beyond  Broad  Run,  the  right  near  Groveton,  the  left 
near  Manassas  Junction.  It  was  probable  we  could  get  into  position  here  be 
fore  the  enemy  could  get  on  the  ground.  But  we  should  have  fought  on  the 
old  battlefield  of  Bull  Run.  That  of  itself  was  a  grave  objection  to  taking  up 
the  position.  We  could  without  doubt  take  up  the  position  of  Centreville, 
and  for  that  the  order  was  issued  at  a  late  hour  of  the  night.  General  Sykes 
with  the  Fifth  Corps  was  across  Broad  Run  at  twelve  o'clock  on  the  14th,  when 
General  Meade  and  myself  reached  Bristol.  He  crossed  above  the  bridge. 
The  Second  Corps  was  to  cross  below.  The  general  order  for  the  movement 
required  the  corps  commanders  to  keep  up  constant  communication  with  the 
corps  in  front  and  rear  of  them,  and  mutually  support  each  other.  General 


642  APPENDIX. 

Sykes  was  now  directed  not  to  move  until  the  Second  Corps  came  up,  and 
orders  were  sent  forward  to  the  Third  Corps  (in  front  or  advance  of  the 
Fifth),  near  Manassas  Junction,  to  halt  until  the  Fifth  Corps  began  to  move 
again.  It  was  expected  that  some  force  of  the  enemy  would  make  its  ap 
pearance  at  Bristoe,  coming  from  Greenwich,  on  the  road  the  Third  Corps 
had  taken. 

' '  When  it  was  found  Lee  would  not  come  forward  to  Centre ville,  and  after 
the  army  had  one  day's  rest,  orders  were  prepared  for  the  forward  movement, 
but  one  of  those  heavy  autumn  rain-storms  set  in  that  flooded  Bull  Bun  so 
that  it  was  impassable,  and  our  pontoon  train  had  moved  with  the  rest  of  the 
trains  to  Fairfax  Station,  and  the  roads  were  blocked  with  trains  coming  for 
ward  to  the  troops  with  supplies.  Thus  Lee  had  time  to  break  up  the  railroad 
between  Bristoe  and  Warrenton  Junction.  That  rain  was  one  of  Fortune's 
favors  to  him." 

Page  608.  THE  QUESTION  OF  LEE'S  SUPPLIES  AT  AMELIA  COURT  HOUSE. 

It  will  be  seen  that  in  the  text  weighty  results  are  attributed  to  the  failure 
of  General  Lee  to  receive  large  supplies  of  commissary  and  quartermaster's 
stores,  which  it  is  alleged  he  had  ordered  to  be  forwarded  to  Amelia  Court 
House.  But  from  the  statements  of  Mr.  Davis  it  would  appear  that  I  was 
misled  by  erroneous  reports  as  to  this  matter.  Mr.  Davis  quotes  from  General 
I.  M.  St.  John,  Commissary -General  of  the  Confederate  Army,  as  follows: 
"No  calls,  by  letter  or  requisition,  from  the  General  commanding,  or  from 
any  other  source,  official  or  unofficial,  had  been  received  either  by  the  Com 
missary-General  or  the  Assistant  Commissary-General;  nor  (as  will  be  seen  by 
the  appended  letter  of  the  Secretary  of  War)  was  any  communication  trans 
mitted  through  the  department  channels  to  the  Bureau  of  Subsistence  for  the 
collection  of  supplies  at  Amelia  Court  House."  Mr.  Davis  also  quotes  General 
John  C.  Breckenridge's  letter  to  General  St.  John,  as  follows:  "I  have  no 
recollection  of  any  communication  from  General  Lee  in  regard  to  accumula 
tion  of  rations  at  Amelia  Court  House.  .  .  .  The  second  or  third  day  after 
the  evacuation  [of  Richmond],  I  recollect  you  said  to  General  Lee  in  my 
presence  that  you  had  a  large  number  of  rations  (I  think  eighty  thousand)  at  a 
convenient  point  on  the  railroad,  and  desired  to  know  where  you  should  place 
them.  The  General  replied  that  the  military  situation  made  it  impossible  to 
answer." 

Mr.  Davis  makes  citations  from  several  other  Confederate  officials  to  the  ef 
fect  that  no  order  to  forward  supplies  to  Amelia  Court  House  was  ever  made, 
or  that,  if  made,  it  was  never  received ;  but  fully  admits  that  the  absence  of 
such  supplies  was  a  severe  blow  to  the  Confederate  forces.  "At  Amelia 
Court  House  Swell's  corps  made  a  junction  with  Lee's  army,  but  forced 
marches  with  men,  most  of  whom  were  untrained  by  previous  campaigns,  had 
greatly  reduced  the  number  of  Swell's  command,  and  the  want  of  rations  now 
was  impairing  their  efficiency"  ("Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Confederate  Govern 
ment,"  Vol.  II.,  page  663). 


APPENDIX.  643 

Page  614.  CLOSING  SCENES. 

Mr.  Davis  makes  the  following  interesting  statement  in  regard  to  the 
views  of  General  Lee  previous  to  the  surrender:  "Lee  had  never  con 
templated  surrender.  He  had,  long  before,  in  language  similar  to  that 
employed  by  Washington  during  the  Revolution,  expressed  to  me  the  belief 
that  in  the  mountains  of  Virginia  he  could  carry  on  the  war  for  twenty 
years,  and,  in  directing  his  march  toward  Lynchburg,  it  may  well  be  that, 
as  an  alternative,  he  hoped  to  reach  those  mountains,  and,  with  the  ad 
vantage  which  the  topography  would  give,  yet  to  baffle  the  hosts  which  were 
following  him.  On  the  evening  of  the  8th  General  Lee  decided,  after  confer 
ence  with  his  corps  commanders,  that  he  would  advance  the  next  morning 
beyond  Appomattox  Court  House,  and,  if  the  force  reported  to  be  there  should 
prove  to  be  only  Sheridan's  cavalry,  to  disperse  it  and  continue  the  march 
toward  Lynchburg;  but,  if  infantry  should  be  found  in  large  force,  the  at 
tempt  to  break  through  it  was  not  to  be  made,  and  the  correspondence  which 
General  Grant  had  initiated  on  the  previous  day  should  be  reopened  by  a  flag, 
with  propositions  for  an  interview  to  arrange  the  terms  of  capitulation.  Gor 
don,  whose  corps  formed  the  rear-guard  from  Petersburg,  and  who  had  fought 
daily  for  the  protection  of  the  trains,  had  now  been  transferred  to  the  front. 
On  the  next  morning,,  before  daylight,  Lee  sent  Colonel  Venable,  one  of  his 
staff,  to  Gordon,  commanding  the  advance,  to  learn  his  opinion  as  to  the 
chances  of  a  successful  attack,  to  which  Gordon  replied,  '  My  old  corps  is  re 
duced  to  a  frazzle,  and,  unless  I  am  supported  by  Longstreet  heavily,  I  do  not 
think  we  can  do  anything  more.'  When  Colonel  Venable  returned  with  this 
answer  to  General  Lee,  he  said,  '  Then  there  is  nothing  left  me  but  to  go  and 
see  General  Grant'"  ("Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Confederate  Government,"  Vol. 
II.,  pp.  656,  657). 

The  following  additional  particulars  are  given  by  Colonel  Taylor,  of  General 
Lee's  staff : 

"The  returns  from  the  various  commanders  made  that  morning  showed  an 
aggregate  of  eight  thousand  muskets  in  line  of  battle. 

"  On  the  previous  evening  I  became  separated  from  General  Lee  in  the  exe 
cution  of  his  orders,  and  did  not  rejoin  him  until  the  morning  of  the  9th. 
After  making  my  report  the  General  said  to  me,  '  Well,  Colonel,  what  are  we 
to  do  ?  '  In  reply  a  fear  was  expressed  that  it  would  be  necessary  to  abandon 
the  trains,  which  had  already  occasioned  us  such  great  embarrassment ;  and 
the  hope  was  indulged  that,  relieved  of  this  burden,  the  army  could  make 
good  its  escape.  '  Yes,'  said  the  General,  'perhaps  we  could  ;  but  I  have  had 
a  conference  with  these  gentlemen  around  me,  and  they  agree  that  the  time 
has  come  for  capitulation.' 

"  *  Well,  sir,'  I  said,  '  I  can  only  speak  for  myself  ;  to  me  any  other  fate  is 
preferable. ' 

"  « Such  is  my  individual  way  of  thinking,'  interrupted  the  General.  '  But,' 
I  immediately  added,  '  of  course  General,  it  is  different  with  you.  You  have 
to  think  of  these  brave  men,  and  decide  not  only  for  yourself,  but  for  them.' 


644  APPENDIX. 

'  Yes,'  he  replied,  'it  would  be  useless  and  therefore  cruel  to  provoke  further 
effusion  of  blood,  and  I  have  agreed  to  meet  General  Grant  with  a  view  to 
surrender'  "  ("Four  Years  with  General  Lee,"  pages  151,  152). 

The  narrative  of  events  is  thus  continued  by  Mr.  Davis  : 

"  General  Grant,  in  response  to  a  communication  under  a  white  flag  made 
by  General  Lee,  came  to  Appomattox,  where  a  suitable  room  was  procured  for 
their  conference,  and,  the  two  Generals  being  seated  at  a  small  table,  General 
Lee  opened  the  interview  thus :  *  General,  I  deem  it  due  to  proper  candor  and 
frankness  to  say  at  the  very  beginning  of  this  interview  that  I  am  not  willing 
even  to  discuss  any  terms  of  surrender  inconsistent  with  the  honor  of  my 
army,  which  I  am  determined  to  maintain  to  the  last.'  General  Grant  re 
plied  :  '  I  have  no  idea  of  proposing  dishonorable  terms,  General,  but  I  would 
be  glad  if  you  would  state  what  you  consider  honorable  terms.'  General  Lee 
then  briefly  stated  the  terms  upon  which  he  would  be  willing  to  surrender. 
Grant  expressed  himself  as  satisfied  with  them,  and  Lee  requested  that  he 
would  formally  reduce  the  propositions  to  writing  "  ("  Rise  and  Fall  of  the 
Confederate  Government,"  Vol.  II.,  pages  658,  659). 


INDEX. 


Abatis,  the  use  of,  in  battle,  20. 

Alexandria,  Va.,  captured  by  Federal 
troops,  30. 

Antietam,  map  of  manoeuvres  on,  199  ; 
the  battle  of,  208;  the  positions 
of  the  two  armies,  208  ;  Lee's  force 
at,  209  ;  the  movement  across  the 
Antietam  on  Lee's  left  flank,  209  ; 
the  desperate  struggle  between 
McClellan's  right  and  Lee's  left, 
212  ;  Sumner's  appearance  before 
the  Confederate  left,  213  ;  Burnside 
at  the  lower  stone  bridge,  219  ;  the 
operations  on  McClellan's  left  un 
der  Burnside,  219 ;  Franklin  ar 
rives  and  re-enforces  McClellan's 
right,  219  ;  McClellan's  urgent  or 
der  to  Burnside — the  latter's  de 
lay  to  advance  on  Lee's  right,  220  ; 
Burnside  driven  back  by  Confed 
erate  re-enforcements,  221  ;  the 
losses  of  both  armies,  221 ;  Lee's 
withdrawal  to  Virginia,  222 ; 
McClellan's  intentions  as  to  re 
newed  attack,  222. 

Archduke  Charles,  the,  on  duties  of  a 
general,  131. 

Army  of  Northern  Virginia — see  Con 
federate  army. 

Army  of  the  Potomac  in  History,  13  ; 
its  adversary,  16  ;  organization  of 
the,  60  ;  engineer  establishment 
of  the,  65  ;  artillery  organization 
of  the,  65  ;  brigade  organization  of 
the,  65  ;  strength  and  condition  of, 
on  McClellan  assuming  command, 
62 ;  strength  available  for  ad 
vance,  70 ;  army  corps,  McClel 
lan's  intentions,  64 ;  first  disposi 
tion  of  the,  27  ;  first  crossed  into 
Virginia,  30 ;  Manassas  campaign 
— see  Manassas  ;  inactivity  during 
winter  of  1861-2,  reasons  ad 


vanced  for,  71 ;  comparative  disci 
pline  in  1861  and  1862,  72  ;  organ 
ization  into  four  corps  by  the  Pres 
ident,  88  ;  resumes  its  positions  of 
previous  to  battle  of  Fair  Oaks, 
139  ;  strength,  June  26,  1861,  142  ; 
Games'  Mills  battle,  149;  right 
wing  on  the  south  bank  of  Chicka- 
hominy  River,  153  ;  retreat  to  the 
James  commenced,  154 ;  order  of 
march  across  White  Oak  Swamp, 
155  ;  concentrated  at  Malvern  Hill 
— the  battle  of,  160;  withdraws 
from  Malvern  Hill  to  Harrison's 
Bar,  164  :  its  bravery  and  endur 
ance  on  the  Peninsula,  166 ;  num 
ber  brought  back  to  Harrison's 
Landing,  167 ;  ordered  to  with 
draw  to  Aquia  Creek,  171  ;  trans 
ferred  to  Aquia  Creek  and  Alex 
andria,  via  Fortress  Monroe,  174  ; 
Army  of  Virginia  absorbed  into, 
193  ;  movement  towards  Frederick, 
197  ;  moves  towards  Harper's  Fer- 
.  ry,  201  ;  arrives  at  South  Moun 
tain,  202 ;  at  Antietam,  208  ;  posi 
tion  after  battle  of  Antietam,  225  ; 
reorganization  of  operations  after 
Antietam,  225  ;  crossed  the  Poto 
mac  into  Virginia,  226  ;  McClellan 
removed  and  Burnside  appointed 
to  command,  227  ;  its  change  of 
base  to  Frederick  sburg,  230  ;  reor 
ganized  by  Burnside  into  three 
grand  divisions,  231  ;  moves  from 
Warrenton,  233  ;  the  battle  of  Fred- 
ericksburg,  238  ;  "  mud  march," 
258  ;  Hooker  placed  in  command, 
261 ;  spirit  of  the  officers  under 
Burnside,  262 ;  Chancellorsville 
campaign,  267 ;  cavalry,  Hooker's 
organization  of  the,  268 ;  the 
badge  system  and  its  value,  268  ; 


646 


INDEX. 


its  strength  before  Chancellors- 
ville,  269 ;  passage  of  the  Rappa- 
hannock  before  Chancellors ville, 
270;  strength  after  Chancellors- 
ville,  310  ;  Meade  appointed  to  com 
mand,  323  ;  Hooker  resigns  com 
mand,  323 ;  Gettysburg  campaign, 
326 ;  campaign  of  manoauvres, 
373  ;  Mine  Run  move,  398  ;  in  win 
ter-quarters,  398  ;  overland  cam 
paign,  the,  402  ;  reorganized  into 
three  corps — Hancock,  Sedgwick, 
and  Warren,  410;  Sheridan  ap 
pointed  to  command  cavalry,  412  ; 
before  Petersburg,  507 ;  ceases  to 
exist,  622. 

Army  of  Virginia  formed  by  McDow 
ell's,  Fremont's,  and  Banks's  ar 
mies,  168 ;  absorbed  into  the  Po 
tomac  army,  193. 

Auburn,  Stuart  bivouacks  within  Union 
lines  at,  381 ;  Caldwell  attacked  in 
rear  at,  381. 

Austrian  Aulic  council  and  its  Wash 
ington  prototype,  96. 


Banks's  (Department  of  the  Shenan- 
doah)  position  during  McClellan's 
advance,  122 ;  at  Strasburg  with 
16,000  men,  122  ;  fights  at,  and 
retreats  from,  Winchester  to  north 
bank  of  Potomac,  125  ;  General,  at 
battle  of  Cedar  Mountain,  173. 

Badge  system  of  the  Potomac  army,  its 
origin  and  value,  268. 

Baker,  Colonel,  death  at  battle  of  BalFs 
Bluff,  77. 

Ball's  Bluff,  the  battle  of,  75. 

Barnard,  General,  on  early  ideas  on 
quelling  the  rebellion,  29 ;  on  as 
saulting  Yorktown,  110;  on  the 
passage  of  the  Chickahominy, 
130. 

Bethel,  Butler,  General,  plan  for  cap 
ture  of  Big  and  Little,  31. 

Big  Bethel,  the  affair  of,  31. 

Birney,  evidence  on  Meade's  attack  at 
Fredericksburg,  248. 

Blackburn's  Ford,  General  Tyler's  re 
pulse  at,  48. 

Blair,  Postmaster-General,  on  advance 
via  York  River,  83. 

Blenker's  division  detached  from  Mc- 
Clellan  to  join  Fremont,  93. 

Bolivar  Heights,  the  position  of,  206. 

Bottom's  Bridge,  purpose  of  throwing 
Potomac  army  on  Richmond  side 
of  the  Chickahominy,  121. 


Boydton  plankroad,  action  of,  542. 

Braddock  Road,  origin  of  the  name,  47. 

Brandy  Station,  cavalry  action  at,  313. 

Bristoe  Station,  Hooker's  defeat  of  Ew- 
ell  at,  179  ;  race  of  the  two  armies 
for,  380;  battle  of,  383. 

Buckland's  Mills,  Kilpatrick's  cavalry 
action  at,  386. 

Buford,  General,  at  Gettysburg,  328. 

Bull  Run,  battle  of— see  Manassas. 

Bull  Run  the  Second — see  Manassas 
No.  2. 

Burgess's  Mill — see  Southside  Railroad. 

Burnside,  General  A.  E.,  at  Antietam 
— see  Antietam  ;  appointed  to  com 
mand  Potomac  army,  227 ;  hia 
opinion  of  his  unfitness  for  the 
chief  command,  230 ;  change  of 
base  to  Fredericksburg  considered, 
232;  his  delay  at  Warrenton  to 
reorganize,  232 ;  move  to  Freder 
icksburg,  233  ;  intentions  and 
plan  of  operations  via  Freder 
icksburg,  233 ;  opinion  on  direct 
crossing  at  Fredericksburg,  237  ; 
desperation  at  repeated  failures, 
251 ;  instructions  to  wait  orders 
from  the  President,  257  ;  contem 
plated  attempt  on  Lee's  rear,  257  ; 
lost  the  confidence  of  the  army, 
258-261 ;  his  career  as  commander 
of  the  Potomac  army  considered, 
261 ;  he  resigns  his  command,  261 ; 
spirit  of  his  officers,  262 ;  (Ninth) 
corps  joins  Meade,  413  ;  the  Peters 
burg  mine,  518. 

Butler,  General  B.  F.,  design  of  raid  on 
Richmond,  398  ;  campaign  on  the 
James — see  James  River. 

Calls  for  troops  by  President  Lincoln, 
14,  29,  30. 

Campaign  of  Manoeuvres,  373  ;  of  ma 
noeuvres  criticised,  388. 

Carnot  on  military  discipline,  67  ;  on 
the  bombardment  of  towns,  241  ; 
on  selection  of  troops  for  assault, 
521. 

Carrick's  Ford,  General  Garnett  de 
feated  and  killed — West  Virginia 
campaign  ended,  39. 

Cedar  Creek,  the  battle  of,  561 ;  Gen 
eral  Wright  commanding  in  Sher- 
dan's  absence,  561  ;  retreat  of  the 
Union  army  beyond  Middletown, 
562 ;  Sheridan  arrives  in  front, 
562  ;  Early  attacked  in  turn  and 
routed,  563  ;  Early  pursued  be 
yond  Strasburg,  563;  Early  re 
treats  southward,  563. 


INDEX. 


647 


Cedar  Mountain,  Jackson's  report  of, 
174  ;  battle  of,  173. 

Cedar  Run,  attack  on  Warren  at,  382. 

Cemetery  Ridge,  see  Gettysburg,  336. 

Centreville,  Pope  pauses  at  alter  Ma- 
nassas  No.  2, 192  ;  the  flank  march 
on,  376  ;  Meade  strongly  posted  at, 
38o. 

Chancellorsville,  Hooker's  plan  of  op 
erations  against  Lee's  left,  271  ; 
passage  of  Ely's  Ford,  272;  pas- 
of  Germanna  Ford,  272  ;  passage  of 
United  States  Ford,  273  ;  Hooker 
In  reverse  of  Lee's  position,  273  ; 
Franklin's  movement  on  Lee's 
front  to  cover  flank  march,  274; 
Hooker  jubilant  of  success,  275  ; 
topography  of  the  field,  277; 
Hooker  commences  pushing  to 
wards  open  country  near  Fred 
ericksburg,  277  ;  observations  on 
the  battle,  303  ;  Hooker's  order  to 
abandon  position  gained  towards 
open  Fredericksburg,  279  ;  strat 
egic  faults  of  the  position,  280  ; 
Hooker's  incomprehensible  col 
lapse  on  Lee's  advance  towards 
him,  280  ;  Hooker's  line  of  battle, 
281  ;  Jackson's  march  on  Hooker's 
flank  and  rear — his  force,  283 ; 
Jackson's  attack  on  Hooker's  right 
rear,  280 ;  rout  of  the  Eleventh 
Corps — not  half  were  Germans, 
286 ;  Jackson's  pursuit  of  the  de 
feated  right  checked,  288;  Jack 
son's  attempt  to  cut  Hooker  from 
United  States  Ford,  289;  Sedg- 
wick's  movement  on  Lee's  rear, 
292;  Sedgwick  met  at  Salem 
Heights  by  a  column  from  Chan 
cellors  ville,  298 ;  Hooker's  forma 
tion  on  second  day,  293  ;  Chancel- 1 
lorsvilie  seized  by  the  Confed 
erates,  295  ;  Hooker  prostrated  by 
concussion  of  a  shot,  295  ;  Fred 
ericksburg  occupied  by  Sedgwick, 
296  ;  for  Sedgwick's  move  on  Fred 
ericksburg,  see  Fredericksburg, 
296  ;  countermarch  of  part  of  Lee's 
army  to  re-enforce  Early,  298 ; 
Sedgwick  checked — his  losses,  299  ; 
positions  on  the  third  day,  299  ; 
Sedgwick's  report  of  losses  at, 
299  ;  Sedgwick  attacked  and  cross* 
es  the  Rappahannock,  300  ;  Hooker 
crossed  to  north  bank  of  the  Rap- 1 
pahannock,  801 ;  the  losses  on ' 
both  sides,  301. 

Ohmt  River,  see  Carrick's  Ford. 


Chickahominy  and  Shenandoah  Val 
ley's  comparative  strategy,  121. 

Chickahominy  River,  McClellan  posted 
on  north  bank  of,  119  ;  McClellan's 
object  in  crossing  Bottom's  Bridge, 
121 ;  dates  of  McClellan's  passage, 
129 ;  topography  of,  130 ;  McClel 
lan's  army  separated  by  the,  130  ; 
two  methods  of  extrication  open  to 
McClellan,  140;  the,  its  relation 
to  Richmond  defences,  481. 

Chickahominy  Swamps,  the  army 
among,  after  Fair  Oaks,  140. 

Circle  of  the  Hunt,  565. 

Cold  Harbor,  the  battle  of,  481  ;  suc 
cess  of  Wright  and  Smith,  483  ; 
positions  of  the  two  armies,  484 ; 
the  Union  army  repulsed  at  every 
point,  485 ;  criticism  on  tactics  of, 
487  ;  the  losses  at,  487. 

Commissariat  of  armies,  the  importance 
of,  21. 

Committee  on  Conduct  of  the  War, 
pressure  of,  89;  on  McClellan's 
march  from  Williamsburg  to  the 
Chickahominy,  119. 

Confederacy,  conscription  act  passed — 
Mr.  Davis  holding  absolute  control 
of  Southern  military  resources, 
111 ;  Johnston  and  Lee's  armies 
the  main  armed  force  of,  404 ;  the 
failure  of  the  conscription  system, 
571  ;  weakened  by  Grant's  refusal 
to  exchange  prisoners,  571  ;  com 
missariat,  the  collapse  of  the,  571  ; 
fighting  population  was  not  ex 
hausted,  but  had  lost  interest,  571 ; 

Confederate  army,  first  disposition  of 
in  Virginia,  27  ;  want  of  discipline, 
72  ;  strength  and  positions  of,  80  ; 
for  further  of — see  Lee. 

Confederate  generals,  the  earliest,  28. 

Corps  d'armee — see  army  corps,  64. 

Crampton's  Gap,  Franklin's  advance  to, 
202  ;  the  Confederate  force  at,  202  ; 
the  battle  of,  204, 

Cross  Keys,  the  battle  of,  127. 

Culpepper,  Long-street  left  to  occupy 
during  Swell's  Sheiiandoah  Valley 
advance,  314;  Lee's  army  at — 
Meade  countermarching  on,  378. 

Gulp's  Hill — see  Gettysburg. 

Dabney's  Mill — see  Petersburg. 
Dahlgren,   Colonel,    marches    towards 

Richmond — his  defeat  and  death, 

400. 
Davis,  Colonel  B.  F.,  death  at  Fleet 

wood,  313. 


648 


INDEX. 


Davis,  Jefferson,  at  Manassas,  58. 
Deep  Bottom — see  Petersburg. 
Despondency  of  the  North  at  the  ckee 

of  1861,  78. 
Detached  columns  of  the  army  inviting 

destruction  in  detail,  122. 
Dimviddie  Courthouse,  Warren  sends 

re-enforcements  to  Sheridan,  593. 
Dufour  on  army  corps,  64 ;  on  passage 

of  the  Adda  by  Prince  Eugene,  416. 

Early  attacked  before  Fort  Stevens,  and 
driven,  527 ;  advances  towards 
Washington,  527 ;  burned  Balti 
more  and  Ohio  Railroad  viaduct, 
527  ;  rstired  across  the  Potomac, 
527;  expedition  at  Frederick,  Ma 
ryland,  via  Hagerstown,  526;  op 
erations  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley, 
554  ;  at  battle  of  Winchester,  556  ; 
at  battle  of  Cedar  Creek,  561  ;  ad 
dress  to  army  after  his  defeat  at 
Middletown,  563. 

Ellsworth,  Colonel,  shot  at  Alexandria, 
Virginia,  00. 

Einmettsburg,  see  Gettysburg. 

Ewell  rejoined  Jackson  after  defeat  of 
Bristoe  Station,  180  ;  advances  into 
Maryland  and  Pennsylvania,  319  ; 
at  Chambersburg,  Carlisle,  Get 
tysburg,  and  York,  320 ;  at  Mine 
Run,  391 ;  his  corps  captured  at 
Sailor's  Creek,  610. 

Exterior  line,  the  Federal,  in  Virginia, 
44. 

Fairfax  Courthouse  abandoned  by  Con 
federates,  47. 

Fair  Oaks,  the  battle  of,  128  ;  Confed 
erate  report  of — Johnston's  reasons 
for  attack,  131 ;  battle — map  of, 
132 ;  positions  of  Union  troops 
near,  132  ;  Casey's  redoubt  at  Sev 
en  Pines  captured,  133 ;  positions 
of  Casey's  division,  134  ;  Hill's  at 
tack  on  Seven  Pines'  position  not 
a  surprise,  133  ;  Sumner  ordered 
to  cross  the  Chickahominy  to  sup 
port  Heintzelman,  136;  Couch's 
force  bisected  by  G.  W.  Smith,  136  ; 
Sumner  reaches  Couch  in  rear  of, 
137;  Confederates  finally  driven 
back  by  Sumner,  138  ;  the  fighting 
next  day  skirmishing  only,  139. 

Final  campaign,  1865,  565  ;  Five  Forks' 
battle — see  Five  Forks  and  Retreat. 

Fisher's  Hill,  Early's  retreat  to  after 
battle  of  Winchester,  558  ;  the  bat 
tle  of,  559. 


Five  Forks,  Sheridan's  movement  to 
wards,  591  ;  captured  by  Devin 
and  Davies,  591  ;  Lee  sends  two 
divisions  to,  592;  Union  cavalry 
driven  to  Dinwiddie  Courthouse, 
592;  Lee's  weakness  discovered — 
Sheridan  puts  his  whole  force  in 
motion,  594 ;  Five  Forks  and  Pe 
tersburg,  595  ;  situation  of  the  op 
posing  forces,  595  ;  Sheridan's  feint 
on  Lee's  right,  and  attack  on  left  on 
White  Oak  road,  596 ;  the  desper 
ate  position  of  the  Confederates, 
598  ;  remnant  of  Lee's  troops  at, 
fled  westward,  599  ;  the  battle 
over — see  now  Petersburg,  600. 

Fleet  wood,  cavalry  action  at,  313. 

Fort  Gilmer,  Butler's  unsuccessful  as 
sault,  540. 

Fort  Magruder  at  Williamsburg,  Vir 
ginia,  112. 

Fort  Steadman,  Lee's  object  in  attack 
ing,  575  ;  surprised  and  taken  by 
coup  de  main,  T>76  ;  attacking  col 
umns  unsupported,  577 ;  the  as 
sault  fails,  and  withdrawal  impos 
sible,  577  ;  two  thousand  Confed 
erates  surrender — the  losses  on 
both  sides,  577 ;  Meade  captures 
picket-lines  on  Lee's  right,  577. 

Franklin,  Fremont  at  with  fifteen 
thousand  men,  122. 

Franklin,  General,  on  operating  on 
Richmond  via  York  River,  81 ;  evi 
dence  on  Burnside's  orders  at 
Fredericksburg,  245 ;  reply  to 
President  Lincoln's  answer  to  him 
and  General  Smith,  265. 

Franklin's  and  Smith's  letter  to  the 
President  proposing  plan  of  cam 
paign,  263. 

Frederick  the  Great,  seven  years'  de 
fensive  campaign,  308. 

Fredericksburg  and  Richmond  Rail 
road,  line  of  advance  towards  Rich 
mond,  22 ;  compared  with  others, 
406. 

Fredericksburg,  the  battle  of,  Burnside 
reaches  Falmouth,  opposite,  234 ; 
topography  of  the  battle-field,  243  ; 
town  and  heights,  Burnside's  omis 
sion  to  occupy,  234  ;  Burnside's  de 
lay,  and  Lee's  arrival  on  south 
bank  of  the  Rappahannock,  236 ; 
Lee's  whole  army  arrived  and  in 
position,  242  ;  Burnside's  designed 
crossing  at  Skenker's  Neck,  on 
Lee's  right,  237 ;  the  possibilities 
of  crossing,  238;  Burnside's  paa 


INDEX. 


649 


Bage  effected,  242;  Lee's  sharp 
shooters  in  the  town  delay  Bum- 
side's  crossing,  240 ;  the  town 
bombarded  by  Burnside,  240  ;  the 
advance  passage  of  three  regi 
ments,  and  flight  of  the  Confeder 
ate  sharp-shooters,  241  ;  Jackson's 
report  on  concentration  at,  243  ; 
Franklin's  operations  on  the  left, 
246 ;  Meade's  temporary  success 
on  the  heights  against  Jackson, 
247 ;  military  road  at,  small  im 
portance  of  Meade's  success  on, 
247 ;  Sumner's  operations  on  the 
right,  249  ;  Longstreet's  position  on 
the  Confederate  left,  250  ;  French's 
and  Hancock's  attack  on  Lee's  left, 
and  terrible  repulses,  250  ;  Hooker 
thrown  forward,  252  ;  Burnside's 
desperate  resolve  to  renew  attack 
next  day,  252  ;  the  scene  closed  by 
night,  252  ;  Burnside  framed  one 
plan,  and  fought  on  another,  244 ; 
the  losses  of  each  army,  253 ;  the 
opposing  forces  at,  296  ;  Sedgwick's 
attack  on  Marye's  Hill,  297 ;  Con 
federate  position  taken — Sedgwick 
advances  towards  Chancellorsville, 
298  ;  Hill  left  in  position  at,  314 ; 
during  Chancellorsville  campaign 
— see  Chancellorsville. 

Frecmantle,  Colonel,  on  Lee's  critical 
position  after  Gettysburg,  365. 

Fremont,  General,  assigned  to  Moun 
tain  Department  of  West  Virginia, 
93  ;  (Mountain  Department  of  West 
Virginia)  position  during  McClel- 
lan's  advance,  122. 

Front  Royal,  Jackson's  capture  of  gar 
rison,  125. 

Games'  Mill,  map  of  battle  of,  149; 
Magruder  occupies  McClellan's  at 
tention  on  south  bank  of  Chicka- 
hominy,  151 ;  Porter  overwhelmed, 
and  the  retreat  commenced,  152 ; 
French  and  Meagher  cover  Por 
ter's  retreat,  153 ;  Porter's  corps 
crosses  to  McClellan  at  night,  153  ; 
estimate  of  casualties,  153. 

Garnett,  General,  Confederate  com 
mander  in  West  Virginia,  35. 

Gettysburg  campaign,  the,  308  ;  theory 
of  the  Confederate  invasion,  308 ; 
Berryville  captured  by  Rodes,  317; 
Blue  Ridge,  passes  occupied  by 
Longstreet,  318;  concentration  of 
the  army  upon,  324 ;  Lee's  army 
countermarches  towards,  326  ;  ap 


proach  of  the  two  armies  towards, 
326  ;  topography  of  the  field,  329  ; 
the  first  day — Buford  engaged  with 
Hill's  van,  328 ;  error  of  covering 
too  much  ground,  333  ;  Howard, 
General,  faulty  dispositions  at  Get 
tysburg,  333 ;  the  Union  centre 
pierced  by  Rodes — the  troops  fall 
back  through  Gettysburg,  334 : 
Gettysburg  Ridge,  the  position  at, 
335 ;  Hancock  arrests  flight  of 
First  and  Eleventh  corps,  335; 
Hancock's  line  of  battle  on  Ceme 
tery  Hill  and  Ridge,  336 ;  Meade 
and  Lee  order  up  their  entire 
forces,  337;  both  armies  concen 
trated  on  Gettysburg,  338  ;  the  first 
day's  results  considered,  341 ;  the 
second  day,  342  ;  positions  at  com 
mencement  of  the  second  day,  842  ; 
Sedgwick's  (Sixth)  corps  arrives, 
343  ;  Sickles'  position  on  Emmets- 
burg  road,  344 ;  Longstreet's  at 
tack  on  Sickles,  345 ;  the  fight  for 
Little  Round  Top,  346;  Warren 
saves  the  position  at  Little  Round 
Top,  346  ;  Hoods  attack  on  Bir- 
ney's  front,  348  ;  the  struggle  for 
the  peach  orchard,  349 ;  "close  of 
the  action  on  the  left,  354  ;  Ewell's 
attack  on  the  Union  extreme  right, 

354  ;  losses  of  the  first  two  days, 

355  ;  the  third  day — Lee  resolves 
to    attack    on    Culp's    Hill,   356; 
Meade's    line   on  Culp's  Hill  re 
gained,  356  ;  the  artillery  combat 
of  the  third  day,  357 ;  battery  po 
sitions  on  the  third  day,  357  ;  the 
Confederate  column  of  attack,  358  ; 
Pickett's     assault     on     Cemetery 
Ridge,   359  ;    the  panic  of  Petti- 
grew's  raw  troops,  359  ;  surrender 
of  Pickett's  troops,  361 ;  Wilcox's 
attack  on  Hancock,  and  its  failure, 
ends  the  battle,  362 ;  Lee's  shat 
tered  army  returns  to  its  lines  on 
Seminary  Ridge,  363  ;  Lee  remains 
a  day  at   bay  before  retreating, 
363  ;  the  retreat  of  Lee,  363  ;  losses 
on  both  sides,  363. 

Glendale — see  Newmarket  Cross-roads. 

Goldsborough,  Admiral,  and  the  navy 
at  Yorktown,  104. 

Grant's  overland  campaign,  402;  ap 
pointed  to  command  all  the  ar 
mies,  403;  his  theory  of  action, 
404  ;  establishes  headquarters  with 
the  Potomac  army,  405  ;  on  con- 
centric  operations,  410 ;  orders  foi 


650 


INDEX. 


advance  beyond  the  Wilderness, 
417  ;  his  opinion  of  manoeuvring, 
440;  his  reason  for  withdrawing 
from  the  North  Anna,  477 ;  obser 
vations  upon,  489  ;  "  I  propose  to 
fight  it  out  on  this  line,"  490  ;  his 
theory  of  "  hammering"  consid 
ered,  494  ;  on  Smith's  delay  to  at 
tack  Petersburg,  503 ;  failure  to 
notify  Meade  or  Hancock  of  move 
ment  on  Petersburg,  504 ;  was 
responsible  for  non-capture  of  Pe 
tersburg,  506  ;  at  Petersburg,  op 
portunities  open  to  him,  516 ; 
north  of  the  James — feints  on 
Richmond  possible,  516  ;  order  for 
final  operations,  578  ;  character  of 
his  final  operations,  579 ;  opera 
tions  delayed  by  rainstorm,  586  ; 
correspondence  with  Lee  on  sur 
render,  615  ;  see  also  Army  of  the 
Potomac. 

Gregg,  Confederate  general,  manner  of 
his  death  at  Fredericksburg,  248. 

Groveton — see  Manassas,  second  battle 
of. 

Halleck,  General  W.  H.,  opinion  on 
McClellan's  proposed  crossing  of 
the  James,  167  ;  an  intolerable  ob 
struction  and  annoyance,  170 ; 
urged  the  withdrawal  from  the 
Peninsula,  170  ;  whim  to  hold  Har 
per's  Ferry,  200  ;  his  interference 
with  Hooker's  intended  movements 
on  Lee's  rear,  821  ;  vicious  distri 
bution  of  the  Union  army  under 
independent  commanders,  321 ;  re 
fusal  to  abandon  Maryland  Heights, 
322. 

Hancock,  report  on,  at  battle  of  Fred 
ericksburg,  251  ;  at  Gettysburg, 
334 ;  report  of  battle  of  the  Wil 
derness,  423 ;  details  of  battle  of 
the  Wilderness,  425  ;  report  of  fifth 
epoch,  campaign  of  1864,  505 ;  at 
Reams'  Station,  535 ;  movement 
towards  Southside  Railroad,  541 ; 
report  of  operations  on  Boydton 
plankroad,  546  ;  leaves  to  organize 
new  First  Corps,  and  never  rejoins 
his  old  command,  547. 

Hanover  Junction,  Porter's  defeat  of 
Branch  at,  124. 

Harper's  Ferry,  United  States  arsenal 
abandoned  in  1861, 26  ;  topography 
of,  206  ;  the  first  Confederate  camp 
at,  28  ;  Lee's  advance  against,  200  ; 
Jackson's  movement  towards,  205 ; 


completely  invested  by  Confeder 
ate  occupation  of  the  heights 
round,  206  ;  surrendered  by  Gen 
eral  Miles,  205  ;  the  surrender  of 
and  death  of  Miles,  207  ;  occupied 
by  McClellan,  226  ;  see  also  South 
Mountain. 

Heintzelman,  General,  evidence  on 
siege  of  Yorktown,  110. 

Heth,  Confederate  General,  on  battle  of 
Hatcher's  Run,  545. 

Hill,  A.  P.,  on  Kearney  at  Manassas 
No.  2.  186  ;  on  the  battle  of  An- 
tietam,  220;  marched  to  rejoin 
Longstreet  at  Culpepper,  317 ;  at 
Mine  Run,  391 ;  death  of,  603. 

Hill,  General  D.  H.,  bombastic  report  of 
Big  Bethel  affair,  33  ;  at  the  battle 
of  Malvern  Hill.  162  ;  on  the  battle 
of  Malvern  Hill,  163  ;  on  battle  of 
Turner's  Gap,  203. 

Hooker,  General,  on  McClellan's  Penin 
sular  corps  commanders,  64 ;  at  bat 
tle  of  Williamsburg,  115;  assault 
on  Jackson  at  Manassas  No.  2, 
185 ;  wounded  at  Antietam,  213  ; 
statement  on  battle  of  Antietam, 
213 ;  on  battle  of  Fredericksburg, 
252 ;  placed  in  command  of  Poto 
mac  army,  261 ;  his  reorganization 
of  the  Potomac  army,  267 ;  his 
popularity  on  assuming  command, 
268  ;  at  Chancellorsville  (see  also 
Chancellorsville),  271  ;  contradic 
tory  evidence  on  Jackson's  pur 
pose  at  Chancellorsville,  284  ;  the 
army  without  a  head  on  Sunday 
morning,  293  ;  his  Chancellorsville 
campaign  considered,  303 ;  strength 
of  his  army  after  Chaucellorsville, 
310 ;  dispatch  anticipating  Lee's 
intentions,  311 ;  dispatch  on  Con 
federate  movements  on  Culpepper, 
312  ;  dispositions  to  guard  the  Rap- 
pahannock  line,  314 ;  plans  on  Lee's 
invasion  and  opinions  at  Wash 
ington,  315 ;  retrograde  move 
ment  towards  Washington,  316 ; 
the  army  concentrated  at  Fred 
erick,  320  ;  plan  of  menacing  Lee's 
rear  towards  Chambersburg,  321  ; 
dispatch  to  Halleck,  urging  aban 
donment  of  Harper's  Ferry,  322 ; 
resigns  command  of  the  army,  323. 

Hunt,  appointed  chief  of  artillery,  197 
plan  of    crossing   Rappahannock, 
241. 

Hunter,  General,  operations  in  the  She- 
nandoah,  468 ;  victory  at  Piedmont,. 


INDEX. 


651 


and  subsequent  retreat,  469  ;  suc 
ceeded  by  General  Sheridan,  555. 

Interior  line,  the  Confederate,  in  Vir 
ginia,  44. 

Jackson,  General  T.  J.  ("  Stonewall"), 
history  of,  28  ;  origin  of  the  title 
"  Stonewall"  at  Manassas,  54 ;  his 
maxim,  "  mystery  is  the  secret  of 
success,"  283  ;  position  between  the 
Shenandoah  and  Swift  Run  Gap, 
124 ;  forces  Banks  from  Winches 
ter  to  Hall  town,  and  then  moves 
back  up  Shenandoah  Valley, 
125 ;  captures  Front  Royal  gar 
rison,  and  moves  towards  Banks 
at  Middletown,  125  :  holds  Banks 
with  Ewell's  force,  drives  Milroy 
upon  Fremont,  and  turns  back  on 
Banks,  125 ;  McDowell  ordered  by 
the  administration  to  head  off, 
126  ;  holds  Shields  in  check — Ew- 
ell  repulse»  Fremont,  127 ;  slips 
between  McDowell  and  Fremont, 
converging  on  Strasburg,  and  es 
capes  up  the  Valley,  127  ;  reunites 
with  Ewell,  and  repulses  Shields' 
advance,  127;  strategic  victories 
saved  Richmond,  128  ;  at  Ashland, 
on  McClellan's  right  wing,  144 ; 
withdrawal  from  Port  Republic  to 
co-operate  with  Lee,  144;  passed 
Beaver  Dam  Creek,  146 ;  descrip 
tion  of  Hood's  charge  at  Games' 
Mill,  152  ;  detached  towards  Pope, 
173;  battle  of  Cedar  Mountain, 
and  retreat  to  Gordons ville,  173 ; 
crossed  the  Rupidan  towards  Pope, 
175  ;  position  and  force  at  Gor- 
donsville,  175 ;  flank  march  on 
Pope's  right,  177;  at  Manassas, 
his  perilous  position,  180  ;  cat  off 
from  Lee  by  McDowell,  180  ;  strat 
egy  of  his  escape  from  Manassas, 
181 ;  position  at  Manassas,  184 ; 
attack  on  Pope's  right  at  Ox  Hill, 
192 ;  movement  towards  Harper's 
Ferry,  205  ;  force  at  Antietam,  212  ; 
march  on  Hooker's  flank  and  rear 
at  Chancellorsville,  283 ;  his  death, 
289;  corps  at  Chancellorsville, 
Stuart's  report  of,  293. 

"  Jacobinism  of  Congress,"  note  on  Mr. 
Lincoln's  phrase,  80. 

Jaines  River  open  by  fall  of  Norfolk, 
120;  Fort  Darling,  Union  fleet 
compelled  to  withdraw,  120  ;  con 
sidered  as  a  base  line,  140  ;  McClel- 


lan  adopts  change  of  base  to,  147 
advance,  merits  of  a,  408  ;  Butler's 
advance  by,  409 ;  Butler's  cam 
paign  on,  460 ;  his  force,  460  ;  as 
cent  of  the  river,  461 ;  landing  at 
Bermuda  Hundred,  461 ;  Butler, 
Grant's  vague  instructions  on 
James  River  campaign,  462  ;  diffi 
culties  of  the  campaign,  463  ;  Rich 
mond  and  Petersburg  Railroad, 
attempts  to  capture,  464 ;  Bermuda- 
Hundred,  Butler  forms  intrenched 
line,  464  ;  Beauregard's  operations 
at  Bermuda  Hundred,  405 ;  Gill- 
more,  General,  at  Bermuda  Hun- 
dred,  465  ;  battle  of  Proxy's  Bluff 
465  ;  losses  of  both  armies  at  Bor 
muda  Hundred,  468  ;  Butler's  force 
withdrawn  within  Bermuda  Hun 
dred  lines,  468 ;  Bermuda  Hun 
dred,  General  Smith's  force  ordered 
from  to  Grant,  482  ;  Grant's  change 
of  base  to  south  of,  498  ;  Bermuda 
Hundred,  Smith's  movement  on 
Petersburg,  500 ;  Butler's  occupa 
tion  of  Bermuda  Hundred,  516. 

Jericho  Ford — see  North  Anna. 

Jenkins'  raid  into  Maryland  and  Penn 
sylvania,  319. 

Johnston,  General,  estimate  of  forces, 
72  ;  army  removed  to  the  Rapi- 
dan,  90  ;  takes  command  of  York- 
town  defences,  103  ;  on  unknown 
redoubts  at  Williamsburg,  115 ; 
withdrawal  behind  the  Chicka- 
hominy,  119 ;  account  of  Casey's 
defeat  at  Seven  Pines  (Fair  Oaks), 
134  ;  wounded  at  Fair  Oaks,  138  ; 
theory  of  defence  of  Richmond, 
143 ;  on  Grant's  direct  attacks  on 
Lee,  495  ;  restored  to  command  of 
forces  opposing  Sherman — his 
strength,  567  ;  on  the  Confederate 
commissariat  and  conscription, 
572. 

Jomini  on  the  difficulties  of  an  invad 
ing  army,  24 ;  on  interference  with 
generals  in  the  field,  96 ;  on  con 
centric  operations,  410. 

Jones,  General,  on  the  battle  of  An 
tietam,  212. 

Kearney's  assault  at  Manassas  No.  2, 
185. 

Kearney,  General,  the  death  of,  192  ; 
his  origination  of  the  badge  sys 
tem,  268. 

Kelley's  Ford,  the  Union  cavalry  at, 
268 ;  cavalry  action  at,  386. 


662 


INDEX. 


Kilpatrick's  raid  towards  Richmond, 
399. 

Kinglake,  Mr.,  on  English  public  sen 
timent  on  the  Crimean  war,  68. 

Laurel  Hill,  Virginia,  Garnett's  position 
at,  35  ;  McClellan's  plan  of  attack, 
37 ;  abandoned  by  Garnett,  38 ; 
see  also  Rich  Mountain. 

Jjee,  General  Robert  E.,  appointed  ma 
jor-general,  and  commander  of  the 
Virginia  forces,  26 ;  defence  of 
West  Virginia,  34  ;  on  the  poor  dis 
cipline  of  the  army,  67  ;  appointed 
to  Army  of  Northern  Virginia, 
142;  withdraws  Jackson  from 
Shenandoah  Valley,  143  ;  plan  of 
attack  on  the  Chickahominy,  144  ; 
concentrated  at  Newmarket  Cross 
roads,  159  ;  on  the  battle  of  Mal- 
vern  Hill,  163  ;  after  Malvern  Hill 
battle  withdraws  towards  Rich 
mond,  164  ;  fault  in  the  Peninsular 
campaign  unnoticed,  165 ;  wished 
McClellan  out  of  the  Peninsula, 
171 ;  Seven  Days'  battle — see  Seven 
Days ;  opened  fire  on  shipping  at 
Harrison's  Landing  from  Coggin's 
Point — is  repulsed,  172 ;  resolved 
to  strike  northward  on  McClellan's 
evacuation  of  the  Peninsula,  174 ; 
on  advance  on  General  Pope,  175  ; 
unwonted  rashness  in  front  of 
Pope — Longstreet  and  Jackson 
separated,  178 ;  joins  Jackson  at 
Manassas,  184  ;  abandoned  pursuit 
of  Pope,  and  turned  to  north  of  the 
Potomac,  193  ;  determined  to  cross 
into  Maryland,  194;  purposes  af 
ter  campaign  against  Pope,  194 ; 
crossed  the  Pouomac  towards  Lees- 
burg,  196  ;  plan  of  Maryland  cam 
paign,  198  ;  advances  towards  Har 
per's  Ferry,  198  ;  plan  of  Harper's 
Ferry  movement  fell  into  McClel 
lan's  hands,  201 ;  withdrew  to  An- 
tietam  Valley,  207  ;  at  Antietam— 
see  Antietam  ;  Maryland  campaign 
at  an  end,  224 ;  position  in  the 
Shenandoah  Valley  after  Antietam, 
225  ;  army  divided  by  McClellan's 
combinations,  226  ;  his  erroneous 
statement  on  Sumner  at  Freder- 
icksburg,  244;  arrives  at  Freder- 
icksburg  and  fortifies  the  heights, 
236  ;  at  Fredericksburg — see  Fred 
ericksburg  ;  strength  before  Chan- 
cellorsville,  269 ;  army-roll  on 
March  31,  1863,  270 ;  positions  be 


fore  battle  of  Chancellorsville,  270 ; 
discovery  of  Hooker's  purpose  at 
Chansellorsville,  276;  Fredericks- 
burg  held,  and  main  army  pushed 
towards  Chancellorsville,  277  ; 
army  increased  by  conscripts  and 
Longstreet 's  divisions,  310  ;  at  bat 
tle  of  Chancellorsville — see  Chan 
cellorsville  ;  strength  of  his  army 
after  Chancellorsville,  310 ;  com 
missariat — reasons  for  invading 
Pennsylvania,  310  ;  army  reorgan 
ized  into  three  corps,  310  ;  force  at 
opening  of  Gettysburg  campaign, 
310  ;  manoeuvres  to  disengage 
Hooker  from  the  Rappahannock, 
312 ;  Culpepper  occupied  by  great 
part  of  his  army,  312;  Shenan 
doah  Valley  advance— Winchester 
reached  by  Ewell,  314;  his  right 
at  Fredericksburg,  centre  at  Cul 
pepper,  left  at  mouth  of  Shenan 
doah  Valley,  315;  on  his  effort 
to  draw  Hooker  from  his  base,  318 ; 
whole  army  crossed  into  Pennsyl 
vania,  320 ;  countermarch  of  his 
army  towards  Gettysburg,  326 ;  bat 
tle  of  Gettysburg — see  Gettysburg  ; 
error  in  fighting  at  Gettysburg,  and 
his  reasons  therefor,  340 ;  his  re 
treat  after  Gettysburg,  366  ;  crosses 
the  Potomac  safely  at  Williams- 
port,  369 ;  retreats  to  Shenan 
doah  Valley,  373 ;  weakened  by 
detaching  Longstreet  to  Tennes 
see,  375 ;  position  behind  the 
Rapidan,  376 ;  at  Culpepper,  378  ; 
flanks  Meude's  right,  who  tails 
back  behind  the  Rappahannock, 
377 ;  swap  queens  (Washington 
for  Richmond),  377 ;  destroyed 
Orange  and  Alexandria  Railroad, 
385  ;  withdraws  towards  the  Rap 
pahannock,  385 ;  withdraws  across 
the  Rapidan,  388  ;  line  of  defences 
at  Mine  Run,  391 ;  his.  positions  on 
the  Rapidan,  391,  416  ;  method  of 
defence  of  the  Rapidan,  416  ;  strat 
egy  to  compel  battle  in  the  Wil 
derness,  418 ;  retired  behind  the 
Tolopotomy,  479  ;  retrograded  to 
wards  the  Pamunky,  and  faced 
Grant  in  advance  of  the  Chicka 
hominy,  479  ;  morale  of  his  army 
after  Cold  Harbor,  492  ;  losses  dur 
ing  Grant's  overland  campaign, 
492  ;  his  army  passing  to  south  of 
the  James,  near  Drury's  Blufl',  503  ; 
real  force  on  opening  spring  cam 


INDEX. 


653 


paign,  1865, 573;  movement  to  wards 
junction  with  Johnston  on  Danville 
^  line,  574  ;  never  meant  to  surren 
der  until  compelled,  574  ;  attack  on 
Fort  Steadman — see  Fort  Stead- 
man  ;  attack  on  Warren,  on  Grant's 
left,  at  Boydton  plankroad,  590; 
announces  his  purpose  to  abandon 
Petersburg  and  Richmond,  603 ; 
hopes  of  escape,  and  junction  with 
Johnston,  605  ;  final  retreat — see 
Eetreat;  correspondence  with  Grant 
on  surrender,  615  ;  final  surrender 
of  his  army,  618. 

Leesburg — see  Ball's  Bluff. 

Letcher,  Governor,  of  Virginia,  calls  for 
State  militia,  26. 

Lincoln,  President,  calls  for  troops,  14, 
29,  30 ;  correspondence  with  Mc- 
Clellan  on  movement  on  Manassas, 
70  ;  despondent  saying  at  the  close 
of  1861,  78 ;  consultation  with  Gen 
erals  McDowell  and  Franklin  at 
close  of  1861,  on  a  Peninsular  cam 
paign,  79  ;  would  like  to  borrow 
McClellan's  army  (1861),  80 ;  spe 
cial  order  to  advance  to  Manassas 
Junction,  85 ;  general  order  to 
move  on  February  22d,  86  ;  gen- 
•  eral  war  order  rescinded,  and  Low 
er  Chesapeake  route  adopted,  87  ; 
order  on  defence  of  Washington, 
89  ;  and  the  administration — policy 
and  errors  of  reviewed,  93  ;  his 
order  recalling  McDowell's  corps 
from  McClellan's  army,  104;  Mc 
Dowell's  recall  to  Washington — 
politics  and  military  affairs,  105 ; 
reply  to  Generals  Franklin  and 
Smith's  proposed  plan  of  campaign, 
265 ;  opinion  on  Hooker's  plan  of 
isolating  Hill  and  Longstreet,  315. 

Little  Round  Top — see  Gettysburg. 

Longstreet  on  time  of  his  re-enforcing 
Jackson  at  Manassas  No.  2,  186  ; 
wounded  at  the  Wilderness,  434. 

Loudon  Heights,  the  position  of,  205. 

McCall,  position  at  battle  of  Newmarket 
Cross-roads,  158;  on  the  fight  for 
the  guns  at  Newmarket  Cross 
roads,  158. 

McClellan,  General,  in  West  Virginia, 
34 ;  intrusted  with  Department  of 
the  Ohio,  35  ;  placed  in  command  of 
the  army,  62 ;  credit  to  for  forma 
tion  of  the  grand  army,  66  ;  the  en- 
entire  confidence  of  the  country,  68 ; 
plan  of  direct  attack  via  Manassas, 


69  ;  correspondence  with  President 
Lincoln  on  an  advance,  70  ;  change 
of  plan  of  advance — consequent 
delay,  70 ;  on  merits  of  advance  by 
Manassas,  73 ;  on  merits  of  advance 
by  James  River,  408  ;  error  of  re 
maining  inactive,  74;  sickness  at 
close  of  1861 — discussions  by  the 
President,  etc.,  in  his  absence,  79  ; 
Peninsular  campaign — see  also 
Peninsula ;  plan  of  attacking  Rich 
mond  by  Lower  Chesapeake  disap 
proved  by  the  President,  85  ;  de 
clined  to  explain  his  plans  to  the 
President's  meeting  unless  ordered, 
85 ;  report  of  merits  of  Chesa 
peake  and  Manassas  advances — 
Lower  Chesapeake  advance  ap 
proved  by  eight  of  twelve  generals, 
87  ;  relegated  to  Army  of  Potomac 
instead  of  all  the  army,  93  ;  hos 
tility  to  of  Washington  influential 
men,  95 ;  his  faults  of  inactivity, 
etc.,  considered,  97  ;  opinion  on  as 
saulting  Yorktown,  110;  objects 
on  arrival  at  the  Chickahominy, 
121 ;  passivity  on  reaching  the 
Chickahominy,  129 ;  his  position 
astride  the  Chickahomiuy,  140 : 
his  nature  to  hesitate  between  al 
ternatives,  141 ;  intentions  after 
battle  of  Fair  Oaks,  142  ;  the  cours 
es  open  to,  on  Lee's  approach,  146  ; 
Seven  Days'  retreat — see  Seven 
Days;  adopts  change  of  base  to 
James  River,  147  ;  error  on  posi 
tion  of  Hill  and  Longstreet  at  Mal- 
vern  Hill,  161  ;  retreat  a  notable 
achievement,  166 ;  design  to  cross 
the  James,  167  ;  proposed  crossing 
of  the  James  afterwards  realized 
by  Grant,  168 ;  promised  re-enforce 
ments  in  the  Peninsula,  170 ;  or 
dered  to  join  Pope  at  Aquia  Creek, 
171  ;  advance  towards  Lee  at  Fred 
erick,  197 ;  gains  copy  of  Lee's 
plan  of  Harper's  Ferry  advance, 
201 ;  arrived  at  South  Mountain, 
202  ;  at  Antietam— see  Antietam  ; 
his  inactivity  after  Antietam  con 
sidered,  222  ;  advance  on  Warren- 
ton,  226 ;  removed  from  command 
in  favor  of  Buruside,  227 ;  the 
close  of  his  career,  225 ;  his  mili 
tary  character  considered,  228. 

McDougall,  General,  on  positions  di 
vided  by  rivers,  129  ;  on  angles  in 
line  of  battle,  344. 

McDowell,  General,  appointed  to  lead 


654 


INDEX. 


the  Potomac  army,  42 ;  time  for 
preparation  denied  him,  42 ;  with 
drew  from  command,  61  ;  sug 
gested  advance  towards  Richmond, 
80 ;  corps  detached  from  McClellan 
to  join  in  defence  of  Washington, 
93  ;  (Department  of  the  Rappahan- 
nock)  position  during  McClellan's 
advance,  122 ;  at  Fredericksburg 
with  30,000  men,  122  ;  ordered  by 
the  administration  to  attack  Rich 
mond  in  co-operaiion  with  McClel 
lan,  123  ;  advance  south  of  Fred 
ericksburg,  124 ;  advance  cleared 
by  Porter's  corps  of  the  Potomac 
army,  124 ;  ordered  to  the  Shen- 
andoah  Valley,  126;  Manassas 
campaign — see  Manassas. 

McMahon,  General,  on  Sedgwick's 
movement  before  Chancellorsville, 
275. 

Magruder,  Colonel  J.  B.,  position  near 
Hampton,  27 ;  on  Confederate  po 
sition  on  Chickahominy  right  bank, 
147. 

Malvern  Hill  reached  by  McClellan's 
artillery,  157 ;  map  of  the  battle 
field,  160 ;  battle  of,  160 ;  position 
of  the  armies,  161 ;  Hill's  advance 
alone  by  misconception,  162 ;  the 
Confederates  completely  repulsed, 
163 ;  left  flank  protected  by  James 
River  gunboats,  164. 

Manassas  Junction,  the  first  Confederate 
camp  at,  27 ;  captures  of  prisoners 
and  supplies  by  Stuart,  177 ;  ad 
vance  against  Jackson  at,  181. 

Manassas,  the  first  battle  of,  40  ;  Mc 
Dowell,  General,  on  fear  of  masked 
batteries  in  Bull  Run  advance,  34  ; 
popular  ignorance  on  nature  of 
the  war,  40  ;  the  battle  of,  in  1861, 
40  ;  McDowell's  plan  of  operations 
against,  44  ;  Johnston's  evacuation 
of  Winchester,  and  union  with 
Iseauregard,  46  ;  McDowell's  army 
moved  from  the  Potomac  towards, 
46 ;  McDowell's  plan  of  attack, 
48 ;  Beauregard's  lines  of  defence, 
50 ;  commencement  of  the  battle, 
51  ;  the  action  of  Stone  Bridge,  52  ; 
peril  of  Confederate  left  flank,  53  ; 
retreat  of  the  Union  army,  56 ; 
losses  on  both  sides,  57  ;  causes  of 
the  Union  defeat,  58  ;  followed  by 
popular  uprising,  60;  evacuated 
by  Johnston,  89. 

Manassas  No.  2,  Jackson's  retreat  from, 
181 ;  the  second  battle  of,  182 ; 


Pope's  position  at,  184  ;  useless  at 
tacks  on  Confederate  positions,  185  ; 
close  of  first  day's  battle,  186  ;  po 
sitions  of  second  day,  188 ;  Pope 
and  Lee's  intended  attack  on  each 
other's  left  flank  on  second  day, 
188  ;  Pope's  belief  of  Lee's  falling 
back,  188 ;  McDowell  ordered  on 
Warrenton  turnpike,  189  ;  Porter's 
assault  on  Warrenton  turnpike, 
190;  Porter  repulsed  from  War 
renton  turnpike,  190. 

Manassas  Gap,  General  French's  feeble 
attack,  374 

Marmont  on  discrimination  of  the  sol 
dier,  256. 

Marsh  Creek — see  Williamsport. 

Maryland  campaign,  the,  194 ;  Lee's 
expected  co-operation  from  citizens, 
195  ;  his  disappointment,  196  ; 
McClellan's  reorganization  of  his 
army,  197 ;  Lee's  plan  of  operations, 
198  ;  Frederick  evacuated  by  Lee, 
198  ;  General  Miles  force  at  Har 
per's  Ferry,  199 ;  Lee's  report  on 
straggling,  224  ;  the  close  of,  224  ; 
Antietam — see  Antietam. 

Maryland  Heights  occupied  by  Miles's 
troops,  205 ;  abandoned  by  Miles, 
206. 

Martinsburg  and  Winchester,  General 
White's  force  at,  199. 

Masked  battery  fiction,  influence  of 
the,  34. 

Meade,  General,  on  McClellan's  creation 
of  the  army,  67 ;  on  the  battle  of 
Fredericksburg,  248  ;  appointed  to 
command  Potomac  army,  322 ; 
characteristics  of,  and  estimation 
by  the  army,  323 ;  position  of  the 
army  on  his  taking  command,  324 ; 
his  desire  to  fight  a  defensive  bat 
tle  at  Gettysburg,  341 ;  circumspect 
pursuit  of  Lee,  367  ;  decides  on  at 
tacking  Lee  at  Williamsport,  369 ; 
Lee's  escape  at  Williamsport  con 
sidered,  369 ;  advance  into  Vir 
ginia,  374 ;  drives  Lee  across  the 
Rappahannock  and  Rapidan,  375 
position  on  the  Rapidan  line, 

376  ;  falls  back  behind  the  Rappa 
hannock,   his    left    being  turned, 

377  ;  advances  towards  the  Rappa 
hannock   in   pursuit  of  Lee,  385  ; 
crossed    the    Rappahannock — the 
Confederate  position,  387  ;  back  be 
tween  the  Rappahannock  and  Rap 
idan,  388 ;  the  Mine   Run  movo, 
390 ;  plan  of  operations  in  Miiu 


INDEX. 


655 


Run  move,  391 ;  pedantic  orders 
of  Halleck  after  Mine  Run,  398; 
army  in  winter-quarters,  398  ;  his 
strength  on  commencement  of 
overland  campaign,  413. 

Mechanics villc,  McClellan's  object  in 
carrying,  122. 

Meigs,  General,  on  direct  advance  to 
wards  Richmond,  84. 

Merrimac,  the,  to  be  neutralized,  91  ; 
the,  destroyed  by  Confederate  Com 
modore  Tatnall,  120. 

Middle  Military  Division,  creation  of 
the,  General  Sheridan  command 
ing,  555. 

Miles,  General,  at  Harper's  Ferry,  199. 

Miles,  Colonel,  brilliant  service  at  Chan- 
cellorsville,  287. 

Mine  Run  move,  the,  390 ;  sketch  of 
the  battle  of,  393  ;  Meade's  plan  to 
interpose  between  Ewell  and  Hill, 
391  ;  Lee's  position  at,  391 ;  cause 
of  delays  of  Meade's  advance,  392 ; 
delays  of  the  Third  Corps,  394 ; 
the  difficulties  in  crossing  the  Rap- 
idan,  392 ;  Lee  gains  time  to  con 
centrate,  394;  Meade's  plan  of 
attack,  396;  Warren's  intended 
attack  on  Lee's  right,  395 ;  War 
ren's  attack  impossible,  and  failure 
of  the  plan,  396 ;  Warren's  forlorn 
hope  fastening  their  names  to  their 
coats,  397 ;  Warren  finds  attack  on 
Lee's  right  hopeless,  397 ;  Meade 
withdraws  his  army,  397. 

Morale  of  an  army,  what  constitutes  it, 
255. 

Moreau.  a  movement  of  compared  with 
Sumner's  crossing  of  the  Chicka- 
hominy,  138. 

Mountain  warfare,  characteristics  of, 
36. 

Mud  campaign,  Banks'  Ford,  the  cross 
ing  prevented  by  a  storm,  259. 

Mustering  out,  haphazard  policy  of  Gov 
ernment,  309. 

Napier,  Sir  William,  on  judgment  upon 
unsuccessful  generals,  121. 

Napoleon,  notes  on  invasion  of  Eng 
land,  99  ;  on  fighting  without  line 
of  retreat,  146;  on  the  chessboard 
of  war,  246  ;  on  attacking  positions 
in  front,  493 ;  on  changes  of  base, 
498. 

National  wars,  the  difficulties  in  con 
ducting,  24. 

Newmarket  Cross-roads,  battle  of,  its 
object,  157 


Newmarket,  battle  of,  and  defeat  of 
Sigel,  468. 

Norfolk,  General  Huger  evacuated,  by 
orders  from  Richmond,  to  which 
garrison  withdrew,  120;  occupied 
by  General  Wool,  120. 

Norfolk  Navy  Yard,  abandoned  in  1861, 
26. 

North  Anna,  the  two  armies  head  for, 
472;  the  Union  army  arrives  on 
north  bank,  and  discovers  Lee  on 
south  bank,  473  ;  Warren  crossed 
at  Jericho  Ford,  and  repulse  of  the 
enemy,  473 ;  Chesterfield  Bridge 
captured  by  Hancock,  475;  extra 
ordinary  position  of  Confederate 
army  at,  477  ;  Grant's  withdrawal 
and  start  for  the  Pamunky,  477. 

North,  the,  offensive  thrown  upon,  24. 

Northern  Virginia,  position  of  the  three 
armies  of,  122;  Pope's  campaign 
(for  further,  see  Pope),  167. 

Officers,  inefficiency  of,  property  hold 
ers'  memorial  on,  63. 

On  to  Richmond,  influence  of  the  phrase, 
40. 

Opening  of  the  war — see  three  months' 
campaign. 

Opequan,  battle  of — see  Winchester. 

Orange  and  Alexandria  Railroad — line 
of  advance  towards  Richmond,  22 ; 
General  Pope's  position  on— his 
force,  172. 

Organization  of  armies — the  division 
and  the  corps,  63. 

Overland  route  to  Richmond,  of  the 
difficulties,  408 ;  overland  cam 
paign  commenced,  414 ;  overland 
campaign,  observations  on,  489 ; 
Cold  Harbor — see  Cold  Harbor; 
Pamunky  crossed  by  the  army, 
and  communication  secured  with 
Chesapeake  Bay,  478 ;  casualties 
during  the  overland  campaign, 
491. 

Patterson,  General,  feeble  operations 
against  Winchester,  46  ;  estimates 
by,  of  Johnston's  strength,  46. 

Peach  Orchard — see  Gettysburg. 

Peninsular  campaign— Peninsula,  de 
scription  of  the,  100 ;  Peninsula, 
unheaithiness  of  in  August  and 
September,  171 ;  discussions,  before 
adoption,  between  the  President, 
members  of  cabinet,  and  Generals 
McDowell  and  Franklin,  79  ;  Lowei 
Chesapeake  advance  approved  by 


656 


INDEX. 


eight  of  twelve  division  command 
ers,  88  :  decided  upon  under  cer 
tain  conditions,  91 ;  McDowell's 
corps  and  Blenker's  division  de 
tached  from  by  the  President,  93  ; 
Peninsula,  transportation  of  the 
army  to  the,  99  ;  the  army  before 
Yorktown  (for  siege  of — see  York- 
town),  99  ;  pursuit  of  Johnston  to 
Williamsburg  (for  further — see 
Williamsburg),  1 12  ;  White  House 
reached.  118;  Seven  days' retreat 
— see  Seven  days ;  the  close  of 
the,  164 ;  reflections  on  its  strat 
egy,  164;  joy  of  the  South  and 
grief  of  the  North,  165  ;  losses  of, 
165. 

Peninsula,  the,  as  a  secondary  base,  23. 

Petersburg,  the  siege  of,  497 ;  import 
ance  as  point  d'appui  for  the  army, 
500 ;  its  strategic  relations  to  Rich 
mond,  607  ;  two  possible  modes  of 
capture,  552 ;  observations  on  the 
siege,  550  ;  manoeuvres  by  the  left, 
551  ;  Grant's  change  of  base  to 
south  of  the  James,  497;  Cole's 
Ferry — the  ponton  delay,  499  ;  the 
fortifications  of  on  Smith's  arrival, 
501 ;  Grant's  army  all  on  south 
side  of  the  James,  500;  Gill- 
more's  and  Kautz's  abortive  at 
tempt  to  capture,  500 ;  partial  suc 
cess  of  Smith's  forces,  503 ;  non- 
capture — circumstances  of  Han 
cock's  march,  504 ;  Hancock  or 
dered  to  assist  Smith  before,  504 ; 
Grant's  expectation  of  easy  cap 
ture  by  Smith,  and  failure  to  notify 
Meade  of  intended  attack,  504 ; 
Lee's  army  arrived  in,  506; 
Meade's  indorsement  on  non-cap 
ture  of,  506;  Smith's  suspension 
of  operations  for  the  night,  506 ; 
Grant  compelled  to  sit  down  before 
it,  507 ;  Petersburg  and  Richmond 
Railroad,  Terry's  failure  to  destroy, 
509  ;  Hancock's  and  Burnside's  as 
sault  the  enemy  driven  on  whole 
line,  509  ;  Hancock  and  Burnside's 
renewed  assault,  510 ;  Grant  com 
mences  intrenching  a  systematic 
line,  511 ;  Lee  draws  closer  round 
Petersburg,  and  repulses  every  new 
assault,  511;  Jerusalem  plankroad — 
Hill  strikes  between  Second  and 
Sixth  corps,  512 ;  Stoney  Creek, 
the  battle  of,  513  ;  Reams'  Station, 
Wilson's  defeat  and  escape,  with 
loss  of  trains  and  artillery,  513; 


Nottoway  Station,  cavalry  action 
at,  513;  Southside  Railroad  de 
stroyed  to  Nottoway  Station  by 
Wilson  and  Kautz,  513 ;  Weldon 
Railroad  destroyed  at  Reams'  Sta 
tion  by  Wilson  and  Kautz,  513  ; 
losses  of  preliminary  operations, 
514 ;  the  lines  of  both  armies  de 
scribed,  515;  Deep  Bottom,  Han 
cock's  expedition  to,  519 ;  Deep 
Bottom,  Hancock's  secret  return 
to  Petersburg  lines,  520 ;  Lee's 
diversion  against  Baltimore  and 
Washington— see  Early,  526 ; 
Deep  Bottom,  Hancock's  second 
expedition,  529 ;  summer  and  au 
tumn  operations  against  Peters 
burg  and  Richmond,  529  ;  Weldon 
Railroad,  Warren's  seizure  of  dur 
ing  Deep  Bottom  operations,  532  ; 
Weldon  Railroad,  Warren's  cap 
ture,  and  Confederate  efforts  to  re 
take,  533;  Peeble's  Farm,  move 
ment  by  the  left,  539 ;  turning 
movement  on  Southside  Railroad 
(for  further — see  Southside  Rail 
road),  540;  Fort  Harrison  carried 
by  Butler,  540;  Butler  at  battle 
of  Cliapin's  Farm,  540  ;  Chapin's 
Farm,  capture  of  Fort  Harrison  by 
Butler,  540;  Southside  Railroad, 
failure  to  force  Confederate  posi 
tion  at  Hatcher's  Run,  541 ;  South- 
side  Railroad — Lee,  his  extreme 
line  below  Hatcher's  Run,  541 ; 
Southside  Railroad  and  Boydton 
plankroad,  importance  of  to  Lee, 
.  541 ;  Southside  Railroad,  plan  of 
attack  on  Lee's  right,  541 ;  opera 
tions  extending  Grant's  lines  west 
ward  to  Hatcher's  Run,  547  ;  War 
ren's  operations  on  the  Weldon 
road,  549  ;  character  of  lines,  576  ; 
Warren's  and  Humphreys'  move 
by  the  rear  and  left,  581  ;  initial 
operations  of  the  29th  of  March, 
582 ;  Lee's  right,  front  position  of, 
582  ;  Sheridan  manoeuvring  to  the 
left,  583;  Dinwiddie  Courthouso 
occupied  by  Sheridan,  584;  tho 
Union  line  from  the  Appomattoi; 
to  Dinwiddie  Courthouse,  584; 
Lee's  strength  and  length  of  in 
trenched  line,  585  ;  Longstreet  re 
tained  at  north  side  of  James 
River,  585  ;  White  Oak  road  and 
Hatcher's  Run,  the  two  armies  at, 
586  ;  Humphreys'  report  of  opera 
tions  of  March  30, 1865, 587 ;  Union 


INDEX. 


657 


left  (Warren's),  disposition  of  the, 
588  ;  Lee's  centre  and  left  still  in 
tact,  600 ;  Lee's  centre  assaulted 
by  Parke,  Wright,  and  Ord,  601  ; 
Confederates  pressed  back  to  chain 
of  works  close  around,  602 ;  the 
defence  of  Fort  Gregg,  602  ;  evac 
uated  by  Lee,  604 ;  Lee's  retreat 
from,  and  pursuit  of — see  Retreat. 

Petersburg  mine  fiasco,  the,  518 ;  Burn- 
side's  choice  of  assaulting  column 
by  lot,  521  ;  Burnside's  corps,  the 
morale  of  before  the  assault,  521  ; 
effect  of  the  explosion,  523  ;  Gen 
eral  Ledlie's  assault  after  the  ex 
plosion,  522;  the  disaster  at  the 
crater,  524 ;  reports  of  Committee 
on  the  Conduct  of  the  War  and 
military  court  of  inquiry,  524. 

Piedmont,  the  battle  of,  469. 

Pipe  Creek — see  Gettysburg. 

Pleasonton's  report  of  strength  of  cav 
alry  after  Chancellorsville,  310. 

Po,  the  river — see  Spottsylvania. 

Pope,  campaign  in  Northern  Virginia, 
167  ;  placed  in  command  of  Army 
of  Virginia  (McDowell,  Banks,  and 
Fremont),  168 ;  his  military  repu 
tation,  168 ;  his  bombastic  non 
sense  on  assuming  command,  and 
its  popularity,  169 ;  thought  he 
could  march  to  New  Orleans  with 
such  an  army  as  McClellan's,  169  ; 
Cedar  Mountain,  the  battle  of, 
173  ;  retrograde  movement,  175  ; 
Jackson  manoeuvring  to  flank  his 
right,  176;  Catlett's  Station,  Stu 
art's  capture  of  camp  and  Pope's  pa 
pers,  177 ;  his  right  turned  by  Jack 
son,  177 ;  on  lying  off  on  enemy's 
flanks,  178 ;  railway  communica 
tions  with  Washington  cut,  178  ; 
his  dispositions  to  attack  Long- 
street  before  uniting  with  Jackson, 
179  ;  Groveton,  Jackson's  position 
at,  and  battle,  181 ;  Jackson  es 
capes  from  Manassas,  181 ;  Porter's 
advance  to  Gainsville  stopped  by 
Lee's  arrival,  183 ;  arrives  at  Ma- 
nassas,  his  position  facing  Jack 
son,  184 ;  forced  from  Manassas — 
retires  to  Centreville,  191 ;  Ox 
Hill,  the  battle  of,  192  ;  falls  back 
to  Fairfax  Courthouse  and  Ger- 
mantown,  192;  campaign,  losses 
of,  193  ;  withdraws  within  Wash 
ington  lines,  193;  resigned  his 
command,  193 ;  campaign  results 
to  the  Confederates,  194. 


Port  Republic,  the  battle  of,  127. 

Porter  on  north  bank  of  Chickahominy 
River  to  engage  Jackson,  148  ;  the 
doubtful  order  at  Manassas  No.  2, 
186. 

Potomac  army — see  Army. 

Potomac  River,  the  Confederate  block 
ade  of  the,  75. 

Prince  Eugene  on  interference  of  the 
States-General,  126. 

Rapidan,  the  march  to  the,  373  ;  Meade 
falls  back  from  behind  Rappahan- 
nock,  375  ;  Lee  withdraws  across, 
387  ;  the,  crossed  by  Meade,  415. 

Rappahannock,  abortive  movements 
upon  the,  255. 

Rappahaniiock  Station,  the  battle  of, 
387. 

Raymond, Mr.,  on  Mr.  Lincoln's  opinion 
of  McClellan's  plan  of  advance,  87. 

Reams'  Station,  Hancock's  action  at, 
535 ;  delay  in  re-enforcing  Han 
cock,  5137 ;  Hancock's  losses,  538  ; 
Hancock's  letter  to  author  on  the 
battle,  538. 

Retreat  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Vir 
ginia — Lee's  only  line  of  retreat, 
603 ;  the  two  Union  lines  of  pur 
suit,  605  ;  Danville  line  Lee's  first 
objective,  606  ;  Lee  reaches  Amelia 
Courthouse,  607  ;  his  expected  ra 
tions  had  been  sent  to  Richmond 
and  burned,  607  ;  Sheridan's  force 
at  Jettersville  heading  off  Lee, 
608 ;  Meade  joined  Sheridan  at 
Jettersville,  608 ;  Sailor's  Creek, 
Ewell's  corps  cut  off,  and  surren 
dered,  610 ;  Lee  crossed  the  Appo- 
mattox  near  Farmville,  611  ;  star 
vation  and  fatigue  of  Lee's  troops, 
611;  ultimo  suspiro,  612;  Lee's 
army  overtaken  at  High  Bridge  by 
Second  Corps,  613;  Farmville, 
Grant's  letter  from,  to  Lee,  615  ; 
Sheridan  across  Lee's  line  of  re 
treat  at  Appomattox  Courthouse, 
617  ;  Lee's  attempt  to  cut  through 
Sheridan's  lines  at  Appomattox 
Courthouse,  617  ;  Lee's  surrender, 
618;  Lee's  surrender,  opening  of 
correspondence  between  Grant  and 
Lee,  618. 

Reynolds,  General,  the  death  of,  330. 

Rich  Mountain,  Pegram  defeated  by 
Rosecrans,  38. 

Richmond  the  objective  point  of  the 
war,  17 ;  the  lines  of  advance  to 
wards  in  1861,  22 ;  what  a  direct 


658 


INDEX. 


march  on  would  have  effected,  147 ; 
outer  line  of  redoubts  pierced  by 
Kilpatrick,  400  ;  merits  of  plans  of 
advance  discussed,  406  ;  outer  de 
fences  penetrated  by  Sheridan, 
460;  entered  by  Union  troops, 
605. 

Rivers  of  Virginia,  system  of  the,  19. 

Rivers,  theories  of  defence  of,  415. 

Round  Top — see  Gettysburg. 

Russell,  W.  H.,  on  McDowell's  army, 
43. 

Schenck,  General,  flight  of  his  recon- 
noitering  party  near  Vienna,  Vir 
ginia,  38 ;  on  Vienna  masked  bat 
teries,  34. 

Scott,  Lieutenant-General,  views  and 
plans  of  the  war — how  they  were 
overruled,  41 ;  dispatch  to  General 
Patterson  on  operations  against 
Johnston,  45. 

Sedgwick,  General,  at  Mine  Run,  395  ; 
his  death  at  Spottsylvania,  447; 
see  also  Chancellorsville. 

Seminary  Ridge— see  Gettysburg,  336. 

Seven  days'  retreat,  the,  140  ;  Lee  dis 
covers  McClellan's  movement  for 
the  James  River,  154 ;  commenced, 
154  ;  Lee  commences  pursuit,  155  ; 
battle  of  Savage  Station,  156  ;  the 
army  debouches  from  White  Oak 
Swamp,  156 ;  the  two  columns  of 
pursuit,  157 ;  Newmarket  Cross 
roads,  battle  of— its  object,  157; 
McClellan's  artillery  at  Malvern 
Hill,  157. 

Seven  Pines  battle — see  Fair  Oaks. 

Shady  Grove,  the  battle  of,  481. 

Sheridan  appointed  to  command  cav 
alry  of  Potomac  army,  412  ;  raid 
on  Lee's  communications,  458  ;  op 
erations  in  Shenandoah  Valley, 
554 ;  qualities  as  a  commander, 
556  ;  .  battle  of  Winchester,  556  ; 
his  tactics  with  cavalry  and  in 
fantry,  564;  raid  up  the  Virginia 
Valley — completes  the  circle  of  the 
hunt,  568;  report  of  operations, 
March  30,  1865.  587 ;  at  battle  of 
Five  Forks,  596! 

Shenandoah  Valley,  topography  of  the, 
19  ;  General  Banks  retained  in,  92  ; 
and  the  Chickahominy — compar 
ative  strategy,  121 ;  Ewell's  move 
ment  into,  314;  Ewell's  captures, 
318 ;  Sheridan's  operations  sum 
mer  and  winter  1864,  554 ;  its  strat 
egic  value  to  the  Confederates, 


554 ;  Sixth  Corps  retained  in,  554  • 
Sheridan  at  Cedar  Creek,  559] 
Early  once  more  ensconced  at  Fish 
er's  Hill,  560  ;  desolation  of  the,  by 
Sheridan,  560  ;  the  battle  of  Cedar 
Creek — see  Cedar  Creek,  561  ;  all 
operations  ended  in,  564 ;  battle  of 
Winchester — see  Winchester. 

Sherman  at  Manassas  (Stone  Bridge), 
53  ;  given  command  at  the  West, 
and  against  Johnston,  405 ;  ad 
vance  on  Atlanta  compared  with 
Grant's  direct  attack  system,  495  ; 
capture  of  Atlanta,  566 ;  march 
from  Atlanta  to  Savannah,  566 ; 
crossed  the  Savannah  into  South 
Carolina,  566  ;  reached  Goldsboro, 
North  Carolina,  568. 

Savage's  Station,  the  battle  of,  156. 

Si  gel,  plan  of  his  operations  in  Shenan 
doah  Valley,  etc.,  409  ;  operations 
in  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  468; 
superseded  by  General  Hunter, 
468. 

Smith,  G.  W.,  commanding  Confed 
erates,  vice  Johnston,  wounded,  138. 

Smith,  W.  F.,  evidence  on  Burnside's 
orders  at  Fredericksburg,  245 ;  and 
General  Franklin's  letter  to  the 
President  proposing  plan  of  cam 
paign,  263 ;  report  on  Grant's  or 
der  at  Cold  Harbor,  482 ;  reports 
of  his  operations  against  Peters? 
burg,  501,  502,  506. 

South  Mountain,  the  battles  of,  204; 
Hill  and  Longstreet  sent  to  hold 
passes,  201 ;  see  also  Harper's 
Ferry. 

Southside  Railroad,  Warren's  turning 
movement  across  Hatcher's  Run, 
542 ;  Hancock's  isolated  position 
on  Boydton  plankroad,  542 ; 
Hancock  withdraws  across  Hatch 
er's  Run,  546  ;  losses  on  both  sides, 
546. 

Spottsylvania,  Grant's  purpose  in  seiz 
ing,  440  ;  the  march  to — orders  for, 
441 ;  Lee  marches  to,  by  Parkers' 
store,  442  ;  Warren's  advance  met 
by  Longstreet's  advance,  444 ;  dis 
positions  of  the  Union  army,  446  ; 
Lee  at,  and  across  Grant's  line  of 
march,  446 ;  Hancock's  unfortu 
nate  movement  across  the  Po, 
447  ;  repeated  disastrous  repulses  of 
Second  and  Fifth  corps  at  Laurel 
Hill,  449  ;  first  line  on  Lee's  right 
carried  by  Upton,  but  abandoned, 
450;  Hancock's  successful  attack 


INDEX. 


on  Lee's  right  centre,  451  ;  Grant's 
endeavors  to  pierce  Lee's  lines  dur 
ing  next  week,  454 ;  Lee  with 
drew  to  his  interior  position  after 
twenty  hours'  fighting  to  dislodge 
Hancock,  454 :  diary  of  attempts 
to  pierce  Lee's  line  May  13th  to 
19th,  455  ;  losses  from  May  5th  to 
21st,  458  ;  the  army  moved  by  the 
left  towards  Richmond,  458  ;  to  the 
Chickahominy,  470  ;  and  the  North 
Anna — character  of  the  region  be 
tween,  472. 

Spottswood  mines,  origin  of  the  name 
Spottsylvania,  428. 

Stafford  Heights — see  Fredericksburg. 

Steadman,  Fort — see  Fort  Steadman. 

Stone,  General,  defeated  at  Ball's  Bluff, 
76;  exonerated  from  blame  at 
Ball's  Bluff,  77. 

Stoneman's  raid  on  Virginia  Central 
Railroad,  302. 

Straggling  in  the  Confederate  army  in 
Maryland  campaign,  224. 

Stuart's  capture  of  Catlett's  Station, 
176  ;  raid  into  Pennsylvania,  226  ; 
succession  to  Jackson's  command, 
292  ;  report  of  Jackson  at  battle  of 
Chancellorsville,  293  ;  his  absence 
during  movements  on  Gettysburg, 
338  ;  bivouacks  within  Union  lines 
at  Auburn,  381 ;  killed  at  Yellow 
Tavern,  Virginia,  459. 

Subsistence — see  Commissariat. 

Sumner,  General,  in  command  of  pur 
suit  of  Johnston,  112  ;  at  battle  of 
Williamsburg,  118;  at  battle  of 
Savage's  Station,  156 ;  report  on 
his  desire  to  occupy  Fredericks- 
burg,  234  ;  on  the  morale  of  the 
army,  256. 

Three  months'  campaign,  the,  in  1861, 
26. 

Tucker,  Mr.,  Assistant  Secretary  of 
War,  directed,  with  General  Mc- 
Clellan,  the  transportation  to  the 
Peninsula,  100. 

Turner's  Gap,  McClellan's  right  and 
centre  at,  202;  the  Confederate 
force  at,  202  ;  battle  of,  203. 

Turenne's  counter  to  Montecuculi  in 
1675,  147. 

Twiss  on  justifiable  desolations  by  ar 
mies,  560. 

Valley  of  Humiliation,  the  Shenandoah 

Valley  called,  318. 
Virginia,  her  vote  to  secede,  13;  the 


theatre  of  the  war,  13, 15, 18  ;  river 
and  mountain  defensive  systems  of, 
19  ;  preparations  for  war — Gov 
ernor  Letcher's  call  for,  26;  first 
entered  by  the  Federal  army  (for 
further— see  Manassas  and  subse 
quent  campaigns),  30 ;  winter  op 
erations,  difficulties  of,  73 ;  see 
also  West  Virginia. 

Wadsworth,  General,  the  death  of  at 
the  Wilderness,  434. 

Wallace,  stand  before  Early  on  the 
Monocacy,  526. 

Warren,  General  G.  K.,  evidence  on 
Big  Bethel  affair,  82  ;  at  Manassas 
No.  2,  190;  report  of  Manassas 
battle  No.  2,  189  ;  evidence  on  dis 
aster  to  Eleventh  Corps  at  Chan 
cellorsville,  286;  at  Cedar  Run, 
381 ;  at  battle  of  Bristoe,  383  ;  at 
Mine  Run,  393-396;  capture  of 
Weldon  Railroad,  532 ;  at  move 
ment  on  Southside  Railroad,  541  ; 
report  of  operations  at  Hatcher's 
Run,  545  ;  report  of  operations  of 
March  30,  1865,  587  ;  report  on  ef 
fort  to  gain  the  White  Oak  road, 
589 ;  bravery  at  battle  of  Five 
Forks,  599;  relieved  from  com 
mand  by  Sheridan,  599. 

Washington,  the  defensive  lines  of,  22 
the  strategic  protection  of,  23 ;  de 
fences,  the  system  initiated,  30 
system  of  defences  formed,  the 
theory  of,  65 ;  popular  anger  at 
Confederate  blockade  of  the  Poto 
mac,  75  ;  President  Lincoln's  order 
to  retain  sufficient  force  to  secure, 
89 ;  Washington  and  Potomac  line, 
dispositions  to  defend,  91 ;  General 
Wadsworth  placed  in  command  of 
defences,  92  ;  number  and  positions 
of  covering  force,  92 ;  fears  for 
safety  of — foment  by  General  Pope, 
170  ;  Early 's  opportunity  of  enter 
ing,  527;  action  before  Fort  Ste 
vens,  527. 

West  Virginia,  Confederate  defence  of 
by  General  Lee,  34;  topography 
of  McClellan's  operations,  35  ;  cam 
paign  closed  by  victory  afc  Car- 
rick's  Ford,  39  ;  see  also  Virginia 

White  House,  General  Franklin's  dis 
embarkation  and  check  by  John 
ston,  117  ;  McClellan's  base  of  sup 
plies  established  at,  118;  White 
House  to  the  Chickahominy,  Mc 
Clellan's  march,  119. 


660 


INDEX. 


Wilderness,  the  battle  of  the,  413; 
Lee's  dispositions  to  attack,  418 ; 
Warren's  battle  with  Ewell's 
forces,  421  ;  Hill's  attempt  to  seize 
the  position  at  Brock  road,  424 ; 
Hancock  s  attack  on  Hill  at  Orange 
plankroad,  425 ;  Wadsworth  sent 
to  attack  Hill's  flank  and  rear, 
426 ;  close  of  the  preliminary  bat 
tle  of  Warren  and  Hill,  427 ;  to 
pography  and  character  of  the 
field,  428  ;  Lee's  demonstration  on 
Union  right,  430 ;  Hancock  drives 
Hill  back,  431 ;  Longstreet  arrives 
and  restores  Hill's  line,  431 ;  Long- 
street's  attack  on  Hancock  inter 
rupted  by  his  fall,  433  ;  Hancock 
again  assaulted  by  troops  of  Long- 
street  and  Hill,  436 ;  cavalry  ac 
tion,  437 ;  the  character  and  re 
sults  of  the  battle  considered,  438 ; 
the  losses  on  each  side,  439. 

Williamsburg,  the  battle  of,  113  ;  Han 
cock's  capture  of  unknown  works 
on  Confederate  left  and  rear,  115; 
battle  of,  Hooker's  losses,  118. 

Williamsport,  Lee's  withdrawal  into 
Virginia  in  front  of  Meade,  369. 

Willoughby's  Run,  battle  of,  330. 

Winchester,  Johnston's  position  and 
force,  45  ;  battle  of,  between  Banks 
and  Jackson,  125 ;  Jackson  de 
feated  by  General  Shields,  92; 
Ewell  ai rives  before,  314 ;  aban 
doned  by  Milroy  after  infamously 
feeble  defence,  318;  entered,  318*; 
occupied  by  Hill,  319  ;  battle  of, 
556  ;  Sheridan's  and  Early 's  dis 
positions,  556 ;  battle  of— strength 


of  the  two  armies,  558 ;  Early  re 
treats  to  Fisher's  Hill  (see  also 
Sheridan),  558. 

Winthrop,  Major,  killed  at  Bethel, 
32. 

Wistar's  raid  to  Bottom's  Bridge,  398. 

Wright,  General,  at  battle  of  Cedar 
Creek,  561 ;  credit  due  to  at  battle 
of  Cedar  Creek,  563. 

Yellow  Tavern,  Sheridan's  victory  at, 
459. 

York  River  Railroad,  supply  line  aban 
doned  by  McClellan,  154. 

York  and  Pamunky  rivers,  McClellan 
en  route  by,  120. 

York  River,  Franklin's  ascension  of,  in 
pursuit  of  Johnston,  117. 

Yorktown,  McClellan 's  advance  arrived 
at,  and  Lee's  Mills,  101 ;  descrip 
tion  and  map  of  Confederate  posi 
tions,  101 ;  McClellan's  plans — the 
navy  and  McDowell  counted  upon, 
but  unavailable,  103  ;  re-enforced 
and  to  be  held  by  Confederates, 
103  ;  the  siege  of  commenced,  106  ; 
Lee's  Mill,  unsuccessful  attempt  to 
break  Confederate  lines,  106  ;  siego 
of,  General  Barry  on — expected  ef 
fects  of  artillery  fire,  107 ;  evacu 
ated  by  the  Confederates,  107  ; 
criticism  upon  McClellan's  opera 
tions,  108  ;  Magruder's  small  force, 
and  McClellan's  delay  of  assault, 
109  ;  arrival  of  part  of  McDowell's 
corps  during  siege,  109 ;  McClel 
lan,  Heintzelman,  and  Barnard'i 
opinion  on  immediate  assault,  110; 
to  the  Chickahominy,  112. 


New  York,  October,  1882.] 


Charles    Scribner's    Sons'    Announcements 

of  New  and   Forthcoming   Books 

for  the   Fall  of  1882. 


Corca,  the  Hermit  Nation. 

By  WILLIAM  ELLIOT  GRIFFIS,  author  of  "  The  Mikado's  Empire,"  and  late- 
of  the  Imperial  University  of  Tokio,  Japan,  i  vol.,  8vo,  with  numerous 
maps  and  illustrations.  $3.50. 

Corea  stands  in  much  the  same  relation  to  the  traveler  that  the  region  of  the 
pole  does  to  the  explorer,  and  menaces  with  the  same  penalty  the  too  inquisitive 
tourist  who  ventures  to  penetrate  its  inhospitable  borders. 

The  object  of  this  volume  is  to  furnish  such  a  hand-book  of  the  history  and 
general  condition  of  Corea,  past  and  present,  as  will  make  it  invaluable  to  the 
general  public,  the  student,  missionary,  literary  and  commercial  people,  and  to 
libraries. 

It  is  the  first  attempt  to  treat  of  Corea  and  the  Coreans  in  a  systematic  and 
serious  manner  Research  has  been  made  in  all  fields,  and  the  history  has  been 
brought  down  to  the  present  time.  The  qualifications  of  the  author  are  well 
known,  and  his  achievements  in  a  kindred  field  attest  his  ability  and  trustworthi 
ness.  The  book  is  enriched  with  very  numerous  maps  and  illustrations  from 
sketches  and  photographs. 

Mr.  Griffis'  book  is  brought  down  to  and  includes  events  of  the  present  year; 
especially  an  account  of  the  recent  revolution  in  Corea,  which  has  drawn  particular 
attention  to  that  country,  and  thus  gives  a  certain  timeliness  to  the  work. 

The  Beginning's  of  History, 

According  to  the  Bible  and  the  Traditions  of  Oriental  Peoples.  From  the 
Creation  of  Man  to  the  Deluge.  By  FRANCOIS  LENORMANT,  Professor  of 
Archaeology  at  the  National  Library  of  France,  etc.,  etc.  (Translated  from 
the  Second  French  Edition).  With  an  introduction  by  FRANCIS  B:<OWN,. 
Associate  Professor  in  Biblical  Philology,  Union  Theological  Seminary,  i 
vol.,  i2mo,  750  pp.  $2.50. 

The  chief  work  of  the  great  archaeologist  of  France  is  now  presented  for  the  first 
time  to  English  Readers  ;  and  though  its  reputation  has  gone  before  it — for  its- 
first  edition  was  exhausted  in  a  fortnight  in  Paris — it  will  be  to  many  a  surprise. 


2  CHARLES  SCRIBNER'S  SONS'  NEW  PUBLICATIONS. 

M.  Lenormant,  in  this  first  installment  of  what  he  means  to  be  the  master-study  of 
his  life,  has  covered  ground  so  much  discussed  and  disputed  that  the  ordinary 
student  may  well  have  shrunk  from  the  mass  of  critical  and  speculative  writing 
already  existing.  Yet  not  only  the  student  but  the  general  reader  will  be  aston 
ished  at  the  clearness  and  succinctness  with  which  the  whole  subject  is  once  for 
all  here  placed  before  him. 

"  What  should  we  see  in  the  first  chapters  of  Genesis  ? "  writes  M.  Lenormant 
in  his  preface — UA  revealed  narrative,  or  a  human  tradition  gathered  up  for  pres 
ervation  by  inspired  writers  as  the  oldest  memory  of  their  race  ?  This  is  the 
problem  which  I  have  been  led  to  examine  by  comparing  the  narrative  of  the 
Bible  with  those  which  were  current  among  the  civilized  peoples  of  most  ancient 
origin  by  which  Israel  was  surrounded,  and  from  the  midst  of  which  it  came." 

The  book  is  not  more  erudite  than  it  is  absorbing  in  its  interest.  With  one  or 
two  other  recent  works,  it  has  had  an  immense  influence  upon  contemporary 
thought  ;  and,  like  them,  it  has  approached  its  task  with  an  unusual  mingling  of 
the  reverent  and  the  scientific  spirit. 

History  of  the  Christian  Church. 

By  PHILIP  SCHAFF,  D.D.     Vol.  I.   Apostolic  Christianity.     8vo.     $4.00. 

The  publication  of  Dr.  Schaffs  History  of  the  Christian  Church  was  begun 
nearly  a  quarter  of  a  century  ago,  but  was  for  many  years  suspended  in  conse 
quence  of  pressing  calls  into  other  fields  of  labor.  The  author  has  now  entered 
upon  its  completion  in  earnest,  and  has  entirely  re-written  and  expanded  the  first 
section  of  the  work.  "  It  is  a  stately  volume  of  nearly  900  pages,  and  is  designed 
as  a  complete  vindication  of  the  Gospels  and  the  Apostolic  Church  against  the 
attacks  of  modern  skepticism.  It  notices  every  important  work  and  enters  into 
all  the  difficulties  connected  with  the  life  of  Christ  and  the  various  books  of  the 
New  Testament,  from  Matthew  to  Revelation." 

Dr.  Ripley,  in  his  review  of  the  earlier  edition  of  this  work,  said,  in  the  New 
York  Tribune  : 

"  In  the  union  of  profound  and  exact  learning  with  the  gift  of  popular  representation,  Dr. 
Schaff  is  almost  without  a  rival  among  modern  ecclesiastical  historians.  In  his  hands  the  history  of 
the  Church  is  not  a  barren  record  of  forgotten  names  and  obsolete  dogmas,  but  an  attractive  j  i  •- 
ture  of  the  intellectual  and  moral  Fife  of  successive  ages.  The  volumes  abound  in  passages  of 
truly  picturesque  effect,  the  ruins  of  antiquity  are  clothed  with  fresh  beauty  find  vigor,  and  the 
centuries  of  the  past  are  shown  in  vital  connection  with  modern  thought  and  cultivation.' 

Swinton's  Army  of  the  Potomac. 

A  critical  History  of  Operations  in  Virginia,  Maryland  and  Pennsylvania, 
from  the  commencement  to  the  close  of  the  wjr,  1861-5.  By  WILLIAM 
SWINTON.  Anew  and  revised  editon,  with  additions.  Steel  plates  and 
maps.  8vo.  $3.00. 

Messrs,  Charles  Scribner's  Sons  have  great  pleasure  in  announcing  the  repub- 
lication — with  revision  and  considerable  additions  by  the  author — of  a  book  which 
will  always  rank  among  the  most  brilliant  and  authoritative  works  in  American 
military  history.  Mr.  Swinton's  Army  of  the  Potomac  has  been  allowed  to  be 


CHARLES  SCRIBNERS  SONS  NEW  PUBLICATIONS.          3 

for  some  time  out  of  print,  though  it  has  been  more  widely  sought  than  ever  by 
those  who  knew  the  reputation  of  this  greatest  contemporary  narrative  of  the  war; 
and  it  is  only  recently  that  it  has  been  possible  for  the  author  to  carry  out  a  long- 
herished  plan  of  re-issuing  the  book  in  a  new  form,  that  places  it  within  the  reach 
of  the  largest  circle  of  readers. 

The  Life  of  Gen.  George  H.  Thomas. 

By  THOMAS  B.  VAN  HORNE,  U.  S.  A.,  author  of  the  "  History  of  the  Army 
of  the  Cumberland."  One  vol.  8vo.,  with  steel  portrait  and  maps.  $3.00. 

It  is  certain  that  no  one  of  our  great  leaders  made  so  deep  a  personal  impres 
sion  on  the  men  who  served  with  and  followed  him,  as  General  Thomas.  To  many 
minds  his  character  makes  him  as  good  a  type  as  we  have  had  of  the  American 
soldier  ;  and  probably  no  one  has  left  behind  him  so  large  a  body  of  men  to  whom 
le  will  always  be  the  leading  figure  of  the  war.  All  of  this  large  circle,  who  knew 
the  confidential  relations,  the  devoted  study,  and  the  authentic  sources  of  informa 
tion  of  which  this  book  is  the  result,  have  long  waited  for  its  appearance,  confident 
that  it  would  be  the  only  adequate  life  of  their  hero. 

Its  readers  will  find  that  it  is  much  more  than  this.  Its  use  of  hitherto  unpub 
lished  material  makes  it  a  book  indispensable  to  the  military  student.  It  is  not 
only  a  remarkable  biography,  but  a  history,  written  under  advantages  open  to  few 
Historians,  of  the  most  important  Campaigns  of  the  West. 

Chaplain  Van  Home  was  specially  authorized  by  General  Thomas  to  write  this 
listory  of  his  life,  and  was  furnished  with  all  the  necessary  materials  for  his  work. 
He  was  also  appointed  by  the  Society  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  to  prepare 
the  biography,  which  thus  has  the  authoritative  sanction  and  approval  of  those 
interested  in  it  and  best  qualified  to  judge  of  its  authenticity  and  value. 

Campaigns  of  the  Civil  War. 

Volume  X.  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA— FRANKLIN  AND 
NASHVILLE.  By  the  HON.  JACOB  D.  Cox,  Ex-Governor  of  Ohio,  late 
Secretary  of  the  Interior  of  the  United  States,  Major- General  U.  S.  V., 
commanding  Twenty-third  Corps,  etc.  i  vol.,  i2mo.  With  maps  and 
plans.  $1.00. 

General  Cox — the  most  competent  as  well  as  the  most  graphic  writer  on  the 
Campaigns  of  Sherman — deals  in  this,  his  second  contribution  to  the  Series,  with 
that  passage  of  the  war  which  has  perhaps  a  more  romantic  and  adventurous  char 
acter  than  any  other, — the  Great  March  "from  Atlanta  to  the  Sea."  The  story  of 
the  expedition  through  the  heart  of  the  Confederacy,  one  of  the  chief  military- 
undertakings  of  modern  times,  is  not  only  told  here  for  the  first  time  adequately,, 
both  to  the  military  student  and  the  general  reader ;  but  the  allied  operations  of 
General  Sherman's  plans  are  described — the  operations  in  Tennessee,  by  which  the 
Confederate  armies  were  kept  from  pursuit  and  beaten  back.  The  volume  carries 
the  narrative  on  through  the  Carolinas,  so  that  it  brings  the  Campaigns  of  Sherman 
to  their  end  in  the  surrender  of  Johnston  ;  and  the  story  of  one  great  portion  of 
the  war  is  finished. 

The  next  volume  of  this  series  will  be  Lieutenant  F.  V.  Greene's  Mississippi. 


4  CHARLES  SCRIBNERS  SONS'  NEW  PUBLICATIONS, 

An  account  of  the  operations  especially  at  Vicksburg  and  Port  Hudson — by  which 
the  Mississippi  river  and  its  shores  were  restored  to  the  control  of  the  Union.  The 
author  of  Army  Life  in  Russia  will  add  to  his  reputation  as  a  skillful  critic  of 
military  movements  by  this  volume. 

Criteria  of  Diverse  Kinds  of  Truth. 

As  opposed  to  Agnosticism.  Being  a  Treatise  of  applied  Logic.  (Philo 
sophic  Series  No.  i.)  By  JAMES  McCosH,  D.D.,  LL.D.,  D.L.  Author  of 
"Intuitions  of  the  Mind,"  "  Laws  of  Discursive  Thought,"  etc.  i  vol., 
paper.  50  cents. 

"  The  aim  of  this  work  is  to  show  that  there  is  truth,  that  truth  can  be  found, 
that  there  are  tests  by  which  we  may  determine  it  when  found.  The  work  is 
divided  into  two  parts  ;  one,  in  which  we  seek  to  find  the  Criteria  of  First  Princi 
ples,  and  in  the  other,  the  Criteria  of  the  Laws  of  Individual  facts." — From  the 
Preface. 

This  is  the  first  of  a  series  which  will  be  published  quarterly,  in  small  volumes 
of  about  sixty  pages  each,  in  stout  paper  covers,  at  fifty  cents  per  volume,  each 
embracing  an  exposition  complete  in  itself  of  one  theme. 

Dr.  McCosh,  introducing  the  series,  says  :  "  For  the  past  thirty  years  I  have  been  taking  my 
part  in  the  philosophic  discussions  of  the  age.  I  have  a  few  things  yet  to  say  before  I  willingly 
leave  the  arena.  These  have  long  occupied  my  thoughts,  and  they  relate  to  thrilling  topics  of  the 
day,  on  which  many  are  anxious  to  have  a  light  thrown.  In  order  to  bring  my  views  before  the 

thinking  public,  I  start  a  Philosophic  Series  to  consist  of  small  volumes which  can  be  read  in 

a  few  hours,  intended  to  give  assurance  to  thinking  minds,  especially  young  men,  in  this  age  of 
unsettled  opinion." 

Science  and  Sentiment. 

Essays  Chiefly  Philosophical.  By  NOAH  PORTER,  D.D.,  LL.D.  i  vol., 
crown  8vo.  $2.50. 

President  Porter's  high  attainments  as  a  metaphysician,  and  his  fine  literary 
sense,  give  to  the  occasional  productions  of  his  pen  a  more  than  ephemeral  value. 
These  essays  on  living  themes  of  philosophy,  or  concerning  philosophical  leaders, 
embrace  a  summary  of  the  teachings  of  the  prevailing  schools  of  philosophy  and  a 
criticism  of  their  pretensions.  The  style  and  form  of  thought  is  popular,  and  at 
the  same  time  scientific,  free  from  all  merely  scholastic  and  technical  phrase 
ology,  but  worthy  of  the  most  careful  attention  on  the  part  of  the  reader. 

The  Irish  Question. 

BY  PROFESSOR  DAVID  BENNETT  KING,  of  Lafayette  College,   i  vol.  $i    50 

Professor  King  has  gained  a  high  reputation  as  an  authority  upon  all  phases 
of  the  Irish  Question,  not  only  by  the  careful  study  which  he  has  given  to  it,  but  also 
on  account  of  ihe  peculiar  and  unusual  facilities  which  he  has  enjoyed  for  arriving 
at  the  facts  of  this  perplexing  subject. 

He  has  spent  the  last  two  summers  in  Ireland,  seeing  for  himself  the  actual 
state  of  things  in  all  parts  of  the  island,  and  conferring  with  the  Irish  leaders  and 
with  the  English  statesmen  who  are  most  actively  concerned  in  the  management  or 
discussion  of  Irish  affairs.  His  knowledge  being  thus  obtained  at  first  hand,  will 


CHARLES  SCRIBNER'S  SONS'  NEW  PUBLICATIONS. 


give  his  book  a  wide  influence  and  usefulness  in  opening  the  eyes  of  outsiders  to 
the  actual  condition  of  Ireland  and  its  relations  with  England. 

Logic  and  Life,  with  Other  Sermons. 

By  REV.  H.  S.  HOLLAND,  M.A.,  Senior  Student  of  Christ  Church,  Oxford, 
With  an  Introductory  Notice  by  President  NOAH  PORTER,  i  vol.,  i2mo. 
$'.50. 

President  Porter  introduces  these  sermons  to  the  American  public  in  these 
words  :  "  The  casual  reader  of  this  volume,  however  carelessly  he  may  turn  its 
leaves,  can  scarcely  fail  to  find  his  attention  arrested  by  many  passages  which  are 
striking  for  fervid  eloquence  and  weighty  and  profound  reflection.  Should  he  be 
led  by  the  promise  of  its  title,  to  select  here  and  there  a  single  discourse  for  a 
more  careful  perusal,  he  will  find  not  a  few  that  are  alike  remarkable  for  origi- 
lality  of  thought  and  eloquence  of  speech." 

The  book  has  been  received  with  extraordinary  favor  in  England.  The  Lon- 
ion  Spectator  says  : 

"  Some  of  the  Sermons  in  this  volume  are  as  powerful  as  any  preached  in  this  generation, 
md,  indeed,  full  of  genius,  original  thought  and  spiritual  vivacity. 

Of  the  first  three  it  would  be  hard  to  speak  in  terms  too  high  ;  they  show  something  of  the 
painstaking  originality,  the  careful  searchingness,  the  candid  courage  of  Bishop  Butler,  though 
:lothed  in  an  oratory  of  higher  force  than  anything  which  was  at  all  in  Bishop  Butler's  way.  .  . 
lr.  Holland  combines  with  an  oratorical  power  which  sometimes  runs  away  with  him,  and  dif- 
uses  itself  like  a  flood  till  the  mind  is  almost  overpowered  by  the  wealth  of  his  accumulated  illus- 
ration,  very  nearly  as  careful  and  precise  an  appreciation  of  the  ins  and  outs  of  the  question  with 
hich  he  is  dealing,  the  qualifications  of  a  truth,  the  set-offs  against  an  argument,  the  difficulties 
n  a  true  position,  the  plausibilities  in  a  false  one,  as  the  great  bishop  himself  could  have  dis- 
layed  " 

tibliotheca  Theologica. 

By  Rev.  JOHN  F.  HURST,  D.D.     i  vol.     $3.50. 

This  work  is  designed  for  the  minister  of  the  Gospel,  the  theological  student, 
he  teacher  of  advanced  Bible  classes,  and  the  general  reader  of  religious  litera- 
ure,  as  a  guide  to  the  better  sources  in  all  departments  of  theological  science.  It 
s  adapted  to  the  wants  of  British  and  American  readers,  and  contains  mainly  the 
itles  of  books  accessible  in  the  markets  of  this  country  and  Great  Britain. 

few  Edition  of  the  Works  of  the  Late  George  P. 
Marsh. 

LECTURES  ON  THE  ENGLISH  LANGUAGE. 

THE  ORIGIN  AND  HISTORY  OF  THE  ENGLISH    LANGUAGE, 
AND  OF  THE  EARLY  LITERATURE  IT  EMBODIES. 

THE  EARTH  AS  MODIFIED  BY  HUMAN    ACTION.     A  new  edi 
tion  of  "  Man  and  Nature." 

Each  i  vol.,  crown  8vo.  Price  reduced  to  $2.00.  The  three  volumes  in 
sets,  $5.00. 


6  CHARLES  SCRIBNER'S  SONS'  NEW  PUBLICATIONS. 

The  writings  of  Mr.  Marsh  display  a  generous  and  careful  culture,  a  wid< 
range  of  study  and  accurate  scholarship. 

With  real  genius  for  the  acquisition  of  languages,  he  was  the  first  Americar 
philologist  to  obtain  a  European  reputation,  and  his  lectures  on  the  English  Ian 
guage  and  literature  are  veritable  classics  ;  they  are  used  even  more  extensively  ir 
England  than  in  this  country. 

His  Earth  as  Modified  by  Human  Action  is  the  most  comprehensive  and  valua 
ble  work  of  its  special  class  in  existence,  and,  like  his  linguistic  writings,  it  is  ad 
dressed,  not  to  professional  readers,  "  but  to  the  general  intelligence  of  educated 
observing  and  thinking  men." 

Moravian  Missions. 

By  REV.  A.  C.  THOMPSON,  D.D.     i  vol.     $1.50. 

These  lectures  open  with  a  history  of  the  Moravians,  both  the  ancient  anc 
the  modern  church,  and  an  account  of  the  life  and  labors  of  Count  Zinzendorf 
The  author  then  proceeds  to  the  special  history  of  the  Moravian  Missions  in  th< 
West  Indies,  in  Central  and  South  America,  in  Greenland,  in  Labrador,  among  th< 
Indians  and  elsewhere.  This  is  the  first  thorough  and  comprehensive  account  o: 
the  Moravians  and  their  missions  that  has  appeared  in  English.  It  has  passec 
under  the  eye  of  Bishop  De  Schweinitz,  the  ablest  writer  of  the  Moravian  church 
and  is  in  every  respect  a  trustworthy  and  interesting  history  of  the  pioneer  mis 
sions  of  the  Protestant  church. 

Helen  of  Troy. 

By  ANDREW  LANG,     i  vol.,  i6mo.     $1.50. 

Mr.  Lang's  poem,  which  shows  great  originality  of  conception  and  delicaq 
of  expression,  is  one  of  the  most  beautiful  and  charming  creations  that  have  ap 
peared  for  years.  It  idealizes  the  beautiful  heroine  of  the  Trojan  war,  working 
out  the  Greek  conception  of  her  subordination  to  divine  influences,  and 'her  owr 
purity  and  irresponsibility. 

Poems  of  American  Patriotism. 

Chosen  by  J.  BRANDER  MATTHEWS,  i  vol..  i6mo.  (In  Press.) 
It  will  be  a  surprise  to  many  who  turn  over  the  pages  of  this  collection  tc 
find  not  only  that  almost  every  stirring  event  of  our  history  has  its  poem,  but  thai 
almost^every  one  of  our  true  poets  has  written— generally  more  than  once— or 
patriotic  themes.  Those  poems  given  here  are  arranged  chronologically,  in  the 
order  of  the  events  they  celebrate. 

Idyls  of  Norway  and  Other  Poems. 

By  HJALMAR  HJORTH  BOYESEN.     i  vol.,  i6mo.     $1.25. 

Professor  Boyesen  has  from  time  to  time  given  evidence  of  a  high  degree  ol 
poetical  ability  in  his  occasional  contributions  to  the  magazines  and  other  periodi 
cals.  These  poems  are  now  collected  for  the  first  time  into  a  volume,  which  call- 
not  but  enlarge  his  reputation  as  an  imaginative  and  graceful  writer. 


CHARLES  SCRIBNERS  SONS'  NEW  PUBLICATIONS. 


The  Land  of  the  Arabian  Nig-hts. 

Being  Travels  through  Egypt,  Arabia  and  Persia,  to  Bagdad.  By  WILLIAM 
PERRY  FOGG.  With  an  Introduction  by  BAYARD  TAYLOR.  A  new  edition 
with  nearly  100  illustrations,  i  vol.,  8vo.  $2.00. 

Mr.  Fogg  was  nearly  the  first  American  to  penetrate  to  the  oriental  strong 
holds  in  Arabia  and  Persia,  and  even  at  the  present  day  it  is  only  the  more  hardy 
and  adventurous  traveler  who  makes  his  way  into  regions  so  far  from  the  beaten 
track  of  the  tourist.  The  work  is  consequently  fresh  and  interesting,  though 
several  years  have  elapsed  since  the  journey  was  made.  The  lively  and  enthusi 
astic  narrative  carries  the  reader  into  the  most  romantic  regions,  the  home  of  the 
gorgeous  scenery  of  the  Arabian  Nights,  where  nearly  all  the  conditions  of  mod 
ern  civilized  life  seem  reversed.  It  is  the  true  traveler's  tale,  and  in  every  way  an 
attractive  and  readable  book. 

Edward  the  Third. 

By  Rev.  W.  WARBURTON,  M.A.  With  three  Maps  and  two  Genealogical 
Tables  (Epochs  of  Modern  History),  i  vol.,  i2mo.  $1.00. 

The  history  of  the  age  of  the  Black  Prince,  Chaucer,  Froissart,  the  Jacquerie, 
he  Black  Death,  Crecy  and  Poitiers  is  necessarily  an  interesting  one,  and  Mr. 
\Varburton  carries  us  through  this  period  with  the  skill  and  special  knowledge  of 
in  expert.  The  volume  is  a  worthy  companion  to  those  of  the  series  which  have 
preceded  it  which  is  sufficient  recommendation. 

Other  Volumes  of  the  Epochs  of  Modern  History  Series. 


The  Beginning  of  the  Middle  Ages. 

The  Normans  in  Europe. 

The  Crusades. 

Phe  Early  Plantagenets. 

rhe  Houses  of  Lancaster  and  York. 

rhe  Era  of  the  Protestant  Revolution. 

The  Age  of  Elizabeth. 


The  Thirty  Years'  War. 

The  Puritan  Revolution. 

The  Fall  of  the  Stuarts. 

Age  of  Anne. 

Frederick  the  Great. 

The  French  Revolution  and  First  Empire, 

The  Epoch  of  Reform,  1830-1850. 


Each  i  vol.,  i2ino,  with  Maps  and  Plans.     $1.00. 

Cupid,  M,D. ;  A  Story. 

By  AUGUSTUS  M.  SWIFT,     i  vol.,  i2mo.     $1.00. 

This  book  is  likely  to  attract  attention  strongly  to  its  author. 

Not  only  is  there  originality  in  the  plot  of  Mr.  Swift's  story,  but  a  new  writer 
very  unusual  powers  is  revealed  in  the  rare  combination  of  lightness  and 
trength  which  this  plot  calls  for.  It  is  not  often  that  the  same  hand  can  sketch 
vith  the  piquancy  and  charming  naturalness  of  the  lighter  side  of  this  love-story, 
ind  can  draw  with  such  power  as  is  used  in  the  description  of  Blake's  Struggle 
vith  Opium. 

It  is  safe  to  prophesy  a  very  unusual  success  for  the  book,  if  only  from 
uriosity  as  to  its  striking  plot ;  but  it  will  have  an  importance  beyond  this  in 
ecuring  the  immediate  recognition  of  a  very  noteworthy  new  pen  in  American 
iction. 


THE  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR. 

The  approval  given  by  the  press  to  this  Series  has  been  emphatic  and  unanimo 
1  he   even  more    important  popular    verdict    is    best    shown    in    the   fact   that    when   1 

r\i  i  V\  1  -i  r+  -*  4-  •? «-» «       -«i-»      V**<»4-      1<4.4.1«       .— .-  *.!.  1_        1  *• 

-lore  than  half  completed,  the  volumes  have 


FORTHCOMING  VOLUMES. 

VIII  -The  Mississippi.     By  F.  V.  GREENE,  Lieut,  of  Engineers    USA™ 

ate    M.l.tary  Attach*   to   the    United   States    Legation  at    St.    Peter!  "™     Author  '  of  ^ 
Russian  Army  and  Us  Campaigns  in  Turkey  in  l8^-'78,  and  of  "Army  Life'in  RtlssL." 

rT        Shenandoah  Valley.     (The  Campaign  of  Sheridan.)     Bv   GEOR 
L.  POND,  Assoaate  Editor  of  "The  Army  and  Navy  Journal,"  etc 

P*"?^8?,8  of  Grant  in  Virginia.     By  ANDREW  A.  HUMPHRY 

co^ 


VOLUMES  OF  THE  SERIES  ALREADY  PUBLISHED 


II.-  From  Fort  Henry  to  Corinth.     By  the  Hon.  M.  F.  FORCE,  Brig.-G 

TTT       -£  Bvt,DMTr-Gen  '  b'  S'  V"  etc-  ;  Treas«r"  of  ^  Society  of  the  Army  of  Tennessee 

The   Peninsula.      By  ALEXANDER  S.  WEBB,   Bvt.   Major-Gen'l  U.  S 

' 


.  ,         .  - 

Wy'          '  "'  ""  P°'°maC'  '86l-'62;  afterWa"1  CUef  °f 

By  JOHN  c  ROPES'  Es<1-'  of  the  Millt    Hi 


•  By  ABNER  DOUBLEDAY'  Bvt- 


US   vAr          Cumberland-     By  HENRY  M.   CIST,  Bvt.   Bri?,Gen 
•Thn  u        .          ft    '?e   staff  of  Major-Gen'l  Rosecrans  and   the    staff  of  MaTor-Gei 

homas;  Secretary  of  the  Society  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland. 

IX.—  Atlanta.     By  the  Hon.  JACOB  D.  Cox,  Ex-Governor  of  Ohio,  late  Secretary  o 

V       ^      ™°r     u  ed  S'ateS  ;  M«J^Ge»'1  U'  S-  V.,  commanding  Twenty.thTrd  Tco^el 

D   cof  Fr°r    t0  th£  -Sea—  Franklin  and  Nashville.    By  the  Hon.  JA! 

Interior  of  the  United  State"  M 


Each  1  vol.,  12mo,  with  Maps  and  Plans,  $1.OO, 

SPECIAL    ANNOUNCEMENT. 

l^e  namreo^thl  source,s'  .f^   ^^    FREDERICK    PHISTERER,   late    Captafn    U.    S.   Army. 


0n°!°S1tc|f1  hst  of  al)  engagements,  with  the  losses  in  each;  tabulated  state-all 

The  vo  n  K  W-        ^  CaUS6S  °f  -^eath'  ^'  >  and  ful1  lists  of  a11  generi  officers. 

ie  volume  will  be  in  all  respects  uniform  with  others  of  the  series. 

CHARLES  SCRIBNER'S  SONS,  Publishers,  743  &  745  Broadway,  New-York. 


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